CREATING AN ARMY
GUERRILLA COMMAND

Part One: The First Six Months

by Michael E. Krivdo
“A partisan strength of 25,000, well-led and properly trained, could be expected to divert from 375,000 to 500,000 regular troops from other duties necessary to a successful prosecution of the war.”

About 2000 hours on 29 March 1953, a small flotilla of fishing vessels emerged out of a hazy, moonless night and scraped over a cold gravel beach on Chop-to, a tiny island a few hundred meters off the west coast of North Korea. A hundred shadowy figures disembarked and moved silently into the scrub and trees above the beach. Seventeen guerrillas guarding the beach landing site (BLS) pushed the boats back out to sea to await the return of the raiding party. The main party quickly moved to their target, a North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) battalion command post. The raiders, guided by friendly agents who had reconnoitered the area, slipped across a rocky sand spit connecting Chop-to to the mainland and moved inland. By the time the sun rose, the partisans were hidden in thick brush observing their target in the distance.

When darkness fell again, the guerrillas moved silently into designated assault positions. They remained undetected. On signal the partisans rushed forward to quickly overwhelm the enemy. They inflicted numerous casualties and captured an NKPA major and a sergeant. Dragging their prisoners along, the partisans melted into the night and withdrew. At the BLS they recalled their boats and got aboard. As the mixed flotilla of fishing boats departed for their base camp on Cho-do, five miles away, pre-arranged Allied aircraft missions and naval gunfire covered their withdrawal by disrupting enemy counterattacks. In this successful action the guerrillas lost five men and had two wounded, yet inflicted many more casualties on the enemy and reinforced the constant threat of attack. Moreover, the raid demonstrated to the populace that resistance to Communist rule continued.

Few modern military campaigns have been as misunderstood and misrepresented as the U.S. Army’s first deliberate attempt to create an ad hoc guerrilla command to support and coordinate the actions of North Korean anti-Communist guerrillas in support of the United Nations (UN) in Korea. Much mythology has cloaked this effort and historical inaccuracies, misidentifications,
and unsubstantiated accounts predominate to the point of becoming ‘facts.’ Why and how did this happen? Long-standing security classification of activities; numerous name changes and structural reorganizations; little documentation to substantiate activities and results; and constant evolution of operations peripheral to the main UN effort are all contributing factors. And to compound the constant evolution of operations peripheral to the main documentation to substantiate activities and results; and constant evolution of operations peripheral to the main UN effort are all contributing factors. And to compound the constant evolution of operations peripheral to the main UN effort are all contributing factors. And to compound the constant evolution of operations peripheral to the main UN effort are all contributing factors. And to compound

This study tackles the confusion of guerrilla warfare in Korea and presents the difficulties of advising, training, assisting, and commanding North Korean partisans. The evolving organizational history reveals the growth, functional changes, and command direction during its critical first six months of operation. But why are the activities of this guerrilla command relevant to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) soldiers today? It is the Army’s first attempt to deliberately create a command to conduct guerrilla warfare. Toward the end of the conflict this wartime effort will be supported by Army Special Forces trained soldiers. Reviewing how the guerrilla command came to be formulated, how its missions evolved, the operational difficulties encountered, and its accomplishments and failures will allow the reader to assess the validity and value of the organization. Because there was so much mythology associated with guerrilla warfare in Korea, the U.S. Army stumbled through Vietnam as well.

Resistance to Communism in North Korea prompted the formation of anti-Communist paramilitary organizations. It began with the advance of UN forces into North Korea. The ousting of Communist officials ended in late 1950 when hundreds of thousands of Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) forced the withdrawal of UN units. Left unsupported, the anti-Communists fled their villages for remote areas and offshore islands that provided them with a degree of security to continue their fight. By early 1951, reports filtered in that several thousand lightly-armed guerrillas were conducting small-scale raids against North Korean targets. As the UN prepared to counter the CCF offensive, some military leaders suggested that the guerrillas be incorporated in that allied effort. They posited that combat power of the partisans behind the enemy lines, properly led, would reduce pressure on the main battle lines. Suddenly, “a number of remote little islands in the Yellow Sea, unnoticed . . . last-stand strongholds of North Korean partisans against the Communist regime,” had potential value.

To verify that conclusion, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) headquarters dispatched Major (MAJ) William A. Burke, a decorated WWII armor officer, to the islands. Burke reported, “These volunteers have organized themselves, appointed leaders and, by virtue of their own initiative, have overcome numerous hardships while effectively combating [the enemy] and securing intelligence.” He believed that

“these groups possess the will to resist, and if supplied, organized, and properly employed, would form the nucleus of an ever-growing liability to the Communist Forces.”

