Paramilitary Operations
Korea, 1950-1951

by Charles H. Briscoe
During the Korean War, all American military services, United Nations (UN) forces, Korean military and civilian elements, and a fledgling Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted special operations. To compound the surprise of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, neither General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur, his Far East Command (FEC), nor the CIA had developed strategic or tactical special warfare plans for the peninsula. Roles in behind-the-lines operations had not been defined by the military or the Agency. The only special warfare asset in Japan when war broke out was an Underwater Demolition Team (UDT-3) detachment. On temporary duty (TDY) from Coronado, CA, they were mapping the Japanese warships sunk off the beaches after WWII.

General MacArthur had traditionally ‘stonewalled’ civilian agencies seeking to conduct paramilitary or intelligence operations in his theater. During World War II, he kept the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) out of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA). MacArthur did not want the CIA setting up shop in Korea, though the Agency had been running agents in Communist China and North Korea since 1947. And, the CIA shared considerable regional intelligence with FEC. Faced with the USA and depleted Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) divisions huddled in a loose defensive perimeter around Pusan by late summer in 1950, the FEC commander had reluctantly agreed to accept George E. Aurell as the CIA Special Operations (OSO) chief. The former consul of Yokohama, born and raised in Kobe, Japan, was a SWPA veteran (Nisei team chief). This endeared him to MacArthur’s ‘Bataan Gang.’ Multi-lingual Hans V. Tofte, an OSS Europe veteran, was chief of OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) in Japan.

In this article CIA activities are untangled from the military special operations lore of the Korean War.

There are several purposes for this article. First it will correct (based on additional information), expand, and clarify “Soldier-Sailors in Korea: JACk Maritime Operations” published in 2006. Second, it will separate CIA covert and clandestine land and maritime operations (tactical and strategic) from the other special activities during the war. Third, it will show that a fluid combat situation permitted deep behind-the-lines operations in 1950-1951. And lastly, it will reveal the critical roles of military officers and sergeants detailed to the CIA.

USMC and Navy UDT officers, seamen, and a CIA civilian case officer explain early paramilitary operations in Korea. The success of Navy-supported UDT/Marine demolition raids against coastal railways in August 1950 caused the Agency to emulate them. The early mission planning and preparation for paramilitary operations in
Korea was done in Japan. While this article focuses on the first year of conflict, an understanding of the prewar intelligence situation in Korea is critical.

To begin, human intelligence (HUMINT) assets in South Korea were limited. With the exception of the small 971st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachment in Seoul, Far East Command had no covert intelligence collection capability in Korea. Despite 971st CIC reports that North Korean divisions were integral to the peninsula war, the FEC G-2, ignored the implications.6

Having reluctantly allowed the CIA to establish a post in Japan in the fall of 1950, General MacArthur kept the Agency ‘under close observation’ until its second director, retired GEN Walter Bedell ‘Beetle’ Smith, came to Tokyo. General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s former chief of staff in Tunisia, Italy, and Europe and ex-ambassador to Russia visited Japan and Korea in mid-January 1951 with the blessing of a frustrated President Harry S. Truman.7 After General MacArthur had downplayed the possibility of Chinese intervention, they had attacked en masse, forcing hasty withdrawals beyond Seoul. In the process two American infantry divisions were decimated. And, contrary to U.S. national policy, GEN MacArthur had publicly advocated using nuclear weapons.

Despite that schism Smith and MacArthur reached an accord in Tokyo: FEC would not interfere with Agency activities in-theater as long as the CIA established an escape and evasion (E&E) network to recover downed UN airmen. Before coming to Japan, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), ‘Beetle’ Smith, had told the Army and Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Agency would provide tactical intelligence to FEC and EUSA for the duration of hostilities.8 In return, the CIA was given freedom of action in Korea. Unlike FEC, that myopically focused on the peninsula war, the Agency directed global strategic intelligence missions against the Soviet Union and Red China.9 Regardless, MG Willoughby kept close tabs on the CIA.10

The Agency had done little to define its behind-the-lines operations anywhere.11 And, the U.S. military planners had not considered the use of friendly guerrillas against Communist flanks until early 1951. Desperate after being pushed out of Seoul again, guerrilla warfare (GW) offered the means to destabilize enemy rear areas and to relieve pressure on frontline UN units.12 EUSA staff officers promoted friendly guerrillas as a low cost force multiplier while the CIA developed its paramilitary programs in Japan.13

Danish-American Hans Tofte and his deputy, Colwell E. Beers, established a large CIA training and support facility (fifty acres) on Atsugi Air Force Base, a former Japanese Navy air station forty-seven miles south of Tokyo. His OPC (covert) operations were covered as the Far East Air Forces Technical Analysis Group (FEAF/TAG). George Aurell’s OSO intelligence activities (collection and espionage), directed from Yokosuka Naval Base (near Yokohama) by his deputy, OSS China veteran William E. Duggan, were accomplished under the cover of the Department of Army Liaison Detachment (DA/LD).14

The OSO chief had an office in the Dai Ichi building (GEN MacArthur’s FEC headquarters) next to Colonel (COL) Washington M. Ives, Jr., the administrative officer for MG Willoughby. But, Aurell was not Tofte’s superior; it was a cooperative relationship.15

OPC and OSO were separate, distinct entities overseen by their respective Far Eastern Desk chiefs in Washington. While generalities about missions were shared between Agency section chiefs, as a rule they compartmented specific activities. The OSO focused on strategic intelligence collection and espionage while OPC operations were largely paramilitary.16

