Culture, Language & SPECIAL OPS

Recruiting & Training “TURNCOAT” Agents in Korea

by Charles H. Briscoe
World War Two veteran Major (MAJ) Jack T. Young, Deputy G-2 (Intelligence), 2nd Infantry Division (2nd ID) organized, trained, and led an indigenous security element that collected tactical intelligence, handled refugees, and countered guerrilla activities during the Korean War. Called the Ivanhoe Security Force (ISF), Young’s unit was also point element for Task Force (TF) INDIANHEAD, the Eighth U.S. Army intelligence exploitation team sent to North Korea’s capital. The ISF entered P’yongyang on 18 October 1950 interspersed amongst the 15th Infantry Regiment, the lead element of the 1st Republic of Korea (ROK) Division. 1 The commander, Colonel (COL) Paik Sun-yup, who had grown up in the city protected by two large rivers, positioned his engineer boats behind the lead regiment because he expected the bridges to be destroyed. Paik’s omniscience enabled the engineers to quickly overcome the obstacles. The 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Major General (MG) Hobart R. Gay, unable to get into the Communist capital because his boats trailed the main column, would not allow any Americans to get ahead of his advance. Undeterred, the multi-lingual Young, arranged to blend his ISF troops among Paik’s lead element. He arranged the subterfuge in Mandarin, the preferred language of senior ROK officers who had been trained by the Japanese for service in Manchuria. 2

This article describes how a Chinese-American officer used cultural aspects and language to rebuild the ISF, to insure solid rapport with the ROK division commanders of X Corps, and to train Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) prisoners of war (POW) as intelligence agents for Far East Command (FEC). This last mission enabled MAJ Young to propose that certain CCF POWs (forcibly conscripted Nationalist Army veterans) be offered repatriation in Formosa. It was the virtual destruction of the ISF at Kunu-ri in late November 1950 that caused him to use cultural

MAJ Jack T. Young

A Chinese-American born in Kona, Hawaii on 13 November 1910, Jack Theodore Young lived most of his early life in China. After graduating with a business degree from Fu Tan University (Shanghai) in 1936, he returned to the States. When the Japanese attacked China, Young left New York to fight for his family homeland. He attended the Kuomintang (KMT) Military Academy at Whampoa before leading Nationalist units against the Japanese and Communists until December 1943. Then, as a U.S. citizen serving with Allied forces, Young was mandatorily commissioned in the U.S. Army Reserve. Thus, on 17 December 1943, Chinese Nationalist Brigadier Young, who was fighting guerrillas in Shantung Province, became First Lieutenant (ILT) Young, Adjutant General Corps (AGC) with orders to Burma. 3 Fluent in Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and several Asian dialects, ILT Young was sent to Lieutenant General (LTG) Joseph W. Stilwell as his aide-de-camp. Following the war, Captain (CPT) Young met the leading Communists in Asia, Mao Tsetung, Chou En-lai, and Kim Il-Sung, during his service in the U.S. Military Mission to China. 4 As the interpreter/aide for General George C. Marshall during his postwar China mission, Young became acquainted with COL Laurence B. Keiser. It was he (MG Keiser, commanding the 2nd ID at Fort Lewis, WA) who recruited Young for the ‘Indianhead’ Division before it left for Korea in July 1950. 5

COL Paik Sun-yup was the most decorated South Korean soldier in the war. After service as the Chairman, ROK Armed Forces, he retired as a four-star general.

1st Infantry Division
Republic of Korea Army SSI

China-Burma-India Theater SSI

2nd Infantry Division SSI
knowledge and linguistics to reconstitute this special operations element.

