



*«You mind if I take a look at one of them leaflets?»*

# **“CEASE RESISTANCE: IT’S GOOD FOR YOU!”: A HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY COMBAT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

2d edition (1999)

Stanley Sandler

Cover illustration from Bill Mauldin, *Up Front* (numerous editions).



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## Preface

This work would not have been possible without the generous assistance of a Secretary of the Army Research and Writing Fellowship for the year 1993-1994. This Fellowship allowed the author to escape office duties and classes and to concentrate on this work. He is deeply grateful to the Office of the Secretary of the Army and trusts that this work will serve as repayment for such generosity. He is also grateful to the helpful professional staff of the Army's Center of Military History (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.), in particular Dr. Jeffrey Clark and Mr. James Knight, and for that institution's providing of office and computer support. He is also indebted to the staff of the Military History Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania), including Messrs. John Slonaker, John Vetock and Dr. Richard Sommers; Dr. Richard Boylan of the Modern Military Branch, National Archives; the Hoover Institution of War, Peace and Revolution of Stanford University and the National Archives' omniscient Mr. John Taylor. It should be noted that the Historical Archives of the Army Special Operations Command (which may well be the most extensive in the English language anywhere) were of enormous help to the author and saved many a research trip further afield. But the book's conclusions are those of the author and not necessarily of the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.

This project grew out of a realization that there was no complete general history of U.S. Army psychological operations. (PSYOP/PSYOPS). Daniel Lerner's authoritative *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany D-Day to VE-Day* deals with World War II in the ETO but the subject rates only scant and scattered mention in the U.S. Army's famous "Green Books" histories of World War II. Edward P. Lilly's extensive "History of Psychological Warfare" (Historical Section, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington: n.d.) is in reality a history of U.S. psywar in World War II. Further, Dr. Lilly's work was never published and only one complete copy is known to exist. Two estimable works cover PSYOP in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts: S. E. Pease, *Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953* (Harrisburg: 1992) and R. W. Chandler, *War of Ideas: Psychological Operations in Viet Nam* (Boulder: 1981). Works have also appeared on, for example, the Office of War Information or the Office of Strategic Services, both of World War II, and brief monographs on combat PSYOP in particular campaigns, but, again, no general history of the U.S. Army's tactical PSYOP. Thus there can be little question of the need for a documented general history of U.S. Army tactical psywar for the general public and for Army psychological operations and Special Operations troops.

## INTRODUCTION

The use of psychological "weapons" on the battlefield is no exclusively 20<sup>th</sup> century phenomenon; the Old Testament Hebrew Prophet Gideon, with a much inferior force, stampeded a Midianite army with sudden nocturnal noise and illumination. During the American War for Independence, both the British and the patriots used sophisticated means to maintain morale and cause desertions. Nonetheless, it was the coming together of the technological and educational advances of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that made large-scale tactical, or battlefield, psychological warfare possible for the first time, during World War I.

The term "Psychological Warfare" was apparently first used in print by the British military historian and pundit, J. F. C. Fuller, in his 1920 essay, *Tanks in the Great War*. The first known American use did not come until 1940. The later term "Psychological Operations" dates back to 1945, although it did not supplant the former term until the era of the Vietnam War.<sup>1</sup> The record will show that the United States, whatever its failings in its strategic psychological wars, has compiled a very impressive record in wartime tactical psychological operations.<sup>2</sup>

Some observers have concluded that this success is only natural, noting unkindly that "The United States invented bulls--t.", and that "malarkey," "baloney," "Madison Avenue" and "Used Car Salesman" are time-tested terms unique to America. Be that as it may, there can be little argument with the large hauls of (not to mention the literally hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war who claim to have been influenced by U.S. battlefield propaganda) garnered by the United States in its 20<sup>th</sup> century wars, even those without a "happy ending," such as in Korea or Vietnam. The record is the more impressive considering that during World War II in Europe, in Korea and in Vietnam, the United States was up against adversaries who were supposedly "masters of propaganda."

These same "masters" have enjoyed little success against American troops. Indeed, since the Mexican War and the tragic episode of the "San Patricios" (Chapter 1), this author can find no documented evidence of a single U.S. soldier who has defected to the enemy in time of war as a result of enemy propaganda. There have been U.S. soldiers who have defected, for example, to North Korea and East Germany for "political reasons," but this was in peacetime. There were plenty of wartime deserters in America's conflicts, but not for "political" reasons. The proof for all this, aside from the historical record, is quite simple: no enemy propaganda has ever made

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<sup>1</sup>J. F. C. Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War* (London: 1920), 320, quoted in W. E. Daugherty, "Origins of PSYOP Terminology," Daugherty, ed., *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies in Military Application*, 1 (Department of the Army, Washington: April 1976), 18-19. This work will use the term "psychological warfare" until it deals with the Vietnam era, when it will switch to "psychological operations." It will avoid the neologism "psychological warfare/operations."

such a claim.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, it can be logically speculated that a major, if unspoken, reason for the Army's historical indifference or even hostility to psychological warfare stems from just this fact: if the enemy has been so singularly unsuccessful in snaring U.S. troops, why should we waste our time in assuming that we would be any more successful? Of course, this argument flies in the face of the multitudes of enemy who at least claim to have been influenced to surrender by U.S. psychological warfare, but those hostile to PSYOP assert that these defected in reality because of victorious American firepower.

It is also gratifying to record that the United States Army has rarely, and never on any large scale, deviated from its conviction that the best battlefield propaganda weapon remains the truth. This does not necessarily mean the whole truth, but it does mean that no lies will be told. This is a commonsense principle that America's enemies learned to their sorrow; did anyone, even in Germany well before the end of the war, take Dr. Goebbels ("Propaganda has absolutely nothing to do with truth!") seriously?<sup>4</sup> (There is some question as to whether the nihilist Dr. Goebbels even took his own propaganda that seriously.) And it is hard to imagine that the communists' own followers believed the wildly exaggerated claims of slaughter and destruction wrought against the "imperialists" by "liberation forces": "3,5000 men (Including 2,800 GIs Killed, Wounded or Captured. 7 Battalions (Including 5 American) Wiped Out or Decimated...32 Planes and Helicopters Destroyed on the Ground, 8 Cannons and 10 Tanks and Armoured Cars Destroyed." (*Vietnam Courier*, No. 140, 1967.)<sup>5</sup> There is also evidence that in Korea and Vietnam the communists themselves were

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<sup>3</sup>There is an almost cryptic reference in a report from the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia after World War I to "a few cases of desertion to the Russian Partisans or Bolshevik forces, but in every case the soldiers were found to be Russians who had enlisted in the United States for that purpose.", Records of HQ, AEF, Siberia, RG 395, p. 224. No corroborating accounts of such desertions have been found. During World War I, 1864 American soldiers were convicted of desertion. Center of Military History, *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War*, 3, part 1, *Zone of the Interior: Organization and Activities of the War Department*, 240.

<sup>4</sup>Joachim C. Fest, *The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership*, trans. M. Bulloch (New York: 1970), 91.

<sup>5</sup>Reproduced in Richard D. Johnson, *Psyop - The Gulf Paper War* (Titusville, Florida: 1992), 17. The Army Ground Forces Psychological Warfare NCO Course during the Korean War aptly summarized the U.S. position on truth-in-propaganda: "one exposed fabrication in propaganda will cause a loss of confidence among the target audience in other efforts and will weaken the entire effort. A fabrication is just not worth the price you have to pay for it." At any rate, "There are always adequate numbers of enemy malcontents and sincere converts, both among prisoners of war and civilians in the enemy country, to provide all the authentic statements a propagandist needs." "Psychological Warfare NCO Course" (Ft. Riley, KS: March 1952), 6.

amused at the credibility of some "progressive" opinion in the West, which wished to believe that the communists really were simply "agrarian reformers" (Just like Mao Tse Tung and Fidel Castro) taking up arms only as a last resort against corrupt, U.S.-backed regimes of landlords and money-lenders.

This U.S. military commitment to the truth goes back to the American War for Independence, where promises of free land to enemy defectors really were honored. The chief of military psychological warfare for the American Expeditionary Force in World War I reflected later that to him the very definition of his work in that conflict was "straight news, facts," based on POW interrogations.<sup>6</sup> This commitment to the truth is not simply for public consumption; the anonymous compiler of an Army Special Warfare School training syllabus noted flatly, "It is not the intention to make a thorough story here of what a Leaflet Writer may or may not say, but one rule is inflexible; he must always tell the truth."<sup>7</sup>

Morality aside, the main reason for always telling as much of the truth as possible in military propaganda is the consideration that it takes only one exposed lie, to drain any reservoir of credibility the propagandist has built up. Tokyo Rose "commiserated" so often with the crews of "sunken" U.S. warships during World War II that further such announcements actually raised morale in the crews of the unscathed vessels. Admiral William Halsey reported to the U.S. Pacific Commander-in-Chief that "The Third Fleet's sunken and damaged ships have been salvaged and are retiring at high speed toward the enemy."<sup>8</sup> The unfilled promises of German propagandists in World War II of "war-winning wonder weapons" in the end lowered German military morale and became the butt of many a bitter joke. In the emphatic words of one PSYOP veteran of World War II and Korea: "This is the heart of the matter, then. Friendly psychological warfare dissemination must be steeped in -- must be cloaked in, must give off, must read, sound, look, smell, must fairly reek -- credibility."<sup>9</sup>

The value of this commitment to truth is not always self-evident. That premier and pioneering authority on psychological warfare, Professor Harold Lasswell, writing admittedly in the disillusioned aftermath of World War I, claimed that "Actual propaganda, wherever studied, has a large element of the false in it."<sup>10</sup> This may be true to some extent of strategic or international propaganda: unfulfilled promises of self-government or protection to those who aid our cause, our unsullied motives in war, the glories of democracy, etc., have punctuated America's strategic propaganda

<sup>6</sup>Heber Blankenhorn, oral interview with H. B. Phillips, 1955-1956 Columbia University Oral History Research Office, Library of Congress transcript copy.

<sup>7</sup>"Psychological Warfare," anon., n.d., USASOC History Archives.

<sup>8</sup>I. Musicant, *Battleship at War: The Epic Story of the USS Washington* (New York:1986), 272.

<sup>9</sup>Herbert Avedon, "The Heart of the Matter," *Military Review* (March 1954).

<sup>10</sup>Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in World War II* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: [1927], 1971), 206.



to friend and foe alike. But the U.S. Army really did fulfil its tactical PSYOP promises, feeding its captives usually far better than when they were free and rarely abusing them. An unexpected result of keeping its promises to its POWs is that the United States must be the one nation on earth whose military prisoners often did not wish to return home.<sup>11</sup>

"Black" propaganda (messages attributed to a spurious source) or clever ploys more often than not have failed, as was evident in the broadcasts of certain Allied "black" radio stations in the ETO during World War II.<sup>12</sup> Graphic sexual themes also fit into this unsuccessful category, and the Army has rightly shunned these, after a few initial stumbles.<sup>13</sup> In the words of the premier British propagandist of World War II:

Although we found the left-hand activities enormous fun, although a vast amount of talent went into them, although I am sure they entertained the Gestapo, I have grave doubts whether black propaganda had an effect in any way commensurate with that of straightforward propaganda from the enemy to the enemy.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Buried in the official history of the U.S. Army transportation Corps in World War II is a nugget of proof: "When sleepers were required in special POW trains, tourist-class cars or troop sleepers were used; in regular trains they might be standard, tourist, or troop sleepers." Surely the United States was the only nation on earth transporting its prisoners of war in railroad sleeping cars and feeding them in dining cars with waiter service. Chester Wardlow, *The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply, The United States Army in World War II*, The Technical Services (Center of Military History, Washington: 1956), 79-80. The most significant, and tragic, exception to this outstanding record occurred during the Korean War, when something like civil war raged throughout UN POW camps between Communist and anti-Communist prisoners in the face of lackadaisical camp administration. Not before more than 100 deaths and the breaking of two General officers to colonel rank, was order restored. The United States, of course, suffered a grievous propaganda blow, and one, in this case, richly deserved. W. G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, United States Army in the Korean War (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington: 1966), Chapt. 11.

<sup>12</sup>M. F. Herz, "The Combat Leaflet - Weapon of Persuasion," *Army Information Digest* (June 1950).

<sup>13</sup>See comments of the veteran Martin F. Herz, in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall 1949). Herz gives a World War II example of "A swarthy foreign worker shamelessly disporting with a naked Teutonic maiden." But this author has found no Allied leaflet remotely approaching such a lubricious theme. The leaflet Herz refers to may well have been scotched by higher authority.

<sup>14</sup>R. H. S. Crossman, "Psychological Warfare," lectures presented to the Royal United Services Institution, *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, 97 (1952).

The terms "tactical" and "strategic," when applied to psychological warfare, are not always hard-and-fast. For example, Radio Luxembourg in the ETO during World War II waged both types of warfare over its airwaves, addressing both the Germans in Germany (strategic) and German troops in the field (tactical). Psywarriors are aware that tactical leaflets distributed on the battlefield may often be taken back by troops going home on leave and there have a strategic impact. Conversely, messages to lower enemy home front morale or induce its government to change some policy may have their effect on its troops returning to the field.<sup>15</sup> But a dividing line can be drawn by understanding that the leaflet and the loudspeaker are essentially tactical weapons, and it is on these two weapons that this study will focus.<sup>16</sup>

Tactical PSYOP certainly does not exclude operations directed toward civilians. Even in DESERT STORM, and contrary to intelligence estimates, the U.S. Army encountered a sizeable number of Bedouin and refugees who, from humanitarian, legal and military considerations, needed information as to where they could go for relief, areas to avoid, etc.

It has sometimes been stated that the advocates of psychological warfare claim far too much when they contend that they can win a campaign, if not a war, by their craft.<sup>17</sup> On the contrary, PSYOP advocates actually go to some pains to explain that

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Another eminent PSYOP authority, the American Paul A. M. Linebarger, agreed that "a great deal of communication, both in wartime and in peacetime, because of the pleasure which it gives to the utterers, and not because of the result it is supposed to effect in the hearers." Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (New York [1948], 1954), 40.

<sup>15</sup>From the field and at the time, "Experience proved that no clear-cut distinction can be made between combat or tactical propaganda and long-range strategic propaganda. [Richard Hollander], *The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. An Account of its Operations in the Western European Campaign, 1944-1945* (Bad Homburg: October 1945), 8. Copies in National Archives (RG 331, SHAEF Special Staff) and U.S. Army Center of Military History.

<sup>16</sup>See Crossman, "The Creed of a Modern Propagandist," from "Psychological Warfare." One PSYOP veteran went so far as to term all post-World War I psywar as tactical: "Psychological warfare, ...is predominantly a tactical rather than a strategic weapon; the General attempt to use it strategically during World War II may explain the difficulty of finding conclusive evidence that it worked." COL R. L. Cardell, "The Relationship of Psychological Warfare to Intelligence Operations," Army War College (Fort Leavenworth: 23 February 1951), Military History Institute Archives. It even can be argued that all warfare is psychological: "Destroying the enemy's forces and material has one purpose - to bring about his surrender - and surrender is a state of mind.", *Armed Forces Talk*, 303, "Meet Psychological Warfare," 1949.

<sup>17</sup>"Propaganda has often been over-advertised, to the extent that 'psychological warfare' is a major nostrum to some persons...."Linebarger, "Essays on Military

their craft only accelerates existing trends.<sup>18</sup> This author has yet to find a written claim by a psywarrior that PSYOP can win anything by itself, and much to the contrary.<sup>19</sup>

Probably the most frequently posed challenge to propagandists has been "This is all very interesting, but how can you show that it works?" Somehow, this question never seems to be raised over, say, artillery, even though it may well be as difficult to "prove" that an artillery bombardment paved the way for troops to take a particular town as to show how many enemy soldiers in that town surrendered, as a result of a leaflet campaign. More than fifty years after the bombings of Dresden and Tokyo, there is still little agreement on a precise cause-and-effect relationship between the mass strategic bombardment of German and Japanese cities and the ending of World War. Yet there are few in the military who would advocate the abolition of such bombardment.

Just as the ruins of a bombarded fortified town will yield the corpses of enemy soldiers, so a psywar campaign might produce numbers of opposing troops waving surrender passes or who will state that their decision to give up was the result, direct or indirect, of that campaign. But just as it might be argued that those surrendering troops simply carried their passes as "life insurance" and would tell their captors whatever they wanted to hear about the wonders of psywar, so it could be argued that those dead enemy troops might have been killed more efficiently by an air strike. As one psywar authority put it, "The question here is not one of evidence, which is abundant, but rather one of evaluation."<sup>20</sup> Or in the words of one journal, referring to psywar in Korea, "Unmeasurable though they may be, the results have been clearly evident."<sup>21</sup> Another authority went so far as to claim that "Coincidence between psychological attack and surrender is a poor criterion." and an example of logical fallacy reasoning. (The rooster believes that his crowing makes the sun "rise"; after all, it appears every morning just after his crowing.) So, this argument goes, it is with tactical psywar. Defectors do come, and in large numbers on occasion, but their defection is due to many reasons, the most common being that they are fed-up with

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Psychological Operations." Special Operations Research Office, American University (June 1965), "working paper," 10. Copy in Center of Military History Archives. This has not been this author's experience.

<sup>18</sup>See James M. Erdmann, *Leaflet Operations in the Second World War* (Denver: 1969), 42, quoting speech by BG Robert McClure, former chief of SHAEF psywar and later of Army psywar during the Korean conflict.

<sup>19</sup>For another example, Crossman, "Psychological warfare is not an independent arm; it is not something that can do miracles on its own. "The Creed of a Modern Propagandist," 35.

<sup>20</sup>Daniel Lerner, "Sykewar, ETO: An Account of the Psychological Warfare Campaign Against Germany...by PWD SHAEF" Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1948), 275.

<sup>21</sup>[anon.], "Psychological Warfare in Korea," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, (Spring 1951).

military life and/or don't wish to die, not because they were convinced of the moral superiority of the United States or of democracy<sup>22</sup> It is quite likely that, in the words of one PSYOP veteran "the more completely psychological warfare is integrated into tactical operations, the more difficult it is to assess its effectiveness."<sup>23</sup> But for all of that, defectors or POWs/EPWs have rarely been used as a criterion for the success of U.S. Army PSYOP. In the words of a coursebook from the Korean War era, U.S. psychological warfare's mission

is to help soften him [the enemy soldier] up so the job of the Armed Forces will be easier. This involves lowering his morale and fighting efficiency, confusing and deceiving him, and sometime causing him to quit the [obscured - "fight"?] completely. It is not, as is so popularly believed, to argue him into surrender, although that occasionally happens. Simply because an enemy soldier sees and reads a leaflet (and he might even believe it) you should not expect him to say, "By George! This is good stuff. I think I'll surrender." You may, however, expect that the "idea" *surrender* will be planted in the enemy's thinking -- that surrender isn't so terrible, that it can be honorable, that on occasions it's the most reasonable action to choose, and that he *can* choose.<sup>24</sup>

Psychological operations, thus, is more of an art than a science, a conclusion that undoubtedly could also be reached about war itself.<sup>25</sup>

Some efforts have been made to account for U.S. tactical PSYOP successes, efforts that went beyond merely counting defectors' heads. One method was to look at countermeasures by the enemy. There is an abundance of such testimony from the

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<sup>22</sup>See William E. Daugherty, "Evaluation of Combat Propaganda," in Daugherty, ed., in collaboration with M. Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore: 1958).

<sup>23</sup>P. Katz, "Tactical Psyop in Support of Combat Operations," in R. D. McLaurin, etc., *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations* (New York: 1982), 42.

<sup>24</sup>Army Ground School, Psychological Warfare NCO Course #2, "Introduction to Leaflet Operations" (Ft. Riley, KS: March 1952), 1.

<sup>25</sup>Carl Berger, *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets* (Special Operations Research Office, American University, Washington: 1959), 130. A high ministerial wartime aide to Winston Churchill compared the evaluating of PSYOP effectiveness to determining how many voters may have been persuaded by a political speech. E. Barrett, *Truth is Our Weapon* (New York: 1953), a fair comparison, except that there would undoubtedly be more advocating the abolition of political speeches than of psywar.<sup>31</sup>

enemy, calling on the troops to be ever "vigilant" against "poisoned" leaflets and "lying" broadcasts, which will be dealt with below. It is a fair question to ask why the enemy would waste his time denouncing ineffective propaganda.<sup>26</sup> (Conversely, the U.S. Army wasted little time countering enemy propaganda towards its own troops precisely because it is so ineffectual.)<sup>27</sup> At any rate, this author has yet to hear of or come across an enemy document, be it German, Japanese, Chinese, Viet Cong or Iraqi, claiming that it is not necessary to worry about U.S. PSYOP.

As will be shown, extensive efforts were made to determine the opinions of POWs as to the effectiveness of U.S. PSYOP. But it also should be pointed out that the cages contained more than their share of malcontents, jail house lawyer types, misfits suck-ins, etc., who were more likely to be picked up by the enemy than their more motivated fellows. Added to this is the understandable desire of the POW to stay out of trouble and please his captors, who may not be so pleased to hear that one of their weapons was of little effect. Yet American psywarriors did find ways of putting POWs/EPWs at their ease and obtaining valid PSYOP intelligence. In fact, the transcripts of POW interrogations do contain numerous negative comments on particular U.S. or allied leaflets or on US psywar generally.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Kehm, "Can Psywar Pay its Passage?" Lerner does postulate that enemy commanders may warn of or denounce U.S. psywar as a scapegoat for the low morale in their units, or simply to show their superiors that they are "on the ball." These are logical postulates, but Lerner adduces no documentation. Lerner thesis, 273.

<sup>27</sup>Among the very few examples of Army concern with the effect of enemy propaganda on U.S. troops is found in a 1920 Army War College lecture by BG D. E. Nolan, AEF G-2 in World War I. Lecture, 7 September 1920, Intelligence Course No.2, U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives. Another example was the series of draft articles drawn up in 1982 by the Army Center for Military Assistance (Fort Bragg, North Carolina), under the auspices of something termed the "Soviet PSYOP Threat Immunization Campaign (with the unhappy acronym SPIC), which called for a widespread effort to counter what was perceived as a most threatening Soviet PSYOP apparatus. The program obviously got nowhere., drafts and Disposition Form from IMA Director of Training and Doctrine, dated 9 June 1982, in "Counter to Soviet PSYOP" folder, "PSYOPS" drawer No. III, USASOC History Archives,

<sup>28</sup>Perhaps the best analysis of POW reactions to U.S. psywar was made early in 1942 by Heber Blankenhorn, the only U.S. psywar veteran of both world wars, who emphasized the reluctance of prisoners to admit that propaganda had much to do with their surrender or capture. "The first fact about prisoner examination is --- to the amateur --- quite disconcerting. No good soldier ever says that he surrendered "because of a leaflet." Blankenhorn also honestly noted the relative immunity of officers and NOCs to psywar. Blankenhorn, "Memorandum for the Record, subj: Observations on Prisoner Examination, as a Guide for Psychological Warfare," 17 July 1942, in Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda in Africa, Italy, United Kingdom, and France, 1943-1944," typescript, n.d., Hoover Institution, Stanford University,

One undoubted lesson that has emerged from this study is that psywar is a *function of command*. If command exercises it, it will succeed, if neglected, or planned and conducted independent of command, it will be wasted."<sup>29</sup> For this reason, beginning with World War I, the U.S. Army in each of its wars has incorporated PSYOP into its command structure. Even though the craft almost vanished from the U.S. military picture between those wars, the coming of conflict brought it back, eventually, into the command structure, the opposition or indifference of "conventional" soldiers notwithstanding. (It may well also be that with the loosening of purse strings in wartime, such officers were not so much "converted" to an appreciation of psywar but were simply not inclined to fight against something that took so few resources anyway.) By the time of Vietnam, however, this pattern had changed, and what by then was termed PSYOP seemed to take its place in the Department of Defense (DoD) and Army command structure with little apparent opposition. The experience of the World War I civilian Creel Committee's preparing propaganda for the Army to disseminate in the field was never repeated. There was a subsequent general consensus that a propagandist for the Army must be at least an Army employee, familiar with its structure, its terminology, policies and methods.

Another major finding over the years was that the surrender pass was one of the most successful PSYOP weapons in the field, and that the most successful surrender pass showed the would-be defector how to do it safely. Defection was usually no easy option; the defector must escape from his comrades (who may already have noted his "shaky" attitude) and sometimes from special squads on the lookout for just such attempts. But his greatest fear and obstacle, justified or not, was that he would be shot down by front-line American troops. Thus an effective surrender pass had to look official and carry English-language instructions to demonstrate that U.S. troops had gotten the message and that defection was feasible. Promises of good treatment gather few defectors if enemy troops cannot be persuaded that they will even make it alive to the American lines where good things might await them.<sup>30</sup>

Pride of place for the single most effective U.S. PSYOP weapon probably would have to go to the newsheet leaflet. Enemy troops from closed societies, bored comatose by their own propaganda or "news" and starved for information, even that known to come from the enemy, proved ready "subscribers" to U.S. newsletter leaflets. These messages usually went easy on the propaganda, and were actually interesting, with their sports scores, cartoons, puzzles, riddles and fairly straightforward news. They made their points with a fair degree of subtlety and rarely laid impossible demands on their readers. ("End the War!", "Overthrow your Government!", "Turn on your Officers!") mistakes made all too frequent in enemy propaganda to U.S. troops. One proof of the effectiveness of news sheet leaflets lies

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<sup>29</sup>Linebarger, "Psyop in World War II," part 2, *Infantry Journal* (June 1947). (emphasis in original.)

<sup>30</sup>McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 47-48; H. Speier, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1948), 14.

in the fact that many enemy prisoners continued to read such messages while in the cages.

Works on PSYOP or propaganda often attempt to classify such messages by type or theme, and generally append a long list of such identifiers: "glittering generalities", "transfer", "card stacking", "bandwagon/reverse bandwagon", "name calling, etc." But most messages are an amalgam of such themes, as with the leaflets themselves, which are often classified basically as "informative", "persuasive", or "directive." The problem with such classification is that one can often discern multiple themes in a message:

Brave soldiers of the \_\_\_\_\_ Division! For over two weeks you have been cut off! When did you last have a full stomach? Did your officers not tell you that the war would be over in a few more months? It is simple for you to escape this trap. Make your way to Allied lines, raise your hands or a white flag and present yourself to the nearest Allied soldier. You will be welcomed, well looked after and returned home at the end of the war"

combines at least three categories. Such classification is, in truth, a mere exercise in theory.

U.S. Army tactical psychological operations had its shortcomings and made its share of mistakes. The most significant shortcomings, however, were usually the result of the Army's general inability to see the value of this weapon until the Vietnam War. And there were mistakes in theme (sex, suicide) and execution (Japanese "I Surrender" leaflets), which will be dealt with below. But the record is an impressive one, certainly in comparison to that of America's enemies and even to that of her allies, the former committed just about every major propaganda blunder in the book.

## EARLY YEARS

U.S. Army combat psychological warfare can be traced back to before the independence of the nation. For as early as 1 May 1775, just after the battles of Lexington and Concord, a leaflet was printed up by the colonial American rebels and directed toward the British regiment in Boston. The "Address to the British Soldierly Now on Duty in America" called on that "soldierly" to desert and join the American cause, and promised good treatment as well as a "comfortable subsistence."<sup>31</sup> This may well have been the first example of American tactical military psychological warfare. At about the same time, the Americans produced the most famous tactical leaflet of the war, the so-called "Bunker Hill" leaflet. This message vividly portrayed the differences between the British soldier's current lot if he stayed on Bunker Hill (actually Breed's Hill), recently taken at heavy cost from the colonials, in contrast to the bright "Prospect" that awaited him with the Americans. This leaflet (figure 1) was wrapped around rocks or bullets and thrown across the lines to the British troops.<sup>32</sup> It showed keen insight into conditions in the British Army, and although pardonably exaggerated, must have struck a resonant note with many enemy soldiers. The promise of "a good farm" proved particularly effective in this leaflet and throughout the War for Independence. In Great Britain the very term "landowning classes" meant the upper classes, and even the word "farmer:" referred to someone who farmed someone else's land. But the lowest private on His Britannic Majesty's service could see about him in North America a land where "every man dwelt under his own fig tree." This was believable psychological warfare, and such appeals ultimately drew in thousands of British and Hessian troops.<sup>33</sup>

At almost the same time that their compatriots were propagandizing British troops in Boston, American forces outside New York targeted the Royal Irish Regiment, playing upon their sense of grievance against the English in the home island. The Americans promised that deserting Irish troops would be protected against the British Army and the military laws of Great Britain which, as the patriots

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<sup>31</sup>Carl Berger, *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets* (Special Operations Office, American University, Washington: 1959).

<sup>32</sup>Paul A. M. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Combat Forces Press, Washington: 1954), 213; William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, "Psychological Warfare in American History," in Daugherty and Janowitz, eds., *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore: 1958), 60; C. K. Bolton, *The Private Soldier Under Washington* (New York: 1902), 78.

<sup>33</sup>Philip Grant Davidson, *Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783* (Chapel Hill: 1941). The eminent psychological warfare authority, the late Paul A. M. Linebarger, characterized the Bunker Hill leaflet as "a classic example of how to do good field propaganda." Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 21. See also Federal Research Division, *An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP)*. (n.d.).



## PROSPECT HILL.

- I. Seven Dollars a Month. — —
- II. Fresh Provisions, and in Plenty. — —
- III. Health. — — — —
- IV. Freedom, Ease, Affluence and a good Farm.

## BUNKER'S HILL.

- I. Three Pence a Day.
- II. Rotten Salt Pork.
- III. The Scurvy.
- IV. Slavery, Beggary and Want.

The "Bunker Hill" leaflet, from Paul A.M. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, Infantry Journal Press: 1948, 1954).<sup>1</sup>

thoughtfully pointed out, "have no legal force in America."<sup>34</sup>

The Americans particularly targeted the Hessians, bought and paid by the British to fight in North America. General Washington thought that "If a few trusty, sensible fellows could get with them [Hessians], I should think they would have great weight and influence with the common soldiery."<sup>35</sup> Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin cooperated in a far more wide-ranging plan to induce Hessian desertions, mobilizing elements of the North American German community to write letters to their compatriots, and producing handbills and leaflets. Captured Hessians were often quickly released after indoctrination, to spread the word to their fellows that the Americans were not barbarians or cannibals and that Hessians would find a ready welcome in the German-American communities that flourished in North America. The two statesmen persuaded the Continental Congress to adopt an appeal, adopted 14 August 1776, which may have been written by Jefferson himself:

Whereas it has been the wise policy of these states to extend the protection of their laws to all those who should settle among them, of whatever nation or religion they might be, and to admit them to a participation of the benefits of civil and religious freedom; and the benevolence of this practice as well as its salutary effects, have rendered it worth of being continued in future times.

And whereas, his Britannic majesty, in order to destroy our freedom and happiness, has commenced against us a cruel and unprovoked war; and unable to engage Britons sufficient to execute his sanguinary measures, has applied for aid to certain foreign princes, who are in the habit of selling the blood of their people for money, and from them has procured and transported hither considerable number of foreigners.

And it is conceived, that such foreigners, if apprised of the practice of these states, would chuse to accept of lands, liberty, safety and a communion of good laws, and mild government, in a country where many of their friends and relations are already happily settled, rather than continue exposed to the toils and dangers of long and bloody war, waged against a people, guilty of no other crime than that of refusing to exchange freedom for slavery; and after that they will do this the more especially when they reflect, that after they shall have violated every Christian and moral precept, by invading, and attempting to destroy, those who have never injured them or their country, their only

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<sup>34</sup>E. Schafer, "Propaganda in the American Revolution," in R. Blanco, ed., *The American Revolution, 1775-1783, An Encyclopedia*, 2, (New York and London: 1993)

<sup>35</sup>F. Kinkaid, "PSYWAR in 1776: Why the Hessians Deserted," *Army* (May 1985).

reward, if they escape death and captivity, will be a return to the despotism of their prince, to be by him again sold to do the drudgery of some other enemy of the rights of mankind. And whereas, the Parliament of Great Britain have thought fit, by a late act, not merely to invite our troops to desert our service, but to direct a compulsion of our people, taken at sea, to serve against their country!

**Resolved**, Therefore, that these states, will receive all such foreigners who shall leave the armies of his Britannic majesty in America, and shall chuse to become members of any of these states; that they shall be protected in the free exercise of their respective religions, and be invested with the rights, privileges and immunities of natives, as established by the laws of these states; and, moreover, that this Congress will provide, for every such person, 50 acres of unappropriated lands in some of these states, to be held by him and his heirs in absolute property."

This proclamation and the campaign in general enjoyed little success until after the British capitulation at Saratoga in October of 1777. Then 785 Hessians came over to the Americans from the surrendered British army. At the end of the war, of the 30,000 Hessians recruited by the British, only 17- 18,000 returned to Germany, although about one-half of those who did not return probably succumbed to illness and wounds. Given the numbers involved, the Hessian/free land campaign was perhaps the most successful such operation until the Gulf War of more than two centuries later. (It may be significant that the British did not resort to renting Hessians again during the War of 1812.)<sup>36</sup>

There is also evidence of American appeals to French Canadians during their ultimately unsuccessful invasion of northern British North America. The occupying American troops were badly behaved and *les Canadiens* seemed reasonably content under British rule. Few joined the "Sacred Cause."<sup>37</sup>

Of course, the Declaration of Independence was masterful and exciting propaganda for the patriot cause, and "freedom" and "independence" more stirring than "The Rights of Englishmen." General Washington ordered that Thomas Paine's pamphlet, *The American Cause*, be read to the troops assembled. It would be a

<sup>36</sup>Lyman Butterfield, "Psychological Warfare in 1776: The Jefferson-Franklin Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 94 (1950), reprinted in Daugherty and Janowitz, *Casebook*; Kinkaid.

<sup>37</sup>Berger, *Wartime Leaflets*. Perhaps the nature of the leaflets had something to do with this lack of success. It was reported that "threatening" letters were shot into Quebec by arrows. *ibid*, 81. See also A. Thompson, *Mass Persuasion in History: an Historical Analysis of the Development of Propaganda Techniques* (Edinburgh: 1977), 86.

churlish trooper indeed who would have failed, even in this time of demoralizing defeats, to be stirred by Paine's uplifting eloquence: "Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolidation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph."<sup>38</sup>

Washington had need of every word of Paine, for not only was his army reeling from its defeats in and around New York City, the British were getting at his troops with their own propaganda, which had commenced early in the war. Realizing that the forces of the Crown might never be able to defeat this people (then as now) "numerous and armed," the British Commander-in-Chief, General Sir William Howe, by March 1777 was offering a full pardon and money for weapons to any deserting patriot soldier. Washington admitted to Congress that British propaganda had "an unhappy influence on too many of the soldiers; in a particular manner on those not natives," and added ruefully, "I could wish some means could be devised to cause more frequent desertions of their troops."<sup>39</sup> Washington himself had found "some means" when he somewhat later called for:

A small traveling Press to follow headquarters [which] would be productive of many eminent advantages. It would enable us to give speedy and exact information of any Military transactions that take place with proper comments upon them; and thereby frustrate the pernicious tendency to falsehood and misrepresentation, which, in my opinion of whatever they may be, are in the main, detrimental to our Cause. If the people had a Channel of intelligence..., they might often be preserved from that despondency, what they are apt to fall into from the exaggerated pictures [of] our Enemies.<sup>40</sup>

The record is unclear as to whether Washington was ever able to obtain such a press, let alone what effect it might have had. But he had good reason for his worries about British propaganda. A year after General Howe had begun his propaganda work, 1,134 rebel soldiers and 354 sailors, mostly recent emigrants from the United Kingdom, had defected to the British and sworn an oath of allegiance to His Britannic

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 86; Schafer, "Propaganda in the American Revolution," vol. 2, p. 1341; Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 23.

<sup>39</sup>Schafer, 1341. A British broadside issued in the Southern Department, "Address to the Soldiers of the Continental Army, 1780," called on those soldiers to "make use of your flintlock and join the British Army, where you will be permitted to dispose of yourselves as you please." This leaflet contained at least one flaw: How could one "dispose" of himself "as you please" while a soldier in the British Army? Papers of the Continental Congress, No. 152, 8, p. 579, quoted in Berger, *Wartime Leaflets*, 3.

<sup>40</sup>J. M. Dederer, *Making Bricks Without Straw: Nathaniel Green's Southern Campaign and Mao Tse Tung's Mobile War* (Manhattan, Kansas: 1983), 24.

Majesty at Howe's headquarters in Philadelphia. The following year, British and Tory agents worked among the patriots encamped under appalling conditions at Morristown, New Jersey.<sup>41</sup>

The patriots, in turn, were able to use "atrocities" propaganda against the British, usually in relation to Indian depredations. The murder of Jane McCrea by Indians under the command of British General John Burgoyne was widely, often luridly, publicized by the patriots to good effect. The British also provoked fears of a slave insurrection, particularly when the Earl of Dunmore issued a proclamation offering freedom and arms to Blacks who would flee to his lines. Nonetheless, Indian depredations and fears of Black insurrection helped to cement colonial opinion against the British.<sup>42</sup>

Both sides in the War for Independence obviously enjoyed considerable success in their propaganda efforts. But the Americans retained one great advantage throughout the war, one that could overcome the blandishments of the British and sustain the weary, often dispirited patriot in the struggle. That advantage was the American Commander-in-Chief, George Washington. However discouraged, the troops knew that Washington, with his selfless patriotism, embodied their cause.

By contrast with the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812 saw very little propaganda emitted from either side. But during the closing months of the War of 1812, British officers in Florida and Alabama used rallied Indians and Spaniards against the Americans under General of Militia Andrew Jackson. They also employed psychological deception by strongly hinting that the main British attack on New Orleans would come from the north. The British-hating Jackson responded with therodomontade of the time that deserves repeating:

The base, the perfidious Britons have attempted to invade your country. They had the temerity to attack Fort Bowyer with their incongruous horde of Indians and negro assassins....The proud, vain-glorious boaster Colonel Nicholls, when he addressed you, Louisianians and Kentuckians, had forgotten that you were the votaries of freedom....I ask you, Louisians, can we place any confidence in the honor of men who have courted an alliance with pirates and robbers [shades of Jean Lafitte!].....And have they not dared to insult you by calling on you to associate as brethren with them and this hellish banditti?

In the end, the British could not back up their propaganda with military success while Jackson could. Clearing the British out of West Florida, Jackson went on to greater victory and glory at New Orleans. Both the victor and the loser's propaganda,

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<sup>41</sup>Schafer, 1343.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 1342.

however, were soon forgotten.<sup>43</sup>

The Mexican War of 1846-1848 was unique in that it saw successful enemy psychological warfare, with a significant number of desertions to that enemy by American soldiers in the field. It was one of the most unhappy episodes in American military history.

Even before any declaration of war, the Mexican government had issued a proclamation offering 320 acres to any foreign-born U.S. soldier who would desert the service. The American Commander, General Zachary Taylor reported in April of 1846 that at least 30 of his troops had made their way across the Rio Grande, although four had drowned and two had been shot dead by pickets. Those 30 renegades would become the nucleus of the San Patricio Battalion of the Mexican Army.

The U.S. Army of the time suffered from the highest desertion rate in its history, more than 80 percent. This incredible figure becomes somewhat more understandable in the light of the brutal discipline and petty harassments that enlisted men of the time had to endure. In addition, the Army was deep in a hostile country, working and fighting in a fierce climate.

It was General "Old Rough and Ready" Taylor's troops who comprised most of the deserters. General Winfield ("Old Fuss and Feathers") Scott, took more pains over the conditions of his men and subsequently suffered less desertion. But even Scott had to report that "Efforts are continually being made to entice our men to desert, and I regret to say, have met with considerable success."<sup>44</sup> Exact figures as to the number of American deserters to the Mexican forces remain elusive, and, in fact, the organization they formed is referred to variously as the "St. Patrick Battalion," the "St. Patrick Brigade" or the "San Patricios." Their motivation and even their ethnic background have been obscured. The name St Patrick Battalion/Brigade, for example, should not mislead. This term was a Mexican embellishment; the best evidence was that the men were not primarily of Irish background, although they were the largest single group, but deserted because of the land offered, girls, liquor, resentment, trouble with their superiors, etc. After their capture, some also claimed that they had been legitimate prisoners of war who had been forced into Mexican service. One fact is not in doubt, the San Patricios deserters, when brought to battle, fought with the courage of doomed men. A major of Ohio Volunteers recalled "These [deserters] the enemy joyfully received and speedily enrolled in their ranks, where they served with a courage and fidelity they had never exhibited in our own."<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>H. W. Youmans, "PSYOP Experience in War of 1812," typescript, copy in U.S. Special Operations Command History Office, MacDill AFB, Florida. See also Robin Reilly, *The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign of the War of 1812* (New York: 1974.)

<sup>44</sup>B. K. Barker, "The St. Patricks Fought for Their Skins, and Mexico," *Smithsonian* (March, 1978), 24.

<sup>45</sup>R. R. Miller, *Shamrock and Sword: The Saint Patrick's Battalion in the U.S.-Mexican War* (Norman, Oklahoma: 1989), 47.

Sixty-nine of the San Patricios were captured at Churubusco. ("It was with much difficulty that the American soldiers could be prevented from bayoneting the miscreants on the spot....")<sup>46</sup> In the end, 50 were hanged, the trap plunging them to ignoble oblivion having been stayed just until they could glimpse the U.S. flag raised over the newly-conquered citadel of Mexico City. But with legal punctiliousness, General Scott spared those who had deserted before the declaration of war. They, including even the ringleader, the infamous Riley, were merely flogged and branded on the cheek with the letter "D," and the miserable affair came to an end. Although the Army seems to have made no effort to determine why so many American soldiers had deserted to an enemy in time of war, nothing remotely like it would ever be repeated in the United States military.<sup>47</sup>

Oddly, although the Civil War generated intense emotions on both sides, almost no psychological warfare was attempted in the field. President Lincoln's propaganda masterpiece, the Emancipation Proclamation was, of course, strategic propaganda, directed toward the British public. The overwhelming mass of Union soldiers fought to preserve the Union, not to free the slaves. Still, it is surprising that no effort was apparently made by either side to undermine the loyalty of border states troops, or by the Union to separate the small farmers from the planter "slaveocracy," or by the Confederates to appeal to fears of Northern working class immigrants for their tenuous economic status in the face of Black competition after emancipation. These were not simply theoretical themes, as the border states' own fierce civil wars showed, as did the savagery of the Irish against Blacks in the New York City draft riots of 1863. Yet nothing remotely approaching the level and intensity of the psychological warfare of the War for Independence would be waged by the United States until World War I.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid, 88.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid, 95. See also E. S. Wallace, "Deserters in the Mexican War," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 40 (August 1935).

<sup>48</sup>During the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902) the U.S. Army conducted a very extensive program of "internal improvements" or what would today be termed "civic action," building farm-to-market-roads, schools (and staffing them with literate NCOs), wells, etc. All of this was to wean the Filipinos from the *insurrectos*. But the historical record is blank when it comes to any articulation of the relationship between all this activity and propaganda for the United States. The American promise of eventual independence for the Philippines was certainly a form of strategic propaganda. See J. M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Kraggs: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport: 1973); B. Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines* (New Haven: 1983). There are eerie parallels between this nasty jungle and village guerilla war with its American opposition coming from journalistic and literary types, and the Vietnam War.

## WORLD WAR I

All U.S. combat psychological warfare in conflicts previous to World War I had been *ad hoc* and by fits-and-starts, with no overall planning and no control by higher authority, either civil or military. But World War I saw the first fully-organized and authorized combat psychological warfare operations by the United States Army. For all the belligerents of this war the technological innovations of the later 19<sup>th</sup> and the early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries now made truly mass psychological warfare possible: information could be sent instantaneously via cable or telephone, rotary presses could print up tens of millions of leaflets and photographs on cheap paper, and the product could be distributed quickly by rail and motor truck to the front and then behind enemy lines by aircraft, balloons and artillery. Furthermore, general schooling and popular journalism had produced a mass semi-literate populace among the belligerents, making it possible to attack from a distance, for the first time on a large scale, the morale of an enemy nation's armies and of its civil population as well. In fact, all of the weapons and supporting technology of psychological warfare that would be used in future wars, with the exception of the electronic, were employed on a large scale for the first time in the First World War. In this great and lengthy conflict the side whose morale "cracked" first would be the one compelled to sue for peace. In World War I, it was Austria-Hungary, then Germany, whose armies in the field and homefronts buckled in the face of effective Allied propaganda.<sup>49</sup>

From the beginning of this war, the United States Army laid down the principle of truth-in-propaganda that would serve it so well in subsequent conflicts. If anything, the excesses of Allied civilian propaganda during this war later led to an even greater U.S. Army commitment to disseminating the truth.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup>In the contemporary words of the British propagandist, E. E. Slosson, "The war has resolved itself to a question of morale. Which people will lose heart first?", quoted in G. C. Bruntz, "Propaganda as an Instrument of Policy," *Current History*, July 1930.

<sup>50</sup>Even before the coming of the Second World War, an Army War College study war game syllabus iterated that "Truth and strict accuracy should be the guiding policy in this situation." "Course at the AWC 1938-1939," Major M. W. Marston, memo for Assistant Commandant, subject: "Propaganda and Initial Propaganda Objectives Against Crimson in Support of Student War Plans Against Red Coalition, AWC 1937 1938," 28 January 1939, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. But an earlier course syllabus had stated that although "it might be said that the governing policy of the United States [in World War I] was 'The Truth.'".... it is believed that no country will be fortunate enough to have the opportunity to conduct a campaign of propaganda so strictly along these lines." "Course at the AWC, 1934-35, Supplement #2," Report of Committee #7, subject: Propaganda, prepared by sub-committee #7," 2 November 1934. Military History Institute Archives.



There were differences, of course, between the U.S. psywar of the two world wars. It is evident with hindsight that the troops of the German army, thanks in no small measure to Allied psywar, believed themselves by the close of World War I to be worse off than they actually were, and, *despite* the Allied psywar of World War II, believed themselves better off at the close of that latter conflict than they really were.<sup>51</sup> Further, World War I was the last conflict in which U.S. psywar could appeal to any relatively widespread popular or political dissidence on the enemy's home front. It was something of a point of honor to the German government that their newspapers carried at least excerpts of President Wilson's more important speeches, and that socialist journals printed measured criticism of the conduct of the war. In later wars, it would prove fruitless to appeal to any sentiments of disaffection against regimes in Berlin, Tokyo, Pyongyang or Baghdad.

America's first step toward a psywar capability in World War I was the establishment by Executive Order of the famous Committee on Public Information (CPI), less than two weeks after the declaration of war against Germany, under the chairmanship of presidential friend and confidant, George Creel.<sup>52</sup> Although the CPI was activated primarily to disseminate domestic propaganda, its quick establishment by presidential fiat indicated that psywar would play a significant part in this conflict. Nonetheless, not until October of 1917, did the CPI establish a foreign branch to expose the iniquities of the Central Powers and disseminate a suitably benign version of America's wartime activities and post-war objectives. Creel, a human dynamo, avoided any outright lies, but CPI's wildly-exaggerated and lurid tales of the atrocities of the "Hun" served to discredit his committee and, to a lesser extent, psywar ever since.<sup>53</sup> Further, the overseas mandate of the CPI would soon bring it into conflict with the U.S. Army, which had its own ideas on psywar.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>Linebarger, 223.

<sup>52</sup>Robert Lansing (Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State throughout World War I), *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing* (Indianapolis: 1935), 245, 258.

<sup>53</sup>See, for example, H. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York: 1927); Arthur Ponsonby, *Falsehood in War-time, Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated throughout the Nations during the Great War* (New York: 1928); J. M. Reed, *Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919* (New Haven: 1941); or F. O. Wilcox, "Use of Atrocity Stories in War," *American Political Science Review* (December 1940). President Wilson was extremely reluctant to use the term "propaganda," which in the words of Blankenhorn, suggested "a hateful means of calculated deceit.", Blankenhorn, "Psychological Warfare", 26.

<sup>54</sup>The literature of the CPI is extensive and often hostile, particularly in the inter-war years. The exception is, of course, George Creel, *How We Advertised America* (New York: 1920, 1972); Creel, "America's Fight for World Opinion," *Everybody's Magazine*, 40, No. 10. See Harold Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in World War I* (London: 1927, Cambridge, England: 1971); George Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate* (New York: 1930); George C. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of*

The Army had established a Military Intelligence Branch (MIB) within the Executive Division of the General Staff, and the Propaganda Subsection within the MIB early in 1918.<sup>55</sup> Heber Blankenhorn, a New York City editor, was hastily promoted Captain and put in command of the subsection, of which he formed then the entire membership. The subsection was initially charged, not with propaganda against the enemy, but rather with the study of *enemy* propaganda, with the preparing of counter-propaganda, with initiating the study of U.S. propaganda against the Central Powers, with contributing to the MIB's daily and weekly intelligence summaries, the preparing of intelligence manuals on major European nations and with the maintaining of an informational and advisory liaison with the CPI and Allied propaganda. All of this was presumably to be carried out by what must have been a terminally busy Blankenhorn.<sup>56</sup> Because of the "unenviable" reputation attached to the generally

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*the German Empire in 1918* (Stanford: 1938, New York: 1972); James R. Mock, and Cedric Larson, *Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919* (Princeton: 1939, New York: 1968); Stephen Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism and the Committee on Public Information* (Chapel Hill: 1980); Lasswell, *Psychological Warfare*, 67-68; Bruntz, "Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of German Morale in 1918," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, (1938); Ralph H. Lutz, "Studies of World War Propaganda 1914-1933," *Journal of Modern History*, 5 (1933). The German literature on Allied propaganda, beginning as early as 1916, is enormous, and overwhelmingly dedicated to proving that "honest" or "moral" Germany was defeated by Allied "tricks," which doesn't say much for the intelligence of the German soldier.

