Line-Crossers, Special Forces, and the "Forgotten War"

by Eugene G. Piasecki
At the end of World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided at the 38th Parallel separating Communist North Korea from an American-supported South Korea. The consequences of this division and its repercussions were best summarized by President Harry S. Truman in 1946 when he stated that Korea became “an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend.” Initially occupied by the U.S. Army’s XXIV Corps, South Korea stabilized to the point that by 25 January 1949, the Corps was inactivated and replaced by the reactivated 5th Regimental Combat Team and the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). Although KMAG’s primary purpose was to create and advise the Korean Constabulary and the fledgling Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), it also became a point for gathering information about North Korean activities. It soon became apparent to the Far East Command’s (FEC) intelligence staffs that neither KMAG nor the military attaché group in the American embassy in Seoul were properly staffed or prepared to monitor and report on the increased North Korean troop movements and activities of Communist guerrillas operating in the South. In 1949 on his own initiative, Major General (MG) Charles A. Willoughby, the FEC G-2, activated a Korean surveillance detachment called the Korean Liaison Office (KLO) to fill this void.

Comprised mostly of native Korean human intelligence (HUMINT) agents trained to identify sources and collect raw information, there were also Americans involved in KLO operations. Among the earliest of these was First Lieutenant (ILT) Chester E. Carpenter of the 971st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment. As an intelligence officer focused on Korea, ILT Carpenter reported that the Communist-equipped and trained North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) was on the verge of invading South Korea. Based on the significance of this discovery, a series of KLO reports emphasizing the threat began appearing in Washington, DC, in December 1949 and continued through 19 June 1950. Collated and interpreted by Army G-2 analysts, they concluded that North Korean forces (NK) were steadily moving south towards the 38th Parallel.

The general Western distrust of Oriental agents and belief that South Koreans were “prone to cry wolf” resulted in ‘other’ American intelligence sources failing to capitalize on these warnings until it was too late and the NKPA had invaded South Korea, placing the United States in the middle of its first ‘undeclared war.’ This attitude toward the value and reliability of HUMINT sources persisted in FEC until January 1951 when the G-3 Miscellaneous Division, Eighth U. S. Army (EUSA) recognized the potential to employ anti-Communist Koreans willing to fight against NKPA and Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). The purpose of this article is to focus on one specific case in which early Special Forces (SF) Course graduates used their individual skills to support a conventional U. S. Army HUMINT collection effort as members of the 8240th Army Unit (AU) Tactical Liaison Office (TLO). Additionally, it addresses the assignment of selected SF personnel to the 7th Infantry Division (ID) in March 1953.

Determined to keep the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its operatives away from General (GEN) MacArthur’s wartime planning, the FEC staff in Tokyo managed its own information gathering efforts as part of its Intelligence Directorate (FEC G-2). The subsequent unconventional warfare organizations of FEC originated from this arrangement, and by 15 January 1951 also included the Attrition (Guerrilla) Section of the Miscellaneous Division of EUSA, G-3. Headed by Colonel (COL) John H. McGee and his assistant, Major (MAJ) William A. Burke, part of the Miscellaneous Division’s responsibility was to reorient KLO missions to concentrate on obtaining more tactical and less strategic intelligence. Following the mid-1951 fighting front stabilization, combat operations became less fluid and began to change from the active offense to a more static defense. This reorientation of mission focus soon resulted in creating Tactical Liaison Offices (TLO). Although initially manned by anti-Communist Koreans, the TLO would eventually return to its early-war concept of conducting line-crossing operations which included using Chinese agent ‘line-crossers’ to supplement existing efforts.
Assigned to each front-line U.S. Army infantry and Marine Corps division, TLOs were comprised of small teams of Americans (officer and enlisted) and approximately twenty-five non-Western agents. One of the first teams, assigned to the 1st Marine Division, was temporarily led by 1LT Douglas C. Dillard from July to August 1952. 1LT Dillard's tour was characterized by the way he efficiently dispatched, recovered, and debriefed three line-crossing teams per week. This was due to the solid TLO-Marine standard operating procedures established by CPT William Shea. In contrast to American units, ROKA units did not employ TLOs. This was because the South Korean soldiers viewed the men who volunteered to become line-crossers as ROKA draft dodgers and would fire upon them when they knew TLO agents were in front of their lines on a mission.

