The Army's Guerilla Command in Korea

Part II: The Rest of the Story
For limited offensives up to a few thousand meters [inland], the [guerrillas] were very good offensive fighters, because they all knew how to use the bayonet, rifle and hand grenade. Therefore, we were able to carry out some creditable military operations.”

— LTC Jay D. Vanderpool

The Many Names of the Army’s Guerrilla Command

The Army’s Korean guerrilla command went through several name changes during the war. In addition, higher echelons were created, reorganized and renamed with great frequency. The many names caused considerable confusion even among persons assigned to the guerrilla units. Because of this, we use the single term ‘guerrilla command’ in a generic sense to describe the EUSA headquarters element that organized, trained, supported, and led the various guerrilla groups.

Sequentially, the guerrilla command was known as:

- The Attrition Section, Miscellaneous Division, EUSA (15 January to 4 May 1951)
- 8086th Army Unit (AU) (5 May to 9 December 1951)
- 8240th AU (10 December 1951 to 7 March 1954)
- 8242nd AU (CCRACK has OPCON of FEC/LD (K) (5 October 1952 - 7 March 1954)
- 8250th ROK AU (Guerrillas only) (16 August 1953 - 7 March 1954)
- UN Partisan Forces Korea (UNPFK) (21 November 1952 - September 1953)
- UN Partisan Infantry Korea (UNPIK) (September 1953 - 7 March 1954)

For the various names and tenures of the guerrilla command’s higher echelons, see the article “Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRACK)” in this issue.
of those tasks. As a result, the guerrilla units produced small-scale tactical successes within their capabilities. Since the guerrillas occupied a low rung in the FEC and EUSA priority ladder, the higher commands only paid attention to them when problems surfaced.⁶

**Expanding the Role of Guerrillas**

As commander of the 8086th Army Unit (AU) guerrilla command, COL McGee took great interest in the activities and welfare of his ‘partisans.’ He provided the vision and energy to make the Army’s first deliberately formed unconventional warfare unit successful. The EUSA's guerrilla warfare expert, McGee pulled off an organizational miracle. He took a widely-dispersed, loosely-organized rabble of resistance fighters and family members and forged them into a capable guerrilla force led and sustained by American advisors. McGee's initial plan was so effective that it remained the model for Army guerrilla operations throughout the war. He took pride in his creation and continually made organizational improvements to meet new combat requirements.⁷

One significant change involved the role guerrillas would fill in guarding the South’s capital city of Seoul. The massive Chinese ‘Volunteer’ intervention of October-November 1950 had not only pushed United Nations (UN) forces out of North Korea, but by January 1951 the Communists had recaptured Seoul. On 16
March 1951, UN troops retook the capital in a massive counter-offensive. They pushed forces up the Kimpo Peninsula west of Seoul all the way to the banks of the Han River. Farther to the west were several large islands that controlled the mouths of the Han and Imjin Rivers. If the UN forces occupied those islands they could dominate maritime access to these key rivers and guard the west flank of Seoul.

Fortunately for the UN, McGee’s TF LEOPARD already had guerrillas on each of the two main islands of the Han Estuary: Kyodong-do and Kanghwa-do (see map). Yet because of the distance from TF LEOPARD, American advisors rarely visited them and lacked a clear picture of their tactical situation. To add to the confusion, the commander of LEOPARD Base, Major (MAJ) William A. Burke, received reports in late May 1951 that a new band of North Korean irregulars had settled in Kanghwa-do, creating friction among the guerrillas. If the Han Estuary guerrillas were to become part of the UN’s defensive scheme, McGee had to determine the disposition and fighting capabilities of his forces in that area and tighten control over them.

MAJ Burke tasked Captain (CPT) Robert I. Channon to visit the islands, meet with the leaders, and view their dispositions first-hand. Channon, former executive officer of the 3rd Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne), had been ‘marking time’ recovering from wounds and agreed to

Composite graphic with an original tactical map depicting the two main islands (Kyodong-do and Kanghwa-do) of the Han River Estuary that guard the mouth of the Han River and the Kimpo Peninsula. The landmass to the north and west of those islands had been in South Korean hands before the war, but by January 1951 was occupied by the Communists. The red line indicates the boundary between North and South Korea. The inset shows Task Force (TF) PERRY’s area of operations (AO) in June 1951. The guerrillas of TF PERRY occupied many of the islands from the Yonpyong group in the west to Kanghwa-do in the east. TF PERRY helped guard the left flank of the United Nations defensive line and became the independent WOLFPACK unit in December 1951.
perform reconnaissance missions for McGee. At the end of May 1951, Channon and an interpreter left LEOPARD for a reconnaissance that would last about three weeks. Afterward, CPT Channon briefed COL McGee and MAJ Burke on the situation in the islands (see sidebar). Based on Channon’s assessment, McGee decided to establish a new command element in the Han River Estuary to better coordinate and control partisan activities.10

