After intense weeks of training at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Army’s four newly created Ranger Infantry companies parted ways after their December 1950 graduation. While the 1st Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) was rushed to Korea by air, the 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies were shipped by train to San Francisco for a slower journey to war. The 3rd Ranger Company was left behind to train Ranger companies to support all active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard divisions.

The 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies maintained unit integrity on board the train carrying them across the country to their port of embarkation. The only exceptions to the unit separation were the cooks, who were all consolidated to operate a single dining car. During the long train ride west, Rangers in both companies began to refer to themselves as “Buffaloes”—simply as an inside joke rising from a city-born Ranger’s mistaken identification of longhorn steers for buffalo.

At Camp Stoneman near San Francisco, California, the Rangers exchanged some weapons and received winter clothing, the sum total of which was pile inserts for their field jackets. The 2nd Company, at least, granted no passes to visit the city while it awaited movement orders to ship aboard the USTS General H. W. Butner. The two Ranger companies joined a large group of military families on the transport ship for the long trip to Japan. Beyond Hawai, rough North Pacific seas reduced movie and meal attendance among the Rangers, but the increasingly cold weather helped the men acclimate for Korea.

When the USTS Butner arrived at Yokahama, Japan, on 24 December, the two slightly overstrength Ranger companies (5 officers and 105 enlisted soldiers authorized) were met by their executive officers, Lieutenants James C. Queen and John Warren, who had been flown ahead to Japan. The companies loaded their equipment and boarded a train for Camp Zama, northwest of Yokohama, where they celebrated Christmas.

On the 29th of December 1950, the two Ranger companies boarded C-46 Commando and C-47 Skytrain transports at nearby Tachikawa Air Base to fly to K-2, an
Combat actions at Changnim-ni, Tanyang, Andong, and Majori-ri had reduced the 2nd Rangers to an effective strength of sixty-three men by the end of January 1951. These North Korean artillery pieces were abandoned near Tanyang.

By then, Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) in Korea and the United Nations forces had withdrawn below the 38th Parallel. The 4th Rangers joined the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division at Kimpo Air Base near Seoul. The 2nd Rangers were attached to 7th Infantry Division (ID) elements near Tanyang.4 Major General (MG) Edward M. Almond, the X Corps commander, directed that the 2nd Ranger Company “be moved up as rapidly as possible and employed.” Thus, by nightfall on 4 January 1951, the 2nd Rangers were part of the 32nd Infantry Regiment defensive line near Tanyang. After X Corps had been evacuated from Hungnam, General Almond had deployed the 7th ID near Tanyang as part of a defensive line across the peninsula to stem the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) and North Korea Peoples Army (NKPA) counteroffensive. Just before dawn on 6 January 1951, the 2nd Rangers fought their first combat action, from defensive positions abutting a railroad tunnel near the village of Changnim-ni.5

By the end of January 1951, combat actions at Changnim-ni, Tanyang, Andong, and Majori-ri had reduced the 110-man company to 63 combat effective soldiers. The high number of frostbite cases prompted the 7th ID to finally issue pile caps and rubber galoshes for the Rangers’ boots. Although vastly understrength for the mission, MG David Barr, the 7th ID commander, followed General Almond’s directive that all black soldiers assigned to the division be temporarily assigned to the 2nd Ranger Company for basic tactical training.7

The task of providing basic combat training—from individual soldiering skills to company-level infantry tactics—to all 7th ID black replacements was rotated among the three 2nd Ranger Company platoons.8 Those Rangers not serving as cadre supported the offensive operations of the 17th Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Ch’un ch’ong. On 22 February 1951, the 2nd Rangers were alerted to join the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) for a future parachute operation. 4th Ranger Company was also alerted. First Lieutenant (LT) James B. Queen, the 2nd Ranger executive officer, and Corporal (CPL) William Weathersbee, the operations sergeant, were driven by Private First Class (PFC) Lester James to K-2 Air Base to establish liaison with the 187th ARCT.9

By this time, Chinese and North Korean armies were withdrawing north under pressure from counterattacking American and United Nations forces. To support a IX Corps offensive on 22 March (Operation RIPPER), EUSA had ordered an airborne assault north of Seoul to cut off retreating Communist forces. Operation HAWK called for the 187th ARCT and two Ranger companies to seize key objectives at the north end of the Ch’un ch’ong Basin on 20 March in order to block that escape corridor, and link up with the 1st Cavalry Division moving northwest. The city of Ch’un ch’ong was an important supply and communications point with a good road network in the center of the basin. When Lieutenant General (LTG) Matthew B. Ridgway encountered lead elements of the 1st Cavalry in Ch’un ch’ong during an aerial reconnaissance on 19 March, he canceled HAWK. The objective for the airborne assault was moved further north to Munsan-ni, and the execution date changed to 23 March. The replanned assault was named Operation TOMAHAWK.10

