Kreuzotters

on the Loose

by Jared M. Tracy

The 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 1951-1952
October 1951, the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, Seventh U.S. Army’s tactical psychological warfare (Psywar) asset in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was in the throes of a major training exercise called COMBINE. The company’s primary mission was printing leaflets for Aggressor, U.S. units role-playing as opposition forces. One style of leaflet warned ‘U.S. forces’ of the Kreuzotter, “Germany’s only poisonous snake.” Stars and Stripes reported, “Enemy’ aircraft showered propaganda leaflets by the thousands on Allied troops, one leaflet warning that the Allies were fighting in areas infested by poisonous snakes.”

In fact, the Kreuzotter was fake. Radio repairman Private First Class (PFC) James M. Niefer later described the impact of the leaflet. “Rumor had it that the guys were really scared about it and they wouldn’t sleep on the ground. They slept in their vehicles because they were afraid the snakes would crawl into their sleeping bags.” The snake hampered the exercise so much that German newspapers had to assure American units that it did not exist.

The Kreuzotter leaflet was one original product developed by the 5th L&L after it deployed to Böblingen, FRG, in 1951 to provide Seventh Army with a tactical Psywar capability.

This article chronicles the first two years of the 5th L&L, one of only a handful of tactical Psywar units that the U.S. Army established, trained, and deployed during the first few years of the Cold War. The 5th was part of the Army’s larger effort to create a viable Psywar capability following North Korea’s 25 June 1950 invasion of its southern neighbor. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., U.S. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins, and Department of the Army (DA) G-3 Major General Charles L. Bolte directed Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure to lead that initiative.

Having served as Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force during WWII, BG McClure was the ideal officer for this task. In August 1950, he reported to the Pentagon (initially for temporary duty [TDY]) “in connection with planning for Psychological Warfare.” As a result of the general’s efforts, within six months the Army established three organizations to facilitate the activation, training, resourcing, and deployment of Psywar units. These organizations were the Psywar Division in the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas (1950-1951), and the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) in the Pentagon (January 1951).

As the head of the OCPW, McClure’s priority was providing trained and equipped Psywar units to theater and field army commanders faced with the Communist threat in Europe and the Far East. For that purpose, by spring 1951 the Army had activated the tactical 1st, 2nd, and 5th L&L Companies and the strategic 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group. It also federalized the reserve strategic 301st RB&L Group. Contemporary doctrine allotted each field army one L&L Company and each theater command one RB&L Group. Accordingly, the 1st L&L supported the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, the 1st RB&L supported the Far East Command (FEC) and the United Nations Command in Korea, and the 301st RB&L supported the European Command (EUCOM) in the FRG. (The 2nd L&L stayed in the U.S. to serve as Army Field Forces’ training element.) In September 1951, the 5th L&L deployed as a tactical asset for Seventh Army, the largest Army combat formation in Europe.

The 5th L&L was activated on 19 March 1951 at Fort Riley, Kansas, as part of the Army General School. Essentially a unit on paper only, the 5th L&L started with just a handful...
of people who had transferred from the 1st RB&L and 2nd L&L (also assigned to the School). The commander, First Lieutenant (1LT) William J. Brennan, and his assistant, 1LT John E. Eckenrode, Jr. (formerly of the 1st RB&L), began building a training program for the fledgling company. On 26 April, when New York native Captain (CPT) Robert K. Wensley replaced Brennan as 5th L&L commander, the company had less than one-third strength with 30 men.7

Initially, the company’s personnel shortage forced it to stray from Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) 20-77. That T/O&E called for a company headquarters and three operational platoons: Publication, Propaganda, and Loudspeaker. However, the 5th L&L organized with a company headquarters and two platoons, Publication and Loudspeaker.8 The company headquarters managed administration, mess, supply, training and transportation. Publication Platoon’s functional sections handled research (Intelligence); writing and illustrating (Propaganda); preparing photographic plates (Camera and Plate); printing (Press); and preparing leaflets for dissemination by artillery shells or bombs (Processing). The Loudspeaker Platoon had three loudspeaker sections with linguists, radio repairmen, and mechanics.9 In the summer of 1951, the company welcomed many highly educated, professionally skilled, and multi-lingual personnel into the ranks. Soldiers were assigned to the 5th L&L because they had college degrees, worked in journalism, advertising, or related fields, or spoke multiple languages. Army induction and training centers (such as Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and Fort Myer, Virginia) screened draftees and prior service personnel for these kinds of backgrounds.

