# OSS

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Primer & Manuals

Army Special Operations Soldiers,

It is important to understand how the past has influenced Army Special Operations Forces. One of America's legendary paramilitary organizations during WWII was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) whose field ranks were largely filled by detailed military personnel. As a wartime organization, it became a USASOC legacy unit because a number of their Army personnel played important roles during the formative years of Special Warfare after the war.

The OSS was a complex intelligence organization with paramilitary capabilities that was given highest priority to recruit within the military services. Major General William J. Donovan, a WWI veteran and Medal of Honor recipient, reported to President Franklin D. Roosevelt as the chief of an independent agency under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The OSS functions most relevant to today's ARSOF are: Operational Groups (OGs); Maritime Unit (MU); Special Operations (SO); Morale Operations (MO); and Secret Intelligence (SI) Branches.

This commemorative book begins with a primer on OSS wartime activities and functions and republished copies of the declassified manuals for each of the above elements. Although disbanded shortly after WWII, Army veterans assigned to the Psywar Center used their OSS manuals to create Special Forces units and to teach special operations tactics, techniques, and procedures. Individual training, group classes, and field exercises were conducted on Smoke Bomb Hill, Fort Bragg and Camp Mackall, NC; and in Pisgah National Forest, SC. Knowledge about the connection of OSS to Army SOF is important to your professional development.

# OSS
## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
### A PRIMER

# OSS

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

A Primer on the Special Operations Branches and
Detachments of the Office of Strategic Services

By Dr. Troy J. Sacquety

# The OFFICE of STRATEGIC SERVICES

CONSIDERED a legacy unit of U.S. Army Special Operations Forces, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) has assumed almost mythical stature since World War II. Several OSS veterans, among them Colonel Aaron Bank, Lieutenant Colonel Jack T. Shannon, and Majors Herbert R. Brucker and Caesar J. Civitella brought unconventional warfare (UW) tactics and techniques to Special Forces in the early 1950s. It should be remembered, however, that the short-lived OSS (1942 to 1945) had two basic missions: its primary one was to collect, analyze, and disseminate foreign intelligence; its secondary one was to conduct unconventional warfare. The first, executed primarily by the Research and Analysis branch (R&A), was considered the most important during the war.

It is the second mission of UW, however, that has received the most attention since WWII. It was this element of the OSS that provided the most exciting stories and which was cloaked by an aura of secrecy and mystery. These UW missions have become the subject of numerous books and several films. This book is designed to serve as a primer on the UW elements of the OSS. It is not an exhaustive look at the OSS, nor does it address every OSS function or branch. Its intent is to provide the reader with a basic understanding of what missions the separate OSS branches had, what the main operational efforts were, and where they took place geographically.

Although never made official, the "spearhead" is regarded as the symbol of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services.)

# From COI to OSS: The Beginning, 1941-1942

On 11 July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Coordinator of Information (COI). Its mission was to collect, analyze, and disseminate foreign intelligence. William J. 'Wild Bill' Donovan, a WWI Medal of Honor recipient and a prominent lawyer, was selected by the president to head the COI.

The Research and Analysis (R&A) branch was the most visible element of the COI. It used notable historians, economists, geographers,anthropologists, and subject matter experts to research and prepare reports for senior policy makers. Covert intelligence collection was also done to support potential paramilitary actions.  Another COI task was to conduct overt and covert psychological warfare. As a civilian agency with access to unencumbered funding, the COI could operate more freely than the military services After America entered the war in December 1941, COI established groups to collect intelligence and conduct sabotage in North Africa and Burma. These expanded capabilities provided better, more up to date information for strategic planners and helped to formulate propaganda campaigns. This done, special operations teams would be inserted behind enemy lines to advise and assist in the formation, equipping, training, and employment of guerrilla groups. Commando raids would then help conventional forces gain a foothold in enemy territory.  This was a new way for the U.S. to conduct warfare.

In June 1942, COI was disbanded.  Responsibility for overt propaganda was assigned to the newly created Office of War Information (OWI), which also took control of the COI-created radio broadcast 'Voice of America.' Covert activities were assigned to the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an agency placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Although the earliest contributions of OSS were intelligence gathering and analysis for senior policy makers, the paramilitary operations have garnered the most interest in our time.  The following sections offer a brief look into the special operations of the OSS, which influenced the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Army Special Operations Forces today.



MG William J. 'Wild Bill' Donovan was the head of the COI and the OSS.



One of the most significant contributions of the COI and OSS was the work of the Research and Analysis branch. This element compiled intelligence and information to provide the Executive Branch and other intelligence consumers with current products, such as this one on the Japanese government.

# SECRET INTELLIGENCE

The Secret Intelligence (SI) branch of OSS, an original part of the Coordinator of Information (COI), was to obtain "by secret means information which cannot otherwise be secured and which is not elsewhere available."[1] In practice, this meant intelligence collection performed by agents, known as human intelligence (HUMINT) today. Although not as well known as the direct-action SO elements in OSS, SI agents faced incredible danger. Small SI teams gathered information by espionage. They established 'nets' of local informants or spies to collect specific information, such as enemy military unit locations.

SI personnel operated alone or in two to four person teams in enemy-controlled and neutral countries. They were particularly active in France, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and French Indo-China (now Vietnam). Twenty-nine SI teams under the SUSSEX program were sent into occupied-France. Only three of the SUSSEX teams—COLERE, FILAN, and SALAUD—were captured and executed by the Germans. Forty-one agents under the PROUST program went into occupied France; they only lost one person. One of the most remarkable SI successes was achieved by Allen W. Dulles, who later directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). On 2 May 1945, he arranged the separate surrender of German forces in Italy. Although this occurred just six days before the surrender of Germany, Dulles' effort saved many Allied lives.


OSS SI station chief Allen W. Dulles operated in neutral Switzerland. He was Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953-61.


Suspected Chinese collaborators await interrogation by Team BUICK, China 1945.


SI agents board P-563, a Maritime Unit boat, off the Burma Coast in 1945. The SI agents of OSS Detachment 404 had successfully infiltrated the Japanese-held coast.


In this painting by Jeff Bass, SI agent Virginia Hall transmits in France, 1944. She was later decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross for her extraordinary heroic efforts.

# SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Set up as the American equivalent to the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), the Special Operations (SO) branch was to "effect physical subversion of the enemy," in three distinct phases: infiltration and preparation, sabotage and subversion, and direct support to guerrilla, resistance, or commando units.[2] After the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, OSS Chief William J. Donovan wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, stressing the need for a special operations element able to function "as an essential part of the strategic plan," that could sow "the dragon's teeth in those territories from which we withdraw … that the aid of native chiefs be obtained, the loyalty of the inhabitants cultivated … and guerrilla bands of bold, and daring men organized and installed."[3] This was to be done with "men calculatingly reckless with disciplined daring, who are trained for aggressive action … it will mean a return to our old tradition of the scouts, the raiders, and the rangers."[4]

Based on Donovan's vision, the OSS developed the SO branch, clearly modeled on the British Commandos, to increase "the enemy's misery and weaken his will to resist."[5] SO operatives became the first OSS personnel to conduct combat operations beginning in North Africa and Burma in 1942. SO personnel and elements later served in China, France, Greece, Italy, Scandinavia, Thailand, Yugoslavia, and other locations. In German-occupied France, SO worked with the British SOE. Prior to the Normandy Invasion, the country had been blanketed with SO and SOE operatives. Once dropped into an occupied area, SO personnel linked up with resistance groups, identified their operational needs, arranged drop zones, and then radioed for supply drops. The OSS/SOE supply effort for Europe was massive. The SO resupply center at Area H in England packed more than 3,335 tons of supplies, including 75,000 small arms and 35,000 grenades, into aerial delivery containers for resistance groups in Belgium, Denmark, France, Poland, and Norway.[6] Many of these night airdrops were made by the 801/492nd Bomb Group or 'Carpetbaggers,' a U.S. Army Air Forces unit whose mission was to support covert operations in Europe. In France alone, some 300,000 resistance fighters were armed by airdrop before D-Day. [7]

The SO branch was the genesis for many other branches of OSS: Research and Development (R&D), the Maritime Unit (MU) and the Operational Groups (OG).[8] Perhaps the best known SO endeavors were in Allied Project JEDBURGH, and Detachment 101, which began as an SO mission in Burma. The Special Operations branch of OSS pioneered many of the Unconventional Warfare (UW), Counter-Insurgency (COIN), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) tactics and techniques used by today's U.S. Army Special Operations Forces.

CPT Walter R. Mansfield of Team MUSKRAT instructs Chinese troops on the use of the Thompson sub-machinegun, China 1945.



1LT Herbert Brucker is decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on Team HERMIT in France, 1944.



CPT Robert L. Ford and his interpreter, 'Peter,' in German-occupied Greece, 1943 - 1944.



Personnel at Area H, the SO packing station, prepare aerial delivery containers for loading. Area H was in Holme, England, and among other teams, supplied SO, Jedburgh, and Operational Groups in German-occupied Europe.

# JEDBURGHS: D-Day 1944 and Beyond

The mission of the Jedburgh teams was to supplement existing SO/SOE 'circuits,' to help organize and arm the resistance, arrange supply drops, procure intelligence, provide liaison between the Allies and the Resistance, and to take part in sabotage operations. Project Jedburgh was a joint Allied program, with the OSS Special Operations (SO) branch, the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the French *Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (BCRA)* involved. Eighty three American, 90 British, 103 French, 5 Belgian, and 5 Dutch personnel were extensively trained in paramilitary techniques for Jedburgh missions. Ninety-three Jedburgh teams parachuted into France and eight went into The Netherlands.[9] A model team consisted of one French, one British, and one American serviceman. Every team had at least one officer and a radioman, but team sizes varied from two to four men.

So as not to alert the Germans to the exact invasion date, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Europe, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, did not permit Jedburgh teams to parachute into occupied-France until the night of 5/6 June 1944. For the next three months thereafter, Jedburgh teams supported attacks on enemy lines of communication and

reduced the destruction of key infrastructure by the retreating Germans. Their actions, like those of the OSS Operational Groups (OG), forced the Germans to divert significant military assets away from major battlefronts. As Allied forces overran the Jedburgh areas of operations, their missions were terminated.

Like many OSS veterans, several former Jedburghs had successful post-war careers. William E. Colby, who also commanded the Norwegian OG, served as the CIA Director from 1973-1975. Major General John K. Singlaub led the Studies and Observation Group (SOG) in Vietnam from 1966-1968. The Jedburgh with the closest connection to Army Special Forces was Colonel Aaron Bank, first Director of Special Forces (SF) and Commander of the first operational SF group, the 10th SFG. Many of the tactics and techniques used by Jedburgh teams were adopted for training early Special Forces in the 1950s.



The unofficial Special Force wing was worn by the Jedburghs. This insignia was also worn by some Operational Group (OG) Teams in France.



Jedburgh teams suit up in England prior to boarding a 'Carpetbagger' B-24 Liberator drop aircraft, August 1944.



Members of Team RONALD prepare to jump into occupied France on 4 August 1944. LT Shirley R. Trumps (in foreground) and T/SGT Elmer B. Esch (behind Trumps) were Americans, while Lieutenant Georges Deseilligny, facing the camera, was French.

# OPERATIONAL GROUPS

The multi-faceted mission of the Operational Groups was to organize, train, and equip local resistance organizations, and to conduct 'hit and run' missions against enemy-controlled roads, railways, and strong points, or to prevent their destruction by retreating enemy forces. Major General William J. Donovan believed that qualified soldiers with language skills and cultural backgrounds could be found among ethnic groups in the United States. These soldiers could then be inserted as a team into enemy-occupied territory and successfully operate as small guerilla bands. Unlike OSS Special Operations (SO) teams, the Operational Groups (OGs) always operated in military uniform. They were trained in infantry tactics, guerilla warfare, foreign weapons, demolition, parachuting, and had attached medical personnel. A country-specific OG had four officers and thirty enlisted men. But in practice, sections sent into the field were often half that size.

OGs were active in Burma, China, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, and Yugoslavia. In the Mediterranean Theater, the OGs were controlled by the 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional) and were divided into regional sections. The OGs were first employed in Italy in September 1943. Eventually thirty teams were sent into occupied Italy. In Greece, eight OG teams operated from April to November 1944. OG teams also conducted operations against the Dalmatian coastal islands from January to October 1944. OGs, like the Jedburghs, were not dropped into occupied-France until after D-Day, 6 June 1944. Twenty-one OG teams supported subsequent Allied landings at Normandy and the invasion of Southern France. Two OG teams served in Norway from

March to June 1945. In the Far East, OG personnel were parceled out to Detachment 101 teams, or worked with the OSS Maritime Unit conducting operations along the Arakan coast of Burma. Many OG personnel were sent to China in 1945 to organize and train the first of twenty Chinese airborne units, called 'Commandos.' Although the war ended before all the units could be trained, several Commandos with their OG 'advisors' conducted operations against the Japanese before the final surrender.

The OGs accounted for thousands of enemy killed and captured, destroyed numerous bridges, locomotives and rail lines, and caused the diversion of large numbers of enemy troops. The lasting legacy of the OGs is found in Operational Detachments Alpha (ODA) of today's Special Forces. The original A teams were modeled after the OGs.



Chinese paratrooper trainees and their OG instructors prior to their first mass tactical jump, China 1945.



Members of Greek OG Group IV coordinate with Bulgarian soldiers in Macedonia in October, 1944.



OG Team LAFAYETTE in August 1944. Many of these men later served on the SEWANEE mission in North Italy, March-May 1945. Caesar J. Civitella, an original member of U.S. Army Special Forces, is in the middle row far right.



Unofficial patch worn by the Greek Operational Group. In the Mediterranean Theater, the OGs of the 2671st were divided into 'companies.' Company A was the Italian OG, Company B was the French OG, while Company C was composed of two separate elements; the Yugoslav OG and the Greek OG.



2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Prov) Tab.

# OG OPERATIONS IN EUROPE



**A** NORWEGIAN OG

**B** CHRISTOPHER

**C** PATRICK

**D** SPOKANE

**E** SOLTA ISLAND RAID

**F** GREEK GROUP IV

# MORALE OPERATIONS

The OSS Morale Operations (MO) branch produced and disseminated 'black' propaganda to destabilize enemy governments and encourage resistance movements at the strategic and tactical levels. OSS Director William J. Donovan believed that "persuasion, penetration, and intimidation" were modern day counterparts to "sapping and mining in the siege warfare of former days."[10]

MO designed and printed leaflets, spread false rumors, and produced radio broadcasts aimed at Axis and enemy-occupied countries. Radio broadcasts against the Germans supposedly came from a clandestine station in France, but actually originated in England. The broadcasts were designed to be entertaining in order to get enemy soldiers to listen. The propaganda was interspersed throughout the programs. The 'entertainment' portion included popular songs in German, such as *"Lili Marlene,"* recorded for MO by Marlene Dietrich. [11]

Operation SAUERKRAUT was highly successful. Released prisoners of war agreed to slip behind their lines in German uniform to disseminate MO leaflets and false rumors in north Italy. One leaflet announced that Field Marshal Albert Kesselring [the German Commanding General], was resigning his post because he believed the war lost. Kesselring had to formally deny the announcement. Operation CORNFLAKES filled German mailbags with personal letters containing MO propaganda. These decoy mailbags were dropped by Allied aircraft during attacks on enemy rail yards. The hope was that the Germans would think the scattered mailbags were real and put them through their postal system. MO was so effective in Italy that an estimated 10,000 enemy troops surrendered or deserted.[12] For these and other efforts, MO is a part of today's Psychological Operations legacy.


MO members clown for the camera in their printshop, China 1945.


Morale Operations produced pamphlets with anti-Japanese and German messages.

# MARITIME UNIT

The Maritime Unit's mission was to infiltrate agents and supply resistance groups by sea, conduct maritime sabotage, and to develop specialized maritime surface and subsurface equipment and devices. The Maritime Unit (MU) grew out of the Special Operations (SO) aquatic training requirement when it became apparent that the OSS needed a specialized amphibious capability. Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Navy, and Army personnel helped MU pioneer a special operations maritime capability.

The Maritime Unit operated in several theaters. In the Mediterranean, a fleet of hired Greek wooden fishing vessels—called *caiques*—covertly supported OSS agents in Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia. After Italy surrendered, the MU and the San Marco battalion, an elite Italian special operations naval unit, operated against the Germans. In the Far East, the MU operated in conjunction with an Operational Group to attack Japanese forces on the Arakan coast of Burma. They jointly conducted reconnaissance missions on the Japanese-held coast, sometimes penetrating several miles up enemy-controlled rivers.

The MU was a special operations pioneer. In addition to being an early maritime warfare force, it developed or used several innovative devices, including an inflatable surfboard, a two-man kayak, and limpet mines that attached to the hull of a ship. Dr. Christian J. Lambertsen, then a U.S. Army captain, developed the Lambertsen Rebreathing Unit (LARU), an early underwater breathing device. The Lambertsen unit permitted a swimmer to remain underwater for several hours and to approach targets undetected because the LARU did not emit telltale air bubbles. The LARU was later refined, adapted, and the technology used by the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and NASA. The Army Special Forces Underwater Operations School at Key West, Florida, the home of Special Forces maritime operations, draws its roots from the Maritime Unit. Dr. Christian Lambersten is remembered today as the 'Father of Military Underwater Operations.'



The LARU underwater rebreather



Dr. Christian J. Lambertsen invented the LARU and other devices for MU. Dr. Lambertsen had a distinguished post-war career in environmental medicine, a field he pioneered after WWII.



An MU swimmer negotiates anti-submarine concertina wire nets during underwater training.

The P-564, an Air-sea rescue boat, under the command of 1LT Walter L. Mess.

# RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

The mission of the Research and Development (R&D) branch was to develop devices to help undercover OSS agents, enhance intelligence gathering, or to facilitate sabotage operations. Like 'Q' in the James Bond movies, the OSS R&D branch developed or contracted for the fabrication of special weapons and devices. The branch cooperated extensively with the British, and in many cases refined their clandestine issue items. These specialized items were primarily used by members of the Secret Intelligence and Special Operations branches.

The most critical items developed by R&D were special explosive and incendiary devices to destroy enemy equipment, vehicles, and infrastructure. These products ranged from limpet mines to sink ships to exploding candles and an explosive flour. 'Aunt Jemima' flour could actually be baked and eaten in an emergency. R&D also developed chemical and pressure activated firing devices and clock timers that enabled an agent to set an explosive charge, and leave knowing that it would later activate.

R&D branch products ranged the gamut. They included the infamous cyanide-filled 'L' capsule, which an agent could bite if captured to avoid revealing information under torture. Other 'spy' items included a miniature camera that looked like a matchbox and a lock picking kit folded up like a small pocketknife. As one would expect, several weapons had silencers—the High Standard .22 pistol and M3 submachine 'Grease' gun. Some of these were later used by Special Forces in Vietnam.

Research and Development experimented with underwater technologies before that mission was assigned to the Maritime Unit in 1943.



The OSS 'Dog Drag' was designed to confuse tracking dogs. When crushed, the glass vial emitted a noxious odor.



The silenced M3 submachine 'Grease' gun was used primarily in the Far East during WWII and later by U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam.



Designed to resemble a common box of matches, the OSS Matchbox Camera was supplied to operatives working behind the lines.

# COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

The mission of the Communications Branch was to recruit and train military and civilian radio operators at OSS training camps and to develop radios and communications devices tailored to specific assignments. The branch had its genesis in the COI period, but did not become a separate OSS entity until 22 September 1942.[13] Mastering the technical aspects of OSS-unique clandestine communications equipment, developing training programs focused on operating, maintaining, and repairing this equipment in the field, and supporting specific needs of the operational branches required an element specifically dedicated to OSS communications requirements.

The Communications Branch trained personnel in a ten-week program that included radio maintenance, Morse code, cryptography, and communications procedures and security. OSS communicators were trained at OSS Areas C [Prince William Forest Park, VA], M [Camp McDowell-Napierville, IL], and on Catalina Island, CA. Trainees at these camps were Communications Branch recruits and designated as radio operators for the SI, SO, and OG branches. The Communications Branch was also responsible for providing communications and radio familiarization training at other OSS training camps operated by the OSS Schools and Training Branch. Subsections of the Communications Branch researched and developed mission-specific communications devices, such as the SSTR-1 Transmitter-Receiver. The SSTR-1 was popularly known as the 'suitcase' radio because of its most common method of concealment. Another item was the SSTC-502/SSTR-6, popularly known as the 'Joan-Eleanor.' The SSTC-502 ('Joan') was a 3 1/2 pound hand-held radio that ran on compact long-life batteries, eliminating the need for a heavy charger. The SSTR-6 ('Eleanor' was emplaced in an aircraft. This revolutionary system, developed late in 1944, allowed the ground operator to talk with OSS personnel in an aircraft thousands of feet up and miles away from their location, greatly reducing the chances of detection.

The communicators were the 'unsung' members of the clandestine service, providing critical command and control nodes. They worked in every theater that the OSS operated in and operated the radios for groups and teams. Communications to elements behind enemy lines was critical. Radios were used to arrange resupply, coordinate field operations, and transmit time-sensitive intelligence. Radio personnel staffed twenty-six OSS message centers in fifteen countries. These centers served as the OSS information clearing houses, receiving messages from the field teams, relaying them to commanders and OSS headquarters, and issued orders and instructions to groups in the field. U.S. Army Special Forces realized the critical need for communications specialists with advanced training at all levels—ODA, ODB, ODC, and the Group. The SF communications sergeant, MOS 18 Echo designation, fills that need.



A Communications Branch instructor demonstrates a radio to an OSS recruit at Area C.



1SG Berent Friele sending a message at SO Team JACKAL, China, 1945. Friele had previously been the radio operator of Jedburgh Team GERALD in France 1944.



Communications personnel coordinated supply drops to the field, such as this one in north Burma in 1944.



The Communications staff of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma, 1945.

# OSS DETACHMENT 101: 1942-1945

Detachment 101's mission in Burma was to collect intelligence on enemy order of battle, find targets for the 10th Air Force, rescue downed Allied aircrews, and to recruit native troops—mostly ethnic Kachins—to serve as guerillas. Activated on 22 April 1942 under the command of Colonel Carl F. Eifler, Detachment 101 was the first Special Operations (SO) unit formed by the Coordinator of Information (COI), the predecessor to the OSS.[14] Detachment 101's operations supported a combined operations campaign that earned the unit the reputation as "the most effective tactical combat force in OSS."[15] For its distinguished contributions to the war in the Far East, Detachment 101 was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

Burma was in the resource-starved China-Burma-India area of operations, a backwater compared to other theaters. OSS observers recognized, however, that "the Burma Campaign is probably not going to be the big show, but it is the 'going' show."[16] In 1943, Detachment 101 launched a series of long-range penetration operations by airdrop—the first done by OSS. However, it was their highly successful overland penetrations behind Japanese lines that enabled them to expand their operations. In 1944, led by Colonel William R. Peers, Detachment 101 established themselves firmly in the CBI by conducting "all operations which they [conventional forces] are not prepared to undertake."[17] Detachment 101 was a force multiplier in the first major Allied success in northern Burma, the capture of Myitkyina. They cut enemy lines of communication, ambushed Japanese troops, and provided scouts and guides for Merrill's Marauders and the British Chindits. Detachment 101 then assisted Allied units, like the MARS Task Force, as they advanced south. A sub-element, the Arakan Field Unit (AFU) supported the British 14th Army in its campaign to recapture the Burmese coast enroute to Rangoon. After the fall of the Burmese capital, Detachment 101 elements from north Burma were tasked to perform a more conventional role. As the only U.S. ground forces, they used their guerillas to clear the Shan States and to block the flight of Japanese forces to Thailand.

At the end of its operations in July 1945, Detachment 101 was credited with 5,500 known Japanese killed. Fewer than 30 Americans and 184 native soldiers were killed, and only 86 native personnel were captured or missing in action. At its busiest time, Detachment 101 had nearly 9,200 guerillas under arms.[18] Detachment 101 is the OSS element that most closely mirrors the mission and capability of today's Army Special Forces Group.



COL Carl F. Eifler commanded Detachment 101 until December 1943.



COL William R. Peers succeeded Eifler. He retired in 1973 as a LTG.

A Stinson L-1 of Detachment's 101's 'Red Ass' Squadron, which supported combined operations in Burma.





CPT Zachariah Ebaugh (left) jokes with indigenous troops. Detachment 101, and the OSS, had to foster good relations with the locals in order to survive.



Unofficial silver Burma Campaign Bar worn by some Detachment 101 personnel.



China-Burma-India Theater SSI



Unofficial Detachment 101 patch worn by U.S. personnel. The term 'Jinghpaw' is another name for Kachin.

# The OSS in Asia

OSS operations in Asia covered a huge geographic area with dramatically different climates and with numerous indigenous groups. Unlike the OSS in Europe, the OSS in Asia was unique in that it was separated into Detachments.

TIBET

NEPAL

BHUTAN

NEW DEHLI

INDIA

CHINA

CHUNGKING

NAZIRA

KUNMING

CALCUTTA

BURMA

RANGOON

THAILAND

BANGKOK

FRENCH INDOCHINA

SAIGON

KANDY

*Disposition as of 16 February, 1945

## Detachment 101

Detachment 101 was established under the OSS predecessor, the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1942 at Nazira, India. Detachment 101 primarily worked in north Burma for the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC). Other OSS elements in the Asia followed an incremental numbering scheme starting with Detachment 101.

## Detachment 202

Based in Chungking, Detachment 202 was the main OSS element coordinating operations in China and French Indo-China. China had several other OSS units, including the Sino-American Special Cooperative Agreement (SACO), a joint command with the U.S. Navy Group, China and Chinese intelligence, and the 5329th Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (AGFTRS), an intelligence group that assisted the U.S. 14th Air Force.

## Detachment 303

Based in New Delhi, Detachment 303 served as an administrative base for the OSS in the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC). The OSS operational element in SEAC was Detachment 404, based in Kandy, Ceylon.

## Detachment 404

Detachment 404 was responsible for operations in southern Burma, Thailand, Malaya, the Andaman Islands, Sumatra, and southern French Indo-China. It gained the rest of the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and French Indochina after the war ended.

## Detachment 505

Originally a supply, administrative, and personnel base for Detachment 101, Detachment 505 became separate in early 1945. It also serviced Detachment 202 in China.

# DETACHMENT 202: 1944-1945

Detachment 202 collected intelligence and supported Chinese forces in order to tie down as many Japanese troops as possible.[21] The OSS began operating in 1943, in conjunction with the U.S. Navy Group China, and Chinese intelligence, under the Sino-American Special Cooperative Agreement (SACO). Although the OSS conducted several successful operations, SACO's isolation, lack of supplies, bureaucratic obstacles, and Nationalist Chinese demands to control all operations prevented it from reaching its potential. Fortunately, in late 1944 the U.S. Army theater commander for China and French Indo-China (Vietnam), Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, pulled the OSS under his command as an independent agency. This enabled the newly created Detachment 202 to operate outside of SACO and away from Chinese influence.

The Operational Groups (OG), Special Operations (SO), and Secret Intelligence (SI) branches of Detachment 202 immediately began exercising their capabilities. The OGs were directed to train twenty company-sized paratrooper elements. Despite the lack of full Nationalist Chinese cooperation, the OGs formed six fully trained commandos and had begun to conduct operations by the end of hostilities. These Commandos were the first paratroop units in the Nationalist Chinese Army. SO had the mission to create, arm, train, and lead guerrilla forces. By the end of the war, a few SO groups were leading guerilla forces 500 miles behind enemy lines.[22] These SO guerilla groups, some as large as 1,500 men, cut roads and rails, blew up road and train bridges, and killed thousands of Japanese troops. Although on a

smaller scale than OG or SO operations, SI established several teams in French Indo-China and southern China. These teams reported Japanese naval and air traffic and meteorological conditions. Although the Japanese surrender ended combat operations, these Detachment 202 elements demonstrated the capabilities of the OSS in China.

One of the most important successes in China took place immediately after the atomic bomb was dropped. 'Mercy Mission' teams parachuted into Japanese prison camps to prevent further harm to Allied POWs. The OSS contributed the bulk of the personnel, although several other organizations participated as well. This was done at great peril because many Japanese commands were not aware that the war was over. Eleven 'Mercy' teams from OSS China arranged for food, medical care, and the evacuation of POWs to Allied camps.

Chinese Commandos receive instruction on how to jump from a C-47 drop aircraft. The OG instructors used a crashed C-47 as a mock-up.

OSS Agent Identification Badge. These serial numbered pin-on insignia were used in China to help OSS personnel identify one another.

Chinese Commando Patch

TOP: Annamese troops of SO Team DEER patrol in French Indo-China, late 1945. BOTTOM: A member of SO Team LEOPARD cranks a Generator to power the team's radio, China, 1945.

Detachment 404 was formed to help coordinate intelligence collection and operations of covert organizations like the OSS and British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in the Far East. Detachment 404 also recruited indigenous personnel from enemy-controlled areas to be reinserted as trained agents via submarines. In addition, it established coast watchers to gather meteorological and topographical shoreline data, record tide tables, report on Japanese shipping, and arrange for the rescue of downed Allied pilots.[19] Located in what is now Sri Lanka, Detachment 404 worked with Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's predominately-British Southeast Asia Command (SEAC).

Detachment 404's area of responsibility was huge—the Andaman Islands, India, Indonesia, Malaya, Sumatra, Thailand, and parts of Burma and French Indo-China (Vietnam).[20] Thailand, an occupied and unwilling Japanese ally, offered the most potential for OSS operations. High-ranking Thai politicians enabled Special Operations (SO) and Secret Intelligence (SI)

teams to infiltrate in late 1944. These teams collected volumes of intelligence and trained a guerrilla force, but the war ended before they could be employed The OSS support generated such positive feelings towards the U.S. that President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed William J. Donovan to be his Ambassador to Thailand in 1953.

The Arakan Field Unit (AFU) of Detachment 404 was a 175-man element that contained SI personnel, Operational Groups (OG) and the Maritime Unit (MU). It was employed along the Burma coast to assist the XV Indian Corps of the British XIV Army. In February 1945, Detachment 101 assumed operational control of the AFU. OG and MU personnel jointly conducted reconnaissance missions along the Arakan coast and up its numerous inlets and rivers. While helping liberate Rangoon, AFU elements collected considerable intelligence. These accomplishments in a highly political environment demonstrated how the OSS persevered and adapted to accomplish all missions.



A Detachment 404 commander briefs the next mission, Burma 1945.



Lord Louis Mountbatten was the British commander in charge of the Southeast Asia Command. He is on the left talking with Cora DuBois, the OSS Detachment 404 Research and Analysis (R&A) chief.



LEFT: CPT Erik J. Anderson of the Arakan Field Unit MU section leads a rubber boat team down a chaung (tidal creek), Burma, 1945. BOTTOM: Members of the Arakan Field Unit Operational Group section, MAJ Lloyd E. Peddicord and CPT George H. Bright, plan operations in Burma, December 1944.

# AN ENDURING LEGACY: 1945-PRESENT

At the end of WWII, the OSS evaluated its wartime operations. For more than three years, the organization had been involved in combat and intelligence collection worldwide. At its peak in December 1944, OSS employed 13,000 personnel, 7,500 of whom served overseas. In terms of numbers, the OSS was smaller than a U.S. Army infantry division in WWII.

The special operations branches were not compatible with a post-war world. Major General William J. Donovan, knowing that the OSS would be disbanded, sought to preserve the covert branches by incorporating them into a peacetime intelligence agency. Donovan reasoned; "It is not easy to set up a modern intelligence system. It is more difficult to do so in time of peace than in time of war."[23] Despite Donovan's best efforts, President Harry S. Truman ordered him to dissolve the OSS by 1 October 1945.

Research and Analysis (R&A), universally recognized as the most valuable OSS function, was transferred to the Department of State. The War Department assumed responsibility for the remaining OSS assets, under the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Intelligence collection, like that conducted by Secret Intelligence (SI) and X-2, the OSS counter-intelligence branch, was retained at a reduced level. The paramilitary branches: Special Operations (SO), Operational Groups (OG), Maritime Unit (MU), and Morale Operations (MO), were dismantled.

In February 1946, President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), as an interim agency. The National Security Act of 1947 converted the CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although there was a two year gap between the demise of the OSS and the creation of the Agency, the CIA views Donovan as its 'founding father.' Likewise, the Special Operations community benefited from OSS. Colonel Aaron Bank, a former Jedburgh, formed the U.S. Army Special Forces in 1952. Bank recruited WWII combat veterans of airborne units, the First Special Service Force, and the OSS, for Special Forces. In 1989, the newly formed United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), at Fort Bragg, NC, chose the Fairbairn-Sykes dagger, carried by some members of the OSS, to be the centerpiece of its insignia. To demonstrate its connection to the OSS, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) wears an adaptation of the unofficial OSS spearhead insignia as its shoulder patch. ♠



CIA Seal     OSS Patch     USASOC SSI     SOCOM SSI

Troy J. Sacquety earned an MA from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC History Office staff he worked several years for the Central Intelligence Agency. Current research interests include Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) special operations during World War II, and Special Operations Units in Vietnam.

## Endnotes

1   Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS* (New York: Walker and Company, 1976) 179.

2   Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 206; 70.

3   OSS Special Operations branch history, "This Phase of SO," F 4, Box 101, E 99, RG 226, NARA.

4   OSS Special Operations branch history, "This Phase of SO," NARA.

5   OSS Special Operations branch history, "This Phase of SO," NARA.

6   OSS London War Diary, "Special Operations Branch: Supply, Roll 10, Vol. 10," 13,17; OSS London War Diary, "Special Operations Branch: Air Operations, Roll 9, Vol. 6," 7.

7   Roosevelt, *The War Report of the OSS: The Overseas Targets* (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), 179.

8   Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 206.

9   For more on the Jedburghs, see Will Irwin, *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944*, (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2005) and Colin Beaven, *Operation Jedburgh: D-Day and America's First Shadow War*, (New York, NY: Viking, 2006)

10  Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 211.

11  Roosevelt, *The War Report of the OSS: The Overseas Targets*, 299.

12  Roosevelt, *The War Report of the OSS: The Overseas Targets*, 99.

13  Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 135-143.

14  [Brief Chronology of OSSSU Detachment 101], F 74, B 42, E 190, RG 226, NARA.

15  Although Detachment 101 was the first COI/OSS unit of its type, one of the early SA/G (the predecessor name of OSS SO) chiefs, Lieutenant Colonel Garland Williams, did not want to reveal that to the British. He chose the name "Coordinator of Information Special Unit Detachment 101" to imply that the unit was one of many. Thomas N. Moon and Carl F. Eifler, *The Deadliest Colonel* (New York: Vantage, 1975) 53; Roosevelt, *The Overseas Targets*, xvii..

16  Carlton Scofield to Kennett Hinks "Dear Ken," 15 March 1944, F Eifler, B 644, E 190, RG 226, NARA.

17  William R. Peers to William J. Donovan, "Report Covering period 31 May to 30 June, 1944," [30 June 1944], F 13, B 34, E 190, RG 226, NARA.