Operation TOMAHAWK was the first combat parachute jump ever made by Rangers. The airborne assault was about twenty-four miles northwest of Seoul, near Munsan-ni. The 187th ARCT mission was to smash the withdrawing NKPA 19th Rifle Division against two tank infantry task forces from the 3rd Infantry Division that would come north on the Seoul–Kaesong Highway (Task Force GROWDEN) and the Seoul–Uijong-bu Highway (Task Force HAWKINS).11 Concerned about personnel shortages, Captain (CPT) Warren E. Allen, the commander of the 2nd Rangers, had sergeants begin checking daily troop trains for airborne-qualified personnel and wounded Rangers returning from hospitals.12

Newly promoted 1LT Albert Cliette, 3rd Platoon leader, was discovered on a train headed back to the 7th ID. Wounded in the leg while “attacking some nondescript hill” in the Ch’un ch’ong operation, Cliette had been evacuated to a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital near Pusan. “When the guys told me about the Munsan-ni operation, I grabbed my .45 caliber Thompson submachine gun and field gear and jumped off that train. It was to be a combat jump—the paratrooper’s dream,” said Cliette. “1LT Bernard B. Pryor,
Operation RIPPER was the IX Corps offensive against North Korean and Chinese forces in March 1951. In three weeks, enemy forces were pushed back twenty-five miles north of Seoul.

the 1st Platoon leader, wounded in the same action as me, had fought with Merrill’s Marauders in Burma during World War II. His steel helmet saved him from being killed by a sniper’s bullet that punched clean through the lieutenant bar on the front. Fortunately, the bullet, slowed by the helmet liner, just plowed across the top of his skull, neatly parting his scalp. Because the top of his head was super-sensitive afterwards, Pryor couldn’t wear a helmet. He couldn’t jump without a helmet so he was put in charge of bringing the individual ‘A and B bags,’ supplies, mess team, and two Korean officer interpreters to the drop zone aboard a truck convoy. Unsure about the Korean attachments, they tried to reassure us by saying, ‘Do not worry about us. We watch you guys and do what you do. Everything OK.’

By 28 February 1951, the 2nd Rangers had joined the 4th Rangers at K-2 Air Base, near Taegu, for Operation TOMAHAWK. Attached to the 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry, the Rangers were assigned to a group of squad tents next to an apple orchard. “There was no dispersion of the units, just row after row of tents. Air attack did not appear to be a concern,” said Sergeant (SGT) Joe C. Watts of the 4th Ranger Company. “The tents had straw-filled mattress ticks for sleeping.”

“I knew it would be a combat jump when the MPs [military police] locked the K-2 airfield gate behind us,” said PFC Donald Allen, an original recruit from K Company, 3rd Battalion, 505th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The Rangers and the 187th dedicated two weeks to preparing for the mission. The Rangers practiced small unit infantry tactics from squad to company level; zeroed their rifles, carbines, Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), and .30 caliber M-1919A6 light machineguns; and fired the two-part 3.5-inch antitank rocket launchers and 60 mm mortars. The officers focused on learning 187th ARCT standing operating procedures (SOP). The 4.2-inch heavy chemical mortar, fougasse (a field-expedient jellied gasoline explosive in fifty-five gallon drums), and aerial resupply were also demonstrated by the 187th. Only supplies and ammunition would be airdropped during Operation TOMAHAWK. Planning was aided by the terrain sand table that CPL Weathersbee built. During the Rangers’ stay at K-2, replacements from the States arrived to fill losses.
To facilitate unit assembly after the parachute assault, the 2nd Rangers painted gold and silver parachute wings on the sides of their helmets, as First Lieutenant Al Cliette (above) has for his Silver Star award ceremony.

The 187th Infantry “Rakkasans” marked their helmets with a divided half-round pattern: 3rd Battalion had three vertical bars, 2nd Battalion had two bars, and 1st Battalion had one bar, while the Headquarters half-round remained solid white.

The 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies jumped on Munsan-ni from World War II-vintage C-46 Commando aircraft. The planes had a distinctive “pregnant guppie” fuselage shape, and two sets of doors: the smaller right-side door was for parachutists, while double doors on the left side facilitated loading heavy equipment.

Before being used for jumps in the Korean War, the C-47 SkyTrain, carried cargo over the Burma Hump into China, and conveyed the bulk of Allied paratroopers and gliders to Normandy on D-Day June 1944.

A four-engine C-54 Skymaster led the airborne armada to the Munsan-ni North and South Drop Zones, and provided command and control for the assault.

ILT Antonio M. Anthony, who received a battlefield commission with the 92nd ID in Italy during World War II, brought thirty black airborne Ranger replacements from Fort Benning, Georgia. The 7th Company in the Army Ranger Training Command had a black platoon specifically to provide replacements to the 2nd Rangers. When the men arrived, they were spread throughout the company. At a special 187th ARCT jump school, two 7th ID black soldiers, tactically trained by the 2nd Rangers, also became airborne qualified.