The Publication Platoon’s Propaganda Section: PFC James K. Rowland, SGT David E. Lilienthal, Jr., 1LT John E. Eckenrode, Jr., PFC Virgil M. Burnett, CPL James J. Klobuchar, SGT Robert W. Ferguson, PFC Donald M. Andrews (seated), and CPL Earl W. ‘Bud’ Moline.

CPT Robert K. Wensley commanded the 5th L&L from April to November 1951 before transferring to the 1st ID while in the FRG.
One exceptional soldier selected for service in the 5th L&L was PFC David E. Lilienthal, Jr. The son of a high-level governmental agency head, Lilienthal had written for the *Harvard Crimson* and reported for the *Saint Louis Post-Dispatch*. After being drafted in 1950 and completing basic training, he helped Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John O. Weaver, CPT Robert Asti, and the rest of the Army General School's small Psywar Division with the development of the Psychological Warfare Officers' Course. Reassigned to the 5th L&L in early 1951, he became Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of the Propaganda Section. In that position, he supervised "writers working alongside the unit's artists to produce the materials we turned out, mostly mock leaflets for use in Army maneuvers."\(^{10}\)

One of Lilienthal's soldiers was Private (PVT) James J. Klobuchar of Ely, Minnesota. The University of Minnesota journalism graduate and writer for the *Minneapolis Star Tribune* was drafted in November 1950. After completing basic training at Fort Riley, Klobuchar awaited orders to a permanent duty assignment. "A major in personnel at Fort Riley had looked at my résumé" and took note of his education and writing ability. The young journalist reported to the 5th L&L as a writer in the Propaganda Section.\(^{11}\)

Another soldier selected for the 5th L&L was PFC Brook 'Mike' Paschkes. In 1950, the Lawrence Fertig and Company advertiser joined the reserve 301st RB&L in New York. Drafted into the active Army in February 1951, Paschkes completed basic training with the 540th Field Artillery Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, before reporting to the 5th L&L.\(^{12}\) Lilienthal, Klobuchar, and Paschkes made up but a few of the almost 90 personnel in the 5th L&L by June 1951.\(^{13}\)

Having focused primarily on getting organized and placing personnel, the company discovered that it only had a couple of months left before deployment. When in June 1951 CPT Wensley learned that his company was going to the FRG, he became concerned about the shortage of European linguists. These assets would be needed to turn out products in case of war. He raised the issue with the Psychological Warfare Division and the Army General School. As a result, the Army transferred 34 enlisted soldiers (many of them multi-lingual) from the 2nd to the 5th L&L.\(^{14}\) One of the new transfers was PVT Silvio J. 'Joe' Perilli. Perilli's father emigrated from Italy to West Virginia in 1913, served in the U.S. military during WWI, and went back to West Virginia in 1920 after getting married in Italy. Born in 1928 in Masontown, West Virginia, Joe Perilli and his family moved to Italy in 1932 and lived there until 1948 before returning to West Virginia. The fluent Italian speaker was drafted in July 1950, took basic training at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and reported as a linguist to the 2nd L&L. He recalled, "All of the linguists from Europe were transferred from the 2nd L&L to the 5th L&L," including himself.\(^{15}\)

Another linguist reporting to the 5th L&L around the time of the personnel shuffle was PVT Boris A. Niepritzky. Drafted in St. Paul, Minnesota, in September 1950, the native Ukrainian proceeded to his first duty station, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland, after completing basic training. There, he translated Russian manuals about Communist weapons that were acquired by the U.S. Army and were displayed in the post museum. “All of the sudden, I got orders to report to Fort Riley, Kansas.” His fluency in Russian earned him a slot in the 5th L&L’s Loudspeaker Platoon.16 Lilienthal later remarked, “One extraordinary aspect of our service . . . was the presence of a number of Eastern European linguists in our ranks—young men native to those countries who emigrated to the U.S. after WWII and were drafted at the time of Korea.”17 With its personnel in place, the company’s pre-deployment training and readiness activities increased.

