“These men of the Army Special Forces (Airborne) represent the first formal recognition of guerrilla warfare in modern United States Army planning.”

— LTC Melvin R. Blair, OCPW

The 25 June 1950 attack of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) on South Korea caught the United States and the Republic of South Korea politically and militarily unprepared. Specialized units from WWII such as the Rangers, Merrill’s Marauders, and the First Special Service Force, trained to ‘take the war to the enemy’ and infiltrate behind enemy lines to disrupt operations, interdict lines of supply and communication and develop and employ indigenous combat forces, had not existed since 1945. When the Korean War erupted, the United States found itself in an unusual situation. Not only was it now involved in its first ‘undeclared war,’ it also lacked a skilled force to perform the special operations necessary to neutralize the threat. To overcome these operational short-falls, the U.S. Army created ‘Special Forces’ (SF) to organize and train indigenous personnel inside enemy territory. The purpose of this article is to explain how Special Forces came into existence and revitalized the U.S. Army’s ability to meet future unconventional warfare (UW) challenges.

Unsure of how to address UW, the Army’s leadership turned to Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure for viable solutions. In retrospect, BG McClure was a logical choice because he had been General (GEN) Dwight D. Eisenhower’s World War II Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Division chief, an assignment that made him the senior serving officer most familiar with UW. His experience though had to be translated to meet the current situation. While BG McClure understood how Psywar fit into UW, he knew very little about direct action by guerrilla forces and their integration into conventional military campaigns. As a result, he gave higher priority to developing Army Psywar capabilities, although he believed that Psywar and UW were inextricably linked.

To demonstrate this connectivity between Psywar and UW, BG McClure capitalized on two of his major achievements. Heading the Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Division, McClure formed a separate element under the Department of the Army G-3 Operations and staffed it with veteran UW officers like Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Russell W. Volckmann, Colonel (COL) Wendell W. Fertig, LTC Melvin R. Blair, COL Aaron Bank, and LTC Martin J. Waters. By doing this, McClure effectively put their collective experiences in guerrilla warfare and long-range penetration operations during World War II to work in his Special Operations Division. They were responsible for staff supervision of all psychological warfare and special operations activities.

On 15 January 1951, the Psywar Division reorganized again, and became the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). Unique in its responsibilities, OCPW enjoyed the luxury of being the first Army staff directorate formally recognized as a Special Staff Division with direct access to the Army Chief of Staff. McClure followed this by integrating Psywar into the Army staff and establishing the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Center on ‘Smoke Bomb Hill’ at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 27 March 1952.

In the meantime, GEN J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, attended a guerrilla warfare conference at Fort Benning, Georgia. During the conference, GEN Collins said: “The Infantry School should consider the Rangers as well as other troops and indigenous personnel to initiate subversive activities. I personally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve as the nucleus of expansion in this direction.” The OCPW representative at the conference was Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Russell W. Volckmann, the former WWII commander of the Philippine guerrilla forces on Northern Luzon. Based on his UW experience, the Infantry School asked LTC Volckmann to analyze GEN Collins’ speech to determine what type of special unit the Army needed and its primary purpose. This analysis “was the first evidence within the Office of the Chief of Psywar of the philosophical basis for the creation of an Army unconventional warfare capability.”

Volckmann believed that ‘special forces’ operations should be an accepted part of conventional ground
Creating ‘Special Forces’

LTC Volckmann, probably more than any other officer on BG McClure’s staff, shaped the reinstitution of UW as part of the U.S. Army’s capabilities. His memorandum to GEN Collins resulted in two far-reaching decisions that affected the creation of Special Forces. First, in May 1951, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge introduced the Lodge-Philbin Act. This legislation allowed Eastern European male citizens to be recruited into the U.S. Army. Those that volunteered for airborne training could be used in ‘special forces’ to organize guerrilla bands to attack lines of communication in the event the Soviets invaded Western Europe. Second, the deactivation of the short-lived Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) before December 1951 provided the personnel spaces to form ‘Special Forces’ at the Psywar Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. These two key decisions opened the way for highly motivated soldiers looking for more challenges and excitement to seek ‘special forces’ duty.