The CIA, charged with establishing an E&E overland corridor across North Korea for downed fliers, created a maritime ‘safety net’ with contracted native smuggling/fishing fleets on each coast extending north to the Yalu River. Tofte needed military trainers with E&E expertise. When WWII veteran USMC Major (MAJ) Vincent R. ‘Dutch’ Kramer (U.S. Naval Group China), an Agency detailee, arrived from Taiwan, Tofte grabbed him to be his paramilitary operations chief. Kramer’s first mission was to organize a multi-service planning effort to fulfill the expectations of the air leadership in Naval Forces Far East (NAFVE) and FEAF.17

The resultant E&E plan satisfied the Air Force and Navy commanders because Tofte had provided very specific guidance. An island terminus off each coast would connect a guerrilla-operated E&E ‘rat line’ spanning the peninsula just below ‘MiG Alley’ along the Chinese-North Korean border. CIA command and control (C&C) teams on these two islands were to coordinate activities and arrange support via radio. Guerrilla base camps every twenty to twenty-five miles in the E&E corridor would protect the ‘rat line.’ In lieu of having airmen carry ‘blood chits’ (promissory notes), Tofte arranged to provide small gold bars for survival kits. Fishing fleets that smuggled contraband to the north were to be contracted to patrol both coasts and periodically check offshore islands for stranded UN flyers. In return Tofte could de-brief rescued...
USMC MAJ Vincent R. ‘Dutch’ Kramer was a WWII veteran of Guadalcanal and U.S. Naval Group China.

Vincent R. Kramer was born 31 May 1918 in Paterson, New Jersey. From Bordentown Military Institute he received a football scholarship to Rutgers University. Following graduation in 1941, Kramer attended the USMC Officers Candidate School and was commissioned as a reserve second lieutenant (2LT). Wounded at Guadalcanal, LT Kramer was later assigned to the U.S. Naval Group China. After WWII MAJ Kramer volunteered for a detail with the fledgling CIA and was assigned to Taiwan. He was awarded the Navy Cross for extraordinary heroism on several CIA operations behind enemy lines in 1951.18

“I arrived in Japan on Christmas Day, 1950, after six weeks of training—yes, six weeks of a course that could have been titled, ‘How to Be a Spy in Occupied France.’ I was officially a ‘Case Officer/Paramilitary GS-5.’ I was one of eight GS-5s at the same level of innocence sent to do whatever we could. None of us had any significant military experience, but the Agency had no one better at the time,”

— John E. Cremeans, Jr.

CPT Tofte, WWII, OSS Maritime Unit, Yugoslavia, was the CIA OPC chief in Japan.

After his Korean service CIA civilian John E. Cremeans, Jr. was commissioned in the U.S. Air Force Reserve as a first lieutenant.
A former Japanese military camp on Yong-do at the mouth of Pusan harbor was refurbished for CIA guerrilla and SMG training. Thirty-six foot LCPRs from the USS Begor (APD-127) were used to provide amphibious orientations to the CIA guerrilla trainees on the beaches of Yong-do in Pusan harbor.

USMC MAJ Vincent R. ‘Dutch’ Kramer was a WWII veteran of Guadalcanal and U.S. Naval Group China. Yong-do Training

The ground school phase of airborne training was given to Special Mission Group (SMG) personnel at Yong-do by SFC James C. ‘Joe’ Pagnella in the spring of 1951.

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After the Koreans completed training they were flown back to Pusan where a refurbished Japanese military camp on Yong-do awaited. The island, connected by a causeway that edged Pusan harbor, was easily secured. The bay beaches could support small boat training. And, the camp was near the refugee camps and supply depots.

CPT Han Chul-min and his cadre got the recruits to Yong-do where they were clothed, equipped, and organized into groups to learn basic soldiering and receive orientations on a variety of weapons. The physically fit who satisfactorily completed the mini-basic training were formed into platoons. These groups were given marksmanship instruction, taught guerrilla tactics, trained in small rubber boat insertions, and coached on how to survive as E&E ‘rat line’ guides to the island terminals. As the volunteers grew into the hundreds MAJ Kramer pulled in U.S. military veterans to help with training.

‘Schmoozing’ at the various headquarters and officers’ clubs in Japan and Korea enabled the Marine major to recruit some of those who had conducted special warfare missions at the behest of GEN MacArthur. The FEC commander had been pressing the service headquarters in Tokyo “to conduct harassing and demolition raids against selected North Korean military objectives and execute deceptive operations in Korean coastal areas.” He wanted to disrupt enemy lines of communication and supply and reduce pressure on Pusan.

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander, NAVFE, proposed to organize small ad hoc amphibious raiding parties to harass the enemy by attacking coastal supply lines. The nucleus of the raiders would come from the UDT-3 detachment in Japan. But, assigning UDT missions beyond the breaker line was a major naval employment change. Ground combat training was needed.”