Scheduled to arrive in Germany in September 1951, CPT Wensley ordered the 5th L&L to complete all necessary requirements before 1 August. According to a company yearbook, “The eight-hour day was abandoned. The company forgot about free Saturday afternoons and off-duty evenings.” By 8 July (three weeks before Wensley’s deadline), the 5th completed all weapons qualifications, combat indoctrination courses, training requirements, and inspections.18 Most enlisted personnel took leave, only to have a major flood delay their return to Fort Riley until late July.19 Once the unit reassembled, a final round of inspections ensued. “After about a week of almost daily inspections, the IG gave the 5th a [Preparation for Overseas Movement] inspection rating of superior, and said that of all units which had left Riley for overseas the 5th was the sharpest and best prepared.”20

The company then deployed. On 3 August, an advanced party left for Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, the staging area for the New York Port of Embarkation (POE).21 Eighteen days later, the 5th L&L main body arrived at Kilmer. After a week of sightseeing, soldiers shipped out from the POE for Bremerhaven, Germany, aboard the USNS transport General C.H. Muir (T-AP-142). On ship, bored Psywarriors read, wrote letters, and played games on the deck, as PFC Perilli remembered.22 One soldier’s experience aboard ship was atypical.

“One extraordinary aspect of our service... was the presence of a number of Eastern European linguists in our ranks — young men native to those countries who emigrated to the U.S. after WWII and were drafted at the time of Korea.” — PFC David E. Lilienthal, Jr.
In order to get head-of-the-line privileges for chow, PVT Niepritzky volunteered to run two motion picture projectors for the hundreds of bored soldiers. “I had no idea how to operate them.” After a couple of hours of tinkering, he thought that he had figured it out. “The first showing was at 2:00 that afternoon.” The hallway outside “was full of G.I.s sitting on the floor waiting for the movie.” The film was not rewound and played upside-down; Niepritzky could not correct either problem. There were “G.I.s screaming, pounding at my door yelling ‘Throw him overboard!’” The harassment continued for a couple of days, “but then it simmered down and I finally learned how to switch the films, how to go from one projector to another.”

As Niepritzky performed this extra duty, other soldiers practiced their trades to pass the time. Publication Platoon members produced a daily mimeographed newsletter, North Atlantic Signal, as the Muir steamed toward Europe. According to PFC Klobuchar, the Signal “was made up of the usual things that happened aboard ship with some humor. We
In summer 1951, a major flood impacted the 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group, the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, and other units stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. For several weeks, Kansas experienced some of the worst rainfall in its history. In May, the state received 200 percent of average monthly rainfall, 300 percent in June, and 400 percent in July. In mid-July, the Kansas River crested at 34.5 feet, causing floods that isolated the post and inflicted irreparable damage to many facilities. Private (PVT) Julien J. Studley of the 301st RB&L remembered “grass on the telephone poles and the wires” because of water elevation because of water elevation. These conditions affected unit training and activities.

