SFC Ethyl W. Duffield explains the 60 mm mortar to the Bolivians.
The 8th Special Forces Group (SFG), Special Action Force (SAF), Latin America, had been tasked by the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Panama in early April 1967 to prepare a Mobile Training Team (MTT) for a classified mission. The MTT was to organize and train a 650-man Bolivian Ranger Battalion in basic and advanced individual military skills, basic and advanced unit tactics, COIN (counterinsurgency) operations, and conduct unit cadre training for the unit officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in nineteen weeks. Major (MAJ) Ralph W. “Pappy” Shelton, the selected commander, was to organize, prepare, and deploy a large mobile training team (MTT designated BL 404-67X) for that mission as soon as possible. Master Sergeant (MSG) Oliverio Gomez, the team sergeant of Team 11, A Company, was selected by COL Magnus L. Smith, the group commander, because he had a wealth of combat experience. He wore the CIB (Combat Infantryman’s Badge) with two stars that signified three awards in three wars: World War II; Korea; and Vietnam.\(^1\)

MAJ Shelton had several immediate tasks: to select an executive officer; to provide mission prep guidance for the MTT forming; to coordinate a site survey with the U.S. Military Group (MILGP) in La Paz; and to identify personnel to accompany him to Bolivia who would stay there as his advance echelon (ADVON). Because arranging the site survey took the most time, he chose another Korean War veteran, Captain (CPT) Edmond L. Fricke to be his Deputy. Korea and Vietnam veteran Master Sergeant (MSG) Roland J. Milliard, an Intelligence Sergeant, and SFC Hector Rivera Colon, a Heavy Weapons Sergeant from Puerto Rico, were identified to be the advance echelon (ADVON). Lieutenant Colonel Eldred E. “Red” Weber, a First Special Service Force veteran of WWII and deputy group commander, led the site survey team to Bolivia on 6 April while the rest of the team was being formed at Fort Gulick in Panama.\(^4\)

CPT Fricke recruited officers and MSG Gomez chose sergeants from nominees provided by the A and B Company sergeant majors. Numbers and military occupational specialties (MOS) had been specified by Shelton.\(^3\) “The team composition was strictly seat-of-the-pants reasoning. I thought that there would be much more classified message traffic and liaison with MILGP and the Bolivians. Hence, we were heavy on ‘commo’ personnel with higher security clearances and brought an extra officer. Since every SF NCO was cross-trained, it worked out,” recalled the MTT commander.\(^6\) I talked with some senior sergeant friends in each company to get their recommendations for personnel and to cross-check everyone. Then, I met each man individually to get a ‘feel’ for him and to find out what secondary skills he had. That proved very useful when we started training in Bolivia,” said MSG Gomez.\(^7\)

While MSG Gomez and CPT Fricke were getting a team assembled in Panama, LTC Weber, MAJ Shelton, MSG Milliard, and SFC Rivera Colon had gone to Bolivia. They were being briefed on the Bolivian armed forces organization by the Army MILGP personnel in La Paz. A list of recommended arms, ammunition, radios, and the equipment necessary to organize the new Ranger unit based on a U.S. Army WWII infantry battalion TOE (table of organization and equipment) was compiled. Requisitions were sent to SOUTHCOM in Panama to be filled from regional war stocks.\(^5\)
Most importantly, MAJ Shelton ran into a Panama friend, Captain “Hoss” McBride, 605th Air Commando, 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), Howard Air Force Base (AFB), Canal Zone, who was training Bolivian Air Force T-28 pilots in close air support at Cochabamba. McBride had established a lot of connections in Bolivia. An Army officer from the MILGP accompanied them to Santa Cruz. The Americans flew into the dirt airstrip at Santa Cruz. There they met the 8th Division commander, COL Joaquin Zenteño Anaya, and conducted a reconnaissance of the area.7 At the 8th Division cuartel the Americans met some of the conscripts being assembled to fill the new Ranger unit.10

The first training site recommended, Guabirá, was too populated and lacked space to conduct small unit maneuvers and marksmanship training. A second proposal, an abandoned sugar mill on the outskirts of La Esperanza, seven miles from Guabirá at the end of a farm road, was more remote. The mill contained sufficient buildings to house the battalion and the American training team, structures for confidence exercises, and the surrounding terrain seemed ideal for small arms marksmanship and crew-served weapons ranges. Since the small, 100-150 person village was at the end of a primitive road, the site was sufficiently isolated. Security could be maintained. The townspeople were friendly. While MSG Milliard and SFC Rivera Colon were walking the terrain around the mill choosing possible training sites and range locations, COL Zenteño Anaya confirmed that the area would be available.11

Satisfied that La Esperanza would do, the Americans returned to La Paz. After getting LTC Weber and MAJ Shelton off to Panama on 11 April, Sergeants Milliard and Rivera Colon drove back to Santa Cruz. It was a long three days of hard driving via Cochabamba. “We drove down in a jeep. It was worse than driving that ‘wonderful’ Pan American Highway to Panama. The potholes were huge and rivers had washed away large portions of the road. It took several hours to find safe fording sites,” said MSG Milliard, the MTT O&I sergeant.12 From a hotel in Santa Cruz the two SF sergeants began to coordinate support, arranged to have the firing ranges built, and prepared for the main body arrival two weeks later.13

“It became obvious when we got to Santa Cruz that MILGP personnel in La Paz had not been there and knew nothing about the Army in that locale,” said MSG Milliard. “Hector (Rivera Colon) and I made sketches and took a lot of notes during our reconnaissance. La Esperanza had open areas 400-500 meters wide, sufficient dead space for combined arms training (mortars and light machineguns), and enough vegetation to cover tactical movement. We kept a low profile. I talked with MAJ Shelton on the telephone to keep him posted on our progress. The 8th Division sent
troops to La Esperanza to secure the training site. By the time the main body arrived, city newspapers were carrying stories about Che Guevara.”