McGee opted to form a small command and control (C&C) cell using LEOPARD assets and sent them to one of the Han Islands. He temporarily subordinated the C&C cell to LEOPARD so that Burke could still centrally manage all West Coast guerrilla activities.11 Because the new unit would soon be independent, he wanted an experienced trainer in charge. McGee chose his chief instructor, MAJ Eugene M. Perry, Jr. (the officer in charge of the BAKER training section). Perry was given two enlisted radio men to control the guerrillas and to maintain contact with LEOPARD Base and adjacent UN units. On 21 June 1951, the new C&C cell (christened TF PERRY) became operational on Kyodong Island. MAJ Perry assumed responsibility for guerrilla operations from Kanghwa-do on the east to the Yonpyong island group in the west (see map) and had four separate units totaling about 2,000 guerrillas.12

Although MAJ Perry initially established his headquarters on Kyodong-do because of its central location, operational demands forced him to relocate further east. Since he spent most of his time coordinating with conventional units on the Kimpo Peninsula he moved his headquarters to Kanghwa-do on 12 July 1951 to better perform that function. Through time, the importance of the guerrillas’ role in the UN defense grew to the point that it dictated a stronger American element. As a result, by year’s end TF PERRY became a separate and distinct guerrilla unit (TF WOLFPACK), reporting directly to the guerrilla command.13

While TF PERRY was getting established, COL McGee relinquished command on 1 July 1951 to attend the Army War College. At the EUSA forward headquarters in Taegu, COL McGee’s executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Samuel W. Koster, assumed command of the guerrillas. A U.S. Military Academy graduate (1942) and WWII combat infantry veteran, Koster had served as McGee’s second-in-command for about two months. Although that short experience gave him some familiarity with the guerrillas and special operations, Koster had little time to reflect on his new position since he became entangled in a major special operation on the verge of disaster.14

Two weeks before LTC Koster assumed command of the guerrillas, Operation SPITFIRE began. It would have far-reaching consequences for long-range guerrilla operations. Operation SPITFIRE kicked off with five men parachuting into North Korea (see the separate article in this issue for details). Their mission was to establish a long-term guerrilla base in the rugged central mountains of North Korea to organize disaffected citizens to fight the Communists. It was a large operation involving 57 personnel. The five-man ‘Pathfinder’ element (one British officer, two American sergeants, and two Koreans) was to set up a drop zone for the main body. They would arrive in three successive airdrops (12-20 men dropping every seven to ten days). Despite improved planning and rehearsals since the airborne fiasco of VIRGINIA I in March 1951, SPITFIRE never got beyond its second phase.15

On 6 July 1951, the enemy discovered SPITFIRE and engaged it, inflicting several casualties and forcing the rest to evade in small groups. Until the last survivors walked into 35th Infantry Regiment lines (26 July), LTC Koster was fixated on rescuing SPITFIRE. But the problem was beyond his capabilities. The few survivors escaped on their own accord.16

FEC’s difficulties in rescuing Westerners on deep missions prompted it to change the composition of the airborne teams. In addition to seven Korean guerrillas, SPITFIRE lost Ranger Sergeant (SGT) William T. Miles and British Fusilier Calder Mills.17 FEC now ‘dropped the hammer’; no more Americans or British on “long-term airborne missions into North Korea.”18 FEC’s position was that non-Asians inserted into the mountains of Korea could not blend in among the people, making it difficult to evade and survive in the tightly controlled Communist society. In reality, Korean guerrillas dropped into an unfamiliar part of North Korea had a minimal chance of survival, but FEC was more concerned with allied casualties than with guerrillas. The prohibition on Western participation removed the only experienced operatives from deep, behind-the-lines missions; future teams consisted of poorly-trained and inexperienced men, led by untested and unproven leaders. In every account of VIRGINIA I and SPITFIRE, the battle-seasoned Americans and British provided the calm, experienced leadership. The blanket prohibition on American participation doomed subsequent deep airborne missions.

FEC stuck by its decision, arguing that its experience showed that “American military personnel are so readily identifiable by physical, racial, and linguistic characteristics” it was impossible for them to escape detection for long.19 FEC disagreed with the contents
of the Army Field Manual on guerrilla operations (FM 31-21) that advocated American advisor support in combat operations. The staff recommended revision of the manual arguing that “in this [Korean] theater only indigenous personnel can operate safely behind enemy lines.” Ignoring the workable doctrinal framework in FM 31-2, FEC contended that unconventional warfare (UW) operations could only “be mounted and conducted from friendly-held bases: island, floating, or rear-area bases," where the firepower and reinforcement from the nearby bases could be employed to ‘bail out’ teams in trouble.20 The results of SPITFIRE probably caused FEC to overreact. While FEC planners might have been justified in removing Americans from long-term deep airborne missions, there was less reason to prohibit Americans from participating in airborne raids that by definition include a planned extraction of the force. That is, unless FEC believed it could not provide Americans with a capability to extract them in an emergency. The successful completion of short raids would have given the Korean participants a better experience base to apply to deeper missions, increasing their chances of survival.21

Other developments also limited guerrilla actions.

