



這個中共戰士，現在安全地在聯軍陣地裏
睡，每天享受好小菜和熱米飯。他
千成真的老同伴在一起，也不用
那裏睡長夜行軍，還得操練了。
他拋棄了戰爭，滿肚的好小菜和熱
正愉快他度着日子。
中共士兵們！你們還睡嗎？
聯軍方面前進了。



The Ganders: 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group Conducts PSYWAR in Korea—Part II

by Robert W. Jones, Jr.

WITH the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 the U.S. Army was ill prepared for war in many crucial areas, one being Psychological Warfare. The Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) of the Far East Command quickly adapted to the situation, taking on responsibilities far beyond the scope of a small staff section. The PWB staff performed Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) at the tactical and strategic levels for the first few months of the war (after 1951 the PWB became the Psychological Warfare Section, PWS). The ever-increasing requirements quickly overwhelmed them. The U.S. Army's solution was to form two new units, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (for the tactical mission) and the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group to fill the strategic void. This article is the second of two about the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L) and its contributions during the Korean War.¹

The term Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) was the doctrinal standard for the U.S. Army and later the Department of Defense from World War II through the Korean War. The term Psychological Operations (PSYOP) came into effect by the mid-1960s. For historical accuracy the term PSYWAR is used throughout the article

Kim Il Sung's North Korean People's Army (NKPA) invaded South Korea in the early morning of 25 June 1950. The numerically superior and better armed North Korean units quickly pushed aside the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army.² President Harry S. Truman ordered U.S. forces to assist the South Koreans on 27 June 1950.³ American advisors with ROK units continued to fight while in Japan the U.S. occupation forces prepared to deploy. In the meantime, Republic of Korean and the advance elements of U.S. forces were pushed south, to what became known as the "Pusan Perimeter." The tactical and strategic situation rapidly changed with the simultaneous execution of Operation CHROMITE, the Inchon invasion, and the



The mainstay of Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) operations in Tokyo were dedicated civilians. Sang Moon Chang (Korean calligrapher, on the left) and David An (translator on the right) of the PWB prepared copy for leaflets to be disseminated in Korea. Both men would work with the 1st RB&L.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the Chief of Psychological Warfare for the Army, was best known as the driving force behind PSYWAR units and doctrine. One part of PSYWAR was the Special Operations Division where the staff created an unconventional warfare capability that later became Special Forces.






The 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group would establish elements in Japan and Korea.

Allied breakout from Pusan on 15 September 1950. United Nations (UN) forces pushed the NKPA back across the 38th parallel and seized large sections of North Korea. The strategic situation changed in late October 1950 when the "Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army" crossed the Yalu River. As the combined Chinese and North Korean forces pushed the UN command south towards Pusan, Seoul was abandoned a second time. This was the situation when the 1st RB&L Group got to Japan.

To provide a strategic PSYWAR capability, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the newly appointed Chief of Psychological Warfare, directed the formation of a new unit called a Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group to conduct radio broadcasts and produce leaflets.⁴ The mission to conduct strategic PSYWAR encompassed the creation, production, and dissemination of PSYWAR products. Three Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Groups were authorized with plans to form additional groups in the Active Army and Reserves. The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L) was formed at Fort Riley, Kansas, from reservists and draftees and sent to Japan. The 301st RB&L, a Reserve unit from New York, was quickly mobilized, and joined the 1st RB&L at Fort Riley for training. They were headed for Europe.⁵ After the 1st RB&L deployed, the 6th RB&L Group was formed to support the school at Fort Riley and later the PSYWAR Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Since Korea was the priority for BG McClure, the Army PSYWAR program had to be organized quickly.

The 1st RB&L Group consisted of three companies. The Headquarters Company was the largest, with 19 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 111 enlisted men. It was responsible for the group's administration, maintenance, and logistical support.

Two sections provided the Group



CPL Dick Crimer operates a Harris printing press at the FEC print plant in Motosumiyoshi, Japan. Crimer was assigned to the 1st RB&L Group's 3rd Reproduction Company.

with specialized capabilities. The Operations Section had linguists, artists, draftsmen, and scriptwriters to prepare strategic leaflets and radio broadcasts.⁶ The Research and Analysis Section was "responsible for the preparation and composition of propaganda material" at the theater level.⁷

The 3rd Reproduction Company, with 3 officers and 54 enlisted men, produced strategic leaflets, newspapers, and other paper products using four high-speed Harris offset printing presses. With a strength of 16 officers and 99 enlisted men, the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company's mission was to broadcast PSYWAR from both fixed and mobile radio stations.⁸ The three radio platoons were organized to repair and operate "... captured or indigenous fixed transmitters," and to operate its mobile transmitters mounted aboard 6x6 trucks.⁹

At Fort Riley, the division between tactical and strategic operations was blurred. In Japan it was determined that the 1st RB&L's area of operations for printed products began where the 1st L&L Company's ended, forty miles behind the line of contact.¹⁰ Although the entire Group was authorized 305 soldiers, it deployed overseas in three increments with less than 250 men.