The U.S.-led indigenous ISF was virtually destroyed by the CCF when it tried to cover the withdrawal of the 2nd ID command group as it moved through a seven-mile long ‘gauntlet of fire ambushes’ (small arms reinforced by heavy mortars) on 30 November 1950. By the time the ‘Indianhead’ Division reached the safety of Kunu-ri on 1 December, it had lost a third of its soldiers (5,000 officers and troops), sixty-four pieces of artillery, hundreds of trucks, tractors, and trailers, and almost all engineer and signal equipment. Rendered combat ineffective, the 2nd ID was put in reserve and MG Keiser was relieved.

The Korean troops of the ISF, mistaken for enemy by American ground and UN air forces at Kunu-ri, were also decimated. MAJ Young and only one of the original four U.S. Army non-commissioned officers (NCO), Corporal (CPL) L. Carl Heesch, survived the debacle. CPL Carl Parsons and Sergeant (SGT) Joseph A. ‘Moose’ Thompson were killed in the fighting. SGT Emmett V. Parker, was missing in action, presumed dead. In reality, a wounded Parker had been captured by the Chinese.

While EUSA reconstituted the 2nd ID, MAJ Young recruited American and Korean volunteers for a new and larger ISF having a headquarters and service company (HSC) for command & control, communications, supply, and...
administration, an infantry rifle company for assault missions, and a security company. Twenty U.S. Army NCOs were selected to cadre eight hundred KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army) soldiers and to supervise a hundred Korean Labor Service (KLS) volunteers. Young arranged specialized training from 1st Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne). In June 1951, Second Lieutenant (2LT) William M. Cole and several Ranger sergeants taught combat marksmanship, care and operation of Soviet, Chinese, and Japanese weapons, small unit raids, and sabotage operations. After creating a new, larger ISF, MAJ Young modified his internal training courses to accommodate a group of 5th, 7th, and 8th ROK Division junior leaders from the Korean units assigned to the U.S. X Corps.

Presenting this special guerrilla course to twenty-one ROKA lieutenants and sergeants was MAJ Young, 2LT Cole, and SGT Robert W. Morgan. Originally slated for 20-27 June 1951, the course was extended until 3 July. They taught classes in close combat techniques, stalking, map reading, compass navigation, first aid, demolitions, planning and conducting raids, security, night marksmanship, intelligence report preparation, handling civilians on the battlefield, and survival skills. The American instructors had the students spend a week in the field practicing raids and ambushes. In his report to the ROKA generals, Young explained that special emphasis had been put on compass and map reading because “eighty-five percent of the veterans were not familiar with these subjects.” The Chinese-American officer observed and evaluated all students during the live-fire infiltration course and the week of field exercises. MAJ Young identified six NCOs by name as “not suitable for raiding operations due to poor physical condition.” This frank assessment was appreciated by the U.S. and Korean generals and raised his esteem among them. It also helped to accelerate approval of a request to convert the ROK Army soldiers in the ISF to KATUSA status. The report containing individual evaluations also attracted the interest of EUSA and FEC staff officers. It led to a by-name request for a very sensitive covert mission.

Well-known among the WWII Japanese-trained ROK commanders who spoke Chinese, the multi-lingual American
The KATUSA Program resulted from a July 1950 agreement between South Korean President Syngman Rhee and General (GEN) Douglas MacArthur. It went into effect on 15 August 1950 when GEN MacArthur ordered Lieutenant General (LTG) Walton H. Walker, Eighth U.S. Army commander, to increase the strength of all American infantry rifle companies and artillery batteries with one hundred Koreans. Woefully understrength post-WWII American infantry divisions [two infantry battalions (instead of three) in two regiments (instead of standard three)], ordered to Korea, were ‘gutted’ to fill units with earlier overseas shipment dates. Legally part of the ROK Army, the KATUSA recruits were paid and administered by the South Korean government. They wore American uniforms and were issued U.S. Army equipment, rations, and special sundry items. While American divisions that arrived earlier got KATUSAs in the Pusan Perimeter, 7th Infantry Division (ID) received 8,600 untrained KATUSAs in Japan, three weeks before the Inch'on assault. The 3rd ID had the same challenges before the Wonsan landings.14

Today, KATUSA soldiers wear ROK flag patches on the right sleeve of their U.S. Army uniforms.

