The "Proper Ganders"
1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group:
Strategic Psywar in Korea, 1951-1954
by Robert W. Jones, Jr. and Charles H. Briscoe

On 28 June 1950, a 374th Troop Carrier Wing C-46 Commando transport plane carrying more than twelve million leaflets left Ashiya Airbase in Japan bound for South Korea. Captain (CPT) Howard B. Secor’s crew tossed out hundreds of bundles of crude, hastily-prepared leaflets urging panic-stricken South Koreans to resist the Communists in Seoul, Taejon, and other cities captured by the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). Dropped less than twenty-four hours after President Harry S. Truman committed the United States to South Korea’s defense, the leaflets assured the populace that help, in the form of troops from the United States and the United Nations, would soon be on its way.¹

Shortly after 8 a.m. the next day, the telephone rang in the quarters of Major (MAJ) Thomas O. Mathews, G-2 Psychological Warfare Officer, U.S. Army Far East Command (FECOM) in Tokyo. When his wife answered, retired Colonel (COL) J. Woodall Greene, the civilian Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), asked to speak with her husband because “I have something very important to tell him.” She explained that her husband was already on the way to the office. When Mathews got to work, Green told him that he needed “thirty minutes of radio time tonight for psychological warfare (Psywar) in Korea.” Twelve hours later, the U.S. Army was conducting its first Psywar radio broadcast in Korea, largely through the efforts of MAJ Thomas O. Mathews, who on 29 June 1950 had no staff, no transmitters, no translators, and no news facilities.³

When the NKPA invaded South Korea in late June 1950, the U.S. Army was not prepared for war in many crucial areas; one was Psywar. Shortly after the war began, the FECOM/PWB hustled to meet operational requirements and assume responsibilities far beyond the scope of a four-person staff section. Amazingly, the PWB staff performed all FECOM Psywar in the frantic first few months of the war even though ever-increasing tasks continually overwhelmed them. After 1951, the Psywar Branch was expanded to a section (Psychological Warfare Section) in the G-2. Help from the States first addressed the tactical Psywar mission.

The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L)

The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) arrived in November 1950 to support the theater army, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), because the U.S. Army still lacked strategic Psywar assets. The post-WWII military demobilizations had eliminated those capabilities. Not only would the Korean crisis prompt the creation of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) to fill the strategic void in theater, but other steps were taken to ensure that the U.S. Army would not again be caught unprepared to conduct Psywar. By the time the ink had dried on the 1953 Armistice, the Army’s strategic and tactical Psywar capabilities had solid foundations with the “Proper Ganders” (1st RB&L) in Japan and its 4th

Since the 1st RB&L Group was a Table of Distribution (T/D) unit, it did not have an official distinctive unit insignia (DUI) or crest. The soldiers wore the U.S. Army Far East Command General Headquarters (GHQ) shoulder sleeve insignia (SSI) on their uniforms.

The U.S. Army term Psychological Warfare (Psywar) dates to World War I. There were three levels of Psywar during WWII, tactical; strategic; and consolidation (occupation/post-conflict).² In the late 1950s the term Psywar (Psychological Warfare) was replaced by PSYOP (Psychological Operations). In 2010, Department of Army created MISO (Military Information Support Operations), combining PSYOP, Information Operations (IO), and Public Affairs.
During training, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, commander of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, had a contest for a cartoon mascot to cultivate unit identity. Even with a collection of trained artists, it was a challenge. The “Proper Gander” cartoon figure, drawn by Seattle native, Private Gudmund B. Berge, won the contest and earned the drafted architect a three-day pass.5

Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) in Korea, the 1st L&L Company in Korea, the 301st RB&L Group and the 5th L&L Company in Germany, and the 6th RB&L Group and 2nd L&L Company at the newly-established U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.4

During World War II the U.S. Army built an extensive Psywar capability in the European and Pacific theaters. As early as the North African campaign, General (GEN) Dwight D. Eisenhower relied on Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, eventually appointing him to head his Psychological Warfare Division in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). McClure not only supervised staff sections at Corps, Army, and the European Theater of Operations (ETO) headquarters, but ensured that Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies with organic radio broadcast, printing, and loudspeaker capabilities were employed at the tactical level.6

General Dwight D. Eisenhower awarded Brigadier General Robert A. McClure a Distinguished Service Medal at the end of WWII. McClure was the pick of the Army G-3, Major General Charles L. Bolte, to revitalize Psywar in the service.

In the Southwest Pacific Area Command, GEN Douglas A. MacArthur created his own Psywar staff in 1944, establishing a G-2 Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) with more than thirty soldiers. By war’s end, the PWB was nearly five hundred strong. In the final phase of the offensive against Japan, tactical loudspeaker teams supported infantry units in the Philippine and Okinawa campaigns.7

After World War II, the U.S. Army inactivated all tactical Psywar units and reduced the strategic capability to small staff sections at major headquarters. Considering future Asian contingencies, GEN Douglas MacArthur re-established a Psywar capability in the G-2 (Intelligence) of FECOM headquarters in 1947. It was the “Special Projects Division” of G-2.8 Major General (MG) Charles A. Willoughby, the FECOM G-2, selected retired COL J. Woodall Greene, a divisional Psywar staff officer and executive officer of the PWB staff in WW II, to head this element. Greene’s staff of one civilian and two officers was tasked to develop a Psywar plan for the Far East. The G-2 PWB was one of few FECOM assets capable of responding to the invasion of South Korea in June 1950.9

The Army as a whole was totally unprepared to conduct Psywar when the Korean War began. By 1948, the only Psywar unit in the active Army was a Tactical Information Detachment (TID) at Fort Riley, Kansas. This small element (four officers and twenty soldiers) supported the Aggressor Force in Army Field Forces maneuvers against U.S. troops by employing loudspeakers and leaflets at the tactical level. Arriving in Korea in October, it became the cadre for the new 1st L&L Company, though a lack of equipment limited its ability to conduct tactical loudspeaker operations until early 1951.10 More significantly, there was a gap in strategic Psywar capability.11