<sup>55</sup>Blankenhorn, "War on Morale," *Harpers*, (1919). Although it was certainly not a U.S. Army propaganda effort, it should be noted that the first American leaflet airdrop was by an American contracted civilian who scattered leaflets over Mexico in 1913 during that country's civil war. W. Biddle, *Barons of the Sky* (New York, etc.: 1991), 21.

<sup>56</sup>Edward P. Lilly, "History of Psychological Warfare," typescript draft (Washington: Historical Section, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: n.d.), 26-32. The Lilly work is a basic source for psywar in World Wars I and II. Lilly was commissioned to compile an official history of American psywar, particularly of World War II's Office of War Information, towards the end of World War II. Apparently, neither he nor the responsible Army commands were satisfied with the drafts. ("It is unfortunate that OWI's history was so badly handled by all parties concerned.", Lilly to C. M. Hulten, OWI Deputy Director, 12 July 1945, RG 208, entry 6e, box 9, "OWI History" folder.) The main cause for Lilly's complaint was that the work was rushed for budgetary reasons to achieve a completion deadline of the end of 1945. Lilly's work is located throughout RG 218. Unfortunately, after the original documents were given to Lilly for copying, the originals were discarded. The only known bound copy has been located in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Directorate of History, Archives and Museums, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Lilly's work is far stronger on

clumsy and ultimately ineffectual German military propaganda ("We will crush you!"), after April the subsection became known as the Psychologic (*sic*) Subsection, and continued its liaison and research functions, carefully avoiding policy questions.<sup>57</sup>

Even before he received his commission, Blankenhorn was writing to CPI officials of the need for U.S. propaganda against enemy troops. A series of informal conferences with, at various times, Secretary of War Newton Baker (a strong supporter of psywar), the head of CPI's Foreign Section, the chief of MIB (who gloried in the name Marlborough Churchill, but was of no relation to the British Churchill family), and the Army Chief of Staff worked out an agreement that determined, as Blankenhorn's believed, that "...executive responsibility for such propaganda rests with the Army, with the Committee [on Public Information] cooperating in the actual writing of propaganda." But this unwritten agreement remained subject to varying interpretations by the two agencies, a situation that undermined the efficiency of American propaganda toward the Central Powers until just before the Armistice. The nub of the problem was the determination of President Wilson to retain civilian control of propaganda, and the Army's practical questions about the control of a free-wheeling civilian agency in its military zone.<sup>58</sup>

In France itself, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) did not have a propaganda sub-section until after July 1918 (retaining the "Propaganda" title), but the Censorship Subsection of the Intelligence Section did continue close liaison with CPI, although the head of AEF G-2 noted that the CPI-Army relationship was "not clearly defined." His assistant felt that the division between CPI and G-2 "is the breeding ground for differences of opinion.", although he added hopefully that these differences could be worked out with good liaison.<sup>59</sup> To put such matters in perspective it should be noted that propaganda was one of the minor concerns of both the War Department and AEF GHQ, particularly in the spring of 1918, when the great German offensive of that time threatened to break through the Allied lines.<sup>60</sup>

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organization than on operations.

<sup>57</sup>E. A. Powell, *The Army Behind the Army* (New York: 1919), 347-348.

<sup>58</sup>Lilly, 41 and *passim* throughout chapter 1; Bruce W. Bidwell, *History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1942* (Frederick, MD: 1986).

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, 47. Assistant to Chief, AEF G-2-D, rough draft, 17 July 1918, AEF GHQ, G-2-D RG 120, entry 235, box 6192, folder #22. Nearly thirty years after these events, Creel stated obscurely that "At no time, as I remember, did the CPI ever state that it wanted nothing to do with front line propaganda. But at no time did we ever deny that the job of handling it was the Army's.", Creel, ltr. to Lilly, 15 February 1947, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 2, "WWI" folder.

<sup>60</sup>General Churchill indicated his view of the importance of psychological warfare in the AEF by almost completely ignoring the propaganda subsection section in his "The Military Intelligence Division General Staff," *Journal of the United States Artillery* (April 1920).

On 25 July a party of seven officers under Captains Blankenhorn and Walter Lippman (the latter to establish himself in the inter-war decades and beyond as America's most influential columnist and commentator on the current scene) reported for duty at AEF GHQ, and were sent forthwith to study propaganda methods of the Allies, particularly the French and the British. In Paris and London these officers found that their Allies indeed took combat psywar as a serious weapon against the common enemy.

The French had been first off the mark in the field and the most prolific, beginning at the opening of the war in August 1914, disseminating leaflets by balloon, rifle grenade, and the renowned 75mm artillery piece. The famous Franco-American Lafayette Escadrille had also dropped leaflets before America's entry into the war.<sup>61</sup> The British came to the use of combat psywar much later, in the spring of 1918. They were the first to compile a news letter in leaflet form, *Le Courier de l'Air* for civilians in German-occupied France and Belgium, informing them that they were not forgotten and that the Germans would soon be turfed out. This was the beginning of a psywar technique of slanted news letters that through subsequent wars garnered a wide readership among enemy troops so starved for reading material that they often perused the labels on their ration cans (At least these told the truth.) The British at first dropped their leaflets from aircraft. But the Germans had threatened to execute any captured aviators engaged in such "underhanded" missions, and had actually condemned to death (but not subsequently executed) two offending captured Royal Flying Corps flyers. The British, rather pusillanimously, capitulated to such threats and abandoned aircraft in favor of unmanned balloon drops. A more perceptive British military command should have persisted; obviously the airborne messages were getting through. American aviators on such missions, fully aware of the enemy threats, made it a point to fly as defiantly low as possible and drop their leaflets directly on German positions, and the British then followed suit in the last weeks of the war.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Historical Division, Department of the Army, *United States Army in the World War*, Reports of Commander-in-Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services (Washington: 1948, 1991), 121; Carl Berger, *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, Documentary Study No. 1 (Special Operations Research Office, Washington: 1959), 4; *New York Times*, 20 April 1919; Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippman and the American Century* (New York, etc: 1980), Chapt 8.

<sup>62</sup>Blankenhorn, *Adventures in Propaganda: Letters from an Intelligence Officer in France* (Boston: 1919), 55-56. Blankenhorn noted that British fliers were rumored to have been prone to burn their leaflets in the hangers rather than carry them. Blankenhorn, memo in response to inquiry from Air Service, subject: "AEF Air Service and Propaganda Against the Enemy," RG 120, entry 235, GHQ AEF, G-2, Correspondence of the Propaganda Section, box 6192, folder 21, N.D.; Lilly, 12; Blankenhorn practically accused the British to their faces of being fearful of the Germans, which may have provoked them to lift their ban. Blankenhorn, "Combat

American psywarriors were also well aware of the recent collapse of Russia and the disaster to the Italians at Caporetto, both Allied reverses attributed in large measure, with considerable exaggeration, to the propaganda of the Central Powers. Upon their return to France, Blankenhorn and Lippman worked out of one-half of a room at Chaumont, grandly, and perhaps slightly tongue-in-cheek, entitled "Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission," where propaganda leaflets, maps, etc. papered over the cracks in the walls.<sup>63</sup>

It was at about this time that the impatient Blankenhorn presented a map of the Western Front to G-2 headquarters on which he had chalked "Four million leaflets over the British front, five million leaflets over the French front. No leaflets over the American front?"<sup>64</sup> But despite the continuing CPI/AEF rivalry, the AEF was indeed forging ahead with its psywar planning, albeit while still looking over its shoulder toward the CPI back in Washington.

At least AEF psywarriors did not have to contend much with their allied counterparts. Allied psywar liaison through the Inter-Allied Conference on Enemy Propaganda remained on a solely consulting and information basis to the end of the

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Propaganda in Africa, Italy, United Kingdom, and France, 1943-1944, Revision to 'A Report to OSS, 1945, With Additions, as Consultant, WD to January 1946,' "typescript, Hoover Institution of War, Peace, and Revolution, Stanford University, n.d.; Psychological Warfare", 130. A *Christian Science Monitor* article stated that the Germans had humanely commuted the sentences on the condemned British fliers on 21 November 1918, that is, after the Armistice. The official *United States Army in the World War* diplomatically records merely that "At that time, the summer of 1918, the British Board [the Northcliffe board] had not been able to get its flying corps to distribute pamphlets, its policy being that propaganda is not worth casualties.", 121; Berger, 36-37. *The Psywar Society Bulletin*, 2 (April 1958). Accounts of Allied propaganda in World War I deal almost exclusively with the strategic, directed to governments and civilians rather than to troops in the field. See, for example, Lasswell and Bruntz; Harold Lavine, and James Wechsler, *War Propaganda and the United States* (New Haven: 1940, New York: 1970); German publications on the topic deal in more detail with combat psywar, undoubtedly because German troops were on the receiving end of so much effective examples, and "enemy propaganda" provided a convenient excuse for military defeat. See Max Dessoir, *Kriegspsychologische betrachtunral* (Leipzig: 1916); H. Foertsch, *The Art of Modern Warfare* (New York: 1940), translated by T. W. Knauth; and, of course, Generalfeldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg, *aus Minen Leben* (Leipzig: 1920), translated by W. A. Holt as, *Out of My Life* (New York: 1921); and General Eric Ludendorff, ed. *Urkunden der Obersten heeresleitung uber ihre taetigkeit in 1916-1918* (Berlin: 1920)

<sup>63</sup>Steele, 147. A photograph of this shabby room is in Blankenhorn, *Adventures in Propaganda*, 5.

<sup>64</sup>Blankenhorn interview, 5.

war, a situation General John J. Pershing, the AEF Commander, found "most satisfactory as it leaves us entire liberty of action for conducting our own propaganda which is essentially American...."<sup>65</sup> General Pershing's attitude was part of his strong belief that the AEF must operate on its own as much as possible. There would be no combined Allied psywar operations in World War I.

The AEF in August divided its new Propaganda Sub-Section into two subdivisions, one in Paris, for the collection, printing, and forwarding of propaganda material, later under Lippman; and the second at Chaumont (AEF GHQ) for the distribution of leaflets to the respective armies, corps, and Air Service fields, under Blankenhorn. The Propaganda Sub-Section, AEF, was preparing for America's first national official military propaganda campaign. By emphasizing the themes of peace and revolutionary progress and by encouraging the Germans and Austrians to turn to Wilson's ideals of an unprecedented new world order of self-determination as their only hope for an honorable end to the war, AEF psywarriors hoped to weaken the will to fight of their enemies in a psywar offensive that some Army officers considered to be even "pacifist and socialist."<sup>66</sup> One of Blankenhorn's subordinates spelled out the type of personnel and their sources for such a campaign: "[P]olitical officers" who understood the languages, religions, customs, voting patterns, and local government of the areas concerned. Such information could be found in only one place, The "Inquiry," headed by "Colonel" House, President Wilson's closest male intimate, which was working on assembling a post-war world of justice and self-determination.

It [the Inquiry] has been collected in a year's work, in which a hundred specialists have participated....MI-2 needs House's machinery; House's machinery needs MI-2....I know of nothing bigger than such a combination. It is the way this war ought to be fought."<sup>67</sup>

The campaign was also to take place during what Secretary Baker optimistically and unrealistically termed the "lull" expected in the winter of 1918-1919.<sup>68</sup> The campaign was somehow to steer an honest course between exciting

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<sup>65</sup>Pershing to Army Chief of Staff, 6 August 1918, RG 120, AEF HQ, G-2-D, entry 235, box 6192, folder #46. In the words of another authority on the subject "It is evident from the CPI files that in the opinion of Americans none of the attempts at Inter-Allied cooperation was as harmonious or as productive of results as one would gather from popular accounts....," Mock and Larson, 256.

<sup>66</sup>Lilly, 54; Blankenhorn, "Addendum," 1.

<sup>67</sup>Charles Merz, ltr. to Blankenhorn, 10 July 1918, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 17, "Chapt 1" folder.

<sup>68</sup>Baker, ltr. to Pershing, 2 July 1918, RG 120, AEF G-2-D, entry 235, box 6193, folder #46. Baker was not alone. Blankenhorn noted that the attitude of Air Service officers that summer was one of "Come back in the winter and we will do anything for



British psywar troops prepare balloon leaflets, World War I, Western Front

enemy hopes for a far better post-war world and the hard fact they would still have to give up the struggle on terms that were, after all, to be imposed on a defeated enemy.

But the leaflets disseminated by the AEF, with only one exception, show no such elevated sentiments, and were dropped beginning in the summer of 1918, rather than during the winter "lull." Responding to immediate military demands, the goals of AEF psywar became, in the words of Blankenhorn "to bring deserters over the line, to make Germans surrender, to destroy their fighting spirit."<sup>69</sup> The catalyst was Colonel Joseph W. Stillwell, G-2, 4<sup>th</sup> Corps (and destined, as the controversial General "Vinegar Joe" of the China-Burma-India Theater, to make his mark as one of the most famous commanders of World War II.) On the late afternoon of 28 August Colonel Stillwell, hurried in from his headquarters and demanded "papers to get deserters." A new American offensive was getting underway and the AEF needed current information about the opposing forces they would meet. Captains Blankenhorn and Lippman "pounced" on Stillwell ("Action!- After so much thinking.") The two captains had Stillwell draw a map of the sector he wished to "propaganda," and tell them in detail what he was looking for. Stillwell's most significant piece of information was that the "Boche" was fearful of surrendering to the Americans because of rumors (fostered by the German High Command) that these troops from the Wild West, the slums of the Eastern cities, the "savage" Blacks from the Deep South, killed their prisoners. Lippman, using the insight that would in due course gain him the confidence of presidents, simply edited AEF Commander General John J. Pershing's, General Order Number 106 (which mandated decent treatment of POWs); at Blankenhorn's suggestion Lippman added a list of the rations of the American soldier, pointing out that these same rations were the due of any POW. The result was the first AEF leaflet of the war, and the most heavily used in the AEF's psywar arsenal, right up to the signing of the Armistice.<sup>70</sup>

The head of AEF G-2 also shrewdly saw to it that English-language copies of this first AEF leaflet were distributed to G-2 officers and aviators in the well-founded belief that all would do a better job if they knew exactly what they were distributing.<sup>71</sup> The credibility of the leaflet was enhanced when the Germans captured several AEF supply dumps and could see for themselves that the Americans had more than enough food, compared to the Germans, who by this time were existing on a meager diet of *kommisbrot*, which the troops half-seriously complained was composed of the sweepings of military bakery floors. (Modern nutritionists, on the other hand, might praise *kommisbrot*'s "high fiber content.") The news of the promised lavish American

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you that you want.", "Addendum to Final Report," 8.

<sup>69</sup>Blankenhorn, "Addendum to Final Report on Propaganda Against the Enemy," 22 January 1919, RG 120, entry 235, GHQ G-2-D, box 6192, folder #21.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 2; Lilley, 52; "Reminiscences of Heber Blankenhorn," 1, Columbia Oral History Collection (1956), typescript in Library of Congress Microform Collection. See also Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 13.

<sup>71</sup>Blankenhorn, "Appendix," 2.



## Tägliche Portionen der amerikanischen Soldaten.

Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen erhalten dieselben Portionen.

	Gramm
Büchsenfleisch . . .	567
oder	
Büchsenfleisch . . .	453
Wohl oder Brot . . .	453
Bäckpulver . . .	2.25
Ölfrüchte . . .	68
oder	
Konservegetable . . .	142
Reis . . .	17
Kartoffeln oder an- dere Gemüse . . .	567
Obst u. s. w. . .	36
Bohnenkaffee . . .	31.75

	Gramm
Zucker . . . . .	91
Milch . . . . .	14
Salz . . . . .	18
Pfeffer . . . . .	1.13
Senf . . . . .	0.4
Spez. . . . .	18
Butter . . . . .	14
Würstsaucen . . .	0.4
Zuckerwaren (wö- chentlich) . . .	227
	Liter
Essig . . . . .	0.019
Sirup . . . . .	0.066

### DAILY RATIONS OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS

The German prisoners of war receive the same rations.

	Grams
Beef . . . . .	567
or	
Canned meat . . . .	453
Flour or bread . . .	453
Baking powder . . .	2.25
Nuts . . . . .	68
or	
Canned vegetables .	142
Rice . . . . .	17
Potatoes or other fresh vegetables .	567
Plums, etc. . . . .	36
Coffee beans . . . .	31.75

	Grams
Sugar . . . . .	91
Milk . . . . .	14
Salt . . . . .	18
Pepper . . . . .	1.13
Mustard . . . . .	0.4
Bacon . . . . .	18
Butter . . . . .	14
Spiced sauce . . . .	0.4
Sugar products (weekly) . . . . .	227
	Liter
Vinegar . . . . .	0.019
Syrup . . . . .	0.066

food supplies spread rapidly "and the effect on the Germans was more telling than if their capture had been carefully planned by George Creel in Washington."<sup>72</sup>

Leaflet #2 carried basically the same message, but outlined the rations in mouth-watering detail ("white bread, coffee beans, butter, prunes [!], sugar...")<sup>73</sup> The third AEF leaflet broke new ground. It took the German Army's *Feldpostkarte* (field postcard) and added the words "for German soldiers who are taken prisoners by the American Army." On the reverse were instructions to keep the card and to show it to the first American officer encountered when taken prisoner and how to fill it out, and the promise that it would be forwarded through the German POW "Protecting Power" (Switzerland) and on to the POW's addressees. The leaflet ended with the words:

Cross out the statements below which do not apply: I am  
captured[,] severely wounded  
slightly wounded  
unhurt

Do not worry about me. I am out of the war. I am well fed.  
The American Army gives its prisoners the same ration it gives  
its own soldiers: beef, white bread, potatoes, beans, prunes,  
coffee, milk, butter, tobacco, etc."<sup>74</sup>

The idea of this leaflet was quite good, but its execution a failure. At their first contact with American troops, the German POWs were separated from their papers, and G-2 certainly never took the trouble subsequently to match up POWs with their *Feldpostkarte* leaflets. Blankenhorn himself also noted later that conditions at the front often frustrated the promise of U.S. Army rations, with more than one POW being informed by an indignant captor that he would be fed after the last American soldier was. He concluded that the history of Leaflet #3 in particular demonstrated the necessity for psywar troops to remain knowledgeable about the field, even if their

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<sup>72</sup>Charles Roetter, *The Art of Psychological Warfare, 1914-1945* (New York: 1974), 81-82. This promise of good food was no mere advertising manipulation. *The History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-1945*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-213 (Washington: 24 June 1955), states flatly, and documents, that "Prisoners of war received the same food, clothing, and quarters as were provided for American troops.", 60. The legend that the AEF deliberately withdrew local units to uncover food dumps and give validity to leaflet #1 remains just that---a legend.

<sup>73</sup>Leaflet reproduced in Linebarger, 70.

<sup>74</sup>War Department General Staff, Intelligence Division, *A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare* (Washington: October 1946), 7, reproduces both sides of leaflet. See also *United States Army in the World War*, 123.

**191**


Hebe diese Karte auf, schreibe die Adresse Deiner Familie darauf, und wenn Du von den Amerikanern gefangen genommen wirst, gebe sie dem ersten Offizier, der Deine Personallein aufnimmt. Er wird es sich zur Pflicht machen, sie abzuschieben und so Deine Angehörigen über Deine Lage zu beruhigen.

Schreibe nichts auf diese Seite.  
Streiche durch, was unzutreffend ist.

Ich bin gefangen  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Leicht verwundet.} \\ \text{Schwer verwundet.} \\ \text{Unverwundet.} \end{array} \right.$

Seid ohne Sorge um mich. Für mich ist der Krieg aus, Ich habe gutes Essen. Die amerikanische Armee gibt ihren Gefangenen dieselbe Nahrung, wie ihren Soldaten: Rindfleisch, Weizenbrot, Kartoffeln, Bohnen, Pfannen, Bohnenkaffee, Milch, Butter, Tabak, u. s. w.

**192**

Abfender:	Dienstgrad _____	
	Name _____	
	(Dieses Feld hat Spalten genau nach der vom Kommandant gegebenen Anweisung auszufüllen.)	
	Mgt. Nr. _____	Sonstige Formationen: _____ (Kompanie, Btlgn., Züge u. s. w.)
	Metallart _____ Abteilung _____ Kompanie _____ Batterie _____ Züge _____	_____
		_____
		_____
(Brieftasche aufheben) (Brieftasche öffnen) (Brieftasche schließen)		
Nr. _____ (Stempel)		
Feldpostkarte für deutsche Soldaten, die von den Amerikanern gefangen genommen werden		
 (Stempel)		

Feldpostkarte leaflet, WWI, Linebarger, 71

presence there was resented by superior officers, who on occasion ordered them away.<sup>75</sup>

Another novel concept was that of the map-leaflet, in this case demonstrating the American gains from the San Mihiel offensive. ("The salient which the Germans held for four years was taken by the Americans in 27 hours. 390 square kilometers were conquered. The count of prisoners reached 15,000.") The American "truth in propaganda" theme reached a new and unexpected level when the map leaflets were used by American ammunition trains themselves in trying to negotiate the San Mihiel sector late in October!<sup>76</sup>

Meanwhile the Propaganda Sub-Section was testing its ideas, primarily by POW interrogations in the AEF cages at Toul and Souilly, after studying the daily intelligence reports at GHQ. They would generally hold hour-long interviews with the prisoners to pre- and post-test concepts and leaflets.<sup>77</sup> In Blankenhorn's words, which also described the leaflet approval process:

I go down to the front to prison cages and with my German-speaking lieutenants hold long confabs with officers and privates and argue the war with them until we know just what arguments hit them hardest. We find out what home papers they read and what Reichstag spokesmen they believe and then we go back and put our information with what Merz gathers in London and Lippman's ideas and draft a leaflet which goes to General Nolan [AEF G-2 Chief]. When he approves [,] it is translated and printed in Paris, sent back to me and then I tackle distribution again.<sup>78</sup>

Blankenhorn wisely preferred to interrogate German prisoners as soon as possible after their capture, realizing that a POW's "shaken morale" would soon be more or less restored as he found himself in a camp under his own officers and NCOs, as was his right by virtue of the Hague Conventions.<sup>79</sup>

Blankenhorn carefully probed the prisoners, first with general conversation to put them at ease, but then with increasingly personal questions. (family, occupation,

<sup>75</sup>Blankenhorn, "Addendum," 3. Blankenhorn adds that "The propaganda officers did not argue but neither did they obey." *ibid.*

<sup>76</sup>Blankenhorn, *Adventures in Propaganda*, 123; "Addendum," 3; *United States Army in the World War*, 123. Blankenhorn's "Report" has originals of each of the leaflets disseminated by the AEF, with the exception of the "food" message.

<sup>77</sup>Powell, *Army Behind the Army*, 350-351.

<sup>78</sup>Blankenhorn, ltr. to General Churchill, 20 September 1918, Libby Papers, RG 218, box 17, "chapter 1" folder; Stephen Vaughan, "Prologue to *Public Opinion: Walter Lippman's Work in Military Intelligence*," *Prologue*, (fall, 1983).

<sup>79</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda", 75.

how long in the trenches?, any complaints?, how long will the war last?, can Germany win the war?, the 14 Points?)<sup>80</sup> Lieutenant Lippman also interrogated POWs in France to prepare leaflets that pivotal summer and fall of 1918, along with a seven-man Army propaganda team. (Blankenhorn believed that Lippman, the former reporter, was especially good at interrogations.) The prisoners were questioned quickly, usually within the first hours after their capture and given an elaborate questionnaire that was often revised in the light of experience. Lippman also engaged the prisoners in conversations that were at first innocuous, but became more specifically directed to obtain reaction to U.S. leaflets: "What is the best leaflet?", "Where did you find it?", "Did you believe it?", "Which leaflet provoked the most discussion?". Perhaps because of his skills and insights as an interrogator, Lippman remained skeptical of POW claims to have been influenced by American psywar, and was primarily interested in those who confessed to having read leaflets but denied that any had induced surrender.<sup>81</sup>

But for all of his abilities, Lippman succeeded in antagonizing most of his military superiors by his determinedly civilian bearing and had been overheard to remark "This place is a prison." Having already been rebuked by the White House for his independent attitude, the prickly journalist was removed from the field and exiled to the AEF Paris print plant to edit leaflets.<sup>82</sup> But Lippman's personal relations with Colonel House and the Inquiry saw to it that Army psywar was able to continue faithfully to follow national policy, no small achievement in those days in which grossly overburdened cables were the only means of quick transatlantic communication.<sup>83</sup>

Blankenhorn had proposed, as long ago as February 1918 an *International Bulletin*, a weekly illustrated newspaper, printed in parallel columns of English and German and distributed on *both* sides of the trenches by American troops. The journal would contain news stories, battle maps, photos of prisoners in American hands, citations of American troops of German descent, quotations from German newspapers, contrasts between spring "victory" announcements from the German High Command and the retreats of the fall, etc., all with little comment. Blankenhorn actually

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<sup>80</sup>Vaughn, "Prelude to *Public Opinion*." An outline of Blankenhorn's questionnaire is in Blankenhorn, "Addendum," 11.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid. Lippman remarked fastidiously that "the most definite impression I have of the German private soldier -that he is not a political animal," that he was a "peasant.", *ibid.*, 158.

<sup>82</sup>Vaughn, "Prelude to *Public Opinion*," *passim*. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda*, 62. In Blankenhorn's words, "But God how he hated the Army!" ("Old Soldier" Blankenhorn's military experience exceeded that of Lippman's by a total of about six months.) Blankenhorn interview, 16. President Wilson wrote that "I have a high opinion of Lippman, but I am very jealous in the matter of propaganda." Ltr to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 5 September 1918, Lilly, 55.

<sup>83</sup>Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique*, xxxii.

intended for his news sheet to be distributed first to the troops of the AEF and then collected, with pencilled doughboy marginalia and sent across no-man's land to the Germans. But like so many American initiatives in this war, the *International Bulletin* came too late to be put into effect.<sup>84</sup> This was an unprecedented concept, and one that has not been taken up since, although the news letter for enemy troops, of course, would become a staple in future psywars.

Delivering the leaflets proved no easy task, particularly at the beginning of the AEF psywar campaign. When Blankenhorn requested an air drop of the St. Mihiel leaflet the Chief of the Army Air Service, Brigadier General William (Billy) Mitchell, replied that "This has no place in combat operations" and refused even to look at the leaflet. Mitchell did, however, helpfully suggest that his service might be able to assist during that mythical winter "lull." The chief of the Air Service for 1<sup>st</sup> Army flatly refused, at roughly the same time, Blankenhorn's request for leaflet distribution.<sup>85</sup> Soon after, however, individual aviators grew so enthusiastic about leaflet drops that this became the overwhelmingly primary source of AEF leaflet dissemination, and Blankenhorn would later pay the fliers a handsome tribute.<sup>86</sup>

The American balloon option never proved itself, in contrast to the British experience. A shortage of hydrogen gas, difficulties in transporting the gas cylinders to the front, and the rapid changes in the battle line at the time, as well as the desire of air commanders to retain the gas for their own observation balloons (each balloon shot down in flames by the enemy consumed 200 tubes of gas), combined to keep the number of leaflets distributed by this means very small in comparison to those eventually dropped from aircraft.<sup>87</sup> And this was despite the personal approval of President Wilson of a special appropriation of \$76,000 for propaganda balloons.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>Blankenhorn, "Addendum," 6.

<sup>85</sup>Blankenhorn interview, 5. After the Armistice Mitchell had the nerve to take credit in front of Blankenhorn for flying "your papers...." 12. Blankenhorn shrewdly pointed out to Mitchell that "the cessation of propaganda in any sector would be the surest signal to the enemy intelligence that operations were about to begin there." Blankenhorn to Chief, G02-D, 22 September 1918, RG 120, entry 235, box 6192, folder #46; Blankenhorn to Chief, AEF GHQ G-2, 23 September 1918, *ibid.*

<sup>86</sup>See Blankenhorn, "No Air Service, No Propaganda," "Addendum," 12. Understandably, Blankenhorn later termed cooperation with the Air Service in leaflet drops as "hectic" but "fairly successful." "Report," 132. James N. Hall and Charles B. Nordhoff, eds., *The Lafayette Flying Corps*, 2 (Boston: 1920) contains descriptions of U.S. aerial distribution of leaflets.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*; Lilly, 63-64; Powell, *Army Behind the Army*, 350; Blankenhorn, "Addendum," 6-8; Blankenhorn, "Report", 29. *United States Army in the World War*, 123. Carl Berger, *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets* (Special Operations Research Office, The American University, Washington: 1959) is a basic source for psywar at this time and later.

<sup>88</sup>BG Churchill to Chief GHQ G-2/2327-27, 6 September 1918, in Lilly Papers RG

Surprisingly, in light of the air commanders' reluctance and the balloons' disappointments, the AEF rarely resorted to shellfire dissemination. This lack of use was the more inexplicable in that the French, as noted, had been using leaflet shells since 1914, apparently to good effect.<sup>89</sup> A final failure of dissemination, this time by patrol, must be recorded, again a method that should have brought results, although the unexpectedly quick end of the fighting may have precluded its employment on any scale. On its one recorded use, a German-speaking AEF officer approached elements of an Alsatian division. Speaking in perfectly colloquial German, a Captain Osann called out "Come up and get out of here. What the hell are you sticking around here for? What do you want to fight for? Get on back here, there's someone to take care of you." Although this patrol brought back no POWs, Captain Osann thought "this idea is a good one.", and, indeed, it was taken up in World War II.<sup>90</sup>

But all of this seemed to go for naught when on 5 September Blankenhorn received from MIB a cable abruptly ordering that "Acting Secretary of War directs that you discontinue your work." High level representations passed between the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Acting Secretary of War Benedict Crowell (Acting while Baker was in France), and the President. Two days later a cable went out from the War Department to Baker, rescinding the Presidential directive of two days previous. But the wording of this cable still left unclear whether the Army could generate propaganda as opposed simply to disseminating it to the enemy in the field. The question was never resolved, and the Army simply proceeded on its own to do both in the remaining months of the war.<sup>91</sup> Blankenhorn wrote in exasperated defiance to General Churchill on 20 September "this campaign is not going to be held up by a committee that does nothing but talks, that had every propaganda in its hands from last September until this June and never did one blessed thing about it despite all the pleading they got from MIB. That was a crime."<sup>92</sup>

Blankenhorn's understandable aggravation did not hinder his work. In fact, one authority claims that "The Psychological Subsection [of the AEF] kept a closer

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218, box 2, "WW I" folder. There were great plans for propaganda balloons, however. Creel wrote enthusiastically of a 10,000 leaflet balloon with a 600-800-mile range, which after the last leaflet had been dropped, would blow itself up. Creel, "America's Fight," 10; also Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda*, 66.

<sup>89</sup>Lilly, 68, says that there "is no evidence that Americans used leaflet shells or leaflet grenades...."

<sup>90</sup>GHQ, AEF memorandum, "Captain Osann's Experiment," n.d., stapled to report, AEF GHQ G-2-D, RG 120, entry 235, box 6192, folder 21.

<sup>91</sup>Lilly, 56-57.

<sup>92</sup>Blankenhorn to Churchill, 20 September, 1918, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 17, "final chapter" folder. Creel claimed thirty years later that his CPI had produced millions of leaflets, and that many of these had gotten through to Germany, via Switzerland and Sweden. Admittedly, these were not military leaflets, but they were certainly propaganda against the German war effort., *ibid.*, "chapter 1" folder.

watch on the morale of the German troops than any of the propaganda agencies or intelligence section[s] of the Allied countries."<sup>93</sup> The inventive psywarrior also realized the need for photographs to give his leaflets more impact. The fact that "So far no propaganda service has ever used them," was a good argument for the AEF to be the first.<sup>94</sup> But this was another good idea that would have to wait for the next war.

Blankenhorn was able to use graphic art in his next leaflet, showing a file of American soldiers, each of increasing size, to demonstrate the flood of troops arriving at French ports and entering the line. This, of course, put the lie to German propaganda that claimed that very few U.S. troopships would ever pass through the submarine blockade.<sup>95</sup>

But Blankenhorn now found AEF officers more distracted than ever and if anything even less willing to give time to psywar as most of the AEF "went over the top" in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the largest single battle in American history. As Blankenhorn put it in a letter to a British liaison officer, "If I may so put it, we have had the deuce of a time getting things started in the midst of an Army which is just undertaking its first independent major operation."<sup>96</sup> The G-2 however, on several occasions asked Blankenhorn to bring over from the cages some recently-captured POWs that Blankenhorn's interrogators had found knowledgeable and cooperative. G-2's reasoning was that if combat troops mounted a raid, the resulting prisoners, aware that they had probably been captured for their information, would "clam up." Blankenhorn's psywarriors were glad to oblige.<sup>97</sup> In addition, by this time the AEF's *Summary of Information* was reporting "Evidence of nervousness" among German troops in the face of the well-publicized and increasing American/Allied strength.<sup>98</sup>

Working more or less on their own, psywar POW Interrogators by early October were beginning to come across references to President Wilson's speech of 27 September on a League of Nations, excerpts of which had been carried in German newspapers. Blankenhorn then had his own excerpts of the speech printed up in a leaflet entitled *The Way to Peace and Justice*, copies of which were often found on German POWs in the last month of the war. He also cleverly inserted a German-American grandson of a "48er" into the cages to describe to the POWs how Wilson's

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<sup>93</sup>Bruntz, "Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of German Morale in 1918," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2 (1938), 22.

<sup>94</sup>Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 17, "first chapter" folder.

<sup>95</sup>Blankenhorn, "Addendum," 6. Blankenhorn thought the leaflet "very simple, too simple, in fact, a bit too hasty," *ibid*. The leaflet is reproduced in Blankenhorn, *Adventures in Propaganda*. Originals of first 12 leaflets, minus the "food" message, are filed in Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 29.

<sup>96</sup>Blankenhorn to Colonel Sir Campbell Stuart, 5 October 1918, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 17. 1" folder.

<sup>97</sup>Blankenhorn interview, 6.

<sup>98</sup>*Summary of Information*, 1450, quoted in Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda*, 192-193.



speech followed in the wake of the aborted liberal German revolutions of 1848.<sup>99</sup> From then on the "news propaganda" of the AEF consisted entirely of Wilson's replies to German requests for an armistice. In fact, Blankenhorn wrote to his wife that "Incidentally, about all I have to do these days is to publish to the Boche what the President says; he writes all our leaflet news."<sup>100</sup> In the words of Harold Lasswell, a pioneer of American psychological warfare, "For a few brief months [Wilson] embodied the faith of the idealists in a better world, and the last desperate hope of the defeated peoples for a soft peace."<sup>101</sup> Or as Blankenhorn put it "It seemed as if the President had been standing with us in the cages, studying Boche. No words could have been better timed, better put than the September 27 speech, to stir the German despair."<sup>102</sup>

But AEF psywarriors did not ignore the military situation. Leaflet No. 14 posed the German soldier some pointed questions:

1. Will you ever again be as strong as you were in July, 1918?
2. Will your opponents grow stronger or weaker?
3. Did your terrible losses in 1918 bring the victory proclaimed by your leaders?
4. Have you the slightest hope of victory in the future?
5. Are you going to throw your lives away in a hopeless struggle?

Another leaflet updated the war map, at Germany's expense, to 21 October, giving the total of 210,000 prisoners in 50 days, and detailing the surrender of Bulgaria and the smashing of Turkish forces in the Middle East. Returning to Wilsonianism as the best hope for peace, the AEF promptly dropped over an Austrian division with a large proportion of Czechs the President's reply to Austria's request for an armistice. (A similar leaflet for Austrians was rendered practically useless by the speed of Austria's acceptance of the Allies' terms.)<sup>103</sup>

A few leaflets were not produced by the AEF Propaganda Subsection. General Pershing is supposed to have personally composed Leaflet "Y", *Austria is Out of the War*, which was run off on First Army presses, but distributed by the Propaganda Subsection. That Subsection, perhaps reflecting some professional jealousy, thought the leaflet sound in principle, but too prolix and a little too "brotherly." Several small

<sup>99</sup>Blankenhorn memo, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 17, "chapter 1" folder.

<sup>100</sup>Blankenhorn, "Addendum," 7; *United States Army in the World War*, 123; Blankenhorn, *Adventures in Propaganda*, 122.

<sup>101</sup>Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique*, 217. For Wilson's great influence on both sides, see Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda*, 101-102; and the sour George Sylvester Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate*, 207; as well as Mock and Larson, *Words that Won the War*, Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines*, *passim*.

<sup>102</sup>Blankenhorn memo, in Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 17, "chapter 1" folder.

<sup>103</sup>Blankenhorn, 8; *United States Army in the World War*, 124.

leaflet editions containing a "news flash" were issued by corps and Army presses, after their content had been approved by the Subsection. But in one or two cases that approval was not obtained, and in one unfortunate example a leaflet in Rumanian committed the Allies and the United States to the union of all Rumanians in Austria with Rumania. Such geo-politics was emphatically not the job of AEF propaganda and had the potential to cause serious embarrassment.<sup>104</sup>

By now the deserters, surrenderees, and POWs were pouring into the cages. Although it remains impossible to sort out the numbers in each category and determine how many were influenced by AEF psywar and to what extent, the AEF did claim 40-50,000 desertions, most of whom were supposedly influenced by their enemy's propaganda. George Creel, for once not exaggerating, asserted that "Eight prisoners out of every ten captured by the Americans had our 'stuff' in their pockets....".<sup>105</sup> Blankenhorn claimed that "by the end of the Argonne campaign the bulk of prisoners were found to have our leaflets on their persons."<sup>106</sup>

In the field, the AEF III Corps quoted a German officer to the effect that U.S. psywar had given them no "end of trouble," with soldiers secreting leaflets on their persons, despite severe penalties, and taking them home on leave to spread the word. The 42d Division G-2 reported that German POWs stated that American fighting spirit took them by surprise, after they had been told that the doughboys were "soft," "untrained," "disorganized," (That is, if their troopships ever got through the German submarines.) Thus their own propaganda had pushed them mentally off-balance and AEF leaflets subsequently made them "uneasy."<sup>107</sup>

In the stockades, the official history of the AEF reported that 75 percent of German officers supposedly laughed at the leaflets, claimed that the troops did not believe them, and turned them in as ordered. This attitude was precisely reversed among the enlisted men: No less than 75 percent said they had believed Allied leaflets, particularly the American variety, while 25 percent said that they had paid them no attention.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>104</sup>Ibid.; Blankenhorn, Addendum, 10.

<sup>105</sup>Bruntz, "Allied Propaganda," 102; Creel, "America's Fight," 14;

<sup>106</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 9.

<sup>107</sup>42d Division, Summary of Intelligence, #276, 286, 13 March, 23 March, 1919, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 2, "chapter 1" folder; III Corps, Intelligence Summary, 14 October, 1918, *ibid.*, box 17.

<sup>108</sup>*United States Army in the World War*, 124. Berger, *Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, for some reason, terms these conclusions "inconclusive.", 124. Another interrogation report, admittedly on a very small sample, concluded that "The prisoners show the same spirit as is encountered among practically all the older men. They are thoroughly tired of the war and say that one-half of the men would gladly surrender, if they knew how they would be treated." "Interrogation of Three Prisoners, 155 LIR-255 Div," (155<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry Regiment of the 255<sup>th</sup> Division), 1 November 1918, HQ. 2d Army, #26-1, RG 120, entry 133, AEF GHQ, G-2, box 6431.

Drawing on German sources, "A high officer on the West Front" wrote in the *Kolnische Zeitung* close to the end of the war, "What caused us the most damage was the paper war waged by our enemies who daily flooded us with hundreds of thousands of leaflets extraordinarily well arranged and edited." The commander of the 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division ordered that all leaflets found by his troops that they will be immediately turned over to headquarters with a statement of the place where they were picked up. It should be explained to the men ...how much damage they may cause by thoughtlessly distributing these tracts, and that they are liable to severe punishment.<sup>109</sup> The 18<sup>th</sup> *Armee Nachrichtenblatt* simply gave up:

In the sphere of leaflet propaganda the enemy has defeated us...The enemy has defeated us, not as man against man in the field of battle, bayonet against bayonet; no, bad contents poorly printed on poor paper have paralyzed our strength."<sup>110</sup>

The counter-measures of the German High Command ranged from the inept to the savage. At first that command simply ordered that all such leaflets be turned in. According to Blankenhorn, the men stalled, modestly telling their officers "We are not turning all leaflets in because we have a use for them" (i.e., as toilet paper), thus starting a legend that endures to the present day as to the use most troops put leaflets in the field.<sup>111</sup> The Command next offered payment for each leaflet turned in.<sup>112</sup> When that measure simply provided a legitimate excuse for the troops assiduously to collect offending literature that they might have otherwise ignored as so much "trash" (as should have been obvious to all but the cloistered High Command), General Ludendorff issued an order as early as June threatening that: "Every man going over to the enemy will be punished with death on return to Germany. All his property within the country will be seized. He will lose his citizenship; his next of kin will not have the right to receive an allowance."<sup>113</sup> Such fulminations must be taken as an indication of just how seriously the German military leadership took the Allied psywar campaign. It is difficult to imagine that they were simply some sort of morale-boosting measure.

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<sup>109</sup>Berger, 121. *Kolnische Zeitung*, 31 October 1918, quoted in Bruntz, 281.

<sup>110</sup>Bruntz, "Propaganda as an Instrument of War," *Current History* (July 1930). See also Hans Thimme, *Weltkrieg ohne Waffen: die Propaganda der Westmächte gegen Deutschland, ihre Wirkung und ihre Abwehr*. Berlin. 1932, *passim*.

<sup>111</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 197.

<sup>112</sup>Bruntz, "Allied Propaganda."

<sup>113</sup>Field Order 1a, #8915, quoted in Bruntz, "Propaganda as an Instrument of War." Presumably the miscreant deserter would meekly return to Germany to face his own execution. Ludendorff would have been better advised to have spent his energies in finding out why thousands of his stout lads were defecting to the Americans. The whole episode shows just how removed from reality was the German High Command.

Yet it should not be imagined that the German Army was falling apart. One AEF psywarrior reported that "We found more and more evidence of a stir, more avowed Social Democrats among the prisoners....We found mutineers. But up front our ambulances labored back more heavily laden."<sup>114</sup> When Blankenhorn encountered two officers from the same unit, one told him "Papers are no good. Those bastards fight just as hard as ever.", but the other did assert that "Fritz is certainly surrendering easier than he used to."<sup>115</sup> Imperial Germany's retreat to the borders of the Fatherland, in fact, never came close to degenerating into a rout, something that German Nationalists and Nazis would make much of later.

Germany conducted its own psywar against the Allies. On the strategic plane it was, in the words of Paul Linebarger, both "Haughty and incompetent" at the same time, a disastrous mixture.<sup>116</sup> For example, the Germans suffered a serious loss of esteem in America when they executed a British nurse for helping British POWs to escape. But they compounded this blunder by refusing to condemn the French when the latter shot *two* German nurses for basically the same offense: "They were spies - they deserved to be shot." [!]<sup>117</sup> On the combat or tactical level, German psywar was considerably better, undoubtedly because its perpetrators were much closer to reality than the High Command. Technically, it was often admirable. One leaflet realistically appealed to Black AEF troops: "To the Colored Soldiers of the U.S. Army. Hallo [sic] boys, what are you doing over here?" America was described, not entirely untruthfully for the time, as a land of Jim Crow segregation and lynchings. Black Americans would be better off in Germany: "where they do like colored citizens ...(where) they enjoy exactly the same social privileges as every white man and quite a number of colored people have mighty fine positions in Business in Berlin."<sup>118</sup> For the rest of the AEF, German leaflets addressed capitalism, "jingoism," America's fighting Britain's battles, and sometimes featured photos of captured doughboys seemingly content enough with their lot. U.S. soldiers were not mocked or caricatured. Another German propaganda effort was *America in Europe*, labeled "A Paper Published in the Interests of Good Fellowship Among All Nations," lofty

<sup>114</sup>Blankenhorn(?) report, in Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 17, "chapter 1" folder.

<sup>115</sup>Blankenhorn, Addendum," 11. Blankenhorn wrote to his wife on 15 October of "the German Army morale, which is still high, and the German Army is capable of a devil of a lot of hard fighting yet.", *Adventures*, 102.

<sup>116</sup>Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 69.

<sup>117</sup>Saul K. Padover, *Psychological Warfare* Foreign Policy Association Series No. 86 (New York: March-April 1951), 8.

<sup>118</sup>Copy and translation in Herz Papers, Georgetown University, box 1, folder #18. Samples also in memo from Blankenhorn to Chief, G-2-D AEF, "Subject: Final Report on Propaganda Against the Enemy, 14 November 1918," RG 120, entry 235, box 6192, folder #21. Note use of Britishism "hallo," a blunder that would trip up more than one German leaflet of World War II and communist messages in the Korean War.

sentiments which seemed to have no effect on the doughboys.<sup>119</sup> A series of subtle "desertion" leaflets, described by AEF G-2 as "bold, brash, and rather 'cute.'" was showered persistently over the U.S. lines, appealing particularly to German-Americans. But, again, the messages "had about as much success as a snowball in hell!," with the troops reported (perhaps with some exaggeration) as "furious" and "grimly determined."<sup>120</sup> The doughboys were even favored by leaflets from an unlikely source: the Spartacist-Communist rebels then poised for revolution in Germany. ("You are being kept in Europe to prevent the rule of the working people.")<sup>121</sup> Blankenhorn claimed that the best of the lot was a well-executed photo of a "large" number of American POWs in the hands of the Germans.<sup>122</sup> None of this seemed to have any effect on U.S. troops, who, after all, had the enemy on the run. Well might the German General Staff officer responsible for German propaganda note truthfully, "In fact, the enemy remained virtually untouched by any kind of German propaganda." And well might General Ludendorff grump, if somewhat inaccurately, that "we made no use of propaganda, the authorities considered it as quack advertising."<sup>123</sup>

By the time of the Armistice, 11 November 1918, the AEF in the last three months of the war had dropped approximately three million leaflets over the lines, almost all by aircraft, a few by balloon and even fewer by shell. In return for this effort, AEF psywar could point to the thousands of enemy POWs who claimed that their decision to surrender had been induced by American leaflets. But, on the other hand, there is the understandable tendency of prisoners to tell their captors just what they want to hear, and this problem would remain through American future wars.

The German High Command's ferocious reaction to Allied psywar is not so easy to deprecate. It is hard to imagine any other reason for such sulphurous diatribes than the fact that the Command believed that Allied propaganda was having a disastrous effect on their troops. Certainly the highest commanding officers in the German Army paid high tribute to Allied psywar. General Eric Ludendorff described such propaganda, disseminated "through the air, with such cleverness, and on such a large scale that many people could no longer distinguish between enemy propaganda and their own sentiment." And Field Marshall Paul Von Hindenburg, after giving a

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<sup>119</sup>Martin Herz Papers, Georgetown University, box 1, folder 26, holds copies of German leaflets and some of their translations.

<sup>120</sup>Blankenhorn, memo to Chief, G-2-D, 16 October 1918, "Subject: Enemy Airplane Raid Our Lines With Propaganda," AEF G-2-D, RG 120, entry 235, box 6192, folder # 25. This report did note that two doughboys with German names went "missing" after these leaflets, but there is no documentation of any desertion to the enemy throughout AEF records.

<sup>121</sup>Herz Papers, box 1, folder 17.

<sup>122</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 132. Unfortunately, no copy of this leaflet has been found.

<sup>123</sup>Linebarger, 66; R. H. Lutz, "Structure of World War Propaganda," *Journal of Modern History*, (December 1933), 47.

fairly accurate description of such propaganda, concluded: "Such the soldiers read and discussed. The soldiers thought surely these could not all be lies, and permitted themselves to be poisoned and poisoned others."<sup>124</sup>

Significantly, neither Ludendorff nor Hindenburg spoke of surrenders or defections. Rather, their concern was with that slippery concept, morale, and both made no bones of the fact that, thanks to enemy propaganda, it was German morale that finally "cracked". The crediting of Allied psywar for the final German collapse in 1918 has sometimes been considered as a German excuse for defeat in the field, a way of saying, as noted, that staunch and "moral" Germany could not possibly be beaten in any fair fight, so her insidious enemies resorted to "underhanded" measures. But this argument begs the question of why the doughty German soldier would prove so feeble-minded as to believe the obvious "lies" of his enemies, and of whether it is less shameful to be beaten by argument than by force of arms.

