The crowning achievement in Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell’s north Burma campaign from late February 1944 until 3 August 1944 was the hard-fought drive for Myitkyina (Mitch-in-aw). The multi-national operation involved American, Chinese, and British forces under Stilwell’s Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC). The principal American units were the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), popularly known as Merrill’s Marauders, the 10th United States Army Air Force (USAAF), the 1st Air Commando, and Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Because Detachment 101 supported all the major Allied forces, it was the only ground organization involved in all parts of the campaign. During the long fight, Detachment 101 came of age to become an indispensable asset for the Allied effort. The unit evolved from an intelligence collection and sabotage force to an effective guerrilla element.

This article is the first of two covering the roles of Detachment 101 in the Myitkyina campaign. Months before D-Day in France, Detachment 101 was conducting one of the earliest Unconventional Warfare (UW) campaigns in coordination with conventional forces. While Merrill’s Marauders and the Chindits fought behind Japanese lines, they did so as conventional elements. Unlike the other forces involved, Detachment 101’s participation was in three phases. During Phase One, the preparatory period (December 1942 through early February 1944), OSS teams infiltrated into north Burma. During Phase Two, (February until 17 May 1944), Detachment 101 supported the 5307th as it maneuvered to capture the Myitkyina Airfield. The unplanned third phase (18 May to 3 August 1944) ended when the city of Myitkyina fell. This first article explains the OSS roles in the first two phases. It is relevant today because Detachment 101 with its Kachin guerrillas was the only true UW force in theater. As such, they were LTG Stilwell’s force multiplier. Effective intelligence collection, liaison, and coordination of indigenous combat forces were the keys to OSS success. One needs to understand the war in Burma to appreciate the importance of the OSS effort.

War came to the British colony of Burma in late January 1942. By May 1942, Japanese forces had summarily defeated a numerically superior British, Burmese, Indian, American, and Chinese defense force. Routed Allied forces and several hundred thousand refugees fled towards the Indian frontier on foot because there were no roads or railroads leading to it from Burma. The skeletons of several thousand people littered the paths and roads used by the Allies when they marched back into Burma.

The Japanese had now isolated China. They controlled the major land route to China; the Burma Road that traced its course from Rangoon, Burma...
to Kunming, China. This road had been critical to resupplying China because the Japanese already occupied that country’s seaports. LTG Stilwell, the U.S. China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater commander, arrived in Burma in time to lead a group of more than a hundred military and civilian Chinese, Americans, British, and Burmese to India. They were forced to walk the final 140 miles when they reached the end of the dirt road. Stilwell said, “I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it.” However, this was easier said than done. Stilwell had to contend with rugged, mountainous terrain, bad weather, remoteness, the defeatism prevalent in the British Army, and Chinese politics.

North Burma was one of the toughest fighting environments in WWII. Steep mountainous terrain, the foothills of the Himalayas, dominates north Burma, making foot movement arduous. Detachment 101 discovered it often took thirty days to walk the same distance that a light plane could fly over in an hour. The distances involved were extensive: the area of the Marauder’s operations alone was nearly the size of Connecticut. Thick secondary-growth jungle—some of it unexplored—slowed ground movement. Leeches, mosquitoes, and diseases plagued fighting men. For instance, the 3,000-man Merrill’s Marauders suffered 296 cases of malaria and 724 incidents of other diseases such as acute dysentery, and scrub typhus by 4 June 1944. They had only been in the field three months. This contrasted sharply with 424 killed, wounded, or missing during the same period. High humidity and temperatures well over 100 degrees Fahrenheit were common from March through May. The monsoon season of torrential rains lasted from June through September. Constant moisture rotted or rusted everything. “A cleaned pistol will develop rust pits in 24 hours, a pair of shoes not cleaned daily will rot in a week,” read one Detachment 101 report. The CBI Theater was also at the tail end of an overtaxed logistics chain. Confusing command and control arrangements with the U.S. Army Air Forces, and the British, who had supreme command over Burma, caused some to say that the theater acronym stood for “Confusion Beyond Imagination.” But, nothing compared to Stilwell’s difficulties with the Chinese.

American strategy in the CBI was built around keeping China in the war. American war supplies kept the Chinese fighting. Since the Japanese controlled the Burma Road and the Chinese coast, the USAAF established an aerial resupply route (airbridge) from Assam, India to Kunming, China affectionately nicknamed “The Hump.” Its route through the Himalayan mountain passes was hazardous and costly. Adverse weather and collisions with cloud-cloaked mountains caused almost daily aircraft losses. The U.S. needed an alternate solution. The obvious answer was to build another road that circumvented the Japanese-controlled Burma Road. In December 1942, U.S. Army engineers began construction on the Ledo
The majority of the troops available to LTG Stilwell’s Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) were troops of the Chinese Army in India.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was the leader of Nationalist China. Seeking to improve China’s position, he was extremely obstructionist to the Allied effort in Burma.

For General Stilwell, Myitkyina’s capture would provide two immediate benefits. Securing its airfield would eliminate the Japanese fighter threat to the “Hump” resupply line. The USAAF pilots could fly a shorter and safer route over lower terrain into China. The new lower altitude air route would reduce gasoline consumption and permit heavier cargos. The city of Myitkyina could serve as a major supply depot along the Ledo Road route. But, capturing both the airfield and the city would not be easy.

The elite Japanese 18th Division was in north Burma.
The 18th had sacked Shanghai and Nanking, China, in the late 1930s, and helped rout the Allies during the late 1941-1942 invasions of Malaya and Singapore. They captured the largest number of British Empire prisoners of war ever taken—some 130,000—at Singapore. At 6,300 men, the 18th Division was severely under strength by January 1944. Only some 3,000 of those remained by late June 1944. The veteran 56th Division was also based in north Burma, as were elements of the 15th, 53rd, and 33rd Divisions, and the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade. In all, the Japanese had more than 50,000 troops in the north Burma area. Luckily, Stilwell had a wildcard; OSS Detachment 101, which had arrived in theater in July 1942.