On 16 March 1951, the 2nd Ranger Company conducted two practice jumps using the daily C-46 mail aircraft. These were the unit’s first jumps since leaving Georgia. Before these training jumps, the Rangers practiced parachute landing falls off the back of the 2½-ton mess truck. Shortly after the practice jumps, the rains came.

Inclement weather delayed the scheduled airborne assault. While they waited for the weather to clear, the 2nd Rangers painted large parachute badges on the sides of their steel helmets. The silver “jump wings” were painted on a black oval background with a thin gold border—the black and gold of the Army Ranger shoulder tab insignia. Helms of the 187th ARCT (“Rakkasans”) were painted with a white “rising sun” half-round pattern on the sides for easy identification—solid for the Regimental headquarters; 1st Battalion had one vertical divider; 2nd Battalion had two vertical dividers; and 3rd Battalion insignia had three dividers. These helped paratroopers scattered in the air to assemble into units after landing.

Following 187th SOP, individual weapons were jumped “exposed”—wedged under straps of the T-7 parachute harness and reserve parachute “belly band.” Even .30 caliber BARs and 3.5-inch rocket launchers were jumped exposed on A-frame boards. The canvas (Griswold) weapons...
C-119s flew in “V of V” formation for the airborne assault on Munsan-ni.

Leaflets depicting invading paratroopers and tanks surrounding enemy positions implored North Korean and Chinese troops to surrender. Such leaflets and safe conduct passes proved effective tools against soldiers often pressed into service by the Communists, and were utilized at Munsan-ni.

Containers that required taking weapons apart were not used. Most Rangers “were loaded for bear” when they jumped. Private Billy Thrasher, a 4th Ranger BAR man, carried eighteen magazines of .30 caliber ammunition, four fragmentation grenades, and two 57 mm antitank rounds. The Rangers, like the 187th “Rakkasans,” wanted to be ready to fight as soon as they cleared their parachutes.

The twelve door bundles in A-22 canvas containers kicked out by each company had colored parachutes: pale yellow with bright yellow stripes for the 2nd Company’s light machineguns, mortars, and ammunition; and yellow with red stripes for the 4th Company. After the jump, Rangers made scarves and lined their wool blankets with parachute silk to keep warm. Though a combination of camouflage, white, and colored parachutes became available, the camouflage silk was the most popular.

On 21 March eighty C-119 transports from the 437th Troop Carrier Wing at Ashiya Air Base, Japan, and fifty-five C-46 and C-47 aircraft from the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron at Brady Air Base, Japan, were assembled at K-2 to support two combat air assaults on 23–24 March. C-119s typically carried forty-six men in two “sticks” of twenty-three men each, fifteen monorail bundles, and four door bundles. The C-46 and C-47 aircraft carried twenty to twenty-eight paratroopers and three door bundles each. The C-119 aircraft scheduled to carry heavy drop loads (75 mm pack howitzers and 105 mm artillery, ¼-ton Jeeps and trailers, ¾-ton weapons carriers, ammunition, water, and supplies) had their rear clamshell doors removed prior to departing Japan. The large troop carrier armada was led to the drop zone by a C-54 Skymaster four-engine transport, piloted by Brigadier General John P. Henebry, the 315th Air Division commander. Just before separating to board their aircraft, CPT Allen gathered the 2nd Rangers together for a moment of silent prayer, and then wished them well.

On Good Friday, 23 March 1951, at 0750 hours, in the second aircraft serial five, eight World War II era C-46 Commando transports took off from K-2 carrying the 2nd and 4th Ranger companies. The three 187th parachute infantry battalions and the 674th Airborne Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm, 75 mm, and quad-.50 caliber antiaircraft artillery guns) flew in new twin-boomed C-119 Flying Boxcar transports and the C-47 and C-46 aircraft. The armada of 140 air transport planes flew out over the Yellow Sea, arranged themselves in nine-plane staggered “V of V” formations with separation between serials, and then headed inland to the two drop zones. While the troop carriers were en route, the two drop zones and the Seoul-Munsan road were bombed and then strafed by sixteen F-51 Mustang fighter-bombers intent on eliminating reported enemy antiaircraft artillery sites in the area. Surrender leaflets had been dropped on several locations in and around the area several days before the operation in order to deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the paradrops.

Surrender leaflet drops and two broadcast C-47s (“The Voice” and “The Speaker”) were effectively employed to support the airborne operation. On 19 March, 250,000 leaflets were dropped over Hungsu-ri. Bad weather on 20 March prevented leaflet operations, but the next day, 750,000 were dropped on Sariwon. On the 22nd, another 250,000 were scatter-dropped from Mindong to Sokkyo-ri, and over Ch’un ch’ong. Aerial broadcasts warned civilians to stay away from Communist troops and installations at nine different points in North Korea.