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A list of the CCF POWs contained background information which the multi-lingual major corrected or expanded in pencil (language capabilities, military education, physical condition).
and render objective evaluations of each intelligence agent’s ‘potential.’ And, he was to screen the Chinese-speaking Korean instructors from FEC/LD (K), KLO (Korean Liaison Office), HID (Human Intelligence Detachment) Teams GOAT, and WHISKEY and choose the best trainers. However, only Kim Yong Chan was a trained parachutist who could teach fundamentals to the candidates. Mr. Kay and Mr. Wang, who were familiar with Chinese customs, culture, and psychology, were to assist the Chinese-American major with administration and logistics. On 9 August 1951 after FEC/LD (K) CPT Shoaff gave MAJ Young seven pages of administrative instructions, some individual equipment and training aid lists, a few comments on topics of instruction, and vague, general guidance, the WWII veteran was introduced to Misters Kay and Wang. It became obvious to Young that he had two weeks to train fifteen former POWs for insertion into North Korea as intelligence agents. Simply inserting him was to: ‘Make it happen with what he was given.’

MAJ Young went to work. A general schedule of instruction was approved by FEC/LD (K) COL Abraham. On loan to FEC/LD (K) for less than three weeks, the WWII combat veteran applied common sense based on the exigencies of the situation. MAJ Young complied with guidance, and followed instructions logically. He selectively ignored wishful intelligence expectations from the EUSA G-2 far removed in Seoul. The ‘shake and bake’ agent training course was another desperate field attempt to collect fresh intelligence. It would be mostly tactical, but maybe, by accident, a little with strategic significance. First, the agents had to avoid getting caught. Then, they had to get back without being killed by either side.

MAJ Young flew to Pusan, picked up an MP (military police) security detail, and signed for fifteen CCF POWs dressed in ‘sterile’ U.S. fatigues (no markings). The prisoners ranged in age from a twenty-year-old, Yung Hsiang Chang, who was reputedly a former CNA warrant officer, to a thirty-four-year-old Catholic, Shih Tung Wu. Once secure inside the ‘school’ area of the 8240th AU compound, visible from the transient quarters, guarded by ‘non-vetted’ South Koreans, and Chinese rice was delivered to a locally hired ‘Chinese cook.’ All of these things were beyond Young’s control.

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Following a short welcome in the morning all students were required to “write a detailed personal history to establish their level of intelligence and education.” Then, Mr. Wang, Mr. Kay, and the five instructors used the histories to prepare short dossiers on each student. The Fu Tan University graduate, MAJ Young, compiled these to evaluate capability and competency of his Chinese-Korean instructors and advisors, to begin official dossiers on all, and assign specific classes to each of his staff. Because backgrounds could not be corroborated by personnel files or pay cards, the ISF commander relied on ‘gut instinct’ and information gleaned by the instructors who lived and ate with the candidates.

All CCF POW students had North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) ID numbers and held internal leadership positions in the prison camp. These formal assignments ranged from a POW compound commander to battalion, company and platoon commanders to a squad leader. Most interestingly, twenty-one year old Chien Sheng Wu was the Pusan compound commander. That fact prompted no written comments by Young. Admitted education ranged from twelve to two years (two farmers and a textile worker). Unproven CNA service spanned the gamut from twelve years to fourteen months and alleged duty positions from guerrilla squad leader to KMT military academy cadet to a warrant officer and an officer. Having been conscripted for the CCF, seven were relegated to service as ammunition bearers, infantrymen (3), guards (2), gunner/instructors (2), and a truck driver. Fourteen were officially classified as ‘self-surrendered’ and one had been captured asleep by ROK forces. Two claimed that they were Christians. Based on this personal data MAJ Young evaluated each candidate after he was photographed and fingerprinted.