Detachment 101 was the first overseas unit created under the nascent Special Operations (SO) branch of the Coordinator of Information (COI), the predecessor to the OSS. OSS Chief MG William J. Donovan envisioned units that could “effect physical subversion of the enemy,” in three distinct phases: infiltration and preparation; sabotage and subversion; and direct support to guerrilla, resistance, or commando units. After conducting several largely unsuccessful long-range sabotage operations, Detachment 101 filled a critical need by focusing its efforts on intelligence collection. Its agents reported on enemy order of battle, the political situation in Burma, and the weather. The former was critical to the 10th USAAF.

**Phase One:**

In December 1942, Detachment 101 infiltrated the group code-named FORWARD, behind Japanese lines in north Burma from Fort Hertz, the only Allied outpost in the area. This began the unit’s first phase of the Myitkyina campaign. A second group, KNOTHEAD, commanded by CPT Vincent Curl, moved into the upper Hukawng Valley in August 1943. Other OSS groups followed to expand the net of intelligence collection. PAT (led by Pat Quinn) placed an agent on a hill ten miles from the Myitkyina airfield to report Japanese air activities. These groups became familiar with the region, but also recruited indigenous agents.

During Phase One, Detachment 101 blanketed the area north and west of Myitkyina with agents that reported a constant intelligence stream to NCAC and the 10th USAAF. By January 1944, FORWARD was observing road traffic, and had agents in Myitkyina and further south. They reported the status and locations of Japanese forces, and identified important bombing targets hidden under the jungle canopy. Major General Howard Davidson, commanding general (CG) of the 10th USAAF, wrote: “OSS furnished the principal intelligence...
Terrain in north Burma was some of the most difficult encountered during WWII. Most ground movement had to be conducted on foot. (U.S. Army map, courtesy Center of Military History)

The Kachins were the most willing and effective ethnic group that Detachment 101 employed in Burma. They were armed with a mixture of British and American weapons, as well as their own "dahs," a short sword that doubled as a machete.

regarding Japanese troop concentrations, hostile natives, stores and enemy movement. Up to 15 March 1944, some 80% of all combat missions were planned on the basis of intelligence received from this source.”

The bombing raids were particularly stinging to the Japanese; only ground observation could have found the targets. One example was a bridge constructed across a river near Myitkyina that was hidden just below the water’s surface. This was the advantage of recruiting Kachins.

The Kachins were fierce warriors, and experts in guerrilla hit-and-run tactics and junglecraft. They were natural hunters. Best of all, they were pro-Allied and liked Americans. Technician Fifth Grade (T/5) Tom Moon of KNOTHEAD said, “Every time they got a chance to knock off a [Japanese] patrol they did it because it was a psychological play.” The Kachins exploited expedient measures. “The Kachins can do terrible things with sharpened bamboos. They fill the bushes on both sides with needle-sharp stakes … When a [Japanese] patrol was fired upon, and dived for the timber—well, I hardly like to talk about it. After a few ambushes like that, the [Japanese] never took cover when we fired on them.” A captured enemy soldier said that Japanese patrols did “not mind working in American or Chinese-occupied territory but never volunteered for assignments against the Kachins as casualties were always about 50 percent.” A 1943 OSS report compared “a Kachin with a dah” [traditional knife/sword] to a “whole panzer division in his own country.” It was only natural for the OSS to enlist these indigenous warriors.

KNOTHEAD was first to create a guerrilla force. CPT Curl incorporated the Myihprap Hpuing [Lightning Force] into his group to serve as its offensive element.
Despite working with a willing indigenous population, Detachment 101 still had to conduct effective counter-intelligence. Numerous Kachins and other locals were in Japanese pay—willing or not—such as this spy (right) captured by KNOTHEAD in late 1943.

The Lightning Force was an already existing resistance group of several hundred men formed by Kachin leader Zing Tawng Naw. The Kachins also helped with the recovery of downed Allied aircrews. Curl reported in February 1944: “We have this whole area pretty well organized and if [the pilots] will tell [the Kachins] that they are Americans there is only one chance in a thousand against their being brought to … [here or] one of our other units.”77 Having a network emplaced behind Japanese lines would prove critical as the Allied forces began to go on the offensive.

Detachment 101 commander LTC William R. Peers conferred with his field units and sent liaison and Kachin teams to the British and American units when he learned of the upcoming north Burma offensive. These liaison officers were critical because they alerted Allied units of the friendly forces already behind enemy lines, facilitated coordination, and disseminated intelligence. LTC Peers assigned U.S. Navy Chief Warrant Officer Robert Rhea and U.S. Army LT Martin J. Waters to Merrill’s Marauders, LT Charles C. Stelle to the Chindits, and CPT Peter S. Joost to the 1st Air Commando. CPT Chester R. Chartrand was assigned to NCAC to brief the headquarters staff daily and to disseminate Stilwell’s intelligence requests to the OSS liaison elements. In January 1944, Joost commented, “abysmal ignorance existed regarding Intelligence and Plans between the Americans and British.” Though the Chindits were not part of Stilwell’s command at the time, MG Orde C. Wingate’s British liaison officer at NCAC was never “up-to-date on the [Chindit’s] plans and position.”21 After joining Wingate’s headquarters in the field, Stelle became the de facto link with NCAC. At this point Detachment 101 entered Phase Two of the campaign, in direct support of the Chindits and the Marauders.