18  Roosevelt, *The War Report of the OSS: The Overseas Targets*, 391-392.

19  Roosevelt, *The War Report of the OSS: The Overseas Targets*, 401-405.

20  Harriet W. Sabine, "History of Detachment 404 Operations," [21 September 1944], F 1, B 64, E 99, RG 226, NARA.

21  Roosevelt, *The War Report of the OSS: The Overseas Targets*, 415; 428-430.

22  Roosevelt, *The War Report of the OSS: The Overseas Targets*, 446.

23  MG William J. Donovan to Harold D. Smith,"[Donovan's OSS Liquidation Plans and Statement of Principles,]" 25 August 1945, reproduced in Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981), 453.

# Notes

# OG

## ONAL GROUPS

# OG

# OPERATIONAL GROUP COMMAND

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

This booklet has been prepared for use within OSS, particularly by OG Branch for the general orientation of its own personnel. Its primary purpose is to define the basic organization of the Branch, its functions, doctrine, and purpose. It is not intended either as a technical training manual or an historical record of actual accomplishments.

— December 1944

# OPERATIONAL GROUP COMMAND

**OG**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

is an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with collecting and analyzing strategic information and secret intelligence required for military operations, and with planning and executing programs of physical sabotage and morale subversion against the enemy to support military operations.

# OPERATIONAL OG GROUP COMMAND

selects foreign-language speaking Army personnel and trains them to operate as military units in enemy or enemy-held territory. OGs organize resistance groups into effective guerrilla units, equip them with weapons and supplies, and lead them in attacks against enemy targets.

PLANNING GROUP

PLANNING STAFF

SECRETARIAT

REGISTRY

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMMUNICATIONS

FIELD PHOTOGRAPHIC

PRESENTATION

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

MORALE OPERATIONS

MARITIME UNIT

FIELD EXPERIMENTAL UNIT

SPECIAL PROJECTS

OPERATIONAL GROUP COMMAND

DEPUTY DIRECTOR SCHOOLS & TRAINING

SCHOOLS & TRAINING

BUDGET & PROCEDURES

# DIRECTOR

### FIRST ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

### SECOND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

| FIELD SECTION | GENERAL COUNSEL | BOARD OF REVIEW | SPECIAL ASSTS. & REPRESENTATIVES |
|---|---|---|---|

| RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT | H Q. & H Q. DETACHMENT | NAVAL COMMAND | SECURITY | SPECIAL FUNDS | CHIEF SURGEON |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**DEPUTY DIRECTOR STRATEGIC SERVICES OPERATIONS**

**DEPUTY DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES**

- SECRET INTELLIGENCE
- X-2
- RESEARCH & ANALYSIS
- FOREIGN NATIONALITIES
- CENSORSHIP & DOCUMENTS

| DEPUTY DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES | | | | | DEPUTY DIRECTOR PERSONNEL | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PROCUREMENT & SUPPLY | REPRODUCTION | TRANSPORTATION | OFFICE SERVICES | FINANCE | PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT | CIVILIAN PERSONNEL |

# OG OBJECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES

● **FUNCTIONS**

Operational Groups have a dual function.

They serve as the operational nuclei of guerrilla organizations which have been formed from resistance groups in enemy territory.

They execute independent operations against enemy targets on orders of the theater commander.

● **METHODS**

OG works with individuals unfamiliar with military operations as well as insufficiently-equipped quasi-military organizations. The former are organized and trained in military techniques of resistance. The latter are provided with supplies and their tactics are coordinated with allied military plans. Leadership is normally kept in the hands of the native people, though OG may select leaders and unify opposing groups.

● **AIMS**

The aim of OG activity is to aid actual and planned Allied military operations by harassing the enemy behind his lines, by disrupting his lines of communication and supply, and by forcing him to divert troops to protect himself from guerrilla attacks and wide-scale uprisings.

The activities, mode of operation and personnel of OG differ from those of the Special Operations Branch. OG personnel activate guerrillas as military organizations to engage enemy forces. They always operate in uniform as military units and are not primarily concerned with individual acts of sabotage.

# OG RECRUITING AND TRAINING

## RECRUITS

Because of the hazardous nature of the work, all OG officers and enlisted men are selected from Army volunteers. All recruits must meet the physical standards demanded for parachute jumping, preferably should have combat training, and must give evidence of stability and good judgment as well as daring. They should speak the language of the area and be acquainted with the territory in which they will operate.

## TRAINING IN THE U.S.

Six weeks' preliminary training is given in the United States on the following subjects:

Map reading
Scouting and patrolling
Close combat — armed and unarmed
Physical conditioning
Fieldcraft and equipment protection
Hygiene and first aid
Military tactics
Demolition
Weapons — Allied and Axis
Operation and repair of enemy vehicles
Enemy espionage organizations
Organization and training of civilians for guerrilla warfare
Identification of aircraft and vehicles
Security
Logistics

## TRAINING OVERSEAS

Advanced training is given in the theaters of operation. Personnel is oriented to the locale while rehearsing military tactics, parachute jumping, and amphibious operations, but does not undergo a set curriculum.

Overseas training has been given in:

England
Algiers
Corsica
Siena
Bari
Ceylon
Assam

# OG HEADQUARTERS:  STRATEGIC PLANNING



**DIRECTOR OSS**

Overall plans and programs are submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval before being sent to the field.

**DEPUTY DIRECTOR**
STRATEGIC SERVICES OPERATIONS

**COMMANDING OFFICER OG COMMAND**

**EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**MAPS & REPORTS OFFICER**

**S-1 PERSONNEL**

**S-2 INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY**

**S-3 PLANS & TRAINING**

**S-4 SUPPLY**

**MEDICAL OFFICER CHIEF SURGEON**

**PLANNING GROUP**

integrates plans with military and naval operations.

**PLANNING STAFF**

jointly develop strategic plans and overall programs.

# OG FIELD ORGANIZATION: TACTICAL PLANNING

THEATER COMMANDER

STRATEGIC SERVICES OFFICER

Plans are based on intelligence furnished by OSS Intelligence Sections.

RESEARCH & ANALYSIS

Topography, industrial targets, enemy military organization and morale.

SECRET INTELLIGENCE

Location of enemy units and installations, and strength and disposition of guerrilla groups.

X-2

Enemy espionage agents and networks.

AREA HEADQUARTERS, comparable to a regimental echelon, is the highest OG command in the field.

OG AREA COMMANDER

ADJUTANT

TRANSPORTATION

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANNING OFFICER

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

SUPPLY

FIELD SERVICE HEADQUARTERS, roughly comparable to an army battalion headquarters.

OG UNIT COMMANDER

ARMORER

THE OPERATIONAL GROUP is the basic field unit.

COMMANDING OFFICER OPERATIONAL GROUP

MEDICAL OFFICER

# THE OPERATIONAL GROUP IS THE BASIC FIELD UNIT

Each group must be self-sufficient because operations are aimed at special isolated objectives. Further decentralization within the group command is also necessary because component parts may have to split from their group, each to organize, train, or take command of a different native force.

Each section and each squad is capable of independent action. The smaller the unit, the more mobile and inconspicuous, two leading requirements in operations conducted behind enemy lines and in constant danger of separation from a base or supporting forces.

GROUP COMMANDING
OFFICER

OPERATIONAL PLANNING ASST
2nd IN COMMAND

SECTION

SECTION

SECTION COMMANDING
OFFICER

SECTION COMMANDING
OFFICER

SQUAD
LEADER

SECOND IN
COMMAND

COURIER

RADIO

SQUAD LEADER

MEDICAL SERGEANT

RIFLEMEN

COURIER

RADIO

SECOND IN
COMMAND

SQUAD
LEADER

RADIO

SQUAD LEADER

MEDICAL SERGEANT

RIFLEMEN

# OG FIELD HEADQUARTERS AND OPERATIONS: ETO-MEDTO

## SEPTEMBER 1943
## OCTOBER 1944

All OG operations in southern France were coordinated with Allied plans for the invasion. Their purpose was to destroy the enemy's lines of supply and communication and force him to divert troops for their protection, to protect the flanks of the Allied forces driving in from the beaches, and to report on enemy strength and movements. To this end OGs were introduced throughout the area, organizing or equipping guerrilla forces and guiding them in operations.

Operations in Italy have been conducted from OG headquarters on Corsica and bases in Italy. Independently and in collaboration with Italian Partisans and British and French forces, OGs have harassed the enemy by raids on military installations and lines of communication, as well as by occupying islands to establish observation posts.

Missions against the islands and mainland of Yugoslavia have been made from the OG base on Vis. With Partisan and British troops, OGs have engaged small German forces, ambushed a naval convoy by shore fire, and rescued many American aviators.

OGs have penetrated Greece by sea and air to cooperate with guerrilla forces in attacking German supply lines and destroying enemy headquarters.



FROM U.S.

INVERNESS

HARRINGTON

LONDON

BERLIN

PARIS

GRENOBLE

BASTIA
CORSICA
SIENA
ROME
VIS
SARDINIA
BARI
SALONIKA
ATHENS

FROM U.S.

ALGIERS

○ OG FIELD HEADQUARTERS
● OG FIELD OPERATIONS

OG operations in France were based on England and Algiers. The former worked closely with the Maquis to harass and ambush enemy units, driving Germans from vital hydroelectric plants and protecting American lines of communication. The latter coordinated the resistance movement in support of the invasions from England and North Africa. In cooperation with Maquis units that they organized and trained, these OGs killed 461, wounded 467, and captured 10,021 Germans; demolished 11 power lines and cables; mined 17 roads; shot down 3 aircraft and destroyed 2 trains and 3 locomotives. They also rescued downed Allied fliers, gathered intelligence, selected and prepared landing strips, and assisted the FFI. For security purposes, each team in the field had its own code name used in communications and command.

| # | Code name | | # | Code name |
|---|-----------|---|---|-----------|
| 1 | EMILY | | 1 | PERCY RED |
| 2 | JUSTINE | | 2 | PERCY PINK |
| 3 | LOUISE | | 3 | PATRICK |
| 4 | BETSY | | 4 | LINDSEY |
| 12 | LAFAYETTE | | 5 | ADRIAN |
| 13 | WILLIAMS | | 6 | CHRISTOPHER |
| 14 | LEHIGH | | 7 | DONALD |
| 10 | SIMON | | | |
| 11 | HELEN | | | ETO |
| 5 | RUTH | | | |
| 6 | ALICE | | | |
| 7 | PAT | | | |
| 8 | PEG | | | MEDTO |
| 9 | NANCY | | | |

Map labels: FROM ENGLAND, LONDON, PARIS, ORLEANS, VIERZON, DIJON, BELFORT, CHATEAUROUX, ARGENTAN, LIMOGES, LYONS, ST. ETIENNE, GRENOBLE, PERIGEUX, TULLE, BRIVE, ANNONAY, CREST, ORANGE, DIGNE, MONTAUBAN, AIGOUAL, ALBI, AVIGNON, APT, TOULOUSE, ST. GAUDENS, LOURDES, PARMIERS, FOIX, TOULON, FROM ALGIERS

# OG OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN ITALY, OCTOBER 1944

1 OGs parachuted into Sardinia at the time of the German evacuation and operated throughout island.

2 Landed on Corsica, OGs fought with French troops through the entire campaign that drove Germans from the island. Established headquarters at Bastia.

3 OGs with British troops were landed by sea and dropped by air in the Chieti area to aid escaped American and British prisoners of war. They also killed Italian Fascist informers.

4 Occupied island of Capraia and established a permanent naval and air observation post with radio communication to headquarters on Corsica. Rescued downed American aviators.

5 Occupied island of Gorgona and established a permanent naval and air observation post with radio communication to headquarters on Corsica.

6 OGs landed with the Fifth Army in the invasion at Anzio and were used to gather intelligence.

7 Damaged a highway bridge just south of Leghorn and withdrew successfully.

8 OGs landed by sea to demolish tunnel entrances and the road fill of a railroad. An enemy convoy forced the withdrawal of OG boats and attempts at rescue proved unsuccessful. Enemy radio later announced a Commando-type unit had been wiped out.

9 Landed with a French force on Pianosa, surrounded barracks and isolated the local prison to seize 24 Italian guards for intelligence purposes.

10 Personnel and supplies flown from Brindisi were dropped by parachute to aid Italian Partisans. OGs were attached to the Third Garibaldi Brigade which controls the road from Torriglian to Bobbio and the surrounding country.

11 Four small teams were dropped in northern Italy to assist local Partisans and to transmit intelligence.



MILAN

BOBBIO
BOLOGNA
GENOA
LA SPEZIA
GORGONA
LEGHORN
SIENA
CAPRAIA
BASTIA
PIANOSA
CHIETI
CORSICA
ROME
ANZIO
NAPLES
SARDINIA

# OG OPERATIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE, OCTOBER 1944

Operations against the islands and mainland of Yugoslavia were based on Vis, to which troops returned after each action. Missions included:

● Destruction of the entire German garrison on Solta and capture of the town of Grohote by OGs and British Commandos.

● Attack on Brac. OGs with British troops forced part of the enemy into an inner defense ring.

● Destruction of a German patrol on the island of Hvar.

● Attack on Korcula. OGs and Partisans cleared two-thirds of the island of Germans.

● From a cove on the Peljesac peninsula, OG troops and a small British naval detachment shelled three passing German ships.

● Reconnaissance on Mljet, Lagosta, and the Yugoslav mainland.

● Rescue of American aviators. More than 1,000 fliers of the Fifteenth Air Force have been safely brought to Vis.

All action in Northern Greece was part of the NOAH's ARK operation which infiltrated by sea and air to aid the guerrilla Andartes in harassing German forces.

1  Infiltration.

2  Attacked German headquarters in Yannitsa.

3  Attacked a train, small arms fire causing many enemy casualties.

4  Ambushed a truck convoy.

5  Blew up railway track and attacked a repair train.

6  Attacked a small convoy.

7  Aided by Andartes and British, OGs shelled a train, and set it afire.

8  Destroyed eight vehicles of a large German convoy.

9  Derailed six boxcars and destroyed a locomotive.

10  OGs parachuted into the Peloponnesus and made contact with an Allied Mission. They destroyed two strategic railway bridges.

# OSS
PRESENTATION

# Notes

65    Pg

N⁰    7

---

**OPERATIONAL GROUPS
FIELD MANUAL –**

**STRATEGIC SERVICES**

(Provisional)

---

OSS ARCHIVES

WASHINGTON  – P. G – A10 – 17

Prepared under direction of
The Director of Strategic Services

**SECRET**

144.2

# OPERATIONAL GROUPS FIELD MANUAL

# – STRATEGIC SERVICES

(Provisional)

Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6

---

Office of Strategic Services

Washington, D. C.

25 April 1944

This Operational Groups Field Manual — Strategic Services is made available for the information and guidance of selected personnel and will be used as the basic doctrine for Strategic Services training for the operations of these groups.

The contents of this manual should be carefully controlled and should not be allowed to come into unauthorized hands. The manual will not be taken to advance bases.

AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, pertaining to the handling of secret documents, will be complied with the handling of this manual.

*William J. Donovan*

William J. Donovan

Director

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

# OPERATIONAL GROUPS FIELD MANUAL — STRATEGIC SERVICES

## SECTION I — INTRODUCTION

### 1. *SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF MANUAL*

This manual sets forth the authorized functions, operational principles, methods, and organization of Operational Groups (OG's) as a part of OSS operations. Its purpose is to guide Strategic Services personnel responsible for planning, training, and operations in the proper employment of OG's.

### 2. *DEFINITIONS*

a. OVER-ALL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIVITIES — a collection of objectives, in order of priority (importance) within a theater or area.

b. OBJECTIVE — a main or controlling goal for accomplishment within a theater or area by Strategic Services as set forth in an Over-all Program.

c. SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIVITIES — a statement setting forth the detailed missions assigned to one or more Strategic Services branches, designed to accomplish a given objective, together with a summary of the situation and the general methods of accomplishment of the assigned missions.

d. MISSION — a statement of purpose set forth in a special program for the accomplishment of a given objective.

e. OPERATIONAL PLAN — an amplification or elaboration of a special program, containing the details and means of carrying out the specified activities.

f. TASK — a detailed operation, usually planned in the field, which contributes toward the accomplishment of a mission.

g. TARGET — a place, establishment, group, or individual toward which activities or operations are directed.

h. THE FIELD — all areas outside of the United States in which Strategic Services activities take place.

i. FIELD BASE — an OSS headquarters in the field, designated by the name of the city in which it is established, e.g., Strategic Services Field Base, Cairo.

j. ADVANCED OR SUB-BASE — an additional base established by and responsible to an OSS field base.

k. OPERATIVE — an individual employed by and responsible to the OSS and assigned under special programs to field activity.

l. AGENT — an individual recruited in the field who is employed and directed by an OSS operative or by a field or sub-base.

m. RESISTANCE GROUPS — individuals associated together in enemy-held territory to oppose the enemy by any or all means short of military operations, e.g., by sabotage, non-cooperation.

n. GUERRILLAS — an organized band of individuals in enemy-held territory, indefinite as to number, which conducts against the enemy irregular operations, including those of a military or quasi-military nature.

## 3. OPERATIONAL GROUPS

### a. DEFINITION

OPERATIONAL GROUPS: a small, uniformed party of specially qualified soldiers, organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the specific missions set forth below.

### b. AUTHORITY

Among the functions assigned by Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to the Office of Strategic Services are the following, which are applicable to Operational Groups:

(1) The organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare;

(2) The use of the organization and facilities of the OSS by the theater commander in his theater or

area in any manner and to the maximum extent desired by him.

### c. MISSIONS OF OPERATIONAL GROUPS

The mission of Operational Groups is:

(1) To organize, train, and equip resistance groups in order to convert them into guerrillas, and to serve as the nuclei of such groups in operations against the enemy, as directed by the theater commander.

(2) In addition, under authority granted to the theater commander by the JCS Directive, Operational Groups may be used to execute independent operations against enemy targets as directed by the theater commander.

## SECTION II — ORGANIZATION

## 4. ORGANIZATION IN WASHINGTON

a. Operational Groups are organized in Washington along strictly military lines. There is a commanding officer, responsible to the Strategic Services Operations Officer, and a staff consisting of an executive officer, an S-1 (personnel), and S-2 (intelligence and security), an S-3 (plans and training), an S-4 (supply), and a medical officer (chief surgeon and medical supply officer). There is also a training staff of variable size consisting of semi-permanent senior instructors, and junior instructors who are assigned to field duty with OG's after they have trained their successors.

b. OG Headquarters, Washington, has no direct command over OG's in the field, since they are under control and direction of the theater commander through the strategic services officer. The primary function of the OG organization in Washington is to service OG's in the field with trained personnel and supplies. OG Headquarters, Washington, also has the administrative responsibility of maintaining coordinated chronological record of OG activities.

## 5. *ORGANIZATION IN THE FIELD*

### a. THE OPERATIONAL GROUP

#### (1) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

The Operational Groups, consisting of 4 officers and 30 men, is the basic unit of OG organization. An OG normally consists of 2 sections of 2 squads each. The T/O of a typical OG is as follows:

Captain (1), commanding
First Lieutenant (3), including:
    Second-in-command of the OG (1)
    Section leader (2)
Technical sergeant (2), including:
    Second-in-command of sections (2)
Staff Sergeant (6), including:
    Squad leader (4)
    Medical technician (2)
Corporal or technician fifth grade (22), including:
    Scout (16)
    Code clerk (1)
    Courier (1)
    Radio operator (4)
Aggregate (all ranks): 34

#### (2) TABLE OF EQUIPMENT

In addition to standard Army clothing, OG members are issued special garments appropriate to the climate and terrain in their country of operations. Each Operational Group has a special Table of Equipment (T/E), showing the arms and other articles to be carried. This T/E varies with the theater for which the OG is bound and the missions it is expected to accomplish.

#### (3) SS EQUIPMENT

(a) SS weapons and demolition equipment are issued to OG's through SS supply channels in the theater, as required by their missions.

(b) Communications equipment carried by OG's consists of SS radio sets which are issued through SS supply channels in the theater.

#### (4) MOTORIZED VEHICLES

Although motorized vehicles are not part of the organic equipment of an OG, they may be issued in the theater when required by a mission and when it is feasible to introduce and maintain such vehicles in the area of operations.

### b. THE FIELD SERVICE HEADQUARTERS

#### (1) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

The Field Service Headquarters (FSHQ) is the next higher echelon of command above the Operational Group. An FSHQ is roughly comparable to the Army's battalion headquarters, and the FSHQ commanding officer directs the operations of from two to five OG's. An FSHQ is normally located outside of, but in proximity to, the enemy-held territory in which several OG's are operating. However, when conditions permit, FSHQ will be established in the area of operations. The T/O consists of the following:

Major (1), commanding
Captain (1), medical officer
First lieutenant (3), including:
    Adjutant (1)
    Communications officer (1)
    Supply officer (1)
First sergeant (1)
Technical Sergeant (6), including:
    Signal non-commissioned officer (3)
    Supply non-commissioned officer (2)
    Replacement (1)
Corporal or technician, fifth grade (16), including:
    Armorer (1)
    Automobile mechanic (1)
    Clerk typist (2)
    Code clerk-courier (6)
    Radio operator (6)
Aggregate (all ranks): 28

#### (2) TABLE OF EQUIPMENT

In addition to standard Army clothing, FSHQ personnel are issued special garments appropriate to

the climate and terrain in their country of operations. Each FSHQ has a special T/E, showing the arms and other articles to be carried. This T/E varies with the theater in which the FSHQ is to operate and the missions it is expected to execute.

(3) SS EQUIPMENT

(a) SS weapons and demolitions equipment are issued to an FSHQ as required, through SS supply channels in the theater.

(b) Communications equipment for an FSHQ consists of SS radio sets which are issued through SS supply channels in the theater.

(4) MOTORIZED VEHICLES

Motorized vehicles are part of the organic equipment of an FSHQ and are issued through SS and military supply channels in the theater, provided it is feasible to introduce and maintain such vehicles in the area of FSHQ operations.

c. AREA HEADQUARTERS (Headquarters at OSS Field Base)

(1) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

An Area Headquarters (AHQ), or Headquarters at OSS field base, is the next higher echelon of command above the FSHQ. It operates under direction and control of the SS officer at the OSS field base. The normal T/O of an AHQ is as follows:

Lieutenant Colonel (1), OG commanding officer
Captain (1), executive officer
First lieutenant (1), operations officer
First sergeant (1)
Technical sergeant (1), signal non-commissioned officer
Corporal or technician, fifth grade (3), including:
Clerk-typist (1)
Code clerk-courier (1)

Motorcyclist (1)
Aggregate (all ranks): 8

(2) TABLE OF EQUIPMENT

In addition to the standard Army clothing issued to personnel of the AHQ, each AHQ has a special T/E, showing the arms and other articles to be carried. This T/E is variable, depending on the theater of operations.

(3) SS EQUIPMENT

(a) Stockpiles of SS weapons and demolitions equipment are normally set up at an AHQ to supply Field Service Headquarters and OG's in areas of operations.

(b) Since the AHQ is located at an OSS field base, communications to and from AHQ are generally handled by the field base message center.

(4) MOTORIZED VEHICLES

Motorcycles, trucks, and trailers needed for operations at AHQ are supplied through SS and military supply channels in the theater.

## SECTION III — PERSONNEL

### 6. ORGANIZATION FOR RECRUITMENT

a. Members of OG's procured in the United States are officers or enlisted men who have been inducted into the Army through regular channels. Under War Department approval, and within War Department allotment of grades and ratings, selection is made of such personnel by trained interviewers of the Personnel Procurement Branch (PPB), OSS, according to specifications submitted by Headquarters, Operational Groups, Washington. PPB interviewers examine the civil and military records of likely candidates and hold personal interviews. Candidates who are acceptable are ordered to an SS area to begin training, pending security clearance. This procedure in no way violates security, as the

training initially given is an extension of Army training. No specialized strategic services instruction is given until the security check has been completed.

b. It will sometimes be necessary to procure OG personnel directly in the theater where they will operate. This procedure is applicable when persons cannot be found in the United States who are qualified in a particular language, knowledge of a certain locality, and other essentials. When an OG must be staffed in the theater, the work of procurement will usually be done by a cadre from the U.S. consisting normally of 2 officers and 5 men, with the following T/O: 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 first sergeant, 1 staff sergeant, 1 sergeant, and 2 radio operator technicians, fourth or fifth grade (specification serial No. 777). This cadre will attempt to recruit and train in the theater sufficient personnel to comprise standard OG's of 4 officers and 30 men each. However, the T/O may be reduced in strength for OG's recruited in the field depending on the availability of qualified personnel. Civilians recruited for OG's in the field will be enlisted or commissioned in the Army of the U.S. and will wear its uniform. The procurement of all personnel for OG's within theaters must be within the limitations of authorized grades and ratings.

## 7. QUALIFICATIONS OF OG PERSONNEL

The following considerations will govern selection of personnel for Operational Groups:

a. WILLINGNESS TO PERFORM HAZARDOUS DUTY

Because of the nature of their assignments, all members of OG's must be willing to undertake unusual and dangerous risks. Candidates must be adequately informed of the hazards they may expect, and must be accepted only on a volunteer basis.

b. LANGUAGE ABILITY

It is normally preferable that the candidate speak the required language as a native tongue, or with great

fluency. In some cases, however, e.g., radio operators, language facility must be sacrificed for other valuable qualifications.

c. FAMILIARITY WITH COUNTRY OF OPERATIONS

Since OG's may have to enter territory without benefit of a friendly local reception committee, previous acquaintance with the country of operations is highly desirable, especially if such acquaintance is of recent date. OG personnel with friends or relatives who might provide concealment and guidance are especially valuable.

d. SKILLS

As many men as possible in each OG should be qualified in certain specialized fields. Previous training on radio, demolitions, weapons, scouting, or fieldcraft is a particularly desirable qualification in a candidate.

e. PHYSICAL CONDITION

The rigorous character of their work demands that OG personnel satisfy the same physical requirements as men accepted for parachute training in the Army.

f. POLITICAL SYMPATHIES

Persons charged with procurement of OG personnel must use great care in the case of individuals who are sympathetic to particular political movements or factions within the country of their origin. The readiness and ability of such individuals to get along harmoniously with the movement or faction in the area of operations must be carefully determined in advance. In certain areas, however, where disputes are bitter, and the areas of rivals not delineated, it is more desirable to staff an OG with American citizens whose language ability is somewhat imperfect rather than with ex-natives of the area who have pronounced political attachments.

g. CHARACTER TRAITS

While the risks involved tend to make OG work appeal to young men, the success of OG assignments

is not the result of daring and bravado alone. Accordingly, candidates will be selected whose past records, civilian and military, give evidence of stability and good judgment.

### h. ARMY TRAINING

Except for certain specially qualified persons recruited in the field (see paragraph 6.b.) candidates must have completed basic training before being accepted for OG work. Candidates who have also had combat training are preferable.

## SECTION IV — TRAINING

### 8. *GENERAL PROCEDURE*

OG training is an intensive course of specialized instruction in the weapons, techniques, and methods of operation appropriate for a small, self-sufficient band of men who may be required to live and fight in the manner of guerrillas. OG training comes under the general supervision of the Schools and Training Branch, but the actual instruction is given by OG personnel, based on schedules drawn up by the OG training officer. An OG is assembled prior to the start of training according to the common foreign language of its members; thereafter, the group trains, lives and operates as a unit. The officers who will lead an OG in the field assists in training its personnel. The training period in the U.S. is normally three weeks. One additional week is allowed for the clearance of administrative details. The group is then ready for embarkation to the theater of operations. An OG is rarely used immediately upon its arrival overseas. The normal time delay involved is utilized for further training, as dictated by the particular mission to be performed. This training will emphasize tactical problems and may include parachute jumping or amphibious operations if either of these means of entry is to be used. Overseas training is usually conducted by OG officers.

### 9. *TRAINING OBJECTIVES*

The objectives of OG training are as follows:

a. To train specially qualified bi-lingual officers and enlisted men in the techniques and skills required to execute their prescribed missions in enemy or enemy-occupied territory.

b. To weld this personnel into an efficient, mobile, self-sufficient unit capable of:

(1) organizing and training local resistance groups with a view to converting them into guerrillas;

(2) supplying such guerrillas withs arms, ammunition, demolition, communication equipment, food, medical supplies, and money;

(3) serving as nuclei in planning and execution by native elements of attacks against enemy forces or installations, as directed by the theater commander;

(4) executing independent operations, usually of a "hit-and-run" character, against enemy targets as directed by the theater commander.

c. To develop in each member of an Operational Group the physical strength, individual initiative, and ability to improvise, which his missions will demand.

### 10. *CURRICULUM*

a. Members of Operational Groups should receive adequate training in the following subjects:

(1) Map study, including map sketching map-and-compass problems, direction-finding by field expedients, study of aerial photos.

(2) Scouting and patrolling, including instruction and practice in use of physical cover, reconnaissance, signalling, infiltration.

(3) Close combat (armed and unarmed), including knife-fighting.

(4) Physical conditioning, including swimming, toughening exercises, and obstacle course runs.

(5) Fieldcraft, including camouflage, living off the land, preparation of shelter and food.

(6) Hygiene and camp sanitation.

(7) Tactics, including basic maneuvers and tactical principles, discussion and practice in small-group operations and methods of guerrilla warfare, day and night problems, planning and execution of airborne raids, street and village fighting, jungle fighting (when applicable).

(8) Demolitions, including explosives, incendiaries, booby traps, field expedients, delayed action charges, multiple charges, charges for special purposes.

(9) Weapons, including function, stripping, cleaning, and firing of .30 cal. M1 rifle, cal. .30 carbine, cal. .30 machine gun, cal. .50 machine gun, Browning automatic rifle, cal. .45 pistol, Sten gun, cal. .45 submachine gun, grenade launcher, 2.36-inch anti-tank rocket launcher (bazooka), Marlin submachine gun, 60 mm. mortar, 81 mm. mortar, hand grenades. Also the function and firing of enemy weapons with which group may come into contact.

(10) Principles and practice of first aid, especially under combat conditions.

(11) Enemy motor transportation, including operation and repair of enemy motorcycles, trucks, automobiles, half-tracks, and other vehicles with which group may come into contact.

(12) Enemy organization, including lectures on enemy military and political structure, uniforms, insignia, procedure in interrogating prisoners, methods of espionage and counter-espionage.

(13) Methods of organizing and training civilians in the techniques of guerrilla warfare; indoctrination as to correct general attitude and behavior toward the civilians.

(14) Identification of enemy and Allied planes, tanks, and other vehicles.

(15) Care of clothing and equipment.

(16) Security, including precautions to be observed in U.S., in the theater, and in area of operations.

(17) Problems of supply, including the procedure of procuring supplies from OSS stocks, methods of packaging, and the details regarding the introduction and receipt of cargo into the zone of operations.

b. The basic training of OG's preparation will be supplemented in the theater immediately prior to operations by a detailed briefing on topography, battle order, friendly and hostile groups that may be encountered, and other matters pertinent to the operation to be performed.

c. In addition to the training outlined in paragraph a. above, radio operators for each OG should receive intensive practice in code, operational procedure, and repair of their equipment.

## 11. MAINTENANCE OF MORALE

In view of the extreme hazards of OG operations, maintenance of morale assumes a special importance. Every effort should be made throughout the training period to keep the aggressive spirit and confidence of OG personnel at a high level. The men should be kept steadily occupied, either with training tasks or with organized group recreation. Following the completion of their training, OG's will be shipped to their theater of operations as expeditiously as possible, to avoid the staleness and dissatisfaction which inevitably result from idleness or a monotonous repetition of training. All means available will be used to foster intimate friendship, mutual confidence, and teamplay among members of the group, and a strong feeling of trust between officers and men.

## SECTION V — OPERATIONS

### 12. *GENERAL*

a. OG's operate only in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. Their primary function is in connection with guerrillas. They have no operational function in neutral territory.

b. The following operational distinctions exist between the OG and SO Branches:

(1) While SO operating personnel may or may not be members of the armed forces, may or may not be in uniform, and operate as individuals or in small groups, OG personnel are always members of the armed forces, always operate in uniform, and conduct operations as a unit. When any individual OG personnel is selected to perform SO tasks and function, he will operate under cover and will become part of SO personnel.

(2) OG's, being military organizations, operate in accordance with military principles and on occasion will deliberately engage hostile armed forces. On the other hand, SO personnel in enemy-held territory operate under cover, except in unusual circumstances, and attempt to avoid all contact with enemy forces.

(3) Both OG and SO personnel deal with resistance groups. SO carries on a strictly covert relationship with such groups and organizes them for such tasks as attritional sabotage. OG's on the other hand, train, organize, and equip resistance groups to operate as guerrillas against enemy forces.

### 13. *TYPES OF OG OPERATIONS*

a. As set forth in paragraph 3-c, OG's have two broad missions. These missions determine the pattern of their operations.

(1) The primary mission of OG's is to organize, train, and equip resistance groups in order to convert

them into guerrillas, and to serve as the nuclei of such groups in operations against the enemy as directed by the theater commander.

#### (a) *Organizing*

Normally before OG's enter a territory contact must have been established with resistance elements, and their potentialities and needs for supplies and equipment ascertained. This can be accomplished by use of OSS clandestine agents, primarily SO, or by representatives abroad of resistance elements who are brought out for this purpose. Such resistance elements range from small, loosely organized and poorly equipped bands of individuals to large quasi-military organizations with insufficient equipment. When organization is inadequate, the main function of OG's is to weld the individuals into a guerrilla unit that can contribute to the support of military operations. Organizing such guerrilla units may involve selecting leaders, assigning individuals or units to various areas of operation, constituting demolition or sabotage teams as the situation may require, providing for communications and courier services. While providing guidance and over-all direction is an OG responsibility, the actual leadership will usually be entrusted to local individuals. Where guerrilla activity is already well developed, the OG's work of organizing consists primarily of coordinating the operations of guerrilla bands with allied military plans. In certain areas, OG's may encounter guerrillas whose effectiveness is reduced by partisan differences. Although OG's will avoid local political controversy and will emphasize their essentially military role, they may, by their ability to furnish supplies, be effective in achieving a measure of coordinated effort among estranged groups.

#### (b) *Training*

The work of OG's will be mainly with civilians who are largely ignorant of military dis-

cipline, tactics, and weapons. Briefly stated, the training objective of OG's is to transform these resisters into efficient guerrillas. Within the limitations of local conditions, OG's must find ways to instruct and give practice to the patriots in such subjects as the use of weapons, close combat, scouting and patrolling, demolition, radio operation, first aid, sabotage, and physical conditioning. For obvious reasons this training should, if possible, be conducted in areas unoccupied by enemy troops, such as isolated mountain or forest regions. One of the most important OG training tasks will be indoctrinating civilians in the necessity of avoiding premature action and preserving their numbers for coordinated use at the proper time.

#### (c) *Equipping*

Need for additional equipment will often arise after arrival of OG's in the zone of operations. OG officers will transmit requisitions or requests for requirements either to their Field Service Headquarters, if established, or the OSS field base.

