“The PsyWar Center represents an effort unique to the military history of the United States. For the first time, the techniques of attacking both the minds and the bodies of our enemies have been coordinated in a single training operation.”

— Colonel Charles H. Karlstad

This description of the Psychological Warfare Center on Fort Bragg, North Carolina’s Smoke Bomb Hill was prepared by Colonel (COL) Charles H. Karlstad, and included in the visitor’s booklet for the U. S. Army psychological warfare seminar in 1952. COL Karlstad, former Chief of Staff of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia was then commanding the Army’s Psychological Warfare Center. The purpose of this article is to explain the background and early development of the U. S. Army Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Center that dates from the end of World War II through the 10th Special Forces Group’s deployment to Germany in December 1953.

Victory over Japan in September 1945 was followed by a decades-long period of conflict with the Soviet Union known as the Cold War. As America rapidly demobilized hundreds of military units and millions of uniformed men and women between 1945 and 1946 the country’s defense capabilities were severely reduced. One of the nation’s top domestic priorities was to reestablish a sense of familiar order and routine as seamlessly as possible. Unfortunately in foreign affairs, eliminating one enemy (the Axis Powers) facilitated the rise of Communism. This situation was not lost on serving veterans, especially those overseas with the occupation forces, who faced daily challenges by the Soviet Union. Among the military leaders, Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, General (GEN) Dwight D. Eisenhower’s wartime director of the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF) recognized the seriousness of the Communist threat.

Familiar with how Psychological Warfare (Psywar) contributed to winning the North African and Sicilian Campaigns, BG McClure began a vigorous letter writing effort to rekindle interest among senior American military officers and government officials. In letters to GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower (now Army Chief of Staff), McClure emphasized the necessity to rebuild U. S. Army Psywar capabilities to counter Soviet expansion. He recommended that psychological warfare material and training be integrated into Army service school curricula, that Psywar annexes be prepared for all war plans, and sent GEN Eisenhower a list of former PWD/SHAEF staff members that he believed capable of forming a Psywar reserve. Based upon his war and post-war Psywar experiences in Europe, BG McClure was recognized as a subject matter expert (SME) on that capability. More interestingly, in the summer of 1948, BG McClure was reassigned from Europe to become the Chief, New York Field Office, of the War Department’s Civil Affairs (CA) Division.

BG McClure reported directly to Major General (MG) Daniel C. Noce, Director, Civil Affairs Division, in the War Department. This CA Division controlled all military government assets in occupied areas and supported U. S. reorientation and re-education efforts in the occupied countries of Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. McClure restructured the New York operation into press, periodical, motion picture, radio, theater, music, art, exhibits, library, and book rights sections as he had in Europe. From New York, BG McClure continued his campaign to resurrect Psywar in the Army. All the services faced massive defense readiness issues as a result of demobilization. Thus, rebuilding Army Psywar fell on many deaf ears.

Despite the perceived lack of attention, the Army had not abandoned Psywar. In response to the tactful presentations of BG McClure, Psywar was moved from the War Department G-2 to the Policy Section of the G-3 Plans and Operations Division in November 1946. In
June 1947, the Director of Organization and Training in G-3 activated a “Tactical Information Detachment” (TID) at Fort Riley, Kansas to support Army Field Forces (AFF) maneuvers. AFF TID teams, equipped with loudspeakers and leaflets, worked with Army units and the Aggressor Force during maneuvers in the continental United States, the Caribbean and Hawaii. Simultaneously, two powerful commanders, GEN Lucius D. Clay, the U. S. High Commissioner for Occupied Germany, and GEN Douglas A. MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) in occupied Japan, sought Psywar support to counter Soviet/Communist Cold War propaganda.

In February 1949, the Wallace Carroll Report, a study of the Army’s role in current psychological warfare activities, was submitted to Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall. Through members of Royall’s staff that included Under Secretary William H. Draper, Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray and Lieutenant General (LTG) Albert C. Wedemeyer [Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (G-3)]. Carroll recommended that a separate organization, headed by a general officer or qualified civilian, be established for Army Psywar. This prompted Major General (MG) Charles L. Bolte, the new director of Plans and Operations (G-3) to write BG McClure soliciting recommendations for candidates for a civilian appointment in the Office of the Secretary of the Army. While discussions to reinvigorate the Army’s Psywar program had bogged down concerning organization, equipment, doctrine, training, etc. two catalysts renewed the momentum.