On the other hand, American TLO agent handlers soon realized that Korean children, teenagers, and women (with or without babies) made the best agents. Two cases highlight the effectiveness of operatives selected from these groups. The first was former teenage KLO Team GOAT agent, Richard K. Hong, who eventually became a member of the 24th Infantry Division (ID) TLO team. Wearing North Korean student clothes and carrying an appropriate identification card, Hong moved freely behind enemy lines and noted the locations of enemy weapons stockpiles, supply depots and troop concentrations as targets for American bombing missions. The second, Shim Yong Hae, a sixteen year-old female with the 25th ID TLO, conducted missions every twenty days to verify information obtained from other sources.

Focusing on tactical intelligence gathering, the TLOs represented the earliest effort and lowest level of HUMINT gatherers in Korea. TLOs staffed with agents like Hong and Shim were considered by some intelligence officers to be little more than glorified reconnaissance units who had high casualty rates and produced unsatisfactory intelligence. This generalization did not take into account that once they were forward of friendly lines, line-crossers faced the constant dangers of death, capture, and torture because they traveled by foot and dressed either as civilian refugees or enemy soldiers. They also carried no visible

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Diagram showing the relationship between TLO agents, the divisions they supported, and the presence of other partisans gathering intelligence on the battlefield. Source: Garth Stevens, Frank Bush, Robert Brewer, Jefferson Capps, and Charles Simmons, *Intelligence Information by Partisans for Armor*, 2 volumes (Fort Knox, KY: Armored Officer Advanced Course, 1952), 29.
(Left and above) 7th Infantry Division trenches, July 1953. Officially it was designated Hill 255, but contour lines on a map of Korea and a 1959 film made it famous as Pork Chop Hill. (National Archives)
means of identification and concentrated their efforts in the most dangerous twenty-mile-deep band of ‘no-man’s-land’ between Communist and allied front-line positions. Various division intelligence operations took advantage of the front-line fluidity during the early days of the war and their TLOs were credited with gathering and providing information to the Eighth Army that helped save it from defeat while defending the Pusan Perimeter.

Capitalizing on their mobility and anonymity, in September and October 1950, line-crossing assets continued to prove their effectiveness as they supported forces moving north from the Inch’on landings by reporting the locations of bypassed enemy soldiers, hidden weapons caches, and North Korean strong points. These early efforts established the precedent for later organization of the TLO structure. TLOs continued to exploit their relatively unsophisticated brand of HUMINT operations until the summer of 1951 when the situation in Korea changed and the front lines stabilized, taking on the characteristics of WWI trench warfare.

The decision to strengthen the EUSA defensive lines and confine its offensive actions to limited advances ended the fluid phase of the Korean War and started a new period that had far-reaching impacts from the Korean Peninsula back to the United States. As U.S. Army general purpose forces were committed to battles to gain control of Korea’s high ground, the EUSA Miscellaneous Division under COL McGee experienced realignments and changes that modified their combat and intelligence collecting capabilities. The first of these initiatives established the Guerrilla Section, EUSA Miscellaneous Division, as an independent organization [designated as the 8086th Army Unit (AU)] on 5 May 1951. On 10 December 1951, the 8086th AU fell under the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea [FEC/LD (K)]. This change made all partisan operations responsible to the Guerrilla Division. It also consolidated TLO operations under the Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), [AU = TDA].

Meanwhile, back in the United States, Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, Chief of the Office of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) in the Pentagon, established the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center (PWC) on Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. As part of the PWC, a new organization called Special Forces (SF) was being created from an all-volunteer group of combat veterans and those who wanted more of a challenge than the garrison-oriented Army offered. In November 1952, eager to demonstrate SF’s capabilities, BG McClure actively pursued efforts to send newly-qualified SF soldiers to Korea. In early 1953, his repeated attempts finally succeeded and FEC requested fifty-five officers and nine enlisted men from the recently-activated 10th Special Forces Group (SFG). However, FEC assigned the SF soldiers as individual replacements and not as members of operational teams. Eager to demonstrate that the SF concept had not been a waste of time and resources, Special Forces-qualified soldiers first reported to the 8240th AU for combat duty in Korea in March 1953.