Yong-do Training

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George C. Atcheson, III was born in Peking, China, 16 April 1923. His father, a WWI Army veteran, had joined the Foreign Service in 1920. The Atcheson family was among the evacuees aboard the USS *Panay* (PR-5) river gunboat on 12 December 1937 when Japanese aircraft attacked and sank it in the Yangtze River. The Atchesons survived. After a short assignment on the Far Eastern Desk at the State Department, his Chinese-speaking father returned to Chungking as Chargé d’Affaires for the duration of WWII. The younger Atcheson attended the University of California, Berkeley before joining the U.S. Navy. Subsequent officer training led to a reserve commission and sea duty aboard a destroyer escort. Ensign Atcheson was at the Philadelphia Naval Yard when his father, the Chairman of the Four Power Allied Council for Japan and Political Advisor (POLAD) to General Douglas A. MacArthur, FEC, was lost in an airplane crash on 18 August 1947. Ensign Atcheson subsequently volunteered for Underwater Demolition Team training in 1948 and was assigned to UDT-3. He took a nine-man detachment to Japan in March 1950 to conduct beach surveys and mark the Japanese military vessels sunk offshore at the end of WWII. Lieutenant junior grade (LTJG) Atcheson was awarded the Silver Star for conspicuous gallantry in action on 25 January 1952 while leading a CIA raiding party that eliminated a North Korean security patrol, derailed a locomotive, and destroyed a railroad bridge.33

were desperate times and every command was ready to try anything,” said UDT-3 Lieutenant junior grade (LTJG) George C. Atcheson, III. On 6 August 1950, NAVFE pulled his detachment off a beach survey in Japan and tasked it to destroy a railroad bridge on the southern coast near Yosu.34 The seaport had three rail bridges and a tunnel within three hundred yards of the ocean. Enthusiasm was insufficient to accomplish this raiding mission forty-five miles behind North Korean lines.

“A PBM-5 *Mariner* flying boat flew us to Sasebo. The *Diachenko* (APD-123) was weighing anchor as we scrambled aboard from the shuttle boat. Before we could settle in, a gunner’s mate passed out M1928A1 Thompson submachineguns [SMG]. Most of us had not fired a weapon since boot camp. Our assigned weapon was a diver’s knife. We got a thorough class in assembly, disassembly, and maintenance before spending a few hours on the fantail shooting at inflatable marker buoys,” recalled Seaman First Class Phillip E. Carrico.

“The plan was to have an LCVP [Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel] ‘Higgins Boat,’ carry us, our ten-man rubber boat [RB-10], and the explosives within two hundred yards of the beach. LT Atcheson and Boatswain’s Mate [BM] Warren ‘Peekskill’ Foley were to be the scout swimmers. Just beyond the breakers, the two scouts slipped into the water with their SMGs. Atcheson, who was carrying a .45 automatic, tossed his SMG back into the boat while Foley struggled to shore with his. They discovered that the selected landing site was five yards of rocky ‘beach’ abutting a cliff-like railroad embankment twenty-five feet high,” said Carrico.

“Foley came back for us while LT Atcheson went looking for a way to get atop the embankment. There was just enough ‘beach’ to get the boat ashore and for us to hide in the shadows. With our backs pressed against the cliff we saw that the LCVP and the *Diachenko* were silhouetted on the water by the full moon. About that time an enemy patrol, riding a railroad handcar, came rattling out of the tunnel to investigate. We heard explosions and Foley took off, charging towards the tunnel to help the lieutenant. As he retreated back down the tracks, Atcheson thought he was a ‘gook’ running towards him. Fortunately, he missed,” chuckled Carrico.

“The North Koreans, however, were better shots and hit Foley twice [leg and hand] before he tumbled off the embankment. Atcheson, who, by then, was back and above our hiding spot, leaned over the edge of the embankment to whisper something. That’s when Seaman Austin cut
L to R: BM Warren Foley, SM Phillip E. Carrico, and SM B. Johnson, UDT-3, pose with Thompson sub-machineguns aboard the USS Diachenko (APD-123) before the first raid.

Seaman First Class Phillip E. Carrico, UDT-3

Born 6 September 1929 in Silsbee, Texas, the first son and second of five children of an auto mechanic and housewife/shipyard worker, Phillip Elwin Carrico grew up in the Depression. At Daisetta High School, the tough, hard scrabble Carrico lettered in football, basketball, and track all three years while working part time. After graduation in 1948, the former All District linebacker joined the Navy with a friend. ‘Boot Camp’ at the Naval Training Center (NTC), San Diego, California, followed. Seaman (SM) Carrico was waiting for assignment at the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Base in August 1948 when an officer asked for volunteers to attend basic underwater demolition training. With no responses, he asked, ‘Who can swim?’ Carrico was among fifteen who raised their hands, saying that they could.

On the Coronado Silver Strand (beach), clad in Navy swim trunks the ‘volunteer’ seamen were handed a Mae West life vest by the coxswain of an LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel). When the UDT WWII Quonset huts on shore became the size of ants, the boat idled. Then, the coxswain told the volunteers to jump in, pointed towards the beach, and powered off. About two hours later Carrico stumbled out of the surf several miles south of the Quonsets, one of six who chose to swim ashore. As the exhausted Texan rode away in a Jeep, he saw yellow Mae West-supported sailors still bobbing far out at sea. The next day SM Carrico joined fifty other UDT candidates to start four weeks of intense training that culminated in a ‘Hell Week.’

to heavily forested coastal areas, were familiar to the North Korean guerrillas. These three advance elements were the nucleus for establishing E&E rally point camps in the interior. UDT-3 aboard the Begor furnished scout swimmers and RB-10 coxswains because the guerrillas were carrying large quantities of supplies with them.

