Ugandan choir students rehearse at the St. Theresa Secondary School in Lira, Uganda, 23 February 2009. The school’s previous location in the nearby village of Alanyi had been attacked by the LRA in late 2002, resulting in the killing, abduction, and displacement of many innocent civilians.
In Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) partnered with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN peacekeepers, and African military forces to end the violent threat of Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in central Africa. Key to mission success were U.S. Army psychological operations (PSYOP) efforts encouraging LRA members to defect. This campaign helped reduce the LRA from several hundred fighters when the operation started in October 2011, to less than one hundred when U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) ended it in April 2017. An operational success, OBSERVANT COMPASS showcased the unique capabilities of the PSYOP Regiment.

This preface explains the emergence of Kony and the LRA, providing historical context for the next article about the PSYOP role in OBSERVANT COMPASS. The roots of the LRA problem dated to post-colonial Uganda, following that nation’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1962. The new nation’s first head-of-state, Milton Obote, served as Prime Minister and President until 1971. He was overthrown by Ugandan Army General Idi Amin, which led to years of despotic rule, economic ruin, and human rights abuses.1

Idi Amin’s rule came at great cost to Uganda. During the 1970s, the self-proclaimed President for Life grew increasingly repressive against minorities and political opponents. Relations with the West soured as Amin warmed up to countries like the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Libya. As the Ugandan economy crumbled, he became expansionist, claiming parts of Kenya and invading Tanzania. In response, Tanzania, bolstered

1: Ugandan President Milton Obote on 22 October 1962 at the White House, shortly after his nation’s independence.
2: Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.
3: Ugandan President Tito Okello.
4: Three years after his rebels defeated the military regime and he ascended to power, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni arrives at Andrews Air Force Base, MD, on 29 January 1989, to visit with U.S. President George H.W. Bush.
Lucy Lamara is typical of LRA victims. In 2003, an LRA soldier shot her through the mouth, causing her to lose an eye. Her wounds still cause bleeding and headaches.

This leaflet advertising the U.S. State Department War Crimes Rewards Program highlights the three LRA leaders indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2005: Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen.

by the anti-Amin Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF)/Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), invaded Uganda in 1979, forcing Amin to flee the country. After elections, Milton Obote returned as President, with the UNLA as the military arm of the government.

Obote could not establish stability. He was deposed again in 1985 by another general, Tito Okello, but not before a bloody insurgency began against the UNLA. From 1981 to 1986, the Ugandan Bush War raged between the northern-based, Acholi-dominated government, and the southern-based, non-Acholi National Resistance Army (NRA), led by Yoweri Museveni. The death toll reached hundreds of thousands. Once the NRA defeated the UNLA, Museveni became President on 29 January 1986. Acholi-led rebel groups, namely the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), opposed the NRA, but were defeated. From these conflicts emerged a 25-year-old Acholi named Joseph Kony.

Kony’s past gave no hint of the monster he later became. Born in 1961 to Christian parents, Kony had a modest upbringing in the northern village of Odek. He abandoned school in the late 1970s to become a healer. After the Ugandan Bush War, Kony mourned the defeat of the HSM, led by his relative Alice Lakwena. Kony declared himself a prophet to the former rebels, and a deliverer of the Acholi people. In 1987, he formed the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from the remnants of the HSM, to force a return to Uganda’s previous political structure, incorporating mysticism and Acholi nationalism into his message. Claiming access to spirits, Kony inspired his followers to view him as a messiah, while others feared his supposed power to curse them. The LRA leader used his occult influence to consolidate power and exact extreme violence on Ugandans.

As one congressional research study argues, the LRA did ‘not have a clear . . . agenda, and its operations appear[ed] to be motivated by little more than the infliction of violence and the protection of senior leaders.’ Kony ordered the LRA to attack and destroy villages, and torture, mutilate, and execute civilians. They abducted children to serve as porters, soldiers, and ‘bush-wives.’ One NGO, The Enough Project, estimated LRA abductions at nearly 70,000 people (30,000 children) over thirty years. Among those brutalized were the Acholi, whom Kony distrusted since Museveni started recruiting them into the military after assuming power. In the 1990s, the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) began attacking the LRA. This set a pattern of direct military engagement, followed by LRA soldiers scattering and causing violence elsewhere.