For three days the educated, combat-experienced Chinese-American major interrogated the fifteen candidates. Young added Chinese symbols for names, noted dialects and Mandarin speakers (court level Chinese), localities for tactical employment, identified Chinese-Koreans, recorded weak physical condition, marked the police academy graduates, and highlighted those who spoke poor Chinese.

The 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company and the 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group enlisted POWs to tape record surrender pleas to their comrades.
While a student was being interviewed by MAJ Young, the rest were playing simple memory games using Life and Look pictorial magazines and ‘The Whispering Game’ to pass verbal messages one to another while seated in a circle. FEC/LD (K) felt that memory training was “useful, simple and not boring.” These preliminary exercises did not disclose any intelligence training scheduled to follow. This precaution was taken in case any were disqualified in screening. None were, and agent training commenced on the fourth day.

Four and a half seven-hour-days [a two-hour lunch break/siesta common for Chinese workers had been set by FEC/LD (K)] were devoted to intelligence training: enemy order of battle; observation and description; distance, height and length estimation. Examinations and critiques followed each class. “Special EEI (Essential Elements of Information) for ‘Operation TURNCOAT’” furnished by EUSA G-2 was three pages (both sides) long and had a map that revealed nine critical areas which might contain CCF activities. Questions addressed infantry, armor, artillery, supplies, propaganda and morale.

Since the EEI was exquisitely detailed, analyses would have been difficult for a seasoned senior field commander. A poorly educated private could not calculate the relevance of various questions. Prepared by American staffs (EUSA and FEC) for U.S. personnel with comparable education and military experience, the EEI far exceeded learning capacities of agent candidates. There was also an assumption that agents posing as CCF privates would have great access behind enemy lines; few low-ranking soldiers enjoy this in any army. Because compasses, maps, binoculars, and radios would not be furnished, no training was provided. It was MAJ Young who ‘dumbed down’ the instruction and training to accommodate his students. They would be impersonating privates, not NCOs or officers.

Plausible cover stories of being temporarily captured and escaping, inadvertently left behind by relocating units, and surviving overrun units and ambushed patrols were fabricated with the instructors on the tenth and eleventh days of training. Stories were tied to CCF units known to have operated around the assigned parachute drop zones. Two mornings were spent preparing covers and undergoing practice interrogations. Parachute ground training covered three afternoons. There were no practice jumps. Mr. Wang assembled CCF uniforms appropriate to...
Three CCF POW “TURNCOAT” agents pose with weapons and uniforms appropriate for the season. While provided forged pay cards, they were only given hand grenades for self-protection during missions. Weapons were not provided.

the summer season, insignia, and forged pay cards while the agents trained. Instead of being issued pistols or rifles, the agents were armed with CCF hand grenades. The twelfth and thirteenth days were spent preparing for individual missions. Since no maps would be issued for their missions, each agent had to select an infiltration route, develop an emergency pick up plan, and choose an exfiltration route. The details had to be memorized and were briefed back to instructors several times along with the cover stories. A full dress rehearsal preceded a critique and final briefing. After dark on the thirteenth day, MAJ Young transferred custody of the agents to a FEC/LD (K) officer and the CCF-uniformed group disappeared into the night. The Chinese-American major received a letter of commendation through channels from infantry COL W. I. Russell, the Military Intelligence Section ‘commander’ of FEC/LD (K). Shortly afterwards, MAJ Young was flown to Formosa to discuss the repatriation of former CNA soldiers, who had been conscripted by the CCF and captured in Korea.36