Stationed at Fort Riley since May, the 301st dealt with the flood in different ways. Between 11 and 14 July, its soldiers helped with “flood control efforts” before seizing the opportunity to train and operate in the abysmal field conditions. A detachment
The Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company manned the radio station W7NKX/C, “for a time the only means of radio communication from Fort Riley to the outside world.” A Repro Company detachment “published a newspaper for Camp Forsyth [Fort Riley] personnel, affording an account of both local conditions and some world news.” The flood provided a unique training opportunity for the 301st, but it caused headaches for the 5th L&L, which was preparing to deploy to Germany. First, 5th L&L soldiers had a hard time returning to post after a couple of weeks of pre-deployment leave. One person impacted was Second Lieutenant (2LT) Gordon B. White, an officer in the Loudspeaker Platoon. “The railroad tracks going into Fort Riley were underwater, so they routed us up to Omaha and then to Kansas City. I had to report to the MPs at the train station and say ‘How can I get to Fort Riley? I’m supposed to be there tomorrow.’” He learned that soldiers had to fly in. “Fortunately, I was on the first planeload they sent in because the water kept rising and the second plane had to turn around and go back. There wasn’t enough of the airfield left for them to land.” By late July, most 5th L&L soldiers had returned from leave, only to encounter another problem.

The L&L discovered that the 519th and 520th Military Intelligence Service Platoons had occupied their barracks because their own had flooded. The unit’s last-minute deployment preparations were complicated because many of its soldiers were “living in tents up on the hills.” According to 2LT White, other elements “expropriated our generators (we had generators to run the loudspeakers) to supply electricity up in the hills to the guys in the tents. It was really a difficult situation.” The flood complicated things for the 5th L&L and provided a training opportunity for the 301st RB&L, in both cases breaking the routine of training and garrison life at Fort Riley.

“It was really a difficult situation.” — 2LT Gordon B. White
also interviewed people in other units.” The platoon did not make too many issues of the Signal before the Muir docked at La Pallice, France on 6 September. There, it dropped off units assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s combined command, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe. However, the 5th L&L remained on board.

On 9 September, the Muir docked at Bremerhaven, and the 5th L&L soldiers disembarked and began moving to their new home in the FRG. They traveled about 340 miles by train to Böblingen, just southwest of Stuttgart, in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. There, they joined other U.S. units, including the 175th Military Police Battalion, 19th Ordnance Battalion, 732nd Medical Detachment, 301st Signal Group, and the 97th Signal Battalion (Operations). 5th L&L soldiers moved into their barracks while married officers and senior NCOs moved into their quarters.

Soon after Seventh Army’s tactical Psywar asset got settled into Böblingen, it began printing original materials, starting with The Leaflet. That mimeographed newsletter reported personnel changes, promotions, current events, training exercises, sports, and other information. In November, the Publication Platoon started printing The Leaflet on the offset press using the same processes “involved in turning out actual leaflets,” thereby using it as a training opportunity.

The 5th soon had the mission of developing leaflets and other products for a major EUCOM training exercise.

Scheduled for 3-10 October 1951, Exercise COMBINE intended to test friendly forces’ ability to defend against a surprise Communist attack and to evacuate U.S. civilians and dependents. It would ultimately include 160,000 U.S., British, and French soldiers. EUCOM Commander-in-Chief General Thomas T. Handy was the commander of the combined maneuver.

In late September, the 5th L&L learned more details about its members’ places and roles in COMBINE. 5th L&L personnel were delegated tasks at several different locations. CPT Wensley would coordinate the company’s actions from the mobile headquarters of the exercise’s aggressor forces. 1LT Charles E. Lowenthal,

The Seventh Army’s Reproduction Plant in Heidelberg where 1LT Dan Hicks, Jr. and his 23-man detachment printed leaflets for Exercise COMBINE in October 1951. In addition, from this location, Seventh Army published its weekly newspaper, Sentinel.

Enlisted soldiers from the Publication Platoon assemble leaflet books for COMBINE. Standing (left to right) are Thomas Ehrlinger, William Schwartz, Jr., Stuart G. Hunting, Earl W. ‘Bud’ Moline, Spiros Sperides, Donald C. Kisabeth, Robert Bernadini, John Giannini, and Karl L. Conant. Sitting (left to right) are Marcos J. Kaganskie and Harry P. John.