First, Frank Pace, Jr. replaced Gordon Gray as the Secretary of the Army on 12 April 1950. He was very interested in Psywar and so made the Army Chief of Staff, GEN J. Lawton Collins aware of this in a memorandum. Secretary Pace wanted a study done that addressed assignment of more personnel to Psywar and special operations and the formation of a separate Subsidiary Plans Branch within the Plans Group, of the G-3 Plans and Operations Directorate. Pace directed the assignment of sixteen officers possessing Psywar and special operations experience to Headquarters, Department of the Army; to U. S. Army, Europe; to Army Field Forces (AFF); and to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) beginning July 1951. Events in Korea in June 1950 soon accelerated that assignment schedule.

On 25 June 1950, North Korea’s surprise invasion of South Korea demonstrated that once again the U. S. was unprepared for a major world crisis. Realizing the gravity of the situation, MG Bolte, now the Army’s G-3, requested that Sixth Army Headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco, California release BG McClure temporarily for return to Washington, DC to assist him with Psywar. Bolte wanted to capitalize on McClure’s experience “to determine the further organizational steps necessary to meet the operational Psywar requirements of the Korean situation or of a general war.” When BG McClure arrived in Washington on 29 August 1950, he met with Secretary Pace, Mr. James E. Webb, the Assistant Secretary of State, Public Affairs, members of the Joint Staff as well as General John E. Hull, the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, and the principal Deputy Chiefs of Staff.

Based on this meeting, BG McClure, with MG Bolte’s endorsement, obtained approval from GEN Collins to activate a Psychological Warfare Division of 102 personnel on 1 September 1950. The Army G-3 Subsidiary Plans Branch was expanded to do psychological warfare planning. McClure’s second step was to form a completely new and independent division within the G-3. While senior government and military leaders supported the revival of Psywar with authorizations, filling specialized Psywar requirements almost derailed the effort. As a stopgap measure, the Army sent six Army officers to attend a thirteen-week course at George Washington University beginning on 2 October 1950. These six were to augment the seven officers on active duty qualified/experienced in psychological warfare.
General J. Lawton Collins replaced General Omar N. Bradley as Army Chief of Staff in August 1949 and focused the Army Staff’s efforts to activate the Psychological Warfare Center and Special Forces.

LTC Melvin R. Blair, former Merrill’s Marauder and Korean combat veteran, was assigned to OCPW in March 1951 and became responsible for developing the initial training and recruiting programs for Special Forces.

COL Wendell W. Fertig led the civil government and guerrilla army on Mindinao, Philippines from 1942 through 1945 during the Japanese occupation.

LTC Russell W. Volckmann, WWII Commander of the U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USA FIP-NL) was one of OCPW’s first members. He developed the position, the policy papers, and led the planning that established U. S. Army Special Forces.

As the Army struggled to react to events in Korea into early 1951, BG McClure integrated Psywar into the Army G-3 staff and throughout the Pentagon. On 31 October 1950, at his first weekly staff meeting, McClure emphasized two key factors: First, not everyone in the Army understood them or their purpose; Second, MG Bolte agreed that unconventional warfare (UW) did not belong in the G-3 and should be a Psychological Warfare Division responsibility. The Psychological Warfare Division consisted of the psychological warfare, cover and deception, and unconventional warfare sections. In December 1950, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John O. Weaver took charge of the Psychological Warfare Division in the General Subjects Directorate of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas. It was 15 January 1951 when the Army Staff recognized BG McClure as the head of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), and OCPW as an independent staff element on the Army Staff.

OCPW’s mission was to “formulate and develop psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policy and to recommend policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in those fields.” BG McClure divided OCPW into the Psychological Operations, Requirements, and Special Operations Divisions. The Psychological Operations and Special Operations Divisions had plans, operations and intelligence, and evaluation branches. The Requirements Division focused on organization, personnel, training, logistics and research for psychological and special operations activities. As the OCPW evolved, so did other U. S. Governmental departments (State) and agencies (CIA) with an interest in Psywar. Realizing the potential for interagency conflict and confusion, President Harry S. Truman established the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) on 4 April 1951 by Executive Directive.