They should not be considered irregular or unconventional warfare. The ultimate objective of ‘special forces’ operations was to organize and support guerrilla or indigenous forces that are capable of efficient and controlled exploitation in conjunction with land, air, and sea forces. Volckmann asserted that the Army had the inherent responsibility in peace to plan and prepare to conduct ‘special forces’ operations, since in wartime the Army would organize and execute those operations. It was unsound, dangerous, and unworkable to delegate these responsibilities to a civilian agency.

To get the ‘special forces’ ball rolling, OCPW sent two of its staff officers to recruit soldiers. LTC Melvin R. Blair, former WWII Merrill’s Marauder, traveled throughout the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Far East, while LTC Volckmann went to Europe. As LTC Blair recalled: “All applications for assignment or transfer to Special Forces were being processed by the Army’s Adjutant General Office, and all over the Army, privates, noncoms, and officers were fighting to get into a unit where chances of sustained survival in combat would appear to be doubtful at least.” The two were so successful that soldiers took leave to travel to Washington to volunteer for SF. To prevent ‘robbing’ the Army of its best men, OCPW and The Adjutant General drafted regulations to authorize enlistment in the Army specifically for SF. While Blair and Volckmann recruited Army-wide, the activity level at the Psywar Center shifted into high gear to keep pace with the soldiers coming into SF.

Volckmann explained his role in establishing and supporting SF: “The actual organizational concept for Special Forces (SF) as well as their mission and functions was based not only on my own operational experience, but also upon every major Resistance Movement that could be researched . . . and in 1949 I undertook preparing draft Field Manuals on ‘Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare’ and ‘Combating Guerrilla Forces.’ These two draft manuals were completed just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.” He further stated that, “The concept of Special Operations and Special Forces was not the easiest task of ‘selling’ within the Department of Army. It took a year of effort and then when it was approved there were no personnel spaces available to man the Psychological Warfare Center and Special Forces Group to be located at Fort Bragg. Through a West Point classmate in the Operations Division, Department of Army at the time, I finally managed to get 3,000 personnel spaces and the Psychological Warfare Center and the Special Forces Group (SFG) was activated.”

In Washington, DC, while BG McClure and the OCPW’s primary focus remained on activating the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), three other separate, but equally significant, tasks were also occurring. These included: continuing to move the Psywar Center and its assets from Fort Riley, Kansas to Fort Bragg, North Carolina; supporting the units in combat in Korea with trained Psywarriors; and filling new Psywar requirements being generated from Europe by Major General (MG) Daniel Noce, the U. S. European Command Chief of Staff. According to LTC Blair, “We staff officers at the Pentagon sat back with our fingers crossed, but not without confidence. We felt that the country was full of adventurous young men who would volunteer for anything if the need for it was carefully presented, and we firmly believed that we had done just that.” For COL Bank and the 10th SFG, that philosophy produced
COL Aaron Bank, the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group.

results and more ‘double volunteers’ (soldiers who volunteered for both airborne and Special Forces) headed to Smoke Bomb Hill. But, other issues arose that had the potential to derail the 10th's activation.

One of the most visible was the association of Special Forces with and under the Psywar Center. According to LTC Volckmann, “We felt there was, in general, a stigma connected with Psychological Warfare, especially among combat men that we didn’t care to have ‘rub off’ on Special Forces. Behind-the-lines operations and the ‘dirty-tricks game’ had enough opposition amongst conventional military minds that had to be overcome without adding the additional problems inherent in Psychological Warfare. However, we lost that battle.”

With the decision to keep Special Forces subordinate to the Psywar Center, COL Bank focused on internal organization and starting a training program.