Among the earliest SF arrivals was Second Lieutenant (2LT) George W. ‘Speedy’ Gaspard, a graduate of the first Special Forces Course at Fort Bragg, NC. Arriving in the first shipment of SF-qualified men in early March 1953, 2LT Gaspard, a World War II veteran of the 6th Marine Division, was not new to combat. But he soon discovered that the 8240th presented him with operational challenges that he had not anticipated. One of these, that posed a constant threat throughout his TLO team assignments in the 2nd, 40th, and 45th Infantry Divisions, was the possibility that a line-crosser was a ‘double-agent’ even though he had been vetted by that particular division’s intelligence staff. Once discovered, these suspected ‘doubles’ were placed under the watchful eye of the TLO camp’s Korean First Sergeant where they remained until hostilities ended. 2LT Gaspard remained a TLO team leader until he was transferred to TLO headquarters to become the adjutant on 26 September 1953.

Arriving in Korea after 2LT Gaspard were Captain (CPT) Charles R. Bushong, First Lieutenant (ILT) Alvin L. O’Neal, Master Sergeant (MSG) John E. Kessling, and Corporal (CPL) Russell A. Shafer. Assigned to the TLO, 7th ID on 3 March 1953, CPT Bushong was followed by ILT O’Neal, MSG Kessling, and CPL Shafer. While assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division, MSG Kessling volunteered for SF because he “wanted to fill his obligation as a soldier and go to combat,” and he remembered his assignment to the TLO as anything but ordinary. Arriving at Camp Stonem, CA, from Fort Bragg, NC, for overseas processing, MSG Kessling
Not SF-qualified, Private First Class (PFC) Russell A. Shafer’s experience was somewhat different. Having already been promoted to Staff Sergeant (SSG) in the New York Army National Guard (NYARNG), and as a graduate of the Infantry School’s Light and Heavy Weapons course at Fort Benning, GA in 1951, Shafer wanted a discharge from the NYARNG so he could enlist in the Regular Army. Because the NYARNG had frozen all equipment and personnel assets anticipating Federalization, Shafer moved to Lawton, OK. There, with the help of an uncle (a Regular Army Warrant Officer stationed at Fort Sill), he accomplished his goal in 1952. Now a Regular Army PFC, Shafer volunteered for Korea after successfully completing the Field Artillery Weapons Maintenance School at Fort Sill, traveling to Japan by troopship from Fort Lewis, WA.

Assigned to FEC/LD(K), Shafer waited in a Tokyo ‘safe house’ until he could be flown in a U.S. Army De Havilland, L-20 Beaver aircraft to the 7th ID airfield at K-16 outside Seoul, Korea. Finally arriving at Headquarters, 8240th AU, Shafer became a mechanic in the motor pool because of his previous automotive mechanic experience rather than receiving a front-line assignment. As he later recalled, “after three days of herding Korean mechanics, I went to the commander and requested to be sent out to one

8240th AU Headquarters in Seoul was a Presbyterian mission school. Living quarters were located on the second floor.
of the TLO units . . which he honored saying ‘all you guys want to be nutso!’”29 Shafer, Bushong, and Kessling soon began conducting operations from the 7th ID’s Tactical Liaison Office in the 32nd Infantry Regimental sector.30

Known by its cover name as the Army Geographical Survey Group (8097 AU), the TLO was really a separate intelligence gathering organization within the 7th ID. Segregated from the majority of the division’s other elements, but not completely isolated or enclosed by barbed wire, the TLO area consisted of five tents located near one of the 7th ID 105 mm howitzer field artillery units and about a half-hour drive from division headquarters. Intended to be indistinguishable from the other tents in the area, the individual functions performed in each tent made them unique. The first tent, occupied exclusively by the Americans, served as their living and working area and the second and third provided temporary housing for the Korean/Chinese agents conducting pre-mission preparation. The fourth became the unit mess facility and the last, reinforced by sandbags, held the TLO weapons and ammunition.31

While the Americans represented the permanent frontline TLO presence, the line-crossers were an entirely different category. To lessen their chances of recognition or compromise before they started their missions, individual TLO agents were isolated in an 8240 AU safe house in Seoul run by CPT Ira C. Feldman, a Quartermaster Corps officer assigned to Intelligence Operations duties. Feldman ensured that the backgrounds and credentials of the individual agent were vetted, and that they received the intelligence training and skills necessary to accomplish their tasks. Once Feldman was satisfied the agents were prepared for the mission, they were dressed in either Chinese or NKPA army uniforms depending on their nationality, loaded into an American three-quarter ton enclosed ambulance sent from the TLO to Seoul, picked up at the safe house, and returned back to the TLO unit the night before they crossed the lines.32 There, CPT Bushong took charge of the operation. He gave the agents a more detailed orientation and operational briefing, an explanation of their mission, and what they were expected to accomplish. He also ensured they had the necessary weapons, equipment, and ammunition, were fed and given some additional cooked rice, and allowed to rest before they were taken forward. As Kessling and Shafer both recalled, when the agents arrived at the TLO base camp they were considered trained and ready to cross the lines.33