Although FECOM/PWB made token radio broadcasts from Tokyo and prepared leaflets in response to the North Korean invasion, the U.S. Army had little that resembled a “pipeline” to train Psywar officers and soldiers to meet growing wartime requirements. According to Dr. Alfred
H. Paddock (U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins) the Army had fewer than ten Psywar-qualified officers on active duty in the summer of 1950. The Army sent six officers to attend a semester-long Psywar course at Georgetown University in October 1950. This stop-gap measure was insufficient. More substantial efforts were needed.\textsuperscript{12} On 15 January 1951, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. ordered the creation of a Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) built from the small Psywar Section in the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations). Pace named BG Robert A. McClure to serve as Chief of the new Psywar Division. Using his WWII experience, BG McClure began attacking the problem by first creating Psywar officer and enlisted courses at the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas.\textsuperscript{13}

**The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L)**

Concurrent with creating a training program to meet the demands posed by the Korean War, BG McClure directed formation of a new strategic Psywar unit called a Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L), to create, produce, and disseminate the Psywar products that the unit’s name suggested.\textsuperscript{14} McClure turned to his old executive officer at PWD/SHAEF, U.S. Army National Guard Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, to command the 1st RB&L. Mobilized with the Indiana National Guard in 1942, Infantry Lieutenant Shields had become executive officer, Seventh Army Combat Propaganda Team in March 1944 and served in North Africa, Italy, and Southern France. Then-MAJ Shields became Chief of Psywar at Sixth Army in October 1944 and eventually worked for BG McClure at SHAEF headquarters. After WWII, Shields returned to Indianapolis and became District Manager of the Circulation Department of the Indianapolis Times, but kept his National Guard commission.\textsuperscript{15}

LTC Shields and his staff had a monumental task. They had to organize, write the table of distribution (T/D) for soldiers and equipment, assemble, equip, train, and deploy the three hundred-man 1st RB&L to the Far East in less than four months. Manpower was dependent on Army Reserve and National Guard unit activations, call-ups of individual ready reserve (IRR) USAR soldiers, and selective service Army draft quotas. There was no guarantee that those assigned to this newly created unit would have college educations or specialized civilian skill experiences appropriate for Psywar (i.e., journalists, artists, printers, photographers, and graphic designers).\textsuperscript{16} Fortunately, the Adjutant General had just started a program to identify those personnel well-suited to the new unit’s mission amongst Army draftees, National Guard, and IRR.

Before Shields got to Fort Riley, a Classification and Analysis (C&A) station was established at Fort Myer, Virginia, to screen Army basic trainees for college degrees and specific job skills and to identify individuals capable of performing specialized tasks. During the C&A process, men with specific vocational and commercial credentials were queried about their civilian backgrounds to identify certain factors (i.e., education, job experience, language ability), that would make them good candidates for the 1st RB&L and other Psywar units scheduled for formation. Interestingly, evaluations were based heavily on the “gut reactions” of the interviewers, as those trainees queried did not have to produce evidence of their education, qualifications, or skills; their word was simply accepted.\textsuperscript{17} Despite this lack of verification, the Army C&A evaluators seemed to have “terrific insight into who would fit into the 1st RB&L,” remembered Thomas M. Klein, a draftee slated for Psywar assignment.\textsuperscript{18} “It was a rare display of putting round pegs in round holes,” recalled 1st RB&L recruit Robert C. McConaughey. “I came to the Army General School in early 1951 fresh from a broadcaster job at an independent radio station in Lincoln, Nebraska.”\textsuperscript{19}

While Fort Bragg is the current home of MISO, the modern birthplace of this capability was Fort Riley, Kansas. The Army established Psywar courses to train staff officers and enlisted soldiers, organized and trained the 1st and 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Groups and the 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. The 301st RB&L, a U.S. Army Reserve unit from New York, was slated for Europe, eventually going to Mannheim, Germany. The last Psywar unit trained at Fort Riley was the 6th RB&L Group that went to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in the summer of 1952.
Because of the initial C&A screening, over one-third of the enlisted men assigned to the newly-created 1st RB&L were college graduates. Many were WWII veterans who had used the GI Bill to go to college or to acquire technical skills that proved suitable for Psywar. To Navy veteran Gudmund Berge, receiving a telegram announcing “Greetings” came as a complete surprise. Having enlisted under the U.S. Navy V-12 program in 1944 (an accelerated commissioning program for prospective naval officers), Berge attended Whitman College in Walla Walla, Washington before Navy ROTC at the University of Washington (UW) and served a summer aboard a destroyer escort before his discharge as a seaman in August 1946. He returned to UW to complete his architecture degree. After passing his architect licensing exam and accepting a job in Seattle, Berge discovered that his WWII navy service did not fulfill his two-year national service obligation. “You must remember the times. You didn’t question the government. You had a job to do and you did it. I had received my draft notice.”

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Fredrick P. Laffey, who “loved being behind the mike,” had worked a variety of civilian radio jobs in his home state of Massachusetts before and after the war. He was a military intelligence enlistee during WWII. When recalled to active duty as a USAR captain, he became radio program manager of the 4th MRBC in Korea. Eddie T. Deerfield, a former B-17 radio operator/aerial gunner in the 303rd Bombardment Group during WWII, was a copy editor for the Peoria Star in Illinois when the Korean War began. “Reclassified as ‘I-A,’ I was drafted to serve as a military policeman (MP), sent to basic, and was about halfway through advanced MP training when I was pulled out to go to the 1st RB&L. The Army was looking for people with [civilian] skills so they did not have to train them. And, there were a lot of guys with college educations and skills that the Army could use. So I was a ‘fit’ for the 1st RB&L,” Herguth recalled. After McCorkle and Herguth were evaluated at Fort Myer, they were assigned to the 1st RB&L at Fort Riley.

Not all 1st RB&L Group soldiers were screened at Fort Myer, but when the Army discovered their skills in basic, they became Psywar candidates. Such was the case of St. Joseph’s University graduate Anthony M. “Tony” Severino. He was in infantry basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, when his company commander denied a request for reclassification, stating, “It is an honor to die for your country!” Discouraged but not willing to give up, Recruit Severino and another college graduate visited the classification building that night. There, they found “a lone corporal working overtime. He listened to our pleas and the next day we were transferred,” said Severino.