While the LRA was widely dismissed as a ‘Ugandan problem’, bordering nations were taking notice, and...
After intense activism and lobbying, NGO representatives were invited to witness President Obama signing the “LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009” in the Oval Office, 24 May 2010.

began guarding against it, among other regional threats. For example, in 1999, the UN Security Council created the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in response to the seemingly unrelated Second Congo War.11 This UN peacekeeping force, later re-designated MONUSCO, was headquartered in Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While the LRA was not MONUSCO’s first priority, peacekeepers located in the eastern part of that country formed a bulwark against the LRA in hopes of keeping them from coming in from Uganda.12

Continued LRA atrocities led the Ugandan government in 2005 to press the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands, to issue arrest warrants for Kony, Major General Okot Odhiambo, and Brigadier General Dominic Ongwen, for crimes against humanity. This raised the stakes for their capture, but failed to yield quick results.13 A glimmer of hope arose in 2006 when the UPDF pushed the LRA out of Uganda, and ceasefire talks began in Juba, the future capital of South Sudan. However, these negotiations foundered after two years. The LRA dispersed into Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic, and resumed atrocities.14 With the LRA operating in four states and a roughly 164,000 square-mile area (about the size of California), it had become a regional problem.15

Heightened global awareness of the LRA led to U.S. involvement. In 2008, the State and Treasury Departments designated Kony a terrorist, and the U.S. began logistical support to UPDF-led counter-LRA operations, called LIGHTNING THUNDER.16 Meanwhile, U.S.-based NGOs lobbied to raise policy-makers’ interest in the LRA. Chief among these was Invisible Children, founded in 2004 “to end Africa’s longest running conflict led by Joseph Kony and [the LRA].”17 Their activism soon paid off.

In 2009, the U.S. Congress passed the “Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act,” with 201 co-sponsors in the House of Representatives, and 64 in the Senate.18 President Barack H. Obama, who viewed Uganda as a key partner against terrorism in the region, signed it into law on 24 May 2010 (Public Law 111-172).19 The act committed to “increased, comprehensive U.S. efforts to help mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA to civilians and regional stability.”20 Its chief aim was “an end to the brutality and destruction that have been a hallmark of the LRA across several countries for two decades.”21 While the act did not directly authorize military action, it had another outcome.

Six months after signing the law, Obama presented his follow-on “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army” to the U.S. Congress.22 This “Strategy” consisted of four pillars:

1. Protect civilians
2. Remove Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders from the battlefield
3. Promote defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of LRA fighters
4. Support and provide humanitarian assistance to affected areas

Though the “Strategy” did not authorize military action either, it provided the core objectives for future operations.

Obama took one final step before deploying soldiers to aid the fight against Kony. In August 2011, he declared atrocity prevention a “core national security interest and . . . moral responsibility” of the U.S.24 Naturally, this applied to the LRA. Between general anti-Kony
sentiment, Public Law 111–172, the November 2010 “Strategy,” and the formal declaration against atrocities, Obama had ample justification for direct U.S. military involvement. On 14 October 2011, the President informed U.S. Congress that he authorized deployment of the first combat-equipped U.S. soldiers to central Africa, with additional soldiers slated to arrive the following month. Obama set the force cap at 100, since their role was advisory only.25

Named OBSERVANT COMPASS, the mission’s broad objectives were the same as the November 2010 “Strategy.” The lead headquarters was the USAFRICOM Counter-LRA Control Element (ACCE [pronounced ace]), in Entebbe, Uganda. Colonel (COL) Russell A. Crane, 19th Special Forces Group (SFG), commanded both the ACCE and Special Operations Command and Control Element — Horn of Africa (SOCCE-HOA), at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.26 The ACCE reported to Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA), in Stuttgart, Germany, commanded by Rear Admiral (RADM) Brian L. Losey, a U.S. Navy SEAL.27 As explained in the next article, Losey soon applied a ‘whole of SOCAF’ approach against Kony.