Between June 1950 and June 1951 the Army was trying to simultaneously fill staff positions worldwide, establish the PSYWAR school, and fill the newly-formed units. Recruits were primarily draftees and mobilized reservists having civilian skills related to PSYWAR (i.e. journalists, artists, printers, graphics designers, etc).¹¹

Unlike World War II, many of the recruits had college educations and better technical skills. Some




Once in Japan the RB&L was assigned to the FEC General Headquarters (GHQ)

In the Spring of 1951,

the Psychological Warfare Department of the Army General Ground School at Fort Riley began training students with an emphasis on producing propaganda. The course was six to seven weeks long, covered psychological warfare, strategic intelligence, foreign army organization, and intelligence. Four officer and two NCO classes produced 334 graduates from all four services and some Allied nations. When Army Reservists and draftees with PSYWAR skills (psychologists, journalists, illustrators, advertising executives, newspapermen, commercial radio technicians, etc) were called up, they were sent to Fort Riley for training and assignment. The Reservists received no theater-specific training until they arrived in Japan or Korea. The Psychological Warfare Department at the Army General Ground School became an independent Army School, the Psychological Warfare Center, when it relocated to Fort Bragg, North Carolina in early 1952.

The Psychological Warfare Center, the predecessor of today's U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, was the proponent for Psychological Warfare training, doctrine, and equipment. The Center's Psychological Warfare Board evaluated PSYWAR tactics, techniques, procedures, doctrine, and equipment. During the Korean War, the board conducted over forty evaluations of radio receiver/transmitters, loudspeakers, mobile print shops, and improved leaflet dissemination techniques.



Reservists called-up were World War II veterans who had used the GI Bill for college and who had acquired new job skills. To capitalize on the situation, the Army established a Classification and Assignment (C&A) station at Fort Myer, VA, to screen basic trainees with a college education and/or specific job skills. During the C&A process, the men were usually asked questions about their civilian background (i.e. education, job experience, language ability). Some soldiers did not have to produce evidence; their qualifications were accepted as given.¹² Others had to present proof of education or professional certification. While the evaluation relied on interviewers "gut reactions," they seemed to have "... terrific insight in who would fit into the 1st RB&L," said Tom Klein, one of the many draftees slated for PSYWAR.¹³ The Fort Myer pool provided soldiers, while officers were often assigned directly.

The majority of the 1st RB&L officers were Reservists, with World War II combat experience. Most officers did not have "official" PSYWAR experience. Instead their education and work experience between WWII and Korea was critical. Other officers were college graduates fulfilling their ROTC obligation. Captain (CPT) Robert Horn had a Ph.D in political science from Princeton. He was a professor at the University of Chicago when he received his recall notice. The WWII veteran became the head of the Group's Operations Research Section.

Captain Fred Laffey was another veteran. He worked a variety of civilian radio jobs at home in Massachusetts. Laffey was assigned as a radio program manager in the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company.

First Lieutenant (1LT) Eddie Deerfield had earned a Distinguished Flying Cross, three Air Medals, and a Purple Heart as a B-17 radio operator/aerial gunner in Europe. After the war, he used his GI Bill to attend Northwestern University and earned a journalism degree. He also received a direct commission in the Reserves. Deerfield was working as a reporter for the *Chicago Times* when he got orders to report by April 1951 to the 1st RB&L at Fort Riley.¹⁴ Deerfield became the officer in charge of the Pusan radio detachment.

1st Lieutenant Alvin Yudkoff had been assigned to a Japanese Language Detachment in the Pacific. It was filled primarily with Nisei (2nd generation Japanese-American) soldiers. He was in the invasion of Okinawa and served in the occupation of Japan. After the war he became a writer. He had begun documentary filmmaking when he was recalled to active duty with orders to the 1st RB&L Group where he was put in charge of radio script production.¹⁵

Princeton ROTC graduate Robert Carlisle had been a field artillery officer in WWII. After the war he was a journalist for the *Passaic* (New Jersey) *Herald-News* for three years. Then he joined *Newsweek*, working in New York City and Detroit.¹⁶

Other officers were recent college graduates. 2LT Jim

Haynes, armed with his Princeton degree, reported to Fort Riley on 1 April 1951. He would serve as a liaison officer to the Air Force planning leaflet drops. 1LT Bill Barry, a Princeton graduate with an English degree, had been working as a reporter for the Bureau of National Affairs when he got his call-up notice. After serving in Panama during most of WWII he was commissioned through Officer Candidate School.¹⁷ 2nd Lieutenant Arthur Holch, with a Masters degree from the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University, had worked as a print reporter for the Denver *Rocky Mountain News* and CBS and NBC radio when he was drafted in 1948. After only a year in uniform as an *Armed Forces Press Service* reporter in New York, Holch went to work for NBC television in New York as part of the *Camel News Caravan* with John Cameron Swayze. He received a direct commission and recall notice with orders to report to Fort Riley.