The claims of AEF psywarriors were modest enough. The official *The United States Army in the World War* summarized that "It appears that propaganda, American and Allied, helped materially to create an atmosphere of defeat, which helped to lower the enemy morale." Blankenhorn wrote soon after the Armistice that "the leaflets' effects, while uneven, contributed in considerable measure to creating that inescapable atmosphere of defeat with which the German Army was shot through at the time of the Armistice." Thirty years later Blankenhorn was even more humble: "So some little aid, I think, was afforded the fighting soldier by the leaflet job."<sup>125</sup>

Blankenhorn may well have been too modest. Allied propaganda succeeded on the strategic plane, and was instrumental in provoking the fall of the Kaiser, as German leaders cast about for ways to obtain easier peace terms. At the tactical level, it helped to lower German Army fighting spirit and hasten its retreat back to the borders of the Reich, as was well attested by German leaders themselves. It may well be that the Allied and American propaganda, strategic and tactical, against the Kaiser's Germany was the most successful of modern history.

Whatever its accomplishments, the AEF Propaganda Subsection had compiled valuable experience in this first use on any scale of American psychological warfare, and recommendations for the future use of this weapon, based upon this experience, were included in the final report of the AEF G-2-D.<sup>126</sup> Unfortunately, and typically, the U.S. Army had to re-learn and re-apply these lessons while fighting a new war.

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<sup>124</sup>*Ludendorff's Own Story: August 1914-March 1918* (New York: 1919), 421. Hindenburg quoted in Bruntz, 203-204.

<sup>125</sup>*United States Army in the World War*, 124; Blankenhorn, "Addendum," 4; Blankenhorn interview, 13.

<sup>126</sup>*United States Army in the World War*, 127.

## WORLD WAR II

For better and for worse, the Second World War was mankind's most extensive enterprise, its fury sparing only the continents of South America and Antarctica. As one historian claimed "The war's assault had injured time itself."<sup>127</sup> Not surprisingly in this greatest of all wars, its belligerents employed psychological warfare on a scale never even attempted in previous conflicts. At times, indeed, some regimes almost seemed to survive primarily on propaganda as their military situation deteriorated.

Almost immediately after the Armistice, Army G-2 had abolished its Psychological Warfare Section, along with the AEF Propaganda Subsection (as was the frenetic CPI, to almost no one's chagrin, including that of its members.) From 1919 through 1939 only two examples can be found of any systematic U.S. Army planning for psychological warfare. In 1919 the War Department War Plan GREEN (Mexican intervention) gave serious attention to psychological warfare, which included an extensive leaflet campaign directed toward Mexicans and other Latin Americans. War Plan TAN, Cuban intervention, (1921) also provided for definite psychological warfare measures. But war plans against more serious potential enemies (ORANGE - Japan, RED -Great Britain) made only passing mention of what was considered vaguely as something of a "good thing" that should get modest attention.) The Army War College (AWC), beginning in 1924, did establish student committees at each session to deal with the topic. But the general student level of interest is shown by the fact that only two War College research papers were written on the subject in those years.<sup>128</sup> For a decade from the mid-1920s, the AWC "Military Intelligence Procedure

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<sup>127</sup>R. J. B. Bosworth, "Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: A Comparative Analysis of the Historiography of the "Long Second World War," paper presented at 109<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, 5 January 1995.

<sup>128</sup>The mere suggestion that the federal government might be involved in any propaganda produced the typical civilian reaction, "Fooling the Americans Again," *The Nation* (20 December 1922). See also J. F. C. "Propaganda and War: The New Technique of Mendacity as a Psychological Weapon." *Ordnance*. (November/December 1937). See AWC Archives collection of student papers and lectures, and Lilly, Chapt. II, passim. Lilly notes tartly that "There is no indication, however, that the reports of these committees did more than occupy space at the AWC Library.", 36; Linebarger, 77. See also "Conference at the Army War College, 1934-35," G-1, Report of Committee #7, "Morale and Propaganda" conference, 2 November 1934, which did give some significant consideration to U.S. Army psywar. See also memo from Colonel E. L. Bourse to Director, G-2, AWC, "Subject: The General Aspects of Propaganda," 11 October 1924; and "Course of the Army War College 1926-1927," individual report by Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Lowry, "Propaganda," 2 February 1927, from G-2 course #23; and lecture by BG D. E. Nolan (W.W.I AEF G-2), part of Intelligence Course #2, to General Staff College

Subcommittee #3" did deal with "Press Relations and Wartime Censorship and Propaganda." The "Propaganda" course for 1926-1927 dealt with the publicity problems of conflict with Italy, a Russian "debacle," German failure to live up to the Versailles Treaty, and even "trouble in US."<sup>129</sup> But an indication of the importance of these efforts can be found in the response of the Army Military Intelligence Division (MID) to a request in 1930 from the scholarly journal *Current History* for information on American tactical psywar in the Great War. The MID informed the journal that it had no such material and referred the editors to the Library of Congress for such "historical" information.<sup>130</sup> The Army's Public Relations Division supposedly had a watching brief for psychological warfare, but budget cuts had rendered this, "less important division ...practically inactive.", in the words of an officer at the time.<sup>131</sup> The only permanent guidance for Army psywar was found in an appendix of the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1933.<sup>132</sup>

As the personnel with Great War experience left MID, the only active-duty officer as late as 1942 with any memory of or interest in the psywar of that previous conflict was a Colonel Charles Mason, whose efforts to establish a psychological warfare branch for planning and operations were met with what he later termed "indifference and opposition within the War Department."<sup>133</sup>

Despite the Army's near-total "indifference" and civilian isolationism, there

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(Washington , D.C.: 7 September 1920).

<sup>129</sup>AWC syllabus, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 3, "Chronology 1920-1940s" folder.

<sup>130</sup>Lilly, 14. MID may simply not wish to have been bothered; the records of the Psychologic Sub-Section and Blankenhorn's reports were still on file with MID until 1942. Note also that MID did not invoke security arguments. In the words of Wallace Carroll, an early and prominent psywarrior of World War II, "Everything we learned was lost after the [First World] war. You can't improvise." "Wallace Carroll Interview with German Television on U.S. Psychological Warfare, November 1989," in Library of Congress Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division, VAC 4624.

<sup>131</sup>COL R. Skelton, "Minutes of Meeting of Orientation Conference No. 10. Subject: Price Control-Public Relations...." 6 November 1934, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 3, "Chronology" folder.

<sup>132</sup>Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 3, "Chronology 1920s-1940s" folder.

<sup>133</sup>Alfred H. Paddock, JR, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (National Defense University, Washington: 1982), 8.7; U.S. Army Military Intelligence Division, "A History of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941 -2 September 1945," typescript, 1946 (copy in Center of Military History, Washington); H. Shulman, "The Voice of Victory: The Development of American Propaganda and the Voice of America, 1920-1942," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, (1984), 7. Wallace Carroll noted dismissively that "The War Department had some colonel who talked about psychological warfare, but they [presumably the War Department] didn't know anything.", Carroll videotape interview



were a very few academics, in particular Harold Lasswell, who kept the subject before the eye of at least the more literate public; many psywarriors of World War II, particularly in the European Theater of Operations, confessed to having been strongly influenced by Lasswell.<sup>134</sup>

The beginnings of a renewed military interest in psywar came with the German triumphs in Western Europe well before the outbreak of war in Europe, such as the bloodless remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Austrian *Anschluss*, and the taking of the Sudatenland. German military victories between 1939 and 1941 were so quick and so overwhelming that many believed that they must have resulted in large measure from German "dirty tricks" ("nuns in paratrooper boots") with spies and leaflets and ubiquitous clandestine radio transmitters giving the birth date and shoe size of every opposing military commander -- and constant propaganda. After all, Germany had its top-level Ministry of Propaganda, led by the alleged media "genius," Dr. Paul Josef Goebbels, a creature who could give lying itself a bad name.<sup>135</sup>

As in World War I, the United States mobilized its resources for war (greater than those of all of its enemies and most of its Allies combined) with agonizing slowness. And America was even more laggard in re-establishing its weapon of psychological warfare than it was in its physical rearmament. The task of American

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<sup>134</sup>Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique*; 18. See also "Harold D. Lasswell and the Scientific Study of Propaganda," Chapt 2 of G. B. Joseph, "American Liberalism and the Problem of Propaganda: Scholars, Lawyers, and the War on Words, 1919-1945," Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1992; Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda*, 11; Ralph Haswell Lutz, and W. Campbell, trans., *The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918*, Hoover War Library Publication #4 (Stanford: 1934); Leonard W. Doob, *Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique* (New York: 1935); Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda*. H. Lavine, and James Wechsler, *War Propaganda and the United States* (New Haven: 1940) is a leftist tract warning of another propaganda-induced American intervention in the affairs of Europe. From a British perspective, see Norman Angell, *The Public Mind: Its Disorders: Its Exploitation*. (London: 1926) Mention should again be made of the odious George Sylvester Viereck's aptly-named *Spreading Germs of Hate* (New York: 1930). Viereck is the only serious American writer to have defended Germany in both world wars.

David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda* (New York: 1995) argues that Goebbels was basically "preaching to the converted" in the Third Reich., *passim*. Another sober appraisal of German propaganda in World War II is found in J. H. Buchsbaum, "German Psychological Warfare on the Russian Front, 1941-1945," (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington: 1953), which deals with more than just the Eastern Front. Buchsbaum speaks of "The disinclination of the [German] Military Establishment to prepare for, and take an active part in psychological warfare....", 31. Nonetheless, even while conceding Crossman's point, it should still be noted that the Nazis were generally perceived to be congenital liars, and in the realm of propaganda perception is everything.

psywarriors was eased by the fact that this was one of those rare conflicts of right-vs.-wrong: if the Western Allies were occasionally in the wrong (the bombing of Dresden, probably), the Axis were never in the right. In the United States itself, apologists for the Nazi evil were fairly well confined to some German-Americans, fringe right-wingers, and the politically simple-minded Charles Augustus Lindbergh (who earned a medal from the Nazis for his efforts toward German-American "understanding"), and his literary wife. The Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor effectively wiped out any doubts about war with Japan, as did the fact that Germany recklessly declared war on the United States.

But the United States Army practically had to begin anew with its psychological warfare, having effectively dissipated its experience in the previous Great War. In so doing, of course, it was simply reflecting the disillusioned General American attitude throughout the inter-war years; the nations had been "suckered" into the Great War." America might well be next. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (whose title sums up its aims) took out full-page advertisements nationwide to proclaim (in hilarious missed metaphor) that "Trojan horses are grazing in all the fertile fields of America." Anyone who doubted these modest assertions was obviously "either an imbecile or a traitor."<sup>136</sup> President Roosevelt himself went on

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<sup>136</sup>Clayton Laurie, "Ideology and Propaganda: The Psychological Warfare Campaign Against Nazi Germany, 1941-1945," Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1990, 50-51. The CDAAA followed this reasoned discourse with the modest proposal of an immediate declaration of war against Germany., 102. See also Congressman Martin Dies, *The Trojan Horse in America* (New York: 1940); William C. Bullett, "America is in Danger," *Vital Speeches*, 6 (1 September 1940). W. O. Donovan and E. A. Mower's *Fifth Column Lessons for America* (Washington: 1941) proved to be very influential. See also Carl Frederich, "Poison in our System: Battle Of and For the Mind of America," *Atlantic* (June 1941). Hans Speier, *Trends in War* (New York: 1940), publicized Spanish Nationalist General Mola's claim of a "Fifth Column" inside Madrid (in addition to his four overt military columns converging on the enemy-held capital). Few pointed out that the Nationalists, Fifth Column or no, did not take Madrid until the very end of the Spanish Civil War. The argument was that German (and to a much lesser degree, Soviet) propaganda and subversion could undermine America from within. A more sober account of Nazi propaganda in the United States was provided by Edward Shills in his "Analysis of the Diffusion of Nazi Propaganda in the United States," Office of War Information, undated. See also P. W. Blackstock, "German Psychological Warfare in 1940," *Casebook* and Edmond Taylor, *The Strategy of Terror* (Boston: 1940). Finally, Martin Herz, one of the foremost U.S. psywarriors of World War II, has pointed out that most of the Nazi's vaunted "War of Nerves" in the period 1938-1941, were far more the result of luck (as well as the shaky nerves of their opponents) than any planning on their part. Herz, "Operations: Leaflets, July 45," Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, AEF [*sic.*], 4 July-1945-10 January 1946, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 8,

about "treacherous fifth columns," "the Trojan Horse, the Fifth Column....spies, saboteurs and traitors [who create] a state of panic. Our morale and mental defenses must be raised as never before."<sup>137</sup> A Special Assistant to the President, John J. McCloy (later High Commissioner to Germany and one of the molders of America's post war foreign policy), urged the establishment of a distinct federal agency to coordinate civil and military countermeasures to Axis psywar. Although America was physically rearming, McCloy continued, "We might better be short of other modern weapons than this one, for anti-tank guns can not stop ideas....."<sup>138</sup> In August 1940, after the fall of France, President Roosevelt established the first of the "defense/wartime" propaganda agencies, the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (burdened with the impossible acronym OCCCRBAR, the title was abbreviated a year later to Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, CIAA), under Nelson Rockefeller.<sup>139</sup> But FDR, who paradoxically disliked propaganda while remaining the master manipulator of the American media, postponed any real action until the appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as Coordinator of Information (COI), in July of 1941.<sup>140</sup> The COI, as is well documented, would go far beyond the mere mission of information coordination, and under Donovan, would prove to be the root of the Central Intelligence generally as well as of Army special operations units, such as Special Forces and psychological warfare/operations units.<sup>141</sup>

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"Ops. Leaflets" folder, 7.

<sup>137</sup>Laurie thesis, 130-131. See also M. Sayers, *Sabotage! The Secret War against America* (New York: 1942). In fairness to FDR and others who seemed to have "gone off the deep end" at the time, it should be remembered that the German Nazis and the Soviets, as a result of the infamous Hitler-Stalin agreements of August 1939, were amicably dividing up much of Europe between themselves, and that propagandists of both right and left in the U.S. (including the Lindbergs) were claiming that democracy was finished. The combined power mustered by Hitler and Stalin was enough to frighten almost anyone.

<sup>138</sup>McCloy to Secretary of War Stimson, Lilly, 61-62. See also Laurie dissertation, 135-136, for McCloy. Not all of this agitation was domestic, and anti-interventionists could detect the fine hand of British propaganda agencies behind much of the controversy. See Nicholas John Cull, *Selling War: The British Campaign Against American "Neutrality" in World War II* (New York: 1994) and Susan A. Brewer, "Creating the 'Special Relationship': British Propaganda in the United States during the Second World War," Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1991; M. L. Chadwin, *The War Hawks of World War II* (Chapel Hill: 1968); Philip M. Taylor, *The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919-1939* (Cambridge, UK: 1981).

<sup>139</sup>Thompson, *Overseas Information Service*, 4.

<sup>140</sup>Lilly, 62 for FDR's aversion to propaganda.

<sup>141</sup>Paddock, 5.

Although the War Department showed some interest at the top echelons, the Army itself remained unconvinced, and extended little enough sympathy throughout the war for Donovan's swashbuckling organization, soon to be renamed the Office of Strategic Services. Heber Blankenhorn, the only Army psywarrior to serve in both world wars (a fact that speaks volumes on the lost inter-war years), claimed that almost to the end of World War II the General Staff was "far more reluctant" to recognize psychological warfare than it had been in 1918. "It was the same fight all over again." In fact those Army General Staff officers who were not actually "hostile" ("Words don't win wars.") "were copyists of the German models -- utterly unadaptable to our Army -- or of the British, who in 1942 had fallen into a morass conditioned by their years of psychological warfare against enemy civilians." And those few who half-remembered World War I reasoned that any American propaganda would prove unconvincing because German messages in that war had failed so utterly against U.S. AEF troops.<sup>142</sup> As late as 1942, according to the officer who would become the head of psywar in Europe and still later the chief of all Army psywar during the Korean conflict, "there was no known military plan in any armed service for the integration of psychological warfare with[in] the military."<sup>143</sup>

The Military Intelligence Service at roughly the same time as the creation of the COI had established a highly-secret psychological warfare office, the Psychologic Branch, later renamed the Special Study Group, and still later, in March of 1942, with the veil of secrecy lifted, the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) of G-2. This organization should not be confused with the PWB of the Mediterranean campaign or of MacArthur's South West Pacific Area PWB. The latter was activated at roughly the same time as the inception of the COI, later renamed the Office of Strategic Services. (The reader has been warned: this is only the beginning of a maze of changes in nomenclature and missions.) but its functions were only those of intelligence and policy and it had no operational facilities, although it did carry out and publish several important studies and maintained liaison with the COI/OSS and the Foreign Monitoring Broadcasting Service of the Federal Communications Commission. Another obscure military psywar office was the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which left little to mark its brief tenure.<sup>144</sup> The Army also produced a few copies of a psywar manual, but this

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<sup>142</sup>Blankenhorn oral interview, 11; quote from "Combat Propaganda", 16. (emphasis in original). One World War II psywar veteran wrote to the OWI historian that "Nobody as far as I know in any branch of our government showed any interest in psywar prior to 1941.", an exaggeration, but not by much. W. D. Puleston, ltr. to E. Lilly, n.d., copy in Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 2, "W.W.I" folder.

<sup>143</sup>Address by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure before the Army War College, 16 February 1953, 7. (emphasis in original), Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

<sup>144</sup>Linebarger, 93-94; Paddock, 8-10; Charles A. H. Thompson, *Overseas Information Service of the United States Government* (Brookings Institution, Washington: 1948),

The OWI was given control either directly or indirectly of all domestic propaganda (except for that in the Western Hemisphere, which remained the province of Rockefeller's CIAA) and "white" propaganda abroad. The black variety was to be handled by the OSS, which also took on foreign subversion and special/guerrilla/partisan warfare. The OSS's Foreign Intelligence Service was transferred to the OWI to become its Overseas Branch. Undaunted by this separation of some of his propaganda assets, the dynamic Donovan drew up far-reaching plans for the conduct of combat psywar in America's forthcoming military campaigns and, in fact, was given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff "complete authority to plan, develop, coordinate and execute the military program of psychological warfare." This was all too much for Elmer Davis, head of OWI, and Nelson Rockefeller. Both appealed directly to President Roosevelt, who shortly after issued an executive order mandating that OWI conduct foreign information and propaganda operations abroad. But to add to the confusion, FDR's order added that in military theaters all psywar plans and operations would be subject to the control of the theater Army commander. Actually, FDR's order as it related to the theater commanders, simply formalized what had already been established in practice.

The Army was hardly galvanized into action by any fears that it might be left behind by the Presidential creation of two high-level offices for the conduct of propaganda. At the end of 1942 the Psychological Warfare Branch of the MIS had been abolished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the reasoning being that with the OSS was now responsible for propaganda there appeared no requirement for the PWB. But ten months later, the Army reestablished the PWB! This time the resurrected PWB, now re-named the Propaganda Branch, was placed within the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) and made responsible for the coordination of all propaganda for the War Department, although its principal success would come with the guidance it gave Army units in the field. Although the PWB/PB maintained fairly good relations with the OWI, it remained suspicious of the free-wheeling OSS. And mutual suspicion festered between the OWI and the OSS to the end of the war.<sup>150</sup> Thus by 1942 there

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with FDR prior to embarking for Great Britain and OWI service. The President several times exhorted him to make the British "tighten their censorship," ignoring Carroll's reminders that this was not at all OWI's job., Carroll videotaped interview. One scholar noted that a large number of OWI principals, "and many others have commented on the fact that Roosevelt was not interested in the propaganda organization, and indeed, never understood what they were doing.", an odd attitude for so great a public communicator., Bishop thesis, 416.

<sup>150</sup>Heber Blankenhorn reported that the War Department informed the PWB that "it had succeeded in its mission of educating the War Department as to the importance of Psychological Warfare" and the only thing that now remained was for the office to be wound up. Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 10. Blankenhorn claims that the OSS inherited its psywar mission by default., *ibid.* As an indication of the confusion and complexity entangling U.S. psywar at the time, Paul Linebarger reported that in

"somewhat innocuous" work actually devoted a mere 10 percent of its material to military psywar. When Heber Blankenhorn innocently asked to see the super-secret volume, he was indignantly informed by the head of PWB that "this manual is a matter of high War Department policy."<sup>145</sup> Blankenhorn was further plagued at this early stage of the war by imaginative would-be psywarriors pushing "messages on clouds", psychologists with "blueprints," "One-Worlders," advertising experts, even "exterminators" who presumably advocated messages of death and destruction for the Nazis. The official proposals were hardly better, outlining impractical projects of "deception, confusion, and a great bagful of trickeries." The sober and experienced Blankenhorn knew better.<sup>146</sup>

Indeed, the U.S. Joint Board even rebuffed the British Chiefs of Staff, who, at the Anglo-American conference at Argentia Bay in August 1941, specifically and in detail called for American attention to psywar against the Nazis. The American military was not to be deflected in its planning to concentrate almost exclusively on a massive land campaign to bring down the Nazis.<sup>147</sup> But the famous playwright Robert Sherwood, head of COI's Foreign Information Service (FIS), did travel to Great Britain "in the guise of an information officer" in September 1941 to study British propaganda and make contacts that would prove very useful when war came.<sup>148</sup>

President Roosevelt did not finally take up the tangled and slack propaganda reins until well after Pearl Harbor, creating the second civilian propaganda organization, the Office of War Information (the COI/OSS was the first) on 13 June 1942. Even here, FDR did not truly understand the possibilities of psychological warfare. As one expert participant wrote later that "It was a curious fact --and I had confirmation of it later --that the President, who established the OWI, never knew that it was doing and sometimes apparently, confused it with the Office of Censorship."<sup>149</sup>

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95. *History of the Military Intelligence Division*, 289-294. The Psychologic Branch/Special Study Group/Psychological Warfare Branch was one of the few U.S. military offices to study morale in the U.S. Army, which it found in a parlous state, but that would change with Pearl Harbor. It should also be noted that one Private Martin F. Herz produced a study, "Propaganda as a Tactical Weapon" (21 September 1941), which laid out the basic principles that the Army would later utilize in the coming conflict. It is pleasing to record that Herz's audacity was rewarded; he went on to become a major figure in Army tactical psywar in the European Theater of Operations.

<sup>145</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 114.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid., 114-115.

<sup>147</sup>Lilly, chapter III, 10.

<sup>148</sup>Sherwood, ltr. to Colonel Don Hall, PWB, n.d., Russell Barnes File notes in RG 208, entry 6g, box 11, "PWB" folder; R. B. Lockwood, *Comes the Reckoning* (London: 1947), 132.

<sup>149</sup>Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 60. Carroll's later "confirmation" came when he met

was a large number of semi-autonomous propaganda organizations functioning. Because the Army couldn't make them go away, it sought and finally succeeded after two years in obtaining what it considered the next best thing, controlling all combat propaganda, with the OWI becoming something of a service organization for the Army.<sup>151</sup>

In the meanwhile, of course, there was a war to be won, and it was the OWI's Overseas Branch, working with Army personnel and units in the field that was first off the mark with American combat psywar. Thereafter, U.S. psywar in the field would be undertaken by a hydra-like, multiple-headed ramshackle conglomeration of the civilian OSS and OWI, the Army's PWB and theater commanders, not to mention the enormous assistance of the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE) and Ministry of Information (MOI). This was confusion compounded with a vengeance. In the words of Linebarger, within the OWI alone, "the overseas operation was separated from the domestic, the broadcasters from the planners, the outposts from everybody else, during much of the war.", and the same could fairly be said of the Army's share of the job. But, as Linebarger concluded, in the end "The job was done!"<sup>152</sup>

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one "routine" day, to deal with some question of overseas propaganda he had to contact Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, the State Department, the Office of the Assistant to the President, the OWI Office of Facts and Figures, the [British] Political Warfare Group, the Office of Civilian Defense, the Research and Analysis Branch of COI, the Office of the Librarian of Congress, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Agriculture Department., Linebarger, "Psywar in World War II," *Infantry Journal* (May 1947). Donovan was one of the few American leaders who remembered anything about America's combat propaganda effort in World War I: "I know what leaflets did in 1918, they are a weapon, they softened things ahead of our attacks.", quoted in Blankenhorn, "Combat Psychological Warfare", 179:

<sup>151</sup>Laurie thesis, 341-342.

<sup>152</sup>Thompson, *Overseas Information Service*, 5, 93, 105; Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 89-94; C. Laurie, "Wonder Weapon or Rear Echelon Insanity: The U.S. Army and Psychological Warfare," 1993, U.S. Army Center of Military History, published as "The Ultimate Dilemma of Psychological Warfare in the Pacific: Enemies Who Don't Surrender and GIs Who Don't Take Prisoners," in J. Bellafaire, ed., *The U.S. Army and World War II: Selected Papers from the Army's Commemorative Conferences*, "U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washington: 1998.; *History of the Military Intelligence Division*, 289-322; Gilmore thesis, 17; Lilly, chapter v., 5; Daugherty, "U.S. Psychological Warfare Organizations in World War I," *Casebook*; Bishop thesis, 28. In the words of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, head of Great Britain's Political Warfare Executive, the top policy-making psywar organization in the UK: "In making their propaganda arrangements the Americans had repeated and, indeed, aggravated our mistakes, for two separate organizations [OSS and OWI], were competing with zeal and with ill-concealed hostility for the doubtful privilege of collaborating with us....", Lockhart, 181-182. It should further

-North Africa-

The first U.S. combat psychological warfare in the European Theater of Operations during World War II took place on the night of 8 November 1942 off the coast of Morocco, when an OWI-OSS-PWE civil/military team broadcast messages from the USS *Texas* to the French authorities just prior to the U.S. invasion of French North Africa, warning civilians to get out of target areas. ("This is not a commando raid.") Although the firing of the main batteries of the venerable American battleship is supposed to have deranged the radio equipment, one authority reported soon after that "one person of every three had listened to us" and that the civilian population had indeed heeded the evacuation warning.<sup>153</sup>

This pioneer team was part of the Psychological Warfare Branch (not to be confused with the old War Department PWB) which had been established in early October of 1942 as the Psychological Warfare Section of Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) at the direction of General Eisenhower, commander of U.S. forces in Europe. Exasperated by the bickering and lack of command and control between OWI and PWB, Eisenhower had ordered Brigadier General Robert A. McClure to establish the unified Information and Censorship Section of the PWB to control all military public information and psychological warfare in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. This PWB was a section of AFHQ's Information and Censorship (INC) staff section, headed by McClure. The INC had been established to incorporate staff and operating responsibility for public relations, psywar, consolidation propaganda, information to neutrals and censorship over all types of communications.<sup>154</sup> It was an indication of America's late entry into this war that the U.S. contribution to PWB was twelve servicemen and civilians, the balance consisting of 35 military and British and civilian personnel. Although the American contingent had been selected on the basis of the special occupational and linguistic qualifications of its personnel, only one member had been informed of the objective and the nature of their assignment before

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be noted that OWI and the military also had different propaganda goals. While the Army rarely extolled the glories of democracy or the "American Way," Elmer Davis reported in 1944 that while his organization did not exist to persuade foreigners to love America, "it tries to help people to understand the United States, on the assumption that the more the truth about America is known, the more the nature of American civilization is understood, the better for all concerned.", Report on the Activities of the OWI for 1944, quoted in Hans Speier, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1948).

<sup>153</sup>Laurie thesis, 354; "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," part IV, 1; F. Auberjainois, "Psychological Warfare in Progress," typescript, 4 January 1943, Herz Papers, Georgetown University, box 1, folder 2.

<sup>154</sup>Thompson, 100; "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 4-5; Bishop, 132-133.



the task force had embarked. This unit, combining military and civilian and Allied personnel, was believed to be unique, at least in the Second World War.

Later in October, General Eisenhower appointed Colonel C. B. Hazeltine to head the PWB.<sup>155</sup> "Hazy", as this bluff, garrulous, and hard-drinking West Pointer liked to be addressed, called himself the "senior colonel of the United States Army," and had taught Eisenhower and other future high-ranking officers of the new U.S. military at the Army War College. Hazeltine later claimed that he, a cavalryman, was "horrified" at the orders that he head a propaganda unit: "I tried to get out of the job on the basis that I knew little of propaganda and nothing of psychology." But Eisenhower persisted and "Hazy" had his marching orders.<sup>156</sup> His unease was in no way diminished by what he found in his new charge.

There was no organization, no plan, no directives and no equipment of any kind. The section itself consisted of American officers, British officers, American civilians, British civilians, British non-coms, American privates and British privates. Their qualifications had no relation to their grade or pay.<sup>157</sup>

But what Hazeltine's men lacked in qualifications they more often than not made up in resourcefulness. For example, two days before the North African landings, the PWB established offices on Gibraltar. The planning geniuses in Washington and London had not thought to allot radio receivers to monitor German or Vichy stations, so one enterprising type prowled the bowels of The Rock and purloined one from the garrison Commanding Officer's office. Unfortunately, this same British officer was later headquartered in Naples and proceeded to make life as

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<sup>155</sup>S. Denlinger, "Psychological Warfare Branch, AFQ, Miscellaneous Activity Reports. Narrative Report of Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater, typescript, n.d., 2; "The Psychological Warfare Branch of A.F.G.Q. From its Inception to November 1, 1943," 1-2; "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater," Part 1 (Naples: 31 August 1945), 2.

<sup>156</sup>Laurie thesis, 352-353; H. F. Pringle, "The Baloney Barrage Pays Off," *Saturday Evening Post*, 31 March 1945; Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish* (Boston: 1948), 32; Bishop, 127.

<sup>157</sup>Hazeltine to Carroll, ltr., 23 January 1943, quoted in James Erdmann, *Leaflet Operations in the Second World War...in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations* (Denver: 1969), 86. Hazleton might have added that PWB never received an official U.S. Army Table of Organization and Equipment. Laurie thesis, 362. Hazeltine is supposed to have told his troops when his office was activated: "I didn't know anything about propaganda, but I believe in its power....We're on trial until we produce the goods. So you write the words and I'll sell the Army on their value." F. C. Paxton, "Fighting With Confetti," *Reader's Digest*, December 1943.

miserable as he could for the PWB team stationed there.<sup>158</sup>

In the meantime, the first truly American Army tactical units ever designated for psychological warfare had been assigned to the PWB and shipped overseas in time for the North African campaign. These were the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Broadcast Operating Detachments, activated in December 1942 at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and consisting of three officers and 39 enlisted men. Soon after, the two RBOD's soon were combined to form the 1<sup>st</sup> Combat Propaganda Company, the prototype for later such units assigned to each American field army. From December 1942 to February of the following year, the OSS had command of the 1<sup>st</sup> CBC, but the War Department was able to claim the unit in February of 1943 and assign it to the PWB.<sup>159</sup> Five Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies (the new name for the RBODs) were eventually established, with the 1<sup>st</sup> serving in the North Africa/Mediterranean Theater, and the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> in the European Theater. Two of the latter were assigned to the 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group and the remainder to the Psychological Warfare Division/Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEP) in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) under General Eisenhower.<sup>160</sup> The Army also found that it could not procure enough trained psywarriors for the job, and "grudgingly recruited" civilians<sup>161</sup>

During the North African landings, and in addition to the *Texas* broadcasts, PWB personnel disseminated goodwill messages from General Eisenhower and the British and U.S. governments by radio and leaflet. No less than 30 million of the leaflet *Souvenez-vous?* ("Do You Remember?") were distributed, chronicling the American help of World War I. This one operation alone exceeded the total of U.S. leaflets produced in that previous conflict. The PWB teams had to be sensitive to high policy, and were instructed to emphasize that this was an American operation, the British remaining distinctly unpopular after their attacks on the French fleet after France's surrender to Germany. In fact, Hazeltine conferred three times per week with Robert Murphy, Eisenhower's political advisor and guide through the complex web of anti-Vichy versus pro-Vichy French politics. The American influence would to some extent cut across such intrigue as well as making a greater appeal to anti-colonial Arabs. It would further appeal to almost all North African Frenchmen, who harbored deep suspicions of British colonial ambitions.<sup>162</sup>

As the invasion force moved out from the beaches, some PWB teams managed

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<sup>158</sup>Ibid.; Carroll, 32.

<sup>159</sup>Laurie thesis, 364. First Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company [sic.], Unit History (United States Forces in Austria: n.d.), 6, MHI Archives.

<sup>160</sup>Hall and Caskey, "Lectures on Psychological Warfare," (for the Infantry, Artillery and Armored Schools), (Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington: n.d.), 14-15.

<sup>161</sup>Laurie thesis, 364-365.

<sup>162</sup>"Psychological Warfare Branch," 2; Charles G. Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare, 1939-1945* (London: 1977), 138-139.

to talk a number of French units out of firing on the American invaders and others seized local radio broadcasting stations. Still others set up their own such stations and news sheets -- and all backed into one of the most controversial political imbroglios of the entire war. In exchange for an end to French resistance, Eisenhower and Murphy had agreed to retain in power the highest-ranking North African Vichyite (read "collaborationist") official, Admiral Francois Darlan. A global storm of protest excoriated this "betrayal" of Allied principles, and PWB was caught in the middle. (In fact, the PWB team had brought over several tons of leaflets, many of which dealt with the possibility that the French fleet, under Admiral Darlan, would resist, and the leaflets were not at all complimentary to the admiral. The offending product had been taken out to sea and dumped.) PWB personnel were outraged by the Allied acquiescence in Darlan's bland continuation of Vichy policies, particularly those against the Jews, and in the actual imprisonment of Gaullists. In the words of the OWI representative in London:

So we who tried to defend America stood naked to the blast with only the words of the President to warm us. And when we had said these words a hundred times, they sounded thin and unreal and brought no comfort. Oh, for one little act to give meaning to those words! Just the name of one patriot released from jail, one honest man restored to his post, one Fascist put out of the way. Or just one photograph of a Jewish schoolboy returning to his classroom, or of a refugee eating the bread of the liberators.<sup>163</sup>

Some U.S. psywarriors felt so strongly about the matter that they unofficially "formed an anti-Darlan resistance group which gathered information on Vichy atrocities....[and] created an even greater furor than the initial Darlan deal.", causing further damage to military-OWI relations.<sup>164</sup> Darlan was conveniently assassinated on Christmas Eve of 1942 and an untainted French general officer was set up in the unmourned admiral's place. The way was now clear for the first application of what the Army now termed "consolidation" propaganda, operations directed toward civilian populations in areas of military occupation, but the delay had been considerable. It was only toward the middle of January 1943 that PWB obtained time for broadcasting its own programs on Algiers Radio and began to place American news and feature films in local cinemas. It also published numerous pamphlets and news letters extolling the Allies and their cause, and operated mobile vans to bring that message to

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<sup>163</sup>Morris Janowitz, and William Daugherty, "The Darlan Story," *Casebook*; Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 61-62, 72-73.

<sup>164</sup>Laurie thesis, 357-358; Daugherty, "Darlan Story," 296-297; Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, (Quotation from Carroll, 162. Obviously this unofficial working group did not really create "an even greater furor" than the international sparked by the Darlan agreement itself.)

the French and Arab populations, all under the suspicious scrutiny of the French authorities, who were particularly resentful of the Allied censorship program. With their territory being liberated from the now-hated *boche*, those authorities were anxious to see the last of Allied troops and their unsettling ways and ideas.<sup>165</sup>

The French colonial masters may also have had their doubts about OWI's shipping to PWB several enormous "portable movie theaters," complete with loud speakers and professional-quality 35-mm projectors, for outdoor showings. These cumbersome units toured the back country, showing what even an official report termed "movies of dubious value," presumably Hollywood's best, to scores of thousands of appreciative Arabs. Whatever benefits this entertainment brought the indigenous peoples, their French masters were presumably not keen on such competition with "France's Historic Civilizing Mission."<sup>166</sup>

With the dashing of the hopes of a speedy ejection of the Axis from North Africa, PWB turned its attention to psywar against Italian and German troops. Their work was hindered by the impatience of Allied commanders with anything that did not promise a speedy pay-off in the face of the early and embarrassing battle set-backs to American forces in North Africa. At first the dissemination of U.S. leaflets was poor, owing to the fact that the U.S. Army Air Forces had to be "sold" on the value of leaflet drops, and this in spite of PWB giving translations of their leaflets to the aircrews. The aviators' suspicions were well-grounded at first; early drops by high-altitude heavy bombers scattered the leaflets apparently everywhere except over the target, and the PWB gave up on the attempt. But an RAF squadron of medium Wellington bombers, experienced in the work while in England, professed themselves as perfectly willing and able to do the job, and by the end of the fighting in North Africa had dropped about 90 percent of all U.S. leaflets.<sup>167</sup>

The British also proved helpful in the resurrection of the artillery leaflet round. The successful experience of the French in World War I had been either forgotten or neglected, and PWB suddenly found itself with a need for ground-to-ground, pin-point accuracy leaflet distribution in the field. A British officer experimented successfully with the dissemination of leaflets from smoke shells from which the smoke canisters had been removed. This 25-pounder leaflet round could burst 300 feet above its target, giving a good distribution pattern. The Royal Artillery School at Chateau d'Un, Tunisia took up the experiments in co-operation with a PWB officer, CPT Con

<sup>165</sup>C. D. Jackson report, "Outpost Service Bureau," 6 November, 1943, report on OWI-PWB in North Africa. RG 208, entry 6g, Records of the OWI Historian of the PWB, 1942-45, box 1, "PWB Algiers" folder. Jackson noted that "A mentally sick people are now well on the road to health again.", 1; "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater," pt. v; Erdmann, 88; Denlinger, "Psychological Warfare Branch," 3.

<sup>166</sup>"Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 6.

<sup>167</sup>"Psychological Warfare Branch," 4-5; Bishop thesis, 138-139; *Views of World War II*.

O'Neill, and formulated a firing table that was used in all later campaigns. In many ways, however, O'Neill's work was unnecessary; he was basically "reinventing" the French 75mm leaflet shell of 1918.<sup>168</sup>

This energetic British officer also addressed the concept of the news letter, developed originally by the AEF Propaganda Sub-Section in World War I, but whose dissemination was foreclosed by the Armistice. This new leaflet did go into service as *Afrika Post*, giving accounts of war news on all fronts. By all accounts *Afrika Post* was eagerly read by *Afrika Korps* troops in the absence of any reasonably objective news from home. Just how removed these troops were from any realistic view of the world is seen in the belief of German POWs that New York city was in ruins "now that the Japanese have bombed it flat." - or had invaded Siberia!<sup>169</sup> Somewhat more down to earth (as it were) was the attempt to distribute leaflets behind enemy lines to both Arabs and enemy soldiers by truck, an attempt that came to a premature end with the capture of the truck, along with leaflets and personnel

More lasting was the surrender leaflet, re-established for the first time since World War I, in addition to leaflets directed to specific units, noting unit officers and specific losses, although *Afrika Post* seems to have been the most influential in Tunisia.<sup>170</sup>

The fact that PWB-OWI teams were pioneers complicated their work. Colonel Hazeltine had to "commandeer" trucks, typewriters, and paper for his work, and was never able to develop a coordinated organized U.S. Army psywar effort in North Africa. And as pioneers, the PWB-OWI/AFHQ had to overcome prejudice and ignorance about its mission. Hazeltine rather bitterly remarked later that "At the beginning we weren't welcome anywhere and nobody gave a damn about us." But, he concluded that the leaflet results in Tunisia changed all that, with Generals Patton and Alexander among the most conspicuous converts.<sup>171</sup> The OWI veteran Wallace Carroll included Generals Mark Clark and Omar Bradley, among others, as "sympathetic" commanders.<sup>172</sup> "Hazy" was perhaps a little too optimistic, at least publicly. One

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<sup>168</sup>Con O'Neill, "Paper Warfare in Tunisia," *The Army Quarterly* (April 1944); "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 2-3; L. Margolin, "A Paper Bullet is No Spitball," *Infantry Journal* (February 1947); Berger, *Wartime Leaflets*, 91-93. Blankenhorn reported that CPT O'Neill could scarcely believe that his was not a new weapon. Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda", 189.

<sup>169</sup>F. C. Painton, "Fighting With Confetti,"; H. L. Anspacher, "Attitudes of German Prisoners of War: A Study of National-Socialistic Fellowship," *Psychological Monographs*, 288 (1948).

<sup>170</sup>"Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Campaign," 3; Bishop thesis, 138.

<sup>171</sup>Hazeltine, "Diagram for PWB Field Set-Up," January 1944, OWI Historian's Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 4, "PWB, Italy 1943" folder.

<sup>172</sup>Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 158. Eisenhower was a fast learner, who had started out in his North Africa planning stage by informing Hazeltine that he "was not at all sure what it [psywar] was.", Hazeltine, ltr. to Carroll, 23 January 1943, quoted in

authority quoted a number of high-ranking Allied officers back in England to the effect that "the Army exists for the purpose of killing our enemies, not for persuading or arguing them out of the war.", "Paper will not kill Germans and that is what we must do -- in large numbers....", and "Lethal weapons are the only propaganda which the German soldiers will understand." These opinions do not seem to have been exceptional.<sup>173</sup> But at lower echelons PWB finally garnered a measure of support, or at least understanding, among USAAF and airmen through its publication *Confetti*, which outlined its day-by-day activities, translations of leaflets, and enemy reactions.<sup>174</sup>

At least one example of public German reaction to PWB North African leaflets has survived. *Oasis*, the Afrika Korps troop paper gave the flavor of the cocky attitude of the German military toward their enemy at this stage of the war in the West in this repulsively-worded item:

The Americans in Algiers and their gaggle of Jewish émigrés compose leaflet after leaflet, they write until their fingers ache and their brains sizzle....So they seize their dictionaries and their printers ink, wiping their greasy paws on their black ringlets....they scribble hysterically on the back of the leaflet, waving their arms and kicking their legs in the air, wiping their faces with their dripping hands.<sup>175</sup>

The German high command must have worried about the effects on its troops of this supposed "gaggle of Jewish émigrés," for it distributed to its officers in North Africa the publication *The Officers as Leaders in the Fight Against Enemy Propaganda*.<sup>176</sup> This publication is the more significant in that it was drawn up for the officers of what was arguably at the time the best army corps in the world. Axis radio propaganda, as it would be for the remainder of the war, was far less nasty than the effort quoted above, and according to an *Infantry Journal* article written not long after the North Africa campaign, "It would be safe to say that most of the troops who could listened to one of two Axis shows -most of us never missed either." Italian radio propaganda was quite good, light on the propaganda, and with an impressive jazz

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Erdmann, 84.

<sup>173</sup>Berger, *Wartime Leaflets*, 94-95; Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," *passim*.

<sup>174</sup>"Psywar in the Mediterranean," part III, 4.

<sup>175</sup>Copy and translation in R. Hollender, memo to Commanding Officer, PWB, subject: "'Section E' Progress Report," 30 April, 1943, RG 208, entry 6g, box 7, "Restricted or Classified" folder. A perusal of this nasty leaflet might weaken somewhat the common perception of the more "gentlemanly" Germans in North Africa.

<sup>176</sup>Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 156.

record collection. ("That's enough propaganda, how about some jive?")<sup>177</sup> Both Italian and German propaganda radio enjoyed some popularity among U.S. troops primarily because they had the wit to use the latest American popular music interlarded with relatively low-key propaganda. The Germans' "Axis Sally" (expatriate American citizen Mildred Gillers) did carry off one deceptive coup in Italy. Interrupting a swing number, the sweet-voiced traitor claimed she had a flash announcement of special interest to the GIs of a certain division: she had just heard on the BBC that this division, which had made such a fine combat record in Italy, was going to be returned to the United States to open a forthcoming war bond drive. The very fact that Axis Sally said no more about it made her announcement the more believable as news rather than propaganda. When the official denials caught up with the bogus announcement, in the words of one observer, "By good timing and logical approach, German psychological warfare had temporarily reduced American effectiveness by one division!"<sup>178</sup> But needless to say, for all its appeal, the message of Axis radio had little, if any "political" effect on U.S. troops.

In the first week of May of 1943 nearly 15 million leaflets were disseminated as the Axis armies were driven into a coastal promontory from which there was no escape. Surrenders came by the tens of thousands, although by then, of course, the campaign was almost over. Earlier, enterprising Arabs had been selling Allied safe conduct leaflets in the markets to Italian and possibly German troops, but that venture faded when the Allies made it clear that any number could indeed surrender on one leaflet.<sup>179</sup>

In all, PWB/OWI AFHQ disseminated between 9 and 15 million leaflets during the North African campaign. Psywarriors reported that 80 percent of the Italian POWs had read a leaflet. The Germans of the crack Afrika Corps, by contrast, who could claim that they had battled the British 8<sup>th</sup> Army across the littoral of North Africa, had given the Americans a bloody nose at Kasserine Pass, and had surrendered only to overwhelming Allied military power, proved much less susceptible to Allied

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<sup>177</sup>J. N. Jablin, "Listen to the Bitch of Berlin: Axis Radio Propaganda in Tunisia," *Infantry Journal* (December 1943); H. E. Ettlinger, *The Axis on the Air* (Indianapolis: 1943) deals somewhat with German radio broadcasts to U.S. troops in North Africa. Wallace Carroll wrote of a clandestine U.S. "black" radio transmitter, "Italo Balbo Station," "The Voice of True Italian Fascism." "True Italian Fascism," of course was anti-Mussolini. Any results from this station were highly problematical., *Persuade or Perish*, 165.

<sup>178</sup>Hall and Caskey, 6; "The Psychological Warfare Division," 19; Harold Ettlinger, *The Axis on the Air* (1943); Jay Baird, *The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-45* (1974).

<sup>179</sup>AFHQ PWB, memo "Combat Propaganda -Leaflet Distribution to Date," to Chief of Staff, 15 June 1943, RG 331, SHAEF Special Staff, PWD, BOX 10, 091.42 FOLDER. Margolin, "Paper Bullet"; Bishop thesis, 138.

blandishments.<sup>180</sup> Nonetheless, PWB/OWI AFHQ could point out that between 5 and 13 May 1943, 248,000 Axis troops had surrendered, provoking the British jibe of "Tunisgrad." Five months earlier, at Stalingrad, a roughly comparable German force had fought almost to the end, with only about 90,000 remaining alive to surrender. (Of course, the considerably less-motivated Italians made up many of the surrendering Axis troops in North Africa. Even the terrible climatic conditions and the fierce ideological/racial war waged in the East, cannot completely explain the disparity in numbers of Germans who surrendered; considerable credit must be given to Allied psywar.

Allied psywarriors could express satisfaction after the German surrender in Tunisia. But William Daugherty noted accurately enough that propaganda directed toward the French had proved "a valiant effort that failed...." Further, the three-way division of OWI/PWB/OSS could hardly have been a pattern for efficiency. But in the end, the spectacle of mass enemy surrenders had gained respect and attention for U.S. psywar operations.<sup>181</sup> "...PWB became an accepted and useful part of the military machine. North Africa set the pattern...."<sup>182</sup>

#### -The Italian Campaign-

The total collapse of all Italian and German forces in North Africa, cleared the way for operations against Italy. Unlike planning for North Africa, the Allied Italian campaign incorporated psywar from the beginning. Even before the final Axis surrender, a PWB liaison officer had been assigned to the headquarters of the Allied Commander, General Sir Harold Alexander, where he was permitted to study the military plans, even the "cover" plans for the forthcoming operation. PWB planners thus had a good opportunity to prepare a comprehensive psywar operation well before the operation began and to secure the full approval of General Alexander.<sup>183</sup> However, when General Eisenhower requested such plans from the British they were

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<sup>180</sup>The "Outpost Bureau" report for 23 July 1943, OWI Historian Records of PWB, 1942-45, RG 208, entry 6g, box 1, "PWB, Algiers" folder, gives the figure of 9 million leaflets; Lilly, box 2, and Erdmann, pp. 98-99, give 15 million. The difference may be explained as that between leaflets produced and those actually disseminated. For German POW attitudes at the time, see H. L. Ansbacher, "Attitudes of German Prisoners of War: A Study of the Dynamics of National Socialistic Followership," in *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied*, 62 (n.p.: 1943).

<sup>181</sup>Daugherty, "The Darlan Story," *Casebook*, 298; "PWB Current Status and Future Requirements," n.d., RG 331, SHAEF Special Staff, box 10, folder 091.42; Laurie thesis, 383.

<sup>182</sup>Bishop, 134.

<sup>183</sup>"The Psychological Warfare Branch of AFHQ, 7-8; "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater," 6.



forwarded with the judicious assessment that the "inexperienced" Americans should realize that the Italians would fight much better when they were encountered on their own soil. Much time and resources were subsequently wasted in acting on this ludicrously inaccurate "experienced" advice.<sup>184</sup> Most such planning, however, was better grounded in reality, with General McClure working closely with the AFHQ Chief of Staff and with the Combined (British-U.S.) Chiefs of Staff.