#### (d) *Serving as Operational Nuclei for Guerrilla Warfare*

In theaters where active military operations are being conducted, the plans covering guerrilla operations, including supply, must be approved by the theater commander. In areas where military operations are not being conducted, the nature and timing of guerrilla operations conducted by native groups under OG direction will be coordinated insofar as possible with the desires of the theater commander. In some areas it may be desirable to attack industrial or other targets at the earliest possible moment; in other regions, the theater commander may consider it essential for the groups to remain inactive until they can be employed in support of Allied military operations. In either case, the authorized function of OG's is to serve as the core of a larger group composed pre-

dominantly of members of the local population. As indicated in paragraph 5, OG's are sub-divided into sections and squads. These smaller units will attempt to insure proper leadership and guidance for the native guerrillas whom they have trained. Typical operations by these groups might include tasks such as attacks on and demolition of a powerhouse or oil dump as well as the marking and holding of landing beaches and cutting of enemy communications.

(2) The secondary mission of OG's is to execute operations, usually of a "hit-and-run" character, against enemy targets as directed by the theater commander. It will be seen that this mission takes in a broad range of activity. Thus, OG's might conceivably be used by the theater commander to: attack an enemy headquarters; harass an enemy withdrawal; destroy enemy stores; blow up a factory; demolish a radar installation—or any one of a number of similar tasks. It is characteristic of OG operations under this category that they may or may not be closely tied in to large-scale military operations.

### 14. *OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS*

#### a. CONTACT WITH RESISTANCE GROUPS

OG's assigned to organize and train resistance elements into guerrillas usually will enter the area of operations only after preliminary contact thru clandestine agents with such groups has been established and arrangements made for reception of the OG's. This contact may be made by SO or SI operatives or agents.

#### b. ENTRY INTO AREA OF OPERATIONS

The manner of entry will be determined by the terrain of the area of operations, the tightness of enemy surveillance, and the transportation available. Entry may be made by parachute, by small boat or submarine, or by infiltration of an enemy area on foot. OG's will be given special training in the theater, appropriate to the

means of entry chosen. OG's will normally be received and guided at the point and time of entry by sympathizers with whom contact has previously been established (paragraph a above).

c. COMMUNICATIONS

As soon after entry as is feasible, OG's will make radio contact with FSHQ, if established, or with the base, according to an arranged schedule for periodic future contact. Communications will be maintained by FSHQ with all OG's functioning in the area of operations which it controls, as well as with Area Headquarters at the field base. Messages to and from Area Headquarters are handled by the field base message center. OG's will not normally attempt to communicate with any higher echelon than FSHQ. When an OG is divided into squads which operate in separate parts of the same area, contact may have to be maintained with the commanding officer of the group by radio. However, because of the risks of location by the enemy, radio traffic should be kept to a minimum. Elements of an OG may find it possible to keep in touch with each other more securely by establishing a courier service, utilizing local civilians, rather than by using radio. OG's in enemy-held territory will normally operate on foot, although in some isolated areas enemy surveillance may be so light as to permit a limited use of horses or even local motorized vehicles.

d. SUPPLY

OG's usually carry into an area of operations only such equipment as they need for their own use. OG's will survey the local status of supply, and, basing estimates upon needs previously reported and consequent preliminary plans for supply of the resistance forces, will report any additional immediate requirements by priorities. They should also report on whether the previously agreed place and means for introduction of supplies is feasible and should furnish necessary modifications.

e. CONCEALMENT

Since OG personnel operate in uniform they must

18

rely on concealment and secrecy to safeguard their operations. Concealment is of particular importance to OG's because they are small in number and can be severely weakened by the loss of even a few men. Prior to their entry, OG's should be issued camouflage clothing appropriate to the season and terrain. OG's will be obliged in most cases to avoid cities and towns where the enemy or his agents may be encountered. Semi-permanent concealment in mountainous or forested areas may be available, and native sympathizers will be induced to provide hiding-places in their homes and barns when this is feasible. In some areas enemy controls may be so rigid as to compel OG's to keep on the move, changing bivouac sites frequently.

f. SECURITY

The enemy has established efficient espionage and counter-espionage organizations in all the occupied countries. These networks, coupled with the enemy-controlled local police and local informers, will frequently be more dangerous to the security of OG's than will the enemy's regular troops. Before OG's enter an area all possible investigations will be made as to the security of the resistance groups with whom OG's are working, but OG's must be alert to the danger of possible penetration by enemy agents. OG's should have contact only with those individuals whom resistance group leaders can personally vouch for as loyal. So far as possible, the location and operations of OG personnel should be kept secret from the families of resistance group members who are being trained and organized by OG's.

SECTION VI — COOPERATION OF OG WITHIN OSS AND WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

15. COOPERATION WITH THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

a. The planning and execution of OG missions are based upon reliable intelligence, furnished primarily by the SI and X-2 Branches and the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A). Liaison between OG and these branches

19

is maintained in Washington and in the theaters; it is most important in the theaters because all operational planning for OG's is done there. R&A provides basic intelligence with respect to topography, industrial targets, the structure of enemy military and political organization, and the attitudes of the people in the area of OG operations. For briefing purposes, SI furnishes up-to-the-minute intelligence concerning locations of enemy units and installations in the area of operations, the strength, location, and personnel of guerrilla and resistance groups that will be encountered, and such other data as is pertinent to the mission at hand. X-2 supplements this with intelligence regarding enemy espionage agents and networks which may jeopardize OG operations.

b. Although procurement of intelligence is not normally an OG task, OG's functioning behind enemy lines will frequently obtain information by reconnaissance and from the local population which will be relayed through channels to the appropriate OSS and military intelligence organizations.

### 16. *COOPERATION WITH OTHER OSS OPERATIONS BRANCHES*

a. OG must work in closest collaboration with SO. The integration of OG operations with this branch is achieved in Washington through the strategic services Operations officer, and in the field by the strategic services officer for each theater.

b. OG operations must be largely dependent upon SO operatives and agents who develop preliminary contacts with and make preliminary investigations of underground resistance groups prior to the entry of OG's into an area of operations.

### 17. *COOPERATION WITH SIMILAR AGENCIES OF ALLIED NATIONS*

Cooperation as to any joint activities with other Allied organizations conducting irregular warfare will be arranged through the strategic services officer.

## SECTION VII — PLANNING

### 18. *PLANNING IN WASHINGTON*

a. Special Programs covering OG activities in a Theater of Operations are incorporated into OSS Over-all Programs. In the Over-all Program for a given theater, the objectives for all the OG branches concerned are set forth in order of importance. The Special OG Programs state the missions to be performed by OG to attain the objectives listed in the Over-all Program, present a brief summary of the situation bearing on the missions in question, and prescribe in a general way the plan to be followed. These Special OG Programs are drawn up jointly by the Strategic Services Planning Staff and the OG Branch, and are presented to the Strategic Services Planning Group for approval. Upon approval by the Planning Group, the Programs are submitted to the Director, OSS, for his consideration and approval before being transmitted to the theater or senior American commander in the field through the strategic services officer.

b. Upon approval of theater commanders, OG Programs establish priorities for OG operations in the field. In conformity with these programs, OG prepares detailed operational plans.

c. When plans covering OG activities in the field are made which are not in furtherance of missions set forth in Special Programs, such plans are reported to OSS, Washington, for consideration and incorporation into an appropriate program, consistent with security control.

### 19. *PLANNING IN THEATERS OF OPERATIONS*

Operational planning for OG's is performed in the field, in the implementation of missions of approved special programs covering OG activities. Such planning should cover the details listed in paragraph 14. The nature of OG operations makes teamwork essential and requires that planning be executed in the most minute detail possible.

## 20. *CHECK LIST*

In Appendix "A" there are summarized in the form of a check list a number of the more important points that have been presented in this manual. This check list may serve as a brief list of reminders to OG personnel to assist them in the course of their work.

### APPENDIX "A"
### TO
### OPERATIONAL GROUPS FIELD MANUAL —
### STRATEGIC SERVICES
### CHECK LIST FOR OG OPERATIONS

This check list is designed to assist the OG Branch, Washington, and Operational Groups in the field in planning, training, and operating.

### FOR OG, WASHINGTON

#### 1. *PROCUREMENT OF PERSONNEL*

a. Is the request for procurement and training of personnel for OG's approved by proper authority?

b. Does the allotment of officers and enlisted men to OG permit the procurement of the numbers requested by the strategic services officer?

c. Are qualified individuals available in the U.S. Army?

d. Can suitable personnel be procured in the time available?

e. Have detailed requests been submitted to the Personnel Procurement Branch, OSS, for procurement of personnel?

f. Is the OSS area in which the OG's are initially to be received properly staffed and equipped to receive them?

g. Have the required numbers of suitable personnel been procured and dispatched to the holding area?

h. Have personnel been procured for Field Service Headquarters?

#### 2. *TRAINING*

a. Have all members of the OG's received basic military training?

b. Are suitable OG instructors available and assigned?

c. Has training schedule been coordinated with Schools and Training Branch?

d. Does the standard curriculum for OG's require addition of specialized training for a particular Group? If so, where is it to be accomplished?

e. Is the training area prepared to receive the OG's?

f. Are there any unqualified or unsuitable individuals who should be dropped from the OG's? Are replacements available?

g. Has training accomplished its objectives?

h. Are abilities properly recognized by assignment of ranks and grades within the groups?

i. Has the strategic services officer been informed of the training given OG's to be assigned to his theater?

j. Has personnel of Field Service Headquarters been given adequate training?

#### 3. *SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT*

a. Has each member of the OG's complete standard army clothing and equipment and special items of individual equipment prescribed?

b. Has each OG complete equipment as prescribed by its approved T/E?

c. Has each Field Service Headquarters the equipment and supplies prescribed by its T/E?

d. Has each Area Headquarters the equipment and supplies prescribed by its T/E?

e. Is special OSS equipment required for the OG's available in the theater?

(1) If so, have requisitions been received and when will the equipment and supplies be shipped? Has the strategic services officer been given complete information?

f. Is any equipment requisitioned unavailable? When will it be available? Has the strategic services officer been informed?

g. What is the schedule of future shipments of supplies and equipment?

h. Is a Table of Equipment sent to the Port of Embarkation with each OG?

## 4. MORALE

a. What is the state of morale in the OG's during training?

b. Is personal contact maintained with the trainees and are facilities available for handling individual morale cases?

c. Are the trainees conscious of the seriousness and the importance of the work?

d. Are periods for rest, relaxation, and diversion provided?

e. Has the schedule been arranged so that there will be no prolonged periods of idleness?

f. Will the OG's depart for the theater promptly after the training period? If early departure is impossible have further training or useful duties been scheduled?

## 5. SECURITY

a. Has each member of the OG's received a security check while he is at the holding area and prior to his specialized OG training?

b. Has the trainee evidenced a sufficient appreciation of security in training?

c. Has each member of the OG's received a security check for overseas service?

## 6. TRANSPORTATION

a. Have all arrangements been completed to transport the OG's to the theater promptly after training is completed?

(1) Theater commander's approval?

(2) T/O's and T/E's complete?

(3) Inoculations and physical examinations completed?

b. Has an OG roster been sent to the strategic services officer?

c. Has the strategic services officer been informed when additional personnel requested will be transported?

## 7. REPORTS

a. Are reports on OG operations received from the field?

b. Do reports indicate that the operations of OG's conform to approved Strategic Services over-all and special programs?

c. Are the reports from the field complete and in the prescribed form?

## CHECK LIST

### FOR OG's, THEATER

1. *PLANNING*

    a. Do the projected operations conform to approved Strategic Services over-all and special programs?

    b. Has the operational plan been approved and co-ordinated by proper authority?

    c. Is all available intelligence considered and plans kept up to date?

    d. Has a system of supply been determined?

2. *PERSONNEL*

    a. Is Field Service Headquarters present and organized to administer control over OG's?

    b. Are the OG's up to strength? If not, can the required additional personnel be procured in the theater?

    c. Is the organization of OG's complete and in conformity with the T/O?

    d. Have the personnel of the OG's been inspected individually to determine their morale and physical fitness?

3. *TRAINING*

    a. Have the OG's received all specialized training required for the tasks assigned?

    b. Has the training of specialists been adequate to enable them to perform their individual duties?

    c. Has the training of the personnel of Field Service Headquarters and Area Headquarters prepared these organizations properly to perform their functions?

4. *SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT*

    a. Are the OG's, Field Service Headquarters, and Area Headquarters fully equipped in conformity with the T/E's?

    b. Is the required special OSS equipment available? If not, have requisitions been submitted? When will it be received?

    c. Is the individual equipment of the OG's complete and in order?

    d. Has a detailed supply plan been made for each task?

5. *REPORTS*

    a. Have detailed reports, within the limits of security control, been sent to OSS, Washington?

# Notes

MO

RATE OPERATIONS

N.º 43

## MORALE OPERATIONS
## FIELD MANUAL –

## STRATEGIC SERVICES

(Provisional)

Prepared under direction of
The Director of Strategic Services

# MORALE OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL

# – STRATEGIC SERVICES

(Provisional)

Strategic Services Field Manual No. 2.

---

Office of Strategic Services

Washington, D. C.

26 January 1943

This Morale Operations Field Manual, Strategic Services, (Provisional), is published for the information and guidance of all concerned and will be used as the basic doctrine for Strategic Services training for such subjects.

The contents of this Manual should be carefully controlled and should not be allowed to come into unauthorized hands. The Manual is intended for use of the OSS bases and should not be carried to advance bases.

AR 308—5, pertaining to handling of secret documents, will be complied with in the handling of this Manual.

*William J. Donovan*

William J. Donovan

Director

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

# MORALE OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL
## STRATEGIC SERVICES
### (Provisional)

### SECTION I—GENERAL PROVISIONS

#### 1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this Manual is:

<u>a</u>. To present the details of Morale Operations, and their relation to other Strategic Services activities and to OSS objectives, as well as to actual or planned military operations.

<u>b</u>. To set forth the general doctrine to be used in the planning and conduct of morale operations.

#### 2. DEFINITION

The term MORALE OPERATIONS as considered in this Manual includes all measures of subversion other than physical used to create confusion and division, and to undermine the morale and the political unity of the enemy through any means operating within or purporting to operate within enemy countries and enemy occupied or controlled countries, and from bases within other areas, including neutral areas, where action or counteraction may be effective against the enemy.

#### 3. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of subversive morale operations are:

<u>a</u>. WITHIN THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY — To incite and spread dissension, confusion, and disorder; to promote subversive activities against his government by encouraging underground groups, and to depress the morale of his people.

<u>b</u>. To discredit collaborationists, to encourage and assist in the promotion of resistance and revolt against Axis control by the people of these territories, and to raise their morale and will to resist.

<u>c</u>. WITHIN OTHER AREAS BEST SUITED TO THE PURPOSE— To conduct activities which will assist in the accomplishment of the objectives in <u>a</u>. and <u>b</u>. above.

<u>d</u>. WITHIN THE ENEMY ARMED FORCES, IN ALL AREAS— To induce low morale and encourage rebellion.

<u>e</u>. WITHIN OSS AND THEATERS—To support and assist other OSS activities, particularly SO and SI, in their respective fields.

#### 4. IMPLEMENTS

<u>a</u>. AUTHORIZED*

The Morale Operations Branch, in cooperation with other agencies of OSS, will employ the following implements for the accomplishment of the above objectives:

(1) *Contacts* with and manipulation of individuals and underground groups;

(2) *Agents provocateurs;*

(3) *Bribery and blackmail;*

(4) *Rumors;*

(5) *Forgery,* to include the writing of poison-pen letters, forging of misleading intelligence documents, falsification of enemy documents and periodicals, and the printing of false orders to the enemy, regulations, and proclamations;

(6) *False leaflets, pamphlets, and graphics,* to be used for subversive deception within enemy and enemy-occupied countries and not identifiable with any official or semi-official United Nations agency;

(7) *"Freedom stations"* masquerading as the voice of groups resistant within enemy and enemy-occupied countries when used for subversive deception and not identifiable with any official or semi-official United Nations agency.

<u>b</u>. UNAUTHORIZED

The following implements are not authorized:

(1) *Propaganda and publicity,* including the dissemination of information, arguments, appeals, and

---

* Under JCS 155/11/D, MO activities should confine themselves to means operating within or purporting to operate within enemy or enemy-occupied territory, and should avoid borderline activities such as leaflets which echo official United Nations propaganda themes, even when these leaflets are unlabelled and might be attributed to subversive groups in the target country.

instructions by mass means of communications (e.g., radio, press, graphics, motion pictures, official pronouncements) on behalf of or clearly emanating from any official or semi-official United Nations agency. This function is delegated to the Office of War Information.

(2) *Economic pressures* within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Economic Administration.

(3) *Official diplomatic pressures*, which are the formal and informal influences exerted through the medium of our regularly constituted State Department. MO may, however, give unorthodox support to State Department policies and activities when such support is desired and requested by that Department.

## 5. *GENERAL PRINCIPLES*

a. FOCUSING ON PRINCIPAL LEADERS AND LIMITED GROUPS

(1) Since the implements employed by MO are not mass means of communication, its operations are focused on principal leaders and special groups who exert, or are capable of exerting, real influence on and control of larger masses of people. These leaders are key enemy military and naval personnel, administrators, civil leaders, quislings, diplomats, and potential leaders of resistance. The groups are special elite groups, important segments of the armed forces, such as, say, naval personnel, soldiers in isolated areas, or soldiers with low morale in certain combat sectors, collaborationists, partisan groups, special political, religious, labor or other organizations, and any disaffected group in the population whose grievances and vulnerabilities can be exploited.

(2) The object is, therefore, to concentrate operations on those critical persons and groups whose subversion or cooperation will produce the most telling effects on large masses. Thus, all morale operations must be carefully "tailored" for the particular persons or groups that are its special targets. Open propaganda methods of wide dissemination and frequent repetition of such appeals as countering enemy

propaganda or building up general good-will for the United States are not within the scope of MO strategic services.

b. COORDINATION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS

(1) MO engages in operations that further actual or planned military operations. In areas of an active military offensive, MO focuses its operations on key enemy military and collaborationist personnel and on specific groups of people at specific times when and at places where its work will be of greatest assistance to our forces.

(2) Similarly, in enemy areas where military action is likely to occur, especially in rear areas of enemy command, communication, supply and transport, MO directs its activities toward critical military or civilian leaders and other persons in specific places where disruption of enemy activity or support of our own projected military action will have the greatest effect.

c. COLLABORATION WITH UNDERGROUND NETWORKS

In order to assist in the promotion of resistance and revolt among people of enemy-occupied and controlled territory and to discredit collaborationists, MO will utilize, so far as is practicable, existing underground networks for MO activities.

d. COOPERATION WITH OTHER BRANCHES OF OSS AND WITH ANALOGOUS ALLIED ACTIVITY

MO works in close liaison with SO and SI and allied networks of operatives and agents, and cooperates whenever possible in joint action. MO tasks in particular areas may be carried out by specially trained MO operatives and agents or by other OSS personnel under MO direction, as the situation requires.

## SECTION II—ORGANIZATION

## 6. *GENERAL*

The organizations within OSS, Washington and in the field, charged with the conduct of morale operations are the following:

a. MO Branch, OSS, Washington, D. C.;

b. MO Section, a part of the Strategic Services field base within a theater;

c. MO Section, a part of the Strategic Services base within a neutral area;

d. Field operating personnel, both within theaters and neutral areas.

## 7. *MO BRANCH, WASHINGTON*

The Morale Operations Branch, Washington, a part of Strategic Services Operations, is responsible for MO planning, administration, and special MO indoctrination of personnel, and for recruitment and procurement, all through established OSS channels.

## 8. *FIELD ORGANIZATION*

a. ORGANIZATION WITHIN THEATERS

(1) In each theater of operations MO activities are directed by the MO Section Officer under the control of the Strategic Services Officer, or any general Operations Officer designated by the Strategic Services Officer. In some theaters, the theater commander may designate a special unit for deceptive propaganda and combat subversive operations, and call on OSS to assign to it MO personnel, supplies, and equipment.

(2) The MO Section Officer is responsible to the Strategic Services Officer for the procurement through established channels of all MO supplies and equipment in his theater, the training and direction of all MO personnel recruited in the theater, and the administration of all MO personnel dispatched to the field from Washington but not destined for operations in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. He is responsible to the Strategic Services Officer for the direction of and policies and plans governing the operations of MO operatives and agents operating in enemy or enemy-occupied areas.

(3) The following are suggested as assistants to the MO Section Officer:

(a) Staff Officers

The Staff Officers are located in the field headquarters and may include the following persons:

(1) The Deputy Section Officer is assistant to the Section Officer and assumes charge in the absence of his superior.

(2) Liaison Officers maintain active contacts with other branches of OSS, and with other U.S. and Allied agencies conducting analogous activities.

(3) Desk Officers are responsible for plans and operations within their respective designated regions.

(4) The Personnel Officer and such assistants as he may require to recruit, process, and train agents, operatives, and technicians within the theater.

(b) Technicians and Experts

These will include persons with special training in the use of MO technical instruments as required.

(c) Field Operatives and Agents

Field Operatives and Agents will be procured and utilized for field operations, both at the base and behind enemy lines.

b. ORGANIZATION IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

(1) In neutral countries, MO personnel will be under the supervision of an MO Section Chief, who will be under the control of the Chief of OSS Mission.

(2) For reasons of security and to avoid interfering with the local requirements of the State Department, the strength of MO personnel should be kept to the smallest number necessary for the effective execution of approved MO programs.

(3) In view of the critical importance of cover in neutral countries, the cover of each authorized person conducting morale operations should be approved in accordance with OSS procedure for cover.

## SECTION III—SELECTION AND TRAINING

### 9. *RESPONSIBILITIES*

The MO Branch is responsible for indicating its requirements for personnel, and, subject to OSS regulations, assists the Services Branches in their selection. It is further responsible for indicating to the Schools and Training Branch the types of special training required for MO personnel.

### 10. *MO BRANCH OF OSS, WASHINGTON*

Personnel of the MO Branch at Washington should have wide and proven experience in the theory and practice of influencing human beings, possessing, if possible, foreign experience and executive and planning ability. The Chief of the MO Branch arranges for such special training of this staff as is necessary.

### 11. *FIELD PERSONNEL*

Requirements for field personnel vary, depending upon the duties and functions of the persons in question. In all instances due regard for security will be observed. The following is an indication of the requirements of each type of MO personnel:

a. FIELD HEADQUARTERS STAFF OFFICERS

These men should be reliable persons, of United States citizenship, having demonstrated proficiency in administrative affairs and the theory and practice of influencing human beings. They should be familiar with the area in which they are to work but do not necessarily have to have excellent linguistic qualifications. They are not required to enter occupied or enemy territories.

b. EXPERTS AND TECHNICIANS

These persons should be individuals usually of United States citizenship having requisite knowledge and skill to service, maintain, and operate the required MO implements.

c. FIELD OPERATIVES AND AGENTS

These men should be reliable persons, not always

7

of United States citizenship. They must possess linguistic qualifications and a detailed knowledge of the people and area in which they work. Normally they serve in enemy or enemy-occupied territories, but may also be called upon to serve at the base, either within theaters or neutral areas.

### 12. *TRAINING OF FIELD PERSONNEL*

The training of field personnel both in Washington and in the field includes the regular Strategic Services basic course in secret intelligence and special operations. In addition, this personnel receives special training in morale operations. This training covers:

a. Purposes and organization of MO;

b. Principles of strategic and tactical planning of MO tasks;

c. Methods of clandestine reproduction media, e.g., freedom stations, false printing;

d. Methods of morale subversion;

e. Sources and analysis of current intelligence;

f. Practice on field problems.

Special instruction and training dealing with the area of their activities will be given to all field personnel called upon to operate under cover.

## SECTION IV — COORDINATION OF MO FIELD ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER SERVICES

### 13. *COLLABORATION IN DETAILED PLANNING*

a. Morale operations will be most effective when they are planned as part of common campaigns conducted by various underground services and integrated closely with actual or planned military operations and Allied strategy.

b. The detailed plans prepared by the MO Section Officer should therefore be worked out through the closest liaison with SO, SI, the Allied underground services, representatives of native underground groups,

8

and with military and naval representatives. The strategic services officer facilitates, checks, and approves such coordinated plans.

c. Where specific military operations are contemplated, particular attention is paid to planning MO tasks in support of them. In addition, tasks which facilitate and complement the work of SO and SI are emphasized. The MO planner may be able to assist in the planning of SO and SI missions by drawing attention to the *specific* support that MO can render through bribery, rumor-spreading, use of freedom stations and false pamphlets, forged documents, direct personal contacts.

## 14. *COLLABORATION IN OPERATIONS*

a. Strategic Services operations out of field headquarters are governed by the nature of the problem that confronts the strategic services officer and by the size and training of the personnel available to him. Morale operations are treated as one integral part of the whole OSS program. When an MO task is to be conducted, and when there are properly placed and trained MO operatives and agents available to do it, these will be used. If a projected task involves physical operations or secret intelligence work, MO men may be given special SO and SI training in order to do the job. Similarly, when an MO task can be best accomplished by SO or SI men without jeopardizing their own work, these men may be given special MO training if necessary and assigned to the job.

b. Whenever SO or SI missions, networks, or contacts are established in a territory, MO should, whenever advisable, operate through them. Similarly, if Allied networks or trustworthy representatives of reliable native underground groups are available and willing to cooperate, these should be employed to do MO work.

c. When specific MO tasks require it or when the theater commander requests it, close collaboration with United States or Allied propaganda agencies in the field should be arranged.

## 15. *RELATIONSHIPS AND LIAISON*

a. Though MO field activities are under the direction

and control of the strategic services officer, the closest relationship between MO Branch, Washington and the MO Field Sections is necessary. Through appropriate channels, the MO Section Officer will report to Washington on his needs, his recommendations, and on the course of his operations. In turn, he will receive from the Director of Strategic Services, Washington, supplies and services which he may require, strategic services programs, plans, and implementation studies, MO campaigns and projects for his consideration, reports on morale operations conducted in other theaters, and reports on morale operations conducted directly out of Washington with which his own work should be coordinated.

b. Liaison with intelligence services at the base in the field is essential to effective MO field operations. This is particularly important for R&A and SI which should be informed as to the needs of MO.

## 16. *COMMUNICATIONS*

All communications between MO personnel, both in the field and from the field to Washington headquarters, will be through the regularly established communication system.

### SECTION V — IMPLEMENTS

## 17. *TYPES*

The major implements employed in subversive work are: direct personal contact by trained personnel and agents, bribery and blackmail, rumors, false leaflets, pamphlets and graphics, freedom stations, forgeries. The kinds of operations implemented by these instruments are given in Section VII on *OPERATIONS*.

## 18. *GENERAL CHANNELS*

a. For the purpose of carrying out various morale operations, the MO representative at an Allied or neutral base will make use of specially trained SS agents. However, such agents will be far too few in number to execute all the operations that the MO representative will desire to initiate. It will be necessary to enlist the

aid of various individuals and organizations not in OSS employ but strategically placed and willing to cooperate. In many cases, contacts can be made in Allied or neutral territory; in other cases it will be necessary for agents in enemy territory to make the contacts.

b. UNDERGROUND REPRESENTATIVES—Selected personnel of underground groups afford the best means of conducting morale operations, such as discrediting collaborationists, winning hostile elements, and promoting discord and revolt among the population. Hence the closest cooperation is desired. OSS should attempt to comply with reasonable requests from underground leaders for equipment, funds, and moral support, in order that a policy of friendly reciprocity may be established.

c. GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE—Closely related to underground movements are the governments in exile which maintain numerous contacts with the home country; their organizations can be used, where practicable and feasible, for promotion of morale operations. Caution must be exercised, however; certain of the governments in exile have strong political aspirations and may attempt to adapt MO plans to their own purposes. Liaison with such governments in exile should be controlled by the strategic services officer.

d. OTHER U.S. AGENCIES — The State Department, OWI, FEA, the Treasury Department, or the CIAA may be in a strategic position, particularly in neutral countries to provide MO with considerable support in the execution of plans.

e. OTHER ALLIED GOVERNMENTS—In certain areas of the world other members of the United Nations will be in an advantageous position for morale operations, and much time and labor can be saved by collaboration with agencies of these governments.

f. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS—Labor organizations have many connections in enemy territory and in general are among the most vigorous opponents of the enemy regimes. Former labor organizations which have been suppressed by the enemy may still retain remnants of

organization that can be used. For example, pre-war trade unions in occupied Europe, though suppressed, may still operate as clandestine organizations. Labor organizations have useful contacts with foreign as well as native laborers in enemy territories.

g. RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS—Religious groups, such as Catholics in Germany, Buddhists in Burma, Protestants in Japan, if properly approached may provide effective assistance for morale operations. Clerics have a high degree of mobility and are less harshly treated by political authorities than ordinary citizens.

h. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS—The Communists and the Social Democrats have hitherto been the most active political organizations opposing the enemy within his territory.

i. PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS — Professional people are, in general, ideologically opposed to the enemy. During the last war, an effective subversive organization in Belgium was composed of professional people (it was run by a university professor and an engineer). Professional classes have numerous international connections and are strategically located.

j. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS — Business organizations with branches in enemy territory may still retain connections that can be exploited. This is especially true of business organizations located in neutral countries. The "commercial traveler" is in an especially favorable position for morale operations.

k. FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS — Attempts should be made to enlist the cooperation of international fraternal organizations, like the Masons, which may be active in the enemy's territory and opposed to him.

l. NEWSPAPERS AND NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS—Assistance in spreading rumors and making "plants" may be obtained from newspapers and newspaper correspondents, especially in neutral and Allied countries, where stories may be published that will work their way into enemy territory.

m. SAILORS — Sailors from neutral countries whose ships touch enemy ports are particularly useful for

spreading rumors and engaging in other subversive work. Contact with sailors in general can most usefully be established through trade organizations.

n. TRAVELERS—Travelers between enemy and neutral or Allied and neutral territories are one of our most common sources of intelligence; it should also be possible to enlist the aid of certain of these travelers in MO activities.

o. FRIENDS AND RELATIVES—The friends and relatives of civilians and soldiers in enemy territory may provide a channel for morale operations in the letters they write to enemy territory.

p. CIVILIANS IN OCCUPIED AREAS — Sympathetic civilians in areas occupied by Allied troops may be allowed to penetrate the lines into enemy territory and carry out morale operations there.

## 19. *PERSONAL CONTACT*

a. Personal contact is the physical meeting or communication between agents, usually operating under cover, and other persons whose participation in morale operations is desired. The persons contacted are usually individuals in key positions, such as leaders or potential leaders of partisan, dissident, or enemy satellite groups, or any persons whose acts can have important morale-disrupting effects on the enemy.

b. The objective in most instances is to approach persons who can in turn influence others. The purpose is to swing key personnel over to achieving greater cooperation with resistance groups, to swing over fence-sitters and wavering personnel in enemy or satellite areas, to intimidate and terrorize key enemy figures or active collaborationists.

c. The best technique, whenever it can be used, is to employ *persuasion* backed up by promises of supplies. Work of this sort involves appeals to convictions, favors, status pressures, exchange of information, payment of legitimate expenses.

d. A detailed "Who's Who" for the area of operations

is essential intelligence for this work. Such a compilation requires a full and detailed list of key native personalities — pro-enemy leaders, pro-Allied leaders, fence-sitters, collaborationists, pseudo-collaborationists, and key figures in organizations in the area. The amount of prestige and influence of each person should be appraised, and a thoroughly worked out description of his background, his strengths and vulnerabilities should be included.

e. Cover, when used in personal contacts, requires the most careful planning. The operative or agent should not only be trained in the principles of cover, and be able to choose one that will protect him from discovery — he should also be "tailored" for the most effective approach to the person to be contacted. He should have the right personality, intelligence, experience, and "contacts" acceptable to the person. The special customs of the area for meeting and negotiating with individuals should not be violated.

## 20. *RUMORS*

a. A rumor is an unauthenticated, unofficial story or report, represented and transmitted as fact. Two broad types of rumors can be differentiated: subversive rumors which play upon the emotions and attitudes of their audience for the purpose of undermining morale; and rumors which seek primarily to mislead and deceive.

b. Subversive rumors against the enemy are used to exploit the fear and anxiety of those who have begun to lose confidence in military success; to instill false optimism and over-confidence which will lead to disillusionment; to cause popular antagonism to civil and military leaders; to create division among racial, political, religious, and military groups within a country, and between the peoples of allied countries; to cause enemy populations to distrust their own news sources; to lead civilian populations to precipitate financial, food, and other crises by panicky reactions; and to create confusion and dismay by presenting a welter of contradictory reports.

c. In addition to the above, rumors may be used to

cause diversionary or impotent enemy action, by revealing false information about our plans and capabilities.

d. The degree to which rumors can achieve such results is determined largely by: (1) the course of military events; (2) the effectiveness of other Allied propaganda media; (3) the effectiveness of enemy propaganda and enemy repressive measures; (4) the emotional state of the audience; and (5) the artfulness and suitability of the rumors in terms of the audiences' background and information. Rarely can they by themselves change basic attitudes. Their function is to confirm suspicions and beliefs already latent; to give sense and direction to fears, resentments, or hopes that have been built up by more materialistic causes; to tip the balance when public opinion is in a precarious state.

e. RUMOR TARGETS

The following groups are most susceptible to rumors:

(1) Groups or classes that have become fearful and anxious about their personal well-being. Rumors should tend to confirm the pessimistic expectations of the group involved.

(2) Groups or classes that have become unrealistically over-confident or hopeful. Rumors should focus on "information" which supports their hopes, which is consistent with information available to them, but which will ultimately produce disillusionment.

(3) Groups or classes that are suspicious of or hate other groups or leaders. Rumors directed against such groups should focus on "information" that justifies and increases hostility.

(4) Groups or classes whose monotonous, humdrum lives make them particularly susceptible to fantasy; for example, men in prisons, army camps.

(5) Highly religious groups.

(6) Primitive, highly superstitious groups whose naive, traditional beliefs can be exploited.

(7) Groups with guilty feelings who fear retribution.

(8) Special groups that lack information either as a result of censorship, discredited propaganda, physical isolation, or illiteracy.

f. PROPERTIES OF A GOOD RUMOR

A good rumor is one which will spread widely in a form close to that of the original story. Probably the main factor determining whether it catches on is the degree to which it is adapted for the state of mind of the audience. In addition, successful rumors embody most of the following qualities:

(1) *Plausibility*. A plausible rumor is tied to *some* known facts, yet incapable of total verification. It may exaggerate, but it stops short of the incredible. It frequently appears as an "inside" story.

(2) *Simplicity*. A good rumor uses only one central idea as a core. Its basic message is simple and thus easy to remember.

(3) *Suitability to task*. To summarize opinions or attitudes which are already widely accepted, slogan-type rumors are best. ("England will fight to the last Frenchman"). To introduce "information" which will help build up *new* attitudes, however, narrative-type rumors are best (e.g., rumors which "prove" that Hitler is mentally ill).

(4) *Vividness*. Regardless of length or type, rumors which stimulate clear-cut mental pictures with *strong emotional content* are likely to be most effective.

(5) *Suggestiveness*. The type of rumor which merely hints or suggests something instead of stating it is well adapted to spreading fear and doubt. The listener should always be allowed to formulate his own conclusions.