On 19 May 1952, the 10th SFG was formally activated with the creation of its Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). Authorized one hundred and twenty-two officers and men, it was organized and assigned to the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army. On 19 June 1952, OCPW’s Chief of Operations, COL Aaron Bank, departed Washington, DC for Smoke Bomb Hill to assume command of the 10th SFG. Arriving on 20 June 1952, COL Bank found one warrant officer and seven enlisted men assigned to the Group. Although large numbers of men throughout the Army volunteered for Special Forces duty, transfer approval rates did not keep pace despite LTC Blair’s assertion that “we [the OCPW staff officers] kept the phone lines to the AGs [Adjutant General] office hot with our inquiries.” By August 1952, the actual strength of the 10th SFG was 259, with 123 of these designated as ‘operational unit’ volunteer personnel.

These early Special Forces hopefuls brought many military occupational specialties (MOS) and represented units throughout the active Army. It soon became obvious that a Special Forces assignment appealed more to some soldiers than to others. Such was the case in the two remaining post-WWII Airborne Divisions: the 82nd at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the 11th at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Volunteers from the 82nd included Captain (CPT) Oscar A. Suchier, Jr., CPT David B. Crowe, CPT Herbert R. Brucker, First Lieutenant (ILT) Carl M. Bergstrom, and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Richard E. “Dick” Shevchenko. The 11th provided LTC Jack T. “Black Jack” Shannon, Major (MAJ) William Ewald, and ILT Norman E. “Ned” Day, all from the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment. Others like CPT Dorsey B. Anderson, CPT John L. Striegel, and ILT Clarence E. “Bud” Skoien, had been members of the recently inactivated 4th, 1st, and 6th Ranger Infantry Companies, respectively. Sergeant (SGT) Joel L. Koford, a medic assigned to Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, DC, learned about Special Forces from a memorandum posted to the unit bulletin board, while Private First Class (PFC) Johnny A. Dolin volunteered after completing infantry basic combat training (BCT).
at Camp Breckenridge, Kentucky. These individuals had long and influential careers in SF.

Knowing the challenges involved in creating the OCPW and the Psywar Center, and realizing the opinions of many senior Army leaders held regarding ‘special’ type units, COL Bank understood his responsibility; the Special Forces concept could not fail. Other key officer leaders knew the importance of projecting only a positive image of 10th SFG success. One of these was MAJ David B. Crowe, Commander, FB Team 18 (forerunner of today’s SF Company). MAJ Crowe remembered: “Outside of the 10th SFG there was no hint of any internal issues. In the early days our big job was to fight the administrative obstacles. People rallied around COL Bank and presented a unified front with no ‘bad words’ [negative comments] leaving the Group.” This did not mean that Bank and the others did this by themselves. Former 10th SFG Adjutant, Carl M. Bergstrom said that COL Bank got support and encouragement from former WWII Philippine guerrilla fighters, LTCs Donald D. Blackburn and Russell Volckmann.

At Fort Bragg, COL Bank, with COL Charles H. Karlstad’s assistance, continued organizing based on the 19 May 1952 SF Group mission concept: “To infiltrate its component operational detachments, by air, sea, or land, to designated areas within the enemy’s sphere of influence and organize the indigenous guerrilla potential on a quasi-military or a military basis for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea and air forces.” On 15 August 1952, COL Bank and his skeleton staff began forming SF Operational Detachments (SFODs) based on their World War II experience. Detachment 12, the Group Headquarters, was charged with organizing a Special Forces Area Command. The subsequent detachments were formed sequentially from 13 through 25 (company-level equivalents). These elements were responsible for organizing Special Forces District Commands comprised of two or more Special Forces (Guerrilla) Regiments.