The first Italian target for the Allies was the island of Pantelleria, which by design would fall to a combination of aerial bombardment and psychological warfare; a landing would be executed only if the island's garrison refused to surrender. PWB/OWI AFHQ prepared its leaflets in great propaganda secrecy. After 18 devastating aerial bombardments, and psywar leaflet drops, many addressed personally to the Italian commander, the 10,000-man Italian military garrison surrendered, the first example of enemy territory falling without the use of ground troops.<sup>185</sup>

A preliminary campaign saw the dropping of leaflets and the broadcast of "news" designed to deceive the enemy as to the time and place of Allied landings and to undermine his morale. There can be little doubt as to the effectiveness of these leaflets; the enemy seemed to have no idea that the Allies would land where they did and Italian troops in particular had no stomach for a fight to the death -- even on their own soil.<sup>186</sup>

PWB personnel, still predominantly civilian, landed on the Sicily beaches, often under fire, making contact with the local anti-fascist underground, and seizing printing presses and radio stations. A PWB officer flew low over the town of Trapani, dropping leaflets that called on the townspeople to put out white flags to save

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<sup>184</sup>Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*, 141-147. Eisenhower himself, in order to take the fight out of those fierce Italian troops, suggested the untruthful "black" propaganda message that the Italian authorities had already signed an armistice. The matter was seriously debated by PWB and Ministry of Information chiefs, Churchill, Anthony Eden, General Alexander (Allied Mediterranean Commander), and the Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, until a sharp-witted official of distinctly inferior rank pointed out that "I assume that the Generals responsible for this bright idea...have given proper consideration to the reaction that this declaration will create in the event of an United Nations reversal in the *Husky* operation. They will be the laughing stock of the world and many a day will pass before British [or U.S.] propaganda will be taken seriously....", *ibid.*

<sup>185</sup>AFHQ, Commander, PWB, memo, to Chief of Staff, "Subject: Combat Propaganda-Leaflet Distribution to Date," 15 June 1943, SHAEF Special Staff, PWD, RG 331, box 10, 091.42 folder; H. F. Pringle, "The Baloney Barrage Pays Off," *Saturday Evening Post*, 31 March 1945; W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 2, 415-445. For more on Pantelleria and the elaborate military courtesies involved in its bloodless surrender, see Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 235-238, 244.

<sup>186</sup>"The Psychological Warfare Branch," 8.

their city. By the time he flew back, the town "Looked as though all the washing in the world were hung out there."<sup>187</sup> Before Palermo was truly secured, a PWB Combat Team had seized the city's cinemas, theaters, newspapers, and radio station. (The latter while the station manager still had sabotage plans in his pocket.) The first tasks of the two newly-organized PWB combat teams, composed of three men each, military and civilian, British or American, was the publication of Military Government (MG) orders and news, as well as the bringing out of such psywar newspapers as *Corriere di Siracuse*, *Sicilia Liberata*, *Corriere di Sicilia*, etc., the first independent journals in Italy since Mussolini's coming to power more than two decades earlier. (*Corriere di Sicilia* journalists made it a point to set up shop in the offices of the official fascist and now defunct *Popolo*.)<sup>188</sup>

Personnel from PWB furnished all civilian newspapers in their areas with news files forwarded from Algiers, and local journals were required to use this material, with the exception of minor local items. But each political party, except the Fascist, was permitted its own paper, although PWB retained one of its journals in each large Italian city to make sure that its message got through in the form that it wanted.<sup>189</sup> This journalistic rehabilitation was no simple matter. The chief PWB Press Officer, a British Army Lieutenant Colonel reported:

That first try-out --perhaps the first in the history of this war-- of one of the Four Freedoms, liberty of expression, seemed to stir up the best and the worst. On the best side were the Partisan editors of the Clandestine press, who had defied the [Italian secret police] and the Gestapo with its brutality. On the worst side were government officials and unscrupulous turn-coats, still imbued with Fascist habits. There were also slick opportunists who tried to insinuate their own selfish interests, and sometimes covert political intrigues, into the freedom plans being

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<sup>187</sup>S. C. Menefee, "Propaganda Wins Battles," *Nation* (12 February 1944).

<sup>188</sup>Denlinger, 5, Menefee, "Propaganda Wins Battles."

<sup>189</sup>"Psywar in the Mediterranean," 164. "PWB Combat Teams," typescript, OWI Historian Records of PWB, 1942-1945, RG 208, entry 6g, "PWB Combat Teams" folder; Colonel Hazeltine, memo to Robert Sherwood (the well-known playwright and chief of the Foreign Information Service of OWI) 24 August 1943, Lilly file, RG 218, box 2, folder #7. An example of the vigilance required of PWB, at least in the early weeks after the Italian landings, was provided when an official proclamation from the Badoglio government arrived at a U.S. Army print plant, referring to the King of Italy also as "Emperor." This ratification of Italy's aggression against Ethiopia was excised by a sweep of a printer's eraser., J.A. Pollard, "Words are Cheaper than Blood: Overseas OWI and the Need for a Permanent Propaganda Agency," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 9 (Fall 1945), 98-99.

developed.<sup>190</sup>

A total of 35.5 million leaflets, four times as many as those disseminated through North Africa, and based on military intelligence, gave good results among Italian soldiers. All of the first 100 Italian prisoners captured had seen and believed PWB leaflets. (or so they said).<sup>191</sup> Although considerably fewer in numbers than the Italian POWs, captured Germans showed a "sullen and discouraged" attitude in contrast to the cockiness of their Afrika Corps fellows.<sup>192</sup> PWB mobile public address systems prowled city streets, proclaiming news and regulations, the demand for the former supposedly "greater than physical hunger." The PWB even controlled and censored films. Such functions and local government, as well as the newspapers noted above, however, were soon taken over after varying periods of tutelage in democratic ideals by cooperative Sicilians assuming the places of purged fascists. (As was commonly heard at the time, "It's hard to stay mad at the Italians for very long.")<sup>193</sup>

In August PWB moved across the Straits of Messina with the British Eighth and the U.S. Fifth Armies --in the wake of German forces sailing across the straits a step ahead of the Allies and with most of their troops and equipment intact. Here the first PWB task was to publicize the news of the Italian armistice. To spread the word a PWB combat team brought out a newspaper under fire in Salerno in September, this at a time when the American Commander, General Mark Clark, was considering re-embarking his expeditionary force in the face of an extraordinary and unexpected German offensive against the precarious beachhead. But the Allies held, and soon another PWB paper was coming out, in just-captured Naples and in cooperation with anti-fascist elements that had been contacted in advance. Another PWB combat team followed in the wake of the British Eighth Army, while a PWB representative, accompanied by a radio engineer, drove forward into the port city of Bari while the Germans were still fighting on the outskirts, seized Radio Bari, and had it transmitting within a few hours. In fact, within a year PWB was operating a network of seven transmitters in Italy as well as eleven in North Africa, providing a basic news service for troops (probably of both sides) and official as well as controlled civilian newspapers.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>190</sup>Quoted in R. L. Bishop, "The Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966, 164.

<sup>191</sup>Ibid., 143-144; Laurie thesis, 380.

<sup>192</sup>Erdmann, 121. *Newsweek* magazine reported breezily that "The Italians were under the impression they were going to New York....Nazis were talking of settling in the States after the war." It is unclear whether the latter were considering their next domicile as under Nazi rule., 24 May 1943.

<sup>193</sup>Bishop, 144-148.

<sup>194</sup>"Psywar in the Mediterranean," 9. Bari was also the site of the first unregulated mainland Italian newspaper in more than two decades, *Gazetta del Mezzogiorno*, Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 275.

Portable public address (PA) systems were thrown into the campaign for the first time, initially bringing news and military edicts to towns and villages without electrical power. Sound systems were often assembled from "requisitioned" jeeps and the materials from handy junk yards. The first combat use of a PA system took place at the little town of Teano, and it was here that the pattern of PA programming was set. This programming was composed of popular music, followed by Italian patriotic songs, then current news, Allied Military Government (AMG) proclamations, and instructions to partisans.<sup>195</sup>

Perhaps reflecting General Clark's personal support of psywar, the U.S. Army became considerably more receptive to psywar than in North Africa, providing more facilities, supplies and vehicles to PWB. In addition, each OWI outpost now served as a radio monitoring station; their results were then made available to the PWB forward combat teams, they in turn monitored enemy radio transmissions for the benefit of army field commanders. A growing number of PWB combat teams, "unilaterally and arbitrarily," roamed the combat areas, mounted on jeeps with trailers, self-sufficient for up to a week, gathering intelligence, conducting psywar against the enemy by print and loudspeaker, and "selling" their specialty to field commanders.<sup>196</sup> These teams later were organized with three radio sections, and one each propaganda, publicity, service, and headquarters sections, plus one publication sub-section. Their duties were to broadcast to enemy troops and civilians, collect and evaluate information, and to reproduce photographs for propaganda purposes.<sup>197</sup>

The 5<sup>th</sup> Army's combat propaganda team was now able to obtain all of its news for dissemination from its own mobile radio intercept equipment, housed in a six-ton semi-trailer hauled by a tractor. The van's equipment included short and long-wave receivers and recording and transcription apparatus. High-speed Morse operators took down United Nations and other Morse newscasts and monitored the BBC and other friendly transmissions as well as enemy news and propaganda. Most of this information, as noted, was then disseminated to Allied commanders in the field and to the Italian public.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>195</sup>"Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 6.

<sup>196</sup>Laurie thesis, 380; "The Psychological Warfare Branch," 9-10; Pollard, "Words are Cheaper than Blood," In the forward to PWB's *Functions of 5<sup>th</sup> Army Combat Propaganda Team* (5 April 1944), General Clark had written a measured approval of psywar: "properly used, propaganda does weaken the enemy's morale, does make him give up more easily; does cause him to fire fewer bullets at our troops; and on occasions, does persuade him to cross the lines and quit the fight altogether....That is why the Fifth Army will continue to use it."

<sup>197</sup>AFHQ files, OWI Records, Historian's Records of the Psywar Branch, 1942-1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 1, "PWB Combat Team" folder, transcript for speech for unknown occasion. See also the AFHQ Information and Censorship Section manual, *Psychological Warfare, PWB Combat Propaganda* (n.p.: 2 September 1943).

<sup>198</sup>Hq. 5<sup>th</sup> Army, Psychological Warfare Branch, *Functions of the 5<sup>th</sup> Army Combat*

The PWB earned an unquestionably appreciative civilian audience for its news and information. One unit operating in Palermo was mobbed by civilians when putting up anti-German, anti-Nazi posters, with citizens operatically spitting on the posters and demanding that they be allowed to take copies home so that they could continue the sport with their families. The team had to call for military police support in order to make their way back to their quarters through the cheering crowd.<sup>199</sup> The PWBs *Luftpost*, southern edition, although written up with German forces in mind, also carried the permanent message "Italians, pass on to German troops."<sup>200</sup>

Even PWB's leaflet printers were mobile, with 5<sup>th</sup> Army's Combat Propaganda Team running off its material on a captured German press mounted on a large Italian truck rolling on U.S. Army tires. The rig was termed "Cromwell's Folly" after its creator, Tom Cromwell of OWI, but it worked well enough in the field.<sup>201</sup> The parent 1<sup>st</sup> MRBC printing team deployed more conventional equipment from the start: two GMC 2 1/2-ton GMC Army trucks with van bodies, one carrying darkroom equipment and the other set up as a printing van, with a Davidson press capable of printing an average of 10,000 leaflets per hour. (Later, a rotary press that could do four times the hourly work of the Davidson was forwarded to the front.) Before long the team, which was situated near 5<sup>th</sup> Army artillery, could compose a propaganda message, set the type, photograph it and make a plate, print and roll the leaflet into shells and have it fired over enemy lines in no more than two hours.<sup>202</sup>

Leaflet operations continued after Pantelleria, of course, as did the distribution of the English-language news sheet, *Confetti*, to inform the fliers as to what they were dropping on their missions. As well, PWB now provided an English-language copy of each leaflet for air and ground crew. PWB's Leaflet Division was headed by the veteran Heber Blankenhorn. Blankenhorn's unit was certainly kept busy, disseminating almost 12 million leaflets over the Italian mainland in September 1943 alone. Only 2.7 million were directed against German forces in Italy, the remainder toward Italian troops.<sup>203</sup> The latter, for the most part, hardly needed such urging, and it can be seen now that most of these leaflets, particularly the "Safe Passage" surrender message were just so much wasted effort, however clever their execution. One such leaflet, however, was "too good to be true" at least so far as Italian troops were concerned. It simply repeated the very successful "food" and "good treatment" leaflets of the AEF in World War I, with many photos depicting the "good life" in any

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*Propaganda Team*, 5 April 1944, 10.

<sup>199</sup>Memo to CO(?), PWB, subject: "The Putting up of Posters in Palermo," 2 August 1943, Herz Papers.

<sup>200</sup>Editions of the southern edition of *Luftpost* in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>201</sup>"Colonel Hazeltine's Diaries for PWB Field Set-Up," January 1944, OWI Historian records of the PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 4, "PWB: Italy -1943" folder.

<sup>202</sup>1<sup>st</sup> MRBC unit history, 39.

<sup>203</sup>"Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 4, originals of PWB leaflets against Italian and German soldiers are in USASOC History Archives.

U.S. Army POW camp, including fresh eggs for breakfast. And it was all basically true. However, Italian POW simply could not believe that conditions, even in the American camps, could really be quite that good. The leaflet had to be reluctantly discarded.<sup>204</sup> More successful was the leaflet that vaguely (and somewhat ungrammatically) but persuasively proclaimed:

Italian Soldiers! You are surrounded, come over to us  
Americans. And you will eat like we do.<sup>205</sup>

Almost all PWB leaflets carried a surrender/good treatment theme, one that assured prisoners of a fair deal and return to their families. The Italian or German soldier was to be given an alibi for his surrender. He must never be encouraged to desert; this appeal only prompted resentment. The choice not to fight had to be made in the face of "hopeless odds." Hostile, condescending or sarcastic themes and language, of course, were ruled out completely.

PWB technicians also improbably helped to save the Italian fleet from falling into the hands of the Germans. They persuaded its commanders to surrender their warships even before the news of the Italian surrender had become public. These specialists labored throughout the night of 7 September 1943 to convert their transmitter frequencies to the International Distress frequency, the only wavelength over which they could reach the Italian mariners. Although the Allies had been in communication with the fleet for years and British paratroopers had actually landed at one Italian naval base, it was the PWB message that brought out the fleet: four battleships, 6 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and 14 submarines. Surveying this powerful fleet tamely steaming into the Grand Harbor of Malta, Commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet is supposed to have remarked to an aide, "Tell General McClure that they've accomplished in one day with propaganda what I've been trying to do for three years with the Navy."<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup>Herz, "Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12-13 (Fall, 1949); HQ., The crack German Hermann Goering Division had the same reaction to the "eggs for your breakfast" line., 5<sup>th</sup> Army PWB, *Functions of the Fifth Army Combat Propaganda Team*; Later, U.S. psywarriors spared the Germans the information that Henry Kaiser was launching merchant ships at the rate of one every five days, in deference to the Germans' "realism.", *ibid.* The reaction of Axis troops to the well-documented fact that POWs in the U.S. on occasion ate in railway dining cars, complete with linen and silverware (while Black U.S. troops, when permitted these amenities, had to enjoy them behind screens) beggars the imagination.

<sup>205</sup>OWI Historian, Records of the PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5, "PWB Leaflets" folder.

<sup>206</sup>Erdmann, 126; Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 174; E M. Kirby and J. W. Harris, "Surrender of the Italian Fleet -1943," *Casebook*. Carroll terms the quote merely a

For the first time in U.S. history American psywarriors also employed electronic psywar in the field, in September 1944. Engineers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Section of the 1<sup>st</sup> MRBC recorded POW interviews for front line broadcasts, and reproduced the sound effects of vast numbers of tanks and other motor vehicles for Allied armored units in attempts to mislead German intelligence and to lower enemy morale.<sup>207</sup>

At the end of 1943 Colonel Hazeltine was "summarily relieved," (He had probably stepped on too many Army toes by his easy-going ways.) with his command passing informally to the PWB Deputy Chief, Mr. C. D. Jackson, a former *Time-Life* executive. Hazeltine's executive was also informally instructed to take control of the strictly military aspects of PWB, including that carried out by the British personnel of PWB. A new pattern of psywar was emerging, in which combat propaganda began to fit into the tactical requirements of the army commanders concerned, working directly under their control, but within the directives of the civilian-dominated AFQ.<sup>208</sup> Until the summer of 1944, PWB remained under loose military control, dominated in leadership and policy-making by civilians, with military troops providing mainly administrative and technical support and most of the equipment.<sup>209</sup> Another, more somber, personnel note was struck at this time with the first PWB battle casualties: four Killed in Action by the end of 1943.<sup>210</sup>

Shell leaflets were now disseminated regularly by Army staff order, in contrast to the hit-or-miss situation North Africa and Sicily. A PWB Combat Team had enjoyed good results by having 20 leaflet rounds fired at a range of 6,000 yards and fused to explode over a farmhouse in which they had taken shelter. The team found that all leaflets had fallen within fifty yards of the farmhouse target. But leaflet shelling remained to the end of the Italian campaign little more than what a 5<sup>th</sup> Army report would term "only in the experimental stage."<sup>211</sup>

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"pleasantry." The escape of the Italian fleet was not without its cost: the newest battleship in the Italian Navy, *Roma*, was struck by a German television-guided flying bomb and sank with very heavy loss of life.

<sup>207</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> MRBC unit history, 33.

<sup>208</sup> "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 11. See also letter from the Associate Director of OWI to Lilly on Hazeltine's relief. Lilly papers, RG; "PWD [*sic.*] Combat Team," speech transcript (no author), OWI Historian Records of PWB, 1942-1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 1, "PWB Combat Team" folder.

<sup>209</sup> Laurie, "Wonder Weapon," (no pagination.)

<sup>210</sup> "Psychological Warfare: OWI Runs School for Propagandists," *Life*, 13 December 1943. According to one reported example, "Prior to this [reorganization], Captain Foster and Corporal Manning used to load a 'Peep' [Jeep?] trailer with leaflet shells that they had loaded themselves and drive up to the front and beg and coax battalion commanders to fire them."

<sup>211</sup> OWI "Outpost Service Bureaus," 24 March 1944, OWI Historian records of PWB, 1942-1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 10, "O-Algeria, Russell Barnes" folder; Bishop thesis, 153-154; CPT John Dabinette, "History, 5<sup>th</sup> Army Combat Propaganda Team,"

Psywar personnel were involved in the bombing raids on Rome, dropping special leaflets to justify this politically sensitive operation. Whatever the cost in adverse publicity, these bombings were considered essential to PWB in that Rome's extensive communications and transportation facilities provided psywarriors with adequate printing supplies, presses and personnel for the first time as well as completely adequate radio broadcasting facilities. Italian patriots seized Roman broadcasting studios after receiving PWB instructions from the Anzio beachhead.<sup>212</sup>

At about this time, PWB drew up and dropped leaflets over such cultural centers as Florence, Pisa, and Livorno, encouraging Italians to preserve their art treasures and at the same time countering the German-fostered theme of the Americans as Cola-swilling, jazz-crazed barbarians.<sup>213</sup> The PWB radio trucks, half-buried in a quarry, also entertained the troops (again, probably on both sides) and again provided liaison with Italian partisans. The latter in particular seemed to have been quite effective. Upon arrival in Rome 5<sup>th</sup> Army combat Propaganda Team found that utilities had been safeguarded from German demolitions more or less in line with earlier instructions from Anzio.<sup>214</sup>

German psywar at Anzio, in turn, was quite knowledgeable, including a steal from the *Feldpostkarte* AEF leaflet of World War I. Most appealing was a idiomatic program guide for the German radio station, "Jerry's Front"

featuring "The big show with SALLY, JERRY, GEORGE, PETE, GLADYS, OSCAR, THE SWINGING TIGERS, AMERICAN RECORDS, THE LATEST NEWS and whatever the producer feels like unloading on you...." A snappy half-hour of dance tunes with a few news items and practically NO TALK!<sup>215</sup>

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23 December 1944, "Miscellaneous Activity Report," 3; PWB....," The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, "Report on Psychological Warfare," typescript, n.d. [c. 1946], 35; G. B. Foster, "Psychological Warfare Leaflet Shells," *Field Artillery Journal* (April 1945). The PWB "Report on Shell-Leaflets in the Fifth Army's Campaign" (11 September 1944) claimed that "The superiority of artillery for disseminating leaflets over enemy front-line troops had thus been established beyond dispute.", but gave only one example. quoted in Berger, *Wartime Leaflets*, 93.

<sup>212</sup>"Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 11; Army General School, "Psychological Warfare NCO Course #2 (Ft. Riley, Kansas: March 1952), 6-7; Erdmann, 124. The fate of these partisans, after the Allies found themselves bogged down on the Anzio beaches and far from Rome, is unrecorded.

<sup>213</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 278.

<sup>214</sup>"Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 5; First MBRBC unit history, 20.

<sup>215</sup>Berger, 126. Examples of German leaflets at Anzio are reproduced in Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 82-83. The German commander in Italy Field Marshal Albert Kesselring provided an effective riposte to the Allied "surrounded" leaflet by



A German "malingering" leaflet, well-written in GI slang, emphasizing that U.S. front-line troops at Anzio had been in the line more than long enough and that now it was time to dig out the "Naples Types" to take their turn, may have actually caused some increase in sick calls.<sup>216</sup>

Overall, however, there was no comparison between the effectiveness of German and Allied psywar. One report of about the time of Anzio stated that of surrendering German troops, "Over 40 percent had leaflets on them.", and many others actually apologized for not having the leaflets. One German officer asserted that the "clever and effective" U.S. propaganda was better than anything he had encountered on the Eastern Front or in France.<sup>217</sup> An Air Liaison Officer enthused that as early as "the fall of 1943, virtually all doubt as to the effectiveness of propaganda leaflets in helping achieve the objectives of modern war had been dispelled....Army Groups were asking for leaflets...."<sup>218</sup> Still, the record seems to indicate that many "German" Army prisoners were more likely in reality impressed Poles, Rumanians, etc. with little stomach for Germany's wars.<sup>219</sup>

PWB's efforts were complicated by the polyglot nature of the troops involved: Africans, Poles, (on both sides) Britons, Americans, Brazilians, Indians, Germans, Ukrainians, Rumanians, Russians, Uzbeks, Kalmyks, Balts, etc., not to mention Italians themselves (also on both sides.) Although PWB personnel were kept busy designing leaflets for the enemy's variegated ethnic groups, even they could be stymied on occasion by its complexity. The U.S. 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division had requested two leaflets for Turcomen troops of the enemy's 162<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division opposite them. One was turned out in Uzbek, the other in Kazak, but still the leaflets were not exactly correct and thus less effective, due to the various dialects within the Turcomen language.<sup>220</sup> PWB resorted to an all-purpose leaflet, in Italian, German, Polish, and Slovene, addressed to the Italian civilian population, to garner as many of these non-German troops as possible:

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reproducing a map of the entire Italian "boot," vividly demonstrating just how small a segment was taken up by the Anzio beachhead. HQ AGF, to distribution, subject: "Observers' Notes on the Italian Campaign during period 13 December 1943-May 1944," Military History Institute Archives.

<sup>216</sup>Margolin, *Paper Bullets*, 99-100. Margolin claims that this leaflet didn't work. "Our medics can spot a fake a mile away." Oral interview, author with Lieutenant General William Yarborough (Ret.) (an Anzio veteran), 30 June 1990.

<sup>217</sup>"Propaganda Reaction Survey Covering Period 9 September 1943 to 2 May 1945," OWI Historian Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5, "PWB Leaflets" folder.

<sup>218</sup>Erdmann, 14.

<sup>219</sup>HQ, AGF, AWC, memo, subject: "Observers' Notes on the Italian Campaign During the Period 25 August to 7 October 1943," 5 December 1943," MHI Archives.

<sup>220</sup>5<sup>th</sup> Army PWB, report, 24 June 1944, RG 94, AG, 5<sup>th</sup> Army, box 2394, 105-39 folder.

The soldier in German uniform who shows you this safe-conduct is a Pole, a Yugoslav, a Czechoslovak or a man of some other non-German nationality, who has been forced against his will to serve in the German Army, and has escaped. You are instructed to give him shelter, food, clothes and every other kind of help necessary to enable him to reach the Allied lines.<sup>221</sup>

A sampling of other PWB leaflets against German troops in the field in Italy shows, for example, *Die Ostfront Am 15 Marz 1944* ("The Eastern Front on 15 May 1944") with a blood-red tide advancing ever westward, and spoke of "Die Tragodie der Deutschen 8. Armee" in the face of this tide. Another challenged "Deutsche Offiziere!

The Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz made it a principle of warfare that the first aim of a General should be the destruction of the enemy and not the capture of a place or territory...The German leadership, which, regardless of the consequences, has always striven with the stubbornness of a madman, to hold on to one military unsuccessful position after another -Stalingrad, Tunisia, the Ukraine and now the Baltic States and Italy -and in this way has driven a whole German generation to death in vain....If one looks upon the ruins of German industrial cities and upon the completely defeated German divisions, annihilated to the last man or taken prisoner in Russia, it can scarcely be denied that the Allied strategic plan is slowly being realized.

Although referring to the venerated Clausewitz may have been a master-stroke in this leaflet designed for German officers, it might still be criticized for leaving no way out for its audience. ("I agree basically with everything you say, but what can I do about it?").

Another leaflet contrasted the "lies" of the official Deutsches Nachrichtenbuero (DNB) with the facts:

The Fifth American Army under the Command of Lieutenant General Mark Clark has been annihilated in the battle of Salerno...." **THE TRUTH IS** that in spite of your heroic resistance and in spite of the strongest counter-attacks the German

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<sup>221</sup>Original copy and translation in USASOC History Archives. The German translation was for the benefit of "Volksdeutsch," Germans living outside the borders of the Reich, who were liable for call-up to the German forces.

army had to abandon this sector of the front just as it has had to abandon other sectors of others [sic] fronts....

This leaflet could also be criticized for offering "no way out." But PWB propagandists would have likely responded that they were really designed more to lower morale

More specific, *Nur Ein Sicherer Weg nach Hause* ("The Only Sure Road Home") informed

German soldiers in the south! You have fought bravely at Cassino, on the Nettuno beach-head and on many other battle-fields. But all that you achieved by your courage was to postpone -for a few weeks -a shattering defeat. We promise you no life of luxury; but you will be decently treated, as soldiers who have done their duty. PRISONERS OF WAR HAVE THE FOLLOWING PRIVILEGES:...."

Along similar lines, a leaflet addressed "TO THE RETREATING GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TROOPS", pointed out three possibilities 1)Be in the vanguard of the retreat, "to fight again in Northern Italy...Russia, in time for the Red Army's summer offensive, or to Western Europe, to face the coming Allied invasion. 2)Be in the rear-guard..."until you are either killed or wounded or taken prisoner. 3)Lag behind...give yourselves up quietly to our patrols.....he will be more useful to his Fatherland alive than dead."<sup>222</sup>

It should be noted that none of these or other PWB leaflets denigrated the German soldier; even the "retreating German and Austrian troops" were not "shamefully" or "rapidly" retreating. Their resistance was "brave," even "heroic." The idea, logical enough, but one apparently difficult for America's enemies in most wars to grasp, was simply that angering enemy troops does not make for effective psywar. As 5<sup>th</sup> Army Headquarters wisely put it:

We have learned, partly from the effects of German leaflets on our own troops, partly from other evidence, that hostile, condescending or sarcastic leaflets -- no matter how much fun to write -- defeat their own premise. In a war among soldiers, recognition of the enemies' soldierly qualities, credit for bravery, soldier-to-soldier talk...are like butter on bread - they make

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<sup>222</sup>Originals or copies of these leaflets, with translations, are in USASOC History Archives. From same source, see collection of topical leaflets for German soldiers in Italy, including *Germany's Situation*, *Allied Air Offensive*, *Allied Aircraft Production*, *The Second Front [It's Coming]*, etc.

swallowing easier.<sup>223</sup>

Admittedly, this principle was fairly easy to apply on the Italian front, where both sides fought a fierce but usually "gentlemanly" war with a merciful absence of atrocities (except for the Germans' operations against the Italians, and vice-versa). But this concept of not denigrating opponents also prevailed later in Korea and Vietnam, where the enemy certainly did not "fight according to the book."

Acting on a suggestion from British 8<sup>th</sup> Army staff, PWB Leaflet Section brought out, early in November 1943, *Frontpost*, a news letter for enemy combat troops. The idea came from the staff of the British 8<sup>th</sup> Army, but Heber Blankenhorn, must have remembered his own news sheet of World War I. At any rate the bi-weekly *Frontpost*, with its information from the fronts, home news (including sports), jokes, puzzles, maps became easily the most read, if not most influential, U.S. printed propaganda of the war. PWB psywarriors also prepared *Nachrichten aus der Heimat* ("News From Home.") Both papers fulfilled the longing of German troops for something to read that somewhat approximated the truth, even if it came from the enemy. *Frontpost* early built up its reputation and readership by more or less frankly reporting Allied losses (e.g. the German recapture of Zhitomir, or Allied shipping losses) In fact, some POWs complained if their *Frontpost* deliveries had been late!<sup>224</sup>

The final news letter for German troops, fittingly, was *Lagerpost* a daily for German POWs still being held in Italy, and composed basically along the lines of *Frontpost*. It was begun shortly after the German capitulation by officers of the 5<sup>th</sup> Army PWB combat propaganda team and used selected German prisoners with journalistic experience. Although requests for the journal ran as high as 60,000 per day, no more than 20,000 were ever run off, due to U.S. personnel shortages. Those copies were apparently read to pieces by the thoroughly bored captives, anxious to know about conditions in their battered homeland as well as simply as keen as ever to read anything in print.<sup>225</sup>

Another operation was designed for an ally rather than the enemy. This was *Italia Combate*, a combined leaflet and radio enterprise directed toward the Italian partisans behind German lines. The operation was headed by Mr. Albert Spalding, an American concert violinist who spoke the language like a native. Spalding had served in the U.S. Army as a liaison officer to the Italian Army in World War I under the future mayor of New York City, Fiorello LaGuardia. Based on various Allied and

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<sup>223</sup>PWB Hq., 5<sup>th</sup> Army, *Functions of the 5<sup>th</sup> Army Combat Propaganda Team* (April 1944), 16.

<sup>224</sup>Margolin, *Paper Bullets*; Appendix, "Intelligence Summary on Enemy Reaction to Frontline Leaflets, December 1943 and January 1944," "Outline of Operations for year February 1943-February 1944," n.d. folder, RG 208, entry 6g, box 11, "PWD" folder; "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 5-6. Run of *Frontpost* and *Nachrichten aus der Heimat* in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>225</sup>"Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 8.

Italian intelligence initiatives, the information for this operation was guarded with the greatest secrecy. *Italia Combatta* sent out instructions for military operations against the Germans as well as forestalling their attempts at a "scorched earth" policy in their measured retreat, identified enemy spies (a number of whom were promptly executed by the partisans), and emphasized that the partisans were part of Allied forces and must conduct themselves accordingly. As late as 30 May 1944 the newspaper warned that "this is not the moment for mass action, it is opportune to increase your attacks where this is made possible by the withdrawal of large formations of German troops."

But less than one week later the clandestine operation scored an impressive success. *Italia Combatta* instructed the Italian General Bencivenga to assume the temporary military governorship of Rome pending the arrival of Allied Military Government. After having served as military governor for 48 hours, General Bencivenga turned over the administration of Rome without difficulty. The disciplined and effective work of the Italian partisans undoubtedly had much to do with the sustenance and direction of *Italia Combatta*.<sup>226</sup>

A more specific and focused leaflet also proved quickly effective. The Germans had established a training school for Italian spies, several of whose graduates had been picked up and promptly executed by firing squad. Several PWB leaflets gave the location of the institution, as well as the names of some of its late graduates and details of their fate. Soon enough the school had to be closed down.<sup>227</sup> Another PWB specific leaflet drop was designed to save lives by warning Italian civilians to escape from the Cassino monastery prior to its controversial obliteration by Allied bombers.<sup>228</sup>

As early as the end of 1943, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall was reliably reported to have acknowledged that "The effect of psychological warfare and propaganda on enemy soldiers and enemy civilians seem [sic] too well known...to need proof of its necessity."<sup>229</sup> By April 1944 General Clark was well enough aware of PWB's work to write that

properly used, propaganda does weaken the enemy's morale; does make him give up more easily; does cause him to fire fewer bullets at our troops; and on occasion, does persuade him to cross the line and quite the fight altogether.... Propaganda helps shorten the war and to save Allied lives. That is why the Fifth Army will

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<sup>226</sup>"Psywar in the Mediterranean," 6-7; Bishop, 156; "Italia Combatta," anon. *Casebook*. Selected issues of the newspaper are to be found in the USASOC History Archives.

<sup>227</sup>Captain John Logan, "PW in Europe," 12 May 1944, in "Washington Weekly Intelligencer," OWI, #20, 23 December 1944, RG 208, entry 6g, box 12, "Washington Weekly Intelligencer" folder; Margolin, *Paper Bullets*.

<sup>228</sup>Denlinger, "Miscellaneous Activity Report," 13.

<sup>229</sup>S. C. Menefee, "Propaganda Wins Battles," *Nation* (12 February 1944).

continue to use it.<sup>230</sup>

As at Anzio, the Germans did not take Allied propaganda in silence. Dug-in or retreating in good order, they had the time and the morale to direct fairly sophisticated propaganda against U.S. and Allied troops that, in another time and place, might have proven more successful. American Black troops were targeted, and with the same themes as used in World War I: lynchings, shacks, race riots -- "Is this What You're Fighting For?" Another, addressed "To all members of the Colored Division," proclaimed that:

The American colored soldier who is presenting this certificate has ceased to fight. He is to be removed at once from the combat area. He is to be well looked after and to receive food and medical attention as required.

But this leaflet probably served more to remind Black American soldiers of their "separate but equal" status than to persuade them to sample the delights of a POW camp. At any rate, coming from the Nazis, racial appeals could hardly be taken seriously.<sup>231</sup> A series of six German leaflets, designed to lower morale, was eagerly snapped up by American soldiers --as souvenirs.<sup>232</sup> The Germans, unlike the Allies, were not above using lubricious sex themes, some quite imaginative and well beyond a simple "Who's Sleeping With Your Wife?". One leaflet displayed a nude female holding a copy of *Death* magazine, in the exact format of *Life* magazine. (Another used the same theme, except that on this cover *Death* featured a skull in a British [?] helmet.) Another quoted that "Gentlemen Prefer Blondes," featuring a slick (draft-dodging?) male attending a physically well-endowed female. The reverse, "But Blondes Don't Like Cripples." showed a one-legged lugubrious Allied soldier.<sup>233</sup> A particularly vile cartoon series, designed to appeal to any GI anti-Semitic feelings by playing on the "who's sleeping with your wife" theme, chronicled the low-life adventures of "Sam Levy, Jewish war profiteer. "Levy" has his evil way with the fiancée of Bob, a decent Aryan-American draftee type, while "piling up big money in war contracts." Bob finally returns from "the fight for the cause of Sam Levy and his kind" --minus both a leg and his fiancée. The series was extremely well-written, employing the most up-to-date slang and idioms ("pulling down 60 bucks," "slick-hairdo home front warrior," "sugar daddy's darling," etc.) and even using the name of

<sup>230</sup>Quoted in Erdmann, *Leaflet Operations*, 120; also in Denlinger, "Miscellaneous Activity Reports," 13.

<sup>231</sup>Berger, *Wartime Leaflets*, 70-71. Copies of several of these German leaflets may be found in the USASOC Historical Archives slide collection.

<sup>232</sup>"Leaflet Quiz No. 1," *Perspectives* (journal of the Psychological Warfare Association), 9 #1 (Spring 1993).

<sup>233</sup>These German leaflets, with others, are found in USASOC History Archives slides.



Joe is so far away  
over there on the front  
and I'd love to go out  
and have a good time  
again. There's so little  
chance of Joe coming  
home. Well, I guess  
I'll just give Sam a call.

German sex, plus anti-Semitism. "What about calling up Sam Levy..." Lifted from an American telephone company ad exhorting Americans to reduce their calls for the war effort.

# BUY AN APPLE



**"Brother  
got a dime for me!"**

## „BROTHER GOT A DIME FOR ME . . . .“

You certainly know that song of 1920  
In those days, Ex-Servicemen were selling apples in the streets  
Veterans were forced to organize a hunger march to Washington  
to get their bonus, which the politicians had promised to them  
for twenty years.  
Well, all that happened after the great victory of 1918. Was  
it a great victory for the amorphous masses, the banner of  
the Ex-Serviceman?

### NO, CERTAINLY NOT!

He was good enough to risk his life a thousand times, but

### AFTER THE WAR HE WAS FORGOTTEN.

When the great plans of the war industry closed up the industry  
after the armistice, the ex-soldier faced unemployment and  
misery for many years.

### WHAT WILL BECOME OF YOU AFTER THIS WAR?

The very same thing will happen again.  
Every war in history was followed by a great depression and  
widespread unemployment.  
Do not be a fool and believe the bombastic talk emanating from  
busy propaganda offices in Washington about everlasting peace  
and prosperity after this war.  
Get this through your head:  
There is only one class of people profiting from any war:  
Wall Street and the Jews.  
They want you to fight because your blood will bring fat dividends  
to the moneyed gang in Wall Street. For their profit you  
are expected to give your life or to return home day as a  
cripple, only as

**SELL APPLES AGAIN!**

German "morale" leaflet, ETO, World War II. Another Great Depression is awaiting your return. But badly done. (And wasn't it "Brother Can You Spare a Dime?")



# DEATH



You Yanks read *Life*, how about *Death*? (German, WW II).



German, directed at the all-Black 92d Infantry Division in Italy. The Nazis going on about racism?!

an actual American Official with a Jewish-sounding name (Mordecai Ezekiel).<sup>234</sup>

What Paul Linebarger terms "defensive psychological warfare" in the *Wehrmacht* was in the hands of *Propagandakompanien* or "propaganda companies" (PK). These military field units combined the duties of combat propaganda teams: that is, printing, radio and leaflet broadcasting, loudspeaker work and POW interrogation, with the maintaining of troop morale in their own forces. In effect, the PKs combined propaganda and information-education missions. In that they had to be current with the latest Allied propaganda, PK personnel could do a fairly effective job of countering that propaganda, the further they were removed from the Nazi propaganda machine and its repulsive political-racial themes.<sup>235</sup>

*Wehrmacht* propaganda was headed by Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar, termed by Wallace Carroll (with some hyperbole) "the outstanding military propagandist of the war.", and a "master of calculated frankness and of an elliptical mode of expression." Dittmar's combat psywar was carried out by Propaganda Platoons of the Propaganda Company, which included several loudspeaker trucks and, later, propaganda mortars, the latter unknown among Allied psywarriors. Aside from the customary jurisdictional rivalries between Nazi fiefdoms, Dittmar and Dr. Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry feuded over the former's attempts to have his propaganda conform somewhat to the truth (at least according to General Dittmar), and Goebbels supposed technique of the "Big Lie." (Except for the conflict over the "Big Lie" question, this quarrel was not totally unlike the ongoing rivalry between OWI, OSS, and Army PWD.)<sup>236</sup>

German Army field propagandists emphasized that this was "Roosevelt's (or

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<sup>234</sup>Linebarger, 138-139. See also Bill Mauldin, *Up Front* (Cleveland and New York: 1945), 95-97. It is difficult to escape the suspicion that this technically excellent leaflet in an unspeakable cause might have been composed by a renegade American. The canard that Jews stayed home to make money and to steal the women of the men fighting overseas was not entirely confined to the Nazis.

<sup>235</sup>Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 223. If persuasion did not work, the German military were prepared to use draconian penalties to counter Allied psywar. An order to German forces in southern Italy ordered all such leaflets to be turned in upon pain of imprisonment or even death. "Survey of Reports from Various Sources of Leaflet-Shells fired by British 10 Corps and American 6 Corps on the 5<sup>th</sup> Army Front for the Period of 9 September to 20 October 1943," memo, n.d., Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 2, "Italy" folder

<sup>236</sup>Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 241; W. Boelke, ed. *The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels: The Nazi Propaganda War, 1939-1945* (New York: 1970); K. Hesse, "German Wehrmacht Propaganda in World War II," *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift* (Switzerland), August 1950, translated for *Military Review*, March 1951; J. R. Willis, "The Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch: German Military Propaganda and Censorship during World War II," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1964; Baird.

"Rosenfeldt's") War," and harped on labor union demands, "Jewish racketeers," post-war unemployment, fighting for the British Empire, and the enfeebled state of the U.S. economy. (or the reverse, "Draft-dodging war profiteers are living it up while you rot in foxholes.") But their efforts were hampered by their inability to resist injecting into their work excessive "messages" (Roosevelt/Rosenfeldt and the Jews, Bolshevism, capitalism) and, as in World War I, their work was weakened by use of British spellings or Germanic usages ("POW Life Assurance Company", "The Wall Street" "Pte" [for "PVT"], honour, etc.). Enemy leaflets also could prove careless in spelling or syntax ("it effects everybody", "A plain wooden cross *in* foreign soil.").<sup>237</sup> Nonetheless, OWI reported that German leaflets were "prepared with both objectivity [that was going a bit far] and skill.... Their weakness lies in a dearth of usable factual material [i.e. victories]...but their technique is sound." Presumably referring to all that skill used without factual basis in a worthless cause, the report concluded with the hilarious analogy that "German leaflet writers today are not unlike Toscanini conducting the Dixie Ragtime Players."<sup>238</sup>

The activities of PWB were not confined to Italy. The newsletter *Soldaten Nachrichten* was printed in Cairo and dropped over German troops in Greece as early as December 1942, followed by a wide range of similar publications in leaflet form as well as radio broadcasts to enemy forces in Albania, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia. These messages seemed to have had some effect on the local populations. A British liaison officer passed on complaints from his area that no leaflets had been received for some weeks. The Rumanian government decreed that

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<sup>237</sup>Herz Papers, box 1, folder 13 for examples. Also see USASOC History Archives for actual German leaflets or slides of leaflets. German leaflets could also wildly exaggerate: "In the face of insurmountable odds a thousand men of the crack British Guards surrendered.", quoted in Psychological Warfare NCO Course, "Bandwagon Lesson" (Ft. Riley, KS: March 1952), 4. Note that the "crack British Guards" unit is not identified.

<sup>238</sup>Margolis, *Paper Bullets*; OWI *Leaflet News letter*, 1, #1, 23 March 1943; "Leaflet Quiz No. 1," *Perspectives*, 9, #1 (Spring 1993); "Leaflet News letter," OWI Historian Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5, "Leaflet News letter, area III" folder. Another report, from the AFGQ Information and Censorship Section, referred to "such seemingly innocuous and puerile leaflets", but warned that they "do have a subversive effect, especially on troops who are relatively immobilized and are enduring physical hardship.", "Enemy Psychological Warfare to Allied Troops," Records of PWB Historian, Psychological Warfare Branch, 1942-1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 11, "Algiers" folder. Bill Mauldin, the famous "The GI Cartoonist," noted that German leaflets "sometimes show more ingenuity. They know our fondness for comic strips and often illustrate their leaflets. What these pamphlets lack in truth they make up in reader interest.", and referred specifically to the "Sam Levy" strip. ("The continuity was awkward, but the pictures were spicy and the guys were hard up for reading matter."), Mauldin, *Up Front* (New York: 1945), 45.

anyone not turning in such leaflets would be treated as an enemy agent, and a leading Budapest newspaper wrote that "The leaflet is just as dangerous a weapon of warfare as bombs or exploding toys." (the latter reference is unclear), while the Germans in Yugoslavia produced a close copy of the OWI leaflet *Glasnik*, subtly slanted to their own viewpoint.<sup>239</sup> In a reprise of the Pantelleria operation, the Greek island of Corfu was "covered" with leaflets from low-flying fighter-bombers, demanding the surrender of the German garrison. Within 18 hours of the paper barrage, the garrison commander had surrendered his command.<sup>240</sup>

The PWB/OWI teams also had their failures. At the hard-fought Anzio beachhead in May 1944, PWB blundered, according to German POWs, in no less than four leaflets: 1)"You are Surrounded," when it was obvious that the Allies were hanging on by their teeth. 2)"Your Wives May be Unfaithful," an unworthy leaflet violently and rightly resented by German POWs, and, fortunately, not repeated. 3)Ridicule of the V-1 pilot-less "buzz-bomb." It was no laughing matter. 4)"You Won't Live to See Another Christmas" seemed to be making mock of German sentiment.<sup>241</sup>

At Monte Atuzzo a German unit had suffered heavy casualties from Allied artillery and air bombardment, which had also interdicted their food and water resupply. These troops would obviously seem good candidates for psywar. PWB dropped such leaflets as the logical "Why Fight in Italy When the Allies are in Germany?" , which were apparently read by the target unit. The result was precisely nothing.<sup>242</sup>

Leaflet distribution in the Italian campaign benefited from the hard-won experience of North Africa. From modest beginnings in that earlier campaign until February 1945 Allied artillery shot more than four and one-half million leaflets over enemy lines, with ten times as many dropped by air over the same period. (For some reason, PWB rarely employed loudspeakers on the Italian front.)<sup>243</sup>

Air dissemination was also greatly improved, with the 334<sup>th</sup> Wing carrying most of the leaflets, sometimes along with supply drops to resistance groups in Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The wing was also occasionally allocated special aircraft which carried leaflets exclusively, up to 4,000 pounds per aircraft. In

<sup>239</sup>PWB Bari, head, Publication Unit #9, "Survey of Year's Activities," 9 December 1944, OWI Historian Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 4, "PWB Italy" folder. Original copies of *Glasnik* leaflets are in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>240</sup>Ibid. Greek leaflets may also be found in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>241</sup>PWB, 5<sup>th</sup> Army, RG 208, entry 6g, box 11, "Psywar in Mediterranean" folder. To be fair, PWB also reported that it had successfully used smoke screens to veil German deserters making their way to Allied lines at Anzio. *ibid.*

<sup>242</sup>C. B. MacDonald, S. Matthews, *Three Battles: Arneville, Altuzzo and Schmidt* (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington: 1952), 239-240

<sup>243</sup>"Combat Propaganda, The Aims and Characteristics of Propaganda to the Enemy," SHAEF Special Staff, PWD, RG 133, box 11, folder 091.1412 folder, 16.

addition, the PWB publication unit maintained a liaison officer at the 334<sup>th</sup>'s airfield to brief crews and supervise the stowage and loading of leaflets. PWB was later able to secure the services of RAF and USAAF air wings of the 15<sup>th</sup> Army Air Force, based at the Foggia airfields complex, with the British flying their Wellington medium bombers by night, and the Americans their B-24 "heavies" by day in leaflet dropping missions whose parameters extended to France, Bulgaria, Germany, and Greece --in all eleven countries. A special weekly mission of 12 B-25 USAAF medium bombers, carrying exclusively T-1 leaflet bombs from November 1943 on carried the same priority as any other bombing mission. Still later, the fighters and fighter bombers of the (USAAF) Balkan Air Force took up the task in their area of operations. In contrast to the situation in the ETO, no special leaflet squadrons or special bombers were specifically dedicated to leaflet dissemination, although many special missions were flown. In all, PWB claimed, perhaps somewhat unrealistically, that only about 20 percent of its leaflets were "wasted."<sup>244</sup>

But accurate air dropping of leaflets remained one of PWB's toughest problems, and hand dumping or dropping from flare chutes remained the prevailing method until quite late in the war. The PWB did work closely with 15<sup>th</sup> Air Force on the problem, eventually settling on the M-26 100-pound flare bomb, the only such device used with any success, but the war ended in Europe before this leaflet bomb could be used on a large scale.<sup>245</sup>

By the end of the Italian campaign PWB/OWI of AFHQ could claim that about half of German troops had been "reached" by Allied propaganda. Personnel of the PWB had evolved quite effective POW interrogation techniques. They could often interview an enemy soldier within minutes of his capture and before he had begun to

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<sup>244</sup>PWB-Bari, "Survey of a Year's Activities." This same source claimed that relations with the air units was so good that on one occasion an RAF Group Captain flew his own plane with a load of leaflets over Sofia, Bulgaria, when no other aircraft were available., 3. "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 10; Air Historical Office, HQ, Army Air Forces, "Special Operations: AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements, 1943-1945," n.p., June, 1947, 153-156. Yet as late as 6 June 1944 (D-Day for Northern Europe) a prominent PWB official complained to a USAAF officer that "Seldom have I found a real understanding of the value of propaganda leaflets....the bulk of the opinion is that the leaflets are taking up room which should be used for bombs." John R. Snyder, memo to Col. Lethbridge, 6 June 1944, OWI Historians Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5 "PWB Leaflets" folder. The Allies had originally also used Italian aircraft and crews for leaflet dissemination. The practice had to be sharply restricted when the Americans discovered that some Royalist aircrews were surreptitiously dropping monarchical literature over the countryside! Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 276.

<sup>245</sup>"Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 14. Blankenhorn reported that early in the war he had "tried to get the air force (sic) to experiment with improving the methods of leaflet dropping", with no success. "Combat Propaganda," 10.