The 2nd Rangers and 2nd Battalion, 187th ARCT, jumped at H-hour—0900 hours local time—on Drop Zone North. 4th Rangers, in the same serial, jumped five minutes later. In about fifty minutes, some thirty-five hundred paratroopers, equipment, and several batteries of howitzers and antiaircraft artillery were dropped on Drop Zone North. Stars and Stripes Pacific reporters jumped with the 4th Rangers. In the midst of searching for their 60 mm mortars, light machineguns (“light thirties”), and the ammunition bundles, and attending to jump injuries, the men of the 2nd Ranger Company were surprised when paratroopers of the 1st Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry, began dropping on Drop Zone North.

The 1st Battalion was supposed to jump to the southeast on Drop Zone South, near its objectives. Because the lead aircraft with the battalion commander aboard developed engine problems, his replacement airplane inadvertently became the unofficial single airplane “Sixth Serial,” and was the only 187th ARCT dropped on Drop Zone.
South. Having noted the obvious 1st Battalion foul-up, the Rangers hurried to their assembly areas, picking up some surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes on the way for souvenirs.  

Yellow marker panels identified the 2nd Ranger Company assembly area on the northwest side of Drop Zone North. The 4th Ranger Company was to gather at a green panel highlighted by green smoke. The additional use of smoke turned out to be a bad idea, because green smoke was the ground signal for a “Go” on the parachute drop and was used five times for the five airdrop serials. Thus, the sign built to be displayed after the jump with the words, “Have no fear, the Rangers are here,” was lost in the green smoke—as were many of the 4th Rangers trying to find their assembly area.  

While a Psywar C-47 was broadcasting around the two drop zones from low altitude, General Douglas A. MacArthur watched the ground activity from high overhead in his Lockheed C-121 Constellation aircraft. LTG Matthew B. Ridgway landed on Drop Zone North in an L-5 liaison aircraft, just before 1st Battalion was mistakenly dropped there. The general managed to escape just as the next flight began dropping paratroopers.

The Psywar C-47 overflew the drop zones after the last airdrop serials to broadcast warning messages telling the North Korean and Chinese troops that they were surrounded and cut off from retreat or aid. The C-47 also dropped another 750,000 surrender leaflets emphasizing the parachute and tank envelopment. After the airborne drop, over a hundred enemy soldiers appeared waving these safe conduct passes.

In the course of three days, 1.3 million more leaflets were scattered on the enemy north of Uijong-bu, caught between the 187th ARCT advance to the east and the I Corps northward drive. One leaflet was specifically addressed to the Chinese 78th Division, whose flank had been exposed by the withdrawal of the NKPA First Corps. The first North Koreans captured had these surrender passes, and after that, the numbers capitulating were so great that paratroopers and Rangers stopped counting. Still, the assembling paratroopers and Rangers had to eliminate pockets of resistance near their assembly areas.

First Sergeant (1SG) Lawrence D. West, one of the first Rangers to arrive at the 2nd Company assembly area located by an orchard, spotted two enemy machinegun positions overlooking the assembly area. Gathering a group of early arrivals, 1SG West, and 1LT “Big Jim” Queen, who was carrying an M1 Garand, ordered bayonets “fixed” and proceeded to attack the two machinegun positions before the enemy could react. Two Communist soldiers were killed, and two more were wounded and captured. The two 36th Regiment, 19th North Korean Division, soldiers were the first prisoners of war taken during Operation TOMAHAWK. Other North Koreans abandoned stockpiled ammunition and rations, fleeing with just their weapons. In addition to the two prisoners of war, the Rangers turned over a Russian Maxim .31 caliber heavy water cooled machinegun to the 187th ARCT S-2. Having eliminated the immediate threat, the 2nd Rangers assembled, got accountability (verified the presence of all personnel and critical equipment), and moved to clear the village of Sandokso-ri en route to their primary objective, Hill 151.

Sergeant First Class (SFC) James E. Freeman, acting 1st Platoon leader, led the attack on the Communist forces in the village of Sandokso-ri. The Rangers fixed bayonets and assaulted. The attack was fast, violent, furious fight that resulted in six enemy soldiers killed and another twenty captured. Before momentum was lost, Captain Allen prepared to seize Hill 151, the unit’s primary objective. The North Koreans were direct-firing 76 mm artillery at the 674th Field Artillery Battalion positions on Drop Zone North. The company 60 mm mortars were brought out.
The narrow valley running northeast from Munsan-ni afforded the Rangers and “Rakkasans” a relatively small margin of error in hitting their drop zones. The wet, uneven surface and the rice paddy dikes provided a less than ideal drop zone.

up to “prep” the hill. As the mortar barrage began, 1LT Queen and SGT Marion “Mighty Mouth” Austin, the communications sergeant with the AN-GRC 9 radio, verified their location on the unit’s only map and called the U.S. Air Force for close air support.