Fortunately, an American company had been contracted to build roads in the area. The Paul Hardeman Construction Company had bulldozers, road graders, and other heavy equipment on hand. Sergeants Milliard and Rivera Colon met with Harry Singh, the director of operations, to explain what they needed and to obtain estimated construction costs. Singh, another friend of CPT “Hoss” McBride, proved to be a great supporter of the SF mission. While MSG Milliard and SFC Rivera Colon were working in Bolivia, the assembled SF MTT was preparing for the mission.

When MAJ Shelton was in Bolivia, CPT Fricke and MSG Gomez collected related programs of instruction (POIs), lesson plans, and some training aids. A footlocker full of U.S. Army field manuals in Spanish were gathered from the U.S. Army School of the Americas at Fort Gulick. The two leaders had chosen the remaining members of the MTT. “CPT Fricke got the other officers, CPT James Trimble, the S-1/S-4 (administration & logistics) officer and CPT Margarito Cruz, the S-2 (intelligence) officer (801st MI Detachment, 8th SAF) to prepare to teach staff procedures to the Bolivian officers assigned to the Ranger Battalion,” remembered SSG James Hapka, one of the assigned medics. First time MTT assignees got guidance from the veterans in their units.

“Once we were selected for the MTT, the senior NCOs of A and B Company oversaw individual preparations. Then, we went into isolation at Battery Randolph, the abandoned WWII coast artillery site on Fort Gulick.

This was standard procedure for missions and exercises,” said Sergeant (later Staff Sergeant) Wendell P. “Thom” Thompson, a radioman on A-16, B Company. “I was single and available. We were issued a Collins KWM2A commercial single sideband radio. It was a tremendous radio [Morse Code (CW) and voice communications] compared to the AN/GRC-109 radio. Because radiomen dominated the team, I wanted a training assignment rather than being stuck on radio watch. When the major gave me .45 cal pistol training, I was happy.”

Another radioman had these memories.

“I was a single radioman at the time. Whenever I went into Colon, Panama, on pass, I paid the bar girls to talk Spanish with me for a drink. The contract Spanish language course in Washington, D.C., ‘DLI-East,’ [Defense Language School (vice the real one in Monterey, CA) – East] had been a total waste of time. CPT Duane Boyer, a Sioux Indian in B Company, briefed me on the mission. We were to train troops from the northern highlands of Bolivia in the southwest lowlands. Personal firearms were
not allowed. The MTT was classified SECRET. The 8th SFG signal company would operate a SIGCEN (signal center) while we were in Bolivia. One of the SF communicators ‘spilled his guts’ in the V.F.W. (a favorite SF watering hole outside of Fort Gulick). He was replaced the next day. The senior radio operators signed for encryption books and SOIs (Signal Operating Instructions). I read the Bolivia area handbook. I remember reading that every male in the countryside usually carried a gun,” said SGT Alvin E. Graham. “We expected to run a 24-hour radio watch so we packed a lot of batteries. A few AN-PRC-6s were brought along for internal communications during the tactical training and to have contact with the ranges.”

The SF medics had to be ready to support themselves and the Bolivian trainees for six months. The American SF medics, Staff Sergeants (SSG) Jerald L. Peterson and James A. Hapka, would have to deal with virtually all American injuries and illnesses in country. SSG Hapka explained, “The training site at La Esperanza was quite remote. Emergency air medical evacuation from Bolivia was very unlikely. Pete (SSG Peterson) and I researched the endemic diseases using a World Health Organization reference and the Merck Manual for prophylaxes and surgical procedures for parasites; scorpion, spider, and snakebites; gunshot; and explosion-caused trauma injuries. We knew what training was to be conducted in southwest Bolivia. Hepatitis B, Yellow Fever, and Chagas Disease were rampant. Everyone on the MTT would get Gamma Globulin and Yellow Fever shots. Supposedly malaria had been eliminated in Bolivia, but mosquito nets would be used.”

Note: The Armed Forces Pest Management Board maintains a Living Hazards Database by country. “Not much known” dominated the treatment for bites and information on the more than thirty poisonous snakes (hemotoxic, myotoxic, and neurotoxic), bees, spiders, and scorpions in Bolivia today.

“Basic field medic and emergency medical treatment training was standard for us. Each team member was responsible for teaching classes in his specialty. Since we were all cross-trained, Pete got compass and map reading and I was assigned camouflage and concealment classes. Our basic load of medical supplies was 90 days, but we carried extra and planned for a resupply,” remembered SSG Hapka. When MAJ Shelton returned to Panama from the site survey, he shared what information the MILGP had provided and clarified the MTT mission. MAJ Shelton briefed the assembled team in Battery Randolph. “We were to organize, equip, and train a group of 600 newly conscripted soldiers. They were not a unit, but we were going to make them into one and it would be a Ranger Battalion. The training site would be an abandoned sugar mill. Shelton didn’t have many details. He showed us the area on a photo imagery map. The duration of the mission was 179 days and we would fly from Howard Air Force Base to Bolivia (Santa Cruz) on two C-130 Hercules on 29 April,” said SSG Hapka. “We were not briefed in great detail, but we knew from the start that we were going to train the Bolivians to combat an ongoing insurgency,” said SSG Jerald Peterson.