During this process, two of the detachments were assigned additional missions. Detachment 12, the Group Headquarters, took control of the first ten Lodge Act enlistees. The group training instructors, including 1LT Ned Day, 1LT Bud Skoien, CPT Dorsey Anderson and CPT John Striegel, were assigned to Detachment 16. Although the entire 10th SFG would change as it matured, this configuration served its intended purpose. It gave commanders and trainers at all levels maximum flexibility, the opportunity to evaluate each man’s aptitude for Special Forces, and identified those considered unsuitable. Reassignment followed quickly. MAJ David Crowe and PFC Johnny Dolin agreed that “we got rid of the ‘sore-heads,’ weeded out the ‘weak sisters,’ those who couldn’t take it, and those who got in trouble.” After the administrative requirements were taken care of, training became top priority.

Because the 10th SFG training requirements were unique in the U. S. Army, the Psywar School’s SF Department developed and conducted the first eight-week (guerrilla warfare) courses, attended separately by fifty-one officers and fifty-two enlisted men. Directed by COL Fillmore K. Mearns, the SF Department Operations Committee was headed by a former Korean War veteran guerrilla commander, MAJ Richard M. Ripley, and staffed with former WWII Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veterans like CPTs Leif Bangsboll, John H. Hemingway, and Herbert R. Brucker. As one of those fortunate enough to be able to attend the SF Department training, SGT Joel Koford remembers that “it seemed that while all the SF training was related to blowing bridges and determining the inner workings of the process of blowing a bridge, students were also taught the best time to execute an ambush, how to develop an escape and evasion (E&E)
Instead of having a formal draft concept plan or even notes, Bank’s training meetings consisted of him telling stories about his WWII experiences. From their notes, the ‘S-3 ½-ers then wrote the lesson plans and created field exercises. Ned Day recalled that COL Bank’s final guidance was: “Whatever you can come up with, until its proven wrong, is as good as anything I come up with.”

Although more simplified than probably intended, Bank’s training philosophy was understood by every man in the Group. SFC Dick Shevchenko confirmed that simplicity: “Our mission was to go behind the lines, gather up guerrillas, and train them.”

By April 1953, the results of the recruiting efforts by OCPW, the SF Department, and individual 10th SFG soldiers paid dividends. The Group had reached its authorized strength of 1,700 officers and men. Individual and SF military occupational specialty (MOS) cross-training, lasting between six and eight weeks depending on individual MOS, had been completed. Certain personnel received additional special skills training off Fort Bragg. Some attended smoke jumpers school in Montana, small boat training in Little Creek, Virginia, or the Radio Operators (O5B) Course while others, like future team medical sergeant Johnny Dolin, received training at Womack Army Hospital, Fort Bragg, before attending the Field Medical Service School at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. SGT Joel Koford, another medical sergeant, prepared lesson plans for advanced training.

Once all individual training was accomplished and everyone had returned to Fort Bragg, COL Bank decided it was time to evaluate team/detachment and group proficiency under field conditions according to Army Training Program (ATP) standards.

Although their initial training established the minimum individual and selected special skills required for all 10th SFG personnel, it was critical to evaluate how well the nominal teams had integrated at the basic operational level. To accomplish this, COL Bank drew again upon his World War II experience, formalized the team assignments, and moved them to Camp Mackall, North Carolina, for small unit training. It was at Camp Mackall during Field Training Exercises (FTX) FREE LEGION and LEGIONNAIRE RALLY that the men learned to apply their individual and collective skills while operating in a ‘hostile environment.’

In this evaluation were SF Department instructors CPTs Leif Bangsboll and Herb Brucker. They put the 10th SFG operational detachments through their paces by having them execute missions that they had planned in the classroom. These included infiltrations, raids, ambushes, blind radio transmissions, E&E plans, and some clandestine tactics, techniques, and procedures.