Robert C. McConaughey was an infantry platoon radio operator in the Army National Guard’s 31st Infantry (“Dixie”) Division, but became an individual replacement for Korea after his unit was taken off the Federal activation list. A New York School of Radio and Television Technique degree and his West Virginia radio announcer experience got him transferred to the 1st RB&L.

Many of the first group of 1st RB&L officers were Army Reservists with WWII combat experience. Most lacked “official” Psywar experience or schooling. Their college educations, technical specialties, and work experiences between WWII and Korea were deemed critical and merited assignment to the 1st RB&L.

Princeton Ph.D. recipient Robert A. Horn was an associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago when he got his USAR recall notice. The WWII veteran was recalled as a captain to head the Operations Research Section. Frederick P. Laffey, who “loved being behind the mike,” had worked a variety of civilian radio jobs in his home state of Massachusetts before and after the war. He was a military intelligence enlistee during WWII. When recalled to active duty as a USAR captain, he became radio program manager of the 4th MRBC in Korea.

The RB&L Group, which spreads strategic propaganda, is the ‘Long Tom’ (the 155 mm Gun M1 & M2 used during WWII & Korea) of Psywar and it supports the field army.
— LT Ernest Codine, QMC, former staff and faculty member at the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, December 1952

“It was a rare display of putting round pegs in round holes...”
— Robert C. McConaughey
In 1951 and 1952, the Psychological Warfare Department (PWD) of the Army General School held four officer and two enlisted Psywar classes, ultimately producing 334 graduates from all four services and some Allied nations. In early 1952, the PWD became a separate and independent Army School, the Psychological Warfare School, when it relocated to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to become part of the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center.

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Hal Curren Weed, Robert McConaughey, Al Busse, Spencer, and Jackman, working with 1st RB&L officers that had Psywar experience, wrote seventy hours of classroom instruction for approval by the Psywar Division.\textsuperscript{54} This mirrored the PWD Psywar Unit Officers course. The ETO Psywar veterans emphasized their WWII experiences in classes that ranged from “Introduction to Psywar” to “News Writing.” “They, in turn, depended heavily upon newcomers—men who had the proper background but no actual experience at the job,” wrote Quartermaster Corps LT Ernest Codine, a former member of the staff and faculty of the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, in December 1952.\textsuperscript{45} “ILT Jack Morris took the writers and conducted drills on how to think and write with limited information. But, we were also soldiers and had to go to the rifle range and bivouac in the field,” recalled Anthony J. Severino.\textsuperscript{46}

The final phase of 1st RB&L training at Fort Riley culminated in a field exercise during which leaflets and radio broadcasts were developed and disseminated.\textsuperscript{38} LTC Shields integrated all the elements into a single exercise to test unit capabilities. Based on intelligence reports, artists and writers prepared leaflets that were lithographed by unit photographers and printed by the press operators. Simultaneously, radio scriptwriters wrote programs that were aired by radio technicians.\textsuperscript{49}

As the soldiers were deemed qualified, they were assigned to one of the three 1st RB&L companies. The Table of Distribution (T/D), a “constant work in process,” evolved and was modified by the Psywar Board, whose members were PWD cadre and 1st RB&L officers. Still, it served as the template for other RB&L groups.\textsuperscript{50} The Headquarters Company, the largest element, had nineteen officers, three warrant officers, and one hundred and eleven enlisted men. It handled Group administration, maintenance, and logistics, and contained a Research and Analysis Section “responsible for the preparation and composition of propaganda material” at the theater level.\textsuperscript{51} The 3rd Reproduction Company with three officers and fifty-four enlisted men created strategic leaflets, newspapers, and other documents and produced them on four high-speed Harris offset printing presses, the “Cadillac” model. With sixteen officers and ninety-nine enlisted men, the 4th MRBC could transmit Psywar messages from both fixed and mobile radio stations.\textsuperscript{52} Its three radio platoons were capable of repairing and operating captured or indigenous fixed transmitters as well as their own mobile transmitters mounted on 6x6 trucks. As the organization began to stabilize LTC Shields and his officers struggled to locate, requisition, and acquire the basic Psywar equipment needed for individual and unit training in order to be considered combat effective.\textsuperscript{53}

Fort Riley, a major training and wartime mobilization base, had plenty of World War II-era uniforms, boots, and field gear, but the Psywar-unique equipment was a problem. Most specialized equipment had been declared surplus and sold after the war. “With the end of World War II, the U.S. Army . . . rapidly dismantled its extensive psychological operations network. Psywar was dropped from Army training programs, from military schools and curricula, and from Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).”\textsuperscript{54} In response to the Korean War, the Army Psywar Board identified new requirements and arranged to buy equipment “off the shelf.” Two of the critical items for the Group were printing presses and truck-mounted radio broadcast systems. The printing presses could be purchased from commercial sources, but they took a few months to assemble. Printers then had to learn the idiosyncrasies of the presses. The mobile radio broadcast systems were based on WWII designs, but used the latest technology. In the meantime, operators and maintenance personnel assisted the Fort Riley printers and did OJT (on-the-job training) with local area radio stations. It would be late December 1951 before the 1st RB&L received its radio vans in Japan.\textsuperscript{55} But despite equipment shortages the 1st RB&L was assigned to FECOM to support the strategic Psywar mission in Korea and would go overseas in the summer of 1951.

Unbeknownst to most 1st RB&L soldiers, a maelstrom of messages and letters had passed between FECOM...
and BG McClure and the Office of Psychological Warfare staff in the Pentagon pressing for a May 1951 deployment. The G-2 PWD in Tokyo wanted the RB&L in theater by June 1951, even though the unit was not fully manned and the mobile radio broadcast systems had not yet arrived. LTC Shields offered an acceptable compromise by dividing the unit movement into three echelons. A small advance echelon (ADVON) would be sent to augment the PWD staff as soon as possible. The main body would follow in July 1951. The final echelon would complete training on their newly-arrived equipment and accompany it to Japan in September 1951. Meanwhile, the 1st RB&L “rear detachment,” trying to reach full strength, would be plagued by constant personnel turnover caused by higher priority replacement fills for the 1st L&L in Korea, European linguists transferred to the USAR 301st RB&L preparing to leave for Germany, and the “mustering out” of reservists who had fulfilled their two-year obligations.