This field grade officer’s assessment convinced EUSA planners to add the guerrillas to the UN effort. The necessity to impose some command and control over the scattered, independent partisan groups was realized. Otherwise, their operations might prove counterproductive to the major war effort. The crux of “the problem was how to convert these untrained and [largely] unarmed volunteers into an effective fighting force and adapt their capabilities to missions advantageous to the over-all operations against the enemy.” It became obvious that a guerrilla command had to be formed to provide logistical support, coordinate training, and to integrate the partisans’ activities into the UN campaign.

How should this guerrilla command be organized, led and directed? A guerrilla war was a new challenge for the U.S. Army. That type of warfare and the environment were totally different than that encountered in Europe during WWII. The ROK government demonstrated no interest in North Korean anti-Communist guerrillas because they considered them politically unreliable. The Far East Command (FEC) in Japan focused on bigger issues. By default, the EUSA staff got the guerrilla warfare mission. Fortuitously, Colonel (COL) John H. McGee, a WWII Philippine veteran with guerrilla experience, was the EUSA G-3 “Miscellaneous Duties” officer. He had

### Miscellaneous Division, Eighth U.S. Army

#### Guerrilla Command:

- **Attrition Section, 15 January to 4 May 1951; 8086th AU, 5 May to 9 December 1951; then becomes 8240th AU under FEC.** Created to advise, train, assist, and command North Korean guerrillas.

#### Eighth Army Ranger Company:

- **8213th AU** Created 25 August 1950 at Camp Drake, Japan. Assigned missions to infiltrate enemy lines and attack command posts, artillery, tank parks, and key communications centers or facilities.

#### Eighth Army Ranger Training Center:

- **8213th AU** Created 15 August 1950 at Kijang, near Pusan, South Korea, to train Ranger units in the skills of infiltration, raids, reconnaissance and combat patrolling, and ambushes. After training the Eighth Army Ranger Company, the Ranger school trained South Korean units in Ranger tactics.

#### United Nations Reception Center:

- **8212th AU** Formed 23 September 1950 at Taegu, ROK, to “clothe, equip, and provide familiarization training with U.S. Army weapons and equipment” for international troops arriving in Korea.
been assigned to every ‘special’ or unconventional project since August 1950.’ McGee had created, organized, and fielded the GHQ Raider Company and the Eighth Army Ranger Company, and established and commanded a new Ranger Training Center near Pusan for the ROK Army on 15 August 1950. McGee also formed and commanded the UN Reception Center at Taegu to “clothe, equip, and provide familiarization training with U.S. Army weapons and equipment” to foreign contingents assigned to the UN. COL McGee first studied the North Korean guerrilla problem in September 1950 when he helped develop anti-guerrilla operations to neutralize pockets of North Korean soldiers and bandits inside the Pusan Perimeter. Later, after the breakout from the Perimeter, McGee focused on the elimination of enemy ‘leakers’ (deliberate stay-behinds, infiltrators, and stragglers) bypassed during the UN charge into North Korea. These experiences taught McGee how guerrilla units operated. Although his initial mission involved destroying guerrillas, solving that problem enabled him to understand how guerrillas operated and what their strengths and weaknesses were.

Not surprisingly, the EUSA commander gave COL McGee, the most qualified officer on his staff, the guerrilla command. By 13 January 1951, the WWII vet had submitted a plan to conduct “attrition warfare,” his term to describe the desired effects of guerrilla operations. He recommended forming “a combined headquarters consisting of United States Army, Navy and Air Force and ROK Army and Navy liaison personnel” to accomplish...
McGee divided his Operations Section into three elements: Guerrilla, Penetration, and Liaison. Led by a naval officer with an Army assistant, the Guerrilla Element planned partisan operations in support of the EUSA at the Corps level. Penetration, led by an Army officer with an Air Force assistant, planned insertions because air delivery was the preferred method. The Liaison Element had the largest contingent of officers (eighteen) in the command, reflecting the importance of coordination to conduct successful guerrilla operations. And since combined operations were envisioned, McGee planned for ten ROK Navy, Army and Marine officers to ensure proper “coordination of partisan effort when [they are] employed in support of an Eighth Army tactical unit.” His rationale was that “Landings, pickups, airdrops, air support and allied operations [demand] the highest cooperation and coordination at planning and operational levels.” Furthermore, “Combined ground, naval and air [support] from a central integrated headquarters are necessary” for successful operations. Unfortunately, McGee never got enough officers to fill all the liaison billets.