In the meantime, COL Bank readied the Group for its final training phase and evaluation. Without an ATP specifically designed to evaluate the capabilities of the Special Forces Group, COL Bank tasked MAJ William Ewald, Commander, 13th SF Operational Detachment to draft a prototype. Once written, the ATP had to be validated and Ewald got the mission. Since this was a Group-level exercise, he established a base camp area (Camp Castro) to serve as the maneuver control element headquarters in Georgia’s Chattahoochee National Forest. From July through September 1953, with help from Army Field Forces personnel, MAJ Ewald conducted FTX CLEO, the formal evaluation of the entire 10th SFG training and operational readiness.

This was a critical time for both COL Bank and the 10th SFG. Carl Bergstrom recalls, “COL Bank didn’t talk about the problems he was facing, but every week he visited every team in the field and didn’t bring along any ‘extra’ staff officers as observers who might influence his future decisions.”

The one thing that COL Bank knew, but had not shared, was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had approved war plans that employed the 10th SFG, and were just waiting for the right opportunity to send it overseas. Neither the JCS nor COL Bank had to wait long. In June 1953, German construction workers revolted against the
Full text not available.
Camp Castro was named in honor of 2LT Joseph M. Castro, who had been among the first to complete Special Forces training before volunteering for duty in Korea. While assigned to the 8240th Army Unit (AU) he was killed on 17 May 1953 while conducting a raid into North Korea as part of the 2nd Partisan Infantry Regiment, United Nations Partisan Forces Korea (UNPFK). It was part of the WOLFPACK 8 organization. 43 2LT Castro was the first SF-trained officer to die in combat.

Camp Castro in the Chattahoochee National Forest of Georgia was named in honor of 2LT Joseph M. Castro, a former 10th SFG soldier killed in action in Korea. MAJ William Ewald established the 10th SFG headquarters here during FTX CLEO, to evaluate the Group’s ability to perform its operational mission.

Communist Government in East Berlin. This provided the catalyst to move the 10th SFG. 44 By October 1953, the 10th SFG had been operationally validated during FTX CLEO. When they returned to Fort Bragg, preparation began for deployment to Bad Toelz, Germany, by December 1953. To the dismay of many SF replacements in the unit, those personnel who had not completed their initial SF training were not qualified to deploy. 45

In response to the constraints, SF personnel were separated into three groups. COL Bank, LTC Shannon (the Group Executive Officer), CPT Bergstrom (the Group Adjutant) and the Operational Detachment Commanders decided which men would be in the first group to depart for Bad Toelz, Germany, in November 1953. A second contingent, the SF personnel to remain at Fort Bragg, became the cadre for a new SFG, the 77th, officially activated on 22 September 1953. A third element was bound for Korea.

While the 10th had been forming and training from November 1952 through January 1953, BG McClure had been pressing U. S. Far East Command (FECOM) to request SF for Korea. Finally, in April 1953, FECOM agreed and requested fifty-five SF-trained officers and nine enlisted men from the 10th SFG. 46 This number steadily grew until the Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. By then, a total of seventy-seven officers and twenty-two enlisted Special Forces soldiers were serving in the 8240th Army Unit Guerrilla Command. These men remained in Korea with the partisan units until their last official mission on 20-21 February 1954. 47

EPILOGUE

In November 1953, the 782 Soldiers of the 10th SFG were transported with little fanfare from Fort Bragg to the port of Wilmington, North Carolina. Because the existence of the 10th SFG was still classified, everyone wore ‘sterile’ uniforms (no visible stripes, patches or badges) to board the USNS General A. W. Greely. After enduring catcalls and jeers of those recruits already on board, the 10th soldiers reappeared on deck after a few hours at sea in uniforms complete with patches, rank and parachute badges. 48
Every Detachment shares the common mission: To infiltrate to a designated area within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize a particular type unit within the Detachment's operational capability and/or to perform such other special forces missions as directed. The differences surface when each Detachment's level of responsibility is more narrowly defined.

**Team FA, Operational Detachment, Regiment (ODA/Team)**
Organize a Special Forces (Guerrilla) Regiment.

**Team FB, Operational Detachment, District 'B' (ODB/Company)**
Organize a Special Forces District Command composed of two or more Special Forces (Guerrilla) Regiments.