These challenges notwithstanding, the twelve-man ADVON left Fort Riley for Japan in mid-June 1951. LTC Shields gave them two missions: Support current Psywar operations in FECOM by assisting the PWD with radio broadcasts and leaflet design; and prepare for the arrival of the main body in July.

The main body, the second and largest echelon, was slated to depart Fort Riley for San Francisco, California, by train in early July 1951, but nature intervened. Kansas was hit by a horrendous five-day rainstorm on 11 July that caused massive flooding statewide. Two feet of flood water rendered the Fort Riley and Manhattan, Kansas train stations inoperable. Busses were leased on 12 July 1951 to carry the 1st RB&L main body the two and a half hours to the Lincoln, Nebraska, train station to begin their three-day journey.

After spending a few nights at Camp Stoneman outside Pittsburg, California, the men of the 1st RB&L main body were trucked into San Francisco to board USNS General A.W. Brewster on 18 July 1951. When the Brewster left California for the five-day trip to Pearl Harbor, Hawai'i, nearly five hundred soldiers were packed into compartments in the ship's hold. They slept on canvas
When the 1st RB&L troops re-boarded the USNS Brewster in Hawaii, they discovered that an additional 1,200 infantry replacements destined for Korea had been taken aboard. 1st RB&L living space in the troop hold went from crowded to severely cramped during the second leg of the voyage from Hawaii to Japan.

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En route to Japan on the USNS General Brewster, the 1st RB&L soldiers organized and presented a variety show to entertain all aboard and pass the time. (L to R: Hal Weed, Bud Perfit, and Gerry Deppe).

Yokohama harbor as seen from the deck of the USNS Brewster by the 1st RB&L soldiers. The infantry replacements for Korea stayed aboard as the “Proper Ganders” disembarked to the music of an Army band greeting the new arrivals.

and metal framed bunks stacked four-to-six high. Upon arriving in Hawaii, the ship’s captain recommended that the soldiers be kept aboard to prevent AWOLs (Absent Without Leave). LTC Shields chose to ignore the suggestion and used the public address system to announce that as the troop commander, he was authorizing twenty-hour passes in Honolulu. He told everyone that he was assuming personal responsibility that everyone would make the troop muster at 9 a.m. the following day. The men returned his respect when one hundred percent of the unit was in formation the next morning. 61

The real surprise came when the 1st RB&L soldiers reboarded the Brewster. They discovered that 1,200 more troops, mostly infantrymen, had been loaded onboard, making the three-week voyage to Japan very cramped. To alleviate the uncomfortable conditions, the Psywar soldiers pooled their talents. They organized, directed, and put on a variety show for everyone aboard. Others worked on the ship’s daily news sheet, published twice daily, broadcast news on the PA system, watched movies, organized boxing and wrestling matches on deck, or attended religious services. Many RB&L soldiers, like Private William L. McCorkle, read “a book a day, including favorite classics by Ernest M. Hemingway, John E. Steinbeck, Jr., John R. Dos Passos, and F. Scott Fitzgerald.” 62 A popular book was Thunder out of China by American journalist Theodore H. White on the Communist takeover of China. 63 After nineteen days at sea the USNS Brewster docked at Yokohama, Japan.
When LTC Homer Shields and the “Proper Ganders” got to Tokyo, they found that their mission, as originally detailed at Fort Riley, had been considerably expanded to cover gaps at the tactical level. The 1st RB&L’s area of operations for printed products now began where the 1st L&L Company’s ended, forty miles behind the line of contact.

Initially attached to FECOM under the direction of GHQ Psywar Section to support the United Nations Command fight in Korea, the 1st RB&L Group was subsequently assigned and administratively redesignated the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 8239th Army Unit (AU). A new mission statement accompanied these actions: Conduct strategic propaganda operations in direct support of military operations; support the national world-wide propaganda effort; and provide operational support to tactical propaganda operations in the Far East Command.

To provide Asian cultural training, Shields instituted formal hourly classes four days a week on 31 August lasting through 22 October 1951. The focus was Chinese and Korean culture, geography, economics, history, and politics. Attendance was mandatory for all enlisted soldiers and optional for officers. Subsequent unit training covered military intelligence topics and reviewed infantry tactics.

The Group’s strategic Psywar effort targeted enemy soldiers, emphasizing four themes: “Surrender and get good treatment”; “Surrender and return home alive after the war”; “The invincibility and strength of the UN”; and “Survival” stressing that “Life was better than dying in the war.” Messages for civilians highlighted the divisive nature and exploitive behavior of the Soviet and Chinese Communists. They were designed to undermine Communism as a whole. Those notices warning civilians about future airstrikes demonstrated the benevolence as well as the power of the United Nations. ILT Eddie Deerfield later explained that, regardless of the theme, the practical goal was to discredit the myth of the Communist ideal painted by the enemy: “Our mission was to destroy this illusion . . . by convincing audiences that democracy was the best means of achieving freedom and bettering their lives.”

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Headquarters Company

The majority of the 1st RB&L worked at FECOM General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo, making use of modern radio studio and production facilities on the sixth floor of the Empire Building. In addition to preparing “Truth and News” scripts, they assisted the Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) with radio programming. While some soldiers were writing radio scripts, others, working with dedicated teams of Chinese and Korean civilian linguists (Department of the Army employees who translated the English into Korean, Mandarin, and Cantonese), prepared propaganda leaflets.

The 1st RB&L soldiers in Tokyo worked and lived in a significantly improved environment than they had at Fort Riley. Though American saturation bombing during
This hand drawn map shows the location of the 4th MRBC units and their equipment in Korea circa 1952.