The impressive level of preparation and planning detail verified that McGee was the best-qualified person to lead the guerrilla command. Two days after McGee made his proposal, the Attrition Section of Miscellaneous Division was formed (15 January 1951). It was the first Army unit specifically created to conduct guerrilla operations. With authority in hand, COL McGee then identified and recruited soldiers to lead, train, and advise the ‘Gs,’ vigorously working his connections in the EUSA G-1. Since the talent pool of guerrilla warfare experts was very shallow, McGee sought out paratroopers, Rangers, and WWII Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veterans in EUSA. He judiciously screened cadre personnel at his UN Reception Center in Taegu and the Korean Ranger Training Center at Kijang, as well as the EUSA Signals Office. With EUSA G-1 support, McGee began filling his staff and advising positions.

Concurrently, the ‘many-hatted’ colonel had to establish a central field operating base to bring the scattered partisan groups under control. He appointed his assistant, MAJ Burke, to command the guerrilla base for the western islands and tasked him to write a detailed organizational plan. A week later, Burke submitted an “Organization and Plan for Partisan Operations in Korea (Plan ABLE).” It specified how to run “covert type missions of sabotage and intelligence.” Burke’s concept was two-tiered with forward echelons located in the relatively secure islands off the North Korean coast. The internal ring consisted of a permanent ‘base’ in a secure location where guerrillas could be organized, trained and prepared for operations. The external ring consisted of ‘mobile’ guerrilla camps/sites located on outlying islands or on the mainland of North Korea. The guerrillas would train and rehearse for missions at the permanent base, then return to their mobile base to finalize details before launching attacks or raids against enemy targets. This internal/external arrangement became the operational model for the guerrilla forces throughout the war.
COL McGee’s Plan ABLE specified that the U.S. Army provide each partisan unit with sufficient radio equipment to allow them to communicate from their mobile locations in North Korea to the American-led training base. The standardization of equipment helped minimize logistics and training issues. McGee’s plan included two options for maintaining radio contact with the guerrilla units, depending on the tactical situation.

‘Plan One’ involved equipping the partisan units with radios that “will net with the high-powered radio on the [stationary, American-run] base.” It presumed that “by using U.S. operators on these sets . . . adequate communications will be established under the most adverse conditions.” ‘Plan Two’ entailed issuing the guerrillas “low-powered radio sets upon which they received training and are capable of operating.” Those sets communicated on a separate guerrilla net terminating on the stationary fixed base. Eventually, Plan Two became McGee’s preferred option although it meant establishing additional relay stations when covering deep guerrilla operations. Communications security was established by use of ‘one-time pads’ to encrypt message content. As a practical command and control measure McGee mandated that only U.S. personnel communicated directly with Allied ships.
or planes or requested supporting arms, thereby keeping the authority for the control of those assets fully within American hands.\(^1\)

In addition to establishing the practical feature of language commonality, the rule also meant that all requests for air or naval fire support passed through American hands where they could be approved or denied. Successive American guerrilla commanders continued that practice as a means of exercising direct control over guerrilla actions.

McGee’s communication plan reflected his overall concept of forming “forward operational echelons” consisting of combinations of two types of organizations: Base and Mobile units. According to McGee, “The base unit is . . . [sited on] an off coast island base from which mainland operations [and training can be conducted].” The “mobile unit is a well trained and equipped organization, which is capable of establishing and maintaining an interior mainland base. The interior teams are provided for infiltration to distant groups for the purpose of coordination and control.” As he envisioned it, the base unit sited on a relatively secure island could train, advise, and support several mobile units located on outlying islands closer to partisan home villages and districts. Meanwhile, the base unit (or units) could maintain contact with (and report to) McGee’s rear echelon guerrilla command headquarters located with EUSA. A separate training command in a secure rear area conducted specialized training of “carefully selected Koreans in demolitions, communications and parachute jumping.”\(^2\) Although McGee’s early planning focused mainly on establishing one base unit in Western Korea, others could be established later (if required) under the central control of McGee’s headquarters, at that time co-located with EUSA Headquarters in Taegu.

Endnotes

\(^1\) Burke, “Plan ABLE,” 36-38, quotes from 37, author’s emphasis added; “Darragh Letter,” 10-11; Ripley interview, 28 July 2011.

\(^2\) John H. McGee, Miscellaneous Division, G-3 Section, APO 301, “Study of Guerrilla Warfare in Korea,” 10 April 1951, in “UN Partisan Forces,” 75-76, quotes from 76.

(Above) Short range (about 3 miles) SCR 300 FM radio was carried by the Korean guerrillas.
Command responsibilities under Plan ABLE’s two-tiered system:

The stationary Base site commander (American) was responsible for:

- Establishing security for the base camp.
- Operating a primary, high-powered HF radio station to communicate with McGee’s headquarters (at that time located in Taegu).
- Monitoring a second net to communicate with the guerrilla units in outlying ‘G’ mobile bases.
- Training the guerrillas in intelligence, communications, weapons, small unit tactics, logistics, and demolitions.