**Phase Two:**

The 1st Air Commando infiltrated the first of 9,250 Chindits into BROADWAY, a landing zone south of Myitkyina, on the night of 5 March. OSS LT Stelle initially channeled requests to the Air Commando, until the first group of Kachin guides were lost in a CG-4A Waco glider crash.22 Stelle scrambled to get replacements. By 19 March, there were six Detachment 101 Kachins at BROADWAY.23 During their patrols, the Chindits identified and apprehended local collaborators.24 Using his knowledge of Japanese, Stelle was able to identify enemy units and agents from captured documents. These enemy agents were dealt with swiftly as Stelle reported; “A five minute scanning … provided a really definitive translation—definitive by reason of the fact that its bearer was shot ten minutes later.”25 Stelle’s most important contribution was to deliver the Chindit’s information to Stilwell. MG Wingate was loath to send information through channels, but he gave Stelle access to Chindit message traffic and encouraged him to forward what messages he saw fit.

Stelle’s element was soon renamed the Group #10 Operation, and reinforced to a total of four radio teams. Although Stelle was soon recalled to join the DIXIE mission, the liaison effort to the Chinese Communists, other Detachment 101 officers remained to recruit locally. They formed the MATES, ADAMS, BARNES, and DAVIS subgroups that reported on Japanese troop movements, engaged in guerrilla warfare, and organized villagers to report on and defend themselves against the Japanese.26 The intelligence they gathered alerted the Chindits of anticipated attacks and enabled them to avoid Japanese formations. Chindit decisions, however, had unintended consequences. Because the group could only carry minimal supplies when they moved north from Mawlu (WHITE CITY) on 7 May 1944, they abandoned uniforms and weapons that the Japanese then recovered. As a result, Detachment 101 elements in the area repeatedly encountered Japanese patrols “dressed in these British uniforms.”27
The Fall Campaign...

British and Commonwealth forces constituted the bulk of the Allied forces in the Burma Campaign. The British 14th Army in India was led by Lieutenant General William J. Slim. Composed of thirteen divisions and seven independent brigades, the 14th Army was largely made up of Commonwealth infantry units from India and East Africa and was a much different force than the one that had been thoroughly routed and demoralized by the Japanese in 1942. The 14th Army was itching for a fight.

Nine Japanese infantry divisions and two independent brigades deployed on three fronts controlled Burma. While Stilwell was organizing the north Burma offensive, the Japanese were preparing to launch the three-division 15th Army against India to capture Kohima and Imphal, the major British supply depots in northeast India. The Japanese forces in Operation U-GO were to sever the supply lines to Assam and north Burma, particularly to the Hump airfields. The enemy planned to live off the land and captured supplies. The Japanese Army also hoped that the invasion would prompt Indian nationalists to rise up against the British authorities in India.

In February 1944, the Japanese launched a diversionary attack (Operation HA-GO) south of the main effort. That mission fell to the 28th Army in the Arakan. The British blunted HA-GO during the Battle of the Admin Box. This did not forestall the Japanese advance from the central Burma front. When the Japanese failed to capture the British supply dumps there, however, U-GO turned into a slugfest that continued until July 1944. Besieged British and Commonwealth troops units were resupplied by air, while the Japanese had paid scant attention to their logistics. The plan to live off captured Allied supplies proved disastrous. Between March and July, the British forces under Lieutenant Generals Slim and Geoffrey A. P. Scoones halted and then decisively defeated the Japanese simultaneously at the battles of Kohima and Imphal. Lieutenant General Kotoku Sato, Commander of the 31st Division, radioed to the 15th Japanese Army commander, “our swords are broken and our arrows gone.” Japanese units began to retreat contrary to orders, leaving their wounded behind. They were starving and their uniforms were in tatters. The Japanese Army’s offensive capability in Burma had been broken, and with more than 55,000 casualties, it was the Imperial Japanese Army’s greatest defeat to date. This was the strategic situation when the NCAC north Burma offensive began.

Field Marshall William Slim led the British 14th Army during the Burma Campaign. The 14th, called “the Forgotten Army,” was composed of multi-national Commonwealth units.
The American 5307th also required more support than they realized when they entered north Burma on 24 February 1944. Their mission was to encircle the Japanese 18th Division because the Chinese divisions who had been fighting in the Hukawng Valley since October 1943 had already proved unable—or unwilling—to do so. The 5307th planned to infiltrate, and while Chinese forces kept the main force occupied, attack the Japanese from the rear. To assist the Marauder infiltration, Detachment 101 started guerrilla operations.

On 5 March, LTC Peers ordered LT James L. Tilly, who was advising Zing Tawng Naw’s Lightning Force, to harass the Japanese “in every way possible.” The first effort, establishing a roadblock, only heightened Japanese awareness of the increasing guerrilla threat. On 10 March, Japanese troops retaliated by ambushing the main body of the Lightning Force, but their marksmanship was so poor that they hit no one. The Kachins charged into the Japanese trenches. “One [Japanese soldier] thrust his bayonet into the leading Kachin … [who] then smashed his Tommy gun over the [Japanese soldier’s] head, and the man beside him calmly blew off the [Japanese soldier’s] head with a shotgun … another [Japanese soldier] charged, he was brought down with the other barrel of the shotgun.” Then, the Lightning Force withdrew and reorganized. The next day they enveloped the Japanese force. The Kachins crept to within twenty-five feet, so surprising the Japanese that they abandoned their weapons and equipment. The Japanese soldiers took out their frustration on civilians; “One old Kachin was captured
The Air Commandos employed CG-4A "WACO" gliders, such as this one being used by Detachment 101, to infiltrate the Chindits into BROADWAY.