WWII had reduced large sections of Tokyo to rubble, U.S. aircraft avoided the area around the Imperial Palace and surrounding business district. The big buildings left standing became 1st RB&L living quarters and daily work areas. Fifteen-to-thirty men lived “open bay style” in large rooms of the old five-story Japanese Ministry of Finance, aptly called the ‘Finance Building’ by the Americans. It contained a mess hall, bowling alley, pool hall, post exchange, library, and barbershop and was adjacent to the moated Imperial Palace. After physical training conducted on the roof, the “Proper Ganders” had breakfast served by white-coated waiters before walking or riding a bus to work. The officers, living nearby, had even better accommodations. Most had BOQ (bachelor officer quarters) rooms in the various officers’ clubs throughout Tokyo or rented private quarters. The low cost of living in postwar Japan prompted some 1st RB&L officers and NCOs to bring their wives over to live on the economy. Life was quite good.

THE 4TH MOBILE RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANY (4TH MRBC)

After the printing presses and mobile radio broadcasting systems arrived, LTC Shields moved to expand radio operations beyond Japan. In late August 1951, one of the mobile radio platoons from the 4th MRBC, commanded by 1LT Eddie Deerfield, was sent to Pusan to rebuild the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) facilities so that they could be used by the United Nations. He was to prepare radio programs with the Korean staff and coordinate RB&L broadcasts with South Korean officials. The Americans and Koreans would jointly operate Radio Pusan. As many as six Korean translators worked side-by-side in the news room with the 4th MRBC soldiers. “Supervision of the Korean staff of Radio Pusan in the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) was the joint responsibility of a Korean government official who served as Station Director and me as the Commanding Officer of the Pusan Detachment,” stated LT Deerfield.

On the Radio Pusan radio station grounds, the 4th MRBC soldiers lived in three Quonset huts and a tent dubbed “Paradise Pines.” EUSA and the UN Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK) provided their administrative and logistical support. “At meal times the soldiers would drive down the hill to the UNACK mess hall,” remembered Anthony Severino. Most Saturday evenings the MRBC signed out a movie projector from Special Services to show the latest Hollywood films. Movie nights quickly became the weekly social event for the American soldiers and the Korean staff and their families.

Once established at Pusan, the 4th MRBC worked to extend the broadcast range for the Voice of the UN Command. Korean topography dictated the installation of low-power transmitter/repeaters on mountaintops. Eventually, the 4th MRBC established twelve transmitters/repeater sites throughout South Korea. By the end of 1951, VUNC was broadcasting ninety-minute programs twice daily.
These photographs show some of the devastation wrought on South Korea’s capital after being invaded, occupied and liberated twice in twelve months. The North Koreans captured Seoul in July 1950. UN forces liberated the South Korean capital in September 1950 and were in the process of rebuilding when Chinese and North Korean forces recaptured it in January 1951. UN forces liberated it again on 15 March 1951. The bottom left photo shows the only streetcar still operating in the capital.

By late summer 1951, the entire 4th MRBC had relocated to Seoul and platoons were dispatched to Taegon and Taegu. The capital became the most sensitive location. Fifty years later, Sigmund S. “Sig” Front remembered “arriving at the HLKA (Radio Call letters for Korean Radio Pusan) building, which had been RCA [Radio Corporation of America] headquarters in Korea before the war. RCA had installed a thousand-watt transmitter and erected a huge tower in the heart of the city.” The RCA building, like the nearby Capitol and City Hall, was pockmarked by shellfire. The North Koreans had stolen most of the equipment and radio tubes before they withdrew. U.S. Army radio engineers had pieced together transmitting equipment salvaged from throughout Seoul and had gotten the station operational again, transmitting at five thousand watts.

Unlike the luxurious 1st RB&L living conditions in Tokyo, life for the 4th MRBC soldiers in the South Korean capital was spartan. “When I arrived in Seoul, there was no running water, little electricity except from military generators, little fuel for cooking and none for heat,” recalled Sig Front. “We had cots and sleeping bags and slept in our clothes. Much of the time the temperature was below zero. We had a Coleman burner to heat C Rations for breakfast, lunch and dinner. I never had a hot meal made by cooks until I did a story on the 1st Marine Division. The Marines not only had plenty of meats, potatoes, canned fruits and vegetables, but also peanut butter and fresh bread. They gave me a huge can of peanut butter, the size of a gallon paint can, which I shared with the guys and the Koreans who had begun to live in our building since they did work for HLKA.”

To accomplish all the mundane tasks required to operate Radio Seoul, the 4th MRBC enlisted local help and arranged food and compensation with UNACK. This arrangement prompted many workers to move their families into the facility, increasing the demand for food. Eventually, “we fed some forty people, families with young children, of fathers doing some task for the station,” Sig Front remembered.

With a local support structure in place, the 4th MRBC could focus on improving the quality of their radio messages. They began creating popular broadcasts based on a detailed target audience analysis. These were carefully aligned with strategic Psywar themes. Regularly scheduled broadcasts contained messages just long enough to get the themes across without boring listeners or putting them at risk. Writers also searched out topics of interest that reinforced UN themes.

Operating quite independently, the isolated 4th MRBC detachments at Korean radio stations controlled content by preparing daily news broadcasts, producing
special features, and arranging commentaries. As communication links improved between the 1st RB&L headquarters in Tokyo and the 4th MRBC in Seoul, so did coordination, cohesion, and support. From soldiers initially gathering news from open sources or short telephone calls to the Group, teletype machines linked Tokyo to all Korean radio stations, provided U.S. wire service news, and standardized news coverage across the group.86

The 4th MRBC writers discovered that there were sufficient stories, international and national, to go around.87 One special UN broadcast was designed to generate pride among Turkish troops, who had “returned to Korea after being nearly wiped out by the Chinese in late November 1950. Their General got on the radio and taunted the Chinese Army Command in the North,” recalled Sig Front, “telling them where the Turks were going to be on the line, and dared them to attack.” A day later the VUNC repeated the taped broadcast. “They went across the line their first night, with the old style knives [the] Turks have used for hundreds of years, and butchered a lot of Chinese in their trenches. They were never challenged again by the Chinese,” remembered Front. “I admired those Turks and will never forget them.”88