The northernmost group, code-named CLOWN, called themselves the ‘White Tigers.’ They had one man killed on the way to their destination. Being deep in enemy territory meant that these elements received resupplies of food, ammunition, and radio batteries by air. More than two hundred guerrillas were dropped near the initial camps during the summer of 1951 to replace casualties and to create more inland E&E rally points. Inaccurate airdrops caused delays as the elements regrouped; leading to inadvertent enemy contacts, teams wandering lost for days, and long foot marches to base camps for the twenty-man reinforcement teams. Because UN aircrew recovery business was slow, CLOWN elements began collecting intelligence from sympathetic locals to attack police stations and security forces. Success prompted larger and more daring missions to include destroying bridges with explosives. The more they did, the more the irritated enemy sought to eradicate the ‘wild pigs.’

A ‘White Tiger’ radio report that a large meeting of North Korean and Chinese military and Communist Party leaders was being held in Kapsan on 29 October 1951 to coordinate guerrilla eradication efforts put the guerrillas at great risk. But, the target was too lucrative for FEC to ignore. A large naval air attack was launched against industrial targets in Sokhyon, thirty-five miles southeast the day before the scheduled meeting. This decy strike was to cover the major low-level attack on the Kapsan compound the next day. Unbeknownst to the Navy AD-4 Skyraider and F4-U Corsair pilots, the ‘White Tigers,’ decided to attack the local police station just before the scheduled TOT (time on target).

Both missions were very successful. More than 44,000 pounds of ordnance (250, 500 and 1,000 pound bombs, aerial rockets, and machineguns) systematically flattened the four-acre complex. One wall was standing an hour later; only one bomb missed its target. The Navy pilots, all awarded Distinguished Flying Crosses, were condemned as the ‘Butchers of Kapsan’ in Radio P’yongyang broadcasts. While the ‘White Tigers’ freed fifteen young anti-Communists held captive by the police and suffered light losses, their involvement prompted extreme retribution.

The attack was the ‘high water mark’ for the ‘White Tigers.’ Regular airdrops of supplies had pinpointed the guerrilla camps. Local informants were revealed, rounded up, tortured for specifics, and then executed by the Communists. An extremely harsh winter with heavy snowfalls in the mountains compounded the situation. Foot movement was hampered as North Korean security forces blocked avenues of escape. The groups split into small elements to break out and radio contact was lost. But, tracking the escapees in deep snow was relatively simple. CLOWN (‘White Tigers’), the key to maintaining the Agency E&E corridor, was a historical footnote by the end of February 1952. Still tasked with E&E despite the military stalemate and Armistice overtures, Hans Tofte continued to insert intelligence agents and guerrilla elements behind the lines.

By then, the North Korean government had reestablished tight population controls, linked military and home defense forces with communications, and had mandated night ‘guard duty’ by local citizenry. The peasants were already being tasked to repair roads, bridges, and railroads damaged by air and commando attacks. Constant coastal bombardment by the UN blockade ships destroyed any lingering local interest in supporting guerrilla elements.

Internal security got tighter as the main line of resistance (MLR) between conventional forces became static. Though the CIA and EUSA infiltrated thousands of agents into North Korea to organize resistance and conduct guerrilla operations, success was nearly zero—whether they parachuted in, transferred to local boats.
offshore, or simply walked in overland. Both the Army and the Agency did much better collecting intelligence. Frustrated by the E&E guerrilla team failures to maintain an overland E&E corridor, Hans Tofte and MAJ ‘Dutch’ Kramer switched gears to address a strategic weapon that was plaguing UN naval forces.

The Russian Navy at Vladivostok had sent military advisors to North Korea to supervise the arming and installation of floating mine fields to barricade Wonsan, Hungnam, and Chinnampo harbors and to harass UN naval ships blockading the peninsula. Sampans, loaded with mines on the shores of the Yalu River, delivered them nightly. With heavy timbers laid across the elevated stern of a sampan, four Russian M-26 contact mines could be delivered. Disruption of Communist coastal mining operations had strategic as well as tactical implications. After MAJ Kramer and Tofte discussed the feasibility with UDT LT Atcheson, they sought out daring U.S. Navy small boatmen and Army Ranger volunteers from NAVFE and FEC for a special mission.

When an ancient South Korean patrol boat delivered five Rangers to the USS Perkins (DDR-877) in the late fall 1950, little did Boatswain’s Mate (BM) William C. Warwick, Jr. realize that he would ‘captain’ their boat for more than seven months. The Tsingtao/Shanghai Navy rescue mission (evacuating American citizens as the Red Army drove the Nationalists from the mainland in May 1949) veteran was reputed to be the best motorized whaleboat (MWB) coxswain in the Pacific fleet.

BM Warwick ‘captained’ a wooden hull, twenty-six foot MWB (Mark 10 version) specially outfitted with a ‘hopped up’ 120 horsepower Gray Marine diesel engine equipped with muffled exhaust. Red-lit night navigation equipment was installed. The U.S. Navy provided transportation for the CIA raiders; first, a ‘piggy back’ ride aboard a blockade ship, and then a ‘stealth’ coastline insertion after a seaside underway launch of the MWB. Operating in North Korea, BMS Warwick and Marvin Curry and Seaman Sam Hill were responsible for camouflaging and guarding the MWB among the rocks along the coast. The seamen formed a perimeter defense and then ‘hunkered down’ to wait for the Rangers to return. After the raids, the seamen transported the Rangers back to base by ‘leap frogging’ along the coast at night, evading the enemy, and trying to avoid ‘triggering’ a floating Russian mine.