The Mobile camp commander (Korean) was responsible for:

- Establishing security of his site.
- Operating and monitoring a radio net to communicate with the American guerrilla leader’s base camp.
- Continuing to train his guerrillas when in his mobile camp.
- Preparing for and conducting operations against the enemy.
- Reporting information back to the American guerrilla leader.16

Essentially, the permanent ‘base’ echelon was the regional headquarters, training, and supply hub that controlled the subordinate guerrilla units located on several ‘mobile’ bases nearer to the enemy. At this early stage in the war, many of the partisan groups still maintained close ties with people from their mainland villages and districts. Since the guerrillas operated independently with American advice, the permanent base commander had little direct control over the day-to-day running of the ‘Gs.’17

Plan ABLE specified a basic guerrilla organization for the cadre and necessary skills for each partisan leader to establish standard levels of proficiency in all guerrilla units. For example, every unit commander (and at least four of his assistant leaders) was supposed to be trained in intelligence gathering, small unit tactics, supply and air drop procedures, and the employment of small arms and crew-served weapons. At least one assistant would be trained in the operation and maintenance of low-powered radio sets, and could give extra small arms instruction to his men. Sabotage techniques, demolitions, and advanced small arms techniques were mandated for other leaders.18

Plan ABLE became the framework for a program of instruction supported by the American advisors/trainers. McGee wanted Americans to teach basic soldier skills to the unit as a whole. Other instructors taught additional skills to leaders so that the Koreans could conduct advanced and sustainment training within their unit. It was a train-the-trainer approach except there were no Special Forces Operational Detachments to accomplish this. Completely overlooked was combat medical training, a deficiency not satisfactorily resolved during the Korean War.19

Less than a week after activating the Attrition Section, MAJ Burke and a small advance party arrived at Paengnyong-do to “establish a base . . . from which [guerrilla] operations on the Peninsula could be supported.
When their Landing Ship-Tank (LST) arrived, Burke discovered a ROK Marine unit guarding the island. COL McGee accompanied the main body to meet with the partisan leaders. He talked at length with forty guerrilla leaders and issued expectations. McGee also discussed training plans and promised periodic supplies of weapons, ammunition, and food. A stretch of flat beach on the southeastern side of Paengnyong Island would serve as a field strip for cargo aircraft. The base, initially called WILLIAM ABLE, was a relatively safe area for training ‘G’ units, who referred to themselves as ‘Donkeys.’

COL McGee coordinated with the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK) for rice and clothing. By 15 March 1951, MAJ Burke had a fully functioning permanent base with “6,000 bags of rice . . . 1,000 bags of salt,” and uniforms for issue to the guerrillas. EUSA also furnished the ‘Gs’ with five tons of enemy weapons and ammunition and three cases of medical supplies.

Rations of salt and rice served as pay for the guerrillas while weapons, ammunition, and demolitions were incentives to conduct raids. As one American commander noted, “Rice is issued to Donkey Units based on the authorized strength and the amount on hand. It will not be issued to [units] who do not produce good operations and accurate enemy information.” Once started at WILLIAM ABLE Base, that practice persisted throughout the war with mixed results.

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**Origins of the term ‘Donkeys’**

The origins of the term ‘Donkey’ for identifying West Coast guerrilla units are unclear, but its use began early at WILLIAM ABLE Base. One probable origination is related to COL McGee’s first speech to the guerrilla leaders on Paengnyong-do. In that meeting he advised them not to be rash, but instead “behave like the mule which [when entangled in wire] stubbornly, patiently awaits the arrival of outside help.” His interpreter substituted the more familiar ‘donkey’ for mule, and the name apparently stuck. Another possible origin was put forward by an early Donkey leader who stated “the generator of the [AN/GRC-9] radio looked like a Korean donkey or ass. When you crank the generator . . . you have to ride on the generator which looks like a rider on the back of a donkey.” Regardless of how the term originated, individual guerrilla units began referring to themselves after McGee’s visit as ‘Donkeys.’ Units became identified as a numbered ‘Donkey’ (example: ‘Donkey 6’).

Meanwhile, seventeen square-mile Paengnyong island filled to overflowing as 12,000 refugees and guerrillas settled there. While it was a fertile recruiting ground, there was a significant challenge to feed the population. Operations commenced with fifteen partisan ‘Donkey’ units and WILLIAM ABLE Base became officially called LEOPARD Base. This was the first of many name changes, redesignations, and reorganizations that confused guerrilla command operations throughout the war. To exacerbate the situation, COL McGee and his other subordinate leaders kept creating special activities, sections, and subunits.