"acclimatize" himself to camp life and learn what would please his captors. The prisoner would be put at his ease, addressed with respect and *not* immediately offered a cigarette (which would seem too obviously a bribe, even if he were salivating at the sight of a pack of Camels or Lucky Strikes.) "Delicate" questions, such as the name of the prisoner's commanding officer, would be put off until some rapport had been established and no time would be wasted on personal details that could be ascertained easily enough later from camp records. The POW was never asked "How was morale in your outfit?", but rather casually questioned about mail, leave, rations, etc.; PWB recognized that deserters were unreliable informants on unit morale. Any question as to whether the prisoner was a member of the Nazi Party were useless; a soldier might well have belonged to the Hitler Youth and in full sympathy with Nazism and still not have been a Party member, or, conversely, had to become a member to hold a position of some authority, but have remained only a "nominal" Nazi. Also unasked was whether he thought Germany would win the war; far better were inquiries about his post-war plans. (Was he perhaps planning to settle on a farm in the Ukraine?). The PWB interrogators also made themselves familiar with German Army soldier slang and expressions: *Ari*=artillery, *Heimat*=limited service, *Sani*=first aid, *Tross*=rear echelon, *Im Einsatz*=at the front, etc. Finally, 5<sup>th</sup> Army's Combat Propaganda Team conducted a monthly POW poll, a series of questions on paper, which was to be returned unsigned, but with the prisoner's rank and unit. The POWs themselves were set to answering the poll's results under questions that assured them of their own security and which also prevented collaboration. The poll's basic aim was not so much to establish hard facts on POW morale, attitudes toward the war and the Nazis, etc., as the discovery of the trends in those opinions, as well the balancing of these results against individual interrogations, and the providing of new fields of interrogation. The results were not taken as necessarily sincere individual opinions. Obviously, 5<sup>th</sup> Army PWB POW interrogations were not hurried hit-or-miss, field-expedient operations.<sup>246</sup> Most of these interrogation techniques were carried over to the SHAEF's Psychological Warfare Division in Western Europe after the D-Day landings.<sup>247</sup>

At the end of the war in Europe, no less than 99,315 German POWs in Italy replied to 180,000 questionnaires sent out by PWB. Of those responding, 61.6 percent of all ranks were favorably impressed by Allied propaganda (leaflets, radio, and loudspeakers). For some reason, radio was judged by a small margin as the most effective. Of radio broadcasts, 8<sup>th</sup> Army radio was by far the most listened to, with

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<sup>246</sup>5<sup>th</sup> Army PWB, *Functions*, 13-15.

<sup>247</sup>See "Combat Propaganda, The Aims and Characteristics of Propaganda to the Enemy," SHAEF Special Staff, PWD, RG 133, box 11, folder 091.1412. Nevertheless, Daniel Lerner claimed that U.S. POW interrogation was "somewhat in the rear of advanced methodology and terminology.", primarily due to a lack of any reliable means of comparing German society as a whole with the POWs., Lerner thesis, 93-100.

the BBC in third place, and Radio Moscow apparently appealing only to surviving barracks Bolsheviks.

Not surprisingly, the captives gave *Frontpost* the most favorable mentions. Other highly-rated leaflets were "News from Home," "Why Fight On?," "Return Home," "I Surrender," "Safe Conduct," and "Do Not Destroy Your Trucks," (You'll need them to transport you to comfortable POW camps.) Loudspeakers were not rated very highly due to lack of audibility, although here PWB put a favorable interpretation on things, optimistically (and perhaps improbably) claiming that even unintelligible messages pricked the enemy's curiosity. These figures are impressive in that in this case at least, the tendency of captive enemy troops to try to please their captors and the obvious fact that Germany had lost the war, were somewhat offset by these prisoners' realization that they were to an extent under the control of their officers in the camps. In fact, at least one private refused to respond because of the "strict discipline" he was still under. The poll also conceded in all honesty that the favorable response of officers had been minuscule.<sup>248</sup> German General der infanterie Guenther Blumentritt claimed after the war that U.S. propaganda had no effect in his own ETO command (of course), "But from our units in Italy we had learned that American propaganda and deception worked both well and successfully."<sup>249</sup> On a more grim note, Heber Blankenhorn reported that Allied burial details, in turning out the pockets of enemy dead, "always found leaflets."<sup>250</sup> A final indication of the effectiveness of Allied tactical propaganda was the fact that captured German records showed Army censors complaining that German troops were enclosing enemy leaflets in letters sent home.<sup>251</sup>

The PWB/OWI AFQ began its planning for the invasion of Southern France as early as May of 1944, three months before the actual landings. Operation DRAGOON psywar was basically a continuation of that waged by PWB/OWI AFQ in Italy, with the exception that here the struggle would take place on the territory of an ally. The "passionate desire" of the French to take over all psywar in their occupied nation as soon as possible promoted an early turn-over by PWB/OWI of such responsibilities. A classic combined operation was planned and executed, which saw a special French Leaflet Section under a former editor of *Coronet* magazine working closely with a special planning group of 7<sup>th</sup> U.S. Army to deal with the situation not all that different from those in Italy: polyglot personnel (Poles, Czechs, Russians, Armenians, even French), but with some demoralization among the Germans, unlike

<sup>248</sup>Ibid., 14-18, 20. PWB pointed out that the ratings of leaflets was probably skewed in favor of the more recent efforts., Ibid., 17. See also "PWB Interrogation Reports, 1 January-31 October, 1944, March 1944-May 1945," Army Adjutant General's Office, , RG 94, box 2394, 5<sup>th</sup> Army.

<sup>249</sup>[Responses to questions by General der infanterie Guenther Blumentritt, 71, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>250</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 227.

<sup>251</sup>Erdmann, 38-39.



their fellows in Italy who fought well to the end. Nine special leaflets were drawn up in six languages (not including German and French), as well as six news letters in French and German. A total of from 22 to 25 million copies were dropped before the invasion and 65 million for the entire campaign.<sup>252</sup> Unfortunately, the close cooperation with air units enjoyed in Italy did not carry over to this new campaign. Allied aircraft were assigned to drop supplies to the *Maquis* (French resistance in the countryside), and RAF pilots again willingly accepted overloads of leaflets; but only rarely did the pilots of the five USAAF B-17s attached to the units take on any leaflets for distribution. At one point the American Colonel commanding not only refused to accept any leaflets but virtually ordered the PWB liaison officer not approach him again. The British were also far more helpful and the Americans considerably less so in the publication of *Courrier des Nations Unies*, a four-page newspaper addressed to French civilians. The project was almost blocked by a shortage of printers, and PWB appealed to nearby military units to release such personnel, even providing names. The British responded, but the Americans pedantically refused on the ground that PWB allotments provided for no such use of manpower.<sup>253</sup>

In the end, the Germans evacuated Southern France with such celerity that military analysts have since wondered if the operation were really necessary. PWB personnel had difficulty in keeping up with the fast-moving campaign. A "gigantic, concentrated, public-information campaign" brought in foreign workers, civilian intelligence on German movements, as well as "significant numbers of German troops."<sup>254</sup> The French Leaflet Section reported that its leaflets had "considerably affected the morale of the German Army in Southern France.", even though only 20 percent of those troops had actually seen those leaflets, due to their rapid withdrawal. (On the other hand, 100 percent of the impressed Poles and Czechs, presumably left behind, claimed to have seen the leaflets and believed every word of them.)<sup>255</sup> The PWB news sheet *Landserpost* was directed not only at German troops but also featured Polish and Russian-language editions for those Slavic conscripts. ("You are not German. What are you worth in Hitler's eyes?") Its field units maintained liaison with the French resistance and in one case, acting on intelligence from the *Maquis*, rounded up 2,000 mostly Russian and Polish prisoners.<sup>256</sup>

The slow start in North Africa demonstrated that, PWB had much to learn on the job in Italy. But the last year in Italy and the successful campaign in Southern France showed that it had learned it well.

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<sup>252</sup>Ibid., 123-124; "Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 11-12; H. F. Pringle, "The 'Baloney Barrage' Pays Off," *Saturday Evening Post*, 31 March 1945.

<sup>253</sup>"Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean," 12.

<sup>254</sup>Erdmann, 123-124.

<sup>255</sup>G-2, 7<sup>th</sup> Army, "D-Day Leaflet Campaign for Anvil: Report of French Leaflet Section, PWB-AFHQ," Naples, 5 September 1944, RG 208, subject file, entry 6e, box 10, folder #5.

<sup>256</sup>Margolis, 72; Berger, 72.

-The European Theater of Operations-

As the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) under General Dwight Eisenhower planned for the invasion of the heart of Nazi-occupied Europe and Germany itself, the question of the organization of Allied psychological warfare arose soon enough. Even before the final German surrender in Tunisia, a conference at the British War Office had resolved to separate propaganda and publicity from intelligence in SHAEF. Two months later a plan for the Directorate of Publicity and Propaganda Warfare was submitted to the War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Committee and approved by them and by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, as well as the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. In October the title of the paper organization was changed to the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) special staff section of SHAEF. This unit was unique among the other SHAEF divisions in being assigned both staff planning and operational functions.

The PWD Leaflet Section held broad responsibilities, which included its own writing team. In addition, the Commander of Eighth Air Force gave PWD the unique operational control of the Special Leaflet Squadron, or the 422<sup>nd</sup> Bombardment Squadron (H) (later designated the 858<sup>th</sup> and still later, the 406<sup>th</sup>) of the 305<sup>th</sup> Bomb Group, composed of B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers for aerial dissemination. The 422<sup>nd</sup> /858<sup>th</sup> /406<sup>th</sup> was "the only air force unit which was permanently and directly under the operational control of a psychological warfare organization.", and flew its first mission on the night of 7-8 October, 1943. Other bomber squadrons and groups also engaged in "nickeling" at different times. But all responsibility for delivering and loading leaflet bombs and their targeting remained with PWD.<sup>257</sup>

In February 1944 General McClure was transferred from AFHQ PWB in Italy to head the PWD. McClure was assisted by four deputies who represented the four civilian agencies which contributed personnel to the organization, namely the OWI and the OSS, as well as the two British agencies, the Political Intelligence Department (PID) of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information (MOI).

In March 1944 the OSS Morale Operations Branch was absorbed into PWD, where it continued its feud with OWI, but got along somewhat better with Army personnel primarily because of the latter's more politically and socially conservative types.<sup>258</sup>

Throughout this combined organization, whenever an American headed a section his deputy was a Briton, and vice-versa. For a time there was also a deputy who advised the PWD chief on military matters. It was also determined that combat and consolidation psywar (the latter was information disseminated to friendly populations after liberation) would be carried out in the field by PWD detachments

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<sup>257</sup>"AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements," 142.

<sup>258</sup>SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division, *Leaflet Operations: Western European Theater* (n.p.: 2 July 1945), 2-3; Laurie, 74.

under the control of Allied Army Groups.<sup>259</sup> Thus, unlike PWB in the Mediterranean, PWD had a "charter," thus easing its way within SHAEF headquarters.<sup>260</sup>

General Eisenhower proved himself anything but parochial when it came to psychological warfare, a topic he was variously reported to have said he knew nothing about or little about, but was "willing to give it a try.", or wanted to give it every chance." or to "do all to help."<sup>261</sup> McClure wrote after the war that "It was only through the support of the Supreme Commander and the cooperation and enthusiasm of the individuals assigned to the Psychological Warfare Division that we finally evolved into a well-integrated organization."<sup>262</sup>, while Wallace Carroll claimed that Eisenhower "used it [psywar] like no General before."<sup>263</sup> Richard Crossman, head of the British PWI recorded that "The only way in which we achieved a joint Anglo-American propaganda policy was by having a Joint Anglo-American propaganda staff under the Supreme Commander, a man who really did believe in Anglo-American teamwork and made it work."<sup>264</sup>

PWD's mission was four-fold: 1) To wage psychological warfare against the enemy., 2)To use the various available media to sustain the morale of the people of friendly nations under enemy occupation and to cause these peoples to acquiesce in the wishes of the SHAEF Supreme Commander., 3)To conduct so-called Consolidation Propaganda in liberated friendly countries., and 4)To control information services in Allied-occupied Germany.<sup>265</sup> PWD Leaflet Section had its own writing team, controlled the operations of the Special Leaflet Squadron, and had a packing and

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<sup>259</sup>McClure, "Proposed Psychological Warfare Branch Organization to Operate with FUSAG," n.d., RG 208, entry 6g, box 2, "PWB: FUSAG" folder; *P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, Report of Operations (Final After Action Report)*, vol. 14, 28; Laurie thesis, 438, 440. "Combat propaganda" was defined by SHAEF as consisting of the "writing and dissemination of leaflets, oral addresses by loudspeakers, intelligence operation and tactical radio broadcasting.", quoted in *P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 34.

<sup>260</sup>Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 192.

<sup>261</sup>"Psychological Strategy as a Preventative of a Larger War," *U.S. News and World Report*, 2 January (interview with McClure); Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 12; Carroll videotape.

<sup>262</sup>McClure, ltr. to Army War College, 16 February 1953, MHI Archives.

<sup>263</sup>Carroll videotape. But Carroll also noted that "Despite the lessons of North Africa and Italy, America was still without a broad policy of persuasion....", *Persuade or Perish*, 189-190.

<sup>264</sup>R. H. S. Crossman, "Psychological Warfare," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, 98, No. 591 (August 1953).

<sup>265</sup>[Richard Hollander], *The Psychological Warfare Division, Allied Forces, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force: An Account of its Operations in the Western European Campaign, 1944-1945* (Bad Homburg: October 1945); Daugherty, "US Psychological Organizations in World War II," *Casebook*, 130-132.

trucking unit to service UK-based aircraft with leaflet packages and packed leaflet bombs.<sup>266</sup>

All of these military lines and channels of command could give the impression that PWD was a primarily military organization. Yet the record is clear that PWD was, in the words of the most prominent chronicler of psywar in the ETO, and himself a participant, "a military formation in name only. Aside from General McClure himself, its key personnel were mainly civilians or soldiers with uniforms tailored for the occasion," with the former predominating.<sup>267</sup> The tension between PWD military personnel, who wanted their civilian counterparts to conform to military protocol or be drafted and civilians who regarded the military as a perhaps necessary evil unimaginatively mired in protocol, would continue throughout the war in Europe. General McClure must have been the only general officer in SHAEF who had to remind his subordinates, rather plaintively, that "The Chief of the Division wishes it to be understood by all personnel of the Division that PWD is a military organization."<sup>268</sup>

General McClure, like every other U.S. Army officer at the time, had absolutely no experience in propaganda, but he had been selected by Eisenhower to "take charge of the 'alphabet agencies' and to keep the press off my back."<sup>269</sup> Like Colonel Hazeltine in Italy, McClure yearned to command troops in battle. On one occasion, while flying on a B-17 leaflet drop in North Africa he fired off a pair of the bomber's machine guns, remarking that he "felt like a soldier again."<sup>270</sup> But Richard Crossman, the British chief policy maker at SHAEF PWD, privately gave McClure credit for being "wonderfully loyal to his subordinates" and accorded this tribute well after the war:

He was the ideal general from our point of view, precisely because he never really interfered in the operation itself and gave us a very free hand on the policy side. He was chronically disappointed that he should have been relegated to what he regarded as an inferior, non-

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<sup>266</sup>"AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements," 136.

<sup>267</sup>Lerner, *Sykewar*, 55-56; Saul Padover, *Experiment in Germany* (New York: 1946), *passim*.

<sup>268</sup>Erdmann, 217. One official report notes that "The exact status of civilians [in SHAEF PWD] was never determined in many respects" and refers to their "obscure status." *P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, vol. 14, 33. After the war McClure privately wrote that "I have always resisted the idea that an OWI or OSS paid employee owed his allegiance to Elmer Davis or Bill Donovan once he had reported to duty with General Eisenhower." Nonetheless, McClure recognized the need for these civilians. McClure to D. W. Johnson, Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch, 21 June 1946, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>269</sup>Erdmann, 102.

<sup>270</sup>McClure letter to wife, 20 December 1942, quoted in Erdmann, 104.

fighting job and chronically afraid of Bedell Smith [Eisenhower's choleric Chief of Staff], who bullied him unmercifully."<sup>271</sup>

Daniel Lerner credits McClure's "gifts of intellect and character" for preventing more "explosions" between "these aggressively imaginative and administratively irresponsible symbol-manipulators" [PWD civilians] and "the more cautious troop-manipulators who ruled the general staff sections." As it was, PWD, for better or for worse, proved "a graveyard of military discipline.", with personnel on a first-name basis and officers occasionally working under their juniors or even under enlisted men.<sup>272</sup> This military-civilian intermixture extended from headquarters to the field; the *Chief* of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, for example, was a civilian.<sup>273</sup>

Yet for all this training, PWD SHAEF still lacked someone who could write leaflets addressed to German soldiers, a crucial skill that had to be learned more or less in the field, and a veteran of the Mediterranean psywar was brought bought over from Italy for the job.<sup>274</sup> Also at about this time PWD made the decision not to use German POWs for psywar purposes, believing that because it had enough fluent German-speakers, many of whom had come from Germany itself recently, the special requirements to screen and select enemy troops would not be worth the effort. (Of course, POWs would be used extensively for intelligence purposes and psywar evaluation.)<sup>275</sup>

But as late as March 1944, PWD SHAEF was a only paper organization. Plans, instructions, and training directives had yet to arrive from higher authority, and no tactical or logistical doctrine had yet been established. Finally, during March, the first psywar contingent of four officers and 26 enlisted men arrived from Stateside and were based at Clevedon, where they conducted planning and training, and tested air and shell dissemination of leaflets and the employment of combat loudspeakers. From February 1943 to May 1944 officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians were trained at Clevedon for psywar on the Continent, although one of its prime objectives was also to integrate PWD civilians with their military opposite numbers. As PWD's personnel increased in number other training facilities were activated at London, Brondesbury, Watford, Caversham and Burton-on-the-Hill.<sup>276</sup> At roughly the same time, the newly-established PWD joint school for psywar, at Brondesbury, did give some grounding in

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<sup>271</sup>R. H. S. Crossman, ltr. to Martin Herz, Herz Papers, box 1, folder #8. For more on McClure qualities, see Erdmann, 199 and *passim*.

<sup>272</sup>Lerner, 67-68.

<sup>273</sup>"History of Second [U.S. Army] Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, December 1943-May 1945," n.d., copy in Military History Institute.

<sup>274</sup>Martin Herz, ltr. to Erdmann, 2 February 1969, quoted in Erdmann, 132.

<sup>275</sup>Libby Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder. For use of POWs for psywar intelligence, survey, and broadcasting, see P&W, *12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 121-122.

<sup>276</sup>P&W *Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 28; *ibid.*, after action report, 31, 42.

propaganda in the field, with the emphasis upon loudspeaker appeals and leaflet writing.<sup>277</sup>

In April SHAEF directed that one Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company accompany each of the First and Third U.S. Armies on the Continent, although these companies were each designed to operate at Army Group and higher headquarters levels. The companies were equipped with specially designed mobile printing presses, mounted on two 2 1/2-ton Army trucks, SCR399A radio sets modified to permit operations on standard or medium wave bands, and powerful loudspeaker systems, as well as its own power supply.<sup>278</sup>

PWD began early to develop themes to be used in its psywar against the Germans, civilian and military. In contrast to the Allied "political" efforts of World War I, it was decided not to try to win any converts from Nazism; that would have to wait until Germany's military defeat brought in the educational ministrations of Allied Military Government. Realizing the hold the Fuhrer still held over his people, even after Stalingrad and "Tunisgrad," PWB planners never "tried to flank Hitler," in the words of Wallace Carroll, instead emphasizing Germany's hopeless position and good POW treatment.<sup>279</sup>

By the eve of D-Day, PWD's Standing Directive had spelled out Allied war aims that would guide PWD SHAEF operations throughout the war in Europe:

- 1) Demilitarization of Germany
  - 2) Punishment of war criminals
  - 3) Liberation of territories overrun by Nazi Germany, including Austria.
  - 4) Occupation of Germany
  - 5) Destruction of Nazism and German militarism
- Prevention of such economic distress in Germany as would be detrimental to the rest of the world.
- 6) Ultimate restoration of Germany to a place "in the world family of democratic nations."

Psywar personnel further were to avoid "all boasting or sneering", "ideological dissertations," or "open appeals." Perhaps the hardest for the former civilian journalists and advertising types was an injunction against anything that "looks like commercial publicity."<sup>280</sup>

In addition to the "political" theme, certain specific approaches that had been used in World War I were now to be discarded in the light of the Allies' "Unconditional Surrender" formula. In addition to the prohibition of personal attacks

<sup>277</sup>2d MBRC history, 5-6. Some MBRC troops also made their way to nearby POW cages near London to practice their newly-learned interrogation skills., *ibid*, 7.

<sup>278</sup>*P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, final after action report, 33.

<sup>279</sup>Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 46.

<sup>280</sup>*PWD SHAEF*, 97; Lerner, *Sykewar*, 164-167.

on Hitler and of any immediate "re-education" of Germans from Nazism, PWD was to avoid the topics of revolution in Germany, ideological arguments, appeals by captured German generals, internal German dissention, counter-propaganda. ("He say, we say")<sup>281</sup>

PWD SHAEF was well aware that the Germans had endured about a decade of intensive propaganda, and based upon previous POW interrogations, determined that "overt, non-political, common sense and straightforward appeals to reason and intellect of German civil and military populations stood the greatest likelihood of success."<sup>282</sup> By way of contrast, each of the highly political themes forbidden to PWD were used to considerable extent by the Soviets, although to what level of success is still difficult to determine.

In all of these guidelines and themes to be used or not to be used, PWD SHAEF's official report emphasized that "it follows that truth is the most important ingredient in psychological warfare. Such truth, to be sure, can and sometimes must be selective, for often the truth is not credible to the enemy." (as in Italian troops refusing to believe that they could have fresh eggs for their breakfast.)<sup>283</sup> Wallace Carroll asserted that "We never openly lied -FDR wouldn't have tolerated it.", and another authority agreed that "We omitted, but we never lied."<sup>284</sup> The only significant exception to this "strategy of truth" lay in "black" propaganda, such as the supposedly underground German transmitter, "Radio Annie," discussed below.<sup>285</sup>

McClure and his subordinates were fully aware that psywar was useless, even counter-productive, until coordinated with obvious and convincing military power. Further, the Germans had become quite cynical about their own propaganda; why should they believe that of the enemy?

PWD was under no illusions as to the state of German morale. The "Standing Directive" of May 1944 stated bluntly that:

Taken by and large, it must be accepted that the German High Command has rendered the Army largely immune to the two Psychological Warfare campaigns which proved effective in 1918 [Bolshevist and democratic propaganda]. As in Tunisia the German Army will fight *as a whole* until it collapses *as a whole*. Indeed, defeatism is more widespread at the top than at the

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<sup>281</sup>Lerner, *Sykewar*, 202.

<sup>282</sup>Laurie thesis, 25. Heber Blankenhorn also resisted any campaign before D-Day directed toward German civilians, much to Crossman's disgust. "It seemed to me that the primary target was the 65 [sic] enemy divisions holding the *Atlantic Wall*.", "Report", 292. (emphasis in original).

<sup>283</sup>PWD SHAEF, 14-15. See also Lerner, *Sykewar*, 200-202.

<sup>284</sup>Carroll videotaped interview; Margolis, 67; also Lerner *Sykewar*, 200.

<sup>285</sup>Howard Becker, "The Nature and Consequences of Black Propaganda," *American Sociological Review*, 14 (April 1949).

bottom.<sup>286</sup>

The year 1943 did see the turning point in German military fortunes, the beginning of the road to defeat. The first "crack" in German morale, of course, came early in the year with Stalingrad, followed by "Tunisgrad." These military disasters were followed by Allied bombing raids in the summer of 1943, one of which turned much of Hamburg into a funeral pyre. Psywar, at least that emphasizing Allied military power, would gain some credibility among the Germans if it could become a part of that bombing campaign.<sup>287</sup>

The first leaflet mission over Germany was flown on 28 July 1943, when 273,000 leaflets were dropped over Kiel and Kassel. It was actually a very small and tentative beginning and there were problems with the barometric leaflet release mechanism, but so early a mission did give PWD sufficient time vastly to improve its psywar before it would be thrown into ground combat.<sup>288</sup> There was certainly no question of the need for improvement. The official history of the USAAF in World War II reports that:

In the first leaflet raids, pilots of B-17s and B-24s threw out leaflets when the planes were seventy-five miles away from a city, trusting that the wind would do the rest. Some of the propaganda dropped over France was picked up in Italy. "(!)"<sup>289</sup>

The USAAF still had not mastered the techniques of leaflet dropping that the RAF had evolved through four years of combat. (The British termed airborne leaflets "nickels," for some reason, and the process of their dropping "nickeling," terms quickly picked up by the AAF.)<sup>290</sup> AAF commanders were reluctant to detail the extra crewman per bomber needed for such missions, while most of the pilots looked with scorn on "paper bullet" missions. Also, American bombers flew in tight formations that made it all the easier for leaflet packs to foul aircraft propellers. What was obviously needed was a device that would automatically open the leaflet bundles several thousand feet below the formation, something that would not be perfected until later in the war.<sup>291</sup> In the meantime, B-26 medium bombers were able to fly low enough and fast enough to drop their leaflets more or less safely on front-line

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<sup>286</sup>"Standing Directive," 29 June 1944, SHAEF Special Staff, RG 331, box 10, folder 091.412. 143. Italics in original.

<sup>287</sup>Cruickshank, 159-160.

<sup>288</sup>Ibid., 146-147.

<sup>289</sup>Craven and Cate, *Europe: Argument to V-E Day*, 3, of *Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: 1951), 496.

<sup>290</sup>Air Historical Office, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, "Special Operations: AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements, 1943-1945," (n.p.: June 1947, 135.

<sup>291</sup>Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 116; Erdmann, 169, 179.



targets.<sup>292</sup>

In addition to leaflets for enemy troops, the bombers dropped native-language newspapers to news-starved occupied friendly populations, which were apparently much appreciated. As one Frenchman put it just after the Liberation:

They were a godsend to us. Four years is a long time. It often seemed as though the invasion was never coming. Then another American or British paper would arrive, and we felt we could go on again.<sup>293</sup>

SHAEF PWD also carried early broadcasts of the "Voice of SHAEF" on the BBC for the peoples of occupied Europe, and the American Broadcasting Station in Europe (ABSIE, a chain of PWD transmitters in the UK). "The Voice of SHAEF" concentrated on broadcasting warnings and instructions to the friendly populations of Europe concerning their actions under a variety of possible circumstances related to the impending Allied landings.<sup>294</sup> PWD also cleverly touted the powerful defenses of "Hitler's Atlantic Wall," just as Allied psywar had publicized the strength of the German Mareth Line in Tunisia. Thus Allied victory would appear all the greater when that fortification was breached.<sup>295</sup>

A similar devious approach in a deception operation saw large quantities of leaflets dropped on the Pas de Calais area during the six weeks leading up to the Normandy landings. Psywarriors knew from ULTRA intercepts of German message traffic that the German High Command, including Hitler himself, was fairly well convinced that the Allies would land in the Calais area.<sup>296</sup>

On the eve of D-Day, PWD found itself in the midst of a high-level political imbroglio. Orders had come from Washington to delete any reference to Charles de Gaulle's emitter organization as the French "Provisional Government." De Gaulle was understandably outraged, and PWD, fearing enormous public damage to its work among the French, fought the decision right back to Washington, but to no avail. Swallowing his ambitions, the imperious Frenchman grudgingly acquiesced. But de Gaulle would remember.<sup>297</sup>

General McClure and other psywar commanders also sought from the highest levels in Washington and London some clarification as to how the Allied "Unconditional Surrender" could be presented to Axis troops, with almost no response. Even the question of what *not* to state in that regard drew no further reply.<sup>298</sup> Of course, most of the propaganda that McClure and the Allies put out

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<sup>292</sup>Ibid., 166-167.

<sup>293</sup>F. Sondern, "McClure's Newsboys," *American Mercury* (February 1947).

<sup>294</sup>PWD *SHAEF*, 6.

<sup>295</sup>Carroll videotape; Erdmann, 272-273.

<sup>296</sup>Cruikshank, 57.

<sup>297</sup>Bishop, 188; Caroline Reed, "D-Day Propaganda," *History Today*, 34 (June 1984).

<sup>298</sup>McClure preface to Lerner, *Sykewar*, xvi.

throughout World War II did modify the "unconditional Surrender" dictate as far as enemy troops were concerned; no leaflet or broadcast ever said words to the effect of "Come over to Our Side Unconditionally and Take Your Chances." Almost all made at least implicit promises of good treatment for enemy soldiers after surrender, although the question of the post-capitulation treatment of enemy *nations* was studiously avoided.<sup>299</sup>

The first Allied heavy bomber mission over the Normandy beachheads during the early hours of D-Day was flown by the Special Leaflet Squadron, which dropped leaflets for French and Belgian transport workers warning them to stay away from transport facilities. Before the end of 6 June 1944, the 406<sup>th</sup> dropped its first tactical battlefield leaflets, emphasizing to German troops the overwhelming superiority of Allied arms, the encirclement of Germany from the East, from Italy, and now from the West.<sup>300</sup>


Within two days of the landings nine million such leaflets had saturated Western Europe, with most carrying simple, sober messages from General Eisenhower urging "patience" and advising against any "premature" underground uprising. A special leaflet in German spoke of the "defeatism" of the Germans while another in German, Russian, and Polish called the attention of conscripted Slavic troops to their serving as "human land mines" for their Germanic *herrenvolk*. The Polish-language leaflet, *Polacy w Armii Niemieckiej* ("Poles in the German Army") was careful not to blame these Poles for their predicament and offered practical advice.

Brute force has thrust you into the ranks of Poland's deadly foes. Brute force has inflicted upon you the German uniform. The Polish Government has the following orders for you. Do not shoot at your brothers, the soldiers of the Allies Armies. If you must shoot -miss. Come over at first opportunity.

One of the earliest U.S. psywar operations on the European continent involved the 2d Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, when they were greeted by the U.S. Army VII Corps G-2 (Intelligence) at Utah Beach and were informed that a leaflet was required immediately to secure the surrender of a group of surrounded enemy soldiers. But the large numbers of previously-printed leaflets that the 2<sup>nd</sup> had in stock did not meet the local situation, their mobile printing equipment had not yet been brought across the Channel, and by the time a new leaflet would have been shipped over from England the local situation would probably have changed significantly. The 2<sup>nd</sup> was

<sup>299</sup>On this point see Erdmann, 329-330.

<sup>300</sup>"Leaflet Operations by 8th Air Force Between D-Day and 1 Feb. 1945," OWI "Leaflet News letter," Area III, 1, #6 (n.d.), RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter, Area III" folder; "AAF Aid to Europe and Resistance Movements," 149; Erdmann, 268-273. But Blankenhorn later termed this effort "a feeble flutter of combat propaganda leaflets.", "Combat Propaganda," 301.



**FLOW CHART  
OF  
LEAFLET OPERATIONS**

EXHIBIT 4

From PWD, Leaflet Operations

# Soldaten-Nachrichten

ДОЗТЕ ТО СТОИТЪ ГЕРМАНОИ  
ДОУПРАТЕ ОВО НЕМУМА  
ДОСТАВИТЕ ОВО НИЈЕМЦИМА  
ЕПНИ ГЕРМАНЕВЕТ КЕТ ФЛЕТЕ

Vertrieb: Die R.A.F. und die U.S.A.A.F.

6. April 1944.

## BERLIN 1944-EIN AUGENZEUGENBERICHT

ETN SCHWEDE, der nach mehreren Jahren Aufenthalts in der Reichshauptstadt nach Stockholm zurückkehrte, berichtete dort über die Wirkung der alliierten Bombenangriffe seit November 1943. Ein Augenzeuge also erzählt, was er gesehen hat.

Man schätzt, dass ungefähr ein Drittel der Stadt vollkommen zerstört wurde, obwohl man hier und da Stellen finden kann, die nur kleine oder gar keine Spuren von Schäden aufweisen. Dazu gehört z.B. die Umgebung des Anhalter Bahnhofs und des Belle Alliance Platzes. Die Fabriksviertel sind am meisten zerstört, aber die Hauptgebäude der A.E.G. erhielten nur einen Treffer und sind im wesentlichen unbeschädigt. Ansonsten sieht man in diesen nördlichen Stadtteilen nur Ruinen.

Es erfordert ungeheuer viel Zeit, um in der verwüsteten Stadt selbst kurze Distanzen zu bewältigen. Im Durchschnitt sind die Berliner Arbeiter mehrere Stunden "auf der Reise" von ihren Heimen zu den Arbeitsstätten und zurück. Die Strassenbahnen sind vollkommen desorganisiert und verkehren nur selten. Die U-Bahn stellt den Verkehr auf verschiedenen Linien oft für eine Woche und mehr ein. Das Wohnproblem ist unlösbar. Viele Berliner schlafen vollkommen angezogen, auch in bombenlosen Nächten. Alt Moabit, das Hansaviertel und die Geschäftsgegend rund um den Kurfürstendamm, besonders aber das Gebiet der Nürnbergerstrasse, gehören zu den am meisten gebombten Teilen der Reichshauptstadt. Ein Spaziergänger, der die Tauentzienstrasse vom Zoo zum Nollendorferplatz durchwandert, wird kaum ein bewohnbares Haus finden.

Der Stettiner Bahnhof ist schwer beschädigt. Im November haben die westlichen Stadtteile am meisten daran glauben müssen. Die Zerstörung von Wilmersdorf und Süd-Berlins, insbesondere der Gegend des Hohenzollerndamms, ist aber auch nicht ohne. Das "Haus Vaterland" ist schwer beschädigt worden, es war lange Zeit geschlossen. Das Erdgeschoss wurde vor kurzem wieder eröffnet, die oberen Stockwerke sind vollkommen zerstört.

Der schwedische Augenzeuge verliess Berlin Mitte Februar. Damals gab es noch keine Terrorangriffe auf Berlin; damals gehörte die Reichshauptstadt

noch nicht zu den Hauptobjekten der amerikanischen Luftwaffe.

Letzten Nachrichten, zufolge die nach genauem Studium von durch Aufklärungsflugzeuge aufgenommenen Lichtbildern herausgegeben wurden, sind in Berlin 326 grosse und 775 mittlere Industriebetriebe zerstört oder schwer beschädigt worden. Es seien nur einige besonders wichtige Unternehmungen angeführt:

Die Rheinmetall-Borsig Werke, Deutschlands grösste Panzerfabrik, mit 25.000 Arbeitern, deren Betrieb seit Dezember eingestellt ist. Siemens & Halske, Berlin-Siemensstadt. Es gibt in Deutschland nur noch einen Betrieb, der gründlicher in Trümmer gelegt wurde, und das ist Krupp in Essen.

Die AEG Kabelwerke, Deutschlands grösste Kabelfabrik; G. Lorenz, Berlin-Tempelhof; Telefunken, Berlin-Steglitz. Zwei der grössten Kraftzentralen Deutschlands, vier grosse Gasanstalten, 5 Strassenbahndepots und 2 Pumpstationen der Wasserwerke befinden sich unter den schwer getroffenen öffentlichen Anstalten Berlins.

## SÜDFRONT

AM 2.4. griffen amerikanische viermotorige Bomber mit Jägerschutz in einer Stärke, wie sie bisher von Mittelmeerbasen aus noch nicht zu verzeichnen war, die Flugzeugwerke und Kugellagerfabriken in Steyr an. Die Kugellagerfabriken wurden beinahe vollkommen zerstört. Die amerikanischen Luftstreitkräfte stiessen auf heftige Jägerabwehr 169 deutsche Jagdflugzeuge wurden abgeschossen gegen den Verlust von 17 amerikanischen Bombern. Derselbe amerikanische Verband zerstörte die Bahnlinie Agram - Belgrad durch Bombenabwürfe auf Brod an der Save und bombardierte einen deutschen Flugplatz bei Bihatsch in Jugoslawien. Am 3.4. wurde Budapest von amerikanischen Kampfflugzeugen schwer gebombt und Eisenbahnknotenpunkte in Jugoslawien angegriffen.

An der italienischen Landfront wurden 2 wichtige Bergstellungen von alliierten Verbänden kämpfenden italienischen Truppen erobert. Strategisch wichtige Ziele in Nord- und Mittelitalien wurden gebombt.



DIE PUTZFRAU: „Der Sockel war zu hoch für diesen hohlen Kopf.“

Soldaten Nachrichten, useful information for enemy troops, as well as sports, riddles, jokes, puzzles.

forced to mimeograph a crude leaflet to meet the emergency and apparently enjoyed some success. On the next occasion for their services, a few days later, personnel of the 2d rousted Bayeaux print shop workers from their beds in the middle of the night and worked them until morning setting up in type a short German leaflet and printing 38,00 copies on a hand press by the end of the following day. The still-warm copies were rolled into leaflet shells and fired over enemy lines. Within a couple of hours 30 Germans deserted to the Allies.<sup>301</sup>

Better foresight was obvious with the first tactical news sheet, the combined British-American *Nachrichten Fur Die Truppe* ("News For the Troops"), which had been dropped over German troops on 25 April 1944, well before D-Day, and which was probably the first daily airborne newspaper of any kind in history, proving to be what one authority termed "the best leaflet newspaper ever produced."<sup>302</sup> Written and made up between 2200 and 0600 hours, the journal would be dropped from 18 to 24 hours later, although this schedule could be improved upon if required. An average of 2,000,000 copies were disseminated per night. On the day of the Normandy landings, several hundred thousand copies were ready for dropping on German reserve divisions in the area by the same night. This joint effort of the British Political Information Department and the OSS was published and disseminated without interruption to 4 May 1945, when the final edition announced the impending German capitulation.<sup>303</sup> *Nachrichten* had by then become the most popular German-language news journal in the ETO.<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>301</sup>"History of 2nd MRBC," 32. An original copy of the Polish leaflet is in the USASOC History Archives, which also has an original copy of a safe-conduct leaflet for Russian troops in German ranks.

<sup>302</sup>Berger, 38.

<sup>303</sup>The clever lads who published *Nachrichten* deliberately omitted the first eight copies, beginning the print run with number nine. Sefton Delmer explained that this dodge was often used by "black" radio "to make the enemy think they had missed the first few broadcasts of a new station. "Our somewhat puerile hope was that thereby we would get whichever unit was in charge of spotting such new developments into trouble because they had been slack and inattentive." Delmer, ed., *Nachrichten fur die Truppe, London, 1944/1945*, Band I, No. 9-160. (London: n.d.) contains the complete run---starting with number 9!

<sup>304</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 8-9; Reed, "D-Day Propaganda." Carroll writes of 27 million leaflets, but states that these were dropped between Normandy and the Zuider Zee in Holland. Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 35. At any rate, Radio Berlin reported that "Millions of leaflets are lying in all the roads and fields of France.", broadcast of 8 June 1944, quoted in Erdmann, *Leaflet Operations*, 265. The PWD History reported that "Prisoner interrogation later indicated that these leaflets played their own part in the rather speedy surrender of these second-string coastal troops.", 3. *Nachrichten* original copies, plus translations may be found in USASOC History Archives. Delmer, *Nachrichten, passim*. German General Gunther Blumentritt, asserted that

*Frontpost* was a weekly, semi-tactical journal, run off in the field by the enterprising psywarriors of 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group and disseminated by fighter-bomber and medium bomber. An abridged version, *Feldpost*, was furnished to lower 12<sup>th</sup> Army echelons for dissemination by leaflet shell. Due to the difficulty of aerial dissemination by the Special Leaflet Squadron, particularly in the winter months, 6<sup>th</sup> Army Group also drew up its own journal, the weekly *Frontbrief*, (not to be confused with the 5<sup>th</sup> Army's similar publication in Italy). *Frontbrief* proved to be virtually the only news source for German troops in the 6<sup>th</sup>'s sector.<sup>305</sup>

On the ground, the first psywar personnel, a news photographer, a liaison officer between First Army, 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group and PWD; and an intelligence officer, landed on the Normandy beaches on D-Day. A few days later, psywar teams brought ashore from landing craft several tons of ready-printed leaflets, rolled for use in the British 25-pounder and the U.S. 105-mm artillery pieces. Several three-man teams also went ashore on D-Day, where the 12<sup>th</sup> Army combat psywar trooper composed a special leaflet "written on a wheelbarrow, run off on a mimeograph machine, loaded into six shells and peddled, with some difficulty, to batteries of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division."<sup>306</sup> Another source reported that within a few hours after the first leaflet shells had been fired, six German soldiers, each carrying a leaflet, crossed over to Allied lines.<sup>307</sup>

Less immediately successful was one bedraggled psywarrior who, after swimming ashore from his landing craft, reported back from the beach that he was "pinned down by concentrated sniper fire for three hours this pm had to move gear inland, etc. Too tired to write more. No sleep 72 hours so far."<sup>308</sup>

Early PWD teams in France carried lists of leaflets with a code available in the United Kingdom. As the need arose the code and number required could be signaled back to PWD SHAEF with the leaflet bombers loaded and directed to their targets by a psywar ground team. Typical combat leaflets of the Normandy campaign carried photos of Rommell inspecting the vaunted "West Wall, then of Allied troops pouring through those breached structures. Others displayed the handling of surrendered

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U.S. combat psywar was "good psychologically, and effective in such German units which were not composed of Germans from the Reich, but of 'Volkliste I-III,'" such as Austrians, mainly VIENNESE, and troops from the East, Eastern Nationalities.", Responses of General der Infanterie Guenther Blumentritt, 71, USASOC History Archives (caps in original).

<sup>305</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 9-10. One POW survey found that all POWs complain about the lack of news at the front.", Lerner Papers, box 51, folder No. 7.

<sup>306</sup>Erdmann, 278.

<sup>307</sup>J. W. Riley, Jr. and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., "Research for Psychological Warfare," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 21 (Spring, 1957).

<sup>308</sup>OWI in the *ETO: A Report on the Activities of the Office of War Information in the European Theater of Operations, January 1944-January 1945* (London: n.d. [1945]). punctuation as in original.

# Feldpost

Nummer 11 - 12 AG

Erste Januar Nr.

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON DER AMERIKANISCHEN ARMEE IN WESTEUROPA


## Deutsche Luftkatastrophe

LONDON. — Alliierte Luftstreitkräfte beherrschen den Frontraum. Vom 23. bis 29. Dezember allein führten alliierte Luftflotten 28 000 Feindflüge durch. Am Neujahrstag erlitt die Luftwaffe bei ihrem Großeinsatz gegen alliierte Flugfelder die größte Niederlage des Krieges. 364 deutsche Maschinen wurden abgeschossen. Großangriffe alliierter Bomber nahmen ihren Fortgang. Ziele bei Berlin, Nürnberg, Ludwigs-hafen, Trier, Hannover, Kassel u. v. a. wurden mit Bomben belegt.

## Amerikaner schlagen zurück

PARIS. — Ein Drittel des von den Deutschen in Rundstedts Groß-offensive gewonnenen Bodens wurde von den Amerikanern zurück-erobert. General Pattons Panzer haben den deutschen Ring um Bastogne durchbrochen, die eingekesselte 101. amerikanische Luftlande-Division entsetzt, und sind tief in den Kernpunkt des deutschen Angriffs-raumes eingebrochen. Die Amerikaner stehen vor Houffalize und St. Hubert. Der Nachschubkorridor zu Rundstedts vorgeschobenen Panzerspitzen ist von allen Seiten unter Artilleriefeuer. An der West-

spitze des deutschen Keils haben die Amerikaner Rochefort genommen. Die Amerikaner konnten auch in Luxemburg, im Raum von Wiltz und zwischen Diekirch und Echternach Fortschritte verzeichnen. Frontberichten zufolge versucht Rundstedt seine Truppen im Raum Hotton-Marche umzugrup-pieren. Im Unter-Elsaß begannen die Deutschen eine Entlastungs-Of-fensive bei Bitsch. An mehreren Stellen erzielten sie Geländegewinne. Seit Beginn ihrer Offensive haben die Deutschen 40 000 Mann verloren. Die Hälfte davon wurde gefangengenommen.



## Russen im Herzen Budapests

MOSKAU. — Budapest steht in Flammen. Russische Truppen haben Buda, am Westufer der Donau, erobert und sind tief in Pest eingedrungen. Die Deutschen haben zwei russische Parlamentäre, die sich mit weißer Fahne den deutschen Linien näherten, um ein Ultimatum zu überbringen, erschossen. Die Deutschen werden in den Stadtkern von Budapest zurückgedrängt. Die Russen stehen 40 km von der österreichischen Grenze. Hitler hat abgelehnt, Wien zur offenen Stadt zu erklären. Die Evakuierung der Stadt soll angeordnet worden sein.

Feldpost, concise, field version of Soldaten Nachrichten, etc.

## German Air Catastrophe

LONDON. — Allied air forces dominate the front. From Dec. 23rd to 29th alone, the allied air forces flew 28,000 missions against the enemy. On New Year's day the German air force suffered its greatest defeat of the war in the course of its major action against allied air fields. 364 German machines were shot down. Heavy attacks by allied bombers continued. Targets in Berlin, Nuernberg, Ludwigshafen, Trier, Hannover, Kassel and other cities were heavily bombed.

## Americans strike back

PARIS. — A third of the ground also able to make progress in gained by Rundstedt's major offensive in Luxembourg in the vicinity of Wiltz has been won back by the Americans. General Patton's armor broke the ring around Bastogne, relieved the encircled 101st Airborne Division, and has pressed deeply into the center of the German attack area. The Americans are close to Houffalize and St. Hubert. The supply corridor to Rundstedt's advanced tank spearheads is under artillery fire from all sides. At the western peak of the German wedge, the Americans have taken the city and at some other points. Since the Germans have lost 40,000 men, the Americans were half of them prisoners.



## Russians Deep in Budapest

MOSCOW. — Budapest is in flames. Russian troops have conquered Buda, on the west bank of the Danube, and have pressed deep into Pest. Two Russian emissaries, who approached the German lines with white flags to deliver an ultimatum, were shot. The Germans are being squeezed together in the center of Budapest. The Russians are 40 kilometers from the Austrian borders. Hitler has refused to declare Vienna an open city. Evacuation is supposed to have been ordered.

## Supplies Didn't Come Through

Supply difficulties of the German offensive army result in increasingly sharp shortages of food and gasoline. The grenadiers of the 1st SS Armored Grenadier Division were promised a rendezvous with the so-called Peiper Unit at Luetlich. Every tank received 700 liters of gasoline. Further supplies never came through. — The soldiers of the 36th Regiment of the 9th People's Grenadier Division went 10 days without warm food and three days without bread. — The 916th People's Grenadier Regiment was supposed to lead the attack of the 352nd People's Grenadier Division, was cut off from supplies and was annihilated after being in existence only 10 days.

## Forbidden Wave Length

### Planes Against Tanks

PARIS. — In the last week of December the IX American Tactical Air Force flew 7,814 sorties and, during this period, destroyed 331 German tanks and armored vehicles, 3,186 vehicles, 1,044 railroad cars, and 41 locomotives.

### Regency in Athens

ATHENS. — King George of Greece has appointed the Greek-orthodox Bishop Damaskos as regent of Greece. The King announced that he would not return to Greece until the people, in a free election, had decided in favor of his return.

### Rats Leave Ship

ZURICH. — The Japanese embassy in Berlin is beginning to evacuate its employes and Japanese citizens into Switzerland. 5X villas here have been rented by the Japanese on Mt. Hirland near Zurich. Five attitudes and accessories of the Berlin embassy have arrived in Berne.

## What it was all about

Rundstedt's offensive could only be successful if the Germans were able to capture immediately American gasoline dumps. The American army has restricted a supplies of gasoline. (0.8 American truck with trailer transports 2,000 liters.) The gas tanks, and only limited amounts of gas, fell into the hands of the Germans.



## Sidelights on the Counter-Offensive

A SECRET ORDER, DATED DEC. 22 BY Tank General Littwitz to the commander of the 2nd German Panzer Division said: I have just learned that a great number of tanks which stood ready to go into action could not move because gasoline was lacking. No gasoline was to be found either in the garages or on the roads leading to the various units.

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRD week in December, the 99th, 90th, and 91st Regiments of the 97th People's Grenadier Division had shrunk to from three to five companies each. The 90th and the 91st regiment each had only 150 men left, while the 99th consisted of about 200.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN MONSIEAU, which is directly behind the front in Allied hands, carried out searches in order to determine whether German civilians were concealing German soldiers. Not a single German soldier was found. In Bamberberg four German paratroopers were captured thanks to the alertness of the inhabitants.

## "Title Sale"

"The Nation" in Berne reports the selling out prices of the following books in the catalogue of the House of Books, Inc., at Basel: "In Defense of all Powers" (Publisher: German High Command) 125 francs, instead of 145; "From the Karawankas Mountains to Crete" (Publisher: High Command) 2.50 francs, instead of 3.00; "Break-through in the West" 3.10 francs, instead of 3.50; "Victory over France" (Publisher: High Command) 1 franc, instead of 1.50.

" English-language version so that troops in the field will be in on the program.