At approximately 1030 hours, the 2nd Rangers, supported by their 60 mm mortars and several F-51 Mustang fighter aircraft, commenced to attack Hill 151. The strafing Mustangs, with shark teeth painted on their engine cowlings, came in so low over the attacking Rangers that the shell casings raining down from their six .50 caliber machineguns bounced off the men’s steel helmets. PFC William Van Dunk, a Ranger replacement from Fort Benning (originally with the 80th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division), fell wounded in the thigh just as the assault started. SFC Daniel Boatwright and SGT Smead Robertson were also wounded clearing the objective.

After consolidating and reorganizing on Hill 151, the wounded were collected for evacuation to the 60th Independent Indian Field Ambulance Unit on Drop Zone North. The airborne medical team had dedicated U.S. Air Force Sikorsky H-5 helicopters for serious injuries. As SGT Boatwright, SGT Robertson, and the attached 187th ARCT medic, moved back down Hill 151 to collect PFC Van Dunk for medical evacuation, they found him dead from shock.

The turbaned Indian Army medics created quite a stir among the American paratroopers and Rangers. PFC Patrick J. “Paddy” Purcell, 4th Ranger Company, was knocked unconscious when he landed. When the Irishman regained consciousness, he regaled later, “Here was a large black-bearded Indian medic cutting my parachute harness off. I could remember thinking before the jump, ‘Good Friday—it was no better time to be in the sky close to God.’ Sure and Bejesus I knew I was going to meet my maker, but I didn’t know that he would be black.” Men with jump injuries and combat wounds were treated swiftly by the Indian doctors and medics, placed in the patient pods of the H-5 helicopters, and then whisked away. Twenty minutes later they were unloaded at a field hospital in Taegu.

While the 2nd Rangers had great success on 23 March, the 4th Ranger Company, encountering stiff resistance on their objective—Hill 205—did not enjoy the same good fortune. In fact, as the 2nd Rangers were linking up with the tank-heavy Task Force GROWDEN at 1848 hours that day, the 4th Rangers had pulled back into a night defensive perimeter below their objective after two unsuccessful assaults.

“Those guys had a tough time,” said 1LT Queen, who talked afterwards with their executive officer, 1LT John Warren. “Every time the assaulters threw a grenade up the hill, the enemy caught it and tossed it back at them. Hill 205 had steep sides, and only a single exposed trail went to the top. That objective was really tough.”

Huddled against a slight depression at the base of the vertical butte, the enemy continually dropped grenades down on the 4th Ranger attackers. The narrow base of the concave refuge quickly eroded into a very steep, slippery moraine that extended more than a hundred feet to the rice paddies below. The Rangers “climbed deep into their steel helmets as they hugged the depression wall,” trying to survive the constant falling grenades. Fortunately, most were concussive rather than fragmentary. Hill 205 was key terrain that favored the North Korean defenders.

Ranger SGT Joseph C. Watts, Jr. remembered: “That hill stuck up there like the obstacle it was, jutting and seemingly pointing toward the clear blue sky.”

“Rakkasan” PFC Robert Schusteff had oriented himself in the air by locating Hill 205—the most prominent terrain feature on the northernmost tip of Drop Zone North. The south side of the butte, much like those in the American Southwest, was vertical, with a view of
As part of Operation R IPPER, the 23 March airborne assault—Operation TOMAHAWK—took place northwest of Seoul near Munsan-ni. Accompanying the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team—the “Rakkasans”—the 2nd and 4th Rangers made the first ever Ranger combat parachute jump. The drop altitude was nine hundred feet above ground level, but the terrain at the north end of Drop Zone North gradually rose in height. The rise was so significant that all paratroopers were warned not to jump after the Red Light came on, because aircraft would bank away to the northeast to avoid higher elevations to the northwest. Once on the ground, the 2nd Rangers’ objective was Hill 151 and the 4th Rangers’ was Hill 205.30

Drop Zone North; the north side had been sharply cut by the Imjin River, which was over a hundred feet below. On Hill 205, “best described as a hill on a hill,” the stubborn defenders poured a heavy volume of small arms fire down on the attacking Rangers, while the 674th Field Artillery Battalion on Drop Zone North provided little assistance that first day.

Sixteen sorties of close air support—F-80 Shooting Star jets and F-51 Mustang fighters—fired rockets, delivered napalm, and strafed Hill 205 with .50 caliber machinegun fire the next morning. With such heavy air support, the 4th Rangers took their objective that afternoon. In their
“first bleeding,” the 4th Rangers had suffered one man killed (CPL Frederick Manship) and nine men wounded in action.\textsuperscript{48} In the meantime, the 2nd Rangers had been shifted to support Task Force GROWDEN, which had been sent to join the 1st Battalion, 187th ARCT, in the vicinity of Drop Zone South. The tank-heavy task force had suffered significant losses moving to Munsan-ni, and was glad to have the Rangers perform advance guard for them.