Composed of the offices of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the PSB was “to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct of psychological operations within the framework of approved national policies.” This strategic group reported to the National Security Council. Since the PSB conducted no operations, its primary function was to prevent interagency rivalries from developing. This was to be accomplished by evaluating national psychological operations, implementing approved objectives, policies and programs, and coordinating and planning psychological warfare efforts. With the PSB focused on formulating national Psywar policy guidance, BG McClure could return to the Psywar issues in the Army.

The demand for Psywar assets grew daily. BG McClure prioritized and allocated resources. Supporting the war in Korea made MG Charles A. W illoughby’s need the highest priority. MG Daniel C. Noce’s [U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Chief of Staff] requests for qualified psychological warfare and special operations staff officers for EUCOM was number two. Third was the development of training programs and support for Psywar in the United States. Between late 1950 and early 1951, the Army activated five Psywar units: the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company for the Eighth Army in Korea; the 2nd L&L Company at Fort Riley; the 5th L&L Company at Fort Riley slated for Europe; the 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet (RB&L) Group; and the 301st RB&L Group (U. S. Army Reserve) to be organized and trained at Fort Riley before being shipped overseas. Having solved that immediate Psywar resources need, BG McClure began the staff action to transfer the UW function in G-3 to the OCPW. Realizing that his knowledge was lacking in special operations, McClure began searching for officers with WWII combat experience in this area. The guerrilla warfare and long-
The Smoke Bomb Hill area of Fort Bragg, NC as seen in 1970 had experienced no significant changes in appearance since LTC Melvin R. Blair made his first visit there in 1951.

range penetration unit officers selected were: LTC Melvin R. Blair (Merrill’s Marauders); LTC Martin J. Waters, Jr. (OSS, Detachment 101 Burma); COL Aaron Bank (OSS, Europe and China); COL Wendell W. Fertig (Mindanao guerrillas, Philippines); and LTC Russell W. Volckmann (Luzon guerrillas, Philippines).22 As Chief of the Special Operations Division in late March 1951, COL Bank credited LTC Volckmann with preparing the staff work required to develop the position, planning, and policy papers used to establish Special Forces units in the active Army.23

As BG McClure dealt with these challenges, there were two factors that determined solutions. First, any outbreak of unconventional warfare would be in Europe and fought using foreign nationals from East European countries who had enlisted in the American Army under the Lodge Act. Second, no type of special unit had been designated and its primary objective mission had not been assigned.24 The first effort to resolve these dilemmas was a UW conference called by Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN J. Lawton Collins, at Fort Benning in early 1951. LTC Volckmann, representing OCPW, was tasked to take the CSA guidance, determine what kind of unit could accomplish UW, and prepare its mission.

On 9 April 1951 LTC Volckmann submitted his report to the Commandant of the Infantry School. “Subversive activities” meant, in reality, “special forces operations.” Based on GEN Collins’ reference to the use of indigenous personnel, Volckmann’s framework clarified the objectives of “special forces operations.”25 Several additional observations were key: he believed special forces operations should be an accepted field of conventional ground warfare not regarded as irregular or unconventional warfare; the ultimate objective of special forces operations was to “organize and support guerrilla or indigenous forces that are capable of efficient and controlled exploitation in conjunction with land, air and sea forces; the Army had the inherent responsibility in peace to prepare and plan for the conduct of special forces operations; and it was unsound, dangerous, and unworkable to delegate these responsibilities to a civilian agency.” 26

LTC Volckmann’s recommendations were taken seriously in Washington. At the end of May 1951, the Department of Defense tasked the Army to enlist eight-hundred Eastern European recruits under the Lodge Act to conduct anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare in Communist-controlled countries. LTC Melvin Blair, the OCPW training officer designated as a Special Forces recruiter, stated that these (Lodge Act) men had a special motivation, linguistic abilities, and knowledge of terrain in potential enemy countries that made them especially valuable.27 A month later, OCPW proposed the formation of a “Special Forces Regiment” of three battalions totaling 2,481 men; 1,300 of the enlisted were coded as Lodge Act recruits.28 On 23 August 1951, the necessary personnel authorizations were provided by the Army. The Airborne Ranger Infantry Companies created during the Korean War were inactivated and those personnel spaces were reallocated to Special Forces. BG McClure realized that Fort Riley, Kansas could not accommodate this new Army organization. The Psywar and Special Forces had to be stationed at a military post with a variety of field and garrison locations to simultaneously train and develop doctrine for these distinctly different UW elements.