After his first encounter with the MILGP, Shelton realized that he should expect little more than weapons, ammunition, and equipment for the Rangers from the
Battery Randolph team isolation site before MTT.

MILGP in La Paz. “If we didn’t make commo with them regularly, we’d be out of sight, out of mind. Our life line would be 8th Group in Panama. Official visitors would fly into Santa Cruz; mountain ranges separated the widely separated cities and there was only one main highway connecting them. To get to La Paz from Santa Cruz by road, you drove to Cochabamba. There was no real road to La Paz from Santa Cruz,” said the MTT commander.39

“The major compiled a list of necessities, gave it to MSG Gomez, who was an extremely experienced and organized soldier, and simply told him to ‘fill in the blanks,’” recalled MSG Al Graham, a radioman.40

29 April 1967 arrived quickly. Early that morning a small convoy of 2 1/2 ton trucks and a bus departed the 8th SFG area at Fort Gulick for Howard Air Force Base, fifty-five miles away on the Pacific side of Panama. Two U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules medium transports awaited them. Fourteen soldiers, personal and team equipment, training materials (from paper targets to manuals), and an estimated six months of canned and boxed food almost filled both airplanes to capacity. “As we were taxiing out for takeoff with the ramp open, MSG Gomez leaned over to me and said, ‘You should have brought your VW bug. There’s plenty of room on the ramp. We’ll probably need it down there.’ I had to laugh because I’d sold it just before we left Gulick,” said MSG Al Graham.41 8th SFG MTT- BL 404-67X was off to Bolivia. ♦

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

2 MSG Oliverio Gomez was a WWII (32d Infantry Division), Korean War (1st Cavalry Division), and Vietnam (1st SFG) veteran with three awards of the Combat Infantryman’s Badge. Oliverio Gomez, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 12 November 2008, Pacific Grove, CA, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Gomez interview with date.

3 Gomez interview, 12 November 2008.


5 CPT Fricke was a former Staff Sergeant, a Korean War veteran of the 189th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT), and a Ranger Department instructor. Daniel V. Chapa interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 18 April 2008, Fort Bragg, NC, Digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Chapa interview with date.


7 Gomez interview, 14 November 2008. Staff Sergeant (SSG) James A. Hapka, A Company, 8th SFG, was the Medical Specialist (“junior” medics) on Team 11 and MSG Gomez was his Team Sergeant and golfing buddy in Panama. James A. Hapka, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 3 November 2008, Lawton, OK, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Gomez interview with date.


9 Shelton interview, 1 October 2008.

10 Ryan, The Fall of Che Guevara, 91.


18 Wendell P. Thompson, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 7 January 2008, Cleveland, OH, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Thompson interview with date. SGM Wendell Thompson was drafted in 1962 and served first as a Military Policeman (MP) in Kerat, Thailand. After going through Special Forces radio training in 1964, he was assigned to 8th SFG in Panama. While there, he met and joined SFC Daniel Chapa, 8th SFG, on the U.S. Army Southern Command (USASOC) rifle team. When Chapa was sent to Bolivia to replace SFC Hector Rivera Colon, he asked MSG Oliverio Gomez to allow newly promoted Staff Sergeant (SSG) Thompson to help him with weapons training. Thompson interview, 20 December 2007.


20 Alvin E. Graham, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 October 2008, Phoenix, AZ, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Graham interview with date.


22 Jerald L. Peterson, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 6 April 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Peterson interview and date and Peterson email to Dr. Briscoe, Subject: Personal Bio dated 28 November 2008, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

23 Hapka interview, 3 November 2008.

24 Hapka interview, 3 November 2008.

25 Armed Forces Pest Management Control Board, Living Hazards Database, Bolivia at afpm-webmaster@osd.mil.

26 Hapka interview, 3 November 2008.

27 Hapka interview, 3 November 2008.

28 Daniel V. Chapa and Jerald L. Peterson, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 11 April 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Chapa and Peterson interview with date.

29 Shelton interview, 1 October 2008.

30 Graham interview, 16 October 2008.

31 Gomez interview, 12 November 2008.
“Today a New Stage Begins”: Che Guevara in Bolivia

by Robert W. Jones, Jr.
On 7 November 1966, Ernesto “Che” Guevara began his diary with the entry, “Today a new stage begins.”1 Disguised as a bald man with large glasses, Che using the name Adolfo Mena González, an Organization of American States researcher, entered Bolivia to launch a revolution.2 He had dreamed of bringing his version of revolution to the heartland of South America while he was fighting in the Sierra Maestras of Cuba a decade earlier:

“I’ve got a plan. If some day I have to carry the revolution to the continent [South America], I will set myself up in the selva [forest or jungle] at the frontier between Bolivia and Brazil. I know the spot pretty well because I was there as a doctor. From there it is possible to put pressure on three or four countries and, by taking advantage of the frontiers and the forests you can work things so as never to be caught.”3

Foco Theory in a Thumbnail

Based on the Cuban revolutionary experience Che Guevara’s Foco Theory had three major tenets:

1 - A small cadre of agile and dedicated fighters becomes a “vanguard” or foco raising popular discontent against a government.
2 - The foco can then increase and manipulate the discontent, leading to a general revolt against the government.
3 - The best place to begin the fight is from rural areas and then expand upon gaining strength.1