When cease-fire talks began on 10 July 1951, the negotiations had a direct impact on guerrilla warfare operations. The U.S. driven decision to seek a negotiated settlement suggested to many Koreans that the UN forces were retreating from a policy of reunifying Korea to one of restoring the status quo antebellum of two Koreas. That major change between UN and ROK war goals had ominous implications for the guerrillas. The North Korean ‘partisans’ wanted to push the Communists out of the North and return to their homes. The negotiations meant that they might never free their homeland, forcing them to choose between returning home to live under Communist rule or integrating into South Korean society. Neither choice was palatable. Some guerrillas began to question why they should continue to risk life and limb over a lost cause.22

Despite the talks, a contemporary study assessed that “partisan morale appears to have been quite good in 1951.”23 In fact, the number of combat actions doubled from an average of 101 reported events per month in 1951, to 221 per month throughout 1952. The guerrillas also grew steadily in size from about 6,000 to over 20,000 during that same period. Even accounting for some degree of ‘double-counting’ and inflation of numbers, the evidence suggests that the guerrillas remained an effective combat force within their capabilities. Although some of the raids were undertaken more for the benefit of the guerrillas than for the FEC, those actions still forced the Communists to react and inflicted damage on the local economy.24 Successful raids of this type actually bolstered the morale of the guerrillas and reduced the logistical burden on the American advisors.

Changes From Above

In August 1951, the commander of UN/FEC forces, General Matthew B. Ridgway, wanted to gain control over the many entities conducting unconventional warfare in North Korea. There were almost a dozen different units from all services and agencies working with guerrillas and the lack of a central coordinating body caused problems. First, it led to overlaps and gaps in the employing of guerrillas to gain information or engage targets. Second, it resulted in several fratricide incidents.25 To correct these problems the FEC formed a string of new theater-level staff sections under the FEC G-2. The first of these ad hoc units created was the Far East Command Liaison Group (FEC/LG) and its coordinating element in Korea, the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea (FEC/LD [K]). When that failed to accomplish its goals

On his return from the Kaesong cease fire talks Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN, United Nations delegate to the Armistice negotiations, is surrounded by news correspondents and a photographer.

Lieutenant General Nam Il, North Korean People’s Army senior Communist delegate to the cease fire talks is shown departing Armistice negotiations at Kaesong, Korea.
a new unit, the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK), was formed and command relationships shifted. But these efforts amounted to G-2 ‘band aids’ that had little impact on the EUSA’s guerrilla warfare effort. At the unit level, the guerrilla command continued to operate as it had since its inception: with little guidance from above. These attempts to impose a theater-level staff section simply had no real impact on the guerrilla units, their advisors, or trainers.26

One positive feature of the FEC’s attempts to create a theater-level guerrilla command is that it introduced a new officer in FEC/LG who would have a direct impact on the guerrilla warfare campaign in Korea. LTC Jay D. Vanderpool, a WWII veteran combat leader, like COL McGee, had served with guerrillas in the Philippines (see separate article in this issue). In Korea, Vanderpool leveraged his WWII UW experiences to better mesh the activities of the guerrillas with rapidly changing UN goals, a task that proved to be a great challenge. With the creation of FEC/LG on 26 July, Vanderpool became the ‘middle man’ who coordinated the activities of Koster’s guerrillas with staff officers in the FEC G-2.27 And he later would replace Koster as the commander of the Army’s guerrilla unit.

By early August 1951, the American-led guerrillas had been raiding targets in North Korea for over six months. With Armistice negotiations ongoing, the Communists used that opportunity to focus new attention on the troublesome islands and the hated guerrillas who occupied them.28 Although UN negotiators had put the islands ‘on the table’ in exchange for the town of Kaesong (an ancient capital city near the 38th Parallel), the allies were unwilling to just give the islands away. The guerrilla-held islands provided the UNC and FEC with too great an advantage at little risk to warrant letting them go without a fight. Others on the UN side wanted to hold on to the islands regardless; one negotiator noting that “it is probably not possible to equate the military value of the islands off the coast of North Korea with an acreage calculation,” meaning “the islands were of some real strategic value” that far outweighed the proposed simple exchange of territory.29 The more realistic negotiators also realized “that the Communists would attempt to recapture” the islands if they were unsuccessful in gaining them at the Armistice table.30 In any event, few were surprised when the Communists used the Armistice talks as a distraction to seize the islands by force.

In August 1951, declaring that the UN had “wantonly undertaken . . . provocative acts,” the North Koreans suspended the Armistice talks indefinitely. Over the next four months the Communists used the collapse of negotiations as cover to try to wipe out the guerrillas and regain their islands.32 One of the first attacks occurred on the East Coast against TF KIRKLAND’s forward staging base at Song-do, a small, rocky island only 900 meters from the mainland and about fifty miles north of the UN lines (see map). Just after midnight on 3 August 1951, the small guerrilla contingent snapped awake to the sounds of explosions, small arms firing, and piercing screams. First Lieutenant (ILT) Joseph R. Ulatoski, the American guerrilla leader knew that “the volume of fire coming in was more than just a routine probe.”33 The defenders had been caught napping and quickly evacuated the island in a small motor launch. But before leaving, Corporal (CPL) Cyril A. Tritz activated a fuse igniter tied into a large charge placed in the island’s ammunition dump. CPL Tritz’ ‘parting gift,’ coupled with a pre-arranged and prolonged naval gunfire salvo, killed most of the attackers and demoralized the few that survived. As a result, friendly forces reoccupied the island several days later.34