(6) *Concreteness*. The more concrete and precise a rumor, the less likely it is to become distorted in transmission.

g. USING RUMOR CHANNELS

(1) To do an effective job of dissemination, a thorough and systematic survey must first be made of

*all* possible channels. The form and content of a rumor should then be adapted to the particular outlets through which they are to be launched. For example, a rumor to be spread via longshoremen's circles might have a bit of pornography as its core. The several channels should be regularly re-examined to determine whether maximum circulation is being achieved.

(2) Rumor-mongers should be natives of the territory where the rumors are to be spread. For reasons of security, it is important that the rumor-monger should be discreet. The rumor should be spoken before an innocent but talkative person (e.g., barber, bartender) who will unconsciously spread the desired rumor.

(3) Rumors can also be initiated by planting material in newspapers, by writing provocative letters containing a purposive message, leaving the letters lying about where people will pick them up when they are alone, by use of denials, and by studied indiscretion.

h. Coordination and Timing

There are no inflexible rules as to whether rumors should precede or follow up other subversive implements in the execution of a given campaign. Rumors frequently prepare the ground for the later use of subversive pamphlets, for personal recruiting, and for open propaganda broadcasts and leaflets. In other instances, as, for example, following SO demolition, rumors may be used most effectively to exploit and exaggerate results achieved. To catch on, rumors must usually exploit the momentary focus of public interest. Hence, one rule of timing is always applicable: there must be as little time-lapse as possible between the provoking event and the launching of the rumor.

i. Special Uses of Rumors in Connection with Military Operations (to be employed only as directed by the theater commander).

The most effective way in which rumors can be used in direct connection with military operations is

in the creation of panic and confusion among civilian populations and enemy troops. Fright rumors can be used to direct civilian refugees into the path of a fleeing enemy and thus block his retreat. They can be used against enemy forces to induce surrender. Rumors may also be employed to foster or allay guilt, i.e., by attributing violence or atrocities to enemy forces or to our own, as the situation may require. Following military action by our forces, they can be used to create fear and anxiety by exaggerating the magnitude of damage done. They have also been used effectively following military action to cause the enemy to release, through refutation, information of value to our intelligence services.

j. Rumor Intelligence

The basis for good rumors is accurate, detailed intelligence. The rumor planner and the rumor operator must keep the closest possible check at all times on the character of the group they are trying to affect, on their traditions, circumstances, sentiments, and interests, and on contemporary happenings and developments. It is essential to have intelligence on what the audience knows and what it does not know, on what it fears and hopes for, on what its morale is at any given time, on what kinds of rumors have "caught on" in the past in the particular area. In many cases, the most effective rumor policy will be to spread further rumors that have arisen spontaneously in enemy territory.

21. *FALSE LEAFLETS, PAMPHLETS, AND GRAPHICS*

a. This type of implement refers to printed, mimeographed or written literature and graphics distributed secretly in enemy territory and under concealed sponsorship. This includes chain and, other anonymous letters, chalking symbols and messages on walls. The false pamphlet sponsored by a belligerent nation attempts to convey the impression that it is a bona fide message from the people's own fellow country-men who are sharing the same risks as the rest of the population and have similar aspirations, aims, and goals.

b. An appeal to nationalistic attitudes is more effective when made by the nationals of the group than when

made by another nation which has its own nationalistic axe to grind. Likewise, incitement to action or revolt coming from a representative of an aggrieved group is more effective than such incitement coming from an "outsider." Whenever an attempt is made to assure potential sympathizers that they would not be alone in resistance activities, such assurance comes better from a group which is presumably carrying on the same activities under the same conditions and taking the same risks.

c. USES OF FALSE LEAFLETS

(1) In general, the false leaflet can be used for dissemination of "forbidden" news, spreading of rumors, exposing nefarious activities of enemy officials and collaborationists, giving reassurances to potential sympathizers, instructing in sabotage, inciting to subversive activities, and preparing the populace for cooperation with invading troops. The false leaflet can be capitalized upon by propaganda agencies in popularizing a passive resistance campaign (such as the "V" campaign or the "1918" campaign). It may be desirable to have the campaign "planted" via false pamphlets. This "spontaneous" activity can then be picked up by the authorized propaganda agencies.

(2) The false pamphlet can be effectively used to make the enemy uneasy about the loyalty of the people in the territory. The very existence of clandestine pamphlets is "evidence" of underground activity.

d. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND LIMITING FACTORS

(1) While false literature ostensibly originates in enemy-occupied territory, it is frequently printed in neutral or Allied countries adjacent to the countries for which it is destined. This immediately raises important questions of (a) authenticity, (b) procurement of supplies, (c) transportation and distribution, (d) timing, and (e) security.

(2) The kind of paper, typography, ink, diction, colloquial expressions, and general composition should be indigenous to the country. That necessitates having, in the Allied or neutral country, the

proper supplies and equipment for printing the pamphlets, and the personnel to compose the pamphlets; or providing natives within enemy territory with proper supplies, equipment, and instruction in clandestine methods of reproduction.

(3) The problem of distribution is two-fold: first, the pamphlets, cuts, mats, and other supplies often must be smuggled into the enemy-held country by boat, submarine, plane, or agent; and second, the pamphlets must be distributed to the ultimate consumer within that country. The simplest method of distribution — scattering pamphlets from Allied planes — is not feasible since this would immediately betray the real origin of the pamphlets. The airplane, however, may be used to make pre-arranged wholesale deliveries to resistance groups who would then be responsible for retail distribution. In any event, distribution to the final consumer requires a network manned by native personnel in the country.

e. TIMING

In the case of pamphlets that are printed outside the country, the transportation and distribution process will frequently be a slow and dangerous one, and a considerable time will elapse between the period when a pamphlet is printed and the moment it reaches the intended reader. Therefore, such false leaflets cannot be used to exploit events of immediate and temporary importance.

f. SECURITY

(1) The problem of security is an important one *at every point of the process*. The printing, whether done externally or internally, must be kept secret from enemy agents and even from the people to whom the pamphlets are addressed, else the Allied origin would be disclosed. The smuggling of pamphlets or supplies into enemy territory is extremely hazardous and requires careful planning. Finally, the internal distribution of the pamphlets endangers the security of both the distributor and the reader.

(2) As a practical security aid, the pamphlet

should preferably be small, probably not greater than 6 x 8 inches. This facilitates smuggling and distribution, and also tends to protect the recipient of the pamphlet by making it much easier to hide. Not only should the pamphlet be small, but the message itself, whenever possible, should be brief. The message should stress one point and suggest positive action.

(3) It is customary to conceal false pamphlets by using the cover and format of a familiar enemy publication, such as a magazine, newspaper, or time-table; and by inserting them in packaged goods, containers of various sorts, books, magazines, and other pamphlets.

g. INTELLIGENCE

False pamphleteering can be successfully executed only if based on accurate information regarding the current attitudes and morale of the group for which it is adapted. Various other types of expert information will be necessary depending on the nature of the pamphlet. For example, a pamphlet that gives instructions on sabotage must be based upon detailed technical and regional knowledge.

h. COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

Several different agencies and types of personnel must cooperate in false pamphleteering. MO's function is primarily that of writing and translating texts, and directing distribution. The distribution of the pamphlets will usually be made by sympathizers and members of underground groups in the country. The information which goes into the pamphlet must be obtained from every source possible, including SI, SO, FN, and R&A. Natives of the country should be recruited by MO for the technical job of composing the pamphlets in order to insure authenticity in idiom and expression. For special MO campaigns, false pamphleteers should coordinate their activities with those of propaganda agencies, within limits of security. False pamphlets that urge sabotage or open revolt must be worked out under coordination with the theater command.

22. *FREEDOM STATIONS*

Various types of *cover* are used by freedom stations. They may pose as: the organ of a subversive (freedom) group within an enemy area; a regular official station of the enemy; the special organ of an official enemy group (Army, Navy, or party); the organ of an anonymous or private group within enemy territory, not openly subversive. Some freedom stations have no very definite cover at all beyond that of being a freedom station run by a colorful personality, the question of identity being left as a mystery.

a. USES OF FREEDOM STATIONS

Freedom station transmissions can be used for the following purposes:

(1) To spread demoralizing rumors among enemy soldiers and civilians;

(2) To encourage "patriotic" resistant groups within enemy territory by acting as their spokesman;

(3) To stimulate and direct sabotage and subversive activity;

(4) To make preparations for, and direct, popular uprisings and pro-Allied activity on D-day;

(5) To terrorize collaborationists and Axis officials by black-balling, giving the impression of a vast and powerful underground;

(6) To divide the enemy group from group, or nation from nation, by spreading divisive stories, by posing as a representative of one group or nation and condemning, insulting, ridiculing another group or nation;

(7) To heckle enemy broadcasts.

b. ESTABLISHING A FREEDOM STATION

(1) In addition to technical experts, the staff of a freedom station includes broadcasters who speak the language of the area to which the transmissions are beamed without a trace of foreign accent and with full knowledge of current slang. Freedom station broadcasters must appear to be typical representatives of the intended audience.

(2) Whether short or medium wave is to be used depends upon the distance from transmitter to audience (much greater distance with the same power can be achieved by a short-wave transmitter) and upon the type of receiving sets possessed by the audience (in Europe medium-wave receiving sets are much more common than short-wave). Mountainous obstructions reduce the range of audibility. Short-wave transmission is very good across water, very poor across sand.

(3) Ordinarily a freedom station is permanently located in friendly territory as close to the enemy area as power supply, transportation, and political problems will permit. The audience is gradually built up. On occasion, it may be feasible to employ mobile transmitters or captured enemy transmitters for freedom station purposes.

c. INTELLIGENCE

A freedom station must have detailed, up-to-the-minute intelligence. The best sources are: interviews with travellers from enemy areas, interviews with prisoners of war, reports from agents in the field, censorship material. Excellent intelligence is necessary because the clandestine station pretends to be closely identified with its audience, and to be broadcasting from within enemy or enemy-occupied territory; and because much of the audience appeal of subversive broadcasts depends upon its ability to reveal intimate intelligence about personalities and local affairs. While unverifiable rumors may be spread on occasion, it is important to hook all broadcast materials onto facts which can be verified by the audience, thereby lending prestige to the medium and making the rumors more credible.

d. AUDIENCE TECHNIQUES

Freedom stations employ various techniques to obtain a larger listening audience such as:

(1) Emphasizing the very mystery and danger of being a "Freedom Station," changing frequencies suddenly, or breaking off transmission and returning at a later period;

(2) Providing "inside dope" — naming names, giving facts in detail, giving the impression of eye-witness account;

(3) Using slang, vulgarity, and pornography when consistent with cover, giving gossip and "dirt," e.g., describing the sexual life of prominent enemy officials or their wives;

(4) Providing local color through news items, songs;

(5) Making special group appeals to youth, women, peasants, workers, Catholics, social democrats;

(6) Selecting a domestic "enemy" or object of hate (individual leader, political, social or ethnic group), continually attacking him and blaming him for all evils;

(7) Predicting military developments;

(8) Pretending to have a tremendous following, appearing to address organized groups — "comrades";

(9) Using catchy titles, symbols, slogans, songs, jokes;

(10) Providing news "scoops";

(11) Playing incidental recorded music which will catch "dial twisters";

(12) Making broadcasts brief (10-15 minutes), so that the danger to listeners will be minimized and the chances of hearing a particular message maximized;

(13) Broadcasting on enemy domestic frequencies during lulls, between programs, and pauses in speeches during air raids, and shortly after enemy radios shut down for the night, thus catching the regular enemy audience. Since a single freedom station program uses a transmitter only a small part of the time, it is common to use the same transmitter for several different programs, usually directed to different audiences.

e. SECURITY

(1) The freedom station presents an unusual

security problem. Extreme precaution must be taken not to reveal its sponsorship or location. Nevertheless, there is little hope that its *general* sponsorship and location can be concealed from the enemy, who will spot it through radio engineering methods, and therefore it must be carefully concealed to prevent bombing attacks. Furthermore, while enemy officials may discover the general location and sponsorship, the chances are that they will not reveal the information to their own public, because it would only call attention to the freedom station and possibly increase its audience (there is no record of an enemy country ever having "exposed" a freedom station).

(2) An additional security problem arises from the fact that a freedom station is frequently so indecent and deceitful that its exposure might arouse public opinion in one's own country and result in public arguments on the moral issues involved.

(3) Special precautions must be taken that the station does not present information which, in view of its cover, it could not be expected to know; or information which comes from a recognizable source.

f. COORDINATION WITH OTHER OPERATIONS

A freedom station may assist SO operations in the following ways: by giving instructions on, and stimulating sabotage and guerrilla warfare; by acting as spokesman for and encouraging an underground movement; by directing popular uprisings and pro-Allied activities on D-day.

g. COORDINATION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS

A freedom station can assist the military in a theater of war by spreading confusion, demoralizing, and divisive rumors; by encouraging resistance to the enemy; and by directing sympathetic groups on D-day.

h. LIMITATIONS OF THE FREEDOM STATION

The effectiveness of a freedom station is limited by the following conditions: the power of the transmitter; the number of receiving sets possessed by the audiences; the willingness of individuals in enemy areas to risk their lives listening to a forbidden radio program; the

severity of punishment for listening; the trust which listeners will put in a broadcast that professes to speak in their interest but has no authority behind it. The freedom station is also limited by the degree to which the listeners take the station seriously and do not feel they are being hoaxed. A few slips, such as out-of-date slang, misinformation easily checked up, or failure to maintain cover, will quickly show up a clandestine broadcast.

23. *FORGERY*

a. "Forgery" is understood to mean the act of falsely making or altering any kind of document.

b. Forgeries can be used for the following purposes: to assist the theater commander, when requested, to deceive and confuse the enemy regarding our military intentions and capabilities; to harass and over-burden the enemy administration; to implicate enemy personnel; to spread information and rumors designed to demoralize and divide the enemy; to arouse false hopes.

c. Forgeries are usually intended to fall into the hands of enemy military personnel, enemy political police, or groups who may possess definite suspicions that will be confirmed by the forgery, and to implicate enemy personnel and destroy confidence in leaders.

d. Forgeries will usually be the more effective if supported by rumors and other morale operations. Conversely, forgeries are particularly important for confirming operations initiated through other channels.

e. Extreme care must be taken to make the forgery appear *authentic* — otherwise it may have a serious boomerang effect. It must be technically perfect. It must fall into the proper hands through apparently normal channels. It must be consistent with facts known and impressions currently held by the enemy, preferably adding fuel to an already existing fire. Too many forgeries will defeat the purpose — unless the purpose is that of making all documents of the given kind suspect. A poor forgery may not only expose an agent, but may also expose and invalidate other more competent forgeries.

#### f. TYPES OF FORGERIES

Any kind of written communication can be forged. The following are common types: (1) propaganda documents, ostensibly designed to increase the morale of the enemy or improve his relations with an enemy ally, but actually written in such a way that an opposite effect will be achieved; (2) periodicals, which imitate enemy periodicals and convey misleading or morale-disturbing information; (3) business documents, using letterheads or other business forms of either enemy, Allied or neutral firms, and filled out with misleading information; (4) cables, either Allied or enemy; (5) canards, which are extravagant reports or documents circulated for the purpose of deluding large sections of the public; and (6) letters of all kinds. In addition to the above, upon request of the military authorities, the Commander can be assisted by forging military documents, which include fake *enemy* military documents, especially fake orders; and fake Allied military documents, especially documents containing false intelligence on Allied plans and capabilities.

#### g. INCRIMINATING DOCUMENTS

(1) Incriminating forgeries, especially letters, are prepared to cast suspicion upon selected enemy or collaborationist personnel actually loyal to the enemy. Letters may be sent to the individual in question from a neutral country and be incriminating by virtue of the implications of their contents when intercepted by enemy censors; they may be sent from one neutral country to another and be intercepted when passing through enemy territory; they may be sent to enemy police, party or military officials from a neutral country, and contain direct charges; they may be sent anonymously from within enemy territory to police, party or military officials and contain direct charges; or they may be left in spots where enemy officers will "discover" them. The latter type is dangerous, however, unless expertly done (preferably by pasting together words from newspapers) because police efforts will doubtless be made to discover the writer.

(2) Incriminating documents are often designed merely to harass and over-burden the enemy secret police. If supported by other evidence, they may, however, succeed in causing liquidation of undesirable persons although this is a result that should not be anticipated unless circumstances are very favorable and the case is built up with the greatest skill. Additional results of incriminating documents may be resentment against the secret police on the part of individuals investigated (particularly of army officers), and the slackening of secret police investigation of really disloyal personnel, should a number of suspect individuals turn out to be loyal and cause embarrassment to the secret police.

(a) *Targets.* Collaborationists provide good targets because enemy police are more likely to be suspicious of these individuals than of their own people. Certain collaborationists have, in fact, turned out to be really working for the Allies. For this reason extreme care must be taken in selecting the target. One must be absolutely sure that he is in fact a quisling. A thorough and accurate intelligence report must therefore be first obtained on each potential target.

(b) Army or navy officers are usually good targets in view of the internal discord that would be created by a secret police investigation.

(c) Officials of enemy-allied or satellite nations, usually suspect in the eyes of the enemy, make good targets. Only those known definitely to be enemy sympathizers should be concentrated on.

(d) If a forged document is directed against a party official, he should ordinarily not be so high in rank that the lower officials will be afraid to do anything about it, or will refuse to believe it.

(e) *The incriminating case.* The offense charged or implied should be serious enough to be worthy of secret police attention. It should be consistent with the known past of the accused. For example, a man of wealth, particularly one who has often dealt with foreign firms, would be a most

suitable person to implicate as having concealed funds in a neutral country. A direct accusation should be accompanied by several correct corroborating circumstances. A mere general charge that X is really not a quisling but an Allied agent is likely to receive little attention, but a statement of true particulars of X's whereabouts and actions on a certain day on which he is alleged to have acted treasonably will produce action.

(f) A letter of accusation should be written in the way in which the purported sender would be expected to write. If, for example, it purports to come from an Argentine banker and to acknowledge to a Swiss banker the receipt of funds for the account of a French client, ordinary commercial language should be used. The accusation should not be so subtly concealed that the censor or other intended reader will fail to discover it. A number of incriminating letters accusing different people should not be sent from the same source in the same style, with the same paper.

## 24. *BRIBERY AND BLACKMAIL*

a. Bribery and blackmail, while in many cases extremely effective, must be used with great caution. Unless done skillfully, they may result in exposure of the operator. This is especially true for bribery, since the art of double-crossing is an ancient one, and the bribed individual is apt to be an unscrupulous person willing to work for either side.

b. Bribery and blackmail must be adjusted to the social customs and expectations of the recipient. In some areas of the world (particularly in the East) and among some classes of people, bribery is almost as common as tipping in the United States; in other areas and among other classes of people, the mere suggestion of bribery is highly insulting.

c. Such individuals as political and military leaders, newspaper editors and reporters, radio broadcasters, heads of business houses, religious, professional and

labor leaders, police, petty officials, customs officers, and sentries are the most useful targets of bribery.

d. USES OF BRIBERY

(1) In rare instances, bribery may be effective in accomplishing important strategic secret diplomatic acts, especially in enemy satellite countries (see paragraph 33-e). Typically, bribery is used to *aid* in carrying out less ambitious operations. Thus, for the purpose of spreading rumors, it may be desirable, especially in neutral areas, to bribe newspaper men or radio announcers to plant the rumors in newspapers or in broadcasts. Bribing of police officials may facilitate the creation of an "incident" or riot.

(2) In some cases, bribery can, by itself, achieve certain MO objectives. Thus by judicious bribing of local leaders of various enemy or fence-sitting political, religious, labor or professional groups, the group may be induced to engage in subversive work — or by selective bribing of such officials, dissension might be created in the rank of the organization. Successful bribery of an enemy or collaborationist official followed by exposure to the enemy authorities can also be used to discredit or neutralize the effectiveness of such officials and create doubt and suspicion of all officials.

e. OPERATION OF BRIBERY

(1) It is often desirable for the first services purchased to be of a minor character, and one not involving great risk on his part. Once the initial bribe has been accepted, and evidence of such bribery has been obtained, the demands can become successively greater. Where possible, the "reward" or bribe should also be of such a nature as to become increasingly indispensable to the recipient.

(2) In many cases money may be less effective than goods or services, particularly in areas where certain goods and services are relatively inaccessible while money is plentiful. The following may be useful depending on the needs and susceptibilities of the recipient: food, medicines, drugs (this may involve first inducing a dependency in the individual upon a

drug), clothes, liquor, employment, escape to neutral countries, transportation of letters to friends and relatives outside, release of relatives or recipient from prison, protection, business tips, social and political favors, especially aid to the recipient's family.

(3) Indirect or covert bribery may be used where it will reduce the danger of exposure and avoid the possibility of insulting the recipient. Covert bribery involves the use of such techniques as the following: selling goods below their value; buying goods above their value; losing to the recipient at gambling; making unwinnable bets with him; presenting him with expensive gifts; making heavy "loans"; granting monopolistic rights to certain revenues, products or services; establishing "philanthropic" organizations as fronts; subsidizing corporations.

f. TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

To carry through successful bribery it is essential to have full intelligence on the character of the recipient — his needs, weaknesses, grievances, fears, hopes, honesty, and integrity. What he feels deprived of in the way of goods and services should be known. Closest collaboration with X-2 should be maintained.

g. BLACKMAIL

(1) Blackmail is directed against the same targets and can be used for the same purposes as bribery. It differs from bribery in that threats, rather than rewards, are used to induce action. They are ordinarily threats to divulge information about the individual which would cause him serious harm, socially, politically, or physically. This information can be based on acts committed by the individual in the past, acts now being committed, acts which the individual *believes* he has commited, or acts which he has not in fact committed but for which evidence is planted against him.

(2) Threats to reveal infractions of rules — especially military regulations — constitute a good hold on a man. In wartime, regulations are so numerous, complex, and severe, that it is difficult for any-

one not to break *some* of them, or to fear one has broken them.

(3) Blackmail is often a secondary stage of bribery. After a man has accepted bribes, he is kept in line by threats that his duplicity will be exposed; or both may be used at the same time.

(4) The action demanded of the victim should be consonant with the blackmail risk involved. That is, care should be taken to see to it that the action demanded of him does not entail greater risks than the consequences of exposure of his original "misdeed."

h. TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

(1) Blackmail requires intimate intelligence on the man, his family, his friends, or his associates. Documentary or photographic evidence is valuable.

(2) When incriminating information is difficult to secure, or when no such information exists, it may be possible either to create it or to plant it. A study of the individual's character should suggest special vulnerabilities (drugs, alcohol, women, luxury, power), which may be exploited and result in transgressions. If this is not feasible, spurious documents, and bits of "telltale evidence" can be used to build up a case. The latter procedure, however, will be extremely difficult and dangerous. Closest collaboration with X-2 should be maintained.

i. COORDINATION WITH OTHER OSS AGENCIES

Inasmuch as bribery and blackmail are two techniques which will also be used by SO and SI, projected operations should be checked with these branches. Frequently an individual who has been successfully used by one branch can be used by the other.

25. *COORDINATION OF MO CHANNELS AND IMPLEMENTS*

a. A morale operation will be the more effective if several implements are used to carry it out. For example, a rumor or an anti-Axis slogan may be planted in a freedom station broadcast. A few days later it may be

carried also in a false pamphlet. Through personal persuasion or possibly bribery, a newspaper in a neutral capital picks it up. Evidence (forged) is discovered confirming it. Finally the propaganda radio picks up the item.

b. Certain channels naturally supplement each other. The same appeals can be made by freedom station and false pamphlet. In fact, it is common for false pamphlet writers within enemy territory to obtain much of their material from clandestine broadcasts. Bribery and blackmail may be employed to facilitate rumor-spreading and false pamphlet distribution. Forgeries will confirm suspicions about individuals initially raised by freedom stations, false pamphlets, or rumors. And conversely, a false pamphlet, for example, can photostat and publicize an incriminating forged document.

c. When several implements are used to carry out an MO project and when the project is developed through the coordinated use of several implements and channels, the operation is referred to as an MO "campaign". The most important projects should, if possible, be carried out in this fashion.

## SECTION VI — PLANNING

### 26. *GENERAL*

a. NOMENCLATURE

For convenience in planning, the meanings of the following general terms are indicated below:

(1) *Over-All Program for Strategic Services Activities;* a collection of objectives, in order of priority (importance) within a theater or area.

(2) *Objective;* a main or controlling goal for accomplishment within a theater or area by strategic services as set forth in an Over-all Program.

(3) *Special Program for Strategic Services Activities;* a group of detailed missions, assigned to one or more Strategic Services branches, designed to accomplish an objective, having also a general statement of the situation and the general methods of accomplishment.

(4) *Mission;* one or more subsidiary goals set forth in a special program which together result in the accomplishment of an objective, and are usually assigned to one Strategic Services branch.

(5) *Operational Plan;* an amplification or elaboration of a special program, containing in greater detail the means of carrying out the specified activities.

(6) *Task;* a detailed operation, usually planned in the field, directed toward the accomplishment of a mission.

(7) *Target;* an individual place, establishment, person, or individual which is involved in the accomplishment of a task or result desired.

(8) *The Field;* all areas outside of the United States in which Strategic Services activities take place.

(9) *Field Base;* an OSS headquarters in the field, designated by the name of the city in which it is established, e.g. OSS Field Base, Cairo.

(10) *Advanced or Sub-Base;* an additional base established by and responsible to an OSS field base.

(11) *Operative;* an individual employed by and responsible to the OSS and assigned under special programs to field activity.

(12) *Agent;* an individual recruited in the field who is employed and directed by an OSS operative or by a field or sub-base.

(13) *Cover;* an open status, assumed or bona fide, which serves to conceal the secret activities of an operative or agent.

(14) *Cutout;* a person who forms a communicating link between two individuals, for security purposes.

(15) *Resistance Groups;* individuals associated together in enemy-held territory to injure the enemy by any or all means short of military operations, e.g., by sabotage, espionage, non-cooperation.

(16) *Guerrillas;* an organized band of individuals in enemy-held territory, indefinite as to number, which

conducts against the enemy irregular operations including those of a military or quasi-military nature.

b. STRATEGIC TASKS

In deciding on the general MO strategy for a given territory, the major subversive tasks most suitable to the situation existing in the area are selected. Below are listed the major tasks which may achieve the MO objectives within the areas cited in Section I, paragraph 3.

(1) *Within the enemy's country*

(a) Dividing the enemy.

(b) Inducing panic in enemy population.

(c) Strengthening the enemy civilians' desire for peace, and raising false hopes.

(d) Subverting enemy civilian populations during a ground offensive.

(2) *Within enemy occupied or controlled territory*

(a) Promotion of resistance and revolt against the enemy.

(b) Interfering with the enemy's consolidation and use of an occupied country's capabilities.

(c) Producing civilian disorder in support of military operations.

(d) Increasing terror, friction, and demoralization among collaborationists.

(e) Provoking rebellion or a *coup d'etat* in a satellite country or inducing its separation from the Axis.

(3) *Within other areas*

(a) Establishing an MO section of a base in a neutral country for operations in enemy and enemy-dominated countries.

(b) Assisting the chief of the diplomatic mission in special work requested by him.

(4) *Within the enemy armed forces, in all areas*

(a) Fostering rebelliousness within enemy armed forces.

(b) Inducing surrender.

---

(5) *Within OSS, Washington and theaters*

(a) Within OSS, Washington, over-all planning for and servicing of field operations.

(b) Assistance desired by the theater commander.

27. *BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING*

All plans prepared by MO must be for the purose of attaining the purpose of the over-all program for a given theater or area and of the special MO programs pertaining thereto. In such inplementation the following general principles should be observed:

a. SUITABLE OBJECTIVES — Successful planning and execution of MO tasks require that *specific* MO objectives be clearly delineated. These objectives are those which, when fully achieved, produce the most damaging morale disrupting effects on the enemy.

b. FEASIBILITY — Only those MO tasks are planned in which all the operations required to accomplish the objectives are practical of execution with the means OSS possesses or can reasonably expect to obtain from the theater commander and other cooperating agencies or media.

c. ACCEPTABILITY — All subversive operations should lie within the scope of MO policy as authorized, and should justify the costs involved. Since MO activities by their nature are deceptive and not attributable to any official or semi-official United States or United Nations agency, morale operations need not conform to public statements of policy. However, they should be so planned and executed as not to jeopardize United States state of war policy.

d. OFFENSIVE — In general, MO tasks should consist of aggressive, determined, continuous, and unrelieved action against the enemy.

e. TIMING AND PLACING—The military, and especially the political and social situation in which the task is to be carried out, should be carefully studied and the subversive action planned for the exact time when, and place where, its total effect will be greatest.

### 28. OVER-ALL MO PLANS

All subversive operations in a given territory should be in conformity with an objective in a special program. MO should prepare MO plans for the implementation of these special programs and although no rigid form is necessary for such a plan, the MO section of it should, in conformity with the basic principles listed above, contain the following:

a. A brief statement of the missions in the special programs that MO is charged to accomplish.

b. A succinct survey of the situation, including only data that has *direct bearing* on the MO tasks which will carry out the stated missions. This survey would normally include summaries of the military situation, of the capabilities of the enemy, and of the capabilities of MO and its cooperating agencies and media.

c. A listing of the proposed tasks or courses of action which will achieve the stated missions. If necessary, order of priority should be given, and any timing or placing requirements. The cooperative relation of these tasks to military operations, to other strategic services operations, to subversive strategic plans of Allied partners, and (when relevant) to MO plans in other territories and theaters should be shown. It is to be assumed that all the tasks have been checked for acceptability, but if any question is to be anticipated, a statement clearing up the matter should be included.

d. A statement of requirements for the projected tasks, including an indication that arrangements for carrying out all the necessary operations have been made.

e. If necessary, a statement of any important contingencies that may seriously alter the plan, and how these contingencies will be met.

### 29. TACTICAL PRINCIPLES

a. Tactics are the particular morale operations necessary to carry out the general tasks laid down in the over-all MO basic plan. Operational planning requires

decisions on what specific tasks are to be engaged in, precisely when and where the job is to be done, what specific operatives, agents, collaborating persons are to be employed, what particular persons or groups are the objects of subversive action, and what implements are necessary.

b. Originality, knowledge of the situation, enterprise, and practical judgment determine good tactics. Nevertheless, specific courses of subversive action are always more effective if governed by a few simple principles. If these are ignored, results are often ineffective or wasteful, if not disastrous.

c. The principles of strategy apply equally to tactics—those of object, offensive, timing and placing, feasibility, and acceptability. In addition, there are a few principles dealing specifically with subversive tactics.

d. Most work of this kind involves inducing individuals or special groups to think, feel, and finally to act, wittingly or unwittingly, willingly or unwillingly, in a desired manner. To get them to act requires *inciting* them to act by so capitalizing on strong desires and emotions that they see and feel real personal or group advantages in acting, despite the personal danger involved, and *presenting* the lines of action in the proper way so they know clearly what should be done and find it within their means to do it. Getting people to act is not entirely a matter of intuition. A few broad principles are known to practitioners:

(1) Simplicity — Proposed ideas or actions should be simple and clear and be presented in a form easy to remember.

(2) Plausibility and feasibility—Proposed ideas or actions should be within the understanding of the persons or groups approached; and the desired work should be action they feel or are led to feel they can actually carry out.

(3) Suggestion (especially in deception) — Proposed ideas or actions are usually more effective when presented by indirection, so that persons or groups

are led to believe they have arrived at their own conclusions, and that they voluntarily participate in the work.

e. INCITEMENT AND INDUCEMENT—Many persons or groups who will do effective MO work already have a strong desire for action. Verbal appeals to their own self-interests are likely to sound naive to them. They need little incitement — what they need is encouragement, guidance, and above all, support or subsidy. Fence-sitters, collaborationists, and enemy personnel with low morale can be induced to act subversively only if strongly impelled to do so in their immediate or future self-interest. It is necessary, therefore, to discover what will impell them to act, and, in terms of these impelling emotions and desires to use suggestion, bribery, or blackmail to induce action. In particular, the following should be exploited:

(1) Fears, anxieties, hatreds, feelings of discrimination, grievances, and mysticisms.

(2) Hopes and desires for personal gain.

(3) Conceptions of right and wrong.

(4) Social position (prestige, face, vanity).

(5) Desire for personal security.

## 30. OPERATIONAL PLANS

a. The MO Section Officer should delegate staff personnel to draw up detailed plans for every important MO tactical operation. These plans will show how the projected morale operations implement the approved special programs or directives based thereon.

b. These plans should be as detailed as possible, for they constitute a blue-print of action. They should be *written,* in order to insure that all important details have been considered, to facilitate conferring with collaborating personnel who are directly involved in the operations, to permit approval by the strategic services officer, and to provide for the briefing of operatives and agents who will put the plan into effect.

c. Responsibility for the development of the details of operational plans lies with the MO Section Officer.

These plans will implement the MO Programs. The Implementation Studies sent from Washington will be useful in formulating these programs as well as specific information on which these plans are based obtained in the theater base from SI and R&A representatives, from G-2, A-2, ONI, JICA, and from Allied sources.

d. The nature of the problem will determine the form of an operational plan. It should, however, include the following:

(1) A precise delineation of the MO targets of the operation, with a brief statement indicating how the particular targets are, under the circumstances, the most suitable in implementing the special program.

(2) An adequate survey of intelligence bearing on the problem, including only such matters as collaborating personnel and MO personnel must know in order to execute the projected tasks.

(3) A complete detailing of all the important operations required. Progressive steps in the action should be indicated, showing the times when and places where action will occur, specific persons and groups involved, nature of cover, specific use of MO implements and the coordination of them, probable enemy counter-action to be anticipated, and how it is to be met.

(4) All details of collaboration with the armed services, with SO and SI, with Allied agencies, with native underground personnel, and with propaganda agencies (if involved).

e. To insure that all the operations are feasible, sufficient detail should be included showing the requirements of the operations and how they are met, covering such matters as equipment, communications, transport, supplies, liaison, and the selection and briefing of operatives and agents.

## SECTION VII — OPERATIONS

## 31. GENERAL

a. This section describes the subversive operations which may be especially suitable in carrying out the

strategic tasks of MO as set forth in Section VI, paragraph 26 b.

b. Under each of these strategic tasks there is presented a statement of mission and of practical principles which may be helpful in planning and directing these operations.

c. This section does not attempt to show the detailed administration of personnel engaged in the subversive operations to accomplish these strategic tasks. In general, however, the strategic services officer will administer the personnel engaged in all morale operations including MO operatives and agents in enemy or enemy-occupied territory and at the base. These MO operatives and agents, though acting under the direction and policies of MO, will conduct their activities under the administration and discipline of an OSS officer responsible for operations of both MO and SO agents. Such activities will therefore call for the closest joint planning by the MO-SO staff personnel.

d. The actual implements and channels employed in these operations are also not developed in this section, except by way of illustration. The actual means available to the MO Section Officer in each theater base — and they may vary greatly from one base to another — will determine by what direct and indirect media he will effect these operations. At some bases, some of the implements required for MO work, especially radio and printing facilities, may be assigned by the theater commander to a special combat propaganda unit not under the jurisdiction of the strategic services officer. In this case, MO personnel, supplies, and equipment may be assigned to this unit to effect that part of the MO program requiring these implements. For effective action in this situation, the closest collaboration between the MO Section Officer and the officer in charge of this special unit is necessary.