Over one-third of the enlisted men were college graduates and some had advanced degrees.¹⁸ Gudmund Berge had served in the Navy, before completing an architecture degree at the University of Washington. He was working as an architect in Seattle when he was drafted to serve as a combat engineer.¹⁹ Jim McCrory, with a degree from Marquette University was working as a reporter for the *Milwaukee Sentinel* when drafted. He was sent to a transportation truck company at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.²⁰ Draftee John Davenport, an experienced commercial artist, was at Artillery basic training at Camp Atterbury, Indiana when he received orders for 1st RB&L.²¹

Hanno Fuchs had earned a Bachelors degree in Journalism from Syracuse University and attended Columbia University's Graduate School of Business before he started working at the advertising firm of Young and Rubicam.²² Bob Herguth, a graduate of the University of Missouri's School of Journalism was working for the *Peoria Star* newspaper when he got his draft notice.²³ Thomas Klein, with a Masters degree in economics (University of Michigan) reported to Fort Sheridan, Illinois in December 1950 and was immediately shipped to Fort Meyer for classification.²⁴ There, he first heard of "this PSYWAR outfit and it seemed pretty interesting." Klein was shipped to the 1st RB&L and assigned to the Research and Analysis Section.²⁵ These experiences of only a few men are a "snapshot" of the varied backgrounds, education and job experiences of the unit members.

Not all 1st RB&L Group soldiers were screened through Fort Myer. Tony Severino was in infantry basic training at Fort Jackson. When his company commander denied a reclassification request, stating, "It is an honor to die for your country," Severino and another college graduate visited the classification building that night. There they found "... a lone corporal working overtime. He listened to our plea and the next day we were transferred," said Severino.²⁶ Sig Front had been trained to be an infantry platoon radio operator in the 31st Infantry ("Dixie")



The mobile radio station at Fort Riley: During the graduation of PSYWAR Class #1 the mobile radio station was set up for visiting dignitaries. This was the prototype system. It would take a few months to produce the systems for the 1st RB&L in Korea. The two vans on the left are production studios; on the right are the radio transmitter and receiver, each mounted in a truck shelter. In the center of the photo are BG McClure, the Chief of PSYWAR (indicated by arrow) and COL Greene, the Chief of PSYWAR for FEC.

Division. He became a replacement for Korea when the unit was demobilized. En route to Korea, the graduate of the School of Radio and Television Techniques (in New New) and former West Virginia radio announcer found himself transferred.²⁷ Equipment and training became the next step for the 1st RB&L.

The individual soldier's equipment came primarily from World War II stocks. As a major training and mobilization base, Fort Riley had plenty of uniforms, boots, and field gear. The M-1 carbine and M-1911 .45 caliber pistols were the primary weaponry. While individual equipment was readily available, the unit equipment was a problem.

Because PSYWAR had languished after WWII most of the equipment had been declared surplus and sold. "With the end of World War II, the U.S. Army ... rapidly dismantled its extensive psychological operations network. PSYWAR was dropped from Army training programs, from military schools and curricula, and from Tables of Organization and Equipment for Army units."²⁸ Faced with the presence of war the Psychological Warfare Board developed new requirements for equipment and arranged to buy "off the shelf." Two of the critical items for the Group were printing presses and truck-mounted radio transmitters. The printing presses could be purchased from civilian companies, but it took a few months for assembly. Printers had to be trained on the idiosyncrasies of the presses. The mobile radio sets were built from scratch, with new technology, based on old WWII designs. The operators and maintenance personnel had to be trained on the equipment which did not yet exist. The 1st RB&L received its radio vans (as they were



LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOMER E. SHIELDS, a European PSYWAR veteran was selected by Brigadier General McClure to command the 1st RB&L. Mobilized with the Indiana National Guard in 1942 as an infantry lieutenant, Shields later served as the executive officer of the 7th Army Combat Propaganda Team in March 1944. After service in North Africa, Italy, and Southern France, then Major Shields became chief of PSYWAR for the 6th Army in October 1944. Afterward he became Brigadier General McClure's executive officer at Supreme Headquarters until the end of the war in Europe. Following the war, Shields returned to Indianapolis and the newspaper business as a circulation manager, but maintained his commission in the Indiana National Guard.

commonly called) in Japan in late December 1951. Despite a shortage of unit equipment Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, the 1st RB&L Group commander, had to provide FEC with interim reinforcements.

LTC Shields and his small staff, had less than four months to field the unit. The three-phase training program consisted of basic military training, a general introduction to PSYWAR, and specialty training. The basic military training included the standard military subjects, common soldier tasks, and weapons marksmanship. Not knowing where they would be assigned, base defense was taught to the mobile radio company. With other units also preparing for deployment the 1st RB&L competed for tight resources.²⁹ PSYWAR training was less competitive.