German officers and men, and up-to-the-hour situation reports; all carried surrender messages or instructions.<sup>309</sup>

The PWD themes for the immediate weeks during and after the invasion were basically that the Allies were landing in "overwhelming force," that defectors were always well treated, and that German troops had done their duty while their leaders had let them down. Robert Sherwood described how surrendering Germans felt no shame in having given in to overwhelming force. In all this there was a complete absence of any speculation or promises as to Germany's ultimate fate at the hands of the Allies. As Wallace Carroll put it:

Here for the first time...we have an honorable way out for the Germans, civilian as well as military, and it is a way which involves no commitment or disadvantages....It is high time we started to show the Germans a way out.<sup>310</sup>

Carroll's exhortations were fairly consistently followed through the remainder of the European campaign.

The absence of "political" themes, however, bothered the famed American correspondent, Edward R. Murrow. Casting a critical professional eye on the Allied psywar campaign in France less than a month after the landings, Murrow claimed in a radio broadcast that the refusal to articulate a policy of telling the Germans what would happen to them after the war had left PWD personnel "bewildered and frustrated....They have an elaborate machine but little ammunition."<sup>311</sup> But such decisions were undoubtedly out of the hands of PWD.

PWD, of course, had more than Germans to contend with. It was now operating in a densely-populated area and could not ignore the French civil population, which for the most part had not been evacuated. Guidelines for the French civilians in the newly-liberated territories or those territories in the process of liberation had been spelled out to General McClure in order of priority: 1) To assist military operations

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<sup>309</sup>"Combat Operations," OWI undated report, RG 208, entry 6g, box 2, "Germany" folder, 5.

<sup>310</sup>Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 261. This was precisely the point made by R. H. S. Crossman on D+15, and that point seems to have been made. Crossman memorandum, 21 June 1944, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder.

<sup>311</sup>Murrow broadcast of 3 July 1944 transcript, quoted in "OWI and Government Information Policy," OWI Bureau of Special Studies, Division of Press Intelligence, Historians Records of the Psywar Branch, 1942-1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 1 "PWB Accomplishments" folder. Murrow's contention was somewhat reinforced in a 12<sup>th</sup> Army report which noted that "Some P'sW, asked why they continued to fight replied that the Allies had not offered the German Army anything worth stopping for.", P&W Section Report for 17 September 1944, Lerner Papers.

and help secure the safety of lines of communication., 2)To ensure cooperation of the civil population in returning essential services., 3)To create opinion favorable to Allied war and post-war aims., 4)To facilitate the establishment and operation of Military Government. and 5)To provide for the early transfer of propaganda to the properly constituted civilian agencies.<sup>312</sup>

PWD consolidation teams functioned under the title of Allied Information Services (AIS). They operated along the front, reopening newspapers, disseminating news through their loudspeakers, helping to reestablish local radio stations, distributing previously-printed leaflets and brochures, and also serving as the public relations link between the Allied commands and the civil population of liberated areas. They even provided films and equipment for reopening cinemas, replacing Vichy and German films with those from the Allies. One such team published what must have been the first politically "free" newspaper in France in several years, a small news sheet, at Isigny. (The first true daily newspaper in liberated France was established at Cherbourg, *La Presse Cherbourgoise*.) A little later, *Accord*, an illustrated monthly French-language review, achieved wide dissemination throughout liberated France.

AIS personnel often showed a keen insight into human nature that eased their work among peoples, particularly the dour Normans, traditionally suspicious of outsiders. Sometimes on Sundays, AIS loudspeaker crews would visit outlying villages solely to rebroadcast a concert from the BBC or from ABSIE to people cut off from the outside world by the lack of electrical power. (Such missions also served to weaken the common European stereotype, assiduously propagated by the Germans, that American "culture" consisted of boogie-woogie, lynchings, gangsters, Coca-Cola and Hollywood.) The AIS Publications Division shrewdly realized that "when people pay for something it's a sure sign they want it. Every publication that found its way to the hand of a Frenchman had been paid for by a Frenchman who wanted to read it." These publications covered a vast array of topics, from Oxford pamphlets to a description of the workings of the American electoral system.<sup>313</sup>

Although its mission first and foremost was to aid the military effort in the field, AIS also tried to remain as unobtrusive as possible, seeking to bring in French

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<sup>312</sup>SHAEP PWD, memo, subject: "Responsibility of PWD for Consolidation Propaganda," n.d., "Consolidation Propaganda," memos, reports, directives, etc. in SHAEP Special Staff, PWD, RG 331, box 11, 091.412 folder; Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEP Untitled" folder.

<sup>313</sup>1<sup>st</sup> U.S. Army Report of Operations, "Psychological Operations, Part One: Combat Operations," RG 208, entry 6g, box 2, "Germany" folder, *passim*. "AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements," 137. H. Becker, "Opinion Research in Liberated Normandy," *American Sociological Review* (December 1947). Many AIS functions were taken over by civilian agencies of the British and U.S. governments for the remainder of the war and into the post-war months due to the French government's financial difficulties. Much of this work, obviously, overlapped into the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs mission.

authorities and technicians as soon as possible to take over the work, hoping, in the words of one report, "that it would disappear as soon as possible before anyone in France might begin to wonder why it was still hanging around." In fact, AIS went out of business on 15 October, after the liberation of France had been completed.<sup>314</sup>

But AIS was not the only PWD organization to work with the liberated French. The PWD Survey Section was ordered to gather French reaction and attitudes toward the invasion and toward Americans. Mounted on jeeps and supplied with paper, pencils, maps, slide rules, and a hand-operated gelatin duplicator, ten young Frenchmen and women conducted an even 1,000 face-to-face interviews based on sociological sampling techniques. Their results showed that 75 percent of the local population was pleased with the landings. (The remaining 25 percent was apparently more unhappy with the Allied ground and air bombardments than was really pro-German.) and with the conduct of U.S. troops, although (being French) they voiced some criticisms.<sup>315</sup>

PWD also put out a weekly newspaper for the French, entitled *Courrier des Nations Unies*, featuring important news of the week, summary articles on resistance movements in other parts of occupied Europe, what Frenchmen were doing around the world, political cartoons, ridicule of Vichy, and plans and hopes for the postwar world.<sup>316</sup> The 2<sup>nd</sup> MRBC published its own journal, *The Liberator*, beginning on D+10, and established a daily radio monitoring report covering all transmissions by major stations, as well as later a mobile film projector unit for its own audiences or for civilian cinemas.<sup>317</sup>

By this time PWD sound trucks were regularly visiting each town to re-transmit BBC news and any military instructions as well as to broadcast purely local matters over their mobile transmitters (SCR 399s) and to interrogate POWs. PWD had also re-opened five cinemas for newsreels and French-language films.<sup>318</sup> The psywarriors now received their first "really workable loudspeaker unit," the "Public Address Set AN/UIQ-1," which was clearly audible at a range of one mile under normal conditions. This unit was still too large to be carried in or mounted on a jeep and its voice coils expired fairly rapidly under field conditions, but it was a

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<sup>314</sup>Ibid., 20-21.

<sup>315</sup>Oddly, many French civilians responded that the reason they had not evacuated their Normandy villages, even though they were warned by leaflets that they might be bombed, was that they believed the leaflets had blown over from somewhere else. J. W. Riley, Jr. and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., "Research for Psychological Warfare," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, (Spring, 1957). J. W. Riley, Jr. "Opinion Research in Liberated Normandy," *American Journal of Sociology* (December 1947); *The Psychological Warfare Division*, 22.

<sup>316</sup>Berger, 43.

<sup>317</sup>"History of 2d MRB," 25.

<sup>318</sup>AGO Records Branch, Historical Records Section, SHAEF PWD 091.412, copy in Lilly Papers, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder.

beginning.<sup>319</sup>

On the Fourth of July 1944; the 2d MRBC brought its 400 watt mobile transmitter Radio Cherbourg on the air, using a mobile SCR 399 transmitter which lacked much range, but was enough to cover the city with its two-hour broadcasting each evening and to win a loyal audience. "Radio Cherbourg" relayed BBC and ABSIE programs, plus announcements from French and U.S. Army Civil Affairs officials. In early August "Radio Bretagne" signed on with basically the same fare, but broadcast over a far wider area, using a rehabilitated French station. The operation at Rennes was more typical, where a 2d MRBC mobile one-kilowatt transmitter replaced the damaged city transmitters but carried purely French material. Although each MRBC transmitter used purely American or British personnel at the beginning, these were gradually replaced by Frenchmen from Radio Diffusion Francaise.<sup>320</sup>

With the important exception of civilian broadcasts, however, PWD tactical radio scored few successes, primarily because such radio at the time was not truly mobile enough to keep up on the battlefield. In the words of one psywar authority, "Not everything classified by the Army as 'mobile' turned out under actual wartime conditions, to be mobile in fact."<sup>321</sup> But broadcasting from a commandeered studio building cut off the now-static station from the tactical situation.<sup>322</sup> Tactical radio against enemy troops proved effective only against enemy "pockets," and even then was quite rare.<sup>323</sup> In the words of the Deputy Chief of the SHAEF Radio Section himself, "All the evidence here suggests that tactical radio is of very doubtful value."<sup>324</sup> In fact, U.S. tactical psywar radio in the ETO could claim only one undoubted tactical military success, at L'Orient.

L'Orient, one of the most heavily-fortified of the Channel ports, was defended by a German garrison which remained dug in long after the rest of France had been liberated, and indeed, after much of Germany itself had been overrun. A nine-man psywar radio team, composed of OSS and OWI civilians and U.S. Army personnel was incorporated into the American assault force and began operations from a mobile 400-watt mobile transmitter at the beginning of August 1944. Its earliest broadcasts

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<sup>319</sup>Hall and Caskey, "Lectures on Psychological Warfare," 23-24.

<sup>320</sup>2d MRBC history; 37, 49. One reason for Radio Cherbourg's popularity may well have been that there had been no local station in Cherbourg before the war. *P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 25-26; Hall and Caskey, "Lectures in Psychological Warfare," 20-21.

<sup>321</sup>Lerner, *Sykewar*, 226-227; Herz Papers, box 1, folder 3. Richard Crossman asserted after the war that "Radio is an instrument ill adapted for tactical use,..." , Crossman, *Psychological Warfare*, Bishop thesis, 401; "Combat Operations," 10.

<sup>322</sup>Lerner, *Sykewar*, 210-211.

<sup>323</sup>Kehm, "Military Psychological Warfare."

<sup>324</sup>Memo to distribution, 20 July 1944, RG 331, SHAEF Signal Staff, PWD, box 10, folder 091.41.

consisted of reading undelivered letters addressed to soldiers and marines in the German garrison, followed by a news broadcast and "factual reports." After the first POWs taken could not tell whether they had been listening to the BBC or ABSIE, the format was changed. The broadcasting staff created a fictitious character, a certain "Captain Angers," son of a high German officer who had fallen in the last war. "Captain Angers" had supposedly emigrated to the States before the current war, but still loved the language and culture of his native land, and taught German at an American university. (This theme was not so far-fetched as it might sound at first. The psywar team leader was indeed a former professor of German literature who had actually been a boyhood boarder in the house of now-Field Marshall Ewald von Kleist. But why the *non de microphone* of "Angers" was chosen rather than a more Germanic name, remains unexplained.)

The fictive Captain's main theme was that it was useless to die in a lost cause; far better to stay alive to return to rebuild the homeland. "Captain Angers" also commented on the wholesomeness of democracy and the American Way of Life, and on news from both German and Allied sources. Despite the blandishments of "Captain Angers" the garrison troops for a variety of reasons would not come out. Broadcasting personnel then devised a unique propaganda ploy: a surrendered German Master Sergeant was loaded with candy, chewing gum, and cans of food and sent back into the fortress. The word then went out that anyone else in the garrison could also come out, receive similar gifts, and if he did not like American captivity, return to his comrades. ("Ask Hopf! You'll find him in Bunker #6, Barracks Four.")<sup>325</sup> For a while, none went back, presumably preferring the life of an "Ami" POW. But eventually one did, and reported that, at least in this case, the enemy was telling the truth. As a result according to several sources and reports "Our prison cage received many more willing visitors."<sup>326</sup>

Another fictional character was the lugubrious Polish draftee "Kaslowsky," who broadcast:

Why should I go voluntarily into American captivity? I've got diabetes. It's the most dangerous thing for me to eat fats, and I'm told the Americans are cooking entirely with fat- and all this business about being allowed to write four postcards and three letters a month when you are captured. Who am I going to write all that to? Do they think after all the air raids at home...well, never mind that, I mustn't get upset, I have

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<sup>325</sup> P&W 12th Army final report, 158-159; "History of 2nd MRBC," 55; David Herz, "The Radio Siege of Lorient," *Casebook*, 387; David Hertz, "The Radio Siege of Lorient," *Hollywood Quarterly* (July 1946); Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 294.

American psywarriors believed that the German defector was probably a plant, but nonetheless seized the opportunity to thus prove their veracity. Lerner thesis, 186.

<sup>326</sup> Laurie thesis, 523-524.

diabetes and, finally, the Americans promise to treat us as soldiers. Who the hell wants to be treated as soldiers?<sup>327</sup>

Psywar intelligence played a large part in the L'Orient operation. The broadcast team learned, for example, that a Captain Ubach had deserted the garrison, disguised as a stretcher bearer, on a hospital ship, and jibed regularly "Wo ist Captain Ubach?" Captain Ubach's scuttling, rumors, morsels of gossip, lists of German dead buried by the Americans, applicable quotations from great Germans (preferably dead), slogans, etc., were supplied by psywar intelligence and were apparently well-received by the Germans. The team named particular German units ("264<sup>th</sup> Infantry, 66<sup>th</sup> Division ") that were about to be hit by U.S. artillery, and, in fact, knew more about the German positions than the Germans themselves, due to aerial reconnaissance photographs and close work with the G-2. Yet, in spite of an average daily average voluntary surrender rate of 20 Germans per day from the garrison, the radio team was called away for other missions, and the remainder of the L'Orient fortress garrison, supplied by U-boat, did not surrender until V-E Day.<sup>328</sup>

"The Mad Colonel of St Malo" also frustrated PWD psywarriors. This German garrison commander of the French port, so dubbed by Allied broadcasters for his fanatical resistance and Nazi views, all the more stubbornly prolonged his troops' resistance and attracted the attention of Dr. Goebbel's propaganda machine. The "Mad Colonel" was quickly promoted to Major General and awarded the coveted "swords" to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and, thanks, inadvertently, to U.S. Army psywar, the Reich now had a new war hero.<sup>329</sup>

As the Allies moved inland, PWD's heavy printing presses (one built to order to OSS specifications) with their own transport on 2 1/2-ton Army trucks and their own power supply, caught up with the field psywar units and were put to intensive use. Most leaflets carried an immediate message on one side; the other was taken up by a standing statement, such as a series of quotations from the Geneva Convention covering treatment of prisoners of war or helpful suggestions on "How to Surrender." It was discovered that German soldiers usually found it easier to surrender by permitting themselves to be overtaken by Allied advances, rather than by attempting to leave their positions and make their way to the nearest Allied unit --a distinctly dangerous procedure on the battlefield. Counseling the enemy to do nothing was often

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<sup>327</sup>Herz, "The Radio Siege of Lorient," 388.

<sup>328</sup>P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, final report, 160; Laurie thesis, 523-524; "History of 2d MRBC," 54-55; *History of PWD SHAEF*, 30; J. H. Harrington, "Broadcast in Brittany," *Infantry Journal* (March 1947).

<sup>329</sup>Herz, "Psychological Warfare Against Surrounded Troops," *Military Review*, August 1950. Herz also mentions the commander of the Brest garrison, who, despite a "good cop/bad cop" campaign in which the first leaflet was worded courteously but the second accused the commander of crassly holding out simply to win a Knight's Cross, did not surrender for several months., *ibid.*

found to be preferable to calling for some overt action.<sup>330</sup>

Overall, PWD Western European psywar organization in the field had by this time evolved into four MRBC's at Army and Army Group levels (two for 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group and two for PWD SHAEF). The pattern remained fluid, with both the 12<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Army Groups having a special psywar staff section under a Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section under a Publicity and Public Affairs officer, while the 6<sup>th</sup> AG had to make do with a Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, which included a psywar Combat Team. Third Army had a Psychological Warfare Branch of G-2 with a psywar officer head, the 9<sup>th</sup> Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section with its Psychological Warfare officer in charge, under the Publicity and Psychological Warfare office. The 7<sup>th</sup> also had its Psychological Warfare Branch under G-2. Below Army Group and Army levels the best arrangement seems to have been one public address team per infantry division and one per armored combat command, as well as one psywar specialist at each corps headquarters who might not necessarily be full-time in that duty. Most of the actual psywar in the field was conducted by a propaganda teams, usually part of an MRBC, consisting of five or six officers and 50-60 enlisted men.<sup>331</sup>

After the breakout at St Lo the MRBCs were removed from the U.S. Armies and centralized at Army Group level, from whence detachments and combat psywar teams were dispatched on specific operations.<sup>332</sup> The 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group sent a small fast-reaction Psychological Warfare Combat Team to 1<sup>st</sup> Army Group, consisting of between 40 and 50 enlisted men, who performed all phases of combat propaganda, including the collection of intelligence, the writing and printing of leaflets, and, in fact could turn out over one million leaflets per day.<sup>333</sup>

Because of experience gained in Italy, psywarriors in France were able to work out closely-coordinated artillery and leaflet operations that could produce quick and gratifying results. Two sets of leaflets would be printed and shipped to a selected artillery battery. At a determined time, the battery opened fire, laying down a vigorous barrage lasting for half an hour. The battery then fell silent for a few minutes, after which it opened up again, but this time its shells were loaded with leaflets instead of high explosives. The leaflets called the enemy's attention to the

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<sup>330</sup>1<sup>st</sup> MBRC; PWD/SHAEF, *Leaflet Operations*, 20-21.

<sup>331</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 4-5; Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 190-191; H. D. Kehm, "Organization for Military Psychological Warfare in the ETO," *Military Review*, 26 (January 1947); PWD SHAEF, 19; Laurie thesis, 125. One authority claims, with considerable justification, that "The union of psychological warfare and public relations...was not a happy one.", and presumably felt the same about the inclusion of censorship in these organizations. Certainly psywar, as opposed to publicity and censorship, had entirely different "audiences.", Kehm, "The Organization of Military Psychological Warfare."

<sup>332</sup>"History of 2d MRBC," 50.

<sup>333</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 5; Erdmann, 290.

barrage they had just endured, and warned that it would begin all over again in twenty minutes with renewed fury. Those twenty minutes, the leaflets suggested, could be profitably used by the enemy to leave their positions and come over to our side. A few would. And at the end of the twenty minutes "grace period" the battery would speak again, even more violently. After a half-hour, the artillery would fall silent and the second set of leaflets fired. These messages were now stronger and sounding somewhat impatient, saying that the next barrage would annihilate the enemy troops, and that this was their last chance to give up the hopeless struggle. This second leaflet would quite often bring results, as whole squads might stream to U.S. lines. The same routine, of course, could be used with a mobile loudspeaker unit in place of leaflets.<sup>334</sup> As one authority described this psywar campaign:

The patterns for the great psychological warfare campaign in France had been set: the use of combat terminology and photography for the leaflets; fast production and dissemination schedules, a slightly mocking tone for describing the plight of the German forces, a line of "no quarrel with the individual enemy soldier," and an increasing accent on Allied material superiority.<sup>335</sup>

A poll of enemy POWs at this time showed a high recognition level of U.S. psywar leaflets among the prisoners, with, for example, 80 percent at St Lo having seen leaflets, and 40 percent carrying copies on their persons.<sup>336</sup>

The PWD combat teams often displayed a commendable initiative in interpreting their duties. When, for example, the 2<sup>nd</sup> MRBC entered Paris it sifted through the records of the Nazi Propaganda agency to locate collaborators, as well as to pick up ideas that might be useful in their own work. Later, in February, when artillery fire had damaged his amplifier, a driver-technician "gathered" civilian radio sets from nearby houses and temporarily cobbled together a working amplifier and continued broadcasting.<sup>337</sup>

But PWD was hardly immune to high-level policy considerations. General McClure reported that he needed an effective counter to the German propaganda impressing on German troops and civilians the iniquities of the so-called "Morgenthau Plan." This was the vengeful proposal of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau to "de-industrialize" or "pastoralize" Germany after this war, to ensure that the Germans could not start another. (The fact that Morgenthau was Jewish simply made Dr. Goebbels' and General Dittmar's propaganda that much easier; here was a "Judeo-plutocratic scheme to enslave Germany.") McClure soon enough realized that the best

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<sup>334</sup>"Combat Operations," 8.

<sup>335</sup>Erdmann, 273.

<sup>336</sup>Laurie thesis, 533-534.

<sup>337</sup>"History of 2d MRBC," 42; (anon.), "Psychological Warfare," typescript, n.d., USASOC Archives.



propaganda move here was to ignore the whole idea, hoping that it would die an natural death, which was indeed the fate of this best-forgotten plan.<sup>338</sup> He adopted a similar silence over the still-vexed question as to the effect of the "Unconditional Surrender" demand on German resistance, perhaps remembering the recent French North African Darlan political imbroglio.<sup>339</sup>

In the fall of 1944, U.S. psywarriors helped seize Radio Luxembourg, the first permanent transmitter that could be used against the enemy, and which soon became the most important single operation of the PWD's Radio Section. This station could be heard throughout Europe, even on German sets that had been designed to pick up only government broadcasting. It had been used by the Germans for their own propaganda since 1940. Although the retreating enemy had attempted to destroy the station, they had been foiled by loyal employees who saved its virtually-irreplaceable main transmitter tubes. Thus Radio Luxembourg went on the air under PWD auspices only three days after its seizure. Under new management the station's programs were basically tactical, directed to German troops and civilians and featuring "inside" news from Germany, recordings of POWs (who had always been "captured," never surrendered), messages from seized Wehrmacht mail bags, comedy, world news, helpful sabotage hints for foreign workers in Germany, music (classical to jazz), even the confessions of a pair of German spies and the on-the-scene crash of bullets at their execution. German civilians were told how to organize their villages and towns to resist Nazi "scorched earth" and "last ditch" attempts. The station interlarded these announcements with a considerable amount of gibberish disguised as "coded messages" to confuse German monitors.<sup>340</sup>

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<sup>338</sup>Record of Meeting held at SHAEF on 13 October 1944, SHAEF G-5 (Hist.), Lilly Papers, box 13 "SHAEF Untitled" folder. The head of SHAEF Plans and Directives Section succinctly noted that "for SHAEF the Morgenthau Plan does not exist.", LTC G. G. Mure, Memo for distribution, subject: "Policy Toward German Civilians," 5 October 1944, Ibid.

<sup>339</sup>See Lerner, *Sykewar* and Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, both *passim*. Such reticence on this question may well have been all to the good. As Lerner notes tartly, "the talents and skills which make a good propagandist do not necessarily insure a high level of policy thinking. Lerner, *Sykewar*, 24.

<sup>340</sup>*P&W Section, 12th Army Group History*, 160-161; *PWD HISTORY*, 27-30; Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 302-303; Lerner, *Sykewar*, 225-226; H. Becker, "The Nature and Consequences of Black Propaganda," *American Sociological Review*, 14 (April 1949); W. H. Hale, "Big Noise in Little Luxembourg," *Harper's*, April 1946; "Radio Luxembourg: It Uses Jokes as Propaganda Against Nazis," *Life*, 5 March 1945; "Combat Operations," untitled, undated OWI report, RG 208, entry 6g, box 2, "Germany" folder, 10. One veteran pointed out after the war that PWD had a built-in audience in that the "Germans had the radio habit.", *Views of World War II Psywar Personnel*, 192; Hall and Caskey, "Lectures in Psychological Warfare," 21-22. One German tailor claimed that his village had been so easily captured because he, clever

In many respects the capture of aptly-nicknamed "Radio Lux," with its broad range and its ample, even palatial facilities, rendered unnecessary the work of PWD's mobile radio transmitters. However, as the station found itself increasingly isolated from the battlefield its workers often wondered just how effective they were. One "spot announcement" wistfully requested surrendering Germans to "please mention our program." That sense of isolation was somewhat dispelled when, soon after a broadcast ridiculing the Luftwaffe, a German fighter plane strafed the station!

Far more threatening was the German Ardennes counter-offensive, with enemy forces only a few kilometers from the transmitter site. Certain essential transmitter parts were removed to Verdun and preparations were made to evacuate the staff itself.

Fortunately the German onslaught was stopped and the transmitter reassembled in time to resume broadcasting on 23 December. But the Radio Lux personnel were not entirely at their ease; in the following month nearby Luxembourg City was the target of numerous German "rocket bombs" (in the words of the official PWD history presumably referring to V-2 German rockets.)<sup>341</sup>

A more enduring problem was the nature of the American staff of Radio Luxembourg. Their fluency in German, practically free of alien accent or emphasis, paradoxically made them suspect to their German listeners. No Americans could speak such good German. These announcers must be German traitors. In addition, some Radio Lux German exile personnel became emotionally involved in their work, "rubbing it in" when it came to Germany's crimes on the one hand, or discoursing at some length on "democracy" and "freedom," themes that were emphatically not to be determined in Luxembourg but in Washington, London, or Yalta.<sup>342</sup>

At about this time, ABSIE began to develop a listenership that made up in the "quality" of its listenership what it may have lacked in its quantity. A few German soldiers who had access to radio sets and were not under close supervision apparently listened regularly, drawn by the station's news and music programs. But among civilians, the figure was given as much higher, perhaps as much as 70 percent, despite Dr. Goebbels' fulminations.<sup>343</sup>

The PWD loudspeaker broadcasts by this time began to show results. A British report stated that such operations had been "used with remarkable success in

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fellow, knew the Radio Luxembourg code and had followed it explicitly! *ibid.*, 14.

<sup>341</sup>Lerner thesis, 113; Saul Padover, "Political Warfare in World Wars I and II," Council on Foreign Relations, *Headline Series*, 86 (March-April 1951). Hale, "Big Noise in Little Luxembourg," refers to the station as "- a thing of marble whiteness palatially set in a deep park." See also "Psychological Warfare NCO Course #2," "Introduction to Radio and Psychological Warfare," 4-5; and R. Hanswr, "Ist Ein Scherz Sohn," *Infantry Journal* (September 1946).

<sup>342</sup>Padover, "Political Warfare," 86.

<sup>343</sup>"A History of ABSIE," RG 208, box 24, item 4; Bishop thesis, 398-400. For PWD radio policy for Germany see SHAEF G-5, 7.35, memo by General McClure, 18 September 1944. Lilly Papers, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder.

inducing pockets of resistance to surrender" and a PWD memo claimed two to three thousand POWs were bagged in one day as a result of public address work.<sup>344</sup> Loudspeaker teams had an advantage in that they could adapt more easily than radio or leaflets to a particular or fast-changing tactical battlefield situation. Surrender instructions could be broadcast to troops of a specific enemy unit, along with detailed directions on avoiding mine fields, civilians could be immediately informed of the local military situation and given instructions.<sup>345</sup> The PWD official history claimed that combat loudspeaker units were particularly effective in Brittany:

Three divisions were moving toward Brest. Two made constant use of the loudspeaker and made consistent headway. Operating against troops of the same caliber, however, the third division made little progress. Finally, constrained to employ the loudspeaker, they found that the enemy laid down their arms with little persuasion, and they began to move forward rapidly. As a matter of fact, resistance was so low that the German Commanding General surrendered his troops shortly thereafter.<sup>346</sup>

A psywar coup was scored by the 13<sup>th</sup> Amplifier Unit, a PWD soundtrack team operating in the Cherbourg area. Battling opposition from combat officers (the Colonel in charge of the Cherbourg assault troops cruelly dismissed the team as "The Bulls---t Brigade"), the team broadcast German and Polish-language appeals to an entrenched Cherbourg German garrison: "You now have thirteen minutes to see your wives and children.", "You now have ten minutes...." "You have distinguished yourselves. You have brought honor to your Fatherland. You have already discharged your duty as soldiers of the highest order." After the capture of a German doctor, the team also thoughtfully provided the names of local girls infected with venereal disease. Despite the fact that the Germans were well-supplied with food, water, and cognac, and were "heroes" to the Fatherland, the 200-man garrison lined up and formally surrendered without a shot being fired (if one does not count the few U.S. tank rounds discharged by prearrangement to preserve the "dignity" of the garrison.) All four members of the 13<sup>th</sup> received Bronze Stars for this exploit. This same loudspeaker truck team had just previously eased the surrender of no less than 1,700 Germans and Poles near Cherbourg, and had again allowed these troops to surrender to *force majeure* by arranging for the throwing of a few phosphorous

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<sup>344</sup>SHAEF G-5, 7.35, memo to Executive Officer, G-5 SHAEF, 1 July 1944, "Sub: France CA Operations," Lilly Papers, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder.

<sup>345</sup>*Views of World War II Psywar Personnel*, 192.

<sup>346</sup>*P&W Section, SHAEF*, 176. Blankenhorn termed the Brest operation the "laboratory of Psywar," "Combat Propaganda," 324. But Blankenhorn also noted that the loudspeaker equipment of the time was "too weak, too vulnerable", *ibid.*, 304.

grenades in their general direction.<sup>347</sup> But the tough Cherbourg Citadel garrison itself, despite loudspeaker addresses featuring talks and the playing of Strauss waltzes, only capitulated after a three-battleship bombardment and a 1,000-plane saturation bombing.<sup>348</sup>

Probably the greatest success of U.S. combat loudspeakers came in an area south of the Loire, where the 2d MRBC assisted in surrender negotiations that netted 20,000 German troops.<sup>349</sup> But because the equipment was weak and unreliable, combat loudspeaker operations, until the coming of the tank-mounted loudspeaker, were only successful in a few instances, primarily in those against enemy "pockets." In the St Malo sector the 2d MRBC did talk 18 German paratroopers into surrendering. But an attached British unit, with far more powerful equipment (250-watt amplifiers) as early as 26 June had garnered the commander of a Wehrmacht artillery unit and its 600 men, and the following day a nearby German field hospital (1,000 men) turned itself over to the same unit.<sup>350</sup>

This was dangerous work. American psywar troops in the field felt particularly exposed to enemy fire zeroing in on the loudspeaker apparatus, the operator, and nearby combat troops. Some U.S. commanders, in fact, refused to permit all such operations in their command.<sup>351</sup> A high-level post-war report stated

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<sup>347</sup>In the words of one psywarrior at Cherbourg, "The West Point Colonels could not find a cup of coffee for us before we started work.", Laurie thesis, 526. "Psychological Warfare" (interview with Major Lagonby, 9 August 1944), RG 332, U.S. Theater of War, World War II, Historical Administrative Files, 1942-1946, box 116, "Psywar" folder.; C. Carnes, "Advertising Paid off at Cherbourg," *Saturday Evening Post*, 12 August 1944; "Cherbourg" folder, Center of Military History, HRC GEOG. M, France 384.1. A correspondent for the British *Daily Mail* noted the wholesale walkout of German soldiers from Cherbourg, but reported that "a great many I have just seen were carrying leaflets dropped by Allied bombers during the past few days telling the Germans they would not be shot if they surrendered", quoted in Erdmann, 286. Wallace Carroll claims that the publicity given the Cherbourg area operations was not entirely helpful to psywar. Combat troops felt that all of the credit had gone to the psywarriors, while some of the latter began to imagine that their weapon could work wonders, and consequently suffered some avoidable failures later. Although it was not apparent at the time, surrendered troops who could be identified as Soviet citizens, even though they were often promised that they would not be returned to the Soviet Union, were actually rounded up by the Allies at the end of the war in Europe and were executed for treason or worked to death in the GULAG. Erdmann, 328.

<sup>348</sup>Omar Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (Chicago: 1951), 308, 313.

<sup>349</sup>"History of 2d MRBC," 43.

<sup>350</sup>*ibid.*, 35-36.

<sup>351</sup>P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army history, 177-178; Laurie thesis, 528-529; Lerner, 228-230. See also the comments of the Commanding Officer of the 45<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division:

that "All G-3's endorsed their use for training [for what?] but had no use for them for battlefield communication...."<sup>352</sup>

Unfortunately, many commanders did not understand the most effective means of using loudspeakers. A post-war chief of the Army Psychological Warfare Division noted that:

During the war there was an appalling lack of understanding on the part of many troop commanders of the proper employment of this weapon. There was a tendency to overrate it when the results were spectacular - in which case the commander would expect it to perform miracles or to underrate it if no direct surrenders were forthcoming - in which case the commander would be reluctant to employ it again.<sup>353</sup>

Much of the difficulty seemed to lie in commanders' belief that loudspeaker success could be measured solely in the numbers of POWs brought in. The 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group P&W Section spoke for almost all World War II psywarriors when he insisted that, to the contrary, the chief mission of the propaganda loudspeaker was to undermine morale and resistance.<sup>354</sup>

The apparently sole surviving "log" of a combat loudspeaker unit (for February 1945), shows good success mixed with "dry" periods:

(excerpts)

Date/location	Requesting unit	Target	Results/remarks
7 February	11 Armd Div.	167 VG Div	8 Ps/W credited to C-L Dasburg
Announced news of Russian and American offensives, concluded with strong appeal for mass surrender. Drew enemy fire after 081130			
6 <sup>th</sup> Cav Gp Surrender appeal given.			
Germuend Recon German civilians and Sqdn, troop C soldiers in town observed listening to broadcasts.			

"It tends to draw enemy fire and to add to the personnel that the troops have to protect.", M. J. Mountain, "A Combat Commander on PW: Staff Memorandum," Operations Research Office, (Fort McNair, Washington: 21 August 1950), 2, USASOC Archives.

<sup>352</sup>Army General Board, "Report on Psychological Warfare," prepared by Major Roy K. Croft, Chief Psychological Warfare Section, n.d., [1946], 42. These commanders may have seen the results of the succinct orders by the commander of the German 91<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, "loudspeaker propaganda is answered by accurate fire.", Berger, 122.

<sup>353</sup>Colonel David F. Hall, "Lectures on Psychological Warfare," courses for Infantry School, Armor School, n.d., Military History Institute Library/Archives.

<sup>354</sup>P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, 182; Lerner thesis, 267.

C-L drew small arms fire. Results unknown.

- 081600 11<sup>th</sup> Arm Div, 167 VG 64 Ps/W credited to Div, 55 Inf Rgt  
C-L. Broadcast emphasized American advances in  
Germany and strong appeal for mass surrender.  
C-L drew enemy fire before and after appeal.
- 091330 " 24 Ps/W credited to C-L. Announcer  
stressed German casualties, hopelessness of German  
situation, and surrender instructions
- 100930 101 Rgt, 2, Units unknown Broadcast reviewed Bn, 26 Inf failure of German  
Div Ardennes and Alsach and Russian offensive. Results  
unknown.
- 10 Feb. XVII AB Corps " 31 Ps/W credited to C-L.
- 121400 376 Rgt, 87 481 VG 40 Ps/W credited to C-L.  
Address pointed out. Himmler commands  
in Silesia, German casualties and desire of  
party leaders to remain in power.
- 141400 [US] units For the purpose of getting a message to U.S. soldiers  
marooned on East bank and unable to re-cross the Saar River after a  
night raid.  
German propaganda talks  
served solely as a means of camouflage. Results  
unknown.<sup>355</sup>

The enemy seemed to have taken the loudspeaker threat seriously enough. Presumably following the lead of the Commander of the German 91<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, noted above, or the similar sentiments of the 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division ("The answer to loudspeaker propaganda is accurate fire."<sup>356</sup>), some loudspeaker teams were indeed wiped out by enemy fire<sup>357</sup>, and the Psychological Warfare chief of 1<sup>st</sup> Army was killed operating a loudspeaker near a recalcitrant enemy position.<sup>358</sup>

<sup>355</sup>"Combat Loudspeaker Missions for Feb 1945," Appendix A, Part 1, "Combat Propaganda," SHAEF Special Staff, RG 133, box 11, folder 091.1412.

<sup>356</sup>Erdmann, *Leaflet Operations*, 525-526

<sup>357</sup>Carroll, videotape interview.

<sup>358</sup>Tom Mahony, "Words that Win Battles," *Popular Science* (June 1945). The unfortunate officer's name is unrecorded in 1<sup>st</sup> Army's *After Action Report*. According to one authority the Germans would at least hear out the message before laying down fire on the offending loudspeakers. "Memo on the Use of Combat Loudspeakers"

More consistently successful were those "consolidation" operations in newly-liberated areas, where a PWD loudspeaker, in the absence of radio broadcasts, were often the only means by which the local population could receive information that intimately and immediately affected them. Citizens could be informed of curfews, be asked to clear all roads for military traffic, report booby traps and mines, bring in enemy soldiers out of uniform or in hiding, turn in all weapons, and await further instructions from Military Government.<sup>359</sup> Things became quite confusing early in the German counter-offensive in the Alsach area, where a PWD loudspeaker section warned the citizens of Strasbourg to evacuate, and 10,000 subsequently jammed the rail station. Then the evacuation order was countermanded to "undisguised relief."<sup>360</sup> More improbable was the situation in a chemical dump when a container began to leak. A jumpy guard thought that he smelled gas, fired the standard three-shot warning, and set the encampment into an uproar. A section of the 2d MRBC was called out with its loudspeaker trucks to announce "no gas." Unfortunately, the word "gas" alone was enough to turn an uproar into a near-panic that lasted through most of the night.<sup>361</sup> The 12<sup>th</sup> Army P&W Section likely enjoyed about as much success in publicizing the Army's "No Fraternalization with the Germans" rule, although it probably claimed that such work was "proving effective."<sup>362</sup>

The answer to the problems of combat loudspeaker operations against enemy troops, as opposed to work with friendly soldiers or civilians, was the tank-mounted public address system. Even jeeps and Army trucks lacked the cross-country capacity of the "half-track," but the latter also presented a more conspicuous target without much armor protection and had trouble keeping up with armored spearheads. At the St Lo breakout, for example, the jeep or truck-mounted loudspeaker units could not keep up with the armor and many opportunities were lost.<sup>363</sup> A tank, on the other hand, had the cross-country ability and even if it were a target it did carry ample armor and, of course, it could maintain formation in an armored column. A loudspeaker tank could also awe the civilian population, friendly or hostile, and by pointing its gun the tank could show enemy troops that it meant business. Used for the first time in February 1945, three light speaker tanks effected the surrender of no less than 15,000 enemy troops. The speaker tank immediately established itself as an integral and accepted part of any armored force. By the end of February 1945 sixteen

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HQ, 9<sup>th</sup> USA, PW Detachment," 16 January 1945, Herz Papers, box 1, folder 3.

<sup>359</sup>"Consolidation in Friendly Areas and Control Propaganda in Occupied Enemy Areas," Army Ground Forces report, 47-49; *P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 26.

<sup>360</sup>AGO reports, 7<sup>th</sup> Army PW Section, report for January 1945,, RG 94, entry 99/12, box 2703, folder #8. Also Kehm, "Military Psychological Warfare."

<sup>361</sup>"History of 2d MRB," 37.

<sup>362</sup>Report of Activities for March 1945, 12<sup>th</sup> Army P&W Section, 7 April 1945, RG 94, AGO, entry 99/12-32-39, box 1788, "99/12-32-39...." folder.

<sup>363</sup>*P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army*, 44.

U.S. divisions were applying for the services of the 7<sup>th</sup> Army's loudspeaker team.<sup>364</sup> Commanders appreciated the fact that the fire power of a speaker tank was not particularly impaired; in other words, they did not have to give up a tank entirely for propaganda work., they way they would with a truck, jeep, or half-track.<sup>365</sup> Furthermore, the speaker tank gave the enemy soldier another incentive to surrender; he was giving up only in the face of overwhelming enemy armored force.<sup>366</sup> Third Army reported that:

A combat loudspeaker was used effectively in overcoming hostile resistance and in controlling the civilian population. The combat loud speaker unit was installed in one of the light tanks of the 37 TK Bn and was operated by a specialist from the Psychological Warfare Branch....It was used alternatively with the fire and shock power of the t[an]k, Armd Inf, Art[iller]y team (37<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup> and 66<sup>th</sup> Bns, respectively) in attacking towns, woods and strong points occupied by the enemy....It is estimated that the broadcasts helped to capture at least 500 PW and, in many cases, resulted in keeping the Germans from firing on our troops....<sup>367</sup>

When the all-out drive for Central Germany was unleashed a loudspeaker tank was the spearhead of each corps attack, and in several cases, whole towns capitulated, in what was, admittedly, the last days of the Reich.<sup>368</sup> An 82d Airborne Division report handsomely credited the speaker tanks:

In some cases, civilians in towns turned on the SS men and helped drive them out when they heard our loudspeakers....There were a good many towns in our area and we estimate that the loudspeakers saved us 50 percent of our fighting in those towns.<sup>369</sup>

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<sup>364</sup>P&W Section, 7<sup>th</sup> Army, report for February 1945, AGO Records, RG 94, box 2703, folder 107-39, location not given. The tank speaker veteran LT Arthur Hadley noted candidly that he preferred the light tank: "Among other advantages, this goes backwards faster than a medium tank. (I'm getting old; I like that.)" Hadley comments to Lerner, *Sykewar*, 250.

<sup>365</sup>Laurie 527-528; Army General Board Report, 44-46; *P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 180-180-181.

<sup>366</sup>A. T. Hadley, "The Propaganda Tank," *Armor* (January-February 1951).

<sup>367</sup>Army General Board Report, 45-46.

<sup>368</sup>"History of 2nd MRBC," 69-70. Se also "Report of Activities, Publicity and PW Section, 12 AG, report of activities for March 1945," dated 7 April 1945, RG 94, AGO, entry 99/12, box 1788, "99/12-32-39..." folder;

<sup>369</sup>*Views of World War II Psywar Personnel*, 153-165.



In a particularly successful joint operation an advanced column of the 2d Armored Division, a combat loudspeaker mounted on an M-5 tank, came under fire outside a fortified town. The loudspeaker tank informed the garrison that a large armored task force stood on the outskirts, that American artillery was zeroed in, but that the American commander did not want to destroy the town. Simultaneously, leaflet shells specifically designed for use against surrounded enemy garrisons, burst over the town. The garrison was then informed that USAAF fighter-bombers were overhead, at which time a Forward Air Controller called down a P-47 fighter-bomber, which thereupon dropped a leaflet bomb over the town's center. The tanks then moved forward while the speaker tank called upon the garrison and citizens to surrender. After some spasmodic firing the tanks penetrated the town with minimal firing and soon white flags appeared. The payoff was the capturing of a fortified garrison of some 800 men equipped with excellent anti-tank weapons.<sup>370</sup>

Undoubtedly with such PSYOP mobile successes in mind, SS Reichsfuhrer, Heinrich Himmler himself, warned that:

Through tricks the enemy tries to make German localities hand themselves over to the enemy. His advanced recon cars [sic] have the job of intimidating the population by saying that if the locality were not handed over it would be destroyed by tanks or artillery that are supposed to be present....No German town will be declared an open town. Every village and every town will be defended...." etc., etc.<sup>371</sup>

A probable combat psywar "first" was the cutting and broadcast of recordings. Combat conditions usually precluded live radio broadcasting. But recordings could be made in the field and used later and still give a "live" impression to the audience. The earliest recording equipment suffered from insufficient dust protection, were mounted on the wrong type of vehicle and could not produce broadcast-quality disks. But eventually Preston double table recorders mounted in ambulances (with dust-free heated interiors) yielded "marked success." Recordings made in the field by MRBCs often featured pleas from German citizens of captured towns to Wehrmacht troops to end the fighting, as well as Military Government proclamations and even excerpts from the military trial of a local SA leader. Recording units later commandeered commercial studios in Leipzig and Prague. Although the audiences were usually German soldiers or civilians, the surrender ceremonies of 20,000 Germans conducted by the 2d MRBC were recorded and immediately flown to London for broadcast to a more general listenership. Documentation is scanty on what must have been an extremely cumbersome operation, but the post-war Army Ground Forces report claims

<sup>370</sup>"Psychological Warfare NCO Course, #2, Techniques and Tactics, Tank," 2. At least two officers were killed in action operating loudspeaker tanks. Lerner, *Sykewar*, 249.

<sup>371</sup>*P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 181.

that "German troops turned in desperation to Allied sources for information. It should also be emphasized that recordings from the field, made in forward areas by small recording teams, played an increasing role in these programs."<sup>372</sup>

As Allied armies penetrated the borders of the Reich itself they now had to deal with enemy civilians as well as civilian/soldier units of the *Volkssturm* and Volksgrenadier divisions. Here psywar units helped save lives and facilities from the futility of Nazi-inspired "last-ditch stands."<sup>373</sup>

Outside Geilenkirchen, defended by a *Volksgrenadier* division, psywarriors of the 84<sup>th</sup> U.S. division and Ninth Army drew up and printed 30,000 leaflet copies within four hours from receiving its orders, using the Company's truck-mounted presses. The shell-fired leaflets proclaimed that Geilenkirchen was surrounded and the choice was surrender or death. At 0700 on 28 November 1944, a unit loudspeaker company jumped off with one company of the 333d of the 84<sup>th</sup> Division into the battle for the town. A loudspeaker team reached across the German lines with the message that the defenders were gallant soldiers who had done all they could for the Fatherland, that further resistance would prove just a futile sacrifice, and that surrendering troops would be well-treated. Resistance was slight. Then six Germans walked out, followed by 350 more, despite the fact that one surrendering German, waving a leaflet, had been shot dead by a jittery U.S. soldier. A post-war Army Ground School publication termed the Geilenkirchen leaflet "One of the best conceived and most successful of all the tactical leaflets produced by the Ninth Army Psychological Warfare Detachment." This happy ending was not a foregone conclusion; it took an entire U.S. regiment without psywar support two days to capture a nearby German town at about the same time.<sup>374</sup>

Another Ninth Army leaflet, of December 1944, just before the German Ardennes counter-offensive displayed considerable knowledge of the German psyche and technical skill. It featured a very German, almost Nazi-style, square-jawed sturdy yeoman, and a Germanic script proclaiming that "God Helps Those Who Help Themselves." Intelligence showed that the German troops opposite them were of relatively poor quality (but not why: the best had been secretly withdrawn to prepare for the German offensive) and that many wished to surrender but hesitated, not sure of

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<sup>372</sup>Ibid., 162; P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army, Consolidated Report for February 1945, dated 1 March 1945, RG 94, entry 99/12-32-39, AGO, box 1788, "99/12-39...." folder; "History of 2d MRBC," 43. Army Ground Forces Report, 29. It should be noted that these were direct disc-to-disc recordings, with no use of wire or tape or "other novel devices," in the words of the SHAEF *PWD History*, 30-31.

<sup>373</sup>*Volkssturm* leaflets in USASOC History Archives; Psychological Warfare NCO Course #2, "Special Leaflets," 2.

<sup>374</sup>E. A. Caskey, "Coordinated 'Assault' on the Geilenkirchen Salient," *Infantry Journal*, (December.1949); AGS, *Tactical Psychological Warfare*, 16-17. The leaflet itself is reproduced in both sources. See also Hall and Caskey, "Lectures on Psychological Warfare," 9.

their reception and worried about Gestapo retaliation on their families. The 9<sup>th</sup>'s leaflet, showed these troops a way out:

The German leaders will not help you. You are being told that you lack the right fighting spirit. The fact is that, along with other items, you lack heavy weapons and planes. Courage is no substitute for lack of weapons. The allied material supremacy is too great. The German proverb is true. You must help yourself. Escape from the terror of war's sixth winter.... Where There is a Will There is a Way.

The remainder of the leaflet gave the brief stories of five German soldiers who had succeeded in surrendering. Their units were given but their names were blacked out. Thus the leaflet appealed to the enemy's instinct for survival, gave him a way out with dignity, and reassured him that his family would be safe.<sup>375</sup>

When the German counter-offensive of December 1944 (the Battle of the Bulge) did come, it presented Allied psywar with its greatest crisis. But, as noted, straightforward reporting, notably in *Frontpost*, actually increased PWD's reputation with the enemy. Two days into the almost completely unexpected offensive, PWD accurately predicted that, on the basis of its analysis of enemy propaganda, the Germans' goal was neither Paris nor Liege, but only to go as far as possible to upset the stability of the Allied front and delay their projected winter offensive. This view aroused "unusual interest by Allied commanders."<sup>376</sup> This appraisal did not forestall McClure and his British counterpart, Richard Crossman, from using an old ploy: the Germans were committed in radio broadcasts to the taking of Liege; when they failed the disillusionment would be all the greater.<sup>377</sup>

Certainly SHAEF PWD could not be accused of "losing its head" in the crisis. Shrewdly, it wasted no leaflets between 16 and 27 December on the advancing enemy, who was then presumably more or less immune to Allied propaganda. But it kept busy, composing and printing leaflets to exploit the Germans' disillusionment when their offensive would have inevitably failed. These leaflets also would also give German troops a more accurate picture of the actual battle situation in the West. According to one American psywar report, "many German soldiers believed, until they found copies of our leaflets, that they were defending a flank under difficult circumstances, but that the spearhead had passed on to Liege, Belgium, or even Paris." When they learned the true state of affairs they were often ready to capitulate." Something like one-half of subsequent POWs carried these leaflets on their persons.<sup>378</sup> The first four PWD leaflets dropped after the offensive was contained

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<sup>375</sup> AGS, *Tactical Psychological Warfare*, 16-17.

<sup>376</sup> Lerner, *Sykewar*, 101-102.

<sup>377</sup> *Views of World War II Psywar Personnel*, 199.