Endnotes

1 Ernesto Guevara (introduction by Marc Becker), Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998).
2 Daniel James, Ché Guevara A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1969), 129.
3

Cuba became the advocate of “wars of national liberation” when 400 delegates of the newly formed Organization of Solidarity of Asian, African, and Latin American Peoples (called the Tricontinental) met in Havana in January 1966. A central topic of discussion was Che Guevara’s revolutionary concept. Fidel Castro publicly committed himself to this new international revolutionary movement and subsequently created the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) to control and coordinate revolutionary activities in the Western Hemisphere, with Cuba in a leadership role.4

Within this new framework, Che Guevara was given a major role in coordinating a revolutionary act in South America. Following his failure in the Congo, Che needed time to recover. While abroad he had become an international Communist “boogy man,” mysteriously disappearing and reappearing. U.S. and allied intelligence agencies searched for him in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Colombia.

Che firmly believed that the only way to break free of imperialist oppression was to involve the United States. Multiple simultaneous uprisings in Latin America would lead to the final defeat of the ultimate enemy, the United States. “It is the road of Vietnam; it is the road that should be followed by the people; it is the road that will be followed in Our America... The Cuba Revolution will today have the job of... creating a Second or Third Vietnam of the world.”5 His dilemma was where to start.

Che considered several countries, particularly Peru and his native Argentina. However, Bolivia seemed to be the best candidate, based on Cuban intelligence reports and his personal experiences. As a young man traveling through Latin America, Che stopped in Bolivia in 1953, the year after the Bolivian Revolution and was impressed by the move toward radical social reforms. Since then he became convinced that politicians, generals, and the United States had corrupted the Bolivian Revolution. However, Che’s intelligence regarding Bolivian social conditions in 1967 was highly inaccurate.

Two Bolivian communists, Roberto “Coco” Peredo Liegue and Guido “Intí” Peredo Liegue, were his primary sources of misperception. They reinforced his earlier analysis during visits to Cuba in 1962 and again in 1965.6 They, like many other Bolivian communists, related stories of widespread dissent with the regime of President Rene Barrientos. They ignored the fact that Barrientos had won the election with more than 60% of the vote.7 Guevara accepted the popular consensus that the Bolivian military was one of the most poorly organized in Latin America.8 All of these elements convinced Che that Bolivia was the best candidate for a foco.

A copy of Che’s false Uruguayan passport identifying him as “Adolfo Mena González.”

Che’s revolution would begin in the corazón, the “heart” of South America – Bolivia.9 The Cuban revolutionary experience in the Sierra Maestras would be the template to spread insurgency throughout the South American continent. First, the foco would be established with Cuban leadership and military support. Second, after organizing his foco, building base camps and a logistical cache, and training guerrillas would begin. Then small groups of guerrillas, using “hit and run” tactics, would harass the Bolivian Army and police. As the guerrillas became more effective, the Bolivian army had to disperse to protect towns and infrastructure. This strategy made the Army even more vulnerable to attacks. As this Cuban-led revolutionary vanguard grew in strength it would gain more support from the campesinos, farmers, and miners.
Victories would demonstrate their ability to defeat the army and improve their legitimacy.

Eventually, the foco would gain enough strength to strike three of Bolivia’s major cities: Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Sucre. Once the guerrillas isolated or controlled these cities, they effectively split the country. Part of the strategy would be to sever the railroad line to Argentina and the major oil pipeline between Santa Cruz and Camiri, further isolating the country.¹⁰

As the guerrilla movement gained strength and momentum, Che was convinced that the United States would send military advisors as they did in the Republic of Vietnam. Conventional units would follow the advisors. Che hoped to increase U.S. military obligations in Latin America. As the second and third “Vietnam” erupted, the American army would rapidly exhaust itself in a vain attempt to support counterinsurgency efforts.¹¹ From Inti Peredo’s perspective: “As they become incapable of defeating us, the U.S. Marines will intervene, and imperialism will unleash all its deadly power. Then our struggle will become identical with the one being waged by the Vietnamese people.”¹² This was only a beginning to foster regional insurgencies.

Once the Bolivian guerrilla vanguard was firmly established, it would train and support other revolutionary movements (focos) in Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The Peruvian foco was scheduled for the end of 1967. Eventually Che predicted that the Bolivian foco would defeat the government and, like Cuba, establish a revolutionary government. The focos still needed support, and Bolivia would become a sanctuary for the various groups. Bolivia would be the first to fall, triggering subsequent collapses to create a South American “domino effect.”

There were several elements in the organization of the Bolivian foco. The nucleus was the Cuban revolutionary fighters. The majority of the foco would be locals, drawn from the ranks of the Bolivian Communist Party (BCP). The combined element would be called the Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Bolivia (ELNB, or National Liberation Army of Bolivia). The ELNB had to plan and build a large support network. Cuba provided the monetary and weapons support for the ELNB. Behind the scenes was a network of agents collecting intelligence and providing logistics assistance, some of whom had been in place for years. The majority of the clandestine support apparatus was built around Cuban agents coordinating with the Bolivian Communist Party in La Paz. However, there were two key foreign players, Haydée Tamara Bunke Bider and Régis Debray who played significant roles as special agents for the Bolivian foco.