Task Force GROWDEN had lost four M46 medium Patton tanks, two Jeeps, and an armored scout car to enemy antitank mines, and two more Pattons to NKPA artillery as the task force traveled to join the 187th ARCT.\textsuperscript{49} Still, the linkup proved to be a reunion for the black officers in the 2nd Rangers. Lieutenants Van Exel and A.C. McLean, two of the tank company commanders (6th Medium Tank Battalion) in Task Force GROWDEN, had served in the 758th Tank Battalion of the all-black 92nd ID in World War II, and later in the all-black 64th Tank Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The number of black officers in the Army during World War II and Korea was very small; almost everyone knew one another from Officer Candidate School days at Fort McClellan, Alabama, or through prior service together.\textsuperscript{50}

A 2nd Ranger platoon was detailed to augment security for the road-bound M46 tanks. They were welcomed aboard the tanks as the heavy vehicles lumbered off in the darkness to find the 1st Battalion, 187th ARCT, marching to join its battalion commander on Drop Zone South. The 1st Battalion objectives were attacked a day late.\textsuperscript{51}

The rest of the 2nd Ranger Company established a perimeter defense on Hill 151, organized combat patrols, and sent foraging parties to Drop Zone North for rations, water, parachute silk, and to find ILT Pryor with the land convoy. The 2nd Ranger Company, like the 187th “Rakkasans,” had jumped with “horseshoe bedrolls”—a GI wool blanket and poncho wrapped in half of a canvas “pup tent” (shelter half)—typical of the adage, “Travel light, freeze at night,” because temperatures in that region still dropped below freezing in late March. Just before dark, the 187th ARCT convoys arrived from Taegu, as a heavy fog settled in the low areas.\textsuperscript{52}

From 24 to 27 March, the 2nd Ranger Company (-) patrolled in advance of the 3rd Battalion “Rakkasans” as they moved east to gain control of Highway 33. This “highway” paralleled the railroad, and was a major north–south route into Seoul. By the afternoon of 27 March, the 4th Ranger Company was operating on the left flank of the 2nd Rangers. On 28 March, the 2nd Rangers met advance elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division (ID), pushing north along the highway. Following the 3rd ID linkup, the final 2nd Ranger mission with the 187th ARCT was to provide security for A Company, 64th Tank Battalion. Elements of the 4th Rangers had been providing security for a 674th Field Artillery Battalion battery when they were released from attachment to the 187th ARCT.

While the 2nd Rangers arranged their usual ad hoc transportation aboard trucks and began the journey from Suwon to Taegu, the 4th Rangers boarded Korean “40 x 8” (forty men or eight horses) boxcars for the trip home. The 2nd Rangers arrived at Taegu in the early morning hours of 31 March 1951. It took several days to get all of their individual equipment back from Munsan-ni. They then rejoined the 7th ID on 7 April to resume training black soldier replacements.\textsuperscript{53}

The 2nd Ranger Company trained black replacements for 7th ID until early May 1951. The initial tasking was to give fifty-two black replacements two weeks of basic infantry training. Then, another seventy-eight soldiers were attached, followed by eleven more, and so on. By 30 April 1951, the 2nd Ranger Company morning report...
F-80 Shooting Star jets and F-51 Mustang fighters provided close air support to the 2nd Ranger and 4th Ranger assaults on Hills 151 and 205.

The 2nd Rangers provided advance guard security for the M46 Patton medium tanks of Task Force GRODEN after they joined the 187th ARCT at Munsan-ni.

reflected 125 men assigned, and 282 men attached for training. This was, in fact, a reduction from the peak of 440 attachments on 24 April.54

Following the basic training model in the Army, 2nd Rangers formed specialized instructor groups and rotated replacements through formal programs of instruction. CPT Allen organized committees to teach infantry tactics (from the fire team to company level), rifle marksmanship, tactical radio classes, and soldiering skills. He added “a good dose” of bayonet, hand-to-hand, and physical fitness training. The length of basic combat training had been reduced so drastically in the U.S.—to fill the understrength post-World War II divisions and offset wartime casualties—that replacements arrived in Korea lacking basic soldiering skills. 1LT Queen even tasked a black bandsman to learn Communist Chinese Forces bugle calls using a captured manual.55

In return for the additional training duty, the 2nd Ranger Company received a small quid pro quo. MG Claude B. Ferenbaugh, who replaced General David G. Barr, allowed CPT Allen to select ten Ranger replacements. Washington DC, the hometown of 1LT Queen, proved to be the common denominator among those selected to stay in the 2nd Rangers. Queen knew many of them from his days as a Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps colonel.56 Integration was late coming to X Corps while MG Almond commanded in Korea. Still, the 2nd Rangers managed to keep an attached white medic, PFC Frank Russo, throughout the replacement training.57