**Team FC, Operational Detachment, District 'A' (ODC/Battalion)**
Same as Team FB except that the ranks of commander and staff are higher since they are commanding and staffing a larger district and commanding a 'Provisional' Battalion during the pre-mission phase within friendly lines.

**Team FD, Operational Detachment Area (SFOB/Group)**
Organize a Special Forces Area Command composed of two or more Special Forces District Commands. Assists Group Headquarters as directed by the Group Commander.

**Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Group**
Provide administration, less supply and evacuation, for FA, FB, FC, and FD Teams committed for operations. Furnish command, staff and administration for a Special Forces Group.

**Team AA, Administrative Detachment, Company**
Augment and assist the FB Team to function as a Company Headquarters, and conduct the company's administration and mess.

**Team AB, Administrative Detachment, Battalion**
Augment and assist the FC Team to function as a Battalion Headquarters, and operate a Battalion motor pool. Messes with one of its subordinate companies.¹

¹ Draft Training Circular, The Special Forces Group, 13 May 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, Department of the Army, 5 October 1951, Part II authorizes the organization of a SF Command at theater level or the integration of the SF Group(s) within a designated theater command at the discretion of the theater commander.
Back at Fort Bragg, command of the Psywar Center passed from COL Charles H. Karlstad to COL Gordon Singles in July 1953, to COL Thomas A. McNanish in July 1954, and then to SF COL Edson D. Raff in December 1954. Under COL Raff, the role of Special Forces expanded and matured. The 77th SFG sent the first Special Forces Special Operations Detachment to Japan. COL Raff did not command the Psywar Center long. His continued wear of the unauthorized green beret after repeated warnings from MG Paul D. Adams, Fort Bragg commander and veteran of WWII's First Special Service Force (FSSF) led to Raff’s relief. COL William J. Mullen, told to “keep a low profile” with respect to Special Forces, replaced COL Raff. Despite the early controversy in the Army over its existence and utility, the Psywar Center demonstrated its academic professionalism and capability to perform its diverse missions.

Author’s Note: Prior to the publication of this article, the Army Special Operations community suffered the losses of COL (retired) William Ewald (25 December 2011) and CSM (retired) Johnny A. Dolin (17 December 2011). To their credit, both provided valuable advice and assistance to the end. Their knowledge, experience, unselfishness, and dedication to duty will be greatly missed.

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Endnotes

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The author would like to express his sincere thanks and appreciation to the following people for the contributions, patience, and assistance they provided during the preparation of this article:

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Joel L. Koford
Richard M. Ripley
Richard E. Shevchenko
Clarence E. Skoien

The USNS General Adolphus W. Greely (T-AP-141) was commissioned in 1945 and was used as a troop transport from then until her transfer to the National Defense Reserve Fleet at Olympia, Washington in August 1959.
7 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 122. Paddock attributes this observation to LTC Russell W. Volckmann’s analysis of GEN Collins comments at the Infantry School Commander’s Conference in early 1951.

8 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 123. This is also part of the Infantry School memorandum prepared by LTC Volckmann on 9 April 1951 and referenced in note 2.

9 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 125. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, DC Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subject: Staff Studies, “Special Forces Ranger Units: and Special Forces Ranger Units, Recruiting and Training of Personnel,” 12 June 1951, from BG Robert S. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 270.2-370.64, box 15, PSY War 370.64 (12 June 1951), National Archives.

10 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 124. The original memorandum was for General C. D. Eddleman, subject: Utilization of Lodge Bill Recruits in Special ( Forces) Operations, 23 May 1951, from BG McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-1954, TS Decimal Files, 370.2-370.64 box 15, PSY War 373.2 TS (23 May 1951), NARA. For additional information concerning Lodge Act Soldiers and Special Forces see Dr. Charles H. Briscoe’s “America’s Foreign Legionnaires, The Lodge Act Soldiers-Part II” in Veritas, Volume 5, Number 2, 2009.