On 15 February 1951, the Attrition Section commander formed a special training unit called BAKER Section. He manned it with American instructors from the ROK Ranger course near the town of Kijang, just north of Pusan. McGee selected MAJ Eugene M. Perry, Jr., a regular Army maverick and warrior, to command BAKER Section. With a college degree in Psychology, Perry enlisted in 1942 for the infantry, earned a battlefield commission the following year, and was awarded a Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) in France on 5 November 1944. After WWII, Perry served in the Medical Service Corps until the Korean War broke out. Then, he transferred to the infantry as a Regular Army officer. McGee assigned a young, highly motivated Captain (CPT) David C. Hearn as Perry's executive officer in BAKER Section. Several combat-experienced 4th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) volunteers fleshed out the unit. BAKER Section's first mission, VIRGINIA I, took place on 15 March 1951. That operation began when a combined twenty-four man American/ROK Army team parachuted into North Korea to destroy a mountain railway tunnel near Hyon-ni, thirty-five miles south of Wonsan.

VIRGINIA I did not go well. Planning for the mission was poor, done in haste, and preparations were minimal. In the midst of planning EUSA replaced the team leader, fearing that his capture might compromise future missions. The detailed planning and rehearsals that normally characterize successful special operations did not occur. The twenty-man Korean element joined the Americans only fifty-two hours before the airborne drop. The Koreans came in cold. They were not trained for the mission, had made only one parachute jump, spoke little English, and had insufficient time to learn and practice their role before insertion. It only got worse.

Fighting high winds, snow, and subzero temperatures, the aircrew missed the intended drop zone by nine miles, scattering the twenty-four men on both sides of a ridgeline. Some landed in a village, destroying the element of surprise. Although the entire VIRGINIA I team managed to reassemble and move to its objective, the leader decided that enemy activity on both the primary and secondary targets was too great. He aborted the mission. Then poor, intermittent radio communications made it difficult to arrange extraction. When they did contact the U.S. Navy vessel, the North Koreans intercepted their transmission, pinpointed their location, and closed in to destroy them. Enemy contact scattered the team into small groups and all but three were killed or captured. A U.S. Navy helicopter sent to rescue the survivors was shot down and the pilot captured.

Despite the dismal failure of VIRGINIA I, eighteen more deep parachute insertions (forty teams totaling 389 men) were conducted by BAKER Section. None succeeded. Entire teams were killed or captured with no further contact after they jumped into North Korea. These abysmal results led one postwar study of special operations in Korea to bluntly conclude that the decision to continue such activities “appears to have been futile and callous.”

McGee also inherited Task Force (TF) REDWING, a “special American-led ROK Marine Company [trained] for intelligence, sabotage, and commando-type operations.” REDWING had been formed in late 1950 to seize North Korean islands along the West coast as far as the mouth of the Yalu River. Once that mission had been completed the unit remained, setting up a base on Sok-to, a small island off the northwest coast of the Hwanghae Peninsula. Although the task force operated independently, the REDWING raiders came under McGee's authority because they operated from the same West coast islands covered by TF WILLIAM ABLE/LEOPARD. REDWING had two American soldiers (one officer and one enlisted man) serving as advisors/trainers with the ROK Marine company. Until the 1953 Armistice,
Original military topographic map depicting location of Al-som (Nan-do) and Sol-som (Song-do) Islands off the coast of North Korea.

View of Al-som Island (Nan-do) from a resupply aircraft.

TF REDWING planned, rehearsed, and conducted small-scale raids on enemy targets while collecting intelligence on Communist troop dispositions. Because of their insular locations, REDWING Marines also assisted in locating and recovering downed Allied pilots and aircrews. Their contributions in manning the escape and evasion (E&E) net in the northwest were significant. REDWING also helped to defend the islands and even recaptured mobile guerrilla bases seized by the enemy. McGee’s guerrilla operations were complicated by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities. In March 1951, the CIA stationed a case officer on Paengnyongdo to coordinate West Coast E&E with LEOPARD Base. After initially relying on highly trained, four-man airborne teams for personnel recovery, the CIA switched to using local guerrillas. This cooperative CIA/LEOPARD program recruited, trained, and dispatched LEOPARD ‘Gs’ to recover downed personnel. By 28 January 1952, this joint effort was “credited with 15 rescues—seven British and eight American” pilots and crewmen. And success in the West prompted expansion to the East Coast.