LT James L. Tilly (2nd on right) was the OSS advisor to Kachin leader Zing Tawng Naw’s Myihprap Hpuing, or "Lightning Force."

CPT Vince Curl, with beard, briefs the Marauder’s commanding officer, BG Franklin D. Merrill (with pipe) on 15 March at Naubum. Father James Stuart, in the bush hat, is on the right.

... tortured ... to reveal our location ... he did not talk ... and was put to death with the bayonet.” On 16 March, about 200 soldiers approached a Lightning Force patrol lying in ambush near the banks of the Hkawnglaw Hka. Thinking them to be Chinese from a nearby element, the Kachins verbally challenged, them with, “O.K.,” the first half of the sign/countersign for friendly forces in the area. The Japanese soldiers raised their weapons, which was “definitely the wrong password,” and a three-day fight ensued that fixed the enemy. This enabled the Marauders, who were also engaged with this force but who did not yet know the OSS were in the area, to disengage and slip around the contested area. Trailing Chinese forces relieved the Lightning Force and dealt with the remaining Japanese. By then, the Marauders were deep into the OSS operating area.

The first OSSer that many Marauders met was Father James Stuart, an Irish Catholic priest with KNOTHEAD who had spent years among the Kachin. COL Charles N. Hunter described his encounter on 15 March near Naubum with the priest, “We first saw ... a strangely uniformed individual leaning against a tree. Without insignia to indicate his nationality or status,
The Kachins were armed with several kinds of weapons, such as the United Defense “Marlin” UD-42 carried by the guerrilla on the right. Flintlocks and muskets, such as the one being carried by the Kachin on the left, were so popular that the OSS dropped several hundred model 1861 Springfields into the field. The Kachins, who could make their own powder and shot, reveled in the smoke, noise, and general confusion caused by the weapon.

Lt. Freeling H. Clower was rescued from Japanese-occupied Burma by the OSS after crash landing in the jungle near Myitkyina in early 1944.

The Catholic priest, Father James Stuart, shown here in late 1944/early 1945, had lived in the Kachin hills for years. He was fluent in Jinghpaw, the Kachin language.

Kachin leader Zing Tawng Naw headed the several-hundred man Myihprap Hpuing, or “Lightning Force.” The force was of great assistance as the Marauders moved on Myitkyina.

Detachment 101 had its own light air force, dubbed the “Red Ass Squadron.” Here, an L-1 Stinson “Vigilant” has landed at an improvised airstrip in Burma, 1944.

CPT Curl split his guerrilla force to accomplish two functions. One section continued harassing the Japanese. Even though the Marauders already had their own guides, the OSS recognized they “were strangers to this part of the country.” As a result, CPT Curl dedicated 160 Kachin guides from the Lightning Force to support the Marauders. They knew the easiest and most direct paths through the operating area, and identified which villages were friendly, river crossing sites, and sources of potable water. A KNOTHEAD report said, “A group [of Marauders] would be advancing down the
trail, when the Kachin out front would spot and point (rather like a bird-dog), since he could not talk to them. They invariably found a [Japanese] position … which they never would have seen otherwise.”

Unlike the Americans, the Kachins could tell friend from foe as “To the inexperienced eye … there is no difference in a Burman and a Kachin … a Japanese out of uniform is almost as difficult to recognize.”

Kachin scouts, for instance, informed the Marauder’s 1st Battalion that the town of Shaduzup was held in strength by the Japanese. This allowed them to surprise a Japanese force below the town. Not all efforts went as smoothly.

Poor communications created confusion. While the Marauder’s 1st Battalion was advancing along a trail near Nprawa on 20 March, their Lightning Force guides “suddenly became talkative.” The Marauders thought that the Kachins merely wanted food or cigarettes. What the Kachins were trying to convey was that a Japanese machinegun position was ahead. They assumed that the Marauders understood their warning and had provided the food and cigarettes as a reward. After one Marauder was killed and two wounded, the Americans learned to pay attention when the Kachin guides spoke.

Despite their help, the Marauders remained wary of Detachment 101’s Kachins. LT Tilly commented that the worse part was the “unnecessary nerve strain on the leading American soldiers,” blazing their own trails and “sweating out [Japanese] fire at every turn.” Fortunately, the Marauder’s commander, BG Merrill saw the intrinsic value of OSS assets. He conferred daily with Zing Tawng Naw through Father Stuart, who spoke fluent Jinghpaw, the local language. The Kachins sped up the Marauder advance by providing so much intelligence on Japanese troop movements that it reduced the need to send out advanced reconnaissance patrols. Each of the three Marauder battalions had two dedicated Kachin guides. A pool of ten to fifteen others was kept at the 5307th command post to relieve them. Other Lightning Force patrols operated more than a day’s march from the Marauder’s main body. They improved or cut new trails to ease the passage of pack animals. To expand their support to the Marauders, LTC Peers further directed that KNOTHEAD push further ahead of the Allied advance and to recruit more Kachins.

Detachment 101’s reputation was growing. LT Jack C. Pamplin, the second commander of KNOTHEAD, visited BG Merrill at Nhpum Ga at the end of March. He told Peers that the general was “quick to realize the actual and potential value of our Kachins,” and lavished praise on Father Stuart and Zing Tawng Naw. Now, the Marauders had the “greatest respect” for the Kachins and said “I’m damn glad they’re on our side.”

The Kachin guides were of immeasurable assistance to Merrill’s Marauders. As was common with male Kachins, these guides carry a sword, called a “dah” on their front. It served as both a tool and a weapon.
An artist rendition of a Lightning Force Kachin guide pointing out Japanese troops ahead on the trail to the Marauders.