Similar attacks broke out on the West Coast. The Chinese and North Koreans attacked guerrilla-held islands beginning in the north near the mouth of the Yalu River. From August to November, the enemy assaulted one island after another: Ae-do; Yuk-do; Yongui-do; Sinmi-do; Ka-do; T’an-do; and Sohwa-do. Each fell to the Communists and the guerrillas were pushed back onto their major holding in the northern island sector, Taehwa-do. As the fight for the islands intensified the Communists resorted to daylight bombings and shore-based heavy artillery fires. UN forces responded with sorties of jet fighters, bombers, and naval gunfire ships. The fight for Taehwa-do produced mixed results for both sides: the Americans won the largest air battle of the war, downing twelve Chinese bombers and fighter escorts; but in the end the Chinese still pushed the guerrillas out to sea (see separate article in this issue) and briefly occupied the island. The cost to the guerrilla command was high; two American officers killed, and three British officers and one American sergeant captured.35
Although the guerrillas soon recaptured several of the islands, the setback forced FEC to reevaluate its plans for island defense. To prevent similar losses in the future, FEC tasked the U.S. Navy with overall responsibility for island defense on both coasts. FEC also formally tasked the guerrillas to assist the Navy and island defense became a major guerrilla mission after January 1952. And since the guerrillas assumed a larger role in theater-level plans, the FEC decided to gain greater control over guerrilla activities. FEC therefore engaged in a flurry of efforts to again reorganize the guerrillas at a theater level.36

**Vanderpool Takes Over**

On 10 December 1951, FEC redesignated the EUSA's 8086th guerrilla command as part of 8240th AU FEC/LG, formally placing the guerrillas under the operational control (OPCON) of the FEC/LD (K) staff. This had little effect on the various guerrilla task forces. The only change of any consequence was that LTC Jay D. Vanderpool (formerly the FEC/LD [K] Partisan Operations Officer) assumed direct command of the guerrillas and LTC Koster became his Operations and Training Staff Officer. Vanderpool commanded the day-to-day activities of the partisans and was directly responsible for all guerrilla operations, training, and administration. For the next sixteen months (until he departed Korea in April 1953), LTC Vanderpool was the only commander the guerrillas and their advisors knew. He provided stability, leadership, and insulated the guerrilla command from the never-ending uncertainty, lack of direction, and indecision that characterized both FEC/LG and CCRAK. Men of the guerrilla command knew who was in charge. WWII combat veteran Major Richard M. Ripley, WOLFPACK commander, stated clearly that “the only operational guidance I received came from Vanderpool.”37 Ripley dryly observed that CCRAK, far from being the element that ‘called the shots’ in guerrilla warfare operations, “was just another layer down south” with no influence whatsoever on how he ran his guerrillas.38 The bottom line is that CCRAK, FEC/LG, and similar theater-level staff sections had no real impact over the EUSA's guerrilla command and its operations.

LTC Vanderpool quickly proved to be the right person to head the guerrilla command. He competently filled the command vacuum caused by the ever-changing G-2 staff sections and their near-constant reorganizations. Vanderpool also provided much-needed stability, direction, and focus for the guerrillas, allowing them to operate effectively. Like COL McGee, Vanderpool issued clear guidance and direction that shaped how the guerrillas trained, planned and conducted their operations. He developed and circulated two key planning documents. In April 1952 he issued his “Guerrilla Operations Outline, 1952,” a succinct directive to his task force commanders that provided broad guidance on tactics, operations, air and naval support, prioritization of targets, and other pertinent issues that molded the disparate units into a tighter, more cohesive organization. Intending the information more “as a guide, rather than a restriction” on their operations, it showed that Vanderpool valued the judgment of his subordinates in conducting guerrilla warfare (GW). The document reminded his subordinates to “avoid trying to win the war by yourself,” and cautioned them that when the advantage “passed [to the enemy], get away to fight another day.” He added sound advice learned during his days with the Philippine guerrillas: “Hit and run; those are guerrilla tactics,” and “Substitute speed and surprise for mass.” His suggestions shaped the guerrilla leaders’ own operational planning and reestablished the solid framework of command and control earlier erected by COL McGee.39

Other initiatives revealed the depth of Vanderpool’s influence on GW operations in Korea. He helped to create a ‘Partisan Infantry’ Battalion/Regimental (PIB/PIR) organizational structure and updated the FEC Operations Plan (OPLAN) (“Phase IIA”) for Guerrilla Warfare. The OPLAN specified in clear terms the missions, tasks, and special planning considerations for each of his subordinate guerrilla elements. Vanderpool directed the retaking of some islands lost to the Communists, arranged fire support, and helped formulate plans to

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**“Who’s On These Islands?”**

Seldom were the guerrillas and their advisors alone on an island. The islands often harbored a wide variety of detachments or units from all services or agencies. These included:

- CIA personnel.
- Radar detachments.
- U.S. Air Force ‘crash-boat’ search and rescue detachments.
- Helicopter rescue detachments (all services).
- Communications detachments of various types (from signal intercept to retransmission sites).
- Counter-Intelligence teams and agents.
- ROK Marine Corps units and ROK Navy personnel & boats.
- U.S. Marine Corps units.
- Allied and American Navy shore fire control parties.
- ROK Army personnel and units.
- Anti-aircraft detachments.
- Occasional Military Police detachments.
- Various logistics and movement control personnel.
- Occasional Engineer and/or Seabee detachments.
A guerrilla instructor teaches other members of his unit basic demolition skills.