5th L&L leaflet developed for Aggressor during Exercise COMBINE, October 1951. This deceptive leaflet warned ‘U.S. forces’ of the Kreutzotter, “Germany’s only poisonous snake.” No such snake existed.
former officer in the 2nd Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) during WWII and now the Loudspeaker Platoon Leader, would represent the 5th L&L at Seventh Army headquarters near Stuttgart. On 19 September, EUCOM notified the company that its primary mission in the exercise was producing leaflets for Aggressor. The leaflet mission fell on a 23-man detachment led by 1LT Dan Hicks, Jr. On 27 September 1951, Hicks' group arrived at its exercise location, Seventh Army’s Reproduction Plant in Heidelberg. The detachment developed and printed six different varieties of leaflets in-house during the exercise. It also printed leaflets of six additional designs that were sent over by the Propaganda Section under 1LT Leif Oxaal.

The Propaganda Section’s wartime role involved processing requests “for dissemination of leaflets to an enemy . . . to try to induce them to surrender.” For the exercise, “We developed appeals that we thought were suitable,” remembers Klobuchar. To gauge the impact of the leaflets after they were employed, the 5th L&L attached one observation team from the Publication Platoon to each of Seventh Army’s three divisions at the time: 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions (IDs) and 2nd Armored Division.

The 5th L&L produced a high quantity of leaflets (over 120,000) during COMBINE. In addition to the Kreuzzotter leaflet campaign that aimed to scare U.S. forces by warning them of a fictitious snake, the 5th L&L dropped leaflets promoting “COMBINE Connie.” U.S. forces were distracted by COMBINE Connie’s soothing voice which
they heard several times a day on Aggressor Network, a mock enemy radio network. These products impressed many COMBINE participants, including Seventh Army commander LTG Manton S. Eddy. He later sent a written commendation to the 5th L&L and highlighted the efforts of 1LT Hicks’ detachment at Heidelberg. The 5th L&L could safely call its first major exercise a success.

With Exercise COMBINE behind them, 5th L&L soldiers had new opportunities to practice their creative skills. On 12 October 1951, Corporal (CPL) Robert W. Ferguson, PFC Earl W. ‘Bud’ Moline, and PFC John W. Sanders went TDY to EUCOM headquarters in Heidelberg. There, they produced artwork for five displays to be “sent all over EUCOM . . . to tell the Psywar story to high-ranking U.S. officers,” completing the bulk of this task by 25 November. The largest display was 12 feet high and 29 feet long; the others were 4 feet high and 8 feet long. Reporting back to the company on 26 November, Ferguson commented, “There was a lot of work to do up there, but everybody was friendly and helpful . . . [W]e really enjoyed it.” PFC Sanders stayed at EUCOM a bit longer to add the final touches before returning to the 5th.

Military training complemented these more artistic projects. In fall 1951, the 5th L&L developed a sixteen-module curriculum on military subjects, including land navigation, guard duty, first aid, customs and courtesies, land mine warfare, and chemical, biological, and atomic warfare. Practical exercises supplemented classroom instruction. In late November, a Chemical Corps soldier visited to train the L&L on the M5 Gas Mask and other protective equipment. 1LT Lowenthal then led 30 soldiers at a time into a gas-filled tent with cleared and sealed masks. According to The Leaflet, every soldier “removed his mask, gave his name, rank, and serial number, and fled . . . [T]ickling throats and tear-filled eyes attested to the success of the mission.” Occasionally, 5th L&L soldiers took combat arms training from other U.S. units. For example, on 13 May 1952, Sergeant (SGT) Paul Drobiezewski and PFC Perilli received orders to participate in infantry training with Seventh Army’s VII Corps (28th and 43rd IDs) about 200 miles away in Hohenfels. The company continued honing its military skills, even though many of its assigned draftees neared the end of their service obligation.