A young woman of dual Argentine-East German nationality, Haydée Tamara Bunke Bider was best known by her code-name, “Tania.” After meeting Che Guevara in East Germany in 1960, she became enthralled with his revolutionary ideas. Tania subsequently traveled to Cuba where she became active in the Cuban revolutionary movement and was recruited and trained as an agent for the Bolivian mission.¹³ Tania went to Bolivia in 1964 under the alias Laura Gutiérrez Bauer to establish contacts among the Bolivian upper class. In her cover as a researcher of indigenous folk music and as a German tutor for wealthy children, she began collecting strategic and tactical information.¹⁴ Through her network of contacts and Communist “fellow travelers” Tania obtained Bolivian press credentials for Che Guevara, Régis Debray, and Ciro Roberto Bustos (a Cuban agent from Argentina).¹⁵ In La Paz she hosted a radio advice program for the lovelorn and used it to send coded messages to Cuban intelligence. Tania was a triple agent who also worked for the Soviet KGB and the East German secret police, the “Stasi.”¹⁶ The importance of her role in the Bolivian foco has become almost as mythologized as that of Che Guevara. The second “agent provocateur” was a French intellectual.

Régis Debray was a Marxist theorist and “wannabe” revolutionary in his mid twenties. The Debray family was wealthy and well connected and enjoyed a high position in French society. His father was a prominent lawyer and his mother served on the Paris city council. He had obtained a position as a professor of philosophy at the University...
of Havana.\textsuperscript{17} While he was there he wrote, \textit{Revolution Within a Revolution}, chronicling the Cuban Revolution as the harbinger of a new revolutionary model for Latin America and the world.\textsuperscript{18} Cuban intelligence sent him to Bolivia to write a geopolitical analysis and gather intelligence.

Debray traveled to Bolivia in September 1966 posing as a journalist and professor “whose mission is to make a geopolitical study of the chosen zone in the Beni.”\textsuperscript{19} His travels did not go unnoticed “he [Debray] had been sighted moving around the Bolivian countryside—in Cochabamba, in the Chapare and in the Alto Beni—all regions that had been under discussion by the Cubans as possible guerrilla sites.”\textsuperscript{20} He collected maps and answered Che’s questions through intermediaries in Cuba.\textsuperscript{21} Simultaneously, other agents supporting the effort made arrangements for the foco.\textsuperscript{22}

Following the template for the Cuban Revolution, agents purchased a ranch/farm in Bolivia to serve as a foco base. In June 1966 the Peredo brothers bought a 3,000-acre farm for 30,000 Bolivian pesos (about $2,500) near Nancahuazú in the rugged southeastern region of Bolivia. It was dubbed the casa calamina (the “zinc house” or “tin house” for its shiny metal roof). Located fifty miles north of Camiri, the Nancahuazú farm sat in a very rough environment in a sparsely populated area.\textsuperscript{23}

Recruitment of Bolivians for the foco began in the summer of 1966. Mario Monje Molina, head of the Bolivian Communist Party, promised twenty men from his organization. Moisés Guevara Rodríguez, the Maoist mine labor leader, was another source of manpower.\textsuperscript{24} While the Bolivians would form the bulk of the new insurgency, Che planned to use Cuban veterans to train and lead the local recruits until they could assume responsibility for liberating their country.\textsuperscript{25} Recruiting was a constant problem for the Cuban-led organization.

The Cuban veterans began infiltrating from Havana through various Eastern Bloc countries. They then continued their journey using new identities and false passports to enter different Latin America cities before slipping into Bolivia.\textsuperscript{26} The incremental deployment of the Cubans lasted through 1966. Che Guevara entered Bolivia on 3 November 1966.\textsuperscript{27}

Che Guevara’s revolutionary dream was to liberate the Latin American people independent of Soviet influence. This supported the \textit{Tricontinental} philosophy of an alliance of revolutionary
Some of the Key Guerrillas and Their Nicknames/Pseudonyms

One confusing aspect of Che’s Bolivian Diary is the number of pseudonyms or nicknames used by the group members. Many had two or more nicknames. It is not known if this was a security move to disguise the names or to conceal the number of guerrillas.

Ernesto “Che” Guevara de la Serna = Ramón, Mongo, Fernando, Fernández

Régis Debray = Dantón, El Frances, Debre

Haydée Tamara Bunke-Bider = Tania, Maria, Mary, Tamara, Laura

Juan Vitalio Acuña Nuñez = Joaquin, Vilo

Ciro Roberto Bustos = Carlos, Palao, Mauricio

Juan Pablo Chang Navarro = Chino, El Chino, Francisco, Emilio, Emiliano

Octavio de la Concepción de la Pedraja = Moro, El Médico, Morogoro, Munganga, Mugambo, Tavito

Moisés Guevara Rodríguez = Armando, Guevara, Moisés

José María Martínez Tamayo = Papi, Ricardo, Chinchu, Mbili

Roberto Peredo Liegue = Coco

Guido Alvaro Peredo Liegue = Inti

Jorge Vázquez Machicado = Bigotes, Loro, Jorge

Harry Villegas Tamayo = Pombo, Carlos

A typical village in the Ñancahuazú area. In this area any stranger would be immediately noticed.

governments in the Western Hemisphere with Fidel Castro as the ideological leader. As he waited in Cuba, Che was not alone in looking for the next revolutionary fight. Several of his compatriots from the Sierra Maestras volunteered. Of the seventeen Cubans who accompanied him on the Bolivian mission, five were “commandantes” in the Cuban army; seven others were officers of lesser rank, and one was the chief of the Border Police. This nucleus of veterans formed the Bolivia foco.