Korean guerrillas conducting communications training with the AN/GRC-9 ‘Angry 9’ radio set.

effectively defend them from counterattack. On one of the reoccupied islands (Sunwi-do in TF WOLFPACK’s area), the guerrillas successfully repelled a 3,000-man North Korean amphibious assault with air and naval gunfire support, killing a large percentage of the attackers. LTC Vanderpool also ordered guerrilla raids against key radar sites and enemy headquarters. In addition, he paved the way for the first deployment of Special Forces trained personnel, although they arrived late in the conflict. Under his leadership the guerrilla force grew from about 6,000 to over 20,000 strong.40

A major change in the overall role of the guerrillas in theater took place on Vanderpool’s ‘watch.’ The savage fight for the northwest islands in late 1951 reinforced the value of having the guerrillas defend key terrain behind enemy lines as bases for other elements. The guerrilla-held islands were ideally suited for radar units and signal intercept stations. They also served as safe havens for helicopter teams and boat crews, dedicated to rescuing downed airmen. And the forward location provided those assets with extended operating ranges in enemy territory. In addition, a large amount of the FEC intelligence during this static phase of the war came from guerrilla actions and agent insertions launched from those islands.

There were other advantages as well. The guerrillas occupied key terrain that controlled several Yellow Sea choke points, giving the UN forces an operational advantage. The friendly islands limited enemy movements around the mouth of the Yalu River, into the port cities of Chinnam’po and Haeju, and within the important Han River Estuary. The UN’s control of the sea forced all support for the Communist front lines to move overland or by rail, making them vulnerable to air attacks.

To maintain that advantage, FEC made some changes that bolstered island defense. On 6 January 1952, FEC tasked the Commander, Naval Forces Far East (COMNAVF) with responsibility for the defense of all islands north of the 38th Parallel along both coasts. A new unit was formed (the UN Blockading and Escort Force [TF 95]) to provide “support for the ROK Marines and guerrillas holding the outposts.” For the first time in the war, responsibility for the sea, air, and land elements of northern island defense were vested in one commander. Less than one month later, guerrillas repulsed a North Korean battalion-sized assault on the island of Yang-do (Shin-do) at the mouth of the Yalu River and inflicted heavy losses on the Communists.41 Similar attempts on other islands were also turned back. With the support of allied aircraft and naval gunfire, Vanderpool’s guerrillas reoccupied some of the islands they had held earlier. The friendly northern island outposts became a ‘thorn in the side’ of the Communists and a central issue in the ongoing negotiations.42 The main point is that FEC recognized Vanderpool’s guerrillas as a key component of the island defense plan and provided them with the resources to handle that task.

In late 1952, the guerrilla command went through several name changes. In addition to reorganizing the original Donkey and Wolfpack units into Partisan Infantry Battalions (PIBs) and Regiments (PIRs), a special Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment (PAIR) was formed under BAKER Section and trained for Ranger-type missions. And in December 1952, Vanderpool’s guerrilla command was officially redesignated as the United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea (UNPFK). Despite the name, the guerrillas remained under American, not UN, command. And the composition of those ‘battalions’ and ‘regiments’ varied widely.43 From the outside,
“Looking back, we could have developed a much more capable force much earlier, if we had just made up our mind as to what we wanted to achieve with this resource.”

— BG Glenn E. Muggelberg

these changes appeared dramatic, but they were really cosmetic ‘band aids’ of no real substance. The renaming did not reallocate forces to create standardized units or materially change anything that affected how the guerrillas operated. In fact, the guerrillas continued to use their original unit names. The reorganization did not address the main guerrilla problem, namely their waning morale as cease-fire negotiations intensified.

The Armistice and the Guerrillas

By Spring 1953, it seemed fairly certain to most that the UN Command would agree to an Armistice with the Communists. This meant that the MLR would become the new boundary between North and South and the FEC would relinquish the islands north of the 38th Parallel to the North Koreans. When this happened, the guerrillas’ homeland would remain under Communist control. With no homes to return to and lacking citizen status in the South, the Armistice would leave the guerrillas’ future uncertain. Many wondered why they should continue to fight if they had little to gain.

Another blow that hit the guerrillas hard was the departure of their commander, LTC Vanderpool, on 14 April 1953. When Vanderpool left, a dizzying succession of staff officers from CCRAK was put in charge of the guerrillas. None adequately filled Vanderpool’s shoes and the guerrilla command essentially functioned on ‘autopilot,’ without an experienced and concerned leader who might have guided the guerrillas through that critical period. A permanent commander would not be assigned to the guerrilla command until August 1953, when California National Guard LTC Glenn E. Muggelberg stepped in and essentially presided over the unit’s deactivation. Although Muggelberg had gained some knowledge of UW operations from his previous position as the CCRAK G-3, he had never before served as a combat commander.