Formal training for PSYWAR was not universal in the



En route to Japan on the USNS General Brewster the soldiers put on a variety show to pass the time. (L to R: Hall Weed, Bud Perfit, Gerry Deppe)

1st RB&L. Some officers attended the first Psychological Warfare Unit Officers' Course at Fort Riley. European theater PSYWAR veterans, most recalled to active duty, filled the course with their World War II experiences. When the students asked about Korea "the instructors were not allowed to talk about current operations," said Arthur Holch.³⁰ Since many officers had been selected because they were journalists for both radio and print, this was a surprise.³¹ There was no enlisted PSYWAR course, so the 1st RB&L soldiers developed their own curriculum under the guidance of LTC Shields. The internal classes ranged from "Introduction to PSYWAR" to "News Writing." "ILT Jack Morris took the writers and conducted drills on how to think and write with limited information. But we were also soldiers and had to go to bivouac and the rifle range," said Tony Severino.³²

In the final phase of training at Fort Riley, LTC Shields integrated all unit capabilities. Based on intelligence reports, artists and writers prepared leaflets. The leaflets were lithographed by the photographers and printed by the press operators. Radio scriptwriters wrote programs that were presented by radio technicians.³³

With the 1st RB&L Group training at Fort Riley, Kansas nearing completion, the unit was divided into three increments. A twelve-man advance party flew to Tokyo in June 1951 to augment the PWS staff. The main body moved by train to Camp Stoneman, CA and then boarded the USNS *General Brewster* for Japan. Their voyage lasted from 12 July to 6 August 1951. The last element followed two months later, on the USNS *John Pope*. They arrived in Japan the first week of October 1951. Soldiers completed training courses while they waited for unit equipment, notably the mobile radio vans.

As it settled in, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group became absorbed in the Far East Command's (FEC) effort to support the United Nations fight in Korea. In Japan the 1st RB&L underwent an administrative redesignation. It was "tagged" the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 8239th Army Unit, signifying that it was assigned to the FEC.³⁴ LTC

Shields received a formal mission statement in Japan. General Order 61, FEC Headquarters and Service Command, specified that the unit was to "... conduct strategic propaganda operations in direct support of military operations, support the national world-wide propaganda effort, and provide operational support to tactical propaganda operations in the Far East Command."³⁵ This meant that the 1st RB&L would conduct radio broadcasting in Japan and Korea and produce strategic leaflets in Japan for dissemination in Korea.

As the Group commander, LTC Shields became the liaison with the FEC PWS, while retaining command. Recognizing that the unit needed more cultural training, Shields implemented a program from 31 August through 22 October 1951. One hour, four days a week were devoted to Chinese and Korean culture, geography, economics, history, and politics classes. Attendance was mandatory for all enlisted soldiers and optional for officers.³⁶ Subsequent soldier training included military intelligence and tactics classes. As a supporting commander, LTC Shields "conducted several orchestras," each with its own requirements and capabilities, simultaneously.

The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group scrambled to support the Psychological Warfare Section campaign in Tokyo and re-establish and operate radio stations in Korea. The majority of the group



Shopping district near the Finance Building in Tokyo.

supported FEC general headquarters in Tokyo. The 3rd Reproduction Company was co-located with the Far East Command's Printing and Publications Center (print plant) in Motosumiyoshi, south of Tokyo.³⁷ Radio programming for the Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) became a major priority for the unit. The first missions were conducted from Japan.

The 1st RB&L soldiers worked and lived in different conditions in Japan. Although large sections of Tokyo had been destroyed by bombs during WWII, the business district surrounding the Japanese Imperial



The 3rd Reproduction Company building in Motosumiyoshi. The company HQ and the billets were here, and the soldiers worked nearby in the FEC print plant.

Palace was intact. The U.S. bombing raids avoided the area. Living quarters and work space were located in that district.

The soldiers were billeted in the "Finance Building," a five-story structure that was the old Imperial government Ministry of Finance (it would be like living in the Treasury Building in Washington DC). It was close to the moated Imperial Palace. Occupation duty in Japan was a relief for most soldiers. Japan was rebuilding after the war and for Americans the cost of living was very inexpensive. This prompted some officers and NCOs to bring their wives to live on the economy.³⁸


The Finance Building was better than the Fort Riley barracks. The soldiers slept in 15-to-30 man open bays. They had a mess hall, bowling alley, pool hall, post exchange, library, and barbershop available in the building.³⁹ Officers lived in officers' clubs and private quarters throughout Tokyo. The 1st RB&L's daily routine in Tokyo began with physical training on the roof of the building. Following breakfast, the soldiers either walked or rode a bus to the Empire Building where the PSYWAR offices were located.⁴⁰

The 3rd Reproduction Company was based in Motosumiyoshi, halfway between Tokyo and Yokohama.⁴¹ Though its four high-speed Harris offset presses were co-located with the print plant in the fixed site, the company remained a separate unit.⁴² They stayed in Japan while the radio detachments of the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company began moving to Korea.

Mountainous Korea required VUNC to rely on low-power transmitters/repeaters on mountaintops throughout the country. Eventually there were twelve of these transmitter/repeater stations. Broadcasts to China and North Korea were serviced by nineteen Broadcasting Corporation of Japan sites on the Japanese islands. By late 1951,

VUNC was broadcasting ninety minutes of programming countrywide, twice daily.⁴³

The radio detachments of the 1st RB&L Group began deploying to Korea in August and September 1951. They had to refurbish, and reestablish Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) facilities for use by the United Nations and the South Korean government as VUNC. Beginning in Pusan, new Japanese-built radio transmitters were installed. Transmission quickly followed. Pusan was the




This hand drawn map shows the location of the 1st RB&L units in Korea circa 1952.