The reality was that only the derailment of trains inside tunnels created sufficient chaos and wreckage to close major sections of the Hungnam-Kojo-Yangyang line for long periods. Navy UDT-3 and UDT-1 detachments had concentrated their raids on coastal trains, rail lines, bridges, and tunnels since the summer of 1950. Trains moving at night and tunnels were very difficult targets that required a lot of man-carried explosives. And, the enemy patrolled these vital supply lines in force. Regarding these as simple harassment missions, the CIA was eager to attack the source of the sea mine problem.

The demolition raids against the coastal railway were to ‘gear up’ the CIA team for its most ambitious and significant tasking—to attack the North Korean mine storage/loading facilities. Though the targets were more than two hundred miles from Nan-do, the Agency team chose not to risk alerting the enemy with a U.S. Navy vessel at the mouth of
“We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.” — Rear Admiral (RADM) Allan E. ‘Hoke’ Smith

 Though the atomic bomb gave America omnipotence in the immediate post-WWII era, only naval fleets carrying Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) could project U.S. military power in a few days. Establishing a peninsular naval blockade contained the North Korean invasion to the land. This action gave the United Nations time to react to the aggression. Despite naval and air superiority, sea minefields balanced the strategic battlefield.55

 Mines denied access to harbors, blocked Marine amphibious assaults, and harassed blockade ships. Clearing minefields covered by land-based artillery (Soviet military doctrine) and detecting untethered floating mines were high stress, manpower intensive operations. It did not help that the world’s most powerful Navy had mothballed its minesweeping fleets after WWII.

 Russian military historians admitted that North Korea, with Soviet naval help, managed to emplace thousands of mines to protect the ports of Wonsan (3,000 alone), Hungnam, and Chinnamp’o. “These mine fields significantly reduced the activities of the American Navy,” stated Soviet MG V.A. Zolotarev.56 The USS Brush (DD-745) had its hull torn open mid-ship and its keel broken by a mine. Thirteen sailors were killed, thirty-one wounded, and it was off station almost a year. Two weeks after Incho’n, the USS Mansfield (DD-728) had twenty-seven wounded when its bow was severed by a mine. Seaman George Henderson said: “You could drive a city bus through the hole in her keel.”57 A year later it returned to the blockade.

 Mines sank three minesweepers, the USS Magpie (AMS-25) on 1 October 1950 and the USS Pirate (AM-275) and USS Pledge (AM-277) on 12 October 1950 in Wonsan harbor. Twenty-one seamen were lost.58

 Sea mines were very effective and truly insidious weapons. The final tally for sea mine losses/damages was five severely damaged U.S. destroyers [add the USS Walke (DD-723) on 12 June 1951, the USS Ernest G. Small (DD-838) on 7 October 1951, and the USS Barton (DD-722) on 16 September 1952. The five vessels had nine killed and eighteen wounded. Seven minesweepers were sunk [add the USS Partridge (AMS-31) to total four USN, one ROK Navy, and two Japanese Defense Forces]. A Seventh Fleet ocean tug, USS Sarsi (ATF-111) was sunk on 27 August 1952 off Hungnam. Four were killed and four wounded. Several Korean merchant vessels were also lost to mines.59

 Rear Admiral (RADM) Allan E. ‘Hoke’ Smith, TF Advance Force 95 at Wonsan, cabled Washington: “We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.”60 Easy to emplace sea mines were railroaded south and laid at night by sampans, the ubiquitous small fishing boats that plied the coasts and inland waterways of Asia. The minefields caused a 250-ship amphibious task force with 50,000 Marines and soldiers aboard to ‘yo-yo’ up and down Korea’s East coast for two weeks as NAVFE waited for Wonsan.
The harbor to be cleared. During daylight Navy flying boats (Martin PBM-5 "Marlins"), ship-based helicopters, minesweepers and UDT swimmer teams worked non-stop. Aircraft failed to detonate mines with 1,000-pound bombs and depth charges.61

UDT-3 (-) and UDT-1, operating off the USS Diachenko (APD-123) spent several weeks locating, marking, and destroying mines, first in Wonsan, then Chinnamp’o, and then Hungnam.

“We’d work all day searching and clearing areas, and render an ‘all clear’ report only to discover more mines in the flagged channels the next morning. It was very frustrating. The North Koreans ‘reseeded our zones’ at night,” said UDT-3 Seaman Carrico.62 “The duty was nerve-wracking! It was a nightmare. Tempers got pretty short,” commented another UDT sailor.63

It was 20 October 1950 before ROK I Corps G-2 located a mine depot north of Wonsan. Thirty Russians had left the port on 5 October after assembling mines and supervising the layout of the harbor fields at night with small boats. 64 Primitive 1904-vintage Russian contact mines were laid in fields containing new magnetic influence mines sensitive enough to be triggered by a wooden minesweeper’s engines. This made surface clearing very deadly.65 The U.S. Navy had more luck at Chinnamp’o.

With PBM-5s, helicopters, and a North Korean port pilot to assist, the American Navy had charted the Chinnamp’o minefields by 2 November. Some 217 moored and 25 free floating magnetic mines had been laid in five lines across the main channel north of Sok To Island and one line south of it. Common to the Yellow Sea, large jellyfish more than four feet in diameter drifting a few feet below the surface caused false visual alarms. However, in contrast to Wonsan, no lives or ships were lost while sweeping mines along the seventy mile twisting estuary to that western port.66 Still, the North Koreans kept sowing Soviet mines at night to plague shipping on both coasts.