Finding the right facility was no easy task. Having visited the best three options, Fort Benning, Georgia, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, McClure instructed COL Aaron Bank to “make it Fort Bragg if you can.” 29 It finally took McClure’s diplomacy with GEN Mark W. Clark, Chief of Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and LTG Alvan C. Gillem,
Commanding General, Third Army at Fort McPherson, Georgia, to gain support to establish the Army’s Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg on 4 December 1951. That decision enabled LTC Blair and the OCPW survey team to negotiate with LTG John W. Leonard, Commanding General, Fort Bragg for a location.

After canvassing the post, the best available area was the former World War II mobilization area known as Smoke Bomb Hill. LTC Blair told BG McClure that, “in general, the area is exactly what we wanted.” There were sufficient barracks, mess halls and administration buildings, classrooms and a library. He estimated the facilities could be quickly rehabilitated and occupied for $151,000. After briefing the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) and GEN Collins, BG McClure finally received approval to establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 27 March 1952 with activation on or about 1 May 1952.

On 14 April 1952, the new home of the Army’s Psywar Center came under the jurisdiction of the commanding general, Third Army. This was quickly followed by moving equipment and personnel of the 6th RB&L and the Psywar teaching staff from Fort Riley to Fort Bragg. The Center’s Table of Distribution (TD) contained the mission:

To conduct individual training and supervise unit training in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations; to develop and test Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations.

On 29 May 1952, the Chief of Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia announced the activation of the U. S. Army Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg and the transfer of responsibility for Psywar doctrine development and teaching responsibilities from the Army General School at Fort Riley. The next step was to assemble the Psywar Center assets on Smoke Bomb Hill.

The Psywar Center initially consisted of a Psywar School (Provisional), a Psywar Board, and the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L). These were followed by the 10th Special Forces Group in April 1952. The Center’s first commander and Psywar School commandant was COL Charles N. Karlstad, a combat veteran of World Wars I and II and former Chief of Staff of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia. Although the Psywar Center was formally established by the Department of the Army, there were still administrative issues to resolve. The first one was to change the Psywar School status from “provisional” to that of a formal Army service school. This was quite important. The Psychological Warfare Division at Fort Riley had been conducting U. S. Army recognized service school courses as part of the Army General School. Service schools were accorded more prestige, funding, and authorized to procure equipment and attract quality staff and faculty members. Building on previous recognition, BG McClure convinced the Army staff to accord the Psychological Warfare School official service school status.
Organized into a small headquarters staff and two departments, Psychological Warfare and Special Forces, the Psywar School’s purpose was “to prepare selected individuals of the Army to perform those psychological warfare and special forces duties which they may be called upon to perform in war.” While initially both departments appeared equally important, this would not be true until the mid 1950s. The Psychological Warfare Department, headed by LTC Otis E. Hays, Jr. was organized into staff planning, intelligence requirements, propaganda input, and dissemination committees to support instruction. They conducted the eight-week officer courses, six-week Psywar noncommissioned officer course, and a two-week Psywar familiarization course. On the other hand, the classified nature of its organization and mission dictated that little publicity be given to either the Special Forces Department directed by COL Filmore K. Mearns or the 10th Special Forces Group commanded by COL Aaron Bank. This allowed Special Forces personnel to concentrate more on learning the fundamentals of unconventional warfare and conducting guerrilla operations than contending with external interference.

The second element of the Psywar Center was the Psychological Warfare Board. Its mission was to “test, evaluate, and compile reports on materiel, doctrine, procedures, techniques, and tactics pertaining to and for Psychological Warfare and Special Forces.” Although straightforward, the mission was misleading in its applicability to Special Forces. Since the security surrounding Special Forces was so restrictive, the Psywar Board gave it little attention, only assisted when asked, made no mention of any unconventional warfare projects, and had no Special Forces members on the board. By early 1954, their accomplishments included over forty projects ranging from improvements to Psywar transmitters and receivers, loudspeakers, and mobile reproduction equipment, to leaflet dissemination by mortar and artillery shells, rockets, light liaison planes, and balloons.

The 6th RB&L Group, permanently organized on 2 May 1951, traced its beginnings to the provisional Psychological Warfare Detachment formed at Fort Riley, Kansas on 14 September 1951. Designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations, it could also support the efforts of national world-wide propaganda when so directed. Initially, the...
The 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) at Fort Riley, Kansas before moving to the Psywar Center on Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 1952.