The officer's quarters in "Paradise Pines" (Pusan), a lone wood-framed tent. The soldiers' Quonset huts are visible to the rear.



In Pusan translators prepare scripts in Korean and Chinese for broadcast from copy written in English by 1st RB&L soldiers. 1LT Eddie Deerfield is shown in the rear.



South Korean President Syngman Rhee (in front of the microphone) records a speech for broadcast on the Korean Broadcast System. In the center of the photo is 1LT Eddie Deerfield. On the left is radio technician Lee Tuk Bin.

temporary South Korean capital since the North Koreans captured Seoul in July 1950. New stations in Taejon and Taegu followed.⁴⁴ Eventually five sites were established in Korea (Pusan, Seoul, Munson, Taejon and Taegu). While all produced good work, two radio detachments stand out, Pusan and Seoul.

The key to successful PSYWAR was a detailed target audience analysis and maintaining a series of themes. At each radio station in Korea, the broadcasts were locally controlled. Separate staffs prepared news broadcasts, commentaries, and special features. At first the soldiers gathered news from open sources. Sometimes this included a short telephone call to the 1st RB&L Group headquarters. Eventually teletype machines linked each radio station with the 1st RB&L headquarters in Tokyo and with the U.S. wire service news.⁴⁵ However, the soldiers continued to gather "local news" to inform the population.

In late August 1951 1LT Eddie Deerfield's detachment went to Pusan. Deerfield had to set up the radio station, prepare programs with the Korean staff, and coordinate with South Korean officials at the highest level. From his residence in Pusan, President Syngman Rhee prepared speeches for broadcast that had to be cleared. Taped speeches were reviewed by Deerfield and his soldiers before being aired. President Rhee continually pressed for the reunification of Korea, while the UN only supported the restoration of the 38th parallel as the border.⁴⁶

Americans and Koreans operated the Pusan radio station. Four to six Korean translators worked side-by-side with Deerfield's soldiers in the newsroom. "Supervision of the Korean staff of the Pusan station of the Korean Broadcasting System, was jointly done by the Korean government official who served as station Director and the Commanding Officer of the Pusan Detachment," said Eddie Deerfield.⁴⁷

In Pusan the Americans lived at the radio station in three Quonset huts and a tent.⁴⁸ The RB&L soldiers dubbed their compound "Paradise Pines." Eighth U.S. Army headquarters and the UN Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK) provided administrative support. "At meal times the soldiers would drive down the hill to the UNCACK mess hall," said Tony Severino.⁴⁹ On Saturdays the soldiers got a projector from Special Services to show a Hollywood film. Movie night became the social event of the week for the Korean staff, their families, and the soldiers.⁵⁰

By the end of September 1951 the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company had expanded into Seoul, Taejon, and Taegu. Seoul was the most important because it was the symbol of the South Korean government.⁵¹ "We arrived at our HLKA building [the station call sign], which had been RCA's [Radio Corporation of America] headquarters in Korea prior to the fighting. RCA originally had a 10,000-watt transmitter near a huge tower in the heart of the city," said PFC Sig Front.⁵² The RCA Building, near the Capitol Building and City Hall, was pockmarked by shell-fire. The North Koreans had stolen most of the equipment

and radio tubes. However, some Army radio engineers pieced together salvaged transmitting equipment from throughout the city and had a station capable of transmitting at 5,000-watts an hour a day in Korean.⁵³ Living conditions in Seoul were spartan.

"When I arrived in Seoul, there was no running water, little electricity except from military generators, little fuel for cooking and none for heating comfort," wrote PFC Sig Front.⁵⁴ "We had cots and sleeping bags. Much of the time the temperature was below zero. We had a Coleman burner to heat C Rations for breakfast, lunch and dinner. I never had a hot meal created by cooks until I did a story on the 1st Marine Division. The Marines at that time had not only plenty of meats, potatoes, canned fruits and vegetables, but also peanut butter and fresh bread. They gave me a huge can of peanut butter, similar in size to a gallon of paint, which I shared with the guys and many Koreans who had begun to live in our building since they did work for HLKA."⁵⁵

To operate the Seoul radio station Lieutenant Thomas Glowacki enlisted local help. The Koreans worked for food which Glowacki got from UNCAK. However, with the workers came their families. "We fed some forty people, families with young children, with the father working at some support job for the station," said Sig Front. One day a well-dressed Korean in a suit walked into the station looking for a job with HLKA. "I needed someone who would copy TASS [Telegraph Agency of


the Soviet Union -- *Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuz* in Russian, the Communist propaganda station] in Korean and translate it into English for me. He knew CW code and English. It took him four hours to transcribe TASS, and then four hours to translate it into English. Following that, he would have a very stiff drink right after handing me the copies," said Sig Front.⁵⁶ Radio Seoul could then "scoop" Communist broadcasts.