Although the strategic Psywar themes were carefully articulated, the 4th MRBC reporters continued to gather local human interest stories to keep the population aware and informed. Private First Class (PFC) Sig Front taped radio news broadcasts in the field. His “Tape Team” consisted of himself and two interpreters, one Korean and one Chinese, going about in a jeep to “cover the same stories as all foreign correspondents,” Front explained.89

“We developed special topic broadcasts that we thought would depress the North Koreans. The North Koreans had not had biscuits for several years. When they discovered that Koreans in the south were enjoying biscuits again, intelligence agents reported that they were depressed about it. . . . There was no better way than to let them hear such statements first hand from citizens like themselves,”
— Sigmund S. Front

their meals] for several years. When they discovered that Koreans in the south were enjoying biscuits again, intelligence agents reported that they were depressed about it. Our Korean tape teams interviewed farmers, workers in factories, shop keepers, and people in the street to show the populace in the North that they were losing the war. There was no better way than to let them hear such statements first hand from citizens like themselves,” commented Front.90

To further improve quality, panels of native speakers were assembled to listen to proposed VUNC broadcast tapes. They evaluated how the message would be received by social groups, the accuracy of translations, and whether the language level was appropriate for the intended target audience. As the Chinese military presence grew in North Korea, broadcast evaluations became more important, yet at the same time, much more difficult. Despite the best efforts of the 1st RB&L and 4th MRBC personnel, broadcasts sometimes came across like canned speeches instead of natural conversations, providing little relief from the propaganda diatribes constantly broadcast by the Communists.91

The 1st RB&L Analysis and Evaluation Section in the headquarters used enemy news sources against them. Radio monitoring teams discovered that some of the enemy broadcasts were only done in specific languages and dialects. Selective presentations indicated that the enemy wanted to deny information to particular audiences. To overcome this enemy censorship, monitored broadcasts were translated into the languages not addressed and rebroadcast to those Communist-held areas attributing the information to Radio Moscow,
South Korean President Syngman Rhee (in front of the microphone) records a speech for the Korean Broadcast System (KBS). In the center is 1LT Eddie Deerfield, 4th MRBC, and on the left is KBS radio technician Lee Tuk Bin.

1LT Eddie Deerfield (center rear) supervises local translators as they prepare broadcast scripts in Korean and Chinese from English copy written by 1st RB&L personnel in Tokyo.

Radio Peking, or Radio P'yongyang. These efforts added credibility to 4th MRBC broadcasts.

PFC Front remembered when a Korean in a well-tailored, expensive business suit walked into HLKA looking for a job. Explaining that “I needed someone who could copy TASS [Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza, the Communist propaganda agency] in Korean and translate it into English. I found out that the well-dressed Korean was also well-educated, knew CW [Morse] code, and spoke and wrote very good English. It took him four hours to transcribe the TASS news, and another four hours to translate it into English. After handing me the copies, he would have a very stiff drink and leave,” said Front.

The ability to “scoop” Communist radio messages provided yet another valuable weapon in the evolving American Psywar arsenal.

The 1st RB&L regularly supported broadcasts for the South Korean government. Speeches of President Syngman Rhee, who stridently pressed for reunification, had to be “cleared for content” by the UN Command before live broadcasts. 1LT Deerfield and his soldiers meticulously screened Rhee’s speeches before taping them. However, when the South Korean president went live “on the air,” anything could happen. That was what PFC Front discovered when President Rhee ad-libbed the conclusion of his speech and proclaimed over the airways that “shoulder to shoulder we will fight with all United Nations Forces to reestablish ourselves as one country.” This caused major “flaps” in Tokyo, New York, Washington, Peking, and P’yongyang. 1st RB&L personnel working at FECOM had tighter constraints.

The 3rd Reproduction Company

Turning strategic themes into approved Psywar product proposals was the mission of Headquarters Company personnel supporting the FECOM G-3 PWS in Tokyo. After weekly planning meetings, 1st RB&L writers prepared broadcast scripts drawing upon information from a variety of sources. Some of the scripts served dual purposes as Chinese, Korean, and Japanese civilian artists attuned the written English to accommodate the subtleties and nuances of Asian design. “Proper Candies” worked side-by-side with the U.S. Army Asian employees to develop rough layouts having the greatest appeal to local Korean populations. After resolving the finer points of a proposed leaflet, draft products were sent to PWS offices for final approval.

Once approved, armed guards escorted 1st RB&L couriers who took the leaflet proofs to the FECOM print plant in Motosumiyoshi, about halfway between Tokyo and Yokohama, where the 3rd Reproduction Company (3rd Repro) had co-located its four high-speed Harris presses. The 3rd Repro lived and worked apart from the rest of the headquarters in Tokyo. By the end of the conflict, they printed more than two billion leaflets for UN forces, preparing as many as twenty million a week.
The 3rd Reproduction Company headquarters and billets were located adjacent to the FECOM print plant at Motosumiyoshi, Japan.

CPL Richard N. Crimer, 3rd Reproduction Company, operates a Harris printing press at the FECOM print plant.

This 1st RB&L leaflet warns of a scheduled UN artillery strike. Similar ones were done for UN bombing raids.

At the print plant, 3rd Repro technicians photographed artwork proofs and turned them into lithograph plates for high-speed printing in quantity. Then, the leaflets were either bundled for aerial delivery or rolled and packed inside leaflet bombs. The leaflet bombs were taken to Tachikawa Air Base for B-29 Superfortress delivery over Korea. Bundled leaflets were flown to Kimpo Air Base, outside Seoul, where they were loaded aboard C-46 Commando and C-47 Skytrain cargo planes for aerial dissemination.

USAF aircraft delivered the most 1st RB&L leaflets. Trial and error refined air drop dissemination techniques. At the start of the war, leaflets were loaded unbound and then shoveled out open cargo doors. Once the door opened large volumes of loose paper swirled around the cargo compartment creating a whirlwind of billowing leaflets that was hazardous to the crew dropping them.