32. *WITHIN THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY*

a. DIVIDING THE ENEMY

(1) The mission is to destroy unity among enemy groups and people by alienating group from group,

people from leaders, and nation from nation. A divided home front and a split between enemy nationals are major factors in enemy collapse.

(2) Divisive activities are most profitably carried on with greatest intensity following enemy military reverses or domestic crises, *since at these times dormant splits begin to reappear*. These divisive activities, whether on a local or on an international scale, concentrate on exploiting long-standing cleavages and issues.

(3) The following activities serve to divide *group from group*: launching subversive radio, press, or rumor programs which attack one group (e.g., the Army) but do not attack and may even defend another group (e.g., the Party); planting evidence of treason on political or military leaders by such means as: sending compromising decipherable messages by radio or telegraph, having the individual in question receive especially favorable mention in clandestine leaflets which will be picked up by the police; arranging leaks in neutral countries by diplomatic personnel revealing that selected individuals can be "depended upon"; spreading evidence to show that big industrialists are profiteering; spreading rumors that army divisions drawn from "politically difficult" areas are being sent to the most dangerous fronts; spreading rumors that more members of a given group or class have surrendered or deserted to Allied forces than others. Minor leaders of a political or economic group which has grievances against other groups should be encouraged by bribery and persuasion to take a militant stand against the offending group. The possibility of simultaneously encouraging and bribing the second group to similar aggressive action should also be investigated.

(4) Tactics that divide *people from leaders are*: spreading rumors that leaders are protecting their future by buying securities and durable goods in neutral countries; arranging for agents actually to purchase money, jewels or precious works of art in a neutral capital, then letting it leak that these are

being bought for prominent leaders; introducing into the enemy country picture postal cards of famous castles, villas, and in the descriptive paragraph including such sentences as "The recently purchased villa in Sweden of Herr von Ribbentrop is very similar in architectural design to this beautiful building"; spreading subversive songs, jokes, cartoons, which attack the government; sending tips to the secret police of alleged hoarding and black market operations; circulating reports that deplore or commend the brilliance of methods by which the sons and relatives of officials are avoiding the draft, getting easy jobs, buying restricted food.

(5) Where authentic evidence is available that some leaders are engaged in one or more of the illegal actions described above, opportunities should be put in their way for expanding these activities, to be followed by exposure or blackmail.

(6) To divide *nation from nation,* the following activities are effective; exploiting incidents in which friction occurs between Axis soldiers from different countries; provoking fights and brawls wherever different Axis nationals come together; circulating reports that the reason for moving prisoners of war from one camp to another is enmity between the nationals; circulating rumors and reports of all cases in which forces of the stronger Axis countries desert the troops of the weaker Axis members; circulating statistics of disproportionate casualties of the different nationals; when troops of one country are quartered in another Axis area, exploiting all social problems, especially sexual, which inevitably arise, increase of juvenile delinquency, adultery, pregnancy, venereal diseases; circulating in one enemy country political statements, jokes and satires derogatory to it which are ascribed to the nationals of the other.

b. INDUCING PANIC IN ENEMY POPULATIONS

(1) The mission is to augment feelings of insecurity, anxiety, and panic in enemy civilian population. Such a program is especially desirable just before a

military offensive. But even when a battle is not imminent, neurotic anxiety adds greatly to the political and administrative problems of the enemy. Further, the mental state of the civilians at home inevitably is communicated to men at the front through letters or *via* soldiers returning from furloughs, and thus a panicky civilian population helps to demoralize soldiers in combat zones.

(2) Operations are preferred which augment normal fright reactions to war events, such as inducing sympathizers to scream hysterically in factories and shelters during air raids or upon the publication of casualty lists; distributing small clandestine leaflets purporting to tell how to avoid alleged horrible consequences of incessant bombings — insanity and feeblemindedness, stunting of growth, various nervous disorders, sexual impotency or frigidity, sterility, miscarriage, deafness, blindness; spreading "information" on the methods of avoiding these terrible effects, say, by recommending going to a doctor within 24 hours after a bombing for examination whether the person appears injured or not.

(3) One of the most disorganizing civilian anxieties is the belief that there exists a widespread fifth-column group, that there is no one in whose loyalty one can have faith. To exploit this fear is dangerous, as it may result in reprisals on bona fide agents and sympathizers. When, however, an hysterical state can be so fostered that mob action can be turned on civilians not in the underground, then this work is most effective.

c. STRENGTHENING THE ENEMY CIVILIANS' DESIRE FOR PEACE, AND RAISING FALSE HOPES

(1) The mission is to subvert the fighting spirit of enemy civilians by causing them to agitate for peace and by raising false hopes. Any degree of success not only adds to the crippling of enemy civilian war work, but communicates poor morale to the fighting forces.

(2) Enemy civilians who are susceptible to peace stimuli can be divided into two general categories:

(a) Those who are resistant to the regime and who use pacifist propaganda as a cover to excuse their activities and protect them from charges of treason.

(b) Those who are loyal to the regime but sincerely desire peace.

(3) To exploit *both* these groups, clandestine agitation for peace should be kept on a lofty plane. It should not be complicated by tirades against enemy leaders. It should not be suspect as originating outside the country. Peace is urged as a desirable end in itself.

(4) Two major lines of action may be employed: playing up the horrors of war, and exploiting the pacifistic or religious attitudes of the civilians.

(5) For the horror approach, subversive pictures, for example, may be circulated of burned and mutilated soldiers, asking, "Will your son or husband be next? Save him from this by demanding peace." These pictures should be distributed ostensibly, say, by a peace society made of enemy underground nationals. The maimed and crippled may be encouraged to display themselves in public as much as possible. A rumor may be spread that a certain shrine in a large city has miraculously cured war injured. All war injured are encouraged to make pilgrimages to that shrine.

(6) Religious pacifism is exploited by suggestion; for example, numerous small crosses may be distributed with the single word "peace" written thereon. A rumor may be spread that because of the appearance of a certain saint who also appeared shortly after the end of the last war thousands of women are now praying for peace at noon every day (that being the hour designated by the saint). Reports may be circulated that certain women who have prayed for peace at a certain shrine (in a large city) have miraculously been spared death in the family.

(7) Desire and action for peace will be increased if enemy civilians are made to believe that there is real evidence that peace is within immediate reach. It is

important that such "evidences" be confined to enemy territory. For example, reports may be circulated that engineers are already planning the conversion of enemy factories to peace-time production.

(8) When the object of circulating "evidence" of peace is the raising of false hopes, it is necessary that the hopes raised be "proved" in due course to be actually false. The natural course of events may provide such proof. However, it is best to plan for the pricking of the bubble whenever possible. This may be accomplished in two ways:

(a) By circulating the "evidences" of peace at an appropriate interval before the occurrence of an *actual event* (secretly known to OSS) which will prove the first reports of peace to be false.

(b) By following the first "evidences" of peace after an appropriate interval by "new evidence" which proves the first reports to be untrue.

d. SUBVERTING ENEMY CIVILIAN POPULATIONS DURING A GROUND OFFENSIVE

(1) The mission is two-fold: first, during offensive action in enemy home territory, to create such confusion and panic among civilians as will disrupt enemy military action and demoralize his troops, and second, to invite cooperation of war-weary civilians with our own invading forces so as to decrease our own military problems.

(2) Demoralization and terrorization attacks on civilian populations in enemy countries can, if not immediately followed through by military conquest, have the unintended effect of consolidating the group, improving its morale, and making it more determined than ever. Therefore, all-out terroristic operations should be carried out in areas that comprise the *immediate* objective of our armed forces.

(3) When the proper time and place have been determined, sympathizers and agents may be instructed to create false air raid alarms; start street fighting and riots; spread rumors that the town will

be utterly destroyed by bombings; that Allied paratroopers have already landed in certain sections of the town; that enemy forces at one point have been utterly destroyed; that the enemy military (at times when their retreat seems imminent) have planted mines in all the city streets, have polluted the water supply.

(4) At this time a bribed police force is of particular value for augmenting or for not interfering with such disorders as may occur. Further, at this time the police force is particularly susceptible to bribery and subversion since the police force knows it must remain in the town after the enemy troops have evacuated it and will therefore be ready to be "persuaded" to change sides.

(5) A terrorized civilian group threatened with the devestation of military action will, unless provided with a feasible and hopeful means of escape and positive courses of action to implement it, develop a "back-to-the-wall" attitude, and become a dangerous consolidated adversary. All feasible subversive means of providing hope should therefore be employed. For example, reports of fair treatment which other enemy civilians have received at the hands of our forces may be circulated. Specific methods of signifying capitulation should be clandestinely circulated, such as staying indoors, displaying signs, flags, reporting hidden stores.

(6) Frequently, during ground operations directed against an inhabited point, terrorization can be employed to exploit the tendency of the population to flee from such towns or cities. It is possible, through the use of rumors both to speed up such pell-mell evacuation and to direct it along roads which the enemy would rather keep open and free from civilian traffic.

33. *WITHIN ENEMY - OCCUPIED OR CONTROLLED TERRITORY*

a. PROMOTION OF RESISTANCE AND REVOLT AGAINST THE ENEMY

---

(1) The mission is to induce a greater resistance among the population and to promote the organization of the resistance under good leadership.

(2) OSS will not, in most cases, use its own operatives and agents in directly inciting potentially resistant masses of people. This job can usually best be done by selected native influential persons on the spot who know the people of the area. The OSS task is therefore reduced to supplying through personal contact and other inducements, materials, and guidance by means of which native persons can do the work of incitement.

(3) As for materials which MO personnel will prepare outside the territory (as by freedom stations), the following principles should be kept in mind:

(a) Direct and specific appeals should be made to the individual's fear of personal harm, social ostracism, prejudices, resentments, and hope for rewards.

(b) The impression should be created that the resistant movement is popular, that everyone is "joining up." Special signs, symbols, songs, etc., are issued.

(c) Since actual participation in a movement (*doing* something) tends to increase the feeling of personal identification with the cause of the movement, acts that *every* member of a resistant group can carry out should be urged (within limits of personal security). The simplest act, the smallest child should not be neglected. Simple instructional leaflets, or talks on freedom stations covering methods of simple sabotage may be effective.

(d) The important contribution of each act, especially the minor undetectable, subtle kinds of sabotage should be emphasized; how these acts divert troops, supplies, and officers; how they harass the enemy; how they slow down production or lift the morale of other resistant groups.

(e) The feeling of success increases the people's willingness to continue subversive work.

Therefore, all clandestine (and cooperating white) means may be used to circulate reports and rumors of successful activities, especial care being taken, of course, to protect the people from reprisals.

(f) The personal safety of the citizen-saboteur should be safeguarded. Instruction should be given on methods of making sabotage appear to be accidental or the result of natural causes.

b. INTERFERING WITH THE ENEMY'S CONSOLIDATION AND USE OF AN OCCUPIED COUNTRY'S CAPABILITIES

(1) The mission is to hamper the enemy's efforts to exploit the industrial and civilian administration of an occupied country and to harass enemy government administration. Success in this work pins down enemy troops in troublesome areas and upsets enemy calculations concerning supplies based upon expected production. In addition, augmenting the "normal" problems of civilian administration will produce irritation, confusion and inefficiency in enemy or collaborationist administration.

(2) The technique most suitable for this work is that of fostering "simple sabotage" by the populace. Simple sabotage refers to inconspicuous acts which destroy enemy targets or obstruct enemy production, administration, and political consolidation. In contrast to major sabotage, simple sabotage is performed without the use of specially prepared tools or equipment; it is executed by an ordinary citizen who acts individually and without necessarily any active connection with an organized subversive group; and it is carried out in such a way as to involve a minimum danger of injury, detection and reprisal.

(3) Simple sabotage may consist of (a) *physical destruction* of equipment and installations, or (b) *functional interference* with operations. Detailed treatment of this subject will be covered in a Strategic Services Field Manual.

c. PRODUCING CIVILIAN DISORDER IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

(1) The mission is to deceive the enemy commander so that he may make false moves based upon

incorrect estimates of civilian resistance. Inducing the enemy command erroneously to anticipate large civilian uprisings pins down enemy troops in such areas and assists our armed services if they wish such a diversion. On the other hand, successfully inducing the enemy command to believe that civilian spirit is low and that extra military precautions are unnecessary permits OSS and the armed services to operate with less enemy interference.

(2) Strategic and tactical planning at the highest military echelon is required in this work in order to assist the theater commander in his military program. The success of this work furthermore requires the closest collaboration with the underground.

(3) It is necessary, first, to determine whether to give the impression of spontaneous revolt or of an elaborately organized underground at work. The needs of the specific situation will provide the answer.

(4) If it is to be an impression of spontaneous and widespread revolt, minor subversive activities at widely scattered points are planned and numerous outbreaks committed simultaneously. Thus, at a predetermined time, civilians at various places break windows, start fires, street fights, and riots. Judicious and effective bribing of police officials can help in the successful staging of street fights and riots, without endangering the security of the agent. The police can be bribed either to stay away from the scene until it has developed into a riot of its own momentum, or to make wholesale arrests of innocent by-standers and thus create the impression of greater participation in the riot than actually existed.

(5) If it is to be the impression of an elaborately organized underground at work, coordinated sabotage acts aimed at destroying a single extensive facility are planned. Thus, sympathizers are incited to carry out, under clandestine direction, certain sabotage acts, all of which when taken together tend to demolish or disrupt a given communication, transport or supply system.

(6) Where the enemy is to experience a false sense

of security, sympathizers are clandestinely instructed to cease from all kinds of sabotage. In accordance with the principle of proper timing, it is important that, when possible, such instructions are given after a particularly determined attempt of the enemy authorities to prevent sabotage. The sudden cessation of sabotage activities at any other time would tend to put the enemy authorities even more on their guard.

d. INCREASING TERROR, FRICTION, AND DEMORALIZATION AMONG COLLABORATIONISTS

(1) The mission is to create friction between collaborationists and Axis officials, and among collaborationists themselves, and to incite sympathizers to engage in terroristic operations against collaborationists. Disruption of the work of collaborationists increases the difficulties of the enemy command inasmuch as the collaborationists relieve the enemy military command of many of the responsibilities of civilian administration.

(2) The period during major battles is a period for increased terroristic acts of this sort. Extensive and all-out terroristic activities should be urged through every available channel and individual initiative in these activities is encouraged against bona fide collaborationists. Such acts as the following are suitable methods of terrorizing collaborationists: inciting the populace to dispose of them and, where possible, to plant evidence at the scene indicating the existence of a powerful society which has set itself up to deal with all collaborationists; spreading black lists of quislings; smearing symbols on their houses and vehicles and committing terroristic acts against them; writing anonymous letters and making anonymous telephone calls threatening the lives of collaborationists and their families; preparing documents to be "discovered" by the collaborationists which will appear to give directions for the disposition of collaborationists on D-day; deluging religious authorities with such theological questions as whether or not a quisling who is hanged can be buried in consecrated ground.

(3) Projects designed to create friction among collaborationists should be geared into combat activities wherever possible. Most effective are acts which suggest to the Axis officials that the collaborationist is "selling out" or is untrustworthy in a battle situation. For example, "secret" documents may be discovered by the military officials listing the names of collaborationists who have allegedly appealed to the underground for clemency and who have affirmed their readiness to come over to our side on D-day. Quislings may be tipped off with false information which they transmit to enemy authorities. Tips may be sent to enemy officials and secret police concerning collaborationists who are dealing with the enemy, with underground forces.

(4) Collaborationists, both political and industrial, are concerned with questions of power and status. This battle for status may be exploited by such means as preparing a document ostensibly originating with one group of collaborationists protesting against the activities of another group of collaborationists, who "find" the document.

e. PROVOKING REBELLION OR COUP D'ETAT IN A SATELLITE COUNTRY OR INDUCING ITS SEPARATION FROM THE AXIS

(1) The mission is to aid in the inciting and carrying through of revolutions, incidents, changes in governments, or coup d'etat in satellite or other enemy-dominated countries. Since many of the operations are in the nature of secret diplomacy, close consultation with the State Department may be necessary.

(2) In many cases, the contribution of OSS will consist of supplying the State Department or our military commanders with channels of communication or with agents who can conduct necessary secret negotiations. Frequently, however, through its contacts with the underground or through neutral countries, OSS may discover and suggest to the State Department opportunities for political or economic operations against the enemy. Influential persons in

a satellite country who are in a strong enough position to evoke a coup d'etat, rebellion, or other important strategic act against a collaborationist regime will often require postwar commitments. OSS is not authorized to make such commitments. These must come from the highest authority.

(3) A second category of activities is that of provoking an "incident" between the enemy country and its satellites, and then suitably exploiting the "incident" by freedom stations and false leaflets. In the provoking of an "incident" the *agent provocateur* usually plays an important role. For example, such an agent who has succeeded in establishing himself as an enemy official can be tactlessly or ruthlessly carrying out administrative orders—increase the antagonism of the people of the country against the enemy government. The agent who has penetrated a pro-Axis political group in a satellite country can incite other members to militant action or to ill-considered policies and thus help create incidents which will discredit the pro-Axis group, or which will call for retaliatory action from opposition groups.

34. *WITHIN OTHER AREAS*

a. ESTABLISHING AN MO SECTION OF A BASE IN A NEUTRAL COUNTRY FOR OPERATIONS IN ENEMY AND ENEMY-DOMINATED COUNTRIES

(1) All SS activities must be under the direction of the Chief of OSS mission. Such activities may be in support of programs initiated in other theaters or areas or may be activities pursuant to another approved program.

(2) The mission is to make the necessary personal contacts and to utilize neutral implements and channels for such operations. Establishing a neutral base for these purposes is a critical necessity, for many of the missions described in other parts of this section require operating from a neutral base.

(3) No MO activity should result in the jeopardy of national policy, as expressed and put into effect by the chief of the diplomatic mission. Hence, he should

---

be apprised in general, of MO activities in the area to which he is assigned.

(4) Personal contact work will usually be of three sorts:

(a) Contacts through appropriate channels with influential persons in enemy-dominated countries and, when the situation within the enemy country itself promises internal collapse with influential persons therein.

(b) Contacts with the underground that is collaborating with SS for MO work in areas bordering the neutral country.

(c) Such contacts as will facilitate the introduction into bordering areas of SS agents engaged in special MO missions.

(5) Direct use of neutral implements and channels for MO purposes may often be possible. For example, rumors designed for consumption in enemy areas may be spread by word of mouth or by newspaper or radio "plants." Forged documents may be planted in such a way as to fall in enemy hands. The mail into enemy zones may be used for transmitting poison-pen or other subversive materials.

(6) The special status of a neutral country requires the closest collaboration between SS personnel doing MO work and other SS personnel. In the first place, the enemy has legitimate access to and representatives in the country. There is, therefore, continual danger of enemy penetration into the SS organization. MO personnel should work closely, if indirectly, with SS men assigned the duty of protecting OSS from penetration, and should individually and vigilantly observe security measures.

(7) In the second place, SS intelligence men in a neutral country are in a special position to provide information on MO targets of opportunity. This advantage comes from the presence of official representatives of the enemy, refugees, neutral observers, and enemy nationals travelling into and out of enemy

territory. When operations are planned for such targets of opportunity, care should be exercised to see that they are consistent with the authorized over-all MO program.

**b.** Assisting the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission in Special Work Requested by Him

The mission is to assist the chief of the diplomatic mission by conducting any operations requested by him that fall within the province and capabilities of MO. The enemy will usually conduct subversive activities in the neutral country, either openly, or by a fifth column, or by native persons or organizations which collaborate with him. In order to protect the United States war policy and interests, the chief of diplomatic missions may find it necessary to call upon OSS for special MO work deemed by him not to be expressly prejudicial to the relations between the United States and the neutral country. Any such work should be authorized by OSS, Washington.

**35.** *WITHIN THE ENEMY ARMED FORCES, IN ALL AREAS*

**a.** Fostering Rebelliousness within Enemy Armed Forces

(1) The mission is to increase in enemy troops a spirit of rebelliousness against their officers and political leadership, especially among occupation forces. Even partial achievement of this aim would tend to communicate the rebellious spirit to soldiers in combat areas.

(2) Rebelliousness among soldiers occurs when they lose fighting spirit, and develop acute friction among themselves.

(3) To weaken the fighting spirit, advantage is taken of the fact that the enemy soldier, stationed behind the lines, has most of his contacts with civilians and tends to think, hope, and fear very much like a civilian. Most subversive work, therefore, focuses on the *civilian* attitudes of these soldiers. Every attempt is made to induce anxiety among the troops about conditions at home and to strengthen their

nostalgia for home. For example, rumors may be circulated about the conditions of families due to air raids, disease, overwork, adultery with foreign workers or with stay-at-home soldiers or civilians; letters from foreign workers in the home country may also be forged, describing the above conditions, and then allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy troops. To increase the feeling of isolation, civilians may be urged to talk sympathetically with enemy soldiers about the dangers at home confronting their children, wives, and relatives, but in marked contrast, to treat them coldly during their own church festivals, family gatherings.

(4) To increase friction and mutual distrust among enemy military personnel, *natural* cleavages based on differences in status and ethics among the troops are the logical points of attack. Such cleavages may be discovered between enlisted men and their officers; between soldiers from one nationality or geographic area and soldiers from another nationality and area; or between one group of soldiers with one set of traditions and political ideology and another group of soldiers with another set (as between the Wehrmacht and the SS). Thus, wherever political police of other classes or soldiers have special privileges, clandestine leaflets may be distributed describing these privileges in detail. Ridicule is employed, e.g., toilets are marked "Reserved for Gestapo." Poison-pen letters may be written to officers and men implicating others who are disliked in treasonable, immoral, or unsporting acts. Rumors may be spread indicating how the political police are growing fat on corruption, are at home enjoying the wives and sweethearts of the front-line soldiers, how the political and military elite are preparing for escape to neutral countries in anticipation of losing the war. Attempts may be made to cause some troops to feel that they are sharing greater risks than others, or that some will incur reprisals for "war crimes" while others will not be held responsible.

b. INDUCING SURRENDER

(1) The mission is to increase the demoralization of enemy troops to the point of greater willingness to surrender. The voluntary surrendering of enemy soldiers obviously increases the relative strength of our armed forces, and reduces the fighting spirit of the remaining enemy troops.

(2) This work can be most effectively carried out only when the morale of enemy soldiers is low, especially during and after military reverses, or when they are green and untrained.

(3) The enemy soldier fears annihilation on the one hand, and an imagined harsh treatment as prisoner on the other. The contrast between horrible destruction and decent treatment as prisoner is therefore plausibly built up through subversive means. For example, rumors may be floated of the number of Axis soldiers who have broken down mentally under terrific air attack or cannon barrage. Sympathizers may be urged to contaminate enemy food, and burn enemy buildings and supplies during confused enemy military operations. Timed with these activities, rumors, reports and evidences of good treatment of prisoners should be circulated by every means behind enemy lines.

(4) On grounds of military ethics, the enemy soldier believes that surrender gives him dishonorable status as a soldier. He must be made to believe that this is untrue. Reports may therefore be circulated about wholesale desertion and surrender at other sectors, about "respect" accorded surrender, e.g., officers may retain their sidearms.

(5) The soldier fears for his security in the act of surrendering; he may be shot by his officers or by our own forces. He must be informed how not to reveal to his officers his intent to surrender, and learn to look for leaflets, pass words, gestures, which will assure safe passage.

(6) Such morale subversion activities should be timed with and support open front propaganda.

Though often effective, official front appeals by radio, leaflets are too obviously a "selling-job." Such appeals "substantiated" by allegedly bona fide reports and rumors within and behind enemy lines carry greater weight.

36. *WITHIN OSS, WASHINGTON AND THEATERS*

a. WITHIN OSS, WASHINGTON, OVER-ALL PLANNING FOR AND SERVICING OF FIELD OPERATIONS

For a description of the planning and servicing activities of OSS, Washington, see Section II.

b. ASSISTANCE DESIRED BY THEATER COMMANDER

The theater commander may request to use MO personnel and equipment for special combat subversive activities in forward areas in support of United States Army operations. OSS personnel may, for example, be asked to serve as members of intelligence squads having as a special mission the collection of information useful to subversive work, for example, the locating and appraisal of radio, press and other equipment in forward enemy areas. OSS may also be asked to contribute plans, linguists, technical help and equipment to operating crews engaged in combat subversion or deception, including the operating of mobile radios, loud speakers and presses.

# Notes

# MU
## *maritime unit*

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

This booklet has been prepared for use within OSS, particularly by MU Branch for the general orientation of its own personnel. Its primary purpose is to define the basic organization of the Branch, its functions, doctrine, and purpose. It is neither a technical training manual nor a historical record of actual accomplishments.

# MARITIME UNIT

# MU

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

is an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged with collecting and analyzing strategic information and secret intelligence required for military operations, and with planning and executing programs of physical sabotage and morale subversion against the enemy in support of military operations.

## MU  MARITIME UNIT

plans and carries out the amphibious phases of these activities, and assists in the development of the special equipment required. It penetrates enemy coastal areas, introducing operatives and their equipment for maritime sabotage and other OSS operations. Wherever targets for sabotage may be reached by water, wherever access to enemy land areas may be obtained by water, wherever information is required on water approaches and character of shoreline and coast, MU's special techniques in clandestine ferrying, maritime sabotage, and beach and hydrographic reconnaissance are utilized.

PLANNING GROUP

PLANNING STAFF

OPERATIONS & PLANS OFFICER

TRANSPORTATION OFFICER

INSPECTOR

OSS INSP. GENERAL

CHIEF - INSP. EUROPE-AFRICA

GENERAL COUNSEL

SECURITY

MORALE OPERATIONS

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

MARITIME UNIT

OPERATIONAL GROUPS

SPECIAL PROJECTS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR — SERVICES

FINANCE

BUDGET & PROCEDURES

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

PROCURE-MENT, SUPPLY

OFFICE SERVICES

REPRO-DUCTION

# DIRECTOR

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

THEATER ESTABLISHMENTS

OSS THEATER OFFICER

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

SECRETARIAT

REGISTRY

BOARD OF REVIEW

SPECIAL RELATIONS

PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT

H.Q. & H.Q. DETACHMENT

NAVAL COMMAND

COMMUNICATIONS

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

PRESENTATION

FIELD PHOTO.

MEDICAL SERVICES

SPECIAL FUNDS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR STRATEGIC SERVICES OPERATIONS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE

SECRET INTELLIGENCE

COUNTER-ESPIONAGE

RESEARCH & ANALYSIS

FOREIGN NATIONALITIES

CENSORSHIP & DOCUMENTS

NEW YORK

PACIFIC COAST

MISC.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR — SCHOOLS & TRAINING

SCHOOLS & TRAINING

# CLANDESTINE FERRYING



## MU OPERATIONS ARE THE AMPHIBIOUS

## PHASES OF OSS INTELLIGENCE AND SABOTAGE

Men, munitions, supplies, and communications are secretly infiltrated into enemy areas over water, and communications and returning personnel brought out. OSS intelligence or demolition operatives, liaison officers to guerrilla or resistance groups, or special missions from the Theater Commander may be transported. Airmen shot down over enemy-held territory are brought back. Specially equipped operatives may be landed to carry out beach reconnaissance on the character and gradient of beaches and the depths and shallows of the off-shore coast, data of value in planning amphibious assaults.

The parent craft, which may be a submarine, destroyer, or motor torpedo boat, penetrates to within landing distance of the enemy coast. The operatives transfer to small surface craft, surfboard, rubber boat, or kayak, for the trip to and from the shore.

# MARITIME SABOTAGE



Swimmers, especially trained in the use of underwater equipment and techniques, attack enemy shipping and port installations. Ferried close to their objectives in a small boat or raft, they swim under water, carrying an explosive charge.

Either Limpets or standard waterproofed demolition charges are used for attacks on the hulls of enemy vessels. Fixing the charge to the target, the operative returns unobserved under water to the ferrying craft. The charge is detonated by a time delay.

Expert underwater swimmers also perform offshore hydrographic reconnaissance.

# MU PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON

Strategic services plans and over-all programs are initiated and developed by the Planning Staff in conjunction with the Plans Officer of each branch. The Planning Group integrates the plans with military and naval operations. The Operations and Plans Officer informs the Director of the plans and operations of the branches in the process of development or execution. When the Director has approved a plan, it is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and submitted to the Theater Commander for final approval.

MU Headquarters is chiefly concerned with recruiting and training personnel and with procuring the special equipment needed for operations in all theaters.

For the Central Pacific Theater, MU Headquarters not only fulfills these functions but also originates specific operational plans.

DIRECTOR
OSS

PLANNING GROUP

PLANNING STAFF

OPERATIONS &
PLANS OFFICER

STRATEGIC SERVICES
OPERATIONS

CHIEF
MU

PLANS
OFFICER

AREA
OPERATIONS
OFFICER

SUPPLY
OFFICER

PERSONNEL
OFFICER

RECORDS &
REPORTS

# MU FIELD BASE ORGANIZATION varies with the operational opportunities and requirements of the theater.

## IN SEAC

```
                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │     THEATER     │
                    │    COMMANDER    │
                    └─────────────────┘
                            │
                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │STRATEGIC SERVICES│
                    │     OFFICER     │
                    └─────────────────┘
                            │
                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │   FIELD CHIEF   │
                    │       MU        │
                    └─────────────────┘
```

The two major types of operations are each the responsibility of independent but cooperating staffs. Receiving trained recruits and special equipment from the United States, these staffs put into execution the various operations planned and approved for the theater.

The Plans and Intelligence Officer is concerned with the collection of intelligence and information from the field to facilitate operations. He draws on OSS Research and Analysis, OSS Secret Intelligence, and on the military intelligence units of the United Nations' services.

| CLANDESTINE FERRYING OPERATIONS OFFICER | MARITIME SABOTAGE OPERATIONS OFFICER | PLANS & INTELLIGENCE OFFICER | ADMINISTRATION & SUPPLY OFFICER |

# MU TRAINING

To train men for its specialized operations, MU conducts its own training program under the general supervision of Schools & Training Branch. Men selected as operatives must be highly qualified in swimming and small boat handling. After intensive instruction at basic and advanced schools the men are sent to field bases overseas where training is continuously carried on between missions to keep them in first-class physical condition and familiar with the latest developments in equipment and technique.

OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL infiltrate and exfiltrate Special Maritime Groups, and personnel and supplies for other OSS branches, to and from coastal areas of enemy-occupied territory. They also instruct agents and native operators in the use and handling of small boats and in beach reconnaissance.

SPECIAL MARITIME GROUPS carry out maritime sabotage and offshore hydrographic reconnaissance.

**RECRUITING**

- NAVY
- MARINES
- COAST GUARD
- ARMY
- REGULAR OSS CHANNELS

**CANDIDATE APPRAISAL BOARD**

**OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL**

**SPECIAL MARITIME GROUPS**

### OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL

Maintenance and handling of small boats and motors.

Operation and care of special MU equipment.

Navigation, piloting, seamanship. (Hydrographic and beach reconnaissance.)

Reading of maps, charts, and aerial photographs.

Basic OSS operational instructions.

## 6 WEEKS
## BASIC INSTRUCTION

### SPECIAL MARITIME GROUPS

Preliminary swimming instruction and diving.

Maintenance and handling of small boats and motors.

Operation and care of special MU equipment.

Demolitions.

Maritime sabotage instruments and methods.

Basic OSS operational instructions.

## CLANDESTINE FERRYING

## 8 WEEKS ADVANCED INSTRUCTION

Advanced underwater swimming.
Hydrographic and beach reconnaissance.
Operational problems.
Communications.
Harbor and beach defenses.
Navigation.
Geography of operational areas.

## MARITIME SABOTAGE & BEACH RECONNAISSANCE

Special equipment is required by MU to carry out its various missions. It has actively participated in the development of these specialized



**THE TWO-MAN KAYAK** is a collapsible, portable boat made of a plywood frame covered by rubberized canvas. Assembled, the boat weighs 104 lbs., is 16½ ft. long, has a beam of 34 in. and a depth of 13 in. It can be assembled by two men in less than five minutes.



**THE EIGHT-MAN KAYAK** is built on the same principles as the two-man kayak. It weighs 245 lbs., is 24 ft. long and 19 in. deep. This boat has detachable outriggers for the addition of two outboard motors.



The shaped plywood frames for both kayaks are fitted together by lengths of metal pipe which also serve to stabilize the craft. The entire framework fits into a one-man haversack.

The rubberized canvas hull is made of tough fabric which can be repaired with rubber patches and cement and will not run when punctured.

The double-bladed paddles are collapsible to facilitate packing and transportation.

# SURFACE CRAFT

devices with the Research and Development Branch of OSS. The small surface craft are designed for clandestine approach to enemy shores.



**THE TWO-MAN SURFBOARD** is a pneumatic rubber surfboard, 10½ ft. long, 3 ft. 7 in. wide, weighing about 310 lbs. A compressed air cylinder inflates it in a few minutes. A battery-driven ¾ horsepower motor with a speed of 5 knots and a range of 10 miles can be attached. The surfboard carries two men and their equipment, the equivalent of 900 lbs.



**THE "MATARRASSINO,"** an inflatable one-man rubber float, is a British adaptation of an Italian development. Inflated by means of a built-in hand-operated bellows, it is equipped with a pocket, and is propelled by the operator. The float folds into a compact bundle that can be fitted into a knapsack and carried by one man.



**THE ELECTRIC MOTOR** is driven by a 12-volt, 120-ampere battery. Silent in operation, it is used as motive power for the surfboard.

Underwater approaches to enemy shipping and installations for sabotage have been made feasible through the development and use of specialized equipment.

**THE LAMBERTSON UNIT** is a completely self-contained breathing device which enables a swimmer to approach his target beneath the water surface without leaving a wake, breathing bubbles, or other traces of his presence or movements. The face piece provides excellent visibility, and all controls and gauges are accessible without hampering the swimmer's motions. This unit allows a swimmer to spend an hour under water, and travel more than a mile.

**THE UNDERWATER COMPASS** is a standard waterproof compass fitted into a holder which is attached to the Lambertson Unit. A joint enables the swimmer to raise the compass to eye level or push it down flush to his body. It does not interfere with swimming in either position.

**SWIM FINS.** The large Swim Fin is the improved OSS design. Its base is the standard swim fin on which an extra length of live rubber has been vulcanized. The proper use of swim fins doubles a swimmer's speed and range.

# SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

Special light-weight waterproof devices enable the beach reconnaissance operative with a minimum of apparatus to make and record accurate observations of beach composition, gradient, and depth.

**THE LIMPET** is an explosive weapon designed for use against enemy merchant vessels. The explosive charge is contained in a waterproof plastic case equipped with strong magnets for adhesion to the metal plates of the target.



The Limpet is most effective when used about 5 ft. below the water surface, its charge being sufficient to blow a hole about 25 sq. ft. in a merchant vessel. The Limpet may be attached under water either by a swimmer or from a small boat with the aid of an extendable placing rod. A range of time delays permits the operator to make his escape.

**THE PIN-UP GIRL** is essentially the same explosive weapon as the Limpet, but the method of attaching the container to the target has been changed. A cartridge-driven pinning device which will penetrate wood or steel hulls has been substituted for the magnets of the Limpet case.