Another practice was to tape radio news in the field. The "Tape Team" consisting of Sig Front and two interpreters; one Korean and one Chinese, loaded up in a jeep, "covering the same stories as all foreign correspondents," said Front.⁵⁷ "We devised specific broadcasts we thought would discourage the North Koreans."⁵⁸ "The North Koreans had not had biscuits [a staple all Koreans liked with their meals] for several years, and we learned when they realized the South was getting biscuits again, they were depressed about it," said Sig Front.⁵⁹ "Our Korean tape teams interviewed farmers, workers in factories, shop keepers and others to make people in the North realize they were losing the war. There was no better way then to let them hear such statements first hand from citizens like themselves."⁶⁰ The tape team also did stories about the various United Nations units in Korea.

With over twenty countries fighting in Korea there were plenty of stories. One example stands out. "... the Turks returned to Korea after being nearly wiped out by



An outdoor market in Seoul in the winter of 1951. This was one of the many common sights for the 1st RB&L soldiers in the capital.



These photographs show a snapshot of the devastation wrought on South Korea's capital after being occupied and liberated twice in a year (North Koreans capture July 1950; UN liberation September 1950; Chinese and North Koreans capture January 1951; and UN liberation 15 March 1951). The photo at the bottom left shows the lone streetcar working in the capital.

the Chinese. Their general got on the radio and taunted the Chinese Army Command in the North. He told them where the Turks were going to be on the line, and dared them to attack," said Sig Front. A day later the VUNC repeated the taped broadcast. "They went across the line that night, with the old style knives [the] Turks used for hundreds of years, and butchered a lot of Chinese that night. The Chinese never challenged them again," said Sig Front. "I admired those Turks and will never forget them."⁶¹

In Tokyo the 1st RB&L soldiers operated differently. The Psychological Warfare Section (PWS) offices in the Empire Building were on the 6th floor. They included a modern radio studio and production facilities. While some soldiers worked on radio scripts, others developed printed products. A dedicated team of Chinese and

Korean civilians (working as Department of the Army employees) translated the works into Korean, Mandarin, and Cantonese.⁶²

The central theme for all 1st RB&L Group radio broadcasts was "Truth and News."⁶³ The VUNC radio broadcasts centered on three themes. The first was the illegality of the Communist actions in invading South Korea; the second was how the Communists exploited the Koreans; the third theme was providing information and news about the free world to both North and South Korea.

The 1st RB&L had guidelines to improve the reception of messages. They tried to broadcast on schedule. Messages had to be long enough to get the themes across, but not so long they put listeners at risk or became boring.



Bik Cha Kim, a Korean actress-announcer makes a radio broadcast from VUNC in Tokyo. Women were often used for radio broadcasts aimed at the North Korean soldiers and civilians.

Finally, writers hunted for topics that would be of interest to the listener and still get the UN theme across. The writers had to remember that the broadcasts were heard on both sides of the line of contact.⁶⁴ There were sufficient stories, international and national, to go around.

To improve quality, panels of native speakers listened to recent VUNC broadcast tapes. The panel evaluated reactions to the message, accuracy of the translation, and appropriate level of language for the target audience. As the Chinese presence in Korea grew this became more important and difficult at the same time.⁶⁵




Korean workers load newspaper leaflets into bombs (September 1952)

The RB&L sometimes used enemy broadcasts. Analysts in the 1st RB&L Analysis and Evaluation Section concluded that some enemy broadcasts were in certain languages but not in others. The omissions indicated that the enemy wanted to keep the truth from specific audiences. Monitored broadcasts could be translated into the missing language and rebroadcast to Communist-held areas. The best part was citing Radio Moscow, Radio Peking, or Radio P'yongyang as the source.⁶⁶ By "scooping" the Communist stations or broadcasting a counter message before the initial enemy broadcast, PSYWAR delayed Communist broadcasts by forcing them to courier important messages.⁶⁷

The United Nations forces in Korea produced over two billion leaflets during the war; sometimes as many as 20 million a week.⁶⁸ With information from many sources, and current policy and themes, 1st RB&L writers drew



Leaflets were flown to Kimpo Air Base, outside of Seoul, where they were loaded aboard cargo aircraft for dissemination.



Rear view of a C-47 dropping leaflets in Korea.

up scripts for leaflets after weekly planning meetings. Written in English, they translated the strategic PSYWAR leaflets. Chinese and Korean artists worked side-by-side with the Americans. They were attuned to subtleties and nuances of Asian design. Upon receiving an assignment, the soldiers designed rough layouts and then discussed the product design with Chinese, Korean, and Japanese civilian artists.⁶⁹ Once the finer points had been resolved, the draft product was reviewed at the PWS offices on the 3rd floor.⁷⁰

Once approved, the proofs were taken by courier to the print plant in Motosumiyoshi, protected by an armed guard.⁷¹ At the print plant, the artwork proofs were photographed and then made into lithograph plates. With these plates, the leaflets could then be mass-produced. Once printed, the leaflets were then either packaged for air delivery or rolled and packed inside leaflet bombs. The bombs were taken to Tachikawa Air Base. Leaflets were flown to Kimpo Air Base, outside of Seoul, where they were loaded aboard cargo aircraft for dissemination.