Allied units in the north Burma offensive relied upon aerial resupply, such as this drop in early 1944. The bulky packages have been wrapped in burlap to help protect them from the shock of landing. Aerial resupply prevented the Marauder's 2nd Battalion from being overrun at Nhpum Ga.

Marauders had come to realize that the Kachins have "been just as important a factor in their own preservation as it has been in their success against the [Japanese] forces."

Detachment 101's Kachins alone had killed 160 Japanese during March 1944. It was the scouts, however, that averted disaster when the Marauder's 2nd Battalion got behind the Japanese 18th Division.

The Japanese counter-attacked the strung-out battalion in force at Inkaingatawng. Detachment 101 scouts twice reported that another enemy force was close and marching up from the south to flank the 2nd Battalion. Unfortunately, the Marauders thought that the “enemy” force was actually the Chinese. Warrant Officer Robert Rhea who “was the only American present who knew our Kachins didn’t exaggerate,” accompanied an OSS patrol to investigate for himself. He knew that when the Kachins said “there was trouble ahead, well there was trouble ahead,” and there was. The already embattled Marauders fell back looking for a more defensible position.

After pausing at the village of Auche, they retreated single-file along a steep, narrow four and a half-mile trail where the Japanese had zeroed in artillery fire. The 2nd Battalion stopped and barricaded itself at the hill town of Nhpum Ga while the 3rd Battalion was positioned at Hsamshingyang to protect a nearby improvised airstrip and to guard against possible attacks down the trail from the north. Father Stuart reported that some shaken Marauders were consoled by having “someone to speak to who had the time to listen to them and who didn’t try to explain to them with a trembling voice and a shaking knees that there was nothing to fear. I was as afraid as they were but I kept my mouth shut. Weeks later ... some of these men ... came and thanked me for giving them confidence.”

Then, a message arrived from fifteen Detachment 101 Kachins dug in a mile below the village.

The Americans had withdrawn through them and they wanted to know what to do. Merrill was unhappy that the Kachins had held their ground while his had retreated. He sent a platoon of Marauders to relieve them. Father Stuart reported, “Up till then (Merrill) had always been rather friendly with us. After that he was merely polite.”

Shortly afterwards, the 2nd Battalion was on the defensive.

The siege of the 2nd Battalion at Nhpum Ga lasted for two weeks. The Japanese cut the trail leading to the 3rd Battalion at Hsamshingyang and only airdropped supplies kept the 2nd Battalion from running out of ammo, water, and food. While the 3rd Battalion attempted to reopen the trail, the 1st Battalion was enroute to help break the siege. Until these forces arrived, the 2nd Battalion was defending against Japanese frantically attacking the Nhpum Ga perimeter. These attacks were especially deadly to the 2nd Battalion's pack animals. Enemy artillery killed many, which after lying in the heat for several days, contributed to the “insufferable” stench. Constant attacks and shelling caused many casualties, which could not be evacuated. And, the Japanese seized the only water supply. The situation grew desperate. It was during the siege that the Lightning Force transitioned into a force-multiplying guerrilla force.

While the Marauders were surrounded, the Lightning Force conducted harassing attacks on the Japanese and cut their supply lines. Nearby Detachment 101 agents reported the movements of Japanese troops in the area. On 3 April, the OSS provided a much-needed morale boost when fifty-five Kachins arrived to strengthen the 3rd Battalion's efforts.

Father Stuart relates that upon hearing the news that the Kachins had arrived, COL Hunter told him that this was the “turning point,” of the siege. As the Marauder unit history describes, “The Kachins were probably of more assistance than
101
SUPPORTS THE MARAUDERS
OSS

Marauder Missions

1
101
SUPPORTS THE MARAUDERS

1. 16 March: Lt. James Tilly and the Kachin Lightning Force engage the Japanese from the rear, allowing the Marauder 1st Battalion to disengage.

2. 15 March: The Marauder 2nd and 3rd Battalions arrive at Knothead’s headquarters at Naubum.

3. 24-26 March: Detachment 101 scouts report Japanese positions west and south of the Marauder’s 2nd Battalion, causing them to withdraw.

4. 28 March-9 April: The Lightning Force helps break the siege of the 2nd Battalion at Nhpum Ga.

5. 10-15 May: Forward attacks villages east of Myitkyina to tie up Japanese troops.

6. 15-16 May: LTs William Martin and William Hazelwood lead the Marauders’ infiltration to Myitkyina.

7. 17 May: The Marauders take the Myitkyina Airfield.

Chindits (BROADWAY)
50 miles

Shingbwiyang
Sharaw Ga
Kantau
Hukawng Valley
Wolawbun
Jambu Bum
Maingkwa
Taro Plain
Taro
Kamaing
Nhpum Ga
Inkangtao
Shagtzup
OSS
OSS
OSS
OSS

Mogoung
Red AO
Knothead AO
Tramp AO

Veritas
FROM THE HUKAWNG VALLEY TO MYITKYINA
24 FEBRUARY - 27 MAY 1944

**MARAUDER MISSIONS**

1. **1ST MISSION** 24 FEB - 7 MAR
2. **2ND MISSION** 11 MAR - 10 APR
3. **3RD MISSION** 27 APR - 27 MAY
4. **CHINESE ADVANCE** 24 FEB - 27 MAY

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5. **10-15 May**: FORWARD attacks villages east of Myitkyina to tie up Japanese troops.
7. **17 May**: The Marauders take the Myitkyina Airfield.
COL Charles N. Hunter (L) led the Marauders at Nhpum Ga when BG Merrill was evacuated after a heart attack on 31 March. Hunter was later the commanding officer of "H" Force that captured the Myitkyina Airfield on 17 May 1944.

Kachin guerrillas could be as young as this twelve-year-old using a Thompson M1A1 submachinegun next to a Marauder in mid-1944.