COLs Charles H. Karlstad (U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center & School Commandant) and Aaron Bank (Center Executive Officer) with LTCs Lester L. Holmes (6th RB&L Group commander) and John O. Weaver (Chief of the Psywar Division of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas) pose by the Headquarters sign on Smoke Bomb Hill, Fort Bragg, NC.

The 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (L&L) unit logo.

The DUI of the current 9th Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Battalion. The 9th Battalion traces its lineage back to the 9th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company formed on 14 April 1952.

The 10th Special Forces Group's unit sign on Smoke Bomb Hill, Fort Bragg, NC. Until the current Special Forces shoulder sleeve insignia was approved on 22 August 1955, all Special Forces soldiers wore the WWII Airborne Command Patch.

6th RB&L Group was comprised of three companies. Headquarters and Headquarters Company contained the command, administrative, supervisory and intelligence personnel necessary to direct propaganda operations. The 7th Reproduction Company had the print equipment and skilled technicians to produce leaflets and newspapers of varying sizes and in multiple colors. The 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company could replace or augment broadcasting of propaganda by radio.

The Group remained organized this way until it moved from Fort Riley to Fort Bragg. Under the command of LTC Lester L. Holmes, it became part of the Psychological Warfare Center in June 1952. Soon after its arrival, three more organizations were added to the Group. Two of these were the 2nd and 9th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Companies, created to provide tactical propaganda to an army in the field. Like the 6th RB&L, they could support national propaganda objectives and were capable of propagating the theater commander’s directives via loudspeaker or print media. Their targets were tactical and presented highly vulnerable, rapidly changing propaganda opportunities. On 27 May 1953, the third and final element was formed in the 6th RB&L. The 12th Consolidation Company focused on post-conflict Psywar in support of consolidation operations in areas under military government control.

On 19 May 1952, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) was formally activated at the Psywar Center. Its mission was: “To furnish command, supply, and organizational maintenance for
a Special Forces Group located in rear areas and, when provided with the necessary augmentation in personnel and equipment, for subordinate units committed in the objective area; to furnish administration for a Special Forces Group.” Its authorized strength was one hundred and twenty-two officers and men, but only one warrant officer and seven enlisted men were present when COL Aaron Bank arrived on Smoke Bomb Hill on 19 June 1952. An aggressive Special Forces recruiting campaign was well underway. LTC Melvin R. Blair remembers: “I hit the road on a search for recruits. While Colonel Volckmann went to Europe on the same mission, I visited the headquarters of all the continental armies, all the Army’s combat arms and technical-service schools, training divisions, and Army installations in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Far East.”

**Epilogue**

On 27 July 1953, an Armistice was signed between North and South Korea and the United Nations (UN). It signaled the official end to hostilities on the peninsula and a two and one-half mile wide Korean Demilitarized Zone separated the countries. With its military commitment to the United Nations and South Korea fulfilled, the United States Government looked to cut military spending. The Psychological Strategy Board was replaced by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Unlike the PSB, the OCB had no Psywar planning capability. It reported to the National Security Council and was responsible for integrating national security policies across several government agencies. U.S. Army Field Forces command suggested that the Psychological Warfare Center be deactivated and the Psywar training mission be given back to the Army Ground School at Fort Riley, Kansas. Special Forces training would become a unit mission and no longer be a school function.

Fortunately, BG McClure was able to fight off that initiative. The Psywar Center was retained at Fort Bragg, but its strength levels were reduced. That was BG McClure’s last hurrah for Psywar and SF. President Dwight D. Eisenhower needed the diplomatic skills that McClure so ably demonstrated in London in 1943. The Psywar Center survived, but the first major change came in 1956 when Special Forces became the dominant force on Smoke Bomb Hill. Then, the Psychological Warfare Center was renamed to the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School.

Promoted to Major General, McClure was sent to Iran to be the Chief of the Military Mission to Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi. Major General McClure retired in 1956 after forty years of service and died at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on New Year’s Day 1957.
Eugene G. Piasecki is a retired Special Forces officer who has been with the USAOSOC History Office since 2006. A USMA graduate, he earned his Masters Degree in military history from Norwich University and is currently pursuing a PhD. His current research interests include the history of Army Special Forces, Special Forces involvement Korea and Somalia, and the History of Camp Mackall, NC.

Endnotes


5 Paddock, “The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare,” 328.


7 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 56. The TID was comprised of two officers and approximately twenty men (Paddock, 64).