The PSYWAR leaflet effort targeting enemy soldiers centered on four themes. The first was, "Surrender and get good treatment." The second closely resembled the first, "Surrender and return home

alive after the war." The third stressed "The invincibility and strength of the UN." The final theme was "Survival," stressing that "Life was better than dying in war." These themes had been used during World War II.


Themes were also successfully oriented towards civilians. These took a different approach, often highlighting the divisive and exploitive role of foreign Communism on Korea.⁷² Strategic leaflets warned civilians of airstrikes. The UN *modus operandi* to give warning before bombing strikes and then do it showed both the benevolence and the power of the UN.⁷³

A theme not used was a negative portrayal of the enemy soldier.⁷⁴ As with other American operations, PSYWAR concentrated primarily on military objectives.⁷⁵ However, the UN forbid any reference to a unified Korea and targeting former Nationalist Chinese fighting in Korea.⁷⁶

Leaflets were initially printed in Korean and Chinese, using highly academic language. This alienated much of the target population who only read at a basic level or were illiterate. To compensate, in the summer of 1951 leaflet designers simplified their messages and relied more on illustrations.⁷⁷ Leaflets were usually specific to Koreans or Chinese. Significant cultural differences made simple translations less than effective.⁷⁸



This leaflet, with the theme "The Communists Invasion," is designed to convince the target audience of Chinese soldiers in Korea that the war could have been over long ago, except for the Communist's long-range plan for world conquest. It was dropped in June 1952 when the war had reached a stalemate.



Leaflet number 1153 was targeted at North Korean soldiers, to depress them by suggesting that their families were suffering under Communist domination. The leaflet was requested by the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea and developed by the 1st RB&L Group. Red was a common color used in leaflets for the visual effect. The leaflet numbering system enabled PSYWAR elements to assess effectiveness thru enemy surrenders.*

In the summer of 1952, to deal with the language problems, members of the 1st RB&L constructed a basic Chinese dictionary of more than 1,400 characters. Common Chinese soldiers understood the simplified language.⁷⁹ Based on prisoner interrogations and information from tactical commanders, some leaflets contained specific messages. New leaflets with dated information were printed on paper that dissolved when exposed to the elements. Safe Conduct Passes were printed on more durable paper. They often resembled currency so enemy soldiers could conceal them from their superiors.⁸⁰ "When intelligence revealed that Chinese soldiers were short rolling paper for cigarettes, a leaflet was printed on cigarette paper," said John Davenport.⁸¹ "Later we were told by Lieutenant Mickelsen [the graphic art OIC] that the Chinese were also short toilet paper, so we hoped they used the right leaflet type for the right purpose."⁸²

One of the most successful strategic printed

products was newspapers. They were just double-sided single sheet products, but the 1st RB&L produced several: *The Parachute News*, *The Free World News*, *The Free World Weekly Digest*, *Free Korea*, and *The Rehabilitation News*. On 17 July 1950, the first issue

of *The Parachute News* in Korean fluttered into enemy-held areas. Nineteen issues of the 5" x 7" newspaper were distributed. In late November 1950, it became the *Free World Weekly News*, with a Mandarin version. The themes of the *News* centered on industry, agriculture, textiles, housing, food, and the ROK military. *The Free World Weekly News* was also delivered to friendly areas in the summer of 1951.

Distribution in the North ceased with the Armistice, but publication continued for the South until 1957.⁸³ The United Nations went to great lengths to present true, verifiable facts, which, coincidentally, were pro-UN. POW feedback revealed that these papers were their only source of news and they considered it unbiased.⁸⁴

1st RB&L leaflets were delivered primarily by USAF aircraft. Trial and error refined dissemination techniques. At the beginning of the war, leaflets were loaded unbound and then shoveled out the open cargo door. Once the door opened large volumes of loose paper swirled around the cargo compartment creating a maelstrom of leaflets. This was hazardous.⁸⁵

To solve the that problem leaflets were wrapped in paper bundle "bricks" and secured with twine. Once the brick was tossed outside the door, the twine was supposed to break in the slipstream. 1st Lieutenant Jim Haynes from the Group Operations Section decided to accompany a leaflet drop. When given the chance to throw some leaflets, Haynes stepped up. "Except no one told me to aim for the lower left corner of the door, so I threw about chest high and the string broke before it got out the door, blowing the leaflets back into the cargo compartment of the aircraft," remembered Haynes.⁸⁶ A better system was to attach a blasting cap, short length of fuse, and a fuse igniter to the string. Crewmen at the cargo door pulled the fuse igniter before they threw the brick out. It opened outside the aircraft when the fuse ignited the blasting cap. Flying at six to eight thousand feet, a foot of time fuse blew the bundles apart at one or two thousand feet.⁸⁷

A variety of USAF aircraft were used for leaflet dissemination by the 1st RB&L. On some occasions small liaison and artillery spotter aircraft were used. The most commonly used aircraft were the Douglas C-47 Skytrain, the Curtiss C-46 Commando, and the Douglas A-26 Invader medium bomber. The B-29 bomber also dropped



Korean soldiers assigned as "door kickers" wait for the time to drop. Visible on the leaflet "bricks" or bundles are fuse igniters. Before throwing the brick, the fuse igniter was pulled. Once clear of the aircraft the time fuse would ignite the blasting cap and the leaflets would scatter.