Keeping track of personnel disposition was a priority for company leadership. In November, First Sergeant (1SG) Chester Damiani, veteran of the 1st MRBC in the Mediterranean Theater during WWII, posted a ‘discharge timetable’ in his office. The first column on the timetable showed “the date each individual can be assured of leaving EUCOM for the States; the second show[ed] the discharge date.” The 1SG invited troops to visit his office one at a time “to forestall an eager stampede into his office.” A second chart showed soldiers’ accrued leave, which many soldiers took advantage of.

The desire to go home peaked around Christmas 1951, but the company took measures to alleviate homesickness. Reliable mail service kept letters and gifts coming and helped to sustain positive morale. In addition, the Publication Platoon printed Christmas cards that were “artistically created and handsomely inscribed in German.” Each card required five runs through the press, totaling 15,000 impressions. Every soldier in the company received thirty cards to mail home to friends and loved ones. The holidays did not stop the arrival of new equipment or personnel, nor did they halt training.

In late 1951, resolving the shortage of M38 4 x 4 jeeps for the Loudspeaker Platoon remained one of the company’s highest priorities. (The platoon had not participated in Exercise COMBINE because it did not have its T/O&E-authorized allotment of sixteen M38s.) Thanks to the persistence of Motor SGT Paul R. Erickson, the company procured all of its vehicles by January 1952. New personnel showed up to the platoon concurrently with these vehicles.

One new arrival to the Loudspeaker Platoon was PFC James M. Niefer. Drafted in summer 1951, the telephone lineman from New York completed basic training at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania. After arriving in Germany, an Army assignments office “shipped me off to the 5th L&L. They pegged me for communications in the Loudspeaker unit.” He reported just before Christmas 1951.

After briefly attending radio repair school in Ansbach, Bavaria, PFC Niefer rejoined his unit to repair loudspeaker equipment, an ongoing problem. The 300-watt LS-111/UIQ-1 loudspeaker “was mounted on the framework on the front of the jeep, the [AM-76A] amplifier was in the jeep, and the generator was in the trailer.” The equipment was “cobbled together” for mobile loudspeaker operations. This setup presented practical difficulties. “The jeep bounced up and down so much that the vacuum tubes in the amplifier broke,” and there were only “a few spare parts” to do the necessary repairs. 1LT Gordon B. White, OIC of one loudspeaker section, echoed Neifer’s negative appraisal of the system set-up: “The loudspeakers were not designed for bouncing jeeps. Our men had a lot of trouble keeping them operational in the field.” These practical issues did not keep the platoon from conducting realistic training.

Loudspeaker Platoon Leader 1LT Lowenthal, section OICs 1LT Clayton R. Taylor, 1LT Oxaal (transferred from the Propaganda Section), and 1LT White, and Platoon Sergeant, Sergeant First Class (SFC) George Tomczyk, required their soldiers to train on their equipment in field conditions. Priority loudspeaker missions involved having linguists make surrender appeals to enemy troops and public service announcements to civilians in liberated areas. 1LT White recalled that there were “fifteen or twenty European languages” spoken by linguists who were assigned to the platoon for those missions. For example, SGT Niepritzky, a squad leader assigned three jeeps, frequently read leaflets in Russian through amplified loudspeakers during training.

Niepritzky’s fluency in Russian came in handy during an unexpected run-in with Soviet military officers during a training exercise in early 1952. He and CPL David B. Nuckols were traveling by jeep on a back road during the
exercise when they spotted a car bearing Russian plates ahead. By virtue of being U.S. Army soldiers in Cold War Germany, Niepritzky and Nuckols had been briefed to be on the lookout for this sort of situation. The Soviets had liaison officers in the area, but they were not allowed to observe American exercises and were not authorized to be on that road. Speeding ahead, the Americans ordered the Soviets to pull over. After parking on the side of the road, Niepritzky walked up to the other vehicle. He overheard the officers talking about “stupid Americans” in Russian. “I gave them a ‘tongue-lashing’ in Russian and a lesson on ‘stupid Americans.’ They were absolutely shocked that I spoke in their Russian ‘slang.’ I ordered them to follow us to the next MP [Military Police] station, which they did.”