As the Special Forces men soon discovered, dispatching agents was a considerably more complex task than just having them walk across and return from enemy front lines. In the case of the 7th ID TLO, all agent activities were conducted at night and coordinated through G-2 Intelligence channels. Procedurally, two American agent handlers, one leading and one in the rear, would escort two line-crossers to the furthest forward friendly listening post along the main line of resistance (MLR). There, the TLOs were instructed to move slowly forward out of small arms range, and wait until just before daybreak before moving toward their objectives.34 Having accomplished this, the Americans reported to the forward unit’s S-2 (intelligence section) who notified the division G-2 that the agents had been dispatched and were active. Upon mission completion, line-crossers were instructed to return during daylight to a prearranged point along the same unit lines from which they departed from with their weapons above their heads and shouting “TLO, TLO.”35 Once secured by friendly forces, the agents were taken to the American TLOs, who then escorted them to the 5-2. Once the S-2 informed the G-2 that “there was a package from the TLO,” the agents were transported back to the safe house in Seoul for debriefing by 7th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment (CIC) personnel as quickly as possible.36

As dangerous as line crossing operations could be in enemy territory, the time spent in the presence of friendly forces could be just as hazardous. Dressed in enemy
uniforms and carrying enemy weapons, speaking only pidgin English, often without any formal identification, and either not given or not understanding the purpose of a challenge and password, line-crossers were frequently mistaken for enemy soldiers and killed or wounded by friendlies before their identity could be confirmed. In the case of the 7th ID TLOs this situation was compounded by the fact that on more than one occasion line-crossers were dispatched through that portion of the MLR assigned to the Ethiopian Battalion. Attached to the 7th ID since June 1951, the Ethiopians had proven their ferocity in battle, but had one major shortcoming. Other than their officers who had studied in England and knew English, the majority of the enlisted men and non-commissioned officers manning the MLR spoke only enough English to recognize passwords. This made returning through Ethiopian lines particularly hazardous.

On 27 July 1953, military delegates from the United Nations Command (UNC), the NKPA, and the Chinese People’s Volunteers signed an armistice that resulted in a cease fire. The document also created a four-kilometer wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) between Communist and UN forces along the 38th Parallel and meant that most of the conventional American combat forces would return to the United States. The opposite was true for the majority of the Special Forces men, including the 7th ID TLO. According to MSG Kessling, “after the Armistice we took as many precautions with our line-crossers as before as we continued to send TLOs into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and beyond.” Special Forces soldiers performed their assigned missions in Korea throughout the remainder of 1953 and until the 8240th’s last official mission (Operation CAMEL) was completed in February 1954.
The Kagnew Battalion

The Imperial Ethiopian Expeditionary Force was one of sixteen United Nations member states that contributed forces in the Korean War. Comprised of volunteers from Emperor Haile Selassie’s 1st Division Imperial Bodyguard, three successive battalions served in Korea for one year at a time between June 1951 and April 1954. Known as the Kagnew Battalion, the first unit arrived in Korea on 6 May 1951.41 With only rudimentary combat training and no weapons or equipment, it was sent to the UN Reception Center at Taegu for eight weeks of additional preparation, training, and equipping before being attached to the 7th Infantry Division and forming its right flank for the remainder of the conflict.42 After this rather slow start, the Kagnew Battalion proved its worth in combat. Credited with fighting in 238 engagements, the total Kagnew casualties were 121 killed and 536 wounded. No Kagnew soldiers were ever taken prisoner, and the body of every Ethiopian soldier killed in action was recovered from the battlefield. These qualities earned them not only the respect of their American counterparts, but also the belief among the North Koreans and Chinese that the Ethiopians were some type of super-human soldiers.43