**THE BEACH SAND AUGUR** takes a cubic sample of sand 8 in. long and ¾ in. in diameter. The sand is transferred to plastic tubes carried in a bandolier.



**UNDERWATER PAD AND PENCIL.** The writing pad, mounted on a strong leather wrist strap, is made of white "ivorine" cards deeply grooved in one inch squares to facilitate the tabulation of soundings in the dark. The underwater pencil is a modification of the vest-pocket flashlight. A chinagraph pencil has been added. The lens in the flashlight is movable, allowing the operator to regulate the amount of light transmitted.

## MU OPERATIONS

Representative of MU operations are those carried out in the Mediterranean theater.

Extensive and highly successful clandestine ferrying operations have been carried out in the Aegean Sea. OSS personnel and supplies have been transported to Greece in support of native resistance groups and guerrilla forces. Fleets of caiques ply between Cyprus and secret bases in Turkey. From these bases smaller craft operate, making pinpoint landings at night on the Greek coast. Refugees and downed fliers, rescued and brought to evacuation points by Greek guerrillas, have been picked up and brought to Cyprus.

MU plans and supervises the operations of an amphibious group of the Italian Navy in the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Adriatic Sea. Specializing in demolition attacks and shore sabotage, the unit has a successful record under MU control.

Clandestine ferrying operations across the Adriatic Sea in support of Yugoslav guerrillas have been conducted by MU from Bari. A ship repair service has also been conducted there for OSS Special Operations Branch.

A few infiltrations along the coast of Southern France have been carried out by MU units based on Corsica.

**OSS**
PRESENTATION

LITHOGRAPHED IN THE REPRODUCTION BRANCH, OSS

30.

# Notes

N⁰ 54

<div style="border:2px solid black; padding:1em;">

## MARITIME UNIT
## FIELD MANUAL –

## STRATEGIC SERVICES

(Provisional)

</div>

Prepared under direction of
The Director of Strategic Services

47189

SECRET

# MARITIME UNIT FIELD MANUAL
## – STRATEGIC SERVICES

(Provisional)

Strategic Services Field Manual No. 7

*[signature]*

SECRET

---

Office of Strategic Services

Washington, D. C.

18 July 1944

This Provisional Basic Field Manual for Maritime Unit is made available for the information and guidance of selected personnel and will be used as the basic doctrine for Strategic Services training for the operations of these groups.

The contents of this manual should be carefully controlled and should not be allowed to come into unauthorized hands. The manual will not be taken to advance bases.

AR 380—5, pertaining to the handling of secret documents, will be complied with in the handling of this manual.

*William J. Donovan*

William J. Donovan

Director

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

# MARITIME UNIT FIELD MANUAL
## STRATEGIC SERVICES
### (Provisional)

### SECTION I—INTRODUCTION

#### 1. *SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE MANUAL*

This manual sets forth the authorized functions, operational plans, methods, and organization of Maritime Units (MU) as a part of OSS operations. Its purpose is to guide Strategic Services personnel responsible for planning, training, and operations in the proper employment of Maritime Units.

#### 2. *DEFINITIONS*

a. OVER-ALL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIVITIES—a collection of objectives, in order of priority (importance) within a theater or area.

b. OBJECTIVE—a main or controlling goal for accomplishment within a theater or area by Strategic Services as set forth in an Over-All Program.

c. SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIVITIES—a statement setting forth the detailed missions assigned to one or more Strategic Services branches, designed to accomplish a given objective, together with a summary of the situation and the general methods of accomplishment of the assigned missions.

d. MISSION—a statement of purpose set forth in a special program for the accomplishment of a given objective.

e. OPERATIONAL PLAN—an amplification or elaboration of a special program, containing the details and means of carrying out the specified activities.

f. TASK—a detailed operation, usually planned in the field, which contributes toward the accomplishment of a mission.

g. TARGET—a place, establishment, group, or individual toward which activities or operations are directed.

h. THE FIELD—all areas outside of the United States in which strategic services activities take place.

i. FIELD BASE—an OSS headquarters in the field, designated by the name of the city in which it is established, e.g., OSS Field Base, London.

j. ADVANCED OR SUB-BASE—an additional base established by and responsible to an OSS Field Base, London.

k. OPERATIVE—an individual employed by and responsible to the OSS and assigned under special programs to field activity.

l. AGENT—an individual recruited in the field who is employed and directed by an OSS operative or by a field or sub-base.

m. PARENT CRAFT—the medium by which personnel and supplies are transported from the base to within Maritime Unit operational distance of their objective.

## SECTION II—OPERATIONS AND METHODS

### 3. MISSIONS

a. To conduct clandestine ferrying.

b. To conduct maritime sabotage.

c. To provide military tactical assistance.

d. To conduct special training by Maritime Unit.

### 4. CLANDESTINE FERRYING

a. GENERAL—Penetrations into and departures from enemy areas by water will be the specific responsibility of MU. The responsibility essentially will be to effect the transfer of personnel, supplies, and communications from water to land and land to water. Such ferrying which will normally be clandestine may be considered in two stages: approach and departure by parent craft, transfer to and from parent craft.

b. APPROACH TO ENEMY SHORE—This can be by a parent craft of sufficient range and other characteristics necessary to get within small boat or swimming distance of enemy shore. Parent craft may be submarine, de-

stroyer, torpedo boat, or other conveyances. Parent craft may be detailed by U.S. Navy or other Allied armed forces either for specific tasks or regular operations. Parent craft may also be native or other vessels acquired by OSS.

c. TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL TO AND FROM PARENT CRAFT TO SHORE—This may be by swimming, surfboard, rubber boat, dinghy, or other small surface craft.

### 5. MARITIME SABOTAGE

Maritime sabotage against enemy shipping and shipping installations in harbors, roadsteads, canals, and rivers, will be executed with limpets and other special underwater demolitions and with standard demolitions. Special Maritime Groups of swimmers are trained to conduct underwater sabotage. However, MU personnel will also participate in maritime sabotage by ferrying demolitions parties to targets or target areas.

### 6. MILITARY TACTICAL ASSISTANCE

a. GENERAL—Where unique techniques and abilities of MU (such as underwater approach and clandestine ferrying and maritime sabotage) are required by a military commander in his theater, such aid by MU shall be furnished as requested of OSS by the theater commander.

b. SPECIAL TACTICAL AIDS—MU sections, when adequately manned at the theater base, may render the following clandestine aid to military operations: (1) hydrographic and beach reconnaissance; (2) establishing navigation aids, especially close to shore; (3) infiltration and exfiltration of personnel.

### 7. SPECIAL TRAINING BY MARITIME UNIT

a. GENERAL—MU will assist Schools and Training Branch by providing instructors and equipment for the training of other OSS personnel and military personnel in special MU techniques, upon request.

b. OSS PERSONNEL—Where operatives or agents have to be infiltrated or exfiltrated by water, they will be

trained (usually in the theater) by S&T to enable them to effect the transition from water to shore and vice versa. MU will provide instructors and equipment to assist in such training. Other MU techniques will be taught to OSS personnel of other branches as required for their special tasks.

c. MILITARY PERSONNEL—Where specific MU techniques and equipment are of special use to military commanders in their theater and where training in MU techniques is requested by the military commander through OSS, the MU Section in the theater will provide instructors and equipment to assist S&T in such training.

## 8. EQUIPMENT

a. Specially designed equipment for use under water and on the surface includes self-contained breathing devices, motor propelled surfboards, swim suits, swim fins, two and eight place kayaks, depth gauge, underwater luminous compass, underwater flashlight, electric waterproof motor for use on surf boards and rubber boats. Detailed descriptions of this special equipment are given in a secret pamphlet "Underwater Operations" prepared for the Maritime Unit, December 1943.

b. Standard military and OSS demolitions are used. A principal type is the limpet; the OSS magnetic type and the "pin up" limpet. Military equipment and supplies, such as rations, clothing, small arms, ammunition, and the like will be supplied from U.S. Army or Navy sources in the theaters. Special OSS explosives and equipment will be supplied by Services Branch, OSS.

## SECTION III—ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING

### 9. BRANCH AND FIELD BASE ORGANIZATION

a. WASHINGTON—The Chief of MU Branch, Washington, is directly responsible to the Deputy Director, SSO for the carrying out of MU operations. He is assisted by a Deputy Chief, an Operations Officer, a Supply Officer, and a Personnel Officer. Liaison in Washington with

British Commander Combined Operations is maintained through appropriate officers of that nation in contact with the Chief, MU, or any representative designated by him.

b. ORGANIZATION OF FIELD BASES—

(1) The organization of MU at OSS field bases will vary in accordance with local conditions and requirements, but generally they will reflect the structure of the MU Branch, Washington.

(2) The MU Section of an OSS field base is headed by a Chief who is responsible to the Strategic Services Officer.

(3) The Operations Officer of the MU Section of an OSS field base is responsible for planning and coordination of operations with naval vessels detailed to OSS tasks. In the case of naval units, they will be administratively and operationally under the Navy.

(4) All activities of a field base in a theater of operations are under the control and direction of the theater commander.

## 10. PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATIONS

a. The approved OSS over-all and special programs establish the objectives and missions for MU. Operational plans are developed by MU in the field in conformity with the approved special programs.

b. The MU section in the field assembles personnel and equipment required to accomplish specific missions based upon operational plans developed in accordance with approved special programs.

c. All MU plans and operations are coordinated with the activities of other branches by the Chief of the MU Branch in Washington, and by the Chief of the MU sections at the various field bases. MU advises and assists other branches on any project with maritime phases.

d. MU Branch in Washington is to be kept fully informed of all MU plans and projects for operations originating in the field.

## SECTION IV—PERSONNEL

### 11. *REQUIREMENTS*

a. The duties of personnel selected for MU activities divide into four general types:

(1) Staff work at the branch in Washington or in the MU Section at a field base.

(2) Assisting S&T in instruction in special MU techniques.

(3) Maritime operations.

(4) Special underwater swimming activities.

b. For all of these types of activities personnel should be such that the MU special training can be assimilated and employed effectively. For the first three types of duties it is important that the personnel have seafaring experience, particularly with small boats. For the special underwater swimming activities, exceptional swimming ability is a specific requirement.

c. The principal sources for the types of personnel required for MU activities are the U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Competent personnel with special skills are also taken from the Army and civil life.

### 12. *RECRUITING*

Personnel for MU activities is secured through the regular OSS channels. Requests for personnel are submitted to the OSS Personnel Procurement Branch. This branch makes all arrangements for procuring Army and civilian personnel and forwards requests for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel to the Naval Command, OSS.

## SECTION V—TRAINING

### 13. *BASIC TRAINING*

a. The basic training for all MU personnel includes the following subjects:

(1) Day and night landings (and reembarkations) through surf.

(2) Swimming in surf and under water.

---

(3) Handling and maintenance of small boats (rubber boats, kayaks, caiques, etc.)

(4) Navigation, piloting, seamanship.

(5) Reading of maps, charts and aerial photographs.

(6) Hydrographic and beach reconnaissance.

(7) Maritime sabotage instruments and methods.

(8) Harbor and beach defenses.

(9) Demolitions.

(10) Small arms (sub-machine guns, pistol, carbine, rifle, MG).

(11) Operation and simple maintenance of outboard and marine motors.

(12) Operation and care of special MU underwater and surface gear.

(13) Signaling.

(14) Hand-to-hand combat.

(15) Types and designs of ships.

(16) Geography of area of operations.

b. For all types of MU personnel recruited in the U. S., basic training in all subjects is given in the U. S.

c. Personnel recruited overseas are given basic training and specialized training at field schools established in the various theaters.

d. MU instruction for special courses in MU techniques is made available especially in the field to other branches of the OSS and on request to military and naval personnel not assigned to OSS.

### 14. *SPECIALIZED TRAINING*

a. "Operational Personnel" are specially trained and equipped for special duties such as clandestine ferrying, maritime sabotage, and military tactical assistance. Such advanced training is normally given by MU instructors at field bases.

b. "Special Maritime Groups" of swimmers are given intensive training in underwater swimming (normally a minimum of six months). They are organized and trained specifically for underwater operations and therefore should be used only for tasks for which this special training is required.

## APPENDIX "A"

### EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL MU OPERATIONS

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

No attempt is made herein to assess the reasoning and considerations which must precede the assignment of a task to a particular section of an OSS Field Base. This Appendix will serve to illustrate several typical Maritime Unit operations.

#### 2. MARITIME SABOTAGE (1)

a. PROBLEM—It is desired to attack an enemy vessel moored in the channel of a hostile harbor.

b. SOLUTION—Task is assigned to Maritime Unit Section of OSS Field Base, since weighing of all factors concerned indicates that underwater sabotage attack presents greatest likelihood of success.

(1) *Personnel*

Since underwater swimming is required, two Special Maritime Group (SMG) men are assigned the task.

(2) *Method of Attack*

It is planned that one man will affix limpets to the side of the vessel, while the other will secure plastic charges to the fore and aft anchor cables. Use of lungs, swim suits, depth gauges, compasses and fins is required.

(3) *Penetration of Harbor*

(a) This is executed by parent craft (submarine, or surface vessel, depending upon circumstances assigned by Theater Commander) which transports the SMG men to

(1) Rendezvous point where friendly native fishermen may pick them up, secrete them, take them into harbor and return them to rendezvous point after they had finished affixing explosives with twelve-hour time charges under cover of darkness, or

(2) Rendezvous point and putting them over the side in inflated surfboard. This would be used to take the men within underwater swimming distance of target, then deflated, secured perhaps to a channel marker so that it may be regained, reinflated by special $CO_2$ bottle and used to rendezvous with parent craft on return, or

(3) Within actual underwater swimming distance of the target.

#### 3. MARITIME SABOTAGE (2)

a. PROBLEM—It is desired to destroy an important lock (or dock, or bridge) in an enemy canal. Heavy guard prevents approach from shore.

b. SOLUTION—Task is assigned to MU Section of OSS Field Base, as underwater approach appears to be only reasonably safe method of attempting attack.

(1) *Personnel*

An MU operative (trained as member of Special Maritime Group), thoroughly conversant with the locality, language, customs of the natives and highly trained in demolition, work is selected.

(2) *Method of Attack*

Attack will be made under water and will require the use of lungs, fins, swim suits, gauges, compass and the handling of explosives and fuses under water.

(3) *Penetration*

Operative is parachuted into locality with his equipment.

#### 4. CLANDESTINE FERRYING (1)

a. PROBLEM—It is desired to land an OSS Operational Group on a hostile beach so that they may penetrate inland to contact guerrilla forces.

b. SOLUTION—The task of ferrying is assigned to the Maritime Unit of OSS Field Base.

### (1) *Personnel*

A group of ten OG's is turned over to the Maritime Unit for several days intensive training in landing through surf. Four Maritime Unit men are assigned responsibility for delivery of OG's.

### (2) *Approach*

A suitable parent ship is assigned to this particular task. It transports the OSS men to within several hundred yards off shore of landing point on beach under cover of darkness. Two 8-man kayaks are assembled and put over the side. In each are two MU men, five OG's and equipment. The OG's are landed after one MU man has gone over the side and swum in to assure that reception committee of guerrillas with whom rendezvous has been established are on hand and that landing has been made at correct point. Similar technique is followed to evacuate personnel from beaches.

## 5. *CLANDESTINE FERRYING (2)*

a. PROBLEM—It is desired to land two native SI agents in an enemy port.

b. SOLUTION—Task of ferrying is assigned to Maritime Unit Section of OSS Field Base.

### (1) *Personnel*

One MU operative, operating under cover as a native fisherman is assigned responsibility for task.

### (2) *Method of Penetration*

The MU operative is in command of a felucca with a reliable crew of natives. This vessel regularly engages in off shore fishing and delivers catch into nearest port, village or harbor every several days. This craft delivers the two SI agents directly into port of their objective, all personnel concerned being under cover as natives.

## 6. *CLANDESTINE FERRYING (3)*

a. PROBLEM—It is desired to establish communications with partisan groups on a coastal island which

---

must be approached through enemy-controlled waters. The purpose is to supply them continuously with arms, ammunition, food and medicines.

b. SOLUTION—Task is assigned to Maritime Unit Section of OSS Field Base.

### (1) *Personnel*

The MU section has trained a number of natives to act as crews for native caiques with under cover MU operatives as commanding officers. Three such vessels with crews are assigned responsibility.

### (2) *Method*

Under cover as fishing boats and native ferries, these vessels accomplish their assigned mission by continuous ferrying of supplies to objective.

# Notes

Nº 13

```
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│ ┌─────────────────────────┐ │
│ │  SECRET INTELLIGENCE    │ │
│ │  FIELD MANUAL –         │ │
│ │                         │ │
│ │  STRATEGIC SERVICES     │ │
│ │      (Provisional)      │ │
│ └─────────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────┘
```

DOCUMENT NO. 9936/004
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:  TS  S ©2010
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH:  HR 70-2
DATE: 27-6-80  REVIEWER: 678488

Prepared under direction of
The Director of Strategic Services

# SECRET INTELLIGENCE FIELD MANUAL

## – STRATEGIC SERVICES

(Provisional)

Strategic Services Field Manual No. 5

---

Office of Strategic Services

Washington, D. C.

22 March 1944

This Secret Intelligence Field Manual — Strategic Services (Provisional) is made available for the information and guidance of selected personnel and will be used as the basic doctrine for Strategic Services training for this subject.

The contents of this Manual should be carefully controlled and should not be allowed to come into unauthorized hands. The Manual should not be taken to advance bases.

AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, pertaining to the handling of secret documents, will be complied with in the handling of this Manual.

William J. Donovan
Director

---

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECRET INTELLIGENCE FIELD MANUAL
STRATEGIC SERVICES

(Provisional)

## SECTION I — INTRODUCTION

### 1. *SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF MANUAL*

This manual sets forth the operational principles, methods, and organization of Secret Intelligence as a part of Strategic Services activities, exclusive of that obtained by counter-espionage methods, which is covered by a separate manual. Its purpose is to provide guidance to authorized SS personnel engaged in operational planning and training in Washington and at field bases. In view of its highly secret nature, this manual will be given a very limited distribution.

### 2. *DEFINITIONS*

a. OVER-ALL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIVITIES—a collection of objectives, in order of priority (importance) within a theater or area.

b. OBJECTIVE—a main or controlling goal for accomplishment within a theater or area by Strategic Services as set forth in an Over-All Program.

c. SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIVITIES—a statement setting forth the detailed missions assigned to one or more Strategic Services branches, designed to accomplish a given objective, together with a summary of the situation and the general methods of accomplishment of the assigned missions.

d. MISSION—a statement of purpose set forth in a special program for the accomplishment of a given objective.

e. OPERATIONAL PLAN—an amplification or elaboration of a special program, containing the details and means of carrying out the specified activities.

---

f. TASK—a detailed operation, usually planned in the field, which contributes toward the accomplishment of a mission.

g. TARGET—a place, establishment, group, or individual toward which activities or operations are directed.

h. THE FIELD—all areas outside of the United States in which Strategic Services activities take place.

i. FIELD BASE—an OSS headquarters in the field, designated by the name of the city in which it is established, e.g., OSS Field Base, Cairo.

j. ADVANCED OR SUB-BASE—an additional base established by and responsible to an OSS field base.

k. OPERATIVE—an individual employed by and responsible to the OSS and assigned under special programs to field activity.

l. AGENT—an individual recruited in the field who is employed and directed by an OSS operative or by a field or sub-base.

m. SUB-AGENT—an individual not a regular member of OSS who is employed and directed by an agent in the field. Sub-agents may be paid or they may be volunteers.

n. INFORMANT—an individual who, knowingly or unknowingly, gives information to an OSS operative, agent, or sub-agent.

o. COVER—an open status, assumed or bona fide, which serves to conceal the secret activities of an operative or agent.

p. CUTOUT—a person who forms a communicating link between two individuals, for security purposes.

q. RESISTANCE GROUPS—individuals associated together in enemy-held territory to injure the enemy by any or all means short of military operations, e.g., by sabotage, espionage, non-cooperation.

r. GUERRILLAS—an organized band of individuals in enemy-held territory, indefinite as to number, which

conducts against the enemy irregular operations including those of a military or quasi-military nature.

### 3. FUNCTIONS OF THE SECRET INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

<u>a</u>. The principal function of the Secret Intelligence Branch is to collect and evaluate secret intelligence and to disseminate such intelligence to appropriate branches of OSS and to military and other authorized agencies. Supplementary functions are: to establish and maintain direct liaison with Allied secret intelligence agencies; and to obtain information from underground groups by direct contact or other means.

(1) *Collection of information*

Information is collected in neutral, enemy, and enemy-occupied countries, outside of the Western Hemisphere, by secret intelligence operatives and agents working under cover. This information is obtained by personal observation, through strategically placed informants, or by other means available. Information is also collected in Allied countries through contact with Allied secret intelligence agencies and representatives of underground or other groups and from individuals who have special knowledge.

(2) *Evaluation of information*

(a) Information is evaluated both as to the reliability of the source and as to the truth, credibility, or probability of the information itself. The following rating scale is used in evaluating the source:

A — Completely reliable
B — Usually reliable
C — Fairly reliable
D — Not usually reliable
E — Unreliable
F — Untried

(b) The following rating scale is used in evaluating the truth, credibility, or probability of the information:

1 — Report confirmed by other sources
2 — Probably true
3 — Possibly true
4 — Doubtful
5 — Improbable
0 — Truth cannot be judged

Thus a report rated A-2 would be a probably true report coming from a completely reliable source.

(c) In Washington, the responsibility for the evaluation of information is lodged in the SI Reporting Board. In the field, Reports Officers perform this function. So far as the evaluation of the *source* of material is concerned, the field offices and the desk heads, through the maintenance of records on operatives and agents, are able to furnish the reporting officials with information from which reasonable conclusions may be drawn. As to the presumptive reliability of the *content* of reports, the operatives and the field offices contribute their opinion, the geographic desk heads add whatever comment they may be in a position to make, and the reporting officials check the information against their own records and knowledge and against information available in other branches of OSS, particularly R&A, or in other government agencies.

(3) *Dissemination of intelligence*

(a) SI disseminates intelligence to the other branches of OSS, and selected intelligence to the Military Intelligence Division (MID), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Air Intelligence (A-2), Joint Intelligence Committee, the State Department, other authorized U. S. government agencies, and to the designated authorities of Allied governments.

(b) Secret intelligence is also disseminated from field bases either directly by the Reports Officer or through the Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies (JICA)* in the Theaters of Operations where such agencies have been established.

(c) Dissemination of secret intelligence is the function of the Reports Officer at an OSS field base and of the SI Reporting Board at Washington. The SI desk heads may suggest the dissemination to be given a report.

(d) In general, operatives should not attempt to disseminate intelligence within the actual area of operations, both for reasons of security and for lack of ability properly to evaluate.

## SECTION II — ORGANIZATION

### 4. ORGANIZATION IN WASHINGTON

<u>a</u>. The SI Branch is one of the intelligence branches, under the general supervision of the Deputy Director, Intelligence Services, OSS.

<u>b</u>. The Chief, SI Branch, is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the functions of the Secret Intelligence Branch. Deputy chiefs are responsible to the Chief, SI Branch, for the supervision of activities within certain broad geographic areas. Under the deputy chiefs, there are section chiefs responsible for all SI activities within smaller geographic areas or theaters or neutral countries. Desk heads are responsible to section chiefs for SI activities in smaller areas which are subdivisions of the section areas.

<u>c</u>. In addition to the organization along geographic lines for SI activities, there are functional sections covering special activities which cut across geographic lines. The section chiefs for these functional sections,

* The functions of the Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies are to: (1) obtain all information within the Theater which is desired by the War and Navy Departments; (2) coordinate, consolidate, and evaluate such information and forward it to Washington by the most expeditious means for dissemination among the interested agencies; and .') furnish the Theater Commander with such of this information as he desires.

---

while directly responsible to the Chief, SI, for their specialized activities, work in close cooperation with the geographical section chiefs.

<u>d</u>. The Executive Officer, SI Branch, is a general executive assistant to aid the chief in the performance of all duties assigned to him.

<u>e</u>. Special staff officers are responsible to the chief for planning, personnel, and administration, as follows:

(1) The Planning Officer has the duty of coordinating the plans of the various sections and desks within SI, with the over-all and special plans for Strategic Services activities.

(2) The Personnel Officer is responsible for the recruiting and training of all SI personnel (except clerical).

(3) The Administrative Officer coordinates all administrative activities within SI having to do with procurement of supplies, budget and finance, special funds, administrative services, civilian clerical personnel, communications and medical services.

<u>f</u>. The Reporting Board is responsible for the evaluation and dissemination of intelligence.

### 5. ORGANIZATION AT OSS FIELD BASES

Organization at OSS field bases varies according to the function of the base and the number of personnel on the staff. In general it follows the pattern of the organization at Washington, with this exception: All the activities of a field base within a theater of operations are under the control and direction of the theater commander concerned who exercises this direction and control through the Strategic Services Officer.

### 6. ORGANIZATION WITHIN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

SI operates as a section of the OSS mission under the direct control and supervision of the Chief of OSS Mission.

### 7. *ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIVES AND AGENTS IN THE FIELD*

Local conditions, the mission to be performed, and the availability of personnel will determine the number and development of operatives and agents in the field. It may vary from one SI operative or agent to an organization consisting of numerous personnel comprising one or more networks.

## SECTION III — PERSONNEL

### 8. *ORGANIZATION FOR RECRUITMENT*

a. Section chiefs and desk heads are responsible for initiating and following up the recruiting or transfer of civilian personnel (except clerical), and for initiating the transfer of military personnel to OSS. They are also responsible for the final selection.

b. The Personnel Officer, SI, assists the section chiefs and the desk heads in filling their personnel requirements, and channels all requests for recruitment of military, naval, and civilian personnel through the Personnel Procurement Branch, OSS. In addition, he assists in coordinating within the SI Branch all matters relating to the procurement of personnel other than clerical or stenographic.

c. All personnel for SI activities must be approved by the Security Officer, OSS.

d. Personnel for field bases are generally recruited in Washington. Where recruiting is done locally, it is the responsibility of the SI section head of the OSS field base, under the control and direction of the Strategic Services Officer.

e. The recruiting of agents, sub-agents, and informants in the field may be done by an operative or by a desk head at a field base. (See Section V, paragraph 18, for a discussion of this matter.)

### 9. *SOURCES FOR THE RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL*

SI personnel are recruited from civilians or from the armed forces of the United States and its Allies. Military personnel of the United States armed forces may be as-

signed to OSS within authorized allotment and detailed for SI activities. Military personnel of Allied armed forces may be attached to OSS for SI activities by agreement with authorities of the nations concerned.

### 10. *TYPES OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED*

a. The qualifications for SI personnel vary according to the requirements of the assignment. Members of OSS, Washington, or Field Base staffs are selected for integrity, intelligence, initiative, and for special qualifications fitting them for a particular job.

b. Undercover field operatives are, if possible, selected with specific cover jobs in view. Unless they can conform thoroughly to a reasonable cover, they can not be used. Natural resourcefulness, energy, a broad general background, familiarity with the area, language fluency, patience, discretion, and judgment are important attributes. The operative should be able to handle men, mix easily, judge character so as to be able to deal with agents. Unqualified loyalty to the United States and unqualified sympathy with the vigorous prosecution of the war by all methods are essential.

## SECTION IV — TRAINING

### 11. *ORGANIZATION FOR TRAINING*

It is the responsibility of the Secret Intelligence Branch to see that proper training is given to its personnel. The Branch's training program is developed by a Training Advisory Committee, a Training Coordinating Committee, and the Branch Training Coordinator. The latter represents SI on the OSS Training Board and handles all relations between SI and the Schools and Training Branch, OSS. Facilities for training at special schools are provided by the Schools and Training Branch, OSS, in the Washington area. The training of agents recruited in the field is the responsibility of OSS field bases and operatives.

### 12. *SCOPE OF TRAINING*

a. Before starting formal training, prospective operatives are generally put through a series of tests and observations to determine their aptitudes for SI work.

b. Training for operatives begins with a basic course in secret intelligence. This course embraces, both in theory and in practice, such matters as security, cover, communications, recruiting and handling agents, police methods, battle order, effects of propaganda, public opinion testing, cipher, radio code, elementary map reading and sketching, use of the compass, demolitions, and weapons. Advanced training for the secret intelligence operatives is conducted at an SI finishing school. Here specialized instruction is given in secret intelligence techniques, and the operative, with assistance from the instructors and his desk head, develops his cover and otherwise prepares for his particular mission. The desk head can be of great help to the operative during this stage of highly individualized instruction and to that end should remain in as close touch with him as is consistent with security.

c. Until he leaves for the field, the operative continues to receive further special instruction, including special briefing and types of intelligence desired from the area where he will operate. Every assistance possible will be given by his desk head to that end. This training should be given to SI operatives recruited and trained in the U.S. and will be supplemented in the theater. SI operatives and agents selected in the theater will receive similar training and instructions under direction of the SI section chief.

d. New personnel selected, section chiefs, desk heads, and other staff personnel for the SI Branch should take the basic course in order to become familiar with the instruction given at the schools.

### 13. TRAINING OBJECTIVES

a. The SI operative must be able to live according to his cover, often in constant contact with experts in his cover activity, without arousing suspicion. He must know how to employ uncensored or underground methods of communication without undue risk to himself or others. He must be able to report accurately and explicitly and to evaluate information he receives. The ability to evaluate requires not only an under-

standing of persons, but familiarity with the military, social, political, economic, and religious history of the area concerned. It requires as well a working knowledge of world-wide current events. The operative going on a mission in an enemy or enemy-occupied country also requires an intimate knowledge of the territory and the ability to pass for a native. Briefly stated, the training of operatives is conducted with these ends in view: to get the operative to his post; to enable him to remain there; to get his reports out; and to get him out when and if necessary.

b. Section chiefs, desk heads, and other staff personnel dealing with operatives require a knowledge of field operating methods and conditions so as better to direct and judge the work of men in the field.

### SECTION V — METHODS OF OPERATIONS

### 14. GENERAL

OSS is authorized to conduct secret intelligence activities in all areas, exclusive of the Western Hemisphere. In neutral areas, however, SI activities may be limited by understandings with the chiefs of diplomatic missions.

### 15. SECURITY

a. Security is the *sine qua non* of secret intelligence activities. If security is lacking anywhere in the process of collecting and disseminating information, the continued functioning of an individual or of an entire network is endangered.

b. The factor of security is present to a greater or lesser degree in every phase of secret intelligence activities; however, several general principles governing security may be stated:

(1) No one in a secret intelligence organization should be told more than he has to know to do his own job. The less any one man knows, the less he can let slip — or be forced to tell — if taken by the enemy. As far as possible, the different activities carried on by an intelligence organization should be boxed in water-tight compartments.

(2) Secret intelligence personnel should be suspicious of every individual until his loyalty has been proven beyond a doubt.

(3) Secret intelligence personnel should proceed on the assumption that all telephones are tapped, all mail censored, all rooms wired, all radio messages read by the enemy.

c. Following are some of the specific security measures that may be taken in the field:

(1) Cutouts should be used by the operative whenever he considers it unsafe to come into direct contact with another individual.

(2) Meeting places should be selected for the opportunities they afford the participants for an inconspicuous encounter.

(3) Danger signals should be arranged in advance of meetings. In order to avoid detection at the time of signaling, a system should be used whereby a pre-determined signal is given only when it is desired to indicate the absence of danger. If danger is present, no signal will be given.

(4) Recognition signals to be used between persons meeting for the first time should also be arranged in advance.

## 16. *COVER*

a. Every SI operative and agent working in enemy, enemy-occupied or neutral territory must have a suitable cover — that is, an ostensibly legitimate reason for being where he is.

b. Obviously, cover must be safe. That is, it must successfully shield the operative's secret activities. In the second place, it must allow the operative sufficient freedom of action to perform his mission. For the activities of the operative must be consistent with his cover. The following broad principles govern the selection of cover:

(1) *Social freedom*

A good cover will permit the operative to mingle inconspicuously with the kind of people he

will have to see to do his job. His particular mission might require the operative to meet people of all levels of society, in which case his cover should justify such varied association. It is generally easier for a man to associate with those beneath him in the social scale than with those above him. Thus, a doctor or a lawyer can legitimately meet all kinds of people, while it would be suspicious for a stevedore to associate with people in high places. However, some jobs, such as those of waiter or cab driver, allow considerable social freedom and provide effective cover for agents.

(2) *Financial freedom*

A good cover will permit the operative to handle the sums of money his SI activities will require, for he must live within the limits of the income received from his cover occupation. If he is to handle substantial amounts of money and to entertain a good deal, the operative should adopt a cover occupation that pays well. On the other hand, if circumstances require him to adopt a poorly-paid occupation, he must be careful not to spend more money than the income from such an occupation would normally allow. Many covers are wrecked on the rock of finances. Unusual bank deposits or irregular financial transactions are prime causes of counter-espionage investigations.

(3) *Freedom of movement*

A good cover will permit the operative to travel to the extent necessitated by his mission. If his particular mission requires extensive traveling, he should choose a cover that would make frequent journeys perfectly natural. It must be remembered, however, that every trip made must have its particular cover story — a story consistent either with the operative's assumed occupation or with his assumed personal life. This story should be prepared in advance and be as true as circumstances permit.

(4) *Freedom of leisure*

A good cover will allow the operative sufficient leisure time for the conduct of his SI activities.

Therefore his cover occupation must not demand too much of his time. If possible, the cover chosen should permit short or irregular hours of work.

c. In the selection of cover, an occupation should be chosen with which the operative is familiar and which is consistent with his own experience. He should draw as much from his own life as is safe to do. Thus his story will be better able to stand investigation. The most effective cover is that which is as near truth as possible. In any case, the cover selected will be limited by the operative's personal characteristics and abilities, as well as by his mission.

d. Where the cover is almost, or wholly, artificial, the operative must take every precaution to live the part. His dress, appearance, personal effects, speech, mannerisms, and every action must conform. He must be sure that nothing he wears, possesses, says, or does will make him conspicuous or reveal that he is not what he pretends to be.

e. Cover is so important, and good covers so rare, that in many cases the finding of a good cover will determine the selection of the operative and the definition of his mission.

f. The selection of a suitable cover is the responsibility of the section chief or desk head. Arrangements with organizations outside of OSS, either private or governmental, which cooperate in providing cover for an operative, are made through the intermediary of a representative of the Director, OSS, appointed for the purpose.

g. In working out the details of an operative's cover, the desk head will have the assistance of the Document Intelligence Division of the Censorship and Documents (CD) Branch. From this Division, the desk head will be able to obtain for his operative the necessary samples of foreign papers, stamps, labels, letterheads, and documents; required items of foreign clothing, accessories, suitcases, dispatch cases, and similar equipment; and information on conditions and regulations in foreign countries with which the operative must be familiar.

h. In the event of capture by the enemy, a secret intelligence operative or agent should stick by his cover story and deny all charges. Despite the seriousness of his own position, he should not fail to protect to the end the security of the organization of which he is a member.