The impending Armistice agreement also allowed the Communists to shift forces off the front line to better protect rear areas. Between March and June 1953, the Communist forces “engaged in coastal and/or zonal defense in west Korea” increased twenty-five percent (from 146,300 to 203,900 enemy soldiers). The extra 57,600 Communist soldiers made it even more dangerous for the guerrillas to operate in that same region.

The absence of a strong leader in the guerrilla command, the increasing enemy threat, and the elevated personal concern over their post-Armistice status combined to affect morale and led to a marked drop in guerrilla activity in the final few months of the war. In April 1953, the guerrillas reported 232 combat actions. By June that number had dropped to 87 engagements, and that figure rose only slightly in July (112 actions). July had a small spike in activity because of a flurry of confusing orders from CCRAK. The guerrillas were ordered to withdraw from some of the northernmost islands. Then, just as quickly, the orders were rescinded. Thus, the guerrillas had to retake the same islands they had just abandoned. Furthermore, more than ninety-seven percent of all those actions took place in Hwanghae Province, where the majority of the guerrillas originated. Almost every reported action occurred along the coast; only twenty-four were ‘interior-based actions.’ After April 1953, the majority of combat actions were shallow coastal raids to gain supplies and livestock to improve living conditions for the raiders. The guerrillas figured the war was nearing the end and they sought to improve themselves in the only way they could.
In the last months a major change took place in the assignments of advisors. In March 1953, the first contingent of Army Special Forces (SF)-trained officers and noncommissioned officers arrived and were sent out to the guerrilla units. Not until the end of the war were personnel trained in UW operations purposefully dedicated to guerrilla command. Their arrival in Korea came too late to affect the guerrilla operations in any significant way. The SF-qualified personnel were assigned as individual replacements rather than more effectively employed as teams (as they had been trained).

At the end of the war, confusion reigned within the guerrilla command as its elements reacted to often conflicting orders and requests. In the absence of a permanent commander, no one insulated the guerrillas from the barrage of confusing, even contradictory directions put out by various FEC staff officers. A good example of this occurred when CCRAK ordered the guerrillas to withdraw from its northern island base. The next morning, CCRAK told them to retake the same island they had just departed. As CCRAK G-3 LTC Muggelberg described it, we “had to try to fight our way back on some of those islands. We lost some good troops at that point. One young lieutenant, I wish I could remember his name, he was a fine officer in the 1st Partisans [Regiment], was killed in that operation. We never did make it back to many of our former locations.”

The lieutenant in question was Joseph M. Castro, a recently arrived Special Forces-qualified officer who was killed in action on 27 May 1953.

Around 12 June 1953, FEC dissolved the 5th PIR at Yonpyong-do and transferred its guerrillas into other PIRs on the West Coast. Simultaneously, the 6th PIR moved south from Cho-do near the mouth of the Taedong River to Yongyu-do off Inch’on. In many cases the guerrillas’ dependents were relocated as well. By the time the Armistice was signed, all guerrilla units were off of the northernmost islands with only a few groups defending the remaining UN-controlled islands. FEC specifically ordered that “No Caucasians were to be left behind in evacuated areas after a truce,” but authorized the guerrillas to plant caches of weapons and ammunition in the event hostilities resumed and they needed to retake the islands. Although some raids and combat actions continued into North Korea for a few months after the Armistice, they were shallow attacks and few in number. After the Armistice, the requirement for a guerrilla force disappeared.

Demobilization

Probably the most noteworthy achievement of the FEC in the final months of the war occurred after the Armistice was signed - the successful demobilization of the guerrillas. The transition phase is regarded one of the most critical elements of UW operations. Current doctrine notes that “Perhaps the greatest danger in transition is the possibility that former resistance members may resort to factional disputes, banditry, or subversion of the new government.” Fortunately for the guerrilla command advisors, FM 31-21 (October 1951), Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, provided detailed guidance to transition guerrillas to civilians or to integrate them into the regular forces.

However, before demobilization could begin, it was necessary to first establish the citizenship status of the North Korean guerrillas. On 16 August 1953, the CCRAK commander, BG Archibald W. Stuart, and the South Korean Minister of National Defense, Sohn Won-il, reached an agreement. A U.S. funded 8250th AU was created within the ROKA and all guerrillas transferred into it. This Stuart-Sohn agreement made the ROKA responsible for the administration and discipline of the former guerrillas who became ROKA soldiers.
In late September 1953, one final paper reorganization took place in guerrilla command. UNPFK's name was changed to the United Nations Partisan Infantry, Korea (UNPIK). Like many of the previous name changes, this one also had no substance – no organizational changes were connected with it. The name change from ‘Force’ to ‘Infantry’ was wholly cosmetic and done to make the American advisors eligible for Combat Infantryman Badges (CIBs) based on service in an ‘infantry’ unit. Although many American advisors had been awarded CIBs for combat actions with the guerrillas previously, some CCRAK staff officers felt that the name change would clarify their status under the Armistice.57

The actual guerrilla deactivation (Operation QUICKSILVER) went fairly smoothly, although several American advisors approached that major milestone with a degree of trepidation. Beginning on 23 February 1954, the American advisors held final formations at each of the PIRs, issued awards, collected weapons and ammunition, and then transported them to ROKA collection sites. The former guerrillas were allowed to keep their small arms but the advisors supervised the collection of crew-served weapons, mortars, grenades, demolition materials, and rocket launchers. The hardest part was retrieving those materials from hundreds of cache sites on the islands. Those on the mainland were untouched.58