For more than three months (mid-February to late April 1951), the four 2nd Ranger platoons rotated between training replacements and serving on the 7th ID combat outpost line. On 23 April 1951, after a major Chinese offensive against the entire Eighth Army front broke through the ROKA 6th ID and exposed the 7th ID flank, the 2nd Ranger Company (-) was quickly attached to the 31st Infantry Regiment, the division reserve. To cover the exposed flank, the Rangers were moved into the gap between the 7th ID and the ROKA 3rd Infantry Regiment. Heavy casualties among the 7th ID infantry regiments forced integration.58

On 29 April, the Rangers were moved to the 17th Infantry Regiment to cover the 7th ID withdrawal across the Soyang River. As the major elements of the division were pulling back, the 2nd Rangers patrolled aggressively to maintain contact with Communist forces.59 This mission concluded 2nd Ranger Company combat operations in Korea between 29 December 1950 and 30 April 1951. During this time, the Rangers fought with the 7th ID, conducted basic infantry training for 7th ID black replacements, and made the Munsan-ni combat parachute jump while attached to the 187th ARCT for Operation TOMAHAWK.

With the Munsan-ni operation, both the 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies jumped into airborne history and earned a combat star on their parachute badges. Shortly after their arrival in Korea, 2nd Rangers proved themselves in combat in early January 1951. Providing basic infantry training to 7th ID black replacements—though not regarded by the “Buffaloes” as an appropriate use of very highly-skilled and combat effective Rangers—kept many a black soldier alive in Korea and was appreciated by those men the Rangers trained, according to CPL Bill Weathersbee:

“I was one of the last of the 2nd Ranger Company to rotate to the States from the 187th Airborne RCT. We traveled on the USTS Jose P. Martinez. When the ship docked at Seattle and we were getting ready to go ashore, several black members of the 7th Infantry Division told the Rangers on board that they wanted to talk to us. The ranking noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the group spoke: “We would like to thank you and your unit, the 2nd
Ranger Company, for the training that was given to us when we arrived in the 7th Infantry Division. That training was the key to our survival. All training we had prior to that time was meaningless. They said ‘Thanks,’ we shook hands all around, and we went our separate ways.”

This article would not have been completed without the assistance of two 2nd Ranger Company stalwarts, Major James Queen, company executive officer, and Sergeant First Class William Weathersbee, company operations and intelligence sergeant, and unit historian. It was written to honor the “Buffaloes,” but especially as a tribute to Rangers Queen and Weathersbee.

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes
1 William Weathersbee notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as the Weathersbee Collection; Albert Cliette, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 1 October 2003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Cliette Interview, 1 October 2003; Robert W. Black, *Rangers in Korea* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 40; Victor J. Bond, “The History of the 2nd Ranger Company,” (MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 20. As the two Ranger companies crossed the American West by train, one city-raised Ranger, spotting a herd of cattle, yelled, “Look at the buffalo!” The “buffalo” were in fact long-horned steers. From then on, both companies referred to themselves as “Buffaloes.” Former SFC William Weathersbee, the 2nd Ranger Company historian, was assigned to the 2nd Platoon as a rifleman and also served as company operations sergeant. Weathersbee, originally assigned to the all-black 555th “Triple Nickels” Parachute Infantry Regiment in June 1946, was later assigned to the S-2 Section as a Reconnaissance Scout Observer in the predominantly black 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division in 1948, after graduating from U.S. Army Photo Interpreters and Enlisted Intelligence courses. Second Lieutenant Albert Cliette, another former member of the 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, was 3rd Platoon Leader, 2nd Ranger Company. His platoon sergeant was Sergeant First Class Robert O. Watkins.

2 Cliette Interview, 1 October 2003.


4 Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Cliette Interview, 1 October 2003; Watts, *Korean Nights*, 86.

5 Cliette Interview, 1 October 2003; 2nd Ranger Company Morning Reports, 31 December 1950 and 5 January 1951, Weathersbee Collection; 7th Infantry Division G-3 Reports, 30 and 31 December 1950, Entry 429, Record Group 407, National Archives; 7th Infantry Division Periodic Intelligence Report 70, 6 January 1951, Entry 429, Record Group 407, National Archives.

6 Cliette Interview, 1 October 2003; 2nd Ranger Company Morning Report, 31 December 1950, Weathersbee Collection.


8 The most outspoken Army opponent of integration was Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, X Corps commander, and former Chief of Staff for General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Japan. Almond had a poor opinion of colored soldiers based on his experience as the Commanding General of the 92nd Infantry Division (Colored) in World War II. His guidance was specific: “There will be no mixed units in X Corps. If the Ranger Company (2nd) under this policy becomes excessively overstrength—separate colored units will be formed.” 7th Infantry Division, G-3 Log, 020950 February 1951, Entry 429, Record Group 407, National Archives. Twenty years later, Almond re-emphasized his views. Letter, Lieutenant General Edward Almond to Center of Military History, 1 April 1972, Center of Military History, Carlisle Barracks, PA. The term “colored” was an official U.S. Army term and is used in that context where needed.