17. *COMMUNICATIONS*

a. Good communications are essential to the efficient functioning of an intelligence network. An operative may be able to obtain vital information, but unless he can get that information to the right people in sufficient time, his work will have been wasted. Much thought and effort, therefore, must go into the establishment of a safe, rapid communications system.

b. Communications can be divided into three categories: within a network; between operatives or agents and the field base; and from a field base to other field bases and Washington.

c. Within a network a number of varying methods may be used to maintain communications. These include personal meetings, cutouts, secret inks, improvised codes, and letter drops, and at times telephone, telegraph, ordinary mail, or general delivery. Each of these measures has particular advantages and disadvantages, and each requires special precautions. The method or combination of methods used will be governed by local conditions. If possible, an alternate communications system should be set up and held in readiness to be used if the first system should break down.

d. For communications between a network and a field base, radio is one of the best means in view of its rapidity. When used, adequate security must be taken to avoid enemy detection. Security methods include: keeping the transmission short; changing the transmission time constantly; moving the location of the set frequently; employing cipher. In addition to radio, couriers are a primary means of communication. Sometimes, however, communication can be effected through

transport workers, public conveyances, or even more ordinary methods of telephone, telegraph, or mail.

e. In communicating between a field base and other field bases or Washington, existing Army and Navy, State Department, and commercial facilities will be used.

## 18. *ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE*

a. It is essential that careful planning precede an operative's penetration of a new territory and that he be furnished with detailed instructions as to the means of entry and of contacting individuals who will be of assistance to him. This is particularly true of an operative inaugurating SI activities in an enemy or enemy-controlled country.

b. An operative can enter and leave his assigned area of operations either secretly or by the normal means of access and egress under the protection of his cover. An operative may gain secret entry to a territory by airplane, submarine or other vessel, or by making his way across a land border. Particular care must be taken to hide or destroy the paraphernalia an operative may have used to enter a country surreptitiously, such as a parachute or a rubber boat.

c. On arrival in a new area, the operative should learn all he can as quickly but discreetly as possible about local conditions and regulations and local personalities, and should at once plan and make arrangements for his escape in case of emergency.

d. Before he enters a new area, every effort is made to furnish the operative with authentic and current documents, such as identity and ration cards. However, since the enemy authorities may from time to time make changes in the cards currently in effect as a control measure, the operative working in hostile territory should as soon as possible make sure that his documents conform to existing regulations.

e. His first pre-occupation should be to establish himself in his cover and become an accepted member of the community. He should not attempt any under-

cover work until this preliminary adjustment has been accomplished. The time required to establish himself will depend on where the operative is located, the nature of his cover, his own resourcefulness and the amount of assistance he will receive from friends. Generally speaking, the operative will be able to begin functioning a good deal sooner in a neutral country than in enemy or enemy-occupied territory, where greater precautions must be taken. The operative or agent who is a citizen or resident of the area in which he is to operate has a distinct advantage and will be able to begin his undercover work much sooner.

## 19. *ESTABLISHING SOURCES OF INFORMATION*

a. In neutral countries, local American business men or those of a friendly nationality can be useful to the operative in making contacts and securing sources of information. Members of the neutral country's secret police and minor government officials, if favorably disposed or sufficiently rewarded, can also be of great assistance. Undercover activities in a neutral country are usually in violation of the laws of the country. Hence, in every case proper security measures must be taken, as well as every precaution against enemy agents in the same area.

b. In enemy and enemy-occupied countries, the operative may receive support and assistance from members of underground organizations and opposition political parties with whom he has established contacts.

c. In the selection of agents, those shall be sought who have direct access to the information desired; first hand information will be more accurate and helpful than hearsay.

d. The number and type of agents an SI operative should recruit will vary with existing local conditions. In general, a secret intelligence network should be kept as small and compact as the mission to be accomplished will allow.

e. In conformity with the basic rule of security that no one in the organization be told more than he needs to know to do his own job, a secret intelligence network may be set up along the lines of the cell system, modified to fit prevailing circumstances. The following diagram represents a type of the cell principle:

## HEADQUARTERS

```
                    ┌──────────────┐
                    │  Operative   │
         ┌──────────┴──────────────┴──────────┐
    ┌────┴────┐                          ┌─────┴────┐
    │  Agent  │                          │  Agent   │
    └─────────┘                          └──────────┘
                    ┌──────────────┐
                    │    Agent     │                    Cell No. 1
        ┌────────┬──┴──────┬───────┴──┬────────┐
   ┌────┴────┐ ┌─┴──────┐ ┌┴───────┐ ┌┴────────┐
   │Sub-agent│ │Sub-agent│ │Sub-agent│ │Sub-agent│
   └─────────┘ └────────┘ └────────┘ └─────────┘

                    ┌──────────────┐
                    │  Sub-agent   │
                    │   (chief)    │                    Cell No. 2
        ┌────────┬──┴──────┬───────┴──┬────────┐
   ┌────┴────┐ ┌─┴──────┐ ┌┴───────┐ ┌┴────────┐
   │Sub-agent│ │Sub-agent│ │Sub-agent│ │Sub-agent│
   └─────────┘ └────────┘ └────────┘ └─────────┘

                    ┌──────────────┐
                    │  Sub-agent   │
                    │   (chief)    │                    Cell No. 3
        ┌────────┬──┴──────┬───────┴──┬────────┐
   ┌────┴────┐ ┌─┴──────┐ ┌┴───────┐ ┌┴────────┐
   │Sub-agent│ │Sub-agent│ │Sub-agent│ │Sub-agent│
   └─────────┘ └────────┘ └────────┘ └─────────┘
```

A key man, the operative, would be sent by headquarters to organize a network in a given area. This man would recruit locally one or more agents, none of whom —in case there were more than one—would know the others. The operative alone would communicate directly with headquarters, each of his agents reporting to him. Each agent would then organize a cell, or group, of perhaps four to six sub-agents. These sub-agents would not know the operative, but each would report to the agent in charge of his particular cell. One of the sub-agents from cell number one, selected for his leadership and ability, would then be designated to form and become chief of a second cell. None of the men in cell number two would know the men in cell number one except the chief, who would report to the head of the first cell. One man from cell number two would then be designated to form a third cell, and so on until the desired number of cells was organized. That number would vary with the job to be done and the local situation. As used by SI, this form of cell organization is not rigid, but may be altered to meet special conditions.

f. Before employing a new agent, the operative should conduct a thorough yet unobtrusive security check to make sure of his reliability. The importance of knowing one's man is obvious. Operatives should be particularly wary of individuals who offer their services unsolicited; these may be agents provocateur and operating for the enemy police. After checking a prospective agent for security, the operative should assign him relatively simple tasks at first, gradually building up to more difficult tasks of greater trust.

g. In addition to collecting information through regularly employed agents, the operative even in enemy or enemy-occupied countries will be able to gather a good deal of general information from the press and radio and through his normal social and business contacts. The individuals furnishing this information, of course, will not be aware of the operative's secret activities. When pieced together in the light of reports re-

ceived from agents, information gleaned in this manner can prove of value.

## 20. *REMUNERATION OF AGENTS*

a. Whenever possible, agents should be recruited whose motives for working against the enemy are patriotic rather than financial. Remuneration should be regarded by the agent as a reward rather than as an inducement to render services. Many individuals, particularly in enemy-occupied territory, will serve as agents out of reasons of patriotism. However, agents who volunteer their services should, if willing, be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the performance of SI duties.

b. Relations with agents working for monetary gain should be placed on a business-like basis from the outset. A definite rate of compensation should be agreed upon and adhered to. Some agents work better when they receive a small retainer and are paid over and above this fee according to results. In such instances, a close watch must be kept to check faked reports submitted in order to get easy money. A good man should be treated fairly and generously and appreciation shown for good work.

c. The terms of employment of agents should be reviewed from time to time in the light of results achieved. However, a proven man ought not to be unnecessarily harried the moment he ceases producing results. Every agent experiences unproductive lulls when information is not easily available or is simply non-existent. He should be allowed to feel that he is trusted and that he can expect reasonable certainty of employment in return for his loyal services.

d. In addition to money, remuneration may be in kind — such as food, medicines, clothing — or in services and favors of one sort or another.

e. If agents get into trouble as a result of their SI activities they and their families should be given every aid possible within the bounds of security. In the event

an agent is in danger of being uncovered, he should be gotten to safety and provision made for the family he may leave behind.

## 21. *SPECIALIZATION OF AGENTS*

In ability, training, and cover an agent should be a specialist for the type of intelligence work he is to do. Assigning an agent to a number of different types of intelligence activities reduces his effectiveness and increases the risk of his being uncovered. However, specialization should be kept within limits and not carried to a point where it requires the employment of too many agents.

## 22. *DOUBLE AGENTS*

a. Double agents — agents working simultaneously for both sides — can prove useful to the SI operative, but the use of double agents is extremely dangerous.

b. There are two general categories into which double agents fall. First is the agent who works one side against the other entirely for personal gain and who does not necessarily know that the operative, his superior, is aware of his double connection. Such an agent can be of limited value and is dangerous to handle. But if employed, particular care must be taken not to divulge, or make it possible for the agent to obtain, any information which would be of use to the enemy.

c. On the other hand, there is the agent whose loyalty to the allied cause is unquestioned and who at the same time has been able to work his way into an enemy intelligence organization. Such an agent is of greater value than the first one; for not only can he supply the enemy with false information, but he may also be able to secure information about the enemy from the inside with some degree of reliability. However, all information obtained from double agents must be checked with extra precaution to guard against deception.

### 23. SEVERING CONNECTIONS WITH AGENTS

If it ever becomes necessary to discontinue the services of an agent, the particular circumstances surrounding the case will govern the procedure to be followed. As a guiding principle, however, it must be remembered that the welfare of the organization comes before that of any individual in it. The operative must be objective, and, if necessary, ruthless in deciding how to handle an agent with whom connections must be severed. However, if secret intelligence activities have been established and conducted with proper regard to security, the services of an agent may be dispensed with without jeopardizing the entire organization.

### 24. RELATIONS WITH UNDERGROUND GROUPS

a. Underground organizations in enemy or enemy-occupied territory can be of invaluable assistance to the SI operative. They may be able to advise him of the dependability of certain persons, to inform him of the counter-espionage methods of the local authorities, to furnish him with communications, or to help him collect the information he has been sent to obtain. On the other hand, the SI operative, in cooperation with other OSS branches, may be in a position to help the underground. He may be able to provide money, supplies, medicines, communications, and other services which the organization may require to carry on its work.

b. In addition to maintaining relations with underground organizations in the actual area of operations, he should assist in establishing liaison between that organization and the nearest SS field base. In the case of regions not yet penetrated by SI operatives, this liaison may constitute one of the most important sources of information about the region in question.

### 25. ASCERTAINING PUBLIC OPINION

In determining popular attitudes regarding current issues, every effort should be made to get the opinions of

a representative cross-section of the population. Ideally, the various groupings into which the population can be broken down as to age, sex, political party, religion, occupation, income, etc., should be represented proportionately in the group upon whose opinions the operative bases his reports. Such ideal conditions are, of course, difficult for an undercover operative to achieve. His particular cover may enable him safely to associate only with people of a certain level of society. To get the broader picture, however, he should make use of his agents and informants who may be able to move in circles closed to him. In any case, the operative should indicate in his reports on public opinion the extent to which the popular attitudes reported are representative of the people as a whole or of one or more particular groups.

### 26. PENETRATING AN ENEMY OR ENEMY-OCCUPIED COUNTRY FROM NEUTRAL TERRITORY

a. In many cases, the best means of establishing an intelligence network in enemy or enemy-occupied territory is by working through a nearby neutral country.

b. Having established himself under cover in the selected neutral country, the SI operative should make contact with persons who are willing or who can be induced to work for him. The operative will choose individuals — after, of course, taking all necessary security precautions — whose qualifications include the privilege of residing in the enemy or enemy-occupied country and of traveling between it and the neutral country from time to time. Such individuals may be found among minor government officials, political leaders, business men, industrialists, educators, scientists, commercial travelers, seamen, railroad employees and other transport workers. With the aid of their business, social or governmental connections, and under cover of their normal occupations — often as a side-line to those occupations — the individuals thus selected may set up small intelligence networks in the enemy or enemy-occupied country or operate entirely on their own to secure the desired information. They will report to the

secret intelligence operative who remains on neutral soil. Professional smugglers may also be employed to get information and materiel into or out of enemy or enemy-occupied countries.

c. If an agent network has been established, it will be easier for the SI operative to enter enemy or enemy-occupied territory to conduct his work personally.

## 27. *REPORTS*

a. Reports on information collected should be accurate, specific, and timely and should include all pertinent information. Exact dimensions, statistics, and dates should be given whenever possible. Any estimates should be labeled as such. It is essential to indicate the date on which the information contained in the report was observed. Photographs, plans, blueprints, and sketches should be included when they contribute to the clarity of the information.

b. Speed in reporting information is always an important factor. Sometimes it may be the crucial factor which will determine the ultimate success or failure of an operation. Hence every effort must be made to transmit information as rapidly as possible. This calls attention to the need for an adequate communications system (See paragraph 17). Upon the urgency of a particular item of information will depend in part the method of communication used in transmitting it. In an emergency, rapid reporting of the available facts is preferable to delay in the hope of ascertaining the whole story.

However, it must be borne in mind that grave danger to an undercover operative lies in prolonged and regular transmission enabling the enemy to locate the station. Reports, therefore, must be of minimum length, sent from different localities at irregular times.

c. With due regard for its security, the original source of any information reported from the field, should always be indicated for the information of the desk head and the reporting board. Such indication is important because the field base or OSS, Washington, may receive

the same information from apparently different sources, whereas in reality various agencies are quoting the same source. If the source is not indicated, this may give rise to the erroneous and possibly dangerous belief that the report has been independently confirmed. Information should be confirmed from other sources wherever possible and such confirmation noted in the report. All information concerning the source such as type of individual, occupation, political prejudices, should be furnished wherever possible but should remain consistent with security considerations.

d. In the dissemination of all SI reports, whether from the field or from Washington, the distribution which has been made should be clearly and completely indicated and reported.

e. A clear distinction should be made in the report between fact, rumor, and opinion.

f. Operational data, as distinguished from intelligence, should be segregated and reported separately.

g. As a guide in reporting military and naval information, the operative will find the Basic Notes of the SI Branch on such subjects as Airfield Reporting, Road Reporting, and Beach Reporting to be useful. These notes are brought up to date from time to time and have been translated into foreign languages according to regional needs. A memorandum prepared by the liaison officer MID-SI/OSS entitled "Requirements of the Military Intelligence Service" should also prove helpful in this respect.

## 28. *RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS*

Generally speaking, no records should be kept. Extreme caution must be exercised by operatives and agents in the field when it is necessary to be in possession of papers relating to their SI activities. Such papers not only place in jeopardy the safety of the individual in whose possession they may be found, but also may furnish the enemy with sufficient information to cause the liquidation of an entire organization. Thus only papers which are

absolutely essential to the functioning of an organization or which are to be sent to the base should be kept; and every possible security measure must be taken to prevent that minimum from falling into enemy hands. The keeping of address books and personnel rosters is particularly dangerous and should not be recorded. In those cases where it is essential to hold documents, the danger factor may be reduced by the use of cipher or of a suitable code disguising the true nature of the information. Incriminating documents of any kind should not be carried on one's person. In that connection, messages between members of an SI organization in areas of operation should be oral whenever possible. If it is necessary to transmit a message or report in writing, the data to be transmitted should be written down only at the last possible moment before its delivery. Documents for transmission to the base should be carefully concealed until they can be safely transmitted.

## 29. RELATION BETWEEN SI DESKS, WASHINGTON, AND SI STAFF IN THE FIELD

a. The Washington desk heads should keep in close touch, through appropriate channels, with the staff at field bases and in neutral areas. They should keep the field heads informed of the Reporting Board's evaluation of field reports, and should transmit to the field information obtained from other sources that will enable the field staff personnel more intelligently to direct their future efforts.

b. At intervals during service in the field, it is desirable for a field desk head and key operatives, when consistent with security and cover, to be brought back to Washington for an exchange of views. In this respect, the governing consideration must be the maintenance of a continuous organization. This will enable them to renew personal contacts with Washington staff members, to be brought up to date on any changes in policies or personnel, and to give the organization the benefit of the intangible aspects of their field experience which are difficult to express in written reports. Conversely,

Washington desk heads should, whenever possible, be given the opportunity of visiting the field in order to see conditions at first hand and thus gain experience that will assist them in directing the field work.

c. When a field desk head or key operative returns from the field, the Washington staff should set aside sufficient time for conferences with him. It is advisable for the Washington desk head to make a preparatory review of the field member's problems and reports in advance so as to be thoroughly familiar with them at the time of conferring. Nothing is more damaging to the morale of field personnel than to be given the impression that the Washington staff is too busy to see him and cannot waste much time on him.

## 30. RELATIONS BETWEEN FIELD DESK HEADS AND OPERATIVES

a. The major concern of the field desk head, whether at a field base or in a neutral area, is to keep his network of operatives and agents intact and secure. A desk head should not withdraw an operative from his place of work except under unusual circumstances or except insofar as may be consistent with his cover. His absence and return is likely to be noticed, and endanger his network of agents. The usual conditions which will lead a desk head to make an emergency withdrawal of an operative are signs in the operative of strain which may lead to a breaking point, or evidence that he is in danger of being discovered. Either contingency should be foreseen early enough to permit, whenever possible, his replacement by another operative who can more safely carry on his work.

b. The desk head should maintain close contact with each of his operatives. The morale of an operative will depend upon the degree to which he feels that his desk head is personally and constantly vigilant in directing and caring for him. Before going into the field, the operative should be given a directive that is as specific as possible regarding the types of information required from his area. The success or failure of an operative's

mission depends, to a great extent, on the desk head's constant attention to the details of the operative's cover, communications, and movement. Any laxity in these particulars will impair the operative's effectiveness and personal safety.

c. Communication from the desk head to the operative should receive special attention. The operative who hears nothing from his desk head for a considerable period of time is likely to feel that his work is unimportant and unappreciated. The desk head must keep closely in touch with the latest intelligence requirements from the operative's area, and, within limits of security, keep the operative informed of important changes in requirements, and of the value of his work.

## SECTION VI — TYPES OF INFORMATION REQUIRED

### 31. *GENERAL*

Since the SI Branch has the dual function of servicing OSS and disseminating intelligence to a number of widely different organizations, the type of information it is required to collect is extremely varied. The order of priority for the different types of information will depend on the area in question and the prevailing situation, as well as on the needs of the different organizations for the particular area. The following lists, paragraphs 32-36 inclusive, typical secret intelligence objectives.

### 32. *MILITARY INFORMATION*

a. ORDER OF BATTLE

Identification, location, strength and movement of enemy troop units, aircraft, materiel, and base supply depots.

b. DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

Gun emplacements (number, type, size, range, and condition of guns). AA defenses; fortifications, block-houses, pill boxes, trenches, and

barbed wire entanglements; AT defenses; tank traps, road blocks, land mines; communication and transportation facilities.

c. LANDING BEACHES AND BEACH DEFENSES

Location; length, width, slope and composition; depth of water off shore, shoals, reefs; currents, tide and surf conditions; terrains behind beaches; roads leading from beaches to interior.

d. AIRFIELDS

Location; adjacent topography including landmarks; dimensions; length and position of runways; surface; size of plane capable of using; obstructions near field; hangars; dispersal areas; repair facilities; fuel and oil supplies; communication and transportation facilities; connecting roads and railroads; defenses; camouflage; weather conditions.

e. COMMUNICATIONS

Railroads, roads, waterways, harbors, radio nets, telephone and telegraph systems used by the military. (See paragraphs 34 d, e, f, g, h, i, below for specific items of information required.)

f. RADAR EQUIPMENT

Type; location; how defended; how camouflaged.

g. SECRET WEAPONS AND LATEST TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

### 33. *NAVAL INFORMATION*

a. NAVAL SEA AND AIR FORCES

Location; numbers and identification of vessels by types and names; new or unusual types of vessels; secret weapons and devices; movements of vessels; photographs and silhouettes of vessel and aircraft.

b. NAVAL BASES

Location; number and types of vessels present; facilities for construction and repair of vessels, including dry docks; fuel storage and facilities; supply depots; ammunition depots; personnel depots; berthing piers; anchorage ground; air bases; radio stations; radar installations; defenses, land and air, submarine nets and mines.

## 34. ECONOMIC INFORMATION

a. ESSENTIAL WAR INDUSTRIES

Location of plants; type, quantity and quality of production; defenses; camouflage; movement of plants to new locations; effects of bombing; blueprints and plans; sources of supply; labor relations.

b. ELECTRICAL POWER INSTALLATIONS

Location, capacity and defenses of power stations, power dams and high tension lines.

c. TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SYSTEMS

Communication net; location of exchanges; number of wires or cables above or below ground; type and condition of equipment; telephone directories; measures of defense.

d. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

Location, power, range, wave length and call letters of stations; number, type and condition of receiving sets; best times for reception; measures of defense.

e. RAILROADS

Location; motive power, steam or electric; if the latter, location of controls, transformers, and substations; signal system; number of tracks; gauge; condition of road-bed, rolling stock and equipment; location of tunnels, bridges, culverts, whether prepared for destruction; repair shops, stations, marshalling

yards, sidings, switches and turntables; goods and personnel transported; time tables; measures of defense.

f. ROADS

Location; width and surface; viaducts, bridges and culverts, with load capacity; road-building equipment; defenses; trucks; buses and cars available; filling stations, gasoline and oil stocks; amount and kind of traffic.

g. WATERWAYS

Location; width, depth; locks; bridges; barges; defenses; amount and kind of traffic.

h. HARBORS

Number and size of port facilities; transportation and communication facilities; cranes; storage, refrigeration facilities; fuel facilities; fresh water supplies; labor conditions; measures for defense; number and types of vessels, with destination where possible.

i. In general, all important economic changes, such as: marked shortages; greatly increased production; new factories, transportation and communication facilities; destruction by bombing; repairs to installations damaged by bombing; new defense measures. In addition, SI agents may be called upon for specific information on designated areas, such as water supply and health conditions.

## 35. POLITICAL INFORMATION

a. PROPOSED CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICY

b. POLITICAL PARTIES

Aims, strength, importance.

c. POLITICAL PERSONALITIES

Venalities, weaknesses, comprising activities; strong and weak points in ability and character.

d. UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS

Organization; strength; aims; operations; finances; leaders.

e. LABOR ORGANIZATION

Strength; leaders; policies.

f. POLICE SYSTEM

Organization; methods; important officials.

g. HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Organization; aims; methods; relation to similar organizations in other countries; effectiveness; descriptions and personal histories of officials and agents.

(The collection of such information is primarily the responsibility of X-2. However, any information of this nature collected by SI will be passed on to X-2.)

h. METHODS OF CONTROLLING CIVILIAN POPULATION

Identity cards; curfews; travel permits; rationing and other regulations; plans for civilian control on D-day. Copies of identity cards and similar documents should be procured, together with intelligence for their proper use, to be utilized by future agents.

i. Where applicable, relations between enemy occupation authorities and civil population; between enemy occupation authorities and local government; between enemy occupation authorities and local police.

## 36. PSYCHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

a. MORALE OF CIVILIAN POPULATION

War workers, foreign labor, miners, farmers, civil servants, etc.

b. MORALE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Relations between officers and men, between

various services, between allied enemy troops, between troops and conquered peoples, between military and civilians; effect on morale of pay, food, housing, medical care, equipment, leaves, etc.; discipline; military smartness; sale of equipment.

c. MORALE EFFECTS OF BOMBING

d. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT, THE ARMED FORCES, THE CHURCH, UNITED NATIONS, AXIS COUNTRIES

e. EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS' PW ON MORALE

f. ENEMY PW METHODS AND RESULTS

g. CLEAVAGES BETWEEN GROUPS OF THE CIVIL POPULATION AND BETWEEN IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF MILITARY AND GOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL

## SECTION VII — COOPERATION OF SI WITHIN OSS AND WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

### 37. GENERAL

The very nature of its activities requires the SI Branch to coordinate such activities with the other branches of OSS, with the armed services, with the State Department and with the secret intelligence services of the allied nations. Not only must SI be kept informed of the specific intelligence requirements of each agency it serves; but it must see to it that the desired intelligence, once collected and evaluated, is disseminated to the agencies which can act on the basis of that intelligence. Furthermore, duplication of effort will be avoided and the collection and evaluation of information facilitated by a complete, rapid interchange of information with other intelligence organizations.

### 38. COOPERATION WITH OTHER BRANCHES OF OSS

Cooperation of SI with other branches of OSS falls into two general categories:

a. Cooperation within the Intelligence Services

The activities of the Secret Intelligence, Counterespionage (X-2), Foreign Nationalities (FN), Research and Analysis (R&A) and CD Branches of OSS are coordinated by the Deputy Director, Intelligence Services. Regular meetings of the chiefs of these branches are held under his supervision. Close collaboration must exist between SI and X-2. In many cases SI and X-2 have to operate jointly, with the personnel of both branches being used interchangeably to perform SI and X-2 missions. Close and constant collaboration must also exist between SI and R&A, both in Washington and in the field. In order to facilitate the work of both branches, corresponding desks and section chiefs in SI and R&A acquaint themselves generally with the types of activities (other than purely operational data) currently being undertaken by each other. Foreign Nationalities can serve SI with respect to recruitment.

b. Cooperation with the Operations Branches

SI, together with the other intelligence branches of OSS, furnishes the Operational Groups, Maritime Unit, Special Operations and Morals Operations Branches with information which these branches require to plan and execute their missions. On the other hand, in the course of operations, OG, MU, SO, and MO may uncover valuable information which they will pass on to SI for evaluation and dissemination to other interested organizations.

### 39. *COOPERATION WITH THE ARMED FORCES*

a. It is essential that SI cooperate closely with the armed forces both in Washington and in theaters of operations.

b. In Washington, liaison is maintained between the Military Intelligence Division (MID) and SI on a reciprocal basis in order to insure a free and rapid interchange of appropriate intelligence. Similar arrangements exist with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and Air Intelligence (A-2).

---

c. In theaters of operation, the coordination of SI activities with the armed forces is still more complete, since all OSS operations come under the direct control of the theater commander.

d. Although combat intelligence does not normally come within the province of SI, SI organizations in theaters of operations may at times be called upon to assist in the collection of this type of intelligence. However, SI should not engage in the collection of combat intelligence unless specifically requested to do so by the theater commander.

### 40. *COOPERATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE*

a. The SI Branch furnishes the State Department with political and other pertinent intelligence, supplementing the intelligence which the Department gathers through its own sources.

b. On its part, the State Department often provides valuable assistance and advice for SI operatives and agents. In addition, diplomatic and consular officials, because of their experience in the field and familiarity with the local scene, are often valuable counselors.

### 41. *COOPERATION WITH SIMILAR AGENCIES OF ALLIED NATIONS*

The SI Branch maintains close relations with the secret intelligence organizations of allied nations, including those governments-in-exile. These organizations often are able to supply SI with information and personnel which it would be otherwise difficult or impossible to obtain. Close liaison with these organizations prevents duplication of effort and helps provide a check on information secured through other channels. This liaison is maintained both in Washington and at field bases, principally the latter.

## SECTION VIII — PLANNING

### 42. *GENERAL*

a. Planning for secret intelligence is essential. Detailed planning must be performed before undertaking activities in a given area and before extending activities already under way.

b. After an organization is established in a given area, secret intelligence activities are determined largely in accordance with the information demanded by a changing situation. Thus the planning of those activities must be a continuous process, based upon military and political developments. It must be flexible and should take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves. It must be farsighted. It will be dependent in large measures upon the initiative of the personnel of all echelons.

### 43. *PROGRAMS*

a. Special Programs covering SI activities in a theater of operations are incorporated into OSS Over-All Programs. In the Over-All Program for a given theater or area, the objectives for all the OSS branches concerned are set forth in order of importance. The Special SI Programs state the missions to be performed by SI to attain the general objectives listed in the Over-All Program, present a brief summary of the situation bearing on the missions in question and prescribe in a general way the plan to be followed. These special SI Programs are drawn up jointly by the Strategic Services Planning Staff and the SI Branch, and are presented to the OSS Planning Group for approval. Upon approval by the Planning Group, the Programs are submitted to the Director, OSS for his consideration and approval before being transmitted to OSS, field bases or to OSS missions in neutral areas.

b. Subject to the approval of the theater commander, SI Programs establish priorities for SI activities in the field. In conformity with these special programs, SI pre-

pares detailed operational plans.

c. In Washington detailed operational plans and projects in implementation of special programs are drawn up by the SI desk head in consultation with the section chief. These plans and projects are then routed through the SI Projects Officer, for recording, to the Chief of the SI Branch, for approval. The Planning Officer, SI, coordinates the plans originating in any one section with other plans of the SI Branch. At the same time he is responsible for coordinating plans of the SI Branch with those of other branches of OSS.

d. When SI, Washington, or at the field base draws up plans or projects unrelated to the objectives and missions covered in a special program, such plans and projects are reported to the Director, Washington, attention Planning Group, for approval and incorporation into the appropriate program.

e. The Chief of SI Section, OSS Field Bases, and in neutral countries, will provide the Strategic Services Officer of the Chief of OSS Mission with all necessary information on progress of activities under SI Special Programs for inclusion in his regular report to OSS, Washington.

### 44. *IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES*

SI, as well as the other OSS branches concerned, participates in the preparation of Implementation Studies. These studies support the various Over-All and Special Programs. They cover certain specific areas and provide supporting data and background information to be used in the preparation of operational plans.

### 45. *CHECK LIST*

In Appendix "A" there are summarized in the form of a check list a number of the more important points that have been presented in this manual. This check list may serve as a brief list of reminders to SI personnel to assist them in the course of their work.

*APPENDIX "A"*
TO
SECRET INTELLIGENCE FIELD MANUAL —
STRATEGIC SERVICES
CHECK LIST FOR SI ACTIVITIES

This check list is designed to assist desk heads, section chiefs, and other staff personnel, in Washington and in the field, in the planning and execution of SI activities.

## FOR SI (WASHINGTON)

1. *AUTHORITY*

a. Does the projected activity conform to approved Strategic Services Over-all and Special SI Programs?— or to contemplated additional programs or revisions of such programs?

2. *PLANNING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SI PROGRAMS*

a. Is planning complete?

b. Has the plan been approved by proper authority?

c. Have provisions been made for:

(1) Recruitment and training of necessary personnel?

(2) Equipment, supplies, funds, and administrative services?

(3) Adequate and secure communications?

(4) Transportation to the theater?

d. Has the advisability been considered of coordinating SI plans with those of other OSS branches and appropriate Allied agencies?

e. Do plans provide that all pertinent intelligence is available in the field for use in indoctrination of personnel for implementing this plan?

f. Have arrangements been made to send to the field:

(1) Comments on data received and further data desired?

(2) Evaluation on the operatives reports?

3. *PERSONNEL*

a. Have adequate "cover" arrangements been made?

b. Have personnel about to be sent abroad in connection with prospective activities been checked individually for:

(1) Proper training?

(2) Required inoculations and physical examinations?

(3) Knowledge of types of information required?

(4) Regular and special equipment?

(5) Security?

c. Has proper security examination been made of all personnel to make certain they understand all security provisions?

4. *TRAINING*

a. Has contact been kept by the desk head with men in training?

b. Has special training for the specific assignment been completed satisfactorily?

c. Has the desk head discussed with each of his men, as completely as is possible, consistent with security, the proposed assignment?

d. Has personnel been properly indoctrinated?

e. Has sufficient emphasis been placed on security during and on completion of the training course?

f. Are you satisfied with the security and discretion of the individual?

## 5. EQUIPMENT

a. Has meticulous attention been paid to the equipment of the individual?

(1) Has he been properly equipped as an SI operative prior to departure for overseas?

(2) Has particular attention been given to foreign funds, foreign documents, cover clothing, and communications equipment?

(3) If not available in Washington, are they available in the field?

(4) If not, have you made other arrangements for their procurement?

b. Have arrangements been made with Procurement and Supply to furnish special OSS equipment?

c. Has the base been notified of what part of the supplies not carried with personnel will be sent from Washington?

d. Has branch chief in the field been notified to initiate requests for supplies and equipment as soon as a possible shortage can be foreseen?

## 6. SHIPMENT OF SUPPLIES

a. Has theater commander's approval been received from the field for shipment of supplies and equipment?

b. Has field been informed of:

(1) Schedule of shipment of supplies and equipment?

(2) Shortages in the shipment?

## 7. TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL

a. Has approval of the theater commander been received for transportation of personnel?

b. Have the proper documents been prepared and all authorizations obtained?

c. Has "overseas security check" been obtained?

d. Has final inspection been made of physical condition and equipment of personnel?

e. Has the field been notified of the names, grades, and ratings of military personnel being sent, (names only of civilians), as well as of the number that is to follow, if any, to complete the requirements for the projected activity or task?

## 8. REPORTS

a. Are reports on SI activities received from the field?

b. Do reports indicate that the SI activities conform to approved Strategic Services Special SI Programs?

c. Are the reports from the field complete and in the prescribed form?

### FOR SI (FIELD)

## 1. AUTHORITY

Does the projected activity conform to approved Strategic Services Special SI Programs or to additional activities approved by competent authority for inclusion in Special Programs?

## 2. PLANNING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SI PROGRAMS

a. Is planning complete?

b. Has the plan been approved by proper authority?

c. Have provisions been made for?

(1) Recruitment and training of necessary additional personnel in the theater?

(2) Equipment, supplies, funds, and administrative services?

(3) Adequate and secure communications?

(4) Transportation to and within the area of operations?

d. Has the advisability been considered of coordinating SI plans with those of other OSS branches, military agencies within the theater, and appropriate Allied agencies?

e. Is plan in accordance with most recent intelligence from OSS and other available sources?

## 3. *PERSONNEL*

a. Has recruitment in conformity with your plan been initiated in the theater?

b. Has personnel on arrival from overseas been examined individually for:

(1) Morale?

(2) Physical condition?

(3) Equipment?

(4) Training?

(5) Indoctrination?

(6) Security?

c. Have final "cover" details been arranged?

## 4. *TRAINING*

For personnel trained at the field base, have the following points been checked?

a. Has continuous contact been kept by the desk with men in training?

b. Has special training for the specific assignment been completed satisfactorily?

c. Has the desk head discussed with the men, as completely as is possible consistent with security, the proposed assignment?

d. Is the indoctrination complete?

e Has sufficient emphasis been placed with the individual on security during the training course and while waiting departure on his task?

## 5. *EQUIPMENT*

a. For the individual intended to enter enemy or enemy-occupied countries, are you satisfied with his personal equipment, clothing, foreign funds, foreign documents, and communications equipment?

b. Have arrangements been made for furnishing future equipment, funds, and documents to the individual?

## 6. *SHIPMENT OF SUPPLIES*

a. Have necessary requisitions been forwarded to OSS, Washington to equip agents recruited and trained in the field?

b. Has theater commander approval been forwarded to Washington for shipment of items?

c. Has schedule for shipments been worked out with Washington?

## 7. *INTRODUCTION INTO ENEMY OR ENEMY-OCCUPIED COUNTRIES*

a. Have all the proper documents been prepared and all authorizations received from competent authority?

b. Has proper liaison been arranged with appropriate Allied agencies or resistance groups?

c. Have arrangements been made with X-2 in connection with departure of personnel and its activities in the field?

d. Have arrangements been made for withdrawal of the mission when its task is completed?

e. Have proper arrangements been made with ap-

propriate Allied agencies, resistance groups, or our own agents assisting in the reception of personnel?