Was Operation TURNCOAT viable? The G-2 Sections of Far East Command in Japan and Eighth Army in Korea, desperate for tactical intelligence, supported innovative, foolhardy collection programs throughout the war. Results were spotty at best. The temporary assignment of multi-lingual MAJ Jack Young to Operation TURNCOAT demonstrated how woefully short Americans with Chinese and Korean cultural backgrounds, language (written and conversation), and the requisite security clearances were in U.S. intelligence, military and civilian, elements. Without CNA records to verify the claims of CCF POWs, MAJ Young relied on his dated WWII combat experience, KMT academy connections, linguistic skills, and the input from the FEC L/D (K) instructors to reinforce ‘gut’ feelings about agent candidates. For the ROKA interrogators, a CCF POW who claimed CNA service and who volunteered to be an intelligence agent, overrode limited education and military experience. American expectations that coerced, conscripted CCF soldiers (private to junior officer) were capable of performing as tactical intelligence agents with only ten days training in collection basics was wishful thinking. Internal security measures in North Korea were simply disregarded.37

The lack of radios, compasses, maps, and binoculars limited timely reporting, prevented the provision of accurate map coordinates for EEI, and navigation ‘behind the lines’ reverted to terrain memorization. The lack of equipment that kept the agents ‘sterile’ and improved cover, did little to facilitate return through UN lines. While operations and training conducted by FEC L/D (K) and 8240th AU were compartmented on a ‘need to know’ basis, the use of ‘non-vetted’ Korean gate guards and employment of ‘local’ ethnic cooks, and special deliveries of Chinese rice to an American compound negated most covertness. Compound this with the fact that the foreign trainees were visible from the 8240th AU transient quarters, removed any operational security.38
During the four-year war AVIARY Section of 8240th AU and the CIA dropped hundreds of agents behind the lines. Few survived and those who returned did so by walking back. They brought outdated intelligence and most had been ‘doubled’ by the Communists. One postwar assessment described the practice of sending POWs behind the lines to collect intelligence and organize resistance as “futile and callous.”

Operation TURNCOH was a desperate, ill-fated intelligence collection scheme that was implemented with pressure from higher headquarters demanding actionable tactical information. It was doomed from the start by a lack of records to ‘vett’ CNA backgrounds. Assignment of a culturally astute, linguistically gifted, and innovative Chinese-American combat veteran served to improve and calibrate training, but even he could not create ‘James Bond’ secret agents in ten days from poorly educated peasants. The experience revealed the plight of conscripted former CNA soldiers in the CCF who had been captured in Korea. MAJ Young’s coordination efforts for Operation TURNCOH raised an Armistice POW repatriation caveat that could potentially benefit President Syngman Rhee and General Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa.

I would like to give special thanks to the daughter of COL Jack T. Young, Chialing ‘Jolly’ Young King, for granting access to her father’s files and talking about him. Jackie L. Wan, her sister, edited the article. Family involvement gave it personality.