Che Guevara thought the struggle in Bolivia could last “seven to ten years,” and prepared for that eventuality. Construction of a permanent foco base began less than one kilometer from the farmhouse. Che Guevara supervised the digging of underground caves and storage caches, and the building of an open-air classroom, a kitchen, and a dispensary. The guerrilla support organization smuggled supplies, ammunition, and weapons into the camp from La Paz, over 400 miles away. As the finishing touches were being applied to the foco base camp, Che directed that a second camp be built farther away from the farmhouse. Upon his arrival, Che realized that the farm was not as isolated as he had been led to believe. Their nearest neighbor, Ciro Algarañaz, made several unannounced visits, offering to sell pigs and chickens. He suspected that the group was building a cocaine factory because of the frequent day and night vehicular activity. In the sparsely populated remote area the numerous visitors attracted unwanted attention. The farm was compromised, but the Cubans remained.

The guerrillas settled into a daily routine. Supplies were carried up from the farm. Che instituted a robust education program for the guerrillas that included history, political economy, mathematics, Spanish, French, and Quechua. Only then did he realize that although Quechua was the dominant Indian language, it was spoken in the Bolivian highlands to the south and west. The local population in the Ñancahuazú region spoke Guarani. The men began to treat the foco base as their home. The veterans committed numerous security violations: photographs were taken; diaries were kept;
and radio messages were sent almost daily. Visitors added to the complacency.

Mario Monje, the Bolivian Communist chief, visited the camp for a strategy meeting on 31 December. An ideological and strategic clash between Guevara and Monje erupted over command and control of the foco. The exasperated Monje issued an ultimatum to Che: “The conversation with Monje began with generalities, but he quickly came down to his fundamental premise, stated in three basic conditions: 1) He would resign as party leader but would obtain its neutrality, and cadres would be brought for the struggle; 2) He would be the political and military leader of the struggle as long as it was taking place in Bolivia; 3) He would handle relations with other South American parties, trying to persuade them to support liberation movements.” Che agreed to the first and third points, but he immediately dismissed Monje’s second proposal, replying that: “I was to be the military chief and I was not going to accept ambiguities on this matter. Here the discussion ended stalled in a vicious circle.” Monje then took his case to the Bolivian guerrillas and issued them an ultimatum: Stay and be purged from the party; or leave with him. “Everyone stayed, and this seemed to be a blow to him,” wrote Che. Monje hastily left for La Paz the next day, disappointed at the turn of events, but promised to return. The breach with the Bolivian Communist Party was irrevocable and effective January 1967. It refused to actively support the ELNB. The lack of recruits would haunt Che throughout his entire campaign.

As training, classes, and supplies were stockpiled in January 1967, the guerrilla band experienced further problems. Several became ill because of the new field diet and the hostile environment. The area was plagued with biting pests. “The insects we have seen, up to now, are yaguasas [a gnat like insect], gnats, mariguís [a yellow winged biting insect], mosquitos, and ticks,” wrote Che. The Cubans gave the Bolivian recruits menial tasks and resentment soon developed. However, Che settled the issues and the group slowly began to coalesce. Suddenly, more trouble arrived at their doorstep.

On 19 January 1967, the local police showed up unexpectedly at the farmhouse. A four-man Bolivian police unit in civilian clothes arrived in an unmarked truck to investigate Ciro Algarrañaz’s claim that the farm was a cocaine factory. The police found nothing suspicious, but confiscated a pistol. The police lieutenant solicited a bribe and then left with an invitation to come to the police station to retrieve the pistol. Apparently satisfied, no more police were heard from for almost two months. Despite all of the interest, Che persevered with his plans and continued the train-up program.

The Long March – 1 February – 20 March 1967

Guevara quickly realized that no one was familiar with the local terrain and the maps provided by Debray were inaccurate. He decided that a conditioning march was needed to accomplish his three goals: “to harden them, teach them how to adapt themselves to the rigors of guerrilla life such as hunger and thirst; to get to know the peasantry, and start winning them over, to establish a base of popular support in the region; and finally, to explore the
terrain in order to familiarize themselves with it and try to broaden their territorial base.\textsuperscript{44}

With the two camps complete by the end of January, they could start the march. Che organized the \textit{foco} of 24-men (sixteen Cubans, one Argentine, and only seven Bolivians) into two equal fighting groups. He further organized for the march designating a vanguard, center, and a rear-guard element. \textit{Comandante} Juan Vitalio Acuña Nuñez (Joaquin) was appointed the second-in-command of the \textit{foco}.\textsuperscript{45} Because of their inexperience, the Bolivians were not given leadership positions. Che emphasized that over time their status would change with experience and ultimately they would become the leaders of the \textit{Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Bolivia}.\textsuperscript{46}

Their equipment had come from Cuba or been bought in Bolivia. A high-powered short wave radio, packed on a mule was the communications link with Havana via coded messages. Their weapons consisted of a mix of civilian rifles, \textit{US-made M-1 rifles and carbines, Bolivian Mausers, and Czech ZB-30 light machineguns}. The eclectic mix would match the hodgepodge of Bolivian Army weapons which, according to Che’s plan, would be captured once fighting began.\textsuperscript{47}

The guerrillas began their planned 25-day conditioning march on 1 February. It lasted a grueling 48 days, a harbinger for the coming campaign.\textsuperscript{48} The group was attacked by insects and bad weather. Four of the Cubans suffered from bouts of malaria, including the doctor. It quickly became apparent that no one was physically ready for the rigors of guerrilla combat, including their leader. The physical stamina of the 38-year-old asthmatic revolutionary had diminished considerably since his days in the Sierra Maestras ten years earlier.\textsuperscript{49} Three weeks into the march Che wrote: “A bad day for me. I was exhausted and made it through will-power alone.”\textsuperscript{50} The tough terrain beat down the entire group.