Once Niepritzky returned to his unit, he resumed practicing surrender appeals via vehicle-mounted loudspeakers.

Formerly head of the Propaganda Section, loudspeaker section OIC 1LT Leif Oxaal (right) discusses the best location to make simulated loudspeaker surrender appeals with PFC George Biriuk and CPL David B. Nuckols (top), and (below, left to right) PFC Stanley E. Frazier, CPL Raymond Shymansky, CPL Andrew J. Tkachuk, and CPL Russell A. Schmidt.

The Loudspeaker Platoon’s officers: 1LTS Gordon B. White, Charles E. Lowenthal, Clayton R. Taylor (back), and Leif Oxaal.
In addition to transmitting verbal messages through loudspeakers, the Loudspeaker Platoon broadcasted sound effects like “tank noise” to confuse target audiences. 1LT White described one such use of this tactic while supporting Aggressor during an exercise. “The Aggressor Chief sent us out to some place thirty miles away from where he was really massing his forces. We would make tank noise. People . . . would hear the noise, and they would say that there’s a whole tank division coming down the road. It was very deceptive; it worked.”

Just as the Loudspeaker Platoon continued training despite equipment issues, so did the Publication Platoon. Under the leadership of 1LT Dan Hicks, Jr. and SFC Karl L. Conant, the Publication Platoon had to surmount chronic equipment and supply problems. With its three 10 x 14 Davidson Model 221 lithographic presses shipped in from the U.S., the unit faced the problem of getting replacement parts in Germany. It also had a shortage of paper. “A big problem all along has been supply,” wrote SGT Lilienthal in a February 1952 letter to CPT Robert Asti at the Army General School’s Psychological Warfare Division. “We’re in the laborious process of establishing supply channels, but for a month, I understand, we won’t be able to print anything. We’re plumb out of publication expendables. After that, supplies ought to be coming in regularly. Still, after a year and a half of Psywar, [we have] no typewriters for the writers and no brushes and inks for the artists. If it weren’t for the personal equipment of the EM [enlisted men], it would be nigh impossible to operate.” SGT Robert K. Hankins and others in the Headquarters supply section worked to address these issues as Publication Platoon struggled to keep printing. The Publication Platoon put out a large quantity of materials despite its supply problems. From September 1951 to September 1952, it printed over 385,000 products, mostly leaflets for exercises. To develop, print, and distribute effective products in training and during war, the platoon needed dependable support from each of its sections: Intelligence, Propaganda, Camera and Plate, Press, and Processing. These sections worked together “to determine the best strategies in appealing to foreign populations and enemy troops,” according to CPL Klobuchar. Ironically, personnel from the platoon and the entire company also had to appeal to American forces in Germany. One of the 5th L&L’s priorities was spreading awareness of Psywar among other U.S. Army units in Europe. PFC Leonard M. ‘Len’ Rudy, a leaflet writer transferred from the 6th RB&L, noted that “in the 1950s the Army in general did not support Psywar. Simply put, they didn’t know our mission or what we might contribute to an overall battle plan.” The 5th L&L dispatched personnel to educate other units about Psywar. In November 1951, 1LT Oxaal presented a three-hour lecture to the 97th Signal Battalion (Operations). In March 1952, one ten-man team led by 1LT White spent six days in Bad Kreuznach explaining the value of Psywar to 2nd Armored Division units. As part of this initiative, 1LT White recalled that “we would try to hold little classes to teach friendly troops what to expect if the Russians tried to use propaganda on them.” Sometimes the company invited people to its location to explain its activities. As part of its public relations campaign, the 5th L&L invited guests to the company area on ‘Unit Day,’
19 March 1952, to mark its first anniversary. The event was hosted by CPT Paul C. Doster, since November 1951 the 5th L&L commander. Doster described the planned activities: “An exhibition, including a short film on psywar, a leaflet exhibition, a recording of a loudspeaker appeal, and a loudspeaker equipment exhibition, will be displayed and conducted in the Company Commander’s office. The Publication Platoon vans, as well as all other Company working areas, will be open for inspection by the guests.”