USN LCDR James C. Luce takes a break from his medical and guerrilla commander duties. He later created and ran Detachment 101’s hospital in its headquarters at Nazira, India.

anyone realized, by creating in the minds of the Japanese an exaggerated idea of the size of the area held by the Marauders and of their strength. By 9 April, the combined assaults of the Marauder’s 1st and 3rd battalions, in addition to the hundreds of Japanese soldiers killed attacking the 2nd Battalion, broke the siege of Nhpum Ga. The Japanese retreated back into the jungle. Acting commander COL Charles N. Hunter, (BG Merrill had been evacuated on 31 March from Hsamshingyang after suffering a heart attack) was full of praise for Detachment 101’s Kachins. He credited them with “saving over two-thirds of Merrill’s forces.”

The siege at Nhpum Ga had caused a serious delay. Even more distressing, the casualties suffered meant that the Marauders had to rapidly reorganize to sustain combat. What remained of the 2nd Battalion was designated as the “M” Force (M taken from its commander LTC McGee), and was supplemented by 200 Kachins from KNOTHEAD. The other Marauder battalions each had a Chinese regiment attached, and were redesignated as “forces.” The 1st Battalion was “H” Force (under COL Hunter) and the 3rd became “K” Force (under COL Henry L. Kinnison). Now, the Marauders could continue their advance.

In early April, the Marauders had left KNOTHEAD’s area of operations and moved closer to that of FORWARD, commanded by LCDR James Luce. He was a surgeon by training and a survivor of the USS Maryland, a battleship sunk at Pearl Harbor. Luce was in charge of eight guerrilla companies; about 1100 men. Like all the Detachment 101 guerrillas, they carried a large number of automatic weapons that provided great firepower. As the Kachins of KNOTHEAD had done, FORWARD’s forces screened the Marauder’s flanks, mined roads, and ambushed Japanese elements patrolling the area. With the advance, elements of some Detachment 101 groups, such as PAT, had to struggle to remain well behind enemy lines. Their response was to move deeper into the Japanese rear areas.

This was a logical strategy, and, as another Detachment 101 group found out in 1945, it was actually safer. “The closer you got to your own lines, the denser the concentration of regular enemy troops … What you met deep in enemy territory were police … trained to fight one on one … Two platoons of … regular soldiers could have defeated my whole battalion … But one of our platoons of forty men could have defeated a force of over one hundred policemen. And our battalion could have taken on a police force of close to a thousand for at least several hours.” The focus on guerrilla warfare had drawbacks for Detachment 101’s ongoing role of intelligence reporting. By April 1944, LTC Peers explained to OSS chief BG William J. Donovan that intelligence collection became secondary to the “sharp increase in the actual combat functions of our patrols.”

To prevent the Marauders’ advance from the west from being discovered, FORWARD began clearing
LT William J. Martin led the Detachment 101 group that helped the Marauders surprise the Japanese at the Myitkyina airfield on 17 May 1944. Villages on the far side of Myitkyina. On 10 May, they lost three Kachins killed in a diversionary attack that tied down an estimated three Japanese battalions. FORWARD's Kachins then assaulted Sadon to the east of Myitkyina on 15 May. They lost three killed and twelve wounded, but killed half of the sixty-five defenders before withdrawing. By then, time was of the essence and the Marauders needed help for the final push to Myitkyina. The numerous engagements with the enemy—particularly at Nphum Ga—had placed them behind schedule. They had to get to Myitkyina before the monsoons arrived.

The Marauders desperately needed help to get to Myitkyina quickly, and unseen. Fortunately, Kachins under the PAT group knew the area well. Particularly active in Detachment 101's role at this critical moment was LTs William J. Martin and William F. Hazelwood group. Under their command was the only Kachin guide who knew the local back trails that the force could follow to the airfield, yet still remain unseen by villagers or the Japanese. As fourteen year-old N’Naw Yang Nau was leading the combined Marauder/Chinese “H” Force on the night of 16 May, disaster struck when he was bitten by a poisonous snake [possibly a cobra or krait]. LT Martin pulled out his poncho to cover himself and the injured Kachin, and used his flashlight to examine the wound. “Sure enough there were two fang marks right behind his toes.” Martin applied a tourniquet and sent word back through the Marauder column for medics to come up. While they waited, the scout had his own ideas of how to treat the wound. His solution was “dig a hole, pour silver rupees in it, put his foot in there, and bury it ... And he would sit there till he either lived or died. So we proceeded to calm him down, dig the damn hole, put a bag of rupees in there ... put his foot on top, and start to fill the hole back up.” Meanwhile, COL Hunter and the medics arrived.

The medics brushed away the dirt and tried to suck out the poison. By then, N’Naw Yang Nau was “woozy” and unable to walk. But, the Marauders were running out of time. They still had to get to Myitkyina unseen, and ahead of the impending monsoon rains. COL Hunter had the scout strapped on his horse and N’Naw Yan Nau managed to lead the Marauder column with “bleary eyed directions” to a bivouac at the village of Namkwi, near the airfield. That mission having been accomplished, LT Martin's group then left their guide to recover, and tried to blow up a Japanese train. They could not reach it in time. Instead, they reported the Japanese working at night on the airstrip to repair damage incurred by day. Meanwhile, the Marauder and Chinese troops rested until daylight.