Their maps proved very inaccurate. The rugged terrain exhausted Che and his men. The group regularly became separated and radio communications failed in the canyons. Disaster struck while crossing rain swollen rivers. Two men drowned, and valuable supplies and weapons were lost.\textsuperscript{51} The lack of food added to their misery and weakened them further. Scavenging for edible plants and hunting animals for food became a daily routine as they slowly wandered through the area. Everything from small birds, monkeys, sparrow hawks, and finally their own horses made the menu. Rather than unify them, the hardships of the march increased stress and caused dissension and daily arguments between guerrillas.\textsuperscript{52}

In their few brief encounters with locals, Che’s \textit{foco} only became more frustrated. The \textit{foco} failed to gain any support from the local population. The few Bolivian guerrillas from the \textit{altiplano} had difficulty understanding the Guaraní dialect. The \textit{campesinos} were curious, but they did not respond to the revolutionary fervor of the strange band of foreigners. Many of the peasants were there because government land reforms had given ten-hectare homesteads (about 25 acres) to 16,000 families.\textsuperscript{53}

After being lost most of the march, the demoralized and exhausted guerrilla force stumbled into the base camp on 20 March. The coded messages from Radio Havana had been tape-recorded to maintain contact with Cuba.\textsuperscript{54} Che recorded a disturbing omen in his diary: “a small plane was circling overhead.”\textsuperscript{55} Their “conditioning march” had not gone unnoticed, and reports had reached Bolivian authorities. There would be no time to rest.

The Guerrilla Offensive 23 March – 20 April 1967

The “Long March” was over and the action was about to begin. Reports of a strange group of armed men roaming the countryside had trickled into Camiri, Santa Cruz, and eventually to La Paz. This made the local police and army more suspicious of the Ñancahuazú farm.

While the exhausted guerrillas were recuperating, they received more visitors. Moisés Guevara arrived with several Bolivian recruits; most were unemployed miners looking for a change and a paycheck. However, Pastor “Daniel” Barrera Quintana and Vincent “Orlando” Rocabado Terrazas quickly became disenchanted with the primitive living conditions and camp discipline. Leaving to hunt game on 11 March 1967, they simply deserted. Arrested by the police when they tried to sell their rifles in Camiri, they revealed the Ñancahuazú guerrilla camp location and other details under interrogation. The police went to the Fourth Army Division headquarters in Camiri with their information. At first the division commander, Colonel Humberto Rocha
doubted them, “Guerrillas in Ñancahuazú, with Che Guevara as their leader? Impossible!” However later that same day an oil worker (Epifano Vargas) arrived to report an encounter with strange speaking men in green clothing carrying automatic weapons and claiming to be geologists. With a second report, Colonel Rocha ordered aerial observation of the Ñancahuazú site (the plane Che had seen) and sent a patrol to verify the information. On 17 March, the patrol reached the farmhouse and discovered various documents, including the diary of Israel Reyes Zayas’ (Braulio), various photos, and drawings. The soldiers captured another Bolivian, Saulstio Choque, apparently trying to desert with a mule. The would-be guerrilla and the intelligence items from the farm were brought back to the 4th Division headquarters at Camiri. Now the government had hard evidence on the guerrillas who were still three days march from the foco base.

Unbeknownst to Che, the guerrilla logistics and intelligence networks were compromised and completely broken by the Bolivian intelligence services. Tania had escorted Régis Debray and Ciro Roberto Bustos (Che’s “coordinator” for Argentina and a journalist and artist) to the camp. Taking separate routes the trio rendezvoused in Camiri. From there Coco Peredo drove them to the Ñancahuazú camp. However, Tania left her jeep parked on a deserted street in the town. The vehicle, with La Paz license plates, attracted police attention. They searched it and discovered a wealth of information about Che’s foco, including four of Tania’s notebooks listing the entire Bolivian network of urban contacts, friendly Communists outside of Bolivia, and secret money accounts. Within the week, Communist safe houses throughout Bolivia were raided and many of the contacts arrested. Whether by design or stupidity, Tania, the experienced operative with East German, Soviet, and Cuban agent training, had compromised the operation through her actions.

Greatly disturbed by the Army’s discovery of the base camp, Che assessed the situation. After learning that Tania’s jeep and its contents had been discovered, Che was infuriated: “Everything appears to indicate that Tania is spotted, whereby two years of good and patient work is lost.” With her cover destroyed he had no choice but to keep Tania with the foco. Outside support was effectively cut off, except for radio messages from Cuba. Civilian transistor radios were now their only link to the outside world.

Other reinforcements had come to the camp. Juan Pablo “El Chino” Chang Navarro and two other Peruvians arrived to offer twenty men for training in Bolivia. Che promised to support his Peruvian foco with weapons, radio transmitters, and “$5,000 a month for ten months.” The strategy meeting with El Chino was cut short when “Loro appeared and announced that he had killed a soldier.”

The revolution was beginning ahead of schedule.

With his foco base discovered, support denied by the Bolivian Communist Party, and his supply network compromised, Che Guevara chose to take the offensive. Major Hernán Plata led a sixty-man patrol to the base camp on 23 March 1967. En route the guerrillas ambushed the force. They killed seven soldiers, captured fourteen (including four wounded), while the rest fled southward. More importantly they captured 16 Mausers with 2,000 bullets, three 60mm mortars and 64 rounds, three Uzi submachine guns with twenty-four magazines, two “bazookas” (rocket launchers), and a .30 caliber machinegun with two belts of ammunition. The prisoners were interrogated and endured a political speech. Stripped of their clothes, they were freed a day later. The guerrillas’ baptism by fire was a success.