"Door kickers" preparing leaflets for airdrop.

leaflet bombs. Each type of aircraft had advantages and disadvantages. The Skytrains and Commandos could carry more cargo, but they were slow, unarmored, and unarmed. The A-26 was fast, but had a limited payload. The B-29 could carry up to a million and a half leaflets, instead of sixteen tons of bombs, but at 10,000 feet dispersion was highly erratic.⁸⁸

By the end of 1952 the 1st RB&L Group was going through a major personnel change. As the original reservists reached 21 months active duty and the draftees completed their 24 months of service, they started rotating back to the United States. The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group was then filled with individual replacements, many of whom were selected by the C&A process and trained at Fort Riley and Fort Bragg.

The original 1st RB&L Group was a unique unit. The mix of draftees and Reservists brought with them education and experience that the Army could not quickly

provide during wartime. The classification and analysis (C&A) process identified soldiers with skills to support PSYWAR operations not only for the 1st RB&L, but also for the 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company and



An example of the "Free World Weekly Digest." Issue #50, from February 1952. This issue, aimed at Chinese Communist Forces in Korea, discusses the peace talks in Panmunjom and other news items. Korean War era leaflets were printed on an acidic paper that discolored and eventually decayed.



Operation MOOLAH

One of the most well-known PSYWAR operations was also highly controversial. In November 1950, the Communists introduced the MiG-15 jet fighter. It was superior to all U.S. aircraft flying over Korea and was especially effective on B-29 bomber formations. In response, the United States Air Force (USAF) quickly dispatched the F-86 to counter the MiG. But tactical air equality was not enough. What the USAF needed was a superior aircraft with a tactical “edge.” They wanted an intact MiG-15 for research and analysis to get that “edge.” However MiGs avoided UN territory (lending credence is the belief that the pilots were Red Chinese or Russian). The first captured MiG-15 had crash landed on a sandbar in enemy territory. While this was helpful, the USAF still wanted a flyable MiG.¹

In March 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan to acquire a MiG from a defecting pilot. The plan was simple; the first pilot to deliver a working MiG to UN forces would get \$100,000. Any subsequent MiG defections would receive \$50,000. A defecting pilot would be granted political asylum. The campaign would be promulgated by radio broadcasts and leaflet drops²

The originator of the plan, which became known as Operation MOOLAH, is in some dispute. One source indicates that the idea originated in Brigadier General Robert A. McClure’s Office of Psychological Warfare in the Pentagon.³ General Mark W. Clark claimed Edward Hymoff, the Bureau Chief of the International News Service in Korea, hatched it over a bottle of brandy as the two were flying to Korea in late 1952.⁴ There are several other versions.

Regardless of where the idea originated, the 1st RB&L Group designed and printed the leaflets in Korean, Chinese, and Russian. In an earlier version of “Reach Back,” used by PSYOP units today, the theme was presented to the 1st RB&L in Tokyo. On 1 April 1953, the UN Joint Psychological Warfare committee approved Operation MOOLAH. The writers and artists of the 1st RB&L went to work, finishing the leaflet products on 20

April 1953.⁵ The UN Commander in Korea, General Mark W. Clark made the first radio broadcast in English. The message was repeated in Russian, Chinese, and Korean. The campaign used radio broadcasts and aerial leaflets in Russian, Chinese, and Korean. Before the end of April 1953, a million leaflets had been dropped on North Korean airfields. A half million more followed in May 1953.⁶ The results were not immediate.

While no defectors with planes appeared, MiG operations over North Korea ceased for eight days after the initial drop of leaflets. Radio broadcasts in Russian were jammed. Strangely those in Chinese and Korean were not. When the MiGs did return to the sky, they were hesitant to engage. UN pilots noticed a decided downturn in flying skills and aggressiveness. Finally, in September 1953 a North Korean pilot landed a MiG 15 at Kimpo Airbase near Seoul, South Korea. Ironically he had never heard of the reward offer, by leaflet or radio broadcast. The defecting pilot eventually got the \$100,000 reward and received political asylum in the U.S.⁷ It was later determined that the MiGs were based in China along the border and flew missions into North Korea.

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The MiG-15 (left) and the F-86 (right) were considered the top jet fighters of their day. The U.S. Air Force wanted to analyze the capabilities of the Communist MiG-15.


the 6th and 301st RB&Ls. LTC Shields effectively balanced the skills of the highly creative individuals to fulfill diverse PSYWAR missions in Korea and Japan. The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group is a historical legacy for Psychological Operations soldiers today. 📌

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The "Proper Gander" of the 1st RB&L Group.