Ethiopian 75mm Recoilless Rifle crew from Addis Ababa. L-R: CPL Alema Welde, CPL Chanilo Bala, and SGM Bogale Weldeynse. Attached to the 7th ID, the Kagnew Battalion became part of the UN forces that occupied positions along the MLR.
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Endnotes
1 Miss Shim Yong Hae, TLO (25 ID); early 1951 to Spring 1954, interview by Dr. Richard L. Kiper, 4 November 2003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
3 John B. Wilson, Army Lineage Series: Armies, Corps, Divisions, and Separate Brigades (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1987), 112-113. James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1992), 50. The XXIV Corps was initially commanded by Lieutenant General (LTG) John R. Hodge who was followed by Major General (MG) John B. Coulter. The major units of the XXIV Corps were the 6th, 7th, and 40th Infantry Divisions. Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2000), 37. The XXIV Corps was replaced by the reactivated 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) comprised of the U.S. 32nd Infantry Regiment, the 48th Field Artillery Battalion, an engineering company, and the 7th Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. The 5th RCT had returned to Hawaii by June 1949.
4 Schnabel, The First Year, 62. The KLO was originally known as the Korean Labor Organization, and formed as an anti-Communist political entity.
5 Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Chester E. Carpenter, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 1 April 2006, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Initially assigned to the 97th CIC Detachment from 1948-1949, he would return to Korea in 1950 and serve with both the 25th ID and 2nd ID TLOs until he left Korea in June 1951. For his service with the 2ID, Carpenter was awarded the Bronze Star for outstanding combat intelligence support to the 2nd ID.
9 Michael E. Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2000) 15-16.
10 Ben S. Malcom with Ron Martz, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey’s, 1996), 138-139. While starting with North and South Koreans, TLO agents eventually included Chinese defectors after November 1950. Depending on their location, mission, and activity and requirements American TLO Teams were comprised of three to five personnel.
11 COL (retired) Douglas C. Dillard, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 8 June 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. 1LT Dillard was sent to the 1st Marine Division TLO to enable CPT Shea to take leave because he had voluntarily extended his tour of duty in Korea.
12 Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow, 16.
13 Mr. Richard K. Hong, KLO Goat and TLO 24th ID, March 1951-February 1954, interview by Dr. Richard L. Kiper, 31 October 2003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. KLO Team GOAT was the name of one of the Korean Liaison Office Human Intelligence Detachments (HID). Comprised of approximately thirty agents, Team GOAT’s mission was to collect information about NKPA supply routes, unit identifications, morale, and unit military training.

POSTSCRIPT
Although Special Forces soldiers were dispatched to Korea after the battle lines had stabilized, several issues concerning mission preparation and employment were identified. These included:
• SF soldiers had been trained to operate as members of a team, but were assigned, employed, and rotated to units as individuals with seemingly little regard for military occupation specialty or skills.
• The in-bound personnel received no Korean history, cultural orientation, or language preparation training prior to employment.
• In-country interpreter screening and hiring became the responsibility of the TLO element conducting operations.
• Members of one division’s TLO unit had no contact with TLOs in other units, and therefore, no way to compare lessons learned.
• TLO team members received little or no mission training before becoming operational.
• At tour completion, neither 8240th personnel, the Psywar Center, nor the Special Forces Department conducted any oral or written mission debriefings. ♦
28 Russell A. Shafer, 7th Infantry Division TLO, interview by Dr. Charles H. Kessling interview, 24 March 2009.
26 Kessling interview, 9 July 2011. CPT Feldman, the safe house Officer-in Charge (OIC), spoke two Chinese dialects fluently and gave each agent a separate and complete briefing and orientation prior to leaving Seoul. Since some of the agents were Chinese or North Korean turncoats Feldman was always very concerned and on the lookout for double agents.
25 Gaspard interview, 5 February 2010. The 8097th AU, also known as the Gaspard interview, 12 February 2010.
24 Gaspard interview, 24 March 2009.
23 BG (retired) George W. Gaspard, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 5 February 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
22 “Orders assigning 10th Special Forces Group personnel to US Army Forces for meritorious service as an intelligence specialist.
21 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., US Army Special Warfare Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1942-1952 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982). 107. Eventually this number increased, and in the end, seventy-seven officers and twenty-two enlisted Special Forces soldiers would serve in Korea. The heart of the 10th Special Forces Group was the Operational Detachment. This was a fifteen-man unit based upon the original OSS Operational Group. Early SF training stressed individual skills such as Operations and Intelligence (O & I); light and heavy weapons; demolitions; radio communications; and medical aid. NOTE: Each man was trained in a primary skill, but ‘cross-trained’ in others.
19 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 73.
18 Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow, 16.
17 Bray, Finnegan, and Gilbert, In the Shadow of the Sphinx, 113.
16 Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow.
15 Ann Bray, John P. Finnegan, and James L. Gilbert, In the Devil’s Shadow, 11.
14 Miss Shim Yong Hae, Interview, 4 November 2003.