By 7 March 1954, the demobilization had been completed and about 10,000 former guerrillas in the Partisan Infantry Regiments were successfully transferred to ROKA authority. About 2,000 guerrillas slipped away to return home. Some were simply ‘ghosts’ on the unit rolls to warrant rations. Others remained in North Korea, stating “We are going to stay here and prosecute the war.”59 But most stayed with their unit. Once they were transferred to ROKA control the former guerrillas were treated in three ways: some were discharged from service; some were retained in their former leadership capacity; and the remainder transferred throughout the ROKA. All received appropriate ROK citizenship documentation. During the transition, some American advisors acted as leaders to the former guerrillas until the demobilization was accomplished.60

**Conclusion**

How effective was the Army’s guerrilla command? At the tactical level it was fairly successful since the hit-and-run tactics of the guerrillas were often quite lethal. The West Coast units, in particular, used their intimate knowledge of the terrain, customs, and people to great advantage. The guerrillas were cunning fighters who were often fearless. They fought savagely, understanding all too well that the enemy would show them no mercy. In the first year of their existence, before the idea of a negotiated settlement dissipated some resolve, they experienced good success against poorly trained Communist militias.

However, FEC let the guerrillas down: it failed to identify a critical role for them at the theater level. For a time in 1951-1952 the guerrillas could have been employed to greater advantage.
Guerrilla Command Problems and Successes:

PROBLEMS:

- FEC provided little guidance or direction (no theater-level plan).
- Deep parachute operations failed.
- Guerrillas produced only small-scale tactical-level results.
- Special Forces-qualified personnel arrived too late to make a significant impact, and were not properly employed (used as individual replacements vice teams).
- Advisors had no prior language/cultural training.
- FEC applied existing doctrine selectively, degrading capability.

SUCCESSES:

- Guerrillas seized and defended key islands for critical Escape and Evasion, intelligence, early warning, and combat assets.
- Provided significant amounts of tactical and operational intelligence.
- Guarded the weak left flank of the UN MLR.
- Tied down large numbers of enemy troops in rear areas.
- Successfully demobilized the guerrillas and transitioned them into the ROK.
- Benefited from the WWII experiences of two guerrilla commanders (COL McGee and LTC Vanderpool).
- Validated parts of the Army’s existing GW doctrine.
- Advisors forged good relations with their guerrillas.
- Guerrillas performed high-risk missions with minimal Allied risk.

Fortunately for the guerrillas, they were generally well led. The groundwork established by COL McGee in early 1951, and the excellent guidance and leadership of LTC Vanderpool provided the foundation that supported day-to-day operations and administration. Both leaders leveraged their WWII experiences to produce a successful guerrilla organization that became a valued element of the Far East Command. The many individual guerrilla advisors, although not given cultural and linguistic training, rose to the challenge and forged effective relationships with their guerrillas. Living and working side-by-side with the guerrillas, the advisors planned, supported, and executed difficult combat missions with minimal support.

The legacy of the success achieved by the guerrillas and their advisors extends to the present. It lives in the three clusters of islands under ROK control along the 38th Parallel: the Han River Estuary; the Yonpyong Islands; and the Paengnyong group. Another lasting contribution is the continuous and close U.S.-ROK Special Forces relationship. Finally, both the U.S. and ROK realize the value and utility of the UW mission in future conflict. In the event of war on the Korean Peninsula, the two Special Forces form a Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force (CUWTF) to conduct missions similar to those done by the EUSA guerrilla command. It is manifest in the long-standing slogan that captures the spirit of ROK and U.S. forces working side-by-side, katchi kapshida (“we go together”).62
In the interests of clarity, this article continues the practice begun in the preceding issue of Veritas of using the term Guerrilla Command to describe the EUSA organization formed on 15 January 1951 to train, direct, and support North Korean guerrilla units. It is important because after the debacle FEC prohibited Allied advisors from similar airborne missions. From that point on, only Korean guerrillas conduct deep airborne operations and every mission failed. This article explores the unintended consequences of the FEC decision.

The second short article describes how the savage fighting in the northwest islands in late 1951 changed the role of guerrillas. FEC realized the utility of the controlling the islands above the 38th Parallel. They served as the ‘eyes and ears’ for the FEC. The islands also provided safe bases from which rescue efforts and intelligence collection operations could be launched. As a result of that fight, FEC made adjustments to the guerrillas’ roles and missions.

The third piece presents background on MAJ Jay D. Vanderpool. In particular it focuses on Vanderpool’s experiences with the Philippine guerrillas in WWII. The article describes his training and functioning as an advisor of guerrillas in southern Luzon. It imparts the familiarity he gained in UW by working closely with Filipino guerrillas. These experiences prepared Vanderpool for commanding Korean guerrillas.