9 Paddock, U. S. Army Special Warfare, 57. Gordon Gray replaced Kenneth C. Royall as Secretary of the Army in June 1949.

10 Paddock, U. S. Army Special Warfare, 59. Also consulted during this process was Professor Paul Linebarger who had recently published a book on psychological warfare. Linebarger's position was that Plans and Operations could not meet its Psywar responsibilities unless the officers designated were assigned full time and given the opportunity to travel. (Paddock, 60).

11 Paddock, U. S. Army Special Warfare, 63. Frank Pace, Jr. had little or no practical experience in Psywar operations. Commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in 1942, he served for the remainder of WWII as a personnel and administration officer in the Air Transport Command, Army Air Force, and was discharged as a Major in 1945. From 12 April to 20 January 1953, as Secretary of the Army, he implemented policies to broaden the Army's utilization of Negro manpower, elevated research and development to the Deputy Chief of Staff level, and was chairman of the Defense Ministers Conference, NATO 1950. General Collins had replaced GEN Omar N. Bradley as the Army Chief of Staff in August 1949.


13 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 93.

14 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 93.

15 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 94.

16 Dale Story, “Army Psychological Warfare Training,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 1952, 16 (3), 446. LTC Weaver had served in Italy during WWII as the commander of the 5th Army’s Combat Propaganda Team and was a graduate of the British psychological warfare school in Cairo (Paddock, 93).

17 Paddock, “U. S. Army Special Warfare,” 95.


19 Harry S. Truman Papers, “Psychological Strategy Board Files.”

20 Paddock, U. S. Army Special Warfare, 116. In the Far East Command (FECOM), Psywar operations were part of a small Special Projects Branch in MG Willoughby’s G-2 Division of Headquarters, FECOM. In Europe, MG Noce was the U.S. European Command Chief of Staff.

21 Paddock, U. S. Army Special Warfare, 117.

22 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 119.

23 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 120.

24 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 120. The Lodge Act was also known as HR 3997, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949.

25 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 122. Volckmann’s memorandum was to the Commanding General, the Infantry Center, subject: Analysis and Suggestions re Gen. J. Lawton Collins’ Conference, 5 April 1951, from Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann, 9 April 1951, filed with Psy War 337 TS (16 April 1951), Record Group 319 Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal files, Box 12, National Archives.

26 Paddock, U. S. Army Special Warfare, 123. (This note is also from the same reference cited in red in endnote 16).


28 Paddock, U. S. Army Special Warfare, 124-125.

29 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 137.

30 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 138.

31 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 139.

32 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 140. Department of the Army General Order No. 37, 14 April 1952 established the Psychological Warfare Center as a Class I activity and installation effective 10 April 1952. A copy of the Recommended Table of Distribution for the Psywar Center can be found with Psy War 320.3 (16 April 1952), National Archives. (Paddock, 201).

33 Dr. Alfred A. Paddock, Jr., “The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare,” 80. Remaining in Europe after the Armistice ended WWII, COL Karlstad performed occupation duty with the American forces located at Brohl between the towns of Nieder-Breisig and Andernach, Germany. In 1933, CPT Karlstad (Infantry) along with CPT William F. Marquat (Coast Artillery) and MAJ Daniel C. Noce (Corps of Engineers) graduated from the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Also stationed at Fort Leavenworth during this period was MAJ Charles A. Willoughby (Infantry), the CGSC school librarian and course instructor.

34 The Psywar School was accorded official service school status by Department of the Army General Order No. 92 on 22 October 1952.


36 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 142-143.

37 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 143.

38 Paddock, “The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare,” 82. One example of the Board’s ability to expedite projects was their development of mobile radio broadcasting studio and transmitter vans that were urgenty needed after the start of the Korean War. Experts estimated that it would take five to seven years to field the systems, but the Board had them built in six months. (Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 143).

39 Paddock, “The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare,” 82.


41 Paddock, “The Psychological Warfare Center and the Origins of Special Warfare,” 82 and Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, 302-303. Consolidation Operations are Psychological operations conducted in foreign areas inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace and occupied by United States forces, or in which United States forces are based, designed to produce behaviors by the foreign populace that support United States objectives in the area (Joint Pub 1-02).

42 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 145.

43 Blair, “Toughest Outfit in the Army,” 89.

44 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 155.