The ubiquitous wooden, man and sail-powered sampan has pld coastal and inland waters of Asia for centuries for fishing and carrying trade goods and contraband.

The USS Mansfield sustained significant damage two weeks after Inchon on 27 crewmembers were injured when the bow was severed by a mine.

Daily sweeping was done to clear hundreds of MKB mines laid before the US arrival at Wonsan. Shown here is an MSB 5 “Destruction Boat” with a captured 1,200 lb Russian MKB mine, April 1952.

The USN Ernest G. Small, DD-838, sails to Kobe, Japan, in reverse after losing its bow to a sea mine.

The Soviets provided two moored contact mines (M-26 / MYaM), two magnetic influence mines (KMD-500 / KMD-1000), and one that could be adapted into a contact or influence mine (MKB).

**MKB**
- **Moored Contact or Influence Mine**
  - **Weight:** 2395 lbs. (1085 kg)
  - **Warhead:** 510 lbs. (230 kg)
  - **Depth:** min. 30 ft. (9 m) max. 265 ft. (79 m)
  - **Platforms:** Surface Ships

**M-26**
- **Moored Contact Mine**
  - **Weight:** 2116 lbs. (960 kg)
  - **Warhead:** 530 lbs. (240 kg)
  - **Depth:** min. 20 ft. (6 m) max. 140 ft. (43 m)
  - **Platforms:** Surface Ships

**MYaM**
- **Small Moored Contact Mine**
  - **Weight:** 385 lbs. (164 kg)
  - **Warhead:** 45 lbs. (20 kg)
  - **Depth:** min. 10 ft. (3 m) max. 197 ft. (60 m)
  - **Platforms:** Surface Ships

**KMD-500**
- **Bottom Influence Mine**
  - **Weight:** 1,100 lbs. (500 kg)
  - **Warhead:** 660 lbs. (300 kg)
  - **Depth:** min. 16 ft. (5 m) max. 230 ft. (70 m)
  - **Platforms:** Surface Ships

**KMD-1000**
- **Bottom Influence Mine**
  - **Weight:** 2,205 lbs. (1,000 kg)
  - **Warhead:** 1,540 lbs. (700 kg)
  - **Depth:** min. 16 ft. (5 m) max. 655 ft. (200 m)
  - **Platforms:** Surface Ships

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**Mine Threat Spectrum**

**Obstacles**
- Anti-Invasion
- Bottom
- Moored
- Floating

**Surf Zone**
- 0’ - 10’

**Very Shallow Water**
- 10’ - 40’

**Shallow Water**
- 40’ - 200’

**Deep Water**
- Over 200’
### Landing/Transport Craft Comparison

#### 26' Motor Whaleboat
**MK10 (Nonmagnetic)**

- **Purpose:** To transport personnel and for use as a lifeboat.
- **Capacity:** 22 men, including crew.
- **Crew:** 2
- **Displacement:** 8,850 lbs. (open), 9,070 lbs. (canopied).
- **Draft:** 2’ 4” loaded
- **Beam:** 7’ 4 5/8”
- **Length:** 26’ 3/8”
- **Speed:** 7 knots at full load displacement.

#### Landing Craft, Rubber
**Large [LCR(L)]**

- **Purpose:** To carry personnel as needed for combat missions and/or rescue.
- **Capacity:** 10 men, including crew.
- **Crew:** 1
- **Displacement:** 395 lb. light, 474 lb with motor
- **Draft:** 0’
- **Beam:** 8’
- **Length:** 16’
- **Speed:** 4.5 knots with 9 1/2 outboard motor; 57 yards/minute for 8 experienced paddlers (2-3 miles normal paddling range before combat)

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**Image:** The 26 foot MKII Navy Whaleboat (NWB) was plywood. Its radar signature was almost non-existent, even when the canvas shelter was erected.

**Image:** The LCRL or LCR (Landing Craft Rubber Large) was an inflatable boat used by the USMC and US Army in WWII and Korea.

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The 26 foot MKII Navy Whaleboat (NWB) was plywood. Its canvas shelter was almost non-existent, even when the NWB was in use as a lifeboat.

The 26' Motor Whaleboat, designated as their 'mother ship,' confirmed the readiness of the refurbished MWB for combat. The CIA team assault tactics were validated against a pair of sampans discovered dumping mines. With a Ranger kneeling on each side of the bow with 30.06 cal. M-1918 Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), two others standing over them with M1 Garand rifles, and the sergeant in the cockpit with another Garand, BM Warwick steered his MWB straight at each sampan. They did not have to wait to engage at five hundred yards because the North Korean crews began firing small arms. Both assaults triggered mines that blew the wooden vessels to smithereens in violent explosions. It took longer to locate the mines already set adrift and to detonate them with rifle fire. Still, they could not have had a better 'trial by fire' rehearsal for their upcoming mission.