On the morning of 17 May 1944, the Marauders assaulted, surprising the defenders and quickly captured Myitkyina's main airfield. LT Martin's group helped to clear it of debris, and reported “C-47's were landing on the strip by afternoon.” Individual Marauders praised the Detachment 101 Kachins for the “excellent work that they had done in leading the entire force to the airstrip without contacting [the Japanese] or even letting the [Japanese] know that this large force was in the area.” COL Hunter commended Detachment 101 when he relayed to LTC Peers; “Thanks to your people for a swell job. Could not have succeeded without them.” However, the success was short-lived. LTG Stilwell wanted to give the Chinese the honor of capturing the city, but they bungled their attack. The two columns mistook each other for the Japanese and nearly annihilated one
Stilwell’s Command Problems

101 was instrumental in helping the Allies infiltrate and another. This debacle enabled the outnumbered Japanese guerrillas. Third, Detachment 101’s commander, LTC Peers, established liaison with the principal spearheading field experience had been critical. Detachment 101 had months to learn the battlefield, and its groups had used with agents that had sent back a constant stream of set itself up to support the conventional forces when the significant force multiplier for NCAC and their prior secure the area north of Myitkyina. They became a forces. By using these three elements, Detachment 101 to pull in reinforcements. Only 300 enemy troops had intelligence about the enemy. Second, the OSS teams began a UW campaign by recruiting and training exists of Kachins who spied for the Japanese, meaning that the OSS always preferred ones in which they knew that they were damaging the Japanese. “KNOTHEAD Group-Report April,” 1 April 1944, F 433, B 29, E 154, RG 226, NARA. The USAAF flew up to 170 sorties/day in the Hukawng Valley. According to LT Jenkins, a downed P-40 pilot picked up by Detachment 101, airmen often did not know why they were bombing through tree cover or that they were causing so much damage. They considered these missions a “dull assignment,” and preferred ones in which they knew that they were damaging the Japanese. “KNOTHEAD Group-Report April,” 1 April 1944, F 433, B 29, E 154, RG 226, NARA.

In its first two phases of the campaign, Detachment 101 was instrumental in helping the Allies infiltrate and secure the area north of Myitkyina. They became a significant force multiplier for NCAC and their prior field experience had been critical. Detachment 101 had months to learn the battlefield, and its groups had used the time well. First, they blanketed the operating area with agents that had sent back a constant stream of intelligence about the enemy. Second, the OSS teams began a UW campaign by recruiting and training guerrillas. Third, Detachment 101’s commander, LTC Peers, established liaison with the principal spearheading forces. By using these three elements, Detachment 101 set itself up to support the conventional forces when the Myitkyina offensive began. In so doing, Detachment 101 became the strategic theater asset originally envisioned by BG Donovan when he dispatched the group to Burma in 1942. The next article will show how Detachment 101 employed UW to facilitate the capture of Myitkyina in August 1944.

Endnotes

1 This often-repeated quote is found in Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane, 1948), 106.
2 [Brief Chronology of OSSSU Detachment 101], F 74, B 42, E 190, RG 226, NARA.
5 Carl F. Eisler to William J. Donovan, “Report Covering Period June 1 to June 30, 1943, inclusive,” 1 July 1943, F 1, B 65, E 99, RG 226, NARA.
9 William R. Peers to William J. Donovan, “Report covering period 31 July to 31 August, 1944,” [31 August], F 15, B 34, E 190, RG 226, NARA. See Davidson to Donovan, “Contribution of Detachment 101; OSS, to USAAF in Northeastern Assam and North Burma,” 1 August 1944; William R. Peers to William J. Donovan, “Report covering period 1 February to 29 February, 1944, inclusive,” 29 February 1944, F 52, B 89, E 190, RG 226, NARA. The USAAF flew up to 170 sorties/day in the Hukawng Valley. According to LT Jenkins, a downed P-40 pilot picked up by Detachment 101, airmen often did not know why they were bombing through tree cover or that they were causing so much damage. They considered these missions a “dull assignment,” and preferred ones in which they knew that they were damaging the Japanese. “KNOTHEAD Group-Report April,” 1 April 1944, F 433, B 29, E 154, RG 226, NARA.
10 “Theater Officer’s Pouch Report,” 2 May 1944, F 31, B 75, E 99, RG 226, NARA.
11 James C. Luce, “Background, historical, military and political of the Kachin Hills area,” 28 January 1944; original in author’s possession. The terms Kachin or Jinghpaw are an amalgamation of several minor tribes, the largest being the Jinghpaw; Although most were loyal, plentiful examples exist of Kachins who spied for the Japanese, meaning that the OSS always had to keep a wary eye on their indigenous recruits.
12 Tom Moon interview by Heidi Vion, April 13 1995, Garden Grove, CA. Copy in author’s files.
13 Ralph Henderson, “Jump-In to Adventure,” Reader’s Digest, June 1945, 47.
14 “KNOTHEAD GROUP!” [March-May 1944], F 48, B 38, E 190, RG 226, NARA.
15 Agent Robey to Wilky [William C. Wilkinson], “Introduction (report on travels)” [early 1943], F 495, B 29, E 154, RG 226, NARA.
16 William R. Peers to William J. Donovan, “Report Covering period 1 April to 30 April, 1944, inclusive,” 30 April 1944, F 54, B 110, E 190, RG 226, NARA. Under a policy set up by previous commander, Colonel Carl F. Eisler, the families of the Lightning Force were under the care of Detachment 101. Much like what occurred later in Vietnam’s Central Highlands, families clustered around KNOTHEAD’s main camp. This stretched food supplies leading Peers to order the practice stopped because it interfered with operations. The families/refugees were given the option of being led to

One of LTs Martin and Hazelwood’s Kachins at Myitkyina Airfield, 17 May 1944. Like many Detachment 101 guerrillas, he is armed with a Thompson M1A1 submachine gun.