## 8. *REPORTS*

Have arrangements been made to transmit to Washington reports on:

a. All military, naval, political, economic, and psychological information required?

b. Operational plans made in the implementation of special programs?

c. Successes, failures, and difficulties in accomplishing missions?

d. Effectiveness of OSS equipment and devices?

e. Any new methods developed?

f. Status of personnel — by activities?

g. Cooperation with Allied organizations?

# Notes

118

# SPECIAL OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL –

# STRATEGIC SERVICES

(Provisional)

OSS ARCHIVES

WASHINGTON

Prepared under direction of
The Director of Strategic Services

# SPECIAL OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL

## – STRATEGIC SERVICES

(Provisional)

Strategic Services Field Manual No. 4.

---

Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.
23 February 1944

This Special Operations Field Manual — Strategic Services (Provisional) is published for the information and guidance of all concerned and will be used as the basic doctrine for Strategic Services training for such subjects.

It should be carefully noted that Special Operations as defined in this Manual covers the following subjects: (1) sabotage; (2) direct contact with and support of underground resistance groups; (3) conduct of special operations not assigned to other Government agencies and not under direct control of theater or area commanders. Special Operations do not include promotion of, or engagement in, guerrilla activities or subversive maritime activities, which will be the subjects of other provisional basic field manuals.

The contents of this Manual should be carefully controlled and should not be allowed to come into unauthorized hands.

AR 380-5, pertaining to handling of secret documents, will be complied with in the handling of this Manual.

William J. Donovan.

Director

---

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

# SPECIAL OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL STRATEGIC SERVICES
### (Provisional)

## SECTION I — PRINCIPLES AND METHODS

### 1. *THE MISSION, OBJECTIVE, AND IMPLEMENTS*

The mission of the OSS is to plan and operate special services, (including secret intelligence, research and analysis, and morale and physical subversion) to lower the enemy's will and capacity to resist, carried on in support of military operations and in furtherance of the war effort. The mission of the Special Operations Branch is to carry out that part of the OSS mission which can be accomplished by certain physical subversive methods as contrasted with the operations of the Morale Operations, the Operational Groups, and the Maritime Unit. The primary objective of the Special Operations Branch is the destruction of enemy personnel, materiel, and installations.

### 2. *DEFINITIONS*

a. OVER-ALL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIVITIES—a collection of objectives, in order of priority (importance) within a theater or area.

b. OBJECTIVE—a main or controlled goal for accomplishment within a theater or area by Strategic Services as set forth in an Over-All Program.

c. SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR STRATEGIC SERVICES ACTIVITIES—a statement setting forth the detailed missions assigned to one or more Strategic Services branches, designed to accomplish a given objective, together with a summary of the situation and the general methods of accomplishment of the assigned missions.

d. MISSION—a statement of purpose set forth in a special program for the accomplishment of a given objective.

e. OPERATIONAL PLAN—an amplification or elaboration of a special program, containing the details and means of carrying out the specified activities.

f. TASK—a detailed operation, usually planned in the field, which contributes toward the accomplishment of a mission.

g. TARGET—a place, establishment, group, or individual toward which activities or operations are directed.

h. THE FIELD—all areas outside of the Western Hemisphere in which Strategic Services activities take place.

i. FIELD BASE—an OSS headquarters in the field, designated by the name of the city in which it is established, e.g., OSS FIELD BASE, Cairo.

j. ADVANCED OR SUB-BASE—an additional base established by and responsible to an OSS field base.

k. OPERATIVE—an individual employed by and responsible to the OSS and assigned under special programs to field activity.

l. AGENT—an individual recruited in the field who is employed and directed by an OSS operative or by a field or sub-base.

m. COVER—an open status, assumed or bona fide, which serves to conceal the secret activities of an operative or agent.

n. CUTOUT—a person who forms a communicating link between two individuals, for security purposes.

o. OPERATIONAL GROUPS—a small, uniformed party of specially qualified soldiers, organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the specific missions set forth below.

p. RESISTANCE GROUPS — individuals associated together in enemy-held territory to injure the enemy by any or all means short of military operations, e.g., by sabotage, espionage, non-cooperation.

q. GUERRILLAS—an organized band of individuals in enemy-held territory, indefinite as to number, which

conducts against the enemy irregular operations including those of a military or quasi-military nature.

3. *METHODS*

The methods to be used by Special Operations are all measures needed to destroy enemy personnel, materiel, installations, and his will to resist. The major classifications of SO methods are;

a. Sabotage.

b. Direct contact with and support of underground resistance groups.

c. Special operations not assigned to other governmental agencies and not under direct control of theater or area commanders.

## SECTION II — ORGANIZATION

4. *ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES*

The Special Operations Branch is included under Strategic Services Operations and is responsible for the following:

a. Sabotage.

b. Direct contact with and support of underground resistance groups.

c. Conduct of special operations not assigned to other governmental agencies and not under direct control of theater or area commanders.

d. Organization, equipment, and training of such individuals or organizations as may be required for operations not assigned to other governmental agencies.

5. *ORGANIZATION AT FIELD BASES*

Each field base will normally include an SO section, the head of which is responsible to the Strategic Services Officer in theaters or to the Chief of OSS Mission in neutral countries, and which will participate in the planning and execution of SO activities in that theater or area. SO personnel both at the base and in the field will be

responsible for carrying out the approved SO special programs and such additional operations as may be authorized by the theater commander for that theater or area.

6. *ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS*

a. At headquarters in Washington and in the theaters of operation the SO units, assisted by other OSS units, are responsible for:

| | |
|---|---|
| Recruiting | Training |
| Planning | Supply |
| Administration | Liaison |
| Staff work | |

b. SO in its activities will be assisted by the intelligence branches, the operating branches, Services and Communications Branches, Schools and Training Branch, Field Photographic Branch, and other OSS organizations.

7. *ORGANIZATION OF FIELD OPERATIVES*

Field operatives work individually or in groups as required by the mission and objective. Many operatives working with the underground must of necessity operate alone. Carefully selected and trained units will be organized specially for specific coup de main projects.

8. *CONTACT WITH AND SUPPORT OF UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE GROUPS*

SO operatives may assist and train agents for contact with and support of resistance groups. In order to perform this function effectively, they must ascertain the needs of the resistance groups, arrange for communications with the base and assist in the delivery of such supplies as can be obtained. On occasion it may be practical for SO operatives personally to serve as leaders of already organized resistance groups.

## SECTION III — PROCUREMENT OF PERSONNEL

9. *ORGANIZATION FOR PROCUREMENT*

The SO Branch is charged with the responsibility for procurement of its personnel. Civilian clerical personnel

is procured through the Services Branch, both in the United States and abroad. Other personnel, including military and naval, is procured in the United States through the Personnel Procurement Branch and at foreign bases through the Services Branch. At all times military and naval personnel must come within the approved allotment of grades and ratings for the theater set by Washington Headquarters.

## 10. *SOURCES FROM WHICH PERSONNEL ARE DRAWN*

SO may recruit civilians of United States or other nationalities. By agreement with the armed forces, members of the United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps may be assigned to OSS and detailed to SO for service. Members of the armed forces of our Allies may be attached to OSS and detailed to SO for duty, in each case by agreement with the authorities of the nation concerned.

## 11. *TYPES OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED*

<u>a</u>. Base personnel will be either military or civilian and are individually selected for their ability to perform special functions.

<u>b</u>. SO agents and operatives are selected for their intelligence, courage, and natural resourcefulness in dealing with resistance groups. In addition they must have stamina to be able to live and move about undetected in their area of operation. Normally, they should be fluent in the local language and be a native of a nationality acceptable to the authorities and people of the area.

### SECTION IV — TRAINING

## 12. *ORGANIZATION FOR TRAINING*

Basic training courses are provided by the Schools and Training Branch. The Special Operations Branch collaborates with that Branch by developing satisfactory training courses for the schools. Training is a continuous process and it is the responsibility of each SO chief, both in the United States and in the field to see that training progresses satisfactorily.

---

## 13. *SCOPE OF TRAINING*

Because of the hazardous nature and specialized technical requirements of SO, it is important that every individual in the organization receive a thorough schooling in the work he has to perform. For field operatives and all those having to do with planning, servicing, and commanding field operatives, training starts with the basic school courses which include instruction in secret intelligence and morale operations as well as special operations. Special schooling for each mission is given to the individuals assigned to it. For specific tasks schooling becomes intensive and detailed and concludes in a final briefing or instruction just prior to the execution of the task.

## 14. *TRAINING OBJECTIVES*

### <u>a</u>. FOR OPERATING TECHNIQUES

The SO operative must be able to assume perfect cover or concealment. He must know how to employ underground methods of communication without undue risk to himself or others. He must know how to recruit, incite, train, and direct the operations of agents, saboteurs, resistance groups, and agents provocateur.

### <u>b</u>. FOR SABOTAGE TRAINING

The saboteur, according to the methods he is to employ, should be skilled in sabotage by resistance, or by destruction, or against personnel, or by coup de main projects. He should be able to reach his objective, perform the act of sabotage effectively, and either avoid detection or effect an escape. He should preferably be able to incite, organize, train, and lead sabotage groups.

### <u>c</u>. MORALE

The maintenance of high morale is the responsibility of all SO commanders and is especially important because of the hazardous, lonely work of SO operatives. From the time a recruit reports for duty until his service is at an end, building up and holding up his morale is an essential training objective for all officers who have

anything to do with the man. SO officers must be personally well-acquainted with each man in their units. Schools and Training Branch officers will inject morale building into their training courses and SO officers will cooperate with the Schools and Training Branch following the progress of their men in the schools. During periods of inactivity or waiting, SO officers will see to it that men are kept occupied with work or diversions directed towards the tasks on which they will be employed and to the maintenance of their morale. Frequent specific checks of the status of morale of each man and each group will be made by responsible SO officers. Senior officers will inspect the units commanded by junior officers to insure that morale is maintained.

## SECTION V — SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATION

### 15. THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPLY PROBLEM

Covering the entire field of sabotage and resistance groups in a number of large theaters of operation means that SO is confronted with a complicated and extensive problem of supply. It will be necessary to obtain thousands of standard items included in the supply tables of the armed forces and in addition many special items necessary to sabotage, underground communication, and resistance groups. Clothing, food, medicines, arms, ammunition, demolition materials, communication equipment, naval equipment, air equipment, money, and other supplies will be necessary to SO activity.

### 16. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPLY

The OSS Services Officer at field bases or in Washington fills requisitions for supplies, money, and transportation. It will not always be possible to communicate with the Services Officer, especially in active service in the field where supplies may be needed on the spot and immediately. To meet these emergencies SO officers and operatives may be supplied with special funds or through the theater commander authority may be obtained to requisition on vouchers from civilian and other sources. It is essential that all responsible SO officers and operatives have a

thorough training in the handling of supplies, transportation, and money.

### 17. SUPPLIES FOR SABOTEURS AND RESISTANCE GROUPS

One of the greatest obstacles to underground and resistance activity is the difficulty of obtaining needed equipment, and one of the most important functions of SO is to see that the underground and resistance groups receive adequate equipment for effective operations. SO officers and operatives should maintain a continuous survey of the supply requirements of the underground and resistance groups they deal with, report such requirements to the theater or other commander, and make every effort to see that their needs are satisfied.

### 18. PAYMENT AND SUBSIDIES

Special funds are provided for the financial support of underground and resistance personnel. Great care must be exercised in disbursing funds for these purposes as oftentimes an individual activated by money may not be a stable character.

### 19. RADIO AND OTHER SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

The Communications Branch of OSS is the normal source of supply for radio and other signal equipment. All equipment of this type must be obtained through this source.

### 20. TRANSPORTATION

a. Arrangements for transportation of such SO military and civilian personnel as have been requested by the theater commander from the United States to theaters of operation are made through the transportation officer of the theater officer's staff. The necessary passports are secured from the Special Relations Office. Arrangements for overseas shipment of material are made through the Cargo Unit of the Services Branch.

b. Transportation of SO personnel and cargo within theaters is arranged by the Services Officer on the staff of the Strategic Services Officer. When movement of

personnel or cargo is required in a place where OSS services officers are not available, arrangements for transportation should be made through nearest appropriate channels of the Army or Navy.

## SECTION VI—COORDINATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITY WITH THAT OF OTHER OSS BRANCHES AND THE ARMED FORCES AND OTHER AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

### 21. *COOPERATION WITH OTHER OSS BRANCHES*

#### a. GENERAL

The activities of the branches of OSS are interdependent. SO activities must be correlated with those of intelligence and the other operating branches. SO is part of the OSS team and all of its activities must be planned and executed as part of the OSS program.

#### b. INTELLIGENCE

SI, X-2, R&A, and FN supply information to SO. Such information will include information from the intelligence services of the armed forces and our allies. SO should obtain its own operational intelligence from the underground and resistance organizations with which they are in contact. Much of the information which SO uncovers will be useful to the intelligence services and others and should be turned over to SI. To avoid duplication of effort and the risk of discovery by the enemy, SO and SI activities in the field will be coordinated for the benefit of both services.

#### c. MORALE OPERATIONS

The functions of MO an SO will often overlap. Activities of SO may have an effect on the morale of our friends or enemies and SO personnel may be required to assist in MO activities in the field. This will be necessary where MO will not have a field organization, and when MO will train SO personnel to execute MO missions. Sabotage and activities of resistance groups will increase in extent and effectiveness as a resistance spirit is increased by morale operations. MO and SO

must work together as each will often be able to aid the other. SO will often require the development of attitudes or states of mind and will request MO to cooperate.

### 22. *COOPERATION WITH SIMILAR AGENCIES OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS*

Our Allies have agencies which in whole or in part parallel the functions of OSS. The governments-in-exile of enemy-occupied countries all have intelligence organizations and are in active communication with the underground and resistance groups in occupied areas. It is the duty of OSS and SO to cooperate with the similar agencies of our Allies. It will often be necessary for SO to be the subordinate teammate of an agency of an Allied government. Every effort must be made to avoid the frictions and misunderstandings which can develop so easily when agencies of Allied governments are working together on the same task.

### 23. *COOPERATION WITH THE ARMED FORCES*

The fact that the Strategic Services are under the command of the theater commander is not enough to insure that OSS will most effectively play its part as a member of the military team. It is the responsibility of Strategic Services Officers and special operations officers and operatives to insure that all plans and activities are integrated with the plans of the theater commander. Military plans may call for drastic and sudden changes in the special operations plan and it will be necessary for operatives and officers to conform.

### 24. *COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES*

Political, diplomatic, and administrative branches of our government and the governments of our Allies participate in the war effort at home and abroad and SO operations must conform to the accepted policies and programs of these agencies. By political and diplomatic activity and through the supply of foods, medicines, and other materials, the government agencies are often in a position to assist in special operations activity. SO must never per-

form functions reserved to other government agencies except when duly authorized.

## SECTION VII — PLANS AND ORDERS

### 25. *IMPORTANCE OF PLANS AND ORDERS*

SO activities must conform to the missions laid down in OSS special programs or in approved projects to be incorporated in special programs. Based upon these missions, SO must prepare, in coordination with all branches of OSS, operational plans for the accomplishment of those missions. SO must see to it that SO plans are coordinated with those of other branches. SO personnel and units must always be prepared to act promptly and decisively in furtherance of those plans when an opportunity presents itself. Unless plans are based on accurate information and worked out in exact detail, SO operatives and agents will be working at a great disadvantage. Slipshod planning will result in discovery by the enemy, heavy casualties, and failure. A failure means that SO methods will be revealed to the enemy, putting him on guard, and making it difficult or impossible to succeed after the failure.

### 26. *ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PREPARATION OF PLANS AND ORDERS*

<u>a</u>. The over-all responsibility for OSS planning is stated in Section IV, Provisional Basic Field Manual for Strategic Services.

<u>b</u>. Within the scope of approved Strategic Services programs, the chief of the SO Branch in Washington or at a field base is responsible for the preparation of operational plans and orders covering SO activities. Similarly, the commander or chief of any SO activity in the field is responsible for the preparation of operational plans and orders for the personnel engaged in that activity.

### 27. *PROCEDURE IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING*

Planning is a continuous process in which all responsible officers participate. It will be the duty of the chief of SO branch or section to develop operational plans covering the missions included in Strategic Services programs. He

will also prepare operational plans for activities which the theater commander desires to have accomplished in connection with military operations, and which have not yet been included in OSS special programs. Within the limits of security control a description of such activities will be sent to OSS, Washington, to be included in OSS special programs, which are to be executed within that theater. The process of preparing operational plans and orders will vary widely according to the situation. A plan may consist of a simple verbal recommendation and an order may be an equally simple verbal instruction. Another plan may call for months of detailed preparation and the development of the corresponding orders may likewise entail laborious work. Procedure must never impede effective operation, and when the preparation of formal orders threatens to slow down action, oral orders must be used. The United States War Department Staff Officers Field Manual, FM 101—5, may be consulted with respect to forms for operational orders. The Strategic Services detachments within the theaters are subject to the direction and control of the theater commander and an adherence to military procedure will facilitate OSS work.

## SECTION VIII — SABOTAGE TECHNIQUES

### 28. *DEFINITION*

Special Operations sabotage includes all secret physical subversive activity which destroys or impairs the effectiveness of enemy resources, production, personnel, materiel, and installations.

### 29. *PLANNING SABOTAGE*

The planning of sabotage will cover a large range of subjects from the most simple act to the highly scientific operation involving inconsiderable original research. Once a sabotage task has been decided upon, careful plans should be prepared for its accomplishment. The enemy will always have a defense against sabotage and no plan can succeed unless this defense is penetrated successfully. Even in the most violent and open sabotage, surprise, deception, and withdrawal are fundamental to planning.

### 30. *TRAINING OF SABOTEURS*

For all types of sabotage, including the most elemen-

tary, the personnel employed should be thoroughly trained in the use of sabotage implements and devices as well as concealment, deception, and withdrawal. For each specific sabotage task individuals or groups should be specially selected, trained, and rehearsed. The details of basic training for sabotage are covered in the courses of the Schools and Training Branch of OSS. For the training of operatives and agents for specific tasks, information and assistance will be obtained from the intelligence services of OSS who will provide information from all other available sources, military, governmental, and civil.

### 31. TYPES OF SABOTAGE

#### a. INDUSTRIAL SABOTAGE

Industrial sabotage includes attacks on natural resources such as mines, oil wells, and water supply; attacks on processing and handling facilities such as refineries, smelters, factories, and warehouses; public utilities such as electric, telephone, railroad, road, water, and gas systems; and, essential supplies such as forage, foods, and medicines. Physical attacks on management and labor personnel are part of industrial sabotage.

#### b. MILITARY SABOTAGE

Military sabotage includes attacks on lines of communication, supplies, installations, equipment, materiel, and personnel. Included are roads, railroads, waterways, and their equipment; aircraft, airports, and their installations; radio, telephone, and telegraph systems; food, water, arms, ammunition, medical, and other supplies; key personnel, staffs, sentries, outposts, bridge and other guards.

#### c. POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SABOTAGE

Political and public physical sabotage covers the liquidation or physical harassment of political and administrative leaders and physical interference with their effectiveness, the demoralization or terrorization of the population by physical means, and physical attacks on collaborationists.

### 32. METHODS OF SABOTAGE

#### a. SABOTAGE APPLIED TO INDIVIDUALS

Includes liquidation, capture, delays, interferences, and physical attacks on personnel.

#### b. SABOTAGE BY DESTRUCTION

Thousands of destructive methods are available including explosions, fires, floods, wrecks, accidents, leaks, breaks, overwork of machinery, maladjustment of machinery, and the adulteration of lubricants, fuels and products.

#### c. SABOTAGE BY RESISTANCE

Physical resistance by riots and mob action is best conducted by native resistance groups. SO contributes by giving support, supplies, and when necessary, leadership. MO contributes by inciting and instructing resistance groups to acts which impede the enemy's military progress, such as absenteeism, slow-down in production, and other acts of passive resistance and simple sabotage. Sabotage by resistance may result in overlapping functions of MO and SO. Hence, in this field MO and SO must cooperate and coordinate their activities. (See the Provisional Basic Field Manual for Morale Operations.)

#### d. COUP DE MAIN PROJECTS

Coup de main operations are usually attacks against important targets and are executed by a carefully selected and trained group of SO operatives.

#### e. DEFENSE MISSIONS

The defense mission is one that is designed to prevent the destruction of installations by the retreating enemy. This includes protection of important bridges and tunnels; wire communications, including wires, transformers, repeater stations; power plants, radio stations, water and sewage systems. It also includes activities to prevent the mining of roads by the enemy, the blowing up of supply dumps, as well as other activities that will prevent the enemy from impeding the progress

of the invading forces. Resistance groups, under the guidance of SO operatives, will be the primary agency in the accomplishment of defense missions.

## SECTION IX—MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS

### 33. *ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS*

As a member of the OSS—Military Team SO may be called upon to perform a variety of functions in support of the Armed Forces, other branches of OSS and governmental agencies of the United States or its allies.

### 34. *MORALE OPERATIONS ACTIVITY*

SO may be required to execute field activity for MO. MO activity may include: physical activity for MO effects; the subversion of important individuals; the distribution of subversive pamphlets, posters, or the marking up of slogans; the creation of riots and disturbances; the work of agents provocateur; the spreading of rumors; incitement to resistance; and countering the effects of enemy morale operations.

### 35. *INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY*

SI may call upon SO to gather information and to transmit it. X-2 may ask SO operatives to assist in discovering and neutralizing the work of enemy intelligence agents.

### 36. *ASSISTANCE TO THE ARMED FORCES*

SO may be called upon by theater and other commanders to perform special activities such as to provide guides, interpreters, couriers, and signal men, and to defend or protect installations within the enemy areas. In support of the military plan SO may be required to create diversions with false signals, sabotage, and attacks by resistance groups for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.

### 37. *DIRECT CONTACT WITH AND SUPPORT OF UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE GROUPS*

SO will maintain liaison with resistance groups; to encourage, instruct, and direct them, and to supply them

---

with munitions, food, medicines, communication equipment, and other materiel.

### 38. *SPECIAL OPERATIONS NOT ASSIGNED TO OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND NOT UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THEATER OR AREA COMMANDERS*

From neutral areas or in areas not under a military commander, SO may recruit and train personnel or conduct operations in enemy or enemy-occupied countries as directed by Strategic Services in Washington, Chief of the OSS Mission and at field bases. For this type of operation, instructions must be clear and explicit to make sure that SO does not overstep its authority or clash with any other agency, or provoke undesirable diplomatic or political complications. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission should be advised of such contemplated operations.

## SECTION X—THE SELECTION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASKS AND MISSIONS

### 39. *TYPES OF TASKS*

In sabotage and in contact with and support of resistance groups there is a large field of possible SO tasks, including:

a. ORGANIZATIONAL TASKS—the recruiting of agents, gaining contact with and establishing good relations with such groups, assisting in their training, organization, leadership and supply.

b. OPERATIONAL TASKS

(1) Sabotage of enemy resources, productive facilities, personnel, materiel, and installations, as well as protection of vital installations and equipment required by our own forces and the civilian population.

(2) Miscellaneous special operations tasks in support of the other branches of OSS and the Armed Forces and governmental agencies of the United States and its Allies.

### 40. SELECTION OF MISSIONS TO COORDINATE WITH THE MILITARY PLAN

As SO is a member of the OSS—Military Team it is necessary that its activities always be in proper relationship to the military plan of the commander. The status of military activities will have a direct and important bearing on the type of special operations engaged in.

a. DURING A RELATIVELY STATIC OR PREPARATORY PHASE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY

(1) Such a phase may extend over a long period of time during which the opposing forces will be gathering strength or breaking down resistance by bombing from the air and submarine warfare, or maneuvering for strategic advantages on the flanks or by the clearing of lines of communication. During a preparatory phase the activities to be engaged in depend on the situation. However, attacks on military communications, installations, and personnel can be effective during a preparatory phase when the enemy is operating in extremely hostile occupied territory, far from its home base, with limited and vulnerable lines of communication. Under such favorable circumstances, activities of resistance groups can make it extremely costly for the enemy to hold the territory and maintain communications.

(2) Industrial sabotage will reach its greatest effectiveness during a preparatory phase of military activity and the primary objectives should be those facilities whose destruction will cause maximum inconvenience to the enemy. The selection of industries to attack will depend on their relative importance to the war effort and this will depend upon the over-all production position of the enemy. Only a careful and accurate survey of the production picture, industry by industry, will enable SO to determine what objectives to attack and then a full knowledge of manufacturing techniques will be necessary before the best targets can be selected. As a general rule, critical materials and sources of supply, bottlenecks of pro-

duction and vital storage and transportation systems should be selected. The foregoing should not preclude the application of general sabotage to anything and everything which may hurt the enemy, if and when included as part of an approved program. These activities should be very carefully coordinated with air intelligence and the air bombing program.

(3) SO may also contribute to an MO program of encouraging slow-downs, mistakes, confusion, demoralization, absenteeism, riots, disturbances, and resistance of all kinds as long as they do not interfere with calculated attacks on the more important objectives.

b. DURING AND JUST PRECEDING A PERIOD OF INTENSIVE MILITARY ACTIVITY

(1) A period of intensive military activity may include air, land, or sea battles or combined operations; offensives, retreats or sieges; warfare of movement or position; landings or river crossings; and, the campaign may extend over large or small areas of land or water and involve large or small forces. During such a phase SO activity should be concentrated on those missions which will give direct and immediate aid to the armed forces.

(2) Missions may include attacks on enemy personnel, materiel, and communications and they may include defenses of communications and installations which the commander may wish to protect from enemy demolition.

(3) The selection of specific missions will depend on the situation and the military plan. Under one set of circumstances, it may be necessary for SO to concentrate all its efforts on blocking enemy transportation. When the enemy forces are not too strong and are operating in a hostile territory, a general organized resistance on the part of the civilian population may give the greatest help to the military commander. In selecting missions, every possibility should be considered and carefully examined in relation to

other possibilities and the military plans before recommendations are made.

### 41. *AUTHORIZED MISSIONS*

In general, SO activities will fall within the scope of its prescribed functions, as described in pars. 1 and 3, Section I. In the field, these may be modified as the theater commander requires. However, all SO missions must be included in approved programs covering the accomplishment of definite objectives.

### 42. *TASKS SHOULD BE PRACTICAL*

Unless it is reasonably feasible to accomplish the task assigned with the personnel and equipment available, such SO task should not be undertaken. This does not mean that SO should be unwilling to take risks. SO should always be on the offensive, planning and executing its activities in an aggressive spirit and willing to accept considerable losses and to risk failure.

### 43. *MISSIONS MUST BE APPROVED BY THE MILITARY COMMANDER*

The responsibility for success of military operations rests with the commander. For security reasons, it will not be possible for SO to be acquainted with all of the military plans. It is essential, therefore, that all SO missions within theaters be acceptable to the theater commander and be approved by him.

### 44. *CHECK LIST*

In *Appendix "A"* there are summarized in the form of a check list a number of the more important points that may have been presented in this manual. This check list may serve as a brief list of reminders to SO personnel to assist them in the course of their work.

---

*APPENDIX "A"*
to
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL —
STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Provisional)

CHECK LIST

For SO (Washington)

PLANNING

### 1. *AUTHORITY*

Does the projected activity conform to approved Strategic Services special programs or to additional activities approved by competent authority for inclusion in special programs?

### 2. *PLANNING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMS*

a. Is planning complete, covering tests as to suitability, feasibility, and practicability?

b. Have provisions been made for:

(1) Coordination of planning with appropriate allied agencies?

(2) Recruiting and training of necessary personnel?

(3) Equipment, supplies, funds, and administrative services?

(4) Adequate communications?

(5) Transportation to the theater?

c. Have SO plans been coordinated with those of other OSS branches to ensure perfect teamwork and to avoid duplication?

d. Have these plans been approved by appropriate authority?

e. Has all pertinent intelligence been forwarded to the field for use in current and further operational plans to be made there?

f. Has the field been informed of the steps being taken by the various branches of OSS, Washington, for the implementation of the approved special programs?

g. Have all standing instructions in respect of SO activities been complied with?

### SUPPLIES: PROCUREMENT, TRAINING, AND EQUIPPING OF PERSONNEL

3. *SUPPLIES*

a. Has the field been consulted regarding supply requirements for the special programs?

b. Based on that information have lists of supplies and equipment required for the projected activities been prepared and submitted as a requisition to Procurement and Supplies Branch?

c. Has close liaison been maintained all the way with Procurement and Supply to determine:

(1) Availability of supplies and equipment?

(2) Time required to obtain such material?

d. Has the base been notified of what part of the supplies will be sent from Washington?

e. Has branch chief in the field been notified to initiate requests for supplies and equipment as soon as need can be foreseen?

f. Has the field been informed of new special devices and weapons that have become available since plans were made, and have descriptions of their functions and operating details been sent to the field, as well as the quantities available?

g. Has provision been made for adequate funds for the activities under this program?

4. *SUPPLIES OF OSS FUNDS AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR RESISTANCE GROUPS*

a. Has the field provided detailed information regarding needs of the resistance elements for money, supplies, and equipment?

(1) What is available from stocks at the base?

(2) What has to be shipped from the U.S.?

b. Have all needed steps been taken to obtain these materials through Services — Procurement and Supply?

5. *SHIPMENT OF SUPPLIES*

a. Has theater commander approval been received from field for shipment of supplies and equipment?

b. Has field been informed of:

(1) Schedule of shipment of supplies and equipment?

(2) Shortages in the shipment?

6. *PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT*

a. Has personnel about to be sent abroad in connection with prospective activities been examined individually for:

(1) Proper training?

(2) Proper inoculations for overseas service?

(3) Regular equipment and special equipment?

(4) Careful security check?

b. Has plausible "cover" been worked out and approved?

7. *TRAINING OF PERSONNEL*

a. Has continuous contact been kept by the SO officers with men in training? Has that contact been maintained in a manner consistent with security?

b. Has special training for the specific assignment been completed satisfactorily?

c. Has the trainee been informed as far as possible consistent with security, of his proposed assignment?

d. Has indoctrination of personnel been completed?

e. Has special emphasis been placed on security throughout the training course?

f. Are you satisfied with the security and discretion of the individual?

g. Has the individual been thoroughly coached in his "cover" story?

h. Has provision been made for utilizing this personnel in event of delay in transportation?

## 8. REPORTS

Have you arranged with the field to send you detailed reports of:

a. Operational plans made in the implementation of special programs?

b. Successes or failures in the field in the effort to carry out the missions?

c. Effectiveness of any special devices?

d. Any new methods developed for the use of special devices?

e. Status of personnel—by activities under programs?

f. Cooperation received from pertinent allied organizations?

g. Supply of resistance forces:

   (1) Supplied directly by OSS?

   (2) Supplied directly by the theater commander?

## 9. TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL

a. Has theater commander approval been given to transportation schedules for personnel?

b. Have all the proper documents been prepared and all authorizations received?

c. Has overseas security check been made by OSS, Washington?

d. Has final security check been made?

e. Has final inspection been made of physical condition and equipment of personnel?

f. Has the field been notified giving names, grades of personnel being sent, as well as the numbers that are to follow, if any, to complete the allotment for the projected activity?

## CHECK LIST
### For SO (Theater)
### PLANNING

### 1. AUTHORITY

Does the projected activity conform to approved Strategic Services special programs or to additional activities approved by competent authority for inclusion in special programs?

### 2. PLANNING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMS

a. Is operational planning complete, covering tests as to suitability, feasibility, and practicability?

b. Have provisions been made for:

   (1) Coordination of planning with appropriate allied agencies?

   (2) Recruitment and training of necessary additional personnel?

   (3) Equipment, supplies, funds, and administrative services?

   (4) Adequate communications?

   (5) Transportation to, within, and from the area of action?

c. Have SO plans been coordinated with those of other OSS branches to ensure perfect teamwork and to avoid duplication?

d. Has the plan been checked against pertinent intelligence from all sources?

e Have instructions been included in the plan for training of personnel and indoctrination in security and responsibility in the projected activity?

f. Has provision been made in the plan for prompt reports of field personnel to base:

   (1) Information obtained?

   (2) Progress of activities?

(3) Additional assistance required — supplies, funds, equipment, personnel?

g. Has provision been made in the plan for the inclusion in the required biweekly reports on all activities to SO in Washington, of:

(1) Copies of operational plans as soon as security conditions permit?

(2) Effectiveness of any special devices?

(3) New methods developed for the use of special devices?

(4) Status of personnel — by activities under programs?

(5) Cooperation received from pertinent allied organizations?

## SUPPLIES: PROCUREMENT, TRAINING, AND EQUIPPING OF PERSONNEL

### 3. *SUPPLIES*

a. Have requirements for supplies and equipment been carefully worked out?

b. Have arrangements been made with Services to obtain in the theater what is available there from American and allied military supplies?

c. Has Services requisitioned the remaining needs from Procurement and Supplies Branch in Washington?

d. Has the final approved list been checked as to time required to get such material to the field?

e. Have descriptions of functions and operating details of latest OSS weapons been received?

f. Has requisition been made for these weapons?

g. Have required funds been requisitioned?

h. Have steps been taken to obtain required amount of foreign currency?

i. Have arrangements been made for adequate disguise and cover for personnel?

### 4. *SUPPLIES OF OSS FUNDS AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR RESISTANCE GROUPS*

a. Is a continuing check kept of needs of resistance groups for funds, equipment, and supplies?

b. What is available from stocks at base?

c. What has to be shipped from the United States?

d. Have arrangements been made for a continuous supply service to the resistance groups?

### 5. *SHIPMENT OF SUPPLIES*

a. Has proper requisition been made for items mentioned in "4" above?

b. Has theater commander approval been forwarded to Washington for shipment of items?

c. Has schedule of shipments been worked out with Washington?

### 6. *PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT*

Has personnel on arrival been examined individually for:

a. Morale;

b. Physical condition;

c. Equipment;

d. Training;

e. Indoctrination;

f. Security?

### 7. *TRAINING OF PERSONNEL*

For personnel trained at the base, have the following points been checked carefully:

a. Has continuous contact been kept by SO officers with men in training? Has that contact been maintained in a manner consistent with security?

b. Has special training for the specific assignment been completed satisfactorily?

c. Has the trainee been informed as far as possible consistent with security, of his proposed assignment?

d. Is the indoctrination complete?

e. Has special emphasis been placed on security throughout the training course?

f. Are you satisfied with the security and discretion of the individual?

## TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL

### 8. *AUTHORIZATION FOR TRANSPORTATION*

a. Have all the proper documents been prepared consistent with the individual's cover or protection and his proposed activities?

b. Has the individual a supply of money consistent with his cover?

c. Have arrangements for transportation of the individual to destination been worked out with military authorities?

d. Have arrangements been made to insure establishment of the individual's secret communications with the base?

e. Have all measures covering security of individual's departure been taken?

f. Have arrangements been made for the individual's withdrawal in case of necessity or when his task is completed?

# Notes