The CIA maritime raiders would also attack the heart of the problem—the sampans fleets loaded with mines. Sea trials off a destroyer escort (DE), designated as their 'mother ship,' confirmed the readiness of the refurbished MWB for combat. The CIA team assault tactics were validated against a pair of sampans discovered dumping mines. With a Ranger kneeling on each side of the bow with 30.06 cal. M-1918 Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), two others standing over them with M1 Garand rifles, and the sergeant in the cockpit with another Garand, BM Warwick steered his MWB straight at each sampan. They did not have to wait to engage at five hundred yards because the North Korean crews began firing small arms. Both assaults triggered mines that blew the wooden vessels to smithereens in violent explosions. It took longer to locate the mines already set adrift and to detonate them with rifle fire. Still, they could not have had a better 'trial by fire' rehearsal for their upcoming mission.

The LCRL or LCR (Landing Craft Rubber Large) was an inflatable boat used by the USMC and US Army in WWII and Korea.
How does one rate the paramilitary efforts of the CIA in the first year of the war?

1. The establishment of a viable guerrilla E&E overland corridor for downed UN airmen across North Korea was a failure. Hundreds of guerrillas were inserted into an inhospitable North Korea by boat and parachute, never to return. Dependency on US airlift for resupply and reinforcement contributed to their compromise and elimination by North Korean security forces. The CIA-operated C&C island bases never materialized, but EUSA guerrilla island bases on the West coast fulfilled part of the requirement.

2. The MWB raids on Soviet naval mine distribution sites in North Korea were a success. Hard evidence of Russian support was provided and more than two hundred mines were destroyed. Preparatory demolition attacks against coastal infrastructure targets demonstrated the effectiveness of limited operations and provided the experience for surprise deep raids.

3. Insufficient time to train the guerrillas in amphibious operations was overcome by getting UDT personnel to support rubber boat insertions behind the lines. Detailed U.S. military advisors ensured UN air and naval gunfire support as well as delivery assets.

4. The success of the UDT and Ranger/Navy team demolition raids against East Coast infrastructure prompted Hans Tofte and MAJ 'Dutch' Kramer to organize and train a guerrilla Special Mission Group to collect intelligence and conduct maritime raids in early 1951. Their activities will be explained in the article covering JACK activities in Korea, 1951-1953.

Alley' for downed UN airmen never became functional and was not used. The CIA commitment to establish E&E command and control (C&C) centers on islands on each coast never materialized. The gold bars for the aircrew E&E kits were distributed by Hans Tofte; most probably became expensive souvenirs. The 'offshore safety net' provided by smuggler/fishing fleets under contract did not work. Radios were not furnished. Thus, the CIA had no regular means of communication and hence, little control over the contracted assets. On the West coast the guerrilla-held islands enabled forward posting of Air Force rescue aircraft and boats to reduce 'May Day' response time and extend air-sea searches.

The local population did not support the E&E corridor guerrillas. It was a very rugged, inhospitable living environment deep behind the lines. Naval and air bombardment and guerrilla destruction of infrastructure did not endear either with the local populace; the peasants were the repairmen and village guardsmen. The absence of experienced American advisors to insure discipline and mission focus left bored guerrilla leaders to their own devices. Dependency on aerial resupply also contributed to self-destruction. Airdrops pinpointed guerrilla camps for North Korean military and security forces.

“Despite abysmal results, we had to continue trying. The presence of guerrilla elements behind the lines, regardless of how long they lasted, served to disrupt lines of communication and harassed the North Korean military. Agents had to be inserted if tactical intelligence was to be collected. We still had the covert E&E mission. Paramilitary operations were not only ineffective but probably morally reprehensible in the number of lives lost.”

All in all, a lot of CIA money, time, energy, and thought were dedicated to paramilitary operations and the return was miniscule and illusory. Thousands of Korean volunteers gave their lives trying to accomplish impossible missions behind the lines. The dearth of Asian linguists and culturally aware personnel in CIA employ (or in the U.S. military) who knew anything about Communist-imposed internal social controls ensured that a seemingly callous destruction of Korean intelligence agents and guerrillas continued throughout the war. Despite everything paramilitary successes in that first year of the Korean War were few, but the CIA had the vast majority.

Special thanks to those who contributed time, photos, and documents for this article: the Korean War veterans; the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center; the CIA History Office; USAF historian Dr. Forrest L. Marion; Mr. Joseph C. Goulden, and Mr. John B. “Barry” Dwyer.

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Endnotes

1. Colonel Rod Paschall, “Special Operations in Korea,” Conflict, 7:2 (1987), 156. During the Korean War there was only strategic and tactical intelligence.

2. Phillip E. Carrico (UDT-3), interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 1 February 2013, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Letter, George Atcheson (UDT-3) to John B. Dwyer, July 1958, cited in Dwyer, Commandos From the Sea: The History of Amphibious


4 James C. McNaughton, Nisi Lingustic: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II (Washington, DC: Department of Army, Center of Military History, 2007), 84.


6 Retired LTC Chester E. Carpenter, 971st CIC Det and TLO, 824th AF, Korea, interview by Briscoe, 1 April 2006, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date. LTC Carpenter estimated a corps of several divisions was being trained by the Red Army. This was no surprise because large numbers of Koreans fled the peninsula to join Mao Tse-tung against the Japanese during WWII.


8 Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 475.


12 Singlaub interview, 9 January 2013.

13 In actuality there were multiple CIA programs going on simultaneously in the Korean area. Richard B. Finn, interview by Charles Stuart Kenna, 8 August 1991, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project at [www.adst.org/X4T_OC/Fin%20Richard%20Btoc.pdf] accessed 2/12/2013, hereafter cited by name and date.