11 Blair, “Toughest Outfit in the Army,” 89.

12 Blair, “Toughest Outfit in the Army,” 89.

13 Brigadier General (ret) Russell W. Volckmann, letter to Mrs. Beverly Lindsey, 21 March 1959 copy in, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

14 Volckmann letter to Lindsey, 21 March 1969.

15 Blair, “Toughest Outfit in the Army,” 89. The 3,000 spaces came from the disbanded Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne).


17 Paddock, US Army Special Warfare, 145.


19 Blair, “Toughest Outfit in the Army,” 89.

20 Paddock, US Army Special Warfare, 145.

21 Joel L. Koford, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 22 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; and Johnny A. Dolin, Medical Sergeant, Operational Detachment 22, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 20 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

22 David B. Crowe, former Commander, FB Team 18 and FB Team 3, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 16 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

23 Carl M. Bergstrom, former Adjutant, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 16 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

24 Training Circular, unnumbered, “Special Forces Group (Airborne),” 13 May 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 1. COL Charles H. Karlstad, a veteran of WWI and WWII was The Infantry Center, Fort Benning Chief of Staff when selected to be the Psywar Center’s first Commandant.

25 Training Circular, unnumbered, 13 May 1952, 2, and GENERAL ORDERS NUMBER 50, HEADQUARTERS FORT BRAGG, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 15 August 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. At the time of publication, this office has no further information as to why the detachments were numbered the way they were.

26 Norman E. “Ned” Day, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 14 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. In a note from Bud Skoien on 22 March 2011, he states that “I spent far more time working for Jack Striegel at Mackall and on ‘CLEO’ in Georgia than as an ‘instructor’.”

27 David B. Crowe, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 16 December 2010, and Johnny A. Dolin, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 20 December 2010. David Crowe did indicate that there was one shortfall in the 10th SFG. In trying to activate the Group as quickly as possible, COL Bank overlooked the need to establish an organization organic to the Group to provide the administrative and logistics functions necessary to support operations and training.

28 COL (retired) Richard M. Ripley, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, and Eugene G. Piasceki, 28 June 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. As the chairman of the SF Operations Committee, MAJ Ripley and his instructors developed and published all the lesson plans and the program of instruction (POI) for Special Forces Training Course Number 1.

29 Joel L. Koford, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 22 December 2010.

30 Clarence E. “Bud” Skoien, 10th Special Forces Group, note to Eugene G. Piasceki, 22 March 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.


32 Day Interview, 14 December 2010.

33 Richard Shevchenko, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 17 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.


35 William Ewald, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Eugene G. Piasceki, 28 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

36 Dolin interview, 20 December 2010. The heart of the 10th Special Forces Group was the Operational Detachment Regiment. This was a fifteen-man unit based upon the original OSS Operational Group and consisted of two officers and thirteen non-commissioned officers. Early SF training stressed individual skills such as Operations and Intelligence (O & I); light and heavy weapons, demolitions; radio communications; and medical aid. Note: Each man was trained in a primary skill, but “cross-trained” in the other skills necessary for the team to remain operational.


38 Dolin interview, 20 December 2010.


40 Ewald, interview, 28 September 2010.

41 Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army, 22.

42 Bergstrom interview, 16 December 2010.


45 Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army, 42.

46 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 110. Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group Airborne, Fort Bragg, NC, Letter to Commanding Officer, Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, subject: Situation of Special Forces Officers in FECOM, 19 May 1953, by COL Aaron Bank, Commanding Officer, filed with PSY War 220.3 (14 May 1953), Record Group 319 Army-Chief of Special Forces, 1951-54, NARA.

47 Ben S. Malcolm, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea, (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996), 188.

48 Simpson, Inside the Green Berets, 42.

49 Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army, 208-09.