To reduce that problem, the leaflets were wrapped in paper bundle “bricks” and secured with twine. Once the brick was tossed outside the door, the twine was supposed to be broken by aircraft propwash. 1LT James B. Haynes, 1st RB&L S-3 (Operations) Section, went along on a leaflet drop to observe deployment by this method. When given the opportunity to throw some leaflets, Haynes stepped up. “No one told me to aim for the lower left corner of the door. So I threw [the bundle out] about chest high and the string broke before it got out the door, blowing the leaflets back into the cargo compartment of the aircraft,” stated Haynes.

A better system was to attach a blasting cap and a short length of fuse with a fuse igniter to the knotted string.
Leaflets were flown to Kimpo Air Base, outside Seoul, where they were loaded aboard Air Force cargo aircraft for dissemination.

String-bound packets of leaflets being man-handled out a C-47 cargo door often came apart and the inside of the aircraft became a maelstrom of paper.

Korean military “door kickers standing-by” leaflet “bricks” containing pull-ring mechanical fuse igniters.

Leaflets were flown to Kimpo Air Base, outside Seoul, where they were loaded aboard Air Force cargo aircraft for dissemination.

Crewmen pulled the fuse igniter before they threw the brick out the door. Dropped at six or eight thousand feet, a foot of time fuse allowed the brick of leaflets to fall to one to two thousand feet before the blasting cap detonated, blowing apart the bundle and scattering the leaflets over the target area.\textsuperscript{104}

The 1st RB&L used a variety of aircraft to drop propaganda leaflets. Although small Army liaison and artillery spotter aircraft were used by the American divisions in Korea, the most commonly used airplanes were the USAF C-47, the C-46, and the B-26 Invader bomber. B-29 bombers based in Japan usually dropped leaflet bombs. The C-47s and C-46s could carry more cargo, but they were slow, unarmored, and unarmed. The B-26 was fast, but had a limited payload. The B-29 could carry a million and a half leaflets, but dropped from ten thousand feet, the dispersion pattern was very erratic.\textsuperscript{105}

Like the radio broadcasts, the leaflets were refined during the course of the war to increase effectiveness. The 1st RB&L initially printed leaflets using proper Korean and Chinese. Highly academic language could not be read by a predominately uneducated target population of soldiers and civilians. By the summer of 1951, leaflet designers simplified their written messages, or used illustrations to offset the problem.\textsuperscript{106} Significant cultural differences between Chinese and Koreans, however, made even simple translations less than effective.\textsuperscript{107}

By the summer of 1952, the 1st RB&L staff developed a basic Chinese dictionary of fourteen hundred characters. Prisoner interrogation reports revealed that most Chinese soldiers understood the simplified language.\textsuperscript{108} Leaflets that became obsolete after a certain time were printed on paper which dissolved when exposed to the elements. In contrast, “Safe Conduct Passes” were printed on more durable paper which could be hidden and safeguarded until an opportunity arose to desert. They often resembled currency so enemy soldiers could conceal them from their superiors.\textsuperscript{109} “When intelligence revealed that the...
One of the most well-known Korean War Psywar campaigns was also highly controversial. In November 1950, the Communists introduced the MiG-15 jet fighter (designed and produced by the Mikoyan Gurevich Design Bureau in Russia.) It was superior to all U.S. aircraft flying over Korea and was especially effective against B-29 Superfortresses bomber formations. In response, the United States Air Force (USAF) quickly dispatched the F-86A Sabre to counter the MiG. Equality was not what the USAF needed, but rather a superior airplane to get a tactical “edge.” To learn what advantages they needed, the Air Force wanted a flyable MiG-15 for research and analysis. The problem was that MiGs avoided overflying UN-controlled territory (lending credence to the belief that pilots were Communist Chinese or Russian). The first MiG-15 captured was one that had crash landed on a sandbar in enemy territory. While this was helpful, the USAF still wanted an airworthy example.

In March 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan (Operation MOOLAH) to get a MiG-15 by enticing a pilot to defect. The plan was simple; the first pilot to deliver an operational MiG to UN forces would be given $100,000 and provided political asylum in the U.S.; subsequent MiG-15 pilots would get $50,000 for a flyable aircraft. The campaign was advertised by radio broadcasts and leaflet drops.

The originator of the “Money for MiGs” idea remains in dispute. One source indicates that it originated in the Office of Psychological Warfare in the Pentagon. General Mark W. Clark claimed that he heard that Edward Hymoff, Bureau Chief of the International News Service in Korea, hatched it over a bottle of brandy flying to Korea in late 1952. There are other versions, making it difficult to attribute the source with any certainty.

Regardless of from where or whom the idea originated, the UN Joint Psychological Warfare Committee approved Operation MOOLAH for execution on 1 April 1953. The 1950s equivalent to “Reach Back” employed by MISO units today was to give this high priority mission to the 1st RB&L in Tokyo. The “Proper Gander” writers and artists got to work and finished the leaflets on 20 April 1953. The UN Commander in Korea, General Mark W. Clark, made the first radio broadcast in English. The radio message was repeated in Russian, Chinese, and Korean and followed by air-dropped leaflets. A million MOOLAH leaflets were dropped on North Korean airfields before the end of April and another half million followed in May 1953.

Results were not immediately forthcoming. Not surprising, MiG-15s stopped operating over North Korea for eight days after the initial leaflet drop. Foreign radio broadcast monitors noted that the UN radio broadcasts in Russian had been jammed, but strangely those in Chinese and Korean had not. When the MiG-15s returned to the sky, UN jet pilots reported a noticeable decrease in flying skills and aggressiveness. Finally, in September 1953, two months after the Armistice, a North Korean pilot landed a MiG-15 at Kimpo Airbase near Seoul, South Korea. Ironically he knew nothing about the reward offer. The defecting pilot eventually received the $100,000 reward and was accorded political asylum. Getting a flyable MiG-15 had no impact on UN air superiority in the Korean War. But, it was a coup for the West in the Cold War arms race especially after the American thermonuclear bomb (H-bomb) in 1952 had been followed a year later by a Soviet equivalent.
Soviet MiG-15 vs. U.S. F-86

General

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Performance

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Armament

- **Guns:** 2x NR-23 23mm cannons (80 rds/gun) & 1x Nudelman N-37 37 mm cannon (40 rds).
- **Rockets or Bombs:** 2x 100 kg (220lb) bombs, drop tanks, or unguided rockets on 2 underwing hardpoints.
- **Guns:** 6 × 0.50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns (1,602 rounds/total).
- **Rockets:** variety of rocket launchers; e.g: 2 × Matra rocket pods w/ 18× SNEB 68 mm rockets ea.
- **Bombs:** 5,300 lb (2,400 kg) / payload on four external hardpoints.