14 Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 156; Retired MAJ Herbert A. Brucker, interview by Briscoe, 14 November 2005, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Lee Wha Rang, The US CIA Young-do Partisans.

15 C-46s probably wore “night colors.”


20 Carriço, Creed and Moore, Naked Warriors, 239.


22 Singlaub interview, 25 January 2008; Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 469.

23 Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 469.

24 Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 469–470. This proved convenient because in between Korean coastal demolition raids, the U.S. Navy Underwater Demolition Team (UDT-3 and UDT-1) detachments were billeted there. Philip Carrico, “Frogmen in Korea: Bits and Pieces from the Forgotten War” at [http://www.webub.com/PhilCarricoFirst_InlandLand.html] accessed 1/10/2013.


26 Cremean, “The Role of the USS Boger (APD-127) in Clandestine Operations in North Korea, 1950-51,” 2-3. C. G. Atcheson was a June 1950 graduate of Williams College who accepted a CIA employment offer after being classified 1-A by his Draft Board. He got six weeks of training before joining seven others bound for Japan.


29 Carriço interviews, 30 January 2013 and 13 February 2013; Carriço, Exploits of Navy Frogmen in Korea, 11-14; Fane and Moore, Naked Warriors, 240.

30 Carriço interview, 30 January 2013.


33 Fane and Moore, Naked Warriors, 243.

34 Letter, George Atcheson to John B. Dwyer, July 1985, cited in Dwyer, Commandos From the Sea, 237. LTJG Atcheson was later recruited by MAJ. John R. Vincent, Jr. ‘Dutch’ Kramer to train the guerrillas supporting the CIA E&D network in North Korea. Boat training was conducted on Yong-do. Atcheson interview, 3 March 2006.


36 Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 469-470.

46. Carrico interviews, 30 January 2013 and 13 February 2013; Carrico, *Stories of Navy Frogmen in Korea*, 57-60. UDT-3, aboard the Beorg, had already done a reconnaissance of the West coast islands south of Wonsan for TF Leopard, EUSA Guerrilla Command.


54. Sadler interviews, 3 March 2011 and 18 November 2011.


61. Within weeks of invading South Korea, the North Koreans were receiving raiclar loads of mines from Russia. They included very sensitive magnetic mines that reacted to wooden hulled vessels. Experienced Soviet mine warfare officers personally helped mine the ports of Wonsan and Chinnamp'o with contact, magnetic, and controlled mines while instructing the North Koreans in mine warfare techniques. Mines were also delivered to Inchon, Haeng, Kunsan, and Mokpo. Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes," 71, 75; LCDR Jason D. Menarchik, "North Korean Protective Mine Warfare: An Analysis of the Naval Minefields at Wonsan, Chinnampo and Hungnam During the Korean War," unpublished thesis, April 2010, U.S. Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 9, 17.


65. Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes," 77.


68. When the Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) were disbanded in the summer of 1951, most of the soldiers and sergeants were assigned to the 10th Airborne Regional Combat Team (ARC-T), the FEC reserve in Japan. After combat garrison duty and winter training in central Japan, the ‘rear area’ had little appeal. Since the Rangers were ‘rank heavy’ their integration into the 16th ARCT infantry units ‘bumped’ a lot of veterans from leader positions. The Rangers were not warmly welcomed. These factors were enough for some Rangers to ‘volunteer’ for extremely hazardous, highly classified missions behind enemy lines.’ Atcheson interview, 3 March 2006; Singlaub interview, 21 March 2012. CIA OSO North Korean agents had penetrated the Soviet naval base at Vladivostok as part of the local work force that performed menial labor and stevedore duties. In addition to reporting on Russian aircraft and ship movements, they unloaded and loaded equipment, supplies, and munitions (naval sea mines). Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 470*; Briscoe, “Do what you can!” U.N. Civil Assistance, Chinnampo, North Korea, November-December 1950,” *Veritas* 61, 108. Providing Rangers for special duty assignments was common. Major Jack T. Young, the Ivanhoe Security Force (ISF) commando, 2nd Infantry Division (ID), arranged for specialized units. The Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne), Second Lieutenant C.H. William M. Cole and several NCOS presented classes in care and operation of Soviet, Chinese, and Japanese weapons as well as raiding and sabotage operations. They also helped the MAJ Young conduct a guerrilla warfare course for the 7th and 8th ROK Army (ROKA) Division junior leaders in X Corps. Retired MSG L. Carl Heesch, interview by Briscoe, 12 December 2005, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter cited by name and date; Heesch, “The Ivanhoe Security Force”; HQ, Ivanhoe Security Force, 2nd U.S. Infantry Division, APO 248 letter 4 July 1951 SUBJECT: Training; COL Jack T. Young Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; ISF letter dated 4 July 1951, SUBJECT: Training; HQ X Corps, APO 909, COG OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE Classified Message, SUBJECT: Extension of Guerrilla Training dated 19 June 1951, Young Collection. “The North Korean Navy, with the help of Soviet sailors, managed to lay more than 37,000 Soviet-made mines in coastal areas. These mine fields significantly reduced the activities of the American Navy.” Zolotarev, Yaremenko, Pochtarev and Usikov, *Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Regional Conflicts in the Second Half of the 20th Century*, 10th Edition, 2006; Andrew S. Erikson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Marolda, “Mining Action Report” from “USS Mansfield (DD-728) Mine Incident” at http://web.meganet.net/kman/nfmine.htm accessed 2/26/2013.