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Endnotes
2 For background on the initial forming of the unit and McGee’s tenure, see: Michael E. Krivdo, “Creating an Army Guerrilla Command, Part One: The First Six Months,” Veritas 8, no. 2 (2012), 12-26. Other articles in that issue provide insight into the origins of the North Korean resistance movement and their motivations to become guerrillas.
3 In the interests of clarity, this article continues the practice begun in the preceding issue of Veritas of using the term Guerrilla Command to describe the EUSA organization formed on 15 January 1951 to train, direct, and support North Korean guerrilla units. The term is employed to more accurately describe that unit since it changed official names repeatedly throughout the war. In this way, one consistent term can be used throughout the article to refer to the unit in the generic sense.
4 Krivdo, “The First Six Months,” 12-26. The term ‘Donkey’ was widely used in West Coast guerrilla units to signify their unit. Guerrilla Unit 3 became Donkey 3. Later, after TF WOLF PACK became operational, ‘Donkeys’ in that unit took on the descriptor ‘Wolfpack,’ and its number, as in ‘Wolfpack 3.’ The origins of the Donkey term are described in: Krivdo, “The First Six Months,” 20.
5 Frederick W. Cleaver, George Fitzpatrick, John Pontinto, et al., “UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954,” AFFE Group Technical Memorandum ORO-76-64, Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, 6 June 1956 (hereafter ORO Study), passim; Krivdo, “The First Six Months,” 12-26. Accounts indicate that the guerrilla tactics changed after the first six months of operation. Where they started off with attacks at battalion or company strength with a mixture of rifles and pistols, through time the attacks using automatic weapons and explosives made for a deadly combination. The small teams were both more mobile and harder to detect. Guerrilla units would saturate an area with teams of 3-15 men armed with semi-automatic rifles, rocket launchers, mines, and demolition charges to attack vulnerable enemy targets and then fade into the jungle. Some of the guerrillas became very skilled in the art of hit and run tactics, and they used those skills to great advantage.
7 Krivdo, “The First Six Months,” 12-26; “Record of Assignments,” John H. McGee Service Record (hereafter “McGee Service Record”), National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO.
11 Darragh Letter, 18-19; ORO Study, 41-42.
13 Richard M. Ripley, interview with Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, and Mr. Eugene Piasceki, 28 July 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; “Short Chronology of the Unconventional Warfare Campaign.”
14 LTC Koster became the 8086th AU Executive Officer on 5 May 1951 and the Commanding Officer on 1 July 1951. “Record of Assignments,” John H. McGee Service Record (hereafter “McGee Service Record”), National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), St. Louis, MO; “Record of Assignments,” Samuel W. Koster (hereafter “Koster Service Record”), NPRC; ORO Study, 40. LTC Koster served in WWII with the 2nd Battalion, 413th Infantry Regiment, commanding that battalion during the Battle of the Bulge. He also saw combat during the Battle of Hurtgen Forest and at the crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen. After WWII, he served as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) for the 20th Armored Division (AD) and the 2nd AD before spending three years as the FEC G-2 Assistant Executive Officer for the G-2 Section. Koster left the FEC G-2 in August 1949 to become a Tactics Instructor at West Point. He returned to FEC in Tokyo on 17 October 1950 and worked as an Operations and Training Staff Officer before moving to the 8086th AU. However, Koster is best known for his role in the My Lai massacre of 16 March 1968. Then Major General Koster commanded the American Division and was flying in a helicopter over My Lai while the massacre was underway. He was the highest ranking officer to be charged in the case. Although the charges were dismissed, he was demoted to brigadier general, censured, and retired. BG Koster died in 2006 (David Stout, “Gen. S. W. Koster, 86, Who Was Demoted After My Lai, Dies,” New York Times, 11 February 2006, available on the Internet at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/11/national/11koster.html?_r=0, last accessed on 12 December 2012), and (Patricia Sullivan, “Samuel Koster, 86; General Charged In My Lai Killings,” Washington Post, 10 February 2006).
15 There are few primary source materials on Operation SPITFIRE; most of the information comes from secondary sources and third parties. And some of that material is contradictory or contains factually incorrect material. Probably the most complete single account appears in Ed [ward C.] Evanhoe, Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 103-16, yet it contains some inaccuracies. One specificity weakness of that account is that it relies heavily on a single source, the “Sgt. C.H. Lane Diary,” not available for scrutiny by historians. As such, its contents cannot be independently verified. Unfortunately, the accounts of SPITFIRE that appear in other secondary sources generally draw heavily from Evanhoe’s version (of the Lane Diary) with undocumented variations, further clouding what actually happened. The information in this account is derived from the essential elements of the story found in primary documentation sources such as: Letter, CPT David C. Hearn to COL John H. McGee, 6 September 1951 (hereafter Hearn Letter),
assigned to defend the West Coast of the United States. When the Korean War began, he was an instructor on the staff of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, and assigned to Korea in May 1953.

Guerrilla unit mustering out formation.

Guerrilla combat actions decreased in April 1953 from a rough average of 221 per month to only 161 per month between April and July 1953, when the Armistice was signed (ORO Study, 13).

For further information on the experiences of the ninety-nine SF-trained personnel who were employed in Korea beginning in March 1953, see the article by Kenneth Finlayson, “A Combat First: Army SF Soldiers in Korea, 1953-1955,” in this issue of Veritas.

Both received posthumous promotions.