Endnotes

2 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 68.
3 June B. Young, Office of Psychological Warfare, Department of Army, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 7 June 2005, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
6 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 71. The effort was in vain because by 1953, the MiG-15s were flying out of Chinese airbases and rarely ventured beyond the Yalu River border areas.
In Psywar units officers plan and supervise operations, while most of the actual writing and production of propaganda materials are done by enlisted specialists.” — 1LT Ernest Codine, QMC

Leaflet #1153 was targeted at North Korean soldiers to cause depression by suggesting that their families were suffering under Communist domination. This leaflet was developed by the 1st RB&L. Red was favored because it symbolized Communism and had a strong visual effect. The leaflet numbering system allowed Psywar staffs elements to assess effectiveness based on numbers of enemy deserters that surrendered carrying it.

Chinese were short cigarette rolling paper, we printed leaflets on cigarette paper,” said John A. Davenport. “When LT Mickelsen [graphic art officer-in-charge] told us that the Chinese were also short toilet paper, we hoped they used the right leaflet type for the right purpose.”

By the end of 1952 the 1st RB&L Group went through major personnel changes. As the USAR soldiers reached twenty-one months on active duty and draftees completed their twenty-four months of active service, they started rotating back to the United States to return to civilian life. Replacements for the original “Proper Ganders” were rarely Psywar School-trained. The small Psywar Division of the Army General School at Fort Riley conducted six Psywar officer and enlisted courses from 1951-1952 and produced a total of 334 graduates from all Army branches as well as some Allied nations. These numbers included original 1st RB&L personnel. Few graduates from later Psywar courses were sent to the 1st RB&L or 1st L&L in Korea. Instead, they were assigned to other units.

By this time, Department of Army had decided to establish an independent U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center and School at Fort Riley, North Carolina in April 1952. Supporting the U.S. Army Psywar Center would be the newly formed 6th RB&L whose officers and men filled most of the last courses held at Fort Riley. Relocation of personnel and equipment to Fort Bragg caused a lapse in formal Psywar training. Hence, sustained formal training to meet the continuing need for Psychological Warfare personnel in the Army, officers and enlisted, remained inadequate two years after the Korean War began.

Armistice negotiations further reduced Army interest. But, when the driving force behind the rejuvenation of Psywar, BG Robert McClure, was reassigned to Iran, OPW in the Pentagon eroded.

After the Armistice, the FECOM G-3 Psywar Section retained several radio broadcast detachments to assist the South Koreans with program content and technical expertise. For the “Proper Ganders,” however, their time in uniform came to an end in 1954, when the U.S. Army disbanded the 1st RB&L Group in Japan. The original “Proper Ganders” that shipped overseas in 1951 were a unique unit, filled largely by an effective U.S. Army Classification and Analysis (C&A) process.

“When in Psywar units officers plan and supervise operations, while most of the actual writing and production of propaganda materials are done by enlisted specialists.” — 1LT Ernest Codine, QMC

Leaflet # 1153 was targeted at North Korean soldiers to cause depression by suggesting that their families were suffering under Communist domination. This leaflet was developed by the 1st RB&L. Red was favored because it symbolized Communism and had a strong visual effect. The leaflet numbering system allowed Psywar staffs elements to assess effectiveness based on numbers of enemy deserters that surrendered carrying it.

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Endnotes


2 U.S. Army General School, Directorate of Resident Instruction, Psychological Warfare Division, Fort Riley, KS. Psywar Unit Officers Course. Student Summary. PW 4201: Phases and Objectives of Military Propaganda I, undated in Robert L. Darcy Papers, Box 1, Folder 51. Manuscript Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA hereafter cited by title Darcy Papers with box and folder number. Darcy Papers, Box 1, Folder 12.


7 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 10-11.

8 Sandler, Cease Resistance, 206.

9 Pease, PSYWAR, 15; Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 6; Sandler, Cease Resistance, 322; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 89.


11 Sandler, Cease Resistance, 206; Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 26; Briscoe, “‘Volunteering for Combat,’” 47; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 99.


13 Sandler, Cease Resistance; 216; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 46; Pease, PSYWAR, 46.

14 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 98-99; Department of the Army, Training Circular TC-17, Military Aspects of Psychological Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 12 December 1958).


17 Reunion Book; 5; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 93.

18 Thomas M. Klein, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones, Jr., 1 March 2007, USAOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.

19 Reunion Book, 23, 207-08.

20 The Navy V-12 program sent officer candidates to college for a year of intensive instruction in science and mathematics. These candidates then attended either the Navy or Marine Corps Officer Candidate School and were commissioned as either an Ensign in the Navy or a 2nd Lieutenant in the Marine Corps.


24 Klein interview, 1 March 2007.


26 Hanno Fuchs earned a Bachelor’s degree in journalism from Syracuse University. He was attending Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business while working at the well-known New York advertising firm of Young and Rubicam when he got his draft notice. Marquette University graduate James T. McCrory was working for the Milwaukee Sentinel as a reporter when he was drafted. John A. Davenport had trained at the Franklin School of Professional Art in New York City before being drafted. He was in Artillery basic training at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, when he was assigned to the 1st RB&L. Reunion Book, 173-174; James T. McCrory, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, email to Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 26 June 2007, USAOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as McCrory email with date.


29 Anthony M. Severino, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 5 August 2007, USAOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Severino email to LTC Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007, USAOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as email with name and date.

30 Sigmund S. Front, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007, USAOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Reunion Book, 230-231.

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34 Robert Carlisle “1st RB&L Group Synopsis,” 20 August 2007, USAOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

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