Marauders of “H” Force take shelter on 17 May 1944 in revetments built to shelter Japanese aircraft. The Marauders had just taken the Myitkyina Airfield. another. This debacle enabled the outnumbered Japanese to pull in reinforcements. Only 300 enemy troops had been in the city on 18 May, but by the end of the month there were more than 2,500. The siege of Myitkyina had begun. To the OSS, this necessitated an unplanned third phase of operations.

In its first two phases of the campaign, Detachment 101 was instrumental in helping the Allies infiltrate and secure the area north of Myitkyina. They became a significant force multiplier for NCAC and their prior field experience had been critical. Detachment 101 had months to learn the battlefield, and its groups had used the time well. First, they blanketed the operating area with agents that had sent back a constant stream of intelligence about the enemy. Second, the OSS teams began a UW campaign by recruiting and training guerrillas. Third, Detachment 101’s commander, LTC Peers, established liaison with the principal spearheading forces. By using these three elements, Detachment 101 set itself up to support the conventional forces when the Myitkyina offensive began. In so doing, Detachment 101 became the strategic theater asset originally envisioned by BG Donovan when he dispatched the group to Burma in 1942. The next article will show how Detachment 101 employed UW to facilitate the capture of Myitkyina in August 1944.
Allied lines, but the “care and welfare of the Kachin refugees was not in any way to influence the actions or policy of this unit.” “KNOTHEAD Group-Report April,” 1 April 1944, NARA.


18 Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 661.


20 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering period 1 February,” 29 February 1944, NARA; Peers advised Merrill to transport the Marauders 125 miles to their jumping off point. Merrill insisted that they go on a conditioning march, but this only contributed to their fatigue. See Peers and Breels, Behind the Burma Road, 141-142. Khe and the singular honor of being made an official member of Merrill’s Marauders; Peers to Donovan, “Report Covering period 1 April,” 30 April 1944, NARA.

21 Sherman P. Joost to Peers, “On or about January…,” 28 May 1944, F 466, B 66, E 190, RG 226, NARA. Another copy can be found in F 2010, B 109, E 154, RG 226, NARA. Joost was the “jack of all trades” in Detachment 101 during the Myitkyina Campaign. As liaison officer to the Air Commando, he went into BROADWAY by glider, was later given command of the DEMOS group and accompanied a Chindit column called the “Dah” force. He later replaced James C. Luce as the Commanding Officer of FORWARD.

22 Stelle was also to provide OSS Intel to Wingate, place OSS equipment and personnel at Wingate’s disposal, find possibilities for Morale Operations, Special Operations and Secret Intelligence work, and perform a tactical Research and Analysis (R&A) function. To perform this mission, Stelle had a crash course in the area that Wingate would go into, as well as familiarization with enemy equipment and the operations of Detachment 101. Charles C. Stelle to Hall, “Activities as OSS Liaison Officer with General Wingate’s Forces,” [June 1944], F 2010, B 109, E 154, RG 226, NARA. For more about the CCA see Troy J. Sascomy, The CC(A)A Waco Glider, Veritas 2/2007.


24 Peers to Donovan, “Report Covering period 1 April,” 30 April 1944, NARA. Detachment 101 later occupied BROADWAY in August after it was abandoned by the Chindits, and used it as an operations base and landing strip to infiltrate/exfiltrate personnel.

25 Stelle to Hall, “Activities as OSS Liaison Officer,” [June 1944], NARA.


27 “Interview with Conley,” 17 May 1945, F 46, B 38, E 190, RG 226, NARA.

28 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering period 1 March,” 31 March 1944, NARA; Peers to Donovan, “Report Covering period 1 April,” 30 April 1944, NARA.

29 James Tilly, untitled report, [March 1944], F 433, B 29, E 154, RG 226, NARA.


33 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering Period 30 September to 31 October, 1944,” 1 November 1944, F 17, B 34, E 190, RG 226, NARA. See “Report by Father Stewart [sic].”

34 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering Period 30 September to 31 October, 1944,” 1 November 1944, F 17, B 34, E 190, RG 226, NARA. See “Report by Father Stewart [sic].”

35 “KNOTHEAD GROU,” [March-May, 1944], NARA; Peers to Donovan, “Report Covering period 1 April,” 30 April 1944, NARA.

36 “KNOTHEAD Group-Report April,” 1 April 1944, F 433, B 29, E 154, RG 226, NARA.


39 Peers to Donovan, “Report Covering period 1 April to 30 April, 1944, inclusive,” 30 April 1944, F 54, B 40, E 190, RG 226, NARA.


41 “KNOTHEAD Group-Report April,” 1 April 1944, F 433, B 29, E 154, RG 226, NARA.

42 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering Period 30 September,” [1 November 1944], NARA. See “Report by Father Stewart [sic].”

43 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering Period 30 September,” [1 November 1944], NARA. See “Report by Father Stewart [sic].”

44 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering Period 30 September,” [1 November 1944], NARA. See “Report by Father Stewart [sic].”

45 Merrill’s Marauders, 75-76.

46 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering Period 30 September,” [1 November 1944], NARA. See “Report by Father Stewart [sic].”

47 The Merrill’s Marauders War In Burma: Volume 1 (Merrill’s Marauders Association, 1995), 25.

48 Anonymous, Merrill’s Marauders, 75-76.

49 “KNOTHEAD GROU,” [March-May, 1944], NARA.


51 Roger Hillsman, American Guerrilla: My War Behind Japanese Lines (Crawfordsville, Indiana: Brasseys’s, 1990), 170-171.

52 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering period 1 April,” 30 April 1944, NARA.


54 William J. Martin interview by James Luce, 8 August 1988, Oregon, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files.


56 Peers to Donovan, “Report covering Period 30 September,” [1 November 1944], NARA. See “Report by Father Stewart [sic].”


58 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, 229, 232.