9 Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Cliette Interview, 1 October 2003; 2nd Ranger Company Morning Report, 31 December 1950; Weathersbee Collection; Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, General Order 108, 28 February 1951, Entry 429, Record Group 407, National Archives.


11 Albert Cliette, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 3 October 2003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, hereafter cited as Cliette Interview, 3 October 2003; Black, *Rangers in Korea*, 91; Larry E. Ivers, “Ranger History: 2nd Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) 1950–1951,” *The Ranger Link*, Winter 1994, 25–46; Arch E. Roberts, *Rakkasan!* (Nashville, TN: Printing, 1997), 48; Watts, *Korean Nights*,132; “Operation KILLER had turned into a slow, not too profitable chase. In Tokyo, in Seoul, and at the Eighth Army command post, the planners were working over a new operation which might panic the Reds or chew them up or possibly trap them. It was a high-speed precision maneuver: an airborne regiment was to drop twenty-five miles northwest of Seoul; an armored column was to link up with them there.” John Dominic and Joe Scherschel, “Airborne and Armor Link Up in Korea,” *Life*, 9 April 1951.
Queen Interview, 17 December 2003.

Watts, Korean Nights, 133. Some of Rangers came by train while others hitched rides on 7th Infantry Division trucks bound for Taegu to pick up ammunition. Queen interview, 17 December 2003.


Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Weathersbee Collection; Roberts, Rakkasan!, 47. First Lieutenant Antonio M. Anthony became the Mortar Platoon leader. During the Korean War, parachutists received either jump pay or combat pay, but not both for combat jumps.

Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Weathersbee Collection; Watts, Korean Nights, 157; Headquarters, 187th Regimental Combat Team, *“Marking of Aerial Delivery Containers,”* 20 March 1951, Entry 429, Record Group 407, National Archives.

Roberts, Rakkasan!, 29.

Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Watts, Korean Nights, 147.

Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Weathersbee Collection.


Queen Interview, 17 December 2003.

Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Weathersbee Collection; Watts, Korean Nights, 135–137. C-119 Flying Boxcar transports could carry forty-six paratroops and nineteen door bundles. Edwin P. Hoyt, *On the Yalu* (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 239. Note: The two Ranger companies kicked out twelve door bundles from their C-46 Commando aircraft. Each Commando carried thirty jumpers. Aircraft and ground photos substantiate that the “V of V” aircraft formation was maintained during the airdrop while several accounts state the aircraft flew in trail to drop the paratroopers. Since the elapsed flight time from K-2 to Munsan-ni via the Seoul South checkpoint was so short, switching 140 aircraft from “V of V” at staggered heights to the standard formation would have meant extending total drop time for five serials—fifty minutes (187th Regimental Combat Team After Action Report). Fifteen seconds between paratroop aircraft and substantially more time between the heavy drop serial and between heavy drop aircraft would have tallied to an hour and a half total drop time minimum. While the plan originally called for specific elements to be dropped on the north half and south half of Drop Zone North, this did not happen. And, factoring that 1st Battalion 187th Infantry, excluding the commander and half of his staff who were dropped alone on Drop Zone South later, were mistakenly dropped on Drop Zone North, lends further doubt to the aircraft dropping paratroops and heavy equipment in trail formation.


187th Regimental Combat Team Staff Journal Entry 23 March 1951 from Watts, Korean Nights, 138, 143.

Weathersbee Collection; Cliette Interview, 3 October 2003; Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; U.S. Army. 2nd Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) Morning Report dated 23 March 1951; Black, Rangers in Korea, 91–92; Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 196–197; Roberts, Rakkasan!, 52. Corporal Glenn Jenkins Jr. and Private First Class Eugene Coleman were lightly injured during the parachute assault.

Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Weathersbee Collection; Watts, Korean Nights, 157; Headquarters, 187th Regimental Combat Team, *“Marking of Aerial Delivery Containers,”* 20 March 1951.


Waterhouse, *The Rakkasans*, 70. Just prior to the Munsan-ni parachute assault, the Air Force dropped tens of thousands of leaflets. After the drop, hundreds of enemy soldiers appeared waving these safe conduct passes.


Hansen, *Psywar in Korea*, 196–197. One prisoner of war was so anxious to produce the correct safe conduct pass that he proffered them like a bridge hand of cards. Blue was his color of choice because the political officer searched the soldiers in his unit daily for United Nations leaflets and surrender passes.

Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Queen Interview, 3 October 2003; Watts, Korean Nights, 135, 138–39.

Queen Interview, 17 December 2003; Weathersbee Collection; Watts, Korean Nights, 135, 138–39.

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