In April 1951, COL McGee established a second permanent guerrilla base camp on the Japan Sea side of North Korea, initially called TF KIRKLAND. The East Coast presented several challenges. First, there were far fewer ‘Gs’ on the East Coast after the large-scale evacuation of refugees from Hamhung and Hungnam in December 1950. That humanitarian operation stripped the East Coast of North Koreans sympathetic to the UN and destroyed the confidence of those left behind. Second, the topography and hydrography in the KIRKLAND operating area are very different. High coastal mountain ranges dropped precipitously to deep water offshore, leaving few offshore islands suitable for bases. Third, the Joint Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK), the unconventional warfare arm of the CIA in Korea, had an active maritime raiding base established on Yo-do at the mouth of Wonsan Harbor. JACK rightfully complained about adding a new base that might complicate their operations. Furthermore, the Air Force, Navy, ROK, and British Commandos were also operating in the same area, making coordination critical. Consequently, representatives from the CIA, JACK, and the EUSA met and agreed to limit the KIRKLAND operating area to a small sector south of Wonsan. These combined factors meant that KIRKLAND had less area to operate in, fewer options for secure basing, and far fewer guerrillas to recruit, organize, train, and direct than LEOPARD Base. To make matters worse, the ‘guerrillas’ assigned to KIRKLAND were North and South Koreans thrown together with different backgrounds, ideologies, convictions, and motivations. Hence, the KIRKLAND guerrilla performances were inconsistent compared to the West Coast ‘Gs.’

Nonetheless, on 15 April 1951, a group of East Coast guerrillas led by First Lieutenant (ILT) William S. ‘Bucky’ Harrison (an early advisor to Donkey 4) established TF KIRKLAND at Chumunjin, a small east coast port forty miles south of the Main Line of Resistance (MLR). But Harrison wanted a forward base closer to potential targets. He selected Al-som (also known as Nan-do), a tiny, rocky outcrop (less than a square mile) in the Sea of Japan. Using Al-som as a forward staging area was risky because its security depended on UN naval and air superiority. On 15 May the first elements of Harrison’s unit departed by boat for Al-som and reported mission-ready four days later. TF KIRKLAND and its activities are included in greater detail in another article.

Also in April, McGee’s guerrilla command received its first official commendation for their combat actions on both coasts of North Korea. A communiqué from
GEN MacArthur's headquarters remarked that the "Korean partisans, operating behind enemy lines, have been instrumental in harassing the Communists and contributing materially to our knowledge of hostile dispositions." In addition, the commander of the Fifth Air Force, GEN Earle E. Partridge, personally congratulated McGee for the "great job our guerrillas were doing in containing two North Korean Army Corps in the [Hwanghae] Peninsula," especially since the Communists had just commenced a major spring offensive.39

On 5 May 1951, EUSA changed McGee's Attrition Section into the Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit (AU) with a formal Table of Distribution (TD). The 8086th AU was tasked to "develop and direct partisan warfare by training in sabotage indigenous groups and individuals both within Allied lines and behind enemy lines." It also had to "supply partisan groups and agents operating behind enemy lines by means of water and air transportation." The official TD authorized the guerrilla command a total of twenty-nine officers and thirty-seven enlisted men. Although never manned at that level, the TD enabled the headquarters to better arrange for replacements and to fill vacant positions.38

With the name change came new command relationships. Responding to the ever-increasing need to coordinate 'G' activities above the EUSA level, the Far East Command (FEC) imposed itself into the command and control of the 8086th AU. Since the guerrilla command's creation in January 1951, multiple staff conferences tried to "fix responsibility for all behind-the-lines activity in a single headquarters."39 The doctrinal solution was to elevate the guerrilla command to a theater-level command. Lacking FEC and EUSA consensus on the issue, incremental changes in the 8086th TD seemed a small step toward the ideal solution. But they had no effect at the field level.

Although involving FEC in guerrilla operations made good military sense, the elevation move fell short because there were no additional authorities granted. Instead, two new 'coordinating' staffs were imposed between McGee and the theater commander. In reality, the new arrangement increased confusion and diffused authority among several staff sections in EUSA and FEC. 'Command' of the 8086th was retained by the EUSA G-3, but the unit had to coordinate all activities with the Far East Command/ Liaison Group (FEC/LG) in Japan, via the FEC/Liaison Detachment (LD) in Korea (FEC/LD[K]). Theater visibility for all guerrilla operations and activities was blocked by the staffs. The reality was that the guerrillas had "no chain of command."40

Furthermore, as long as the guerrilla command remained within the EUSA, it was subject to Army priorities and the conventional fight along the MLR took precedence. While the most effective solution was to make the guerrilla command a separate unit directly under the theater commander (with sufficient authority to control and coordinate all special operations in Korea), it was not accepted. Ironically, that same optimal solution was spelled out in existing Army doctrine.41 Unfortunately for the guerrillas, the idea proved too radical for the conventional military in power. In the interim, COL McGee did the best he could with the new command relationships.