Nesting the counter-LRA mission within broader theater priorities was USAFRICOM, also located in Stuttgart.28 The Commander, USAFRICOM, U.S. Army General (GEN) Carter F. Ham, argued that OBSERVANT COMPASS was “best done through support, advising, and assistance, rather than U.S. military personnel in the lead . . . conducting the operations to try to find Kony and capture him. We are an enabling force to facilitate and advance the capabilities of the African forces.”29 Importantly, on 7 December 2011, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, clarified that “this is not an open-ended commitment; we will regularly review and assess whether the advisory effect is sufficiently enhancing our objectives to justify continued deployment.”30

“...this is not an open-ended commitment; we will regularly review and assess whether the advisory effect is sufficiently enhancing our objectives to justify continued deployment.”

— Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
The ACCE initially treated OBSERVANT COMPASS as a typical Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission. U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) soldiers, initially from 10th and 19th SFGs, were to train the UPDF in Entebbe, Uganda; the Central African Armed Forces in Djema and Obo, Central African Republic; MONUSCO and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Dungu, Democratic Republic of the Congo; and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Nzara, South Sudan. SF soldiers could not conduct combat operations against the LRA, and weapons were only authorized for self-defense. In addition to the size and complexity of the forested operational area, a key challenge was training the same African and UN forces that had thus far been unable to defeat the LRA.

OBSERVANT COMPASS required a creative approach beyond SF providing marksmanship and small unit tactics training to partner forces, MONUSCO, and the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF). Interagency cooperation within the LRA-affected countries was essential. On an official level, the ACCE dealt with the U.S. Agency for International Development...
Counter-LRA Organizations

**United States**
- U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)
- Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA)
- AFRICOM Counter-LRA Control Element (ACCE)
- U.S. State Department/U.S. Embassies
- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

**African**
- African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF)
- Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF)
- Central African Armed Forces (FACA)
- Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC)
- Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)

**United Nations**
- UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
- UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

**Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)**
- Invisible Children
- The Resolve Crisis LRA Initiative
- The Enough Project
- The Voice Project

*This list represents the ‘key players’ through early 2012, but is not exhaustive.*

(UUSAID), the U.S. Embassies, and the State Department Field Representative, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, Jason Lewis-Berry. As the bureau’s stabilization advisor specializing in the LRA, Lewis-Berry also connected the ACCE with various NGOs in the region, including The Voice Project and Invisible Children.

NGOs had demonstrated that there was more to the fight against Kony than ‘kinetic’ operations. In 2010, Invisible Children launched its Early Warning Network (EWN) of “high-frequency (HF), two-way, long-range radios.” The EWN allowed African communities to report violent activity to one another, to humanitarian organizations, and to security forces, improving those units’ response times to LRA attacks. The following year, Invisible Children partnered with the Washington, DC-based Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative to create the LRA Crisis Tracker, a “publicly accessible mapping tool that display[ed] up-to-date armed group activity data in an interactive format.” This site displayed individual LRA attacks, and collated data to show violent trends.

These two examples demonstrated the unique contributions being made by NGOs against Kony and the LRA.

Together, NGOs, the ACCE, other U.S. agencies, MONUSCO, African military forces, and the AU-RTF, became critical strands in a larger counter-LRA ‘web’. According to one State Department counter-LRA specialist, this collaborative approach “built unique partnerships among civil society leaders, communities, NGOs, and UN missions.” He added that “most LRA members did not choose to be in the LRA, and remain[ed] with them only because they fear[ed] retribution by Kony.” Finally, he argued that encouraging defections would weaken the LRA, and increase fighters’ chances of getting home safely. From this statement, U.S. Army Psychological Operations clearly had a role to play in OBSERVANT COMPASS.

Having provided the historical context behind Kony, the LRA, and Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS, the story now turns to early PSYOP efforts. The following article describes how SOCAFRICA arranged the deployment...
of the two-man MISO Support Element – Uganda (MSE-UG) to central Africa in January 2012. It then details how MSE-UG partnered with many organizations countering Kony, and went on the offensive by chipping away at LRA membership through defections.