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Endnotes
3 Department of Army DA Form 66 for USAR COL Jack Theodore Young, AGC, dated 22 August 1966; Department of Defense DD Form 214, Armed Forces of the United States, Report of Transfer or Discharge for USAR COL Jack Theodore Young, AGC, dated 31 May 1968; (COL Jack T. Young Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC); June B. Young, interview by Briscoe, 4 April 2006, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
4 Retired 1SG Emmett V. Parker, interview by Briscoe, 30 January 2006, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Stan Swinton, “S.F. Officer’s Private Army Winning Own War in Korea,” San Francisco Examiner, 23 September 1950; Michael Kiefer, Chasing the Panda (NY: Four Walls Four Windows, 2002), 185-186.
5 Young, “History of Ivanhoe Security Force.”
9 Heesch, “The Ivanhoe Security Force.”
13 EUSA Message G-4-4747 KGP dated TOO 230201j, SUBJECT: ISF ROKA to KATUSA, Young Collection.
15 Secretary of the Army message 15 February 1949, SUBJECT: Assignment of Officer to CIA, Young Collection. This detail was to secure, safeguard, and transport the Chinese national treasure to Taiwan. Chialing ‘Jolly’ Young King, interview by Drs. Briscoe and Michael E. Krivdo, 14 April, 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Chinese was the official language for ROK Army field grade and general officers during the Korean War. Orders were written in Chinese and then translated to Korean for radio transmission to the field. Thus, bilingual staff personnel were needed because few radio operators had that capability. Retired ROK GEN Paik Sun-yup, interview by Briscoe, 27 May 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
16 Far East Command, FCE Liaison Detachment, Korea, APO301, memorandum dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POW’s; FCE/LD Korea memorandum dated 19August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat; FCE/LD Military Intelligence Section letter dated 1 September 1951, SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation; FCE/LD Military Intelligence Section; FCE/LD CWI Bill S. Itto letter to MAJ Young, dated 9 August 1951, Young Collection.
17 Briscoe, “Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea,” Veritas, Vol. 1, No. 2, 50-51; Briscoe, “1 LdL in Korea: A Photographer’s Record, 1952-53, Veritas, Vol. 7, No. 1, 22. Some CCF and NPKA ‘soldiers’ who surrendered were political commissar officers charged with organizing the Communist POW camps. On 10 June 1952 paratroopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) put down riots within the Kejo-do POW camps where a U.S. Army brigadier general, attempting to negotiate, had been seized and held captive by the Communists.
19 Lacking intelligence linguists that spoke Korean and Chinese, American military services relied heavily on ROK Army (ROKA) multi-lingual interrogators to conduct interviews in CCF and North Korean POW camps. “Vetting” of local Korean help—from secretaries to guard forces to cooks and cleaning staff—was done by ‘trusted’ South Koreans. The polygraph was in its infancy. Retired Maj. Paul Baiz, Baltazar, interview by Briscoe, 30 October 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
20 FECOM, FCE/LD (K) list of CCF POWs, undated, Young Collection; When the North Koreans invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, there were only two Korean linguists at the disposal of the Far East Command (FEC) G-2. The Technical Intelligence Section with its large bevy of regional linguists had been disbanded by FEC in 1949. The Army Language School at Monterey, California, would take nearly a year before it could train 100 Korean linguists. This meant that almost all counterintelligence operations and human intelligence operations plans had to be explained through interpreters of varying abilities. Few records were available to verify information data provided by Koreans being employed by U.S. Forces. Ann B. Finnegann, and James L. Gilbert, In the Shadow of the Sphinx: A History of Army Counterintelligence (Fort Belvoir, VA: Office of Strategic Management and Information, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), 2003), 112-113; Finnegann, “The U.S. Army in the Korean War 1950-1953” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Office of the主帅 of the USASOC, Army History, 20 May 2001), 60.
21 FECOM, FCE/LD (K) memo dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POW’s; FCE/LD Korea memo dated 19 August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat, Young Collection; Mr. Richard K. Hong, KLO Team GOAT and TLO 24th, interview by Briscoe, 27 May 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
L. Kiper, 31 October 2003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. KLO Team GOAT consisted of thirty agents. Its mission was to collect information about NKPA supply routes, unit identifications, morale, and military training. Hong interview, 31 October 2003.

22 FECOM, FEC L/D (K) memo dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POWs; FEC/LD Korea memo dated 19 August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat, Young Collection.

23 FEC/LD Korea memo dated 19 August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat, Young Collection.

24 FECOM, FEC L/D (K) memo dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POWs; FEC/LD Korea classified memo dated 19 August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat, Young Collection. Chinese being trained inside the 8240th AU compound was obvious to 1LT Joseph R. Ulatoski, commander of Leopard Base (Forward). Called back to the headquarters from So-do (island) on the East coast for several days, he watched the Chinese who came outside in a group during their daily two-hour ‘lunch & siesta’ break. Exactly what they were doing he did not know, but the 1st Ranger Company veteran recognized Chinese when he saw them. Retired BG Joseph R. Ulatoski, interview by Briscoe, 20 May 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.