By June 1951, Colonel McGee's guerrilla command consisted of: two major guerrilla 'base' units (LEOPARD on the West Coast and KIRKLAND on the East); a third base under consideration at Kanghwa-do near the mouth of the Han River (future WOLFPACK site); several 'mobile' bases with guerrilla units conducting operations against the enemy; TF REDWING operating from Sok-to; and BAKER Section training Korean agents for covert missions behind enemy lines. COL McGee's map shows the approximate locations of his units in June 1951 and radio sites to connect all elements.42

COL McGee left Korea to attend the Army War College. Before leaving, the functions of coordinating guerrilla actions behind enemy lines, airdropping of personnel and equipment into North Korea, deconflicting of small boat operations along both coasts, and naval gunfire and close air support coordination (all involving constant communication and interaction with FEC, higher services, and the CIA) came to a head. Minor organizational changes enabled McGee to coordinate operations with FEC, but he still had to use the EUSA staff for all his growing administrative and logistics needs. Yet guerrilla command requests lacked the weight of authority of separate FEC commands. McGee simply did not have the tasking authority needed to support his assigned missions. This problem was never resolved.

McGee's convoluted command and coordination chain was further stressed by the constant assignment of new staff officers (unfamiliar with guerrilla warfare requirements). And EUSA also changed as Armistice talks progressed and strategic priorities shifted. When
he created the Miscellaneous Division, the EUSA G-3 (COL John A. Dabney) strongly supported guerrilla warfare. COL Dabney’s replacements, however, further subordinated the Miscellaneous Division under the Deputy G-3. McGee had to then justify requests “before a board of Deputy G-3 and G-4 who were seated beside each other on the opposite side of the table from me. I was quizzed on my needs like a schoolboy.” Similarly, the Deputy G-3 prevented McGee from attending the EUSA Commanders Conferences where he could have discussed operational and logistical issues with those who could solve them. The Army’s ground combat elements were fighting daily for key terrain along the MLR, consuming most of the EUSA staff’s attention and resources. Support for guerrilla warfare dropped several rungs.

COL McGee was awarded a Legion of Merit on 30 June 1951 for “demonstrating remarkable resourcefulness and superior administrative ability” in planning and organizing the guerrilla command. He was soon replaced by his executive officer Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Samuel W. Koster, and then later by another WWII Philippine guerrilla veteran, LTC Jay D. Vanderpool, both coming from Major General (MG) Charles A. Willoughby’s G-2 staff.

During his tenure, McGee made great progress in creating a functional guerrilla command out of nothing. He started with ill-equipped and untrained irregulars armed with captured weapons and ammunition. Yet he left behind a mixed legacy. On the West Coast, McGee’s two-tiered base/mobile site system adequately trained, supplied, and directed the North Korean guerrillas.
Some of the guerrilla command’s successes were:

- Keeping the Communist forces off-balance.
- Penetrating the Communist defenses with ease and regularity.
- Conducting deep operations fairly effectively.
- Occupying and defending the West Coast islands and maintaining secure base areas.
- Tying down significant numbers of Communist forces in rear areas.
- Protecting the west flank of the UN MLR.46

The guerrilla command’s problems were:

- The lack of doctrinal framework for Army guerrilla operations.
- The focus on tactical level operations to gain immediate results.
- The East Coast guerrilla base never operating up to par with that of the West.
- The failure of BAKER Section deep parachute operations.
- The constant command, control, and support issues.
- The guerrilla motivation was freedom for all Koreans.
- It was a single-service, Army-driven command, not joint or combined.
- The guerrilla command lacked the joint command authorities at the theater level to succeed.
- Strategic guerrilla warfare guidance was never provided by FEC.

Mc Gee’s guerrillas presented a viable threat to the weak flanks and rear of the North Koreans that begged exploitation. The little guidance received was short-sighted, and concentrated on trying down enemy troops that otherwise could concentrate against the UN’s front lines. Mc Gee’s guerrilla command was especially effective in two key areas: information collection and assisting in the recovery of downed pilots and aircrews. Mc Gee’s successor would work hard to expand these successes, but the Armistice negotiations and changing U.S. strategy would have a dramatic impact on the American-led guerrilla command. ✖

Endnotes


6 ORO Study, 30-31; Quote from “UN Partisan Forces,” 10.

7 “Record of Assignments,” John H. Mc Gee Service Record, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), Military Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, MO (hereafter “Mc Gee Service Record”).


10 Mc Gee, Undated copy of “Proposed Organization of Attrition Warfare Headquarters (Officer Strength),” in “UN Partisan Forces,” 74; Mc Gee, “Study of Guerrilla Warfare in Korea,” in “UN Partisan Forces,” 75-76, quotes from 76.