For the event, Seventh Army’s Psychological Warfare Officer, LTC Ralph O. Lashley, sent a letter praising the 5th L&L for “the superior attitude you continuously display and the superior work evidenced in all that you do.” On Unit Day, CPT Doster confidently remarked to guests and soldiers, “We’re the best company in EUCOM now. I’m sure of that.” He had chances to prove that in the ensuing months.

The unit remained active for the rest of 1952, training and providing Psywar support for military exercises. For example, in late spring, it supported a Command Post Exercise for the Seventh Army. In July, the Publication Platoon developed leaflets for Civil Affairs/Military Government units. The following month, interrogators, artists, and writers attended additional EUCOM-provided Psywar training in Munich. In maneuvers in September, the 5th confused “the ‘enemy’ with black propaganda,” sent “limber-tongued linguists far behind ‘enemy’ lines,” dropped generic, pre-approved (“canned”) leaflets, and “enervated the ‘aggressor’” with loudspeaker appeals. Training intensity continued despite changes in company leadership.

The 5th L&L had to maintain continuity in the face of command changes. In November 1952, CPT Doster moved to a new assignment. Seventh Army commander, LTG Charles L. Bolte, wanted “to find a new commanding

“In the 1950s the Army in general did not support Psywar. Simply put, they didn’t know our mission or what we might contribute to an overall battle plan.”

— PFC Leonard M. ‘Len’ Rudy
officer as well qualified as CPT Doster.” After consulting BG McClure about the best candidate, Bolte pulled CPT Phillip S. Miller from the 28th ID to command the 5th L&L. The fourth commander in less than two years, Miller held the unit to a high standard. He and 1SG Damiani frequently inspected soldiers’ uniforms, equipment, and barracks. They ensured proficiency in physical fitness, marksmanship, and other core tasks. CPL Klobuchar recalls, “We were required never to forget that we were soldiers of the U.S. Army, and that we were to know how to handle an M-1.” It was also “important for the officers to keep us in shape physically.”

One of the ways that 5th L&L soldiers spent their off-duty time was traveling around Europe on leave. PFC Paschkes, Seventh Army Sentinel reporter and editor after leaving the 5th, got to visit family in Southend, England. CPL Alexander Davidovits and others took in such famous French attractions as the Eiffel Tower and the Louvre. SGT Alvin Miller and CPL Hall M. Roberts spent $39 on a three-day tour of prominent cities in Switzerland. PFC Perilli visited his parents in Rome before leaving the 5th L&L in September 1952. Although soldiers got to explore the Old World, they never lost sight of the big picture. As Perrilli recalled, “The Cold War was on, and so one had to be prepared for some unexpected circumstances.”

This article has explained the history of the 5th L&L in 1951-1952, including its activation in March 1951, its organizing and brief training at Fort Riley, and its preparations for overseas movement. Deployed to the FRG in September 1951, the 5th L&L thereafter provided realistic Psywar support for Seventh Army exercises to practice its doctrinal mission, despite frequent supply shortages. In addition, unit personnel traveled around to educate other U.S. Army units on the value of Psywar. Finally, the company tried to maintain its positive reputation by excelling in inspections and exceeding military standards. Not surprisingly, in late 1952, LTG Bolte found the 5th L&L “in excellent condition and very active, both in garrison and in maneuvers.”

On a more personal note, I LT Gordon B. White said, “We had outstanding people in that outfit, and it was not just good skills. They were intelligent, hardworking, motivated people. I was very lucky.”

The author would like to thank the veterans of the 5th L&L for providing stories, documents, and photos related to their time in the unit.

---

JARED M. TRACY, PhD
Jared M. Tracy served six years in the U.S. Army, and became a historian at USASOC in December 2010. He earned an MA in History from Virginia Commonwealth University and a PhD in History from Kansas State University. His research is focused on the history of U.S. Army psychological operations.