25 FECOM, FEC L/D (K) memo dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POWs; FEC/LD Korea memo dated 19 August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat dated 19 August 1951; FEC/LD Military Intelligence Section letter dated 1 September 1951, SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation; FEC/LD CWO Bill S. Ito letter to MAJ Young, dated 9 August 1951; CCF Agent Backgrounds, Young Collection.

26 FECOM, FEC L/D (K) memo dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POWs; FEC/LD Korea memo dated 19 August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat dated 19 August 1951; FEC/LD Military Intelligence Section letter dated 1 September 1951, SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation; FEC/LD CWO Bill S. Ito letter to MAJ Young, dated 9 August 1951; CCF Agent Backgrounds, Young Collection.

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30 FECOM, FEC L/D (K) memo dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POWs; CCF Agent Backgrounds; FEC/LD Korea memo dated 19 August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat dated 19 August 1951, Young Collection.

31 FECOM, FEC L/D (K) memo dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POWs; CCF Agent Backgrounds; FEC/LD Korea memo dated 19 August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat, Young Collection.

32 Eighth U.S. Army, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Intelligence, APO 301, memorandum dated 9 August 1951, SUBJECT: Special EEI for “Operation Turncoat,” Young Collection.

33 Eighth U.S. Army, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Intelligence, APO 301, memorandum dated 9 August 1951, SUBJECT: Special EEI for “Operation Turncoat,” Young Collection.

34 FECOM, FEC L/D (K) memo dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POWs; EUSA, ACS, G-2 Intelligence memo dated 9 August 1951, SUBJECT: Special EEI for “Operation Turncoat,” Young Collection. Even limiting agent armament to hand grenades was hazardous as the Aviary Section, 8240th AU discovered in 1952. Just before the last of six agents jumped from a 437th Troop Carrier Wing C-463 Commando over North Korea on 19 February 1952, a ‘double’ agent lobbed a grenade back inside the cargo compartment. Three Americans were killed and one was declared missing in action (MIA), presumed dead. The grenade broke aileron and rudder cables making the C-46 uncontrollable. The remaining five airmen and one 8240th AU soldier bailed out and were captured. They were released during Operation BIG SWITCH. Retired USN CPT Harry E. Ettinger, interviews by Dr. Jared M. Tracy, 26 November and 10 December 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; KORWALD Loss Incident Summary at http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/korea/reports/air/korwald_info_1583.htm accessed 12/10/2012.

35 FECOM, FEC L/D (K) memo dated 5 August 1951, SUBJECT: Training of Chinese POWs; FEC/LD Korea memo dated 19 August 1951, SUBJECT: Operation Turncoat dated 19 August 1951; FEC/LD Military Intelligence Section, APO 301 letter dated 1 September 1951, SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation signed by COL W.I. Russell, Commander, FEC/LD Military Intelligence Section, Young Collection.

36 HQ, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa, APO 63, letter dated 14 September 1951, SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation for Major Jack Young, O-889127 signed by BG John P. Willey, Chief, Army Section, Young Collection. BG John P. Willey, the MARS Task Force commander, CBI Theater, knew MAJ Young from the Chinese Nationalist Army training mission after his element seized the Burma Road. BG Willey and the Chinese-American major also served together on the Marshall Mission to China. They were well acquainted. As a KMT military academy graduate, brigadier, and major also served together on the Marshall Mission to China, they were well acquainted. As a KMT military academy graduate, brigadier, and old family friend of General Chiang Kai-shek, MAJ Young was very well connected. He spirited national treasures from mainland China to Taiwan in February 1949 while Mao Ze-dong and the Red Army were consolidating power. CSGPA-O-AG 201 Young, Jack T. message dated 15 February 1949, SUBJECT: Assignment of Officer, Young Collection.


38 Ulatoski interview, 7 March 2011.

39 Retired COL John K. Sadler, interviews by Briscoe, 18 November 2011 and 18 April 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; retired MG John K. Singlaub, interview by Briscoe, 21 March 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.