13 ORO Study, 30-31; “UN Partisan Forces,” 65-66; John H. Mc Gee to Shaun M. Darragh, San Antonio, TX, 8 February 1985 (hereafter “Darragh Letter”), Archives, Army Heritage Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle Barracks, PA, 10. According to Mc Gee, the innocuous sounding name ‘Miscellaneous Division’ was merely “a cover name for a G-3 commanded unit to conduct guerrilla warfare.” Essentially, EUSA intended from the beginning that the unit be an operational command and not merely serve as a staff section with limited administrative functions (quote from “Darragh Letter,” 6). Unfortunately for the guerrillas, EUSA’s decision to maintain the unit as a staff department rather than make it an independent command under the US Army (or higher) led to later problems.


Burke, “Plan ABLE,” 36.

19 COL Richard M. Ripley (Ret.), interviewed by Dr. Charles H Briscoe, Dr. Michael E. Krivo, Mr. Eugene G. Piasceki (hereafter Ripley interview), 28 July 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.


23 ORO Study, 30-32, 44-46; “UN Partisan Forces,” 24-27; “Information Gathered by Observation and Interview by COL Arthur S. Daley,” undated, Enclosure 55 to “UN Partisan Forces,” 77-83; Information gathered by Observation and Interview by MAJ B(Jelly). C. Mossaman, “Status Report of Miscellaneous Division,” 120. “Letter of Instruction,” Headquarters, Operation LEOPARD, 15 March 1952, copy in “UN Partisan Forces,” 237-42, quote from 240. The transcript of one meeting at LEOPARD Base between the American commander and several Donkey leaders is highly illustrative of this “give and take” process. The Donkey leaders presented their requests for support items outside their normal rice and salt allocations, and the American commander made a determination of what he would provide based upon that unit’s recent performance in fighting the Communists. A copy of that transcript is found in Enclosure 64 of “UN Partisan Forces,” 140-51. The down side of this practice is that it encouraged the inflation of combat reporting, particularly when Americans were discouraged, even forbidden from accompanying the guerrillas in combat and assessing the validity of the reports firsthand.

24 ORO Study, 30-31, 40. One issue that has added to the confusion in the study of special operations in the Korean War is the frequent name changes and modifications of command structure/relationships that took place throughout the war. Even persons familiar with these units were confused.


26 ORO Study, 52, 92-93; Army Security Center, Fort Meade, MD, Returned POW Interview, SGT Martin R. Watson, 7 June 1954 (ASCIR #0064) (hereafter Watson Interview), Record Group (RG) 319 (Army Staff), Entry 383-6, Box 1693, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, 2; John H. McGee to COL Rod Paschall, San Antonio, TX, 24 March 1986, John Hugh McGee Papers, Box 38, Entry F7, AHEC, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereafter “Paschall Letter”), 24-26.


In the final accounting of the mission, only three of the original four U.S. Rangers were extracted successfully. The remaining Ranger (STG Martin R. Watson) and a downed helicopter pilot, Navy Lieutenant (junior grade) John H. Thornton, were later captured near the village of Yangyu, tortured, and held until released in late 1953. Of the twenty Korean agents accompanying VIRGINIA I, only two returned to friendly lines and they were executed by the ROK Army when debriefers discovered they had earlier been captured by North Koreans and turned loose to serve as spies.


29 ORO Study, 39-40, 42, quote from 39.


32 MG (Ret.) John K. Singlaub, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 21 March 2012, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.


37 “Paschall Letter,” 23, quote from text.

38 HQ, EUSA Korea, Table of Distribution No. 80-8086, Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit, 5 May 1951, Record Group (RG) 319, Army Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Secret Decimal Files, 400-112-413-52, Box 26, Psy War 400.34 (S) (1951), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, also cited in Alfred H. Faddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 104, quotes from text; ORO Study, 39-41.

39 ORO Study, 36, quote from text.


42 “Paschall Letter,” 14.

43 “Paschall Letter,” 20-21, quote from 20; for interservice and interagency coordination, see the example of the “Belfast Conference” reports, “UN Partisan Forces,” Enclosures 41 through 44; 55-60.

44 “Citation for the Legion of Merit,” General Headquarters, 24 November 2011. According to COL McGee, Al-som, just over the horizon from the North Korean mainland, had “little to no beach, [and] was the home of several fishermen and a populous gull rookery” that gave it its name, literally ‘Egg Island.’

45 “Paschall Letter,” 20-21, quote from 20; for interservice and interagency coordination, see the example of the “Belfast Conference” reports, “UN Partisan Forces,” Enclosures 41 through 44; 55-60.

46 Although the focus of this article is on McGee’s guerrilla command, the presence of his irregular fighters backed by allied air and naval fire support provided a relatively secure environment that supported many other aspects of warfare: signal intelligence; human intelligence; combat weather stations; escape and evasion sites; and launch sites for raids or attacks by special operations units.