<sup>378</sup> "Leaflet News letter, Area III", 1, #3, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter, Area

were *The Last Attempt* (The offensive was a desperate gamble, risking troops' lives for nothing.), *The State of Your Life* (Prospects not good), and another *Last Attempt* (The gamble has failed, nothing sensible and humane left to do but surrender.)<sup>379</sup> Then, as the Germans retreated they were "plastered" (in the words of the 2d MRBC's history) with leaflets detailing German reverses, combined with surrender arguments, as well as civilian leaflets and broadcasts detailing what was expected of them under Military Government.<sup>380</sup> It could be said that the Germans, both civilian and military, were now undergoing something akin to "obedience training."<sup>381</sup>

The PWD conducted combat "black" propaganda on a relatively small scale, and with little of the gusto of the British. But U.S. psywarriors did seize an opportunity when the Germans started to airdrop the *Skorpion* morale leaflet on their troops in November of 1944. Up until then German propaganda had fed its troops on such propaganda themes as the impregnability of the Atlantic Wall, the invincibility of the German Army, superior military leadership, etc. Now these arguments seemed a trifle out of date, and the new leaflet, which was a professional piece of work, soberly appraised the mistakes of the Normandy campaign and went on in a quasi-factual manner to hold out the hope of new super-weapons, new manpower drafts, and total warfare that would soon turn the tide. The individual soldier was even invited to ask questions for the leaflet to answer, for "Comrade, you can trust the *Skorpion*."<sup>382</sup>

But airdropping *Skorpion* was the enemy's big mistake. The PWD easily secured copies and with great care prepared three copies in the format of the original, but with a subtle pro-Allied slant, and airdropped millions of them into German lines over a period of six weeks. One leaflet, for example, soberly authorized common soldiers to shoot their officers if the latter did not exhibit sufficient "National Socialist" zeal in the struggle! According to POW interrogations, German Field Marshal Walter Model, was stung by these "*Skorpions*," which he at first took to be the real thing. After several such episodes, and after being informed of the vile American trick, Model concluded that if his people could be made fools of so easily, they had better go out of business. But before Model's final edict, the real *Skorpion* staff had prepared a last leaflet exposing the Yankee publication. Thus the hapless

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III" folder. Almost the exact quotation is found in Berger, 109.

<sup>379</sup>"Leaflet News letter," vol. 1, #3, 20 April 1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5, "Area III," folder.

<sup>380</sup>"History of 2d MRBD," 67; M. Janowitz, "Coordinating Psychological Warfare Output to Future Events," *Casebook*, 641. The Battle of the Bulge claimed the highest toll of any U.S. campaign in World War II. PWD did not entirely escape; as noted, the 12th Army Publicity and Psychological Warfare officer was killed by a German dive bombattack at this time., P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> AG final report, 65.

<sup>381</sup>This point was made by Peter Watson, *War on the Mind* (New York: 1978), 285.

<sup>382</sup>Linebarger, 144, includes a reproduction of *Skorpion*. For examples of British "Black" propaganda to Germany, see R. G. Auckland, *Catalogue of British "Black" Propaganda to Germany, 1941-1945* (n.p.: January 1977).

German propagandists gave U.S. psywar even more publicity.<sup>383</sup>

PWD also interlarded its *Nachrichten* airdrops with pseudo-German leaflets which used "subtlety and indirection" to undermine the soldier's confidence in the regime and in his military leadership.<sup>384</sup> But most PWD "black" leaflets were destined for civilians, foreign workers, and troops on home leave.<sup>385</sup>

PWD applied its tactical "black" psywar most often by radio, although never nearly to the extent of that of the British. But it was the first among the Allies or the Axis to use misleading programming for tactical military operations. The most complete "black" station was "Radio Annie," which broadcast, on a different frequency, from Radio Luxembourg. Broadcasting under the name of "1212," "Radio Annie" purported to be run by a group of dissident Rhinelanders, and featured Rhennish music and Rhennish accented announcers. Its most important feature, however, was news, accurate and timely, from the battlefields of the West. It was claimed that a battalion commander could update his situation map by listening to "1212." Of course, this "news" was misleading and after the Moselle breakthrough, the station grew flamboyant, putting Allied armored columns miles ahead of their true positions, telling of lost battles and mass surrenders, and beginning to speak, with deep sorrow, of "treachery" and "inefficiency" among local Nazi Party bosses. An "Annie" veteran summarized not only the battlefield thrust of "Annie" programming, but also the importance of tactical intelligence:

Annie gave the same sort of detailed battle news that she had been broadcasting for months. But when the 7<sup>th</sup> Army started to make sharp progress through the Siegfried Line, Annie reported the American forces as being repulsed or held without gain. When the truth had to be admitted, Annie blamed misguided informants who endeavored to conceal the truth. As the 3d Army drove south, Annie deliberately sold them short. Annie would report the 37<sup>th</sup> Tank Battalion was bearing down on the town of Schwartz, which was twenty miles farther south. When other elements of the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division found two undamaged bridges across the Nahe River after a thirty-mile dash, Annie had them

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<sup>383</sup> P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, 188-189. Pseudo-*Skorpions* can be found in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>384</sup> PWD SHAEF history, 164.

<sup>385</sup> One such leaflet, although strategic in nature, is worth noting for its insight into human psychology. RAF and USAAF aircraft dropped relatively innocuous leaflets on Berlin with little numbers in one corner showing to which series they belonged, knowing well that children would vie with each other to acquire complete collections of different series. *Hitler Jugend* and *Hitler Madel* were sent out to collect the leaflets, but many were retained to round out collections. Since some were more rare than others, a brisk trade soon developed in enemy psywar leaflets that adults could not touch on pain of dire punishment.

in a brisk battle much farther north and east. We didn't want to frighten the Germans to mill around aimlessly until the pocket was tight. This kind of deception wasn't expected to fool anyone for an extended period. But when events are moving rapidly, small delays develop into large disasters, and the critical period of the Saar pocket lasted only five or six days.<sup>386</sup>

The work was grueling; one "Americanism" could give the whole game away. After the Crossing of the Rhine "Annie" went all-out, exhorting the German people to save their nation from senseless destruction. It went on to create a hypothetical resistance movement, demand the destruction of the Nazi Party, and call for immediate peace, in other words revolution, and one of the very few times that U.S. psywar in this conflict used this theme. Again, according to POW interrogations "Annie" was supposedly listened to throughout its coverage area by soldiers and civilians.<sup>387</sup> Other tactical radio transmitters included "Nest Egg" (to the German garrison on the Channel Islands --unsuccessful), "Clarion" (to foreign transport workers in Germany --stay away from your work to be safe), "Capricorn" (another underground movement), and "Aspidistra" (breaking into German medium-wave newscasts with disguised "official" news).

The success of these "black" operations has never been convincingly established, and there are powerful arguments against their effectiveness. Heber Blankenhorn, for example, argued that any true underground could hardly rely on radio broadcasts, particularly in light of the Gestapo's efficient direction-finding apparatus.<sup>388</sup> Although the P&D Section of 12<sup>th</sup> Army claimed that "Annie"

had deceived and confused the enemy, she had set German against German, Wehrmacht against Party, and civilian against military. She had breached the fortress Germany from within.<sup>389</sup>

Daniel Lerner, one of the most knowledgeable of World War II psywar veterans, pointed out that there was no revolution in Germany; quite the contrary, the Wehrmacht fought on until officially ordered to surrender by its High Command. Lerner characterized official claims for "Annie" and her kin as "highly dubious." Another veteran asked how any "clandestine station" could have made any German believe that it could operate for more than a few days in so tightly-controlled a totalitarian environment as Nazi Germany.<sup>390</sup> (Many Allied agents in Germany, to their sorrow, learned of the efficiency of Gestapo radio-detection apparatus, which

<sup>386</sup>Lerner, *Sykewar*, 270.

<sup>387</sup>*P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 190-192; Army Ground Forces report, 53.

<sup>388</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 304.

<sup>389</sup>*P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 193.

<sup>390</sup>Lerner, *Psywar*, 272.

could soon spot even narrowly-focused transmitters that only shot off a high-speed burst of code to London at irregular intervals.) The authoritative Martin Herz, PWD leaflet writer and former chief of leaflets and interrogation with PWB 7<sup>th</sup> Army in Italy, asserted that because

'black' propaganda lends itself particularly well to fraudulent practices, not only in its production and dissemination, but also in the evaluation of its results, extreme skepticism is in order in evaluating it, particularly since its deleterious effects (anger and increased determination of enemies who discern its origin) are usually not subject to analysis.<sup>391</sup>

General McClure's own Assistant Chief of Radio informed his chief that "I have read all of the 'Annie' scripts for a week recently, and it seems to me that the operation is naive, transparently false, and damaging...." (McClure mildly responded that "Annie is a spirited but minor part of the total psychological warfare operation.") More succinctly, and mischievously, Richard Crossman, noting the brilliant work that went into making these stations often so entertaining, claimed that such propaganda "had to be so entertaining that it probably maintained morale!" - morale of the enemy, that is.<sup>392</sup>

And yet it is not possible entirely to dismiss the evidence of fairly extensive POW responses as merely the self-serving disinformation of those trying to please their captors. And, of course, in that the "black" operators insisted that their mission was to undermine morale and spread dissention, their goals by their very nature were almost impossibly difficult to analyze in an objective manner.

The leaflet, as always, remained the backbone of PWD psywar throughout the war in Europe. PWD kept track of its far-flung leaflet operations by issuing a summary leaflet report to Army corps propaganda officers, giving the status on current and outdated leaflets, and establishing uniformity.<sup>393</sup>

*Nachrichten*, oddly enough, tried, with little success, to conceal its origins to the end of the war. The attempt was so transparent that PWD itself soon began to refer to it as merely "gray" propaganda, rather than "black." But such considerations

<sup>391</sup>Herz, "Radio Siege of Lorient," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1949).

<sup>392</sup>Lerner, *Psykewar*, 271-272. Another authority stated that "'Black' psychological warfare required tight and brilliant control. It is very doubtful whether much was accomplished by it that could not have been accomplished by expending the same amount of effort in 'white' propaganda." E. D. Kehm (instructor, Command and General Staff College), "The Methods and Functions of Military Psychological Warfare," *Military Review*, 26, #10 (January 1947). At least the perpetrators of "black" propaganda, British and American appeared to have thoroughly enjoyed themselves.

<sup>393</sup>Berger, 110.

aside, *Nachrichten*, from its first issue, proved very popular with German troops, with each leaflet reportedly being read by from four to five soldiers, an extremely high readership for a combat situation. Even though *Nachrichten* was printed at a peak rate of no less than 500,000 copies daily, it could still be disseminated from one to four days ahead of the Wehrmacht's own *Front Kurier*, with news that was that more "fresh" than the enemy's efforts. *Nachrichten* often carried the first news of important military developments, such as the Allied landings in the South of France or the airborne push at Arnhem.

The guidelines for *Nachrichten* were not only sensible and effective at the time, they could have been used as a template for similar psywar efforts in future wars: 1) Eschew politics, abstract post-war plans, pronouncements from on high, etc., This was a *soldier's* paper. 2) Resemble as closely as possible a first-class enemy soldier's paper. 3) Avoid outright propaganda, 4) Be objective, reporting Allies reverses as well as successes, 5) Take care in making predictions, 6) Keep an overall conservative tone, but also be lively, featuring maps, human interest items.

*Nachrichten's* editorials were written by a mysterious Captain J. von O. from the viewpoint of a patriotic but critical German officer. The paper retained its "German" tone by lifting news from Dr. Goebbles's own *Deutsche Nachrichten Dienst* (which it obtained by tapping his wire service). The journal was written by professional journalists who could "slant" their reporting against the Nazis --but never the German people. For example, beneath a story on civilian grocery disturbances, *Nachrichten* reported that "Ribbentrop [Reich Foreign Minister] needs 86 servants." Another item featured the full larder of a Nazi official discovered after the capture of Aachen, and a regular feature was an account of well-known Germans recently killed in the war as well as a large-scale map of the Western Front. The paper's already good reputation for veracity was enormously enhanced by its straightforward reporting of German advances during the enemy's Ardennes counter-offensive in December of 1944. The tone of the paper was lively, even slangy, and included "pin-up" photos (that, of course, could not be pinned up) to catch attention, as well as timely sports scores, jokes, and riddles.

*Nachrichten* was in no sense an official journal; its news and views were more-or-less that of its compilers (who seemed to have enjoyed themselves) and were not submitted to military censorship or to higher headquarters for policy approval, although security considerations, of course, were observed. The final issue, 4 May 1945, announced, without gloating, the impending end of hostilities in Europe.<sup>394</sup>

*Feldpost* was similar to *Nachrichten*, put out in the field by 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group P&W and disseminated by fighter-bombers and medium bombers. Both news sheets were published to the end of the war in Europe. *Feldpost* was an abridged version of

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<sup>394</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 12-13. Delmer, *Nachrichten*, introduction. M. Janowitz and M. Shills, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (1948); Lerner, 235-136, 263-265; Erdmann, 34-37, 285; PWD *SHAEF*, 165; Berger, 39-41.



and was furnished to lower 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group echelons for dissemination by leaflet shell, as was *frontbrief*, a 7<sup>th</sup> Army weekly news letter.<sup>395</sup> The tone of *Frontpost* was informal, even chatty, but not friendly, and contained in addition to news, a front-line map, features, a news picture, a column, some German sports news, a riddle, but no overt propaganda, "preaching," or editorializing. The newspaper started out, even before the D-Day landings, with straightforward reporting as in its description of the Tarawa campaign in the Pacific, (November 1943) in which it told of "very heavy [U.S.] casualties," but pointed out that important lessons were learned that would be put to good use in the invasion of Western Europe. One column, "Der Yankee Spricht," ("The Yankee Speaks"), featuring one plain soldier speaking to another across the lines, proved sufficiently successful to be transferred to PWD radio. Although there was no overt "message," propaganda was inserted in as subtle a means as possible. A popular service was "News From Home," which included family photos - as well as reports of bombings. Another feature carried authentic secret German documents which had been selected to show inefficiency, inadequacy, corruption and bungling in military and civilian leadership. Each document was reprinted with exact names, places and designation numbers. *Frontpost* was usually able to get its news to the German soldier several days before the information service of his own Army. The news sheet was able to "scoop" German sources with the first news of the attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944. That authentication, plus "Geheim!" ("secret") stamped throughout gave the German soldier the impression that he was reading very privileged documents indeed.

At the more tactical level, *Frontpost* (and later, *Feldpost*) carried "Aus der Kompanie" ("Company Items") or "Streiflichter aus der Wehrmacht" ("Sidelights on the Wehrmacht"), and were regarded by the editors as the most effective and useful material they could use. Dealing with personalities and situations, they appealed to the enemy's interest in gossip and "inside" stories that was made the more acute by his controlled press's bland fare. They could also stir up resentments and set enlisted men against officers and Nazis versus-Nazis.

*Frontpost* occasionally carried a supplement, *Nachrichten Aus der Heimat* ("News From the Home Country"), a typical issue of which reported straightforwardly such "news" as "wounded men command Volkssturm," "unemployment in the Third Reich," "Top Output through Alcohol," "Twenty-Six Millions eat out," "Gravestones for food," "Beauty repairs forbidden," "Utility winter overcoats this year," "Repairs only for left hand window panes," "Lunatic Condemned to 7 Year's Penal Servitude," etc.<sup>396</sup>

*Frontpost* itself was validated in the eyes of the enemy most of all when, like *Nachrichten*, it soberly reported American reverses in the German Ardennes counter-offensive of December 1944:

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<sup>395</sup>"AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements," 138; Lerner, 238.

<sup>396</sup>Issues in USASOC History Archives.

The Wehrmacht has gone over to the offensive on a 100 kilometer front in the West. Strong German armored and infantry units are advancing in the area extending from south of Monschau to the German-Luxembourg border. The attacks are being supported by the Luftwaffe and in several places have gained considerable ground.

Cleverly, *Frontpost* emphasized General von Rundstedt's Order of the Day which proclaimed that "everything is at stake." When the offensive was smashed, the natural reaction was that "everything" must then be lost. The 6<sup>th</sup> Army Group put out its own journal, the weekly *Feldbrief*, which proved to be virtually the only news source for German troops in this sector.<sup>397</sup>


As for leaflets, the *Passierschien* has gained something close to immortality as one of the most effective leaflets in the history of psychological operations. Based apparently on a Soviet idea as well as on detailed POW interrogations, this leaflet, drawn up in 1944, answered the need for an authoritative instrument of dignified surrender. The *Passierschien* was an extremely formal document that carried an English and German message from General Eisenhower to *Allied* soldiers:

The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible.

The leaflet's strong points were that it carried the signature of General Eisenhower, that it was bi-lingual, that it stuck to basic issues like food and medical care, that it did not refer to "surrender," and that it was so official it could have passed for an international treaty.<sup>398</sup> As one example of this leaflet's effectiveness, a 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group report recorded that of 375 POWs interviewed, 275 had seen the *Passierschein* and 185 claimed that they trusted it completely. Another 32 trusted it

<sup>397</sup>P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, 118-121. PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 9-10; Laurie thesis, 518-520; "History of 2d MRB," 39; Captain John Lyons, "PW in Europe," "Washington Weekly Intelligencer," OWI #20, 23 December 1944, RG 208, entry 6g, box 12, "Washington Weekly Intelligencer" folder; Peter Wyden, oral interview with author, Washington, 9 June 1993. Editions of *Frontpost/Feldpost* can be found in the USASOC Archives, including the first edition of the former. ("Russians Cross the Danube," "Saarbrücken Under Artillery Fire," and "Fire Sale in Berne for German High Command Books.") For a brief analysis of PWD news letters, see Army Ground School, "Psychological Warfare NCO Course," "News Leaflets," section, 5-6.

<sup>398</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 18. An original *Passierschein* is in Report of 7<sup>th</sup> Army AGO for January 1945, RG 94, box 2703, 107-39 folder. An earlier version is in the Herz Papers, box 1, folder #2; and a full-color reproduction is in Lerner, *Sykewar*, 239.



...and the German riposte.

# Grundsätze des Kriegsgefangenenrechts

(Laut Haager Konvention 1907, Genfer Konvention 1929)

1. Vom Augenblick der Übergabe an gelten deutsche Soldaten\* als Kriegsgefangene und unterstehen dem Schutz der Genfer Konvention. Demgemäß wird ihre Soldatenehre vollstens respektiert.
2. Kriegsgefangene haben so bald wie möglich zu Sammelstellen gebracht zu werden, die weit genug von der Gefahrenzone entfernt sind, um ihre persönliche Sicherheit zu gewährleisten.
3. Sie erhalten dieselbe Verpflegung in Qualität und Quantität wie Angehörige der alliierten Heere und werden, falls krank oder verwundet, in denselben Lazaretten behandelt wie alliierte Truppen.
4. Ehrenzeichen und Wertgegenstände sind den Kriegsgefangenen zu belassen. Geld kann nur von Offizieren der Sammelstellen abgenommen werden, wofür eine Empfangsbescheinigung ausgestellt wird.
5. In den Kriegsgefangenenlagern haben Schlafräume, Raumverteilung der Unterkunft, Beistellen und sonstige Anlagen denen der alliierten Garnisonstruppen gleichwertig zu sein.
6. Laut Genfer Konvention dürfen Kriegsgefangene weder Gegenstand von Repressalien, noch der öffentlichen Neugierde preisgegeben werden. Nach Kriegsende werden sie so bald wie möglich nach Hause zurückgeschickt.

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\* Als Soldaten gelten auf Grund der Haager Konvention (IV, 1907): Alle bewaffneten Personen, die Uniform oder ein von Weitem erkennbares Abzeichen tragen.

## REGELN FÜR DIE GEFANGENNAHME:

Um Missverständnisse bei der Gefangennahme auszuschließen, ist folgendes angezeigt: Waffen weglegen, Helm und Koppel herunter; Hände hochheben und ein Taschentuch oder dieses Flugblatt schwenken.

for the most part, with only 21 disbelievers and 19 doubters.<sup>399</sup>

The dissemination of this leaflet was as careful as its contents. SHAEF ordered it to be used only in those tactical situations where there were good chances of success and also forbade any "field expedients." Thus the *Passierschein* was never "cheapened" even while passing through six editions. The changes were: a) German text above English, 2) Addition of Eisenhower signature, 3) Eisenhower's name spelled out below his signature after POWs stated they could not recognize the name, 4) Color changed from green to a more conspicuous red, 5) An added note that the pass was valid for "one or more bearers," to clear up some confusion over how many could surrender on one pass.<sup>400</sup> (A unit *Passierschein*, for some reason, proved a failure.)<sup>401</sup> Typical of enemy reaction was the POW who reported that he and his fellows "thought that they had an official document now and it was high time to go over." Another boasted that he carried a document with General Eisenhower's signature.<sup>402</sup> The causes of the success of this leaflet was summarized by a 5<sup>th</sup> MRBC veteran:

Here was a piece of paper shaped like a dollar bill, engraved to look very, very important....It was a form of commitment....It didn't try to persuade them to surrender in the sense that it ordered them to come over, or it didn't say that either side was winning or losing....It merely stated a fact....<sup>403</sup>

And if "Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Flattery" the Germans flattered PWD by bringing out their own "Passierschein," a leaflet that even used the original's phrase "genuine wish to give himself up," as well as enjoining good treatment, etc.<sup>404</sup>

*One Minute* ("Which May Save Your Life"), a sober, soldier-to-soldier leaflet, proved almost as successful as the *Passierschein*, and for much the same reasons: it steered clear of politics and promised no more than "correct" treatment. A third successful effort, *Ei Surrender*, gave the German soldier the phonetic English phrase to use for giving himself up safely. It also assured him that the Americans were

<sup>399</sup>"21<sup>st</sup> Army Group Report on Psychological Warfare Operations for 14 Oct - 31 Oct 44," Lerner Papers, box 53, folder No. 6.

<sup>400</sup>M. Herz, "Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 13 (Fall 1949); Lerner, *Sykewar*, 158; Berger, 53-55.

<sup>401</sup>Berger, 55.

<sup>402</sup>PWD SHAEF Leaflet Section, "The Leaflet Propaganda Front (A Review of February Activities)," 20 March 1945, Herz Papers, box 1, folder #10. Some German POWs apparently claimed, reference *Passierschein*, that they had not a leaflet, but a "document" in their possession. "Report on the Interrogation of 100 PS/W Captured on the Fifth Army Front Between Sept 15<sup>th</sup> and Oct 22," 22 November 1944," Lerner Papers, box 53, folder #6.

<sup>403</sup>*Views of World War II Psywar Personnel*, 192.

<sup>404</sup>Kehm, "Can Psywar Pay its Passage?", *Military Review* (March 1947).




EXHIBIT I

"Flow chart" of U.S. psywar, ETO, World War II.

From: PWD, Leaflet Operations, Western European Theater  
(SHAEP Paris?: 2 July 1945.

making every effort to see to it that he was able to make it safely across the lines. (For some reason this excellent theme was repeated only once, during the Korean War.)<sup>405</sup> But in August "Surrender" was replaced by "capture" in PWD leaflets.<sup>406</sup> Another effective leaflet, *Ten Divisions*, gave graphic evidence of the annihilation of German units in the Cherkassy pocket on the Eastern Front, naming the units, and asking, "Where is the Luftwaffe?"<sup>407</sup> *Befehl* ("Order") gave obedient German troops their latest order, directly from General Eisenhower: to surrender promptly. (SHAEF gave orders that this leaflet was to be used only in acute tactical situations, presumably in order not to dilute Eisenhower's authority.) Another leaflet that truthfully informed the Germans that POWs were no longer being shipped to America had to be hastily pulled, when it was discovered that most wanted to be sent there, and to forestall a likely Nazi response: "Damn right you're not going to the States. You'll be sent to Siberia!"<sup>408</sup>

The majority of PWD leaflets carried in one form or another what came to be termed the "Six Points," outlining post-capture treatment of German POWs. These points were: 1) Immediate removal from the danger zone, 2) Decent treatment as befits soldiers, 3) The same food as American soldiers -- "The best fed army in the world.," 4) Hospital care, 5) Postal privileges, and 6) Return home after the war as "as soon as possible."<sup>409</sup> In the main "The Six Points" were indeed followed by the American authorities, but the British and French shamelessly held on to many of their POWs as more-or-less slave laborers until several years after the end of the war.

Other leaflets were directed to the huge foreign labor force inside Germany, giving sabotage advice. Later, when it was felt that the war would not end soon, the sabotage theme was discontinued, although a few drops were made periodically simply to divert the attentions of German security forces.<sup>410</sup> Appeals to foreign troops in the *Wehrmacht* proved particularly successful; motivation was none too strong in the first place. The 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group P&W Section reported to Eighth Air Force:

that particular drop, if you recall, was for a Russian leaflet to be dropped on a goose-egg around the river east of the town, which was

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<sup>405</sup> P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, PWD SHAEF history, both *passim*; Laurie thesis, 517-518; Herz, "Leaflet Propaganda," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, (Fall, 1949); "Psychological Warfare NCO Course, #2," 4.

<sup>406</sup> Erdmann, 288.

<sup>407</sup> Bishop thesis, 236.

<sup>408</sup> PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 18. This work gives the reason for the SHAEF restriction as a desire to use the leaflet only in situations where German troops could use it as an "alibi," which seems unlikely. "United States" leaflet described in "21<sup>st</sup> Army Group Report," 8.

<sup>409</sup> P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, 128; PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 15-17.

<sup>410</sup> PWD SHAEF, 41-42, SHAEF Special Staff, memo for record, n.d., RG 331, box 10, folder 091.42.

# ALLIIERTES HÖCHSTKOMMANDO

(Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force)

# BEFEHL


## AN DIE VERSPRENGTEN DEUTSCHEN TRUPPENTEILE

Das schnelle Vordringen der Alliierten hat es mit sich gebracht, dass zahlreiche deutsche Einheiten versprengt und aufgefächert worden sind und daher von Ausländiger deutscher Seite keine Befehle mehr erhalten können.

Um nutzlose Opfer an Menschenleben zu vermeiden, ergeht daher folgender Befehl:

1.) Deutsche Soldaten, die abgeschnitten oder versprengt wurden, sowie Einheiten, die vom deutschen Kommando keine Befehle mehr erhalten, haben sich beim nächstliegenden alliierten Truppenteil zu melden.

2.) Bis dahin ist der Einheitsführer bzw. rangälteste Unteroffizier für die Disziplin seiner Mannschaft verantwortlich. Die umstehenden Verhaltensmassregeln für versprengte Einheiten treten mit sofortiger Wirksamkeit in Kraft.



DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
Oberbefehlshaber der Alliierten Streitkräfte

"Befehl," = "orders," that is, orders to surrender, from General Eisenhower. ("I have orders here from General Eisenhower.")



held by forward elements of troops based on L'Orient proper. It was impossible for us to get at them by artillery shells, and our intelligence informed us at the time that whole river line was being held by Russian units. The air-drop, which incidentally was an expert job, netted us 102 prisoners who came over to our side after swimming the river - no mean feat in itself. The net result of this particular operation was that all the Russian troops in that sector were withdrawn and replaced by Germans, thus weakening the inner defenses of L'Orient which is our ultimate objective.<sup>411</sup>

A particularly bitter theme for the Germans was "Where is the Luftwaffe?" As far as the Germans were concerned the most galling as well as the most dangerous aspect of the Allies' superiority in the West was their near-complete control of the air. General Dittmar stated that this campaign contributed markedly to a lowering of German military morale. In fact, this taunting campaign did provoke the Luftwaffe to come out, when many enemy aircraft were shot down by far-better trained Allied fighter pilots.<sup>412</sup>

In October of 1944 the 2d Armored Division, driving for the Roer River, discovered a way to counter the tactic of German soldiers ducking down into their foxholes at the approach of U.S. tanks, only to rise and fight the following infantry. The 2d simply attached bulldozer blades and buried the enemy alive. Interrogation of POWs soon discovered that the Germans had developed a healthy fear of what they named the *zerpfluge* or "tank-plow." Just prior to the 2d's next attack, the leaflet *Vorschlag fur Abwehr* ("Proposal for Defense") was shell-fired over the opposing 183d Volksgrenadier Regiment. It showed the business-end of a Sherman tank-mounted plow, and told the German unit by name:

Our Panzerplow is no secret weapon. We Americans show our weapons openly. These heavily armed and armored plows bury many of you alive in your foxholes -Lt. Schneps ordered the men of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3d platoons (6<sup>th</sup> Co, 343 Inf Regt) to let the bulldozers pass and attack the American infantry following them: Consequently, 60 men were plowed under as they stood defenseless in their foxholes. Lt. Schneps bears the sole responsibility for their death. Their death brought him the Iron Cross first class. Your best defense against Panzerplows: Use Your V2!\* \*V2 means to raise both your hands in honorable surrender.

As a result, according to one official account, almost every enemy soldier in a foxhole in the way of the 2d's plow-tanks used his "V-2." This outcome was the more

<sup>411</sup>"Leaflet Operations by 8th Air Force," 10.

<sup>412</sup>Carroll, *Persuade of Perish*, 38; Carroll videotape interview.

important, coming as it did when Germany was far from defeated, although many soldiers of the 343d were apparently losing faith in Hitler's new "Secret Weapons." (Hence the teasing in the leaflet about the American's own "un-secret weapons.")<sup>413</sup>

The unit surrender pass required careful timing. Millions of these instruments were drawn up in the stalemated winter of 1944-1945 and distributed to lower-echelon PWD units. But they were not used until Wehrmacht defeats and low morale had rendered enemy units "ripe" for such an appeal some weeks prior to the German surrender.<sup>414</sup> Another successful leaflet was a four-page brochure pictorially detailing the life of the "happy POW." The text emphasized that the depicted German soldiers, overwhelmed by Allied material superiority, had done the honorable and sensible thing.<sup>415</sup> The PWD also continued its policy of allowing the Germans to feel that they would be giving in to preponderant force rather than surrendering.<sup>416</sup> And at this time a report stated that German troops were actually collecting Allied leaflets and trading them around like baseball cards, despite various draconian prohibitions against even carrying the material.<sup>417</sup>

By late 1944, PWD had developed leaflet production into a relatively speedy routine: A leaflet could be written in from two to three hours, typeset in a further three to four hours, be laid out in another hour, photographed and a plate made in four hours, and 50,000 copies printed in three to four hours, a total of from thirteen to sixteen hours. From request to dropping, however, could still take several days, although certain "standard" leaflets that were kept in stock for speedy delivery, such as *Passierschein* and good treatment for POWs could be dropped in a matter of hours.<sup>418</sup> The extent of Allied printing operations can be seen in the fact that at the height of such work no less than 85 percent of all the offset presses in the British Isles were devoted exclusively to turning out psywar material, a figure that does not include large-scale printing in Paris, Brussels, or Luxembourg.<sup>419</sup>

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<sup>413</sup>Army Ground School, *Tactical Psychological Warfare: The Combat Psychological Warfare Detachment* (Fort Riley, Kansas: September 1947), 15.

<sup>414</sup>Janowitz, "Coordinating Psychological Warfare," 642, *Casebook*.

<sup>415</sup>Copy in Herz Papers, box 1, folder 10. Similar leaflets are found in Erdmann, 329-330.

<sup>416</sup>"The Combat Leaflet: Weapon of Persuasion," *Army Information Digest*, 5 (June 1950).

<sup>417</sup>John Lyons, "PW in Europe," "Washington Weekly Intelligencer," OWI, 5 December 1944-23 December 1944, RG 208, entry 6g, box 12, "Weekly Washington Intelligence" folder. One way surrender-minded German troops would avoid the vigilance of their NCOs while actually signaling their desire to defect was to stick an Allied leaflet in their flies; U.S. soldiers had to be instructed as to the meaning of this odd behavior. Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 204.

<sup>418</sup>Erdmann, 291-292; Kehm, "Military Psychological Warfare."

<sup>419</sup>McClure address, Army War College, 16 February 1953, Military History Institute Archives; PWD *SHAEF History*, 39; Kehm, "Military Psywar."

Civilian agents of the PWD on the ground infiltrated behind enemy lines in France to print up leaflets on wood or linoleum blocks or in some local print shop, often with the help of the Resistance, in the small hours of the morning. In fact, all PWD field personnel were trained in the use of such methods and in how to work with the Resistance.<sup>420</sup>

PWD had to devote a considerable amount of time to the aerial dissemination of its leaflets. In fact, by 1944, on each bombing mission of the Eighth Air Force, a maximum of twelve aircraft carried leaflet bombs.<sup>421</sup> But simply "dropping" them, that is, throwing broken bundles out through the bomb bays, was extremely wasteful: B-17s of the Special Leaflet Squadron, on an early mission to Paris in December of 1943, flying at 30,000 feet and facing an unexceptional 60-mile hour wind, had to drop their baskets of leaflets somewhere over Brussels in order to reach Paris and some leaflets destined for Paris quite often landed somewhere in Italy. On another occasion leaflets again destined for Paris, were found embarrassingly scattered over the southern English countryside!<sup>422</sup> Obviously pin-point tactical aerial leaflet dissemination was impossible with current equipment or lack thereof. Through 1944 PWD personnel worked on devices that would enable leaflet bundles to be dropped from a considerable height, clear the aircraft formation, and then open up reasonably near the target.

The Special Leaflet Squadron could not at first show much better accuracy in its distribution of general tactical leaflets. But because the squadron was under the direct operational control of PWD, it could be directed to any target the division selected when they were the most needed, rather than at the convenience of the U.S. Army Air Forces.<sup>423</sup> The squadron paid a price, although a relatively small one in comparison to most bombardment squadrons: in 2,302 sorties it lost three aircraft in action, with 16 or 18 men killed and 11 missing. The commander of the squadron was himself killed by "friendly" flak over England on 4 March 1945.<sup>424</sup>

After four months of speedy work, experiment, and testing, the "Monroe" bomb (T-1), developed by and named after a PWD officer, proved a great improvement. This device was fashioned from the cardboard container for the M-17 chemical bomb and fitted with a mechanical time release fuse. The modified container bomb, could carry 70,000 leaflets, and a B-17 or B-24 heavy bomber could easily lift

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<sup>420</sup>Erdmann, 294.

<sup>421</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 23.

<sup>422</sup>PWD *SHAEF History*, 35-36; *P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group history*, 142-143; F. Sondern, Jr., "General McClure's Newsboys, *American Mercury* (February 1945). A good outline of PWD dissemination methods can be found in "Combat Propaganda, The Aims and Characteristics of Propaganda to the Enemy," SHAEF Special Staff, PWD, RG 133, box 11, folder 091.1412; "AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements," 144.

<sup>423</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 21-22; Berger, *Wartime Leaflets*, 86-87.

<sup>424</sup>"AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements," 146, 151; Berger, 88.

ten such bombs, set to open at 10,000 feet. But this system worked only erratically. The mechanical time fuse was in short supply, and had to be replaced with a barometric fuse, which often opened the bomb prematurely. Further, Major Monroe departed for the States before his leaflet bomb could be perfected.<sup>425</sup> (On one "most embarrassing" occasion a mis-directed PWD leaflet bomb landed just outside the Command Post of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division.) Thus, it was not until only seven weeks before D-Day that the Monroe leaflet bomb could promise a measure of success.<sup>426</sup> Nonetheless, the P&W Section of 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group credited the 406 [Heavy] Bombardment Squadron (the Special Leaflet Squadron) as nothing less than "the most effective single weapon used by Psychological Warfare on the 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group front" due to its ability to "saturate the front with paper to the point where prisoners of war interrogation showed up to 80 percent of enemy units having read Allied leaflets."<sup>427</sup>

PWD experienced much less difficulty with leaflet distribution by medium bombers and fighter bombers, which were used almost exclusively for tactical leaflet drops. But the greater accuracy of these bombers was at the cost of less carrying capacity: the lighter aircraft used the T-3 leaflet bomb, which could carry up to 15,000 leaflets, compared to the T-1's 70,000.<sup>428</sup> (Presumably due to the much more widespread and fluid battlefield in this campaign, the leaflet balloon used with some success by the British in World War I was never utilized after the British found their early efforts landed all over Europe.)<sup>429</sup> The aerial loudspeaker proved another still-born means of dissemination that had to await the Vietnam War era to come into its own.<sup>430</sup>

The development of shell leaflet dissemination followed roughly the same pattern as that by air. In other words, a rather lengthy development process, ignoring the progress made in World War I, yielded a system that was not entirely satisfactory even by the end of fighting in Europe. As noted, PWD had developed an adequate leaflet shell in North Africa from the British 25-pounder shell, and progressed to the modified mm howitzer M2 or M2A1 smoke shell, M-64. But as late as D-Day the leaflet shell was still considered experimental and there was a lack of understanding of

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<sup>425</sup>P&W Section, *12<sup>th</sup> Army Group history*, 141-142, 153; PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 23-24; Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm*, 87-96; Erdmann, 378, 295; Kehm, "Military Psychological Warfare"; Berger, 86-87; "AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements," 144-145; B. Friedman, "The 'Monroe' bomb - World War II Workhorse," *The Psywar Society: Falling Leaf*, 6, No.3 (1965); Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 291.

<sup>426</sup>Kehm, "Military Psychological Warfare"; Berger, 86-87.

<sup>427</sup>P&W Section, *12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 143.

<sup>428</sup>ibid., 144; Berger, 86.

<sup>429</sup>Cruickshank, 87-96.

<sup>430</sup>Bishop, 401. Such failure did not stop psywarriors from resurrecting this idea during the Korean War, with similar lack of success.

its use by SHAEF G-2, G-3, and its artillery chief, as well as a lack of coordination and any one officer pushing the project. As well, the firing table for the leaflet shell was inaccurate because of the ballistic change in the modification from smoke to leaflet shell caused a maximum difference in range of approximately 200 yards, and with a wind of from ten to fifteen miles per hour the range difference could be as much as 500 to 600 yards from an air burst of 100 to 200 yards high; no accurate firing table was developed to the end of the war. Also, the leaflets might arrive partially burned, loading was a complicated, time-consuming process, and artillery officers were often reluctant to give up their rounds for "paper bullets" during times of shell shortages. Finally, the Germans were often so spread along their front that the supposed "pin-point" accuracy claimed for shell-delivered leaflets rarely materialized.<sup>431</sup> In fact, the 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group P&W Section asserted that "It was the fighter-bomber that delivered the news to specific enemy units," concluding that "The best leaflet target is the enemy's ration dumps. News travels with the rations."<sup>432</sup> Still, Heber Blankenhorn could report at the end of the war that "Throughout the American Army's protracted experience of combat propaganda leaflet distribution, 1943-1945, no problem was more persistent than that of liaison with air and artillery distribution."<sup>433</sup>

As enemy POWs were rounded up by the tens of thousands, PWD was able through interrogation to obtain some of the Wehrmacht's reaction to its efforts. Allied psywarriors attempted, with some success, to combine quantitative surveys with qualitative interrogations, knowing full well that POWs were likely to tell their captors what they wanted to hear. They considered that deserters were "purely incidental to, and not a part of the deliberate aim of front-line propaganda, and focused in their propaganda and in their interrogation on the "German soldier who claims to [have] offer[ed] active resistance."<sup>434</sup>

Interestingly, PWD used no psychologists in the camps, but rather historians

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<sup>431</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 26; Kehm, "Military Psychological Warfare"; Cruickshank, 97; *PWD SHAEF history*, 35-36; Erdmann, 285. The PWD also experimented with rocket leaflets but only on a very limited scale, undoubtedly preoccupied as they were with the never entirely-satisfactory leaflet shell. The Germans did send over "Buzz-Bombs" to the British Isles, filled with leaflets carrying messages from British POWs, asking them to be forwarded to their addressees. The British authorities, however, refused, not wishing to have their enemy know the impact zones of the infamous V-1s. Berger, 98-99. For a brief account of how these leaflets were in theory to be distributed, see Hall and Caskey, "Lectures on Psychological Warfare," 18.

<sup>432</sup>*P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 146.

<sup>433</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda", 126.

<sup>434</sup>SHAEF Special Staff, "Combat Propaganda, I, The Aims and Characteristics of Propaganda to the Enemy," n.d., PWD Special Staff, RG 133 ,box 11, folder 091.412.

and social scientists, and made little attempt to establish formal techniques. The standard form for POW interrogation, for example, does not ask outright how effective the respondent found Allied psywar, but by indirection could uncover much about the POWs attitudes, as well as to obtain something of a profile of German wartime society and morale.<sup>435</sup>

As in Italy and North Africa, German reaction to Allied psywar was not long in coming. In March 1944, Goebbels fulminated against the "printed filth" written by the "hireling Jewish scribes of Churchill and Roosevelt." Six days earlier Himmler had ordered all citizens, on threat of prison, to turn in to the nearest *politzei* station all Allied leaflets they might find.<sup>436</sup> A later Nazi publication, *The Secret Weapon of the Enemy is at Work*, iterated Himmler's threat.<sup>437</sup> In the field, the commander of the 2d Panzer Division reported numerous desertions and concluded that "We must prevent this lying venom from falling into the hands of irresolute comrades," and from the commanders of the 9<sup>th</sup> and the 91<sup>st</sup> Infantry Divisions came boilerplate denunciation of the "vile and cunning methods and the meanest forms of deceit" of the Allied psywarriors. Another enemy counter-measure, the resurrection of the "Stab in the Back" legend of World War I, might well have stiffened the troops' resistance to Allied propaganda: "just hold on a little longer this time, and the tide will soon turn."

German authorities attempted to turn the very existence of Allied propaganda against the Allies: "Failing to defeat us with conventional weapons and 'terror bombing,' the enemy now resorts to the most vile lies in his desperation." Whether German propagandists actually believed this far-fetched reasoning is unknown, and of course, immaterial.<sup>438</sup>

The Wehrmacht High Command Bulletin for the Officers' Corps literally demonized "objective" U.S. psywar, but with words of high praise as well:

Here is a cool, objective, German military style. Not a word too many or too few....The reader is amazed to find that this discussion contains no lies. What he does not notice, of course,

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<sup>435</sup>Lerner, *Sykewar*, 121-124. See also Blankenhorn, Memorandum for the Record", subject: "Observations on Prisoner Examination, as a Guide for Psychological Warfare", 17 July 1942, in his "Combat Propaganda," 111.

<sup>436</sup>OWI memorandum for the record, undated, RG 208, item 4, box 59, "OWI in Europe" folder.

<sup>437</sup>OWI "Evaluation Bulletin," #5, 22 January 1945, RG 208, entry 6e, box 7, "Enemy Propaganda: German" folder. Also Lehmann, 285. A Goebbels spokesman warned that "There is not a single sentence in these leaflets which does not want to do us harm...They are weapons, and we must be careful with all weapons. "AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements," 157.

<sup>438</sup>Cruickshank, 174; Berger, 122; SHAEF PWD decimal file, 1944-1945, RG 331, box 32, poll of German POWs, 20 January 1945. "Leaflets and Prisoners of War" folder.

is the fact that this is the exact moment when the devil is on the spot leading him into temptation.....Again in the same matter-of-fact style, it is stated that certain persons are responsible for the outcome of the battle - an SS General is named here, an army General there. In the end, the soldier is asked when he will finally give up this senseless struggle.

But the report concluded on a tenuous upbeat note: "On the whole, it can be assumed that the order to destroy enemy leaflets or hand them in is carried out well."<sup>439</sup>

However, many things in psychological warfare are not exactly what they may seem. It is possible that at least some German commanders simply were attempting to curry favor with their superiors, or to divert attention from a possible loss of confidence by their troops in their leadership, or to show that they were ever-vigilant to any enemy threat.<sup>440</sup> The Nazis were also extraordinary busy-bodies, as is in the nature of totalitarians, and while their concerns with Allied propaganda were probably genuine enough, they naturally involved themselves in nearly everything that went on in their domains, and that certainly included enemy propaganda.

As in Italy, the Germans responded to Allied combat psywar with their own campaign. For some reason, German leaflets in Western Europe do not seem to have attained the artistic or imaginative level of those used in Italy. One of the better efforts calculated the life expectancy of the American infantryman, a point that, considering the replacement situation in 1944-1945, was well taken. Another lifted a piece of *Saturday Evening Post* art as a background for "Her Last Kiss." More lugubrious was "What Have You Made Out of Germany?" ("A Proletarian Country for Stalin.") and "White Feather for Doolittle" (for the bombing of Dresden.) Of the latter two leaflets it can safely be said that the average G.I. could not have cared less about the fate of the "krauts," their country or their cities.<sup>441</sup> Another effort, after the

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<sup>439</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 30. Note the revealing admission that PWD propaganda contains "no lies."

<sup>440</sup>The point is made by M. Janowitz, "Inferences about Propaganda from Textual and Documentary Analysis," *Casebook*, 735.

<sup>441</sup>Leaflets found in Herz Papers, box 1, folder #1; and Lerner Papers, box 29, folder No. 18. One German "bombing" leaflet became nearly hysterical as it displayed photos of

Two of the ten thousand refugee children of Berlin, Dresden, and Magdeburg, maimed, slaughtered, burnt by white people, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, while seeking shelter from the Bolshevik murderers....And you dare talk about atrocities!"

Text but not leaflet in *ibid*. There is also evidence of a German loudspeaker unit at Aachen, calling upon U.S. troops to "cease the senseless fight.", not very effective

Battle of the Bulge was more notable for its grammatical and conceptual solecisms.

### G. I.'s of the 45th Division!

Many thanks for your nice leaflets! So you think that we deserve some rest and an occasional leave, do you? Well, what about the blisters *at* your feet? We don't mind get any leave just now. You don't get any leave either. All that matters to us is that

#### YOU WON'T GET TO BERLIN.

You have been told the war would end in autumn. Your division, well known to us since the days of Sicily and the Anzio-Beachhead, did not achieve anything spectacular so far. Quite a number of your fellows, however, have kicked the bucket. Pretty tough for the replacements who never dreamt of having to cross the pond, isn't it? Your pals told us how much they "enjoyed" fighting. No wonder

they had no idea what they were fighting for!

One of them said that he had been FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM  
He didn't seem to be one of the brightest boys.

You left freedom behind

with your folks at home, your parents, wives, children, girl-friends of whom you keep such a lot of photos.

Slugging it out in the mud you have a good chance to be killed or maimed for the sake of war-mongers and profiteers who once more contrived to stay at home.

Your buddies are glad to be out of the mud. They are sure to return home safe and sound. They have taken the short-cut. You still have a long way to go. Keep alive, if you can. For remember

You are still wanted...for JAPAN! (emphasis in original)

Despite at least one theme that could have been effective ("You are still wanted...for Japan!"), the whole tone is smart-alecky. ("We don't mind not getting any leave

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propaganda to an army on the move into the enemy's home territory. "History of 2d MRB," 63. An excellent study of German psywar on the Eastern Front, which sheds light on similar activities in the West is J. H. Buchsbaum, "German Psychological Warfare on the Russian Front, 1941-1945" (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington: 1953).



[sure]...."kicked the bucket," "cross the pond") where a simple facetiousness might have sufficed, and insulting ("Your division...did not achieve anything spectacular so far....no idea what they were fighting for....he didn't seem to be one of the brightest boys....They have taken the short-cut.") A Britishism ("dreamt"), foreign ideological phraseology ("war-mongers"), and clumsy phrasing ("girl-friends of whom you keep such a lot of photos.") round out what could serve as a short manual in how not to compose a foreign-language leaflet.<sup>442</sup>

Not all German leaflets were this bad, but most in Western Europe labored under the burden of one or more of its failings. In the dismissive words of one veteran, "With minor exceptions, their [German] military psychological warfare efforts were, by our standards, quite crude and relatively unsuccessful."<sup>443</sup> Certainly, there is no evidence that PWD used German propaganda as any guide to their own psywar.<sup>444</sup>

Well before Allied forces entered the Reich, PWD had begun planning for "Information Control" operations, and, in fact, PWD now became the predominantly civilian Information Control Division (ICD), SHAEF, although the old title seems to have been used far more than the new through to the end of the war in Europe.<sup>445</sup> Intelligence showed that defeatism was by now widespread throughout Germany, and Allied "The war is lost" propaganda increasingly met the response of "I could not

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<sup>442</sup>Herz, "The Combat Leaflet: Weapon of Persuasion," *Army Information Digest*, 5 (January 1950). A similar leaflet played on the logical thought that returning World War II American servicemen might well end up after the war like the World War I veterans -selling apples on street corners. But the art work was obviously Teutonic, used Germanisms like *the Wallstreet*, and substituted "Brother, Got a Dime for Me?" for the classic line (at least to Americans) "Brother Can You Spare a Dime?") Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 214.

<sup>443</sup>Kehm, "Can Psywar Pay its Passage?", *Military Review* (March 1947). General McClure used similar words regarding Axis propaganda to Allied troops: "...German propaganda to our boys was so crude, as was the Japanese, that it had little effect." McClure interview, *US News and World Report* (2 January 1953). It might also be argued that the very complexity of the control and coordination of Allied psywar insured that it "never fell to the dead level of mechanical regularity that characterized a great part of the German output.", "Written Directives," M. Janowitz, *Casebook*, 314-315. This author, after viewing scores of German leaflets, has a higher opinion of their quality, for all of their linguistic shortcomings. It would be difficult to improve upon, for example, the German DEATH magazine, as a counter to the popular LIFE Magazine. (example in USASOC Historical Archives).

<sup>444</sup>In fact one PWD veteran noted "We only analyzed German propaganda. We didn't try to think of what they thought of us.", *Views of World War II Psywar Personnel* (Operational Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, MD: 23 February 1951), 105.

<sup>445</sup>PWD SHAEF, 19.

agree with you more, but what can I do?" New themes now emphasized anti-evacuation (temporarily), then evacuation of certain "danger areas," warnings against joining the Volkssturm, a slow-down campaign, a talk-to-the soldier program, and (the most enduring) avoiding senseless destruction.<sup>446</sup> The most important publication of this type was a daily four-page news letter entitled *SHAEF*, printed in English, German, French and Polish; as the emphasis switched to the displaced persons in the Reich, German was dropped in favor of Russian.<sup>447</sup>

As for the post-hostilities era, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff passed on *SHAEF*'s principles for the German occupation, and thus the guidelines for PWD Information Control: the Germans were to be given the cold comfort that their fate under military government would be no worse than it had been under the Nazis(!), and that all depended on how they behaved before and during occupation. If facilities were destroyed in any mis-guided "scorched earth" policy, they would be the ones who would suffer, and that military requirements would come before civil reconstruction. (It is unclear whether the last point was actually spelled out for the Germans.) Basically, the occupation was to be strict but fair, and all political parties were to be treated equally. (although the Nazi Party, obviously, was to be extirpated.)<sup>448</sup> General McClure later issued his own guidelines to the troops in February, 1945, specifying that the German people were not to be indicted as a whole for German atrocities, as this would only stiffen resistance. But, military and civilians, the Germans would nonetheless (and somewhat contradictorily) be held to a "shared responsibility for such actions."<sup>449</sup>

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<sup>446</sup>PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 17-18.

<sup>447</sup>Berger, 16.

<sup>448</sup>W. B. Smith, memo to PWD, subject: "Propaganda Treatment of Military Government," October 1944 [no day given], Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder. This policy came from the top: President Roosevelt noted to Secretary of War Henry Stimson that "the German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.", FDR to Stimson, quoted in C. C. Crane, *Bombs, Cities and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II* (Manhattan, Kansas: 1993).

<sup>449</sup>McClure to P&PW Section, 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group, 3 February 1945, RG 331, *SHAEF* Special Staff, PWD, box 10, 091.42 folder; "Minutes of Staff Meeting on Psychological Warfare held at 1515 hrs. on 1 February 1945, in Room 25 Trianon," Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder. See also MG R. W. Crawford [SHAEF ACS G-4], memo, "Psychological Warfare Policy Toward German Civilians," 6 October 1944, AGO WD Records Branch, *SHAEF-PWD*, 014 CA, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder; Military Government Regulations, RG 331, *SHAEF* Special Staff, PWD, BOX 10, 091.42. See also, PWB, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, report, "An Impression of Germans in Germany", 9 January 1945, Lerner Papers, box 55, folder #1.

The first dissemination of printed news to German civilians took place on 3 November 1944, when 10,000 copies of *Frontpost* were distributed through Military Government channels. On 27 November PWD published its first newspaper specifically for German civilians, the full-size weekly, *Die Neue Zeitung* ("The New Newspaper"). This not very original title was changed with the second issue to *Die Mittelungen* ("The News," or "Bulletin" --not much better), which appeared without interruption almost to the end of the war in Europe, being supplemented successively by such local journals as *Aachener Nachrichten*, *Kolnischer Kurier*, *Frankfurter Presse*, *Hessische Post*, and *Bransschweiger Bote*.

Aachen, the first German city to be taken by the Allies, and the ancient capital of the Emperor Charlemagne, was thus doubly symbolic. Psywar before Aachen may well have back-fired in that, inexplicably for this late in the war, it made no effort no attempt to salve the honor of its defenders. The garrison commander was replaced by a strong Nazi who held out until the city was taken by storm with heavy loss of life on both sides.<sup>450</sup> Within the ruins of Aachen a PWD psywar team established *Aacgeber Nachrichten*, the first German paper to be published by Germans under U.S. supervision, and whose first edition appeared in January 1945. Later, the 2d MRBC used its language skills to help select "reliable" Germans as editors, production managers, etc. for similar newspapers in Cologne, and Bonn as well as for responsible municipal government positions in those cities.<sup>451</sup> These journals acted as semi-official vehicles for Military Government proclamations, instructions (such as the turning in of weapons and of any stray German soldiers), decisions of Military Government (MG) courts, and other necessary information. They further demonstrated the impact of MG on their communities, and its efforts to restore stability, to combat rumor through the dissemination of accurate news, and to carry out such campaigns as the planting of every fertile acre to lay in a food supply against the coming winter.<sup>452</sup> Not surprisingly, Military Government supplied the bulk of the material in the journals. By the end of the war in Europe these journals were running off 3,850,000 copies weekly, this in addition to several million copies of *Die Mitteilungen* and its fellows. Much of the material in these journals, as well as field recordings of the reopening of churches, Military Government trials, speeches, etc., was also broadcast on the "Voice of Military Government" over Radio Luxembourg. The PWD/ICD found "no lack of printing presses or paper in Germany," which was understandable in Dr. Goebbels's domain.<sup>453</sup> The most difficult problem faced by these new journals,

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<sup>450</sup>Herz, "Psychological Operations against Surrounded Troops."

<sup>451</sup>"History of 2d MRBC," 73-74. For other early Information Control operations, by one who was there, see Padover, *Experiment in Germany, passim*.

<sup>452</sup>*P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group history*, 198-199; Weyden interview.

<sup>453</sup>McClure, memo to Chief of Staff, subject: "Dissemination of Instructions and News in Occupied Germany," 30 April 1945 [date of Hitler's suicide], SHAEF AGO, War Department Record Branch, SHAEF-PRD: 014 CA, Lilly Papers, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder; Hall and Caskey, "Lectures on Psychological Warfare,"

considering the complete compliance of German civilians, was distribution amidst the ruins of the Reich's transport systems. PWD detachments displayed "vigorous field improvisation" in obtaining trucks and other necessities for their work.<sup>454</sup>

Another "national" news sheet for U.S.-occupied Germany and the POW camps, in addition to *Die Mitteilungen*, was *Sternbanner* ("Star-Spangled Banner"). Both Nazi and anti-Nazi POWs vied for an opportunity to work on this journal, and PWD had to sort it out. At first *Sternbanner's* editor, Richard C. Hottelet (later a well-known network radio and television news commentator), downplayed the news in general and simply reported Allied successes. But this news sheet was immediately dismissed as "just propaganda" by POWs. Then Hottelet larded it with a few unfavorable news items, such as Allied casualty figures, as well as cultural and scientific material not particularly war-related, and *Sternbanner's* reputation improved.<sup>455</sup>

PWD loudspeaker units worked from corps and division headquarters, entering most towns with the infantry, and broadcasting instructions to civilians to stay off the streets and roads and to obey the orders of Military Government. It often happened that a combat loudspeaker team would assist in the taking of a town and then remain to broadcast instructions for the civilian population. And in one of the few tangible cause-and-effect episodes in psywar, U.S. columns taking Frankfurt were greeted with white sheets and towels hanging from windows, in accordance with instructions disseminated by PWD leaflet and by Radio Lux. Such teams were forwarded to the eastern German cities of Jena, Halle, and Leipzig specifically to assist Military Government.<sup>456</sup>

The war was still raging, of course, and PWD conducting its psywar simultaneously against German soldiers and civilians alike. PWD "successfully spread" the rumor that German airmen wishing to defect would not be fired upon if they gave certain signals, although the rumor was never confirmed by Allied SHAEF. This program was a little too clever and devious, and Allied airmen seem not to have gotten the message; the pilots of a flight of five German fighters jumped by three Mustangs of the all-Black 332d Fighter Group waggled their wings to appear "friendly" - and four of the five were promptly shot down.<sup>457</sup>

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22. Selections of *Die Mitteilungen* in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>454</sup>PWD SHAEF, 47-50; *P&W Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group*, 198-200. For an early account of Information Control in Germany (and not very sympathetic to the Germans) see Padover, *passim*.

<sup>455</sup>OWI, PWD report #3, "Questionnaire Study of German Ps/W, April 13, 1944," Military History Institute. Bishop, 235. Apparently even "Nazi" POWs were interested in *Sternbanner's* news items and maps. "Study of the Reaction of German Prisoners of War to the *Sternbanner* issue of February 29, 1944 [*sic.* read "1945"], OWI, PWD, Report #2, MHI.

<sup>456</sup>Lerner thesis, -266; "History of 2d MRB," 73-74.

<sup>457</sup>PWD SHAEF, 165; PWD, *Leaflet Operations*, 13; S. Sandler, *Segregated Skies*;

More straightforward was the psywar campaign before the Lower Rhine city of Duisburg. The city was shelled for hours at a time, but the bombardment ceased between eight and eleven a.m. so that the population could get their shopping done. The pause, as announced by public address system, was a "humanitarian gesture" that, according to a captured German propagandist "made very strong psychological inroads on the civilian population."<sup>458</sup>

Less gratifying, and fortunately uncommon, was a "false surrender" attempt in January of 1945 by fourteen Germans who had displayed a white flag as instructed and "made their way toward our line and when the American were about to receive them, all threw hand-grenades." In the ensuing melee, four of the treacherous Germans were killed, two escaped, and eight were taken prisoner (presumably to face at the least a beating by the irate GIs.)<sup>459</sup>

Overall, from early 1945 on, the enormous PWD machine was dropping fifteen tons of leaflets on German and German occupied regions every 24 hours. For March of that year the 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group P&W Section alone disseminated 60,000,000 psywar leaflets. The PWD, not surprisingly, estimated about this time that 70 percent of German soldiers had seen its leaflets, and 60 percent had read them. By March, the Allies had garnered 850,000 POWs, of whom 90 percent claimed that they either had seen Allied psywar leaflets or carried them on their persons. In the last week of the war in Europe PWD dropped 5,344,000 leaflets on such German cities as Bremen, Emden, Hamburg, and Burg with instructions to German civilians, troops, slave laborers, and released Allied POWs, warning against atrocities. By the end of the war the stupendous total of almost six billion PWD psywar leaflets had been distributed over the Continent.<sup>460</sup> If paper alone could win a war, the *Wehrmacht* would long since have been out of business. But the German soldier carried on with skill and discipline; no better army ever fought in a worse cause.<sup>461</sup>

The PWD also had to formulate a psywar campaign against the *Volkssturm*, a

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*The All-Black Combat Squadrons of World War II* (Washington: 1992), 139.

<sup>458</sup>"German Propaganda Methods" by "A Captured German Propagandist," OWI Historians Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder.

<sup>459</sup>PW Section report for 7<sup>th</sup> Army, January 1945, RG 94, AGO, box 2703, folder 107-39.

<sup>460</sup>"History of 2d MRB," 10; Publicity and PW Section, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, report of activities for March 1945, (7 April 1945), RG 94, AGO, 12th Army Group, entry 99/12-32-39, box 1788, "99/12-39...." folder; Erdmann, 299, 361; PWD SHAEF, report of activities, n.d., RG 331, box 32, decimal file, 1944-1945, "Leaflets and Prisoners of War" folder; PWD SHAEF, 107.

<sup>461</sup>About ten percent of German soldiers could be said to have been "hard-core" Nazis or Nazi believers. As late as March 1945, eleven percent of these poor devils still believed that Germany "is winning the war.", Murray Gurfein and Janowitz, "Trends in Wehrmacht Morale," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10 (1946) 43.

collection of youths, graybeards, and excited Nazis mobilized to defend the soil of the Reich. While the human material might not have been very impressive from a military point of view, most of these civilian auxiliaries were armed with the *panzerfaust* a shaped-charged anti-armor weapon that was superior to anything on the Allied side, and could have caused considerable trouble. Instead of a "Your leaders are setting you up for the slaughter" theme, PWD decided on a sober, "Save Your lives" to neutralize the threat, which was real enough as the two-month resistance to the Soviet siege of Breslau amply demonstrated.<sup>462</sup>

As the Allies crossed the Rhine, ICD made a "Special Broadcast to Ruhr and Rhineland" issuing orders to doctors, police, miners, farmers, and "peasants," to stay in place, "as the German Government has ceased to exercise effective control over wide areas."<sup>463</sup> The ICD was following command guidance in ordering German civilians not to become a part of any evacuation measures; they were needed for the rebuilding of their areas. Of those who obeyed "a considerable number were influenced by the SHAEF instructions."<sup>464</sup> Then the SHAEF policy changed, and the emphasis was on evacuation. Now "no where is safe, but the Ruhr is less safe than elsewhere; your only hope is to end the war now. And look how the Nazi big-wigs managed to scuttle to relative safety." The new policy was rather cold-bloodedly designed to induce maximum panic and confusion, hobble production, and further to burden already-infarcted transport facilities.<sup>465</sup>

Nonetheless, a small sample of German civilian opinion, made in April 1945, found German civilians untroubled by the turn-about in SHAEF psywar evacuation

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<sup>462</sup>Lerner, 102-103.

<sup>463</sup>AGO WD Record Branch, SHAEF PWD 014 CA, G. F. Maulsby, Radio Section to Radio Section, PWD, Radio Luxembourg, etc., subject: "Voice of SHAEF and Special Broadcast to Western Germany", 5 March 1945, Lilly Papers, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder.

<sup>464</sup>SHAEF PWD, "Summary of Previous Psychological Warfare Directives and Instructions for their Use," RG 331, SHAEF Special Staff, box 10, 091.412 folder.

<sup>465</sup>Cruikshank, 153-158; Lerner, *Sykewar*, 160-161; "Mass Absenteeism: Propaganda to German Civilians and Foreign Workers in Germany Concerning Evacuation," 9 March 1945, AGO, WD, Record Branch, SHAEF PWD, 014 CA, Lilly Papers, RG 218, "SHAEF Untitled" folder; SHAEF Special Staff, Memo, subject: "Evacuation Policy," n.d., RG 331, box 10, folder 091.42. According to Richard Crossman, who should know, this reversal of civilian "stand fast" policy was the result of orders from an unnamed "very important person... visiting at SHAEF," who had been impressed with the German use of disruptive tactics in 1940. Despite the best efforts of SHAEF PWD personnel to point out that this was not 1940, and that the Allies were not like the Germans, who might simply shoot down enemy civilians in their way, and that such mass movements would more likely impede the movements of Allied armies than disrupt the *Wehrmacht*, the order stood. Crossman, "Supplementary Essay," in Lerner, 325-326.

policies, leading Richard Crossman to conclude that "German confidence in Anglo-American humanitarianism is so limitless that they fail to see any ulterior motive."<sup>466</sup> Saul Padover was far less sanguine, at least about German railroaders, and by extension, German civilians generally:

Don't waste your time on appealing to German railroaders. They will continue to work for Hitler until the last possible moment. Then they will work for us with the same unquestioning obedience.<sup>467</sup>

(Padover would likely have agreed with the aphorism attributed to Winston Churchill that "The Germans are either at your throat or at your feet.")

General McClure held no utopian illusions about any revolt in Germany against the Nazi government. Such putative revolutionaries were to be informed that their only reward would be an end of the war and the war's destruction that much sooner, and there should be no "political thinking about the future of Germany."<sup>468</sup>

Dr. Goebbels' propaganda machine had not written off the Germans under Allied occupation, and soon played upon Allied "firmness" as a program for the "enslavement" of the German people. The Nazi Propaganda Ministry sympathized with its compatriots supposedly facing, starvation, deportation, a military money "swindle," the Morgenthau Plan, and "Jewish rule."<sup>469</sup> (The Nazis knew here what they were talking about; except, obviously, for the last two items, these were precisely the plagues they themselves had consistently inflicted upon their unfortunate conquered peoples.)

In those areas of Germany still controlled by the Nazi government, the official reaction to Allied propaganda was later well summarized by one veteran U.S. Army psywarrior:

The Nazis occasionally became extremely excited about our leaflets, and from time to time chopped off the heads of people who were thought to be especially prone to accepting and diffusing the ideas contained therein. But I attribute this more to the hypersensitivity of the Nazis, who themselves greatly overemphasized the importance of propaganda, than to the actual responsiveness of the miserable Germans

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<sup>466</sup>Crossman to McClure, 5 April 1945, AGO WD Record Branch 014 CA, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder.

<sup>467</sup>Padover, *Experiment in Germany*, 314-316.

<sup>468</sup>McClure, memo to DCS, SHAEF, subject: "Incitement of German Civilians to Revolt," 12 April 1945 [very date of President Roosevelt's death], Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder, AGO WD, Record Book, SHAEF PWD, 014 CA.

<sup>469</sup>"Guidance for Output in Germany for the week December 18-25, Ibid.

to whom they were addressed.<sup>470</sup>

The ICD in these last weeks of the war in Europe was now confident enough to shift its propaganda emphasis once again from undermining morale to instructions as to what soldiers and civilians must do as the Allies approached.<sup>471</sup> In fact, 7<sup>th</sup> Army P&W Section ceased leaflet production altogether in April "due to lack of targets."<sup>472</sup>

But PWD now began to spread its net to the foreign workers in Germany, who went by the Allied euphemism of Displaced Persons (DPs). The problems that such a vast number of DPs might cause had not been anticipated by SHAEF, and ICD did not receive a mission to deal with them until as late as April of 1945 (one month before Germany's surrender), although the ever-resourceful 2d MRBC had begun distributing handbills to DPs the month previous. But after that date broadcasts began to go out from Radio Lux in Russian, Polish, French, Dutch, Flemish, Italian, and Czech, as well as in German. ICD personnel made recordings in DP camps, all toward the goal of getting these people off the roads and into camps where they could be looked after and rehabilitated. The DPs were exhorted to avoid violence toward their former masters (who had to keep a curfew) and to turn in German deserters. Realizing the DPs' hunger for unvarnished news after years of Nazi propaganda, ICD published *Since 1939* in several languages to provide an "objective" history of World War II thus far. In addition there was the multi-language *Communique Graphic* for general news, while OWI and MOI provided film exhibitions, news sheets and instructions from loudspeaker trucks, and even parachuted in material if necessary.<sup>473</sup> The ICD

<sup>470</sup>Edward Shils, quoted in Lerner, *Sykewar*, 300.

<sup>471</sup>Thomas, *Overseas Information Service*, 107-108.

<sup>472</sup>AGO 7<sup>th</sup> Army PW Section, report for April 1945, RG 94, box 2394, 107-39 folder.

<sup>473</sup>Memo from SHAEF Deputy Chief of Staff, Radio Section, to N. Newsome, Radio Luxembourg, 18 April 1945, AGO WD, Records Branch, SHAEF PWD, 014 CA, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder; SHAEF PWD report of activities for 1-15 May 1945, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, RG 94, AGO, entry 99/12-39" folder; P&W Section, 7th Army, report for April 1945, RG 94, box 2703, folder 107-39; "2d MRBC History," 71; *PWD SHAEF History*, 51-52. A group of DPs, in one of the few cases of these people taking the law into their own hands at this time, closed down an "unauthorized" German newspaper. ,12<sup>th</sup> Army Group report for 1-15 May 1945, RG 94, entry 99/12-32-39, box 1788, "99/12039...." folder. More typical was the group of foreign workers who burst out of a wood at the approach of a British war correspondent. They jubilantly exclaimed that "We obeyed his orders!" Whose orders? They then pulled out a worn copy of the Supreme Commander's leaflet instructing foreign workers to leave German factories and hide in nearby woods, etc. *PWD SHAEF* 68. The failure to plan for DP information service remains the more inexplicable, considering that the Germans made no secret of the vast numbers of foreign workers in their territories, in fact requiring those from the East to go about



can claim major credit for the relatively peaceful movement of the DPs either back to their homelands or, if that proved impossible, to camps that remained a part of the European landscape for more than a decade after the end of the war. In another encounter with non-Germans in Germany, the 2d MRBC, scored a world-wide "scoop" by making recordings of the historic meeting of U.S. and Soviet forces at Torgau in eastern Germany.<sup>474</sup>

For the post-surrender period, SHAEF laid down rules governing German civilian newspapers that were, if anything, more stringent than those controlling them in wartime. They were prohibited the "advocacy of racism, or directly or indirectly question the principle of the equality of man." (Knowledgeable German editors must have wondered how these lofty sentiments squared with the racially segregated U.S. Army now ordering them about.) Bearing in mind the German "stab in the back" legend of World War I, no German writer could "suggest or imply that Germany was not completely militarily defeated in this war or in the last ." (emphasis added). The net of prohibitions was cast breathtakingly wide when condign punishments were threatened for all who "ridicule or fail to respect the way of life, political systems, institutions, ideals, decisions, and interests of any of the peoples of the United Nations."<sup>475</sup> (which, of course included communism and the Soviet Union, whose troops were even then seizing Germans for slave labor in the Soviet GULAG.) All of this was better than what the Germans had imposed in their conquered areas, but it still must have given pause to impeccably anti-Nazi Germans.

Laboring under these prohibitions, the first occupation newspaper, the *Ruhr Zeitung*, began publishing on 19 May 1945, one week after the national German surrender, and it was bland fare indeed.<sup>476</sup> But the U.S. Army was anxious to shed itself of such "peripheral" tasks as Information Control in a devastated enemy nation, and turn them over to U.S. civilian agencies as soon as possible and the overwhelming

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with an *Ostarbeiter* patch prominently displayed.

<sup>474</sup>"History of the 2d MRBC," 73.

<sup>475</sup>Office of the Chief of Staff, SHAEF, "Directive for Psychological Warfare and Control of German Information Systems," n.d. (penciled "16 April"), and Control of Information and Propaganda Service in Germany, RG 331, decimal file, 1943-July 1945, box 42. See also SHAEF PWD, Directive #1 for Propaganda Policy of Overt Allied Information Services," and "Guidance on Propaganda Treatment of Individual German Responsibilities," May 1945, RG 331, SHAEF Special Staff, PWD, box 10, 091.42 folder. General John J. McCloy, Deputy Military Governor in the U.S. Zone of Germany and later German High Commissioner, and General MacClure had their differences over the rapidity with which the Germans could become democratized and run their own newspapers, free from overt ICD and MG control. See "Assumption of Information Control Responsibilities by German Agencies," 14 December 1945," McClure journal, 26 December entry, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder.

<sup>476</sup>Copy in Herz Papers, box 1, folder 16.

desire of the great majority of U.S. troops was simply to go home.<sup>477</sup> As early as November 1945 the staff of all but one of the official occupation newspapers had gone home and had been replaced by vetted German personnel.<sup>478</sup>

With the end of the war in Europe, PWD could look back upon the greatest propaganda effort in American military history, one that probably even surpassed that of the Soviets on the Eastern Front, and one that certainly reaped a far more extensive response. PWD themes during this campaign could be grouped under the following headings:

German Army	Smaller army units	
Good treatment of POWs	13	10
Save yourself!	14	8
You are cut off (surrounded)	11	7
What surrender means	33	
End the war for yourself	4	
You have been written off by your High Command		3
How to surrender		3
Inevitable German defeat	16	8
Defeats on the West Front	15	7
Defeats on the East Front	9	2
Allied strength (particularly U.S.)	3	
Destruction of German towns)	2	2
Suffering of German civilians)		3
SHAEF notices and instructions	6	
Landser vs officers		3
Germany vs. Nazis	49	
Attacks on Nazi leaders as a Class	19	1
" " Hitler	21	
" " Himmler	7	3
" " Goering	2	
" " Goebbels	2	
" " Papen	1	
" " Rommel	1	
" " Wilk	1	
" " Nazi system	33	
" " propaganda	14	

<sup>477</sup>Kehm, "Military Psychological Warfare."

<sup>478</sup>Albert Norman, *Our German Policy: Propaganda and Culture* (New York: 1951).

Allied Retribution for Nazi crimes		6
Inevitability of Nazi defeat	52	5
Specific Nazi defeats	8	
German hardships under the Nazis and the war		3
Instructions to threatened cities		11
End the war- for yourself	9	9
What Allied occupation means		8
German women		1
Workers		4
Railway workers		2
Foreign workers		8
Miscellaneous	25 <sup>479</sup>	

But with all of this, the question arose as to just how effective PWD psywar had been. (This was at least an improvement over the post-World War I situation, when the questions were not even asked.) Since just after D-Day, PWD SHAEF had been keeping a record of its work. Its evidence of success or lack thereof came from 1)the quantity of leaflets found on surrendering POWs, 2)Recollections or critiques of leaflets by POWs, 3)Reports by cooperative POWs of favorable mentions of leaflets behind the lines, 4)POWs' detailed descriptions of their surrenders, 5)Emphases by German counter-propaganda against certain Allied leaflets, as well as plagiarisms by the Germans, 6)Comments by German high commanders.<sup>480</sup> Using these criteria, one report in December of 1944 claimed that not only had 90 percent of all deserters, as opposed to captured POWs, in the West carried leaflets on their persons, but that 35 to 40 percent of the latter also carried such material. The same 90 percent figure was claimed for the 850,000 POWs captured across the Allied front by March of 1945. In May, just before the German surrender, BG B. M. Bryan stated before the House Military Affairs Committee that "more than 80 percent of [German POWs] brought with them into camp the leaflets scattered by American Air Forces containing assurances that no prisoners of war were or would be mistreated."<sup>481</sup>

<sup>479</sup>Army General School, Psychological Warfare NCO Course #2, "Propaganda Themes," 2-3.

<sup>480</sup>Herz, "Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 13 (1949).

<sup>481</sup>"Leaflet News letter," 1, #4, 4 May 1945, Historian's Records of Psywar Branch, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder. Erdmann, 299. CPT John Lyons claimed that (yet again) 90 percent of deserters had psywar leaflets on them, and one-fourth said that they had been influenced in their decision by psywar, while 35 to 40 percent of all POWs had such material on their persons. Lyons, "PW in

Overall, the evidence is quite strong that the most effective PWD psywar leaflet theme (aside from news sheets) was the simple "Cease Resistance,"/"You Will be Treated Fairly"/"How to Give Up." But "Germany in the Post-War World" and the like were best relegated to Allied civil press and broadcasting.<sup>482</sup>

One of the more informed enemy sources for a critique of PWD's psywar could be found in the interview conducted by PWD interrogators with General Dittmar, which was attended by General McClure himself. The *Wehrmacht* propaganda chief claimed that before 6 June 1944 Allied psywar accomplished little. Afterward, it proved "very successful," particularly with *Nachrichten*, and especially when it stuck with facts and avoided political arguments and theories, which is exactly what McClure's psywarriors were instructed to eschew. In General Dittmar's words, "The German is very much addicted to objectivity. That is where you were very successful." Dittmar dismissed Soviet propaganda as "massive, heavy-footed, and crude.", which sounds suspiciously like the Nazis' racial characterization of the Russians themselves. But, withal, Dittmar's conclusions, even allowing for his circumstances of being at the mercy of his captors, basically ring true, and certainly came from someone who knew his subject.<sup>483</sup> Much further down the line, but still of significance, was the reaction of a convinced Nazi *Wehrmacht* lieutenant, who refused to be interrogated, but who did later state that "unhappily, these leaflets have a great influence on the men and constitute a serious threat to their morale."<sup>484</sup>

The PWD could point to official German reaction to their psywar well before the end of the war: "in every instance the comment [by the audience] is favorable [to the Allies]...it is exceptionally active..., it is prompt and topical, and skillfully worded....very cunningly worded....devastating effect of the skillful enemy propaganda,....venom of lies."<sup>485</sup> Dr. Goebbels himself confided to his diary that

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Europe," 5 December 1944, "Washington Weekly Intelligencer -OWI," #20, 23 December 1944, RG 208, entry 6g, box 12, "Washington Weekly Intelligencer" folder.

<sup>482</sup>Kehm, "Military Psychological Warfare in ETO."

<sup>483</sup>SHAEF PWD, "First PWD Interview with Lieut. General Kurt Dittmar," 6 May 1945, McClure diary excerpt, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 13, "SHAEF Untitled" folder; copy and analysis in Herz Papers, box 1, folder 10. On the other hand, and at a considerably lower level, a sound engineer for *Reichsrundfunk* (radio) extolled the BBC's unemotional tone, contrasted with German "hate propaganda," and concluded that Allied leaflets were ineffective. But this latter point may well have been simply a case of professional jealousy. Interview with Herbert Pischke, 22 September 1945, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 2, "Accomplishments File" folder.

<sup>484</sup>"Leaflet Operations by Eighth Air Force," 11.

<sup>485</sup>"Official German Comments on Allied Propaganda to the Wehrmacht in the West," 15 September 1944, SHAEF PWD, RG 331, Special Staff, PWD, box 10, 09/42 folder. Note the relatively early date of this compendium, four months after D-Day, when PWD presumably still had much to learn.

"Enemy leaflets are now no longer carelessly thrown away, but are read attentively."<sup>486</sup> One scholar claims that "Enemy countermeasures were the best indicators of effectiveness.", and that "Substantial intelligence was received to show that Wehrmacht commanders at all levels were going to great lengths to combat the negative effects of propaganda on their troops." In addition to the harsh penalties already noted, the Germans even went to the trouble of organizing a special section for such work, which published counter-propaganda newspapers and pamphlets on the subject and directed an information course for officers and enlisted men. Clayton Laurie concludes, logically enough, that the Germans would hardly have wasted their time reacting to ineffective enemy propaganda.<sup>487</sup>

There were critics, of course, although most were to be found in the ranks of those straightforward combat arms officers who never were reconciled to the substitution of "paper bullets" for high explosives and lead. Some dismissed the validity of anything POWs had to say, on the familiar grounds that prisoners will say anything they believe would please their captors, and that, anyway, POWs usually do not represent the best troops, and are heavily larded with second-line, less-motivated auxiliaries, who have their own reasons for giving up.<sup>488</sup>

There are numerous flaws in these arguments: The surrenders in the final days of the war in Europe were large-scale, with the elite and the second-rate alike promiscuously entering the cages --there to be interrogated by PWD and PWB. Further, to balance against the argument that POWs wish to please their captors must be set the realization that many soldiers, particularly those from good units, are reluctant to admit that they did anything inconsistent with "soldierly qualities." An example of this comes from a *Volkssturm* unit, of all things, whose troops "all had seen leaflets, mainly the *Passierschein*..., but it seems that they were not much impressed with leaflets and certainly did not act on them...." but these stalwart citizen-defenders of the Reich nevertheless "surrendered as soon as the Americans attacked."<sup>489</sup>

SHAEF specifically warned its psywar personnel well before the invasion of Europe that:

many POWs will be anxious to ingratiate themselves with the Interrogating Officer by giving the answers they think he wishes to

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<sup>486</sup>Paul Josef Goebbels, *Final Entries: The Diaries of Josef Goebbels*, H. Trevor Roper, ed. (New York: 1978), entry for 23 March 1945, 223.

<sup>487</sup>Laurie thesis, 530-531. (italics added.)

<sup>488</sup>Ibid., 534-535; [anon.] "Psychological Warfare Did Not Win the War," *Forum*, 104 (October 1945.) (To which might be added, "Who ever said that it did?")

<sup>489</sup>SHAEF PWD, "Leaflet Reactions by Prisoners-of-War" from 17 March 1945, RG 331, Decimal File, 1944-1945, box 32, "Leaflets and Prisoners of War" folder. Other POW reactions in this sampling were considerably more positive toward PWD propaganda.

hear. POW[s] very rapidly acquired a "prisoner's mentality", and it is not always safe to assume that the picture of enemy morale built up by prisoner interrogation accurately reflects the morale of enemy troops still in the line.<sup>490</sup>

In fact, SHAEF's psywarriors, or those in any of America's subsequent conflicts could not do better than to follow the principles (with the possible exception of point No. 5) of POW cage interrogation laid down by Heber Blankenhorn as early as 1942:

1. The soldier gives soldierly reasons for surrender, but the real motives are elsewhere.
2. Motives come largely via his family or neighborhood or through distrust bred in his unit. Distrust of his command is a powerful motive; disillusion regarding his government more powerful still.
3. Most powerful is disassociation from this war -- it's their war." -- This on the word, and argument, of some organized opposition....
4. The basis of all, of course, is in the military situation -- disillusion regarding the war itself -- growing fears that the war cannot be won. "We have been deceived."
5. The class of soldier most likely to "do something about it" is from industrial labor, which, has, even in Germany, some tradition of revolt. He becomes "invulnerable to propaganda" -- his own government's -- and does propaganda of his own -- which cannot be found by searching in the Nazi mind.<sup>491</sup>

Even POW negative reactions to *Frontpost* conceded that the arguments might be specious, but that the facts were indisputable.<sup>492</sup> As for *Nachrichten*, Dr. Goebbels' deputy, Karl Siegbold, was only exaggerating somewhat in a radio broadcast of 30 September 1944:

There are two kinds of leaflets. The first is small-sized news sheets, very cleverly done, with impressive maps and pictures in many narrow

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<sup>490</sup>SHAEF PWD, 14.

<sup>491</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 279. Blankenhorn had been a labor journalist in civil life.

<sup>492</sup>AGO, 7<sup>th</sup> Army PW Section, report for December 1944, RG 94, box 2394, 017-39 folder; Janowitz and Shils, "Cohesion and Disintegration."

columns. They have a completely bona-fide appearance. But among correct and truthful reports, they contain innumerable half-truths, omissions, exaggerations. Indeed every news item, every short article, every comment contains a small -only just noticeable -amount of distrust in the actions of the German High Command.<sup>493</sup>

Dr. Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front is supposed to have complained in a memorandum to Hitler in March of 1945 of "clever American propaganda," and actually conceded that "How it should be possible that any soldier should go on fighting under these conditions, I don't know."<sup>494</sup>

One reason for PWD SHAEF success may well lie in its avoidance of "atrocious propaganda," even though it would be difficult to imagine any atrocity - murder, torture, enslavement, genocide, etc. that the Nazis did not consistently practice. But "rubbing it in" to the Germans, it was felt, would simply alienate them. PWD further realized that "atrocious propaganda begets atrocious propaganda" and that, thanks to the excesses and downright lies about the Germans of World War I, the topic was at a discount.<sup>495</sup>

Many World War II psywarriors, PWD and otherwise, have left their impressions of the effectiveness of their work as well as of its shortcomings. Daniel Lerner, on the basis of 30 responses by PWD veterans to his questionnaire, rated "black" operations as by far the least successful, and the BBC, tactical leaflets, dissemination of leaflets, and tank-mounted loudspeakers as the most successful. Lerner also collected numerous reports on POW responses to U.S. Army psywar and found that, on average 38.8 percent were "favorable" to those messages or at least believed that Germany would lose the war.<sup>496</sup> He further ranked the most successful tactical leaflets as 1) *Passierschein*, 2) *Eine Minute*, 3) *The Six Points*, and 4) *Nachrichten*. Mobile radio transmitters he listed as almost total failures.<sup>497</sup>

<sup>493</sup>"Leaflet Operations by 8th Air Force," 8-9.

<sup>494</sup>Elmer Davis, "The Office of War Information, 13 June-15 September 1945: Report to the President," n.d., RG 208, entry 6e, Subject File, Records of the OWI Historian, box 13, 74.

<sup>495</sup>Much of this point is arguing through a negative, i.e. the absence of Allied atrocity psywar, at least in the tactical realm, in World War II, although Wallace Carroll made the point in his videotaped interview. German atrocity propaganda over the Allied terror-bombings of Hamburg or Dresden bothered RAF and the AAF not at all; if anything, it served to convince them that their bombs had done their work.

<sup>496</sup>See, for example, 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group memo of 13 September 1944, to Chief of PWD/SHAEF, subj. "Consolidated Report on 264 PW Interrogations Reports"; PWB Combat Team, 1<sup>st</sup> U.S. Army, "Intelligence", 23 September 1944; PWB, HQ 7<sup>th</sup> Army, to CG, PWB SHAEF, subj: "Leaflet Reactions", 13 November 1944, etc., found throughout Lerner Papers, boxes 51, 53.

<sup>497</sup>Lerner, *Psywar*, 308.

Martin Herz drew up a more thorough critique just at the end of the war in Europe, dealing with what should not be done in the future. Herz complained that, with the possible exception of *Passierschein*, no one leaflet was correctly disseminated, and that often sheer momentum kept ineffective leaflets in circulation when better material was ready. Herz also pointed out that although several hundred combat leaflets were prepared in the West, most German soldiers saw only three or four. Surprisingly, in the light of the success of the journalist-run *Nachrichten*, Herz felt that the "newspaperman's psychology" was a distinct hindrance for PWD. "Newspaperman psychology" persisted in giving the German soldier "an entire panorama of the world situation, which since it usually contained little else than bad news for him, dulled him to the key theme of capture-surrender,". And as far as the much-maligned "black" propaganda was concerned, Herz asserted on good evidence that it simply "increased wariness and suspicion on the part of enemy troops." The psywarrior's "intellectual fascination" with such propaganda "harmed the less sophisticated but more efficient straight combat propaganda job." Herz also reported that "Research by PWD Intelligence Section proved conclusively that poor morale, in the sense of feeling good or bad, has no direct relation to combat behavior of enemy troops.", and noted parenthetically that ("Some of the worst German troops in the Siegfried Line, feeling terrible, stopped us for months.") Of course, Herz detailed the near-complete failure of tactical psywar radio, blaming the 1-KW mobile radio transmitters specifically developed for such work, and pointed out that Germans who had safe access to a radio tuned in to the far more powerful BBC, ABSIE, Radio Luxembourg, OWI radio, etc. Noting the nine separate agencies or echelons involved in leaflet writing, Herz understandably noted a lack of coordination in ETO psywar. News sheets, for example, were produced by civilian agencies in the UK (under ostensible SHAEF policy control), by the 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group, and by 7<sup>th</sup> Army. The "21<sup>st</sup> Army Group ignored directives altogether, while liaison with the French First Army consisted of keeping Sixth Army Group informed of what the French were up to...." Finally, Herz made the startling assertion that "we did not wage really psychological warfare at all.", in the sense of alternating good news-bad news in a "war of nerves." Herz, as noted earlier, believed, with considerable justification, that the Nazis' vaunted "War of Nerves" of the 1938-1941 period was more a product of good luck than of planning.<sup>498</sup> Any government that could insouciantly embark on a

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<sup>498</sup>Herz, "Operations: Leaflets, July 45," PWD, 4 July 1945-10 January 1946, Herz Papers, box #1; also in Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 8, "Ops Leaflets" folder. The original in the Herz Papers states "Or to put it more bluntly: the official report on combat propaganda in Europe [PWD SHAEF] is a 'whitewash' in the sense that by describing the intricacies of the operation it makes them appear to have been necessary.", *ibid.* Significantly, a COL C. A. Brown, who was apparently a World War II psywar veteran, concluded that "Official accounts available of actions are not outstanding for their discussion and analysis of deficiencies in tactical psywar.", "Tactical Psychological Warfare," student paper, Army War College, 15 March 1954,



war with the Soviet Union, the British Empire and the United States, could hardly withstand the accusation of less-than-brilliant long-range insight.<sup>499</sup>

Some POW technical criticisms of the leaflets concerned shoddy paper as well as poor print and type choice. (The Germans tended to be pedantic about printing; after all, they claimed to have invented the art.)<sup>500</sup> But these deficiencies appear to have been corrected for the most part well before the end of the war, although Heber Blankenhorn, who certainly knew what he was talking about, maintained that to the end of the war, "Neither PWB-AFHQ nor PWD-SHAEF ever did set up a sound, all-inclusive system of intelligence from prisoners and from documents for psychological [sic.] purposes."<sup>501</sup>

Almost all PWD personnel who have left accounts of this period agreed that they had to waste time throughout those years "selling" their specialty to military commanders, that the emphasis of so many of those commanders on surrenders as the test of psywar's validity detracted from its good work in more generally undermining enemy fighting effectiveness.<sup>502</sup> Many reported a reluctance of Intelligence officers to release their material, despite the best efforts of PWD Intelligence Liaison Officers.<sup>503</sup> There was also some criticism that PWD was more concerned with quantity than quality, with "burying the enemy in paper," as evidenced by its histories' proud recital of the thousands of tons and millions of individual leaflets dropped.<sup>504</sup> In the field, the organization of the MRBCs was faulted for having too much radio capacity and too little for loudspeakers and leaflet shell loading, as well as insufficient air and ground unit liaison, and translator and writer personnel. As a result considerable "pooling and shuffling" was necessary to get these units to function effectively in the field.<sup>505</sup> Finally, there was serious competition between those psywar and public relations personnel who found themselves, rather illogically, in the same organization, with the former believing that they generally came out "short of transportation, devoid of adequate communications and in considerable administrative confusion."<sup>506</sup> Often, a

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Military History Institute Archives.

<sup>499</sup>Then, again, the British and French were planning warlike measures against the Soviet Union for its invasion of Finland in 1939, at a time when they presumably would have had their hands full dealing with Nazi Germany.

<sup>500</sup>CPT John Lyons, "PW in Europe," 5 December 1944, "Washington Weekly Intelligencer," OWI #20, 23 December 1944, RG 208, entry 6g, box 17, "Washington Weekly Intelligencer" folder.

<sup>501</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 112.

<sup>502</sup>Army General Board report, 37.

<sup>503</sup>PWD SHAEF, 23.

<sup>504</sup>Daniel Lerner concluded that PWD psywar "Unfortunately seems to have grown in quantity as its remoteness from the stimulus increased." Lerner thesis, 292.

<sup>505</sup>Kehm, "Organization for Military Psychological Warfare in ETO."

<sup>506</sup>PWD SHAEF history, 21. The history, otherwise bland and "official," pointed out that, whereas psywar and public relations have similar missions at the higher echelons,

"grip and grin" photo of a dignitary from "back home" took precedence over the composition of psywar leaflets whose value escaped many officers anyway

Looking back on the war years in Europe, PWD veterans expressed fairly consistent views on the successes and shortcomings of their work in the field. Their successes, they felt, were self-evident: the literally hundreds of thousands of enemy troops carrying PWD leaflets. Even the raw total numbers of POWs could be grounds for self-congratulation: 4,900,000 taken by the Western Allies as compared to about 1,894,000 by the Soviets, even though the bulk of Wehrmach strength was in the East. Surely verifiable Western psywar promises of good treatment had something to do with this disparity.<sup>507</sup> (If not "fresh eggs for breakfast," at least the prospect of GI rations in Texas proved a much stronger inducement for surrender/capture than "building socialism" by way of Siberia.)

The main goal of PWD SHAEF, the undermining of enemy morale was, of course, almost impossible to quantify. Martin Herz mischievously noted that "Some of the worst German troops in the Siegfried Line, feeling terrible, stopped us for months."<sup>508</sup> Nonetheless, it would be difficult to dismiss the hundreds of thousands of enemy troops who committed the serious offense of secreting Allied psywar leaflets on their persons. Soldiers carrying enemy safe conduct passes cannot be expected to fight to "the last man, the last cartridge."

Overall, in the words of one authority on psywar in the ETO, "Possibly the single most important lesson learned about psychological warfare in World War II [in Europe] was that, like economic warfare, it worked on an enemy by a slow process of attrition."<sup>509</sup> This realization was a valuable antidote to the earlier superficial belief that the spectacular German successes of 1938-1940 were won in large measure by fiendishly clever psywar that quickly and fatally unnerved the Nazis' enemies. Psywar certainly helped, but Germany's early successes were most of all a result of its superior military professionalism, and, as Herz pointed out, luck. Psywar, whether American or German, was simply one more weapon, a weapon that came to be wielded much more effectively by the American psywarriors, who, of course, had the inestimable advantage of usually being on the winning side.

In the measured words of General George Patton at the end of the war in Europe: "Psychological warfare had an important place in the European Command. It can accomplish much good. It can also be extremely harmful."<sup>510</sup> The summary of Army ETO psywar by a scholar writing four decades after the event was more

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in the field, they diverge drastically.

<sup>507</sup>Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 363-364.

<sup>508</sup>Herz, "Operations: Leaflets," 5. Herz went so far as to assert that "Research by PWD Intelligence Section proved conclusively that poor morale, in the sense of feeling good [sic.] or bad, has no direct relation to combat behavior of enemy troops," but gave no source. *ibid.*

<sup>509</sup>Erdmann, 42.

<sup>510</sup>*Army General Board report*, comment of General George Patton, 1.

EXAMPLE OF LEAFLET DISTRIBUTION ON REGULAR BOMBING MISSIONS  
LEAFLET DISTRIBUTION - BERLIN - BY EIGHTH AIR FORCE

<u>Code No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of Bombs</u>	<u>No. of Leaflets</u>
USG.47	Sternenbanner	6 Aug 44	5	100,000
XG.17	The Game is Up	"	5	300,000
XG.19	Foreign Workers (French)	"	5	400,000
XG.20	Foreign Workers (Polish)	"	5	400,000
T.170	Nachrichten	6 Oct 44	10	120,000
T.171	Nachrichten	"	10	120,000
WG.9	Message to German Women	"	5	400,000
ZG.66	General Eisenhower's Statement	"	5	400,000
WG.2F	Foreign Workers Booklet (French)	"	5	40,000
WG.6F	Foreign Workers Leaflet (Polish)	"	5	400,000
T.229	Nachrichten	5 Dec 44	5	50,000
T.231	Nachrichten	"	10	100,000
T.232	Nachrichten	"	20	200,000
ZG.66	General Eisenhower's Statement	"	5	400,000
WG.17H	The Lesson of Aachen	"	5	400,000
WG.221	Voice of SHAEF (Italian)	"	5	400,000
T.291	Nachrichten	3 Feb 45	20	200,000
T.292	Nachrichten	"	20	200,000
ZG.98	The Last Attempt	"	10	800,000
ZG.95	A Last Attempt	"	5	400,000
ZG.75	Ask the Front-Line Soldier	"	4	320,000
ZG.97	What Capitulation Means	"	5	400,000
WG.21	Civilian Safe Conduct	"	5	400,000
WG.27	Volksturm in Battle	"	5	400,000
WG.28	Eisenhower against Himmler	"	5	400,000
T.312	Nachrichten	26 Feb 45	19	190,000
T.313	Nachrichten	"	43	430,000
T.314	Nachrichten	"	13	130,000
WG.28	Eisenhower against Himmler	"	4	320,000
WG.34	Message to Railway Workers	"	5	400,000
WG.35	Roosevelt-Churchill Statement	"	4	160,000
WG.37	Crime Declaration	"	7	280,000
BG.151	The Bridge	"	4	160,000
T.331	Nachrichten	18 Mar 45	11	110,000
T.333	Nachrichten	"	30	300,000
T.334	Nachrichten	"	32	320,000
T.335	Nachrichten	"	19	190,000
WG.25	Report from Western Germany	"	8	640,000
WG.34	Message to Railway Workers	"	5	400,000
WG.42	The Future of Germany	"	5	200,000
WG.43	Three Tons of Explosives	"	10	800,000
T.341	Nachrichten	28 Mar 45	5	50,000
T.344	Nachrichten	"	5	50,000
T.345	Nachrichten	"	15	150,000
WG.45	Two Questions-One Decision	"	3	120,000
BG.152	The Bridge	"	2	80,000
<u>43 different leaflets</u>			<u>438</u>	<u>13,230,000</u>

positive: "The military propaganda approach, although developed far later than its civilian counterparts, ultimately produced the winning psychological appeal."<sup>511</sup>

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<sup>511</sup>Laurie thesis, 545.

## -THE PACIFIC-

Private Richard Sakakida, U.S. Armed Forces, Far East (USAFFE), undoubtedly had no idea that he was making history as he set up his battered loudspeaker as near Japanese lines as he dared go. His was a forlorn hope, to talk some Japanese soldiers into coming over the American side, despite the fact that they were obviously on the winning side. PVT Sakakida's theme was unexceptional enough: "Cherry blossom time is approaching in Japan. Why are you here fighting when only warlords profit from this useless struggle?" Sakakida himself later admitted that the only return on his pioneer message was "more shells." But Private Sakakida in all likelihood had conducted the first American combat psychological warfare of the Second World War.

Sakakida and his fellow Japanese-American (*Nisei*) psywarriors went on to stuff hand-lettered, mimeographed leaflets into sections of ordinary pipe and catapult them over to Japanese lines by means of a giant slingshot, for lack of anything better. More significantly, they were able to interrogate many of the more than 300 Japanese troops captured at Bataan, comparing their stories with seized enemy records and rosters. The U.S. Army psywarriors found that, contrary to popular opinion, the Japanese soldier might indeed surrender, if the circumstances were right, and that a bit of food, some water, a cigarette, or a bandage could likely induce him to talk. He had been given no training in security matters after capture; this option was simply forbidden. Thus, if somehow he did find himself a captive, with all hope of a return to Japan with *yamatodamashii* (honor) gone, he might as well make the best of his new situation by cooperating with his captors. Certainly Japanese captives on Bataan amply repaid the pains taken with them by providing valuable intelligence.<sup>512</sup> But there is no record that the U.S. Army paid any attention to these early psywarriors or to their battle-tested conclusions. (an understandable omission in light of the fact that most records of the cut-off Bataan forces were lost).

World War II in the