Instead of immediately abandoning the foco base Che had his guerrillas regroup at the camp and joyfully listened to transistor radio broadcasts of their victory. The remaining days of March were spent consolidating the force and
preparing for further operations. The foco had reached its maximum strength of 45 combatants, (16 Cubans, 24 Bolivians, 2 Argentines, and the 3 Peruvians. Not all of the Bolivians on the “Long March” impressed Che. On 25 March he “announced the ‘discharge’ of Paco, Pepe, Chingolo, and Eusebio. They were told that they will not eat if they do not work. I suspended their tobacco ration, and redistributed their personal things and gear among other, needier comrades.”

The “discharges” for these “quitters, slackers, and drags” was a technicality; the hapless Bolivians had to stay with the foco and continue to work. The “visitors,” Tania, Debray, and Bustos, remained with the guerrillas as “non-combatants,” although they were armed. “The famous author of Revolution in the Revolution, known to us as Danton [Régis Debray], wanted to demonstrate that he was not simply a theoretician but also a man of action,” said Inti Peredo.

The guerrillas departed Nancahuazú on 1 April 1967 and proceeded to raise havoc with the Bolivian army. During April as the group moved, it twice encountered army patrols southwest of Nancahuazú between El Meson and Muyupampa. On 10 April near Iripiti (only 12 miles north of the original camp,) the foco conducted two ambushes on the same day, killing eight, wounding eight, and taking 28 prisoners. They captured 21 M-1 Garand rifles, 12 M-1 carbines, 9 Mausers, 4 M-3 submachineguns, another mortar, and one Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR). They now had more weapons than they needed. A Cuban, Jesús Suárez Gayol (“Rubio”), one of Che’s best officers, was killed, but the foco had successfully foiled the Bolivian army.

The guerrilla force then turned south. En route to Muyupampa, Che divided his small force. On 17 April north of that town (roughly 30 kilometers,) he detached the rearguard under the command of “Joaquin” (Juan Vitalio Acuña Nuñez). Inti Peredo noted, “We knew that Joaquin’s group did not have combat strength, with 4 “rejects,” 3 ailing comrades receiving care [Tania, Moisés Guevara, and a third guerrilla], and only 10 others who had to carry the load of the entire operations.” (Note: there is doubt concerning the numbers in Joaquin’s rearguard – numbers vary from ten to seventeen). Staying at the village of Bella Vista for two or three days, the rearguard was to rest and wait for the return of Che’s vanguard from the south.

As the vanguard moved through the countryside, the guerrilla’s presence became well known to the locals. Helped by some curious children, George Andrew Roth, an Anglo-Chilean freelance journalist, wandered into the guerrilla bivouac on 19 April. Debray and Bustos quickly concocted a plan to leave the group with Roth. Debray was anxious to leave after experiencing the realities of revolutionary life. His three-week indoctrination to guerrilla field operations convinced Debray that his best contribution was writing theory. After they left, Che wrote: “The Frenchman stated too vehemently how useful he could be on the outside.” As the three set out for Muyupampa, the rest of the vanguard moved away. Little did Che know how significant the events surrounding 20 March would become to the foco.

Robert W. Jones, Jr. is an historian assigned to the USASOC History Office and is a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army. A graduate of the University of Washington, he earned his MA from Duke University and his MS from Troy State University. Current research interests include Special Forces in Vietnam 1960–1966, military government and civil affairs, special operations in World War II, Operation JUST CAUSE, and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
Endnotes

6 James, Che Guevara, 288-289; Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 66-67; Guido “Inti” Alvaro Peredo and his brother Roberto “Coco” Peredo, will be referred to by their nicknames throughout this article.
8 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 64-66.
9 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 327.
10 James, Che Guevara, 212.
11 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 68-69.
13 James, Che Guevara, 200-204.
16 Harris, Che Guevara, 212-213.
17 Anderson, Che Guevara, A Revolutionary Life, 694-695; Ignacio, Guevara, Also Known as Che, 465 and 469; James, Che Guevara, 212-213.
18 James, Che Guevara, 213; Ignacio, Guevara, Also Known as Che, 488.
19 Harris, Che Guevara, 204; Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 77.
20 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 72-77; Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (New York: Seagull Books, 2008), 406; James, Che Guevara, 209; Guevara did just as Fidel Castro had done with the 26th of July Movement ten years earlier. On a small farm in Mexico he had started training for their invasion of Cuba. In Bolivia, the isolated farm would be the birthplace of the new foco.
21 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 75.
22 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 65; Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, 402.
24 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 78.
25 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; James, Diaries, 73.
26 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 79; James, Guevara, 220-221.
27 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 78.
29 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 78.
30 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 78.
32 James, Che Guevara, 216; Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 78.
33 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 79; James, Guevara, 220-221.
34 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 78.
35 Harris, Che Guevara’s Last Mission, 78.
36 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 78.
38 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
39 Weil, Area Handbook, 349.
40 James, Che Guevara, 222-227.
41 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 54-55.
43 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; James, Diaries, 73.
44 James, Che Guevara, 216-217; James, Diaries, 108.
46 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
50 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
52 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
54 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
56 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
57 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
60 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
64 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
70 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.
73 Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 113; Waters, The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara, 146-147.