Takeaways:
1 After the bloody Ugandan Bush War, Joseph Kony founded the LRA and used it to inflict extreme violence on innocent Ugandans
2 The LRA became a regional threat by spreading violence into countries neighboring Uganda, increasing outside involvement
3 ‘Kinetic’ military operations had proven unable to defeat Kony; NGOs demonstrated that creative solutions were needed to weaken the LRA

Endnotes
2 “U.S. Relations with Uganda”; “Uganda Profile – Timeline.”
10 “U.S. Deployment in Counter-LRA Operations.” For more on Ugandan counter-LRA measures, to include offensive military operations, amnesty and reintegration programs, and direct negotiations, see Easter, “Bending the Spear,” 21-31.

Available on www.crisistracker.org, the interactive LRA Crisis Tracker allows users to view LRA activity over time using selected parameters. This screenshot shows all LRA incidents from January through June 2012.


15 Easter, “Bending the Spear,” 3.


21 “Fact Sheet: Mitigating and Eliminating,” 23 April 2012.


26 West Virginia National Guard, “Brigadier General Russell Crane,” no date, online at https://www.wvng.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Bio-Article-View/Article/1541379/brigadier-general-russell-crane/; SOCCE-HOA was a subordinate command of Combined-Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which had the following mission: “in partnership with our joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, conducts theater security cooperation activities and enables regional actors to neutralize violent extremist organizations.” On order, CJTF-HOA will execute crisis response within East Africa to protect and defend U.S. military, diplomatic and civilian personnel, facilities, and interests.” Its area of responsibility included Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda, though its interests lay beyond that in the central African region.

27 RIST-HOA to 7th POB, “SUBJECT: RIST-HOA PMT DAILY SITREP: 312200MAR13(2) to 012200APR13(2),” 1 April 2013, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The SOCAFRICA mission was as follows: “Leads, plans, coordinates, and as directed executes the full spectrum of special operations in [USAFRICOM’s] AOR as part of an integrated theater strategy to combat terrorism and advance [USAFRICOM’s] strategic objectives.”

28 RMT-UG, “RMT-UG Mission Concept Brief,” 4 April 2013, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter “RMT-UG Mission Concept Brief,” 4 April 2013. The USAFRICOM mission was as follows: “protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.”

29 SOCAFRICA Briefing, June 2014. For doubts about UPDF and other African forces’ commitment and ability to defeat the LRA, see “The U.S. Response” (2015), Summary, 10, 18-19.

30 SOCAFRICA, “MOD 001 TO CDRSOCAFRICA OPERATION OBSERVANT COMPASS OPORD,” 27 January 2012, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.


32 For doubts about UPDF and other African forces’ commitment and ability to defeat the LRA, see “The U.S. Response” (2015), Summary, 10, 18-19.

33 LRA Crisis Tracker, “Surge in AU RTF Counter-LRA Operations,” accessed online at https://reports.lracrisistracker.com/en/q3-2013/au-rtf-counter-lra-operations/. Created in 2012, the AU-RTF was authorized 5,000 soldiers from Uganda, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Central African Republic, and its mission was to protect civilians and capture LRA leaders.

34 SOCAFRICA Briefing, June 2014.

35 SOCAFRICA, Briefings, June 2014; U.S. Department of State, “Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations,” no date, accessed online at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/bureaus/offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-conflict-and-stabilization-operations/. A subordinate bureau under the State Department, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations mission “is to anticipate, prevent, and respond to conflict that undermines U.S. national interests. The bureau implements this mission in two complementary ways: through data-driven analysis and forward deploying stabilization advisors to conflict zones. The objective is to inform U.S. strategy, policy, and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization.” Lewis-Berry was the stabilization advisor for the LRA.

36 Invisible Children, “Early Warning Radio Network,” no date, accessed online at https://invisiblechildren.com/program/early-warning-network/. By early 2018, the EWN had expanded to 74 HF radios and 30 satellite phones supporting around 80 communities and 300,000 people.


38 SOCAFRICA, Briefing, June 2014. The State Department official quoted here was Jon Gandomi, Jason Lewis-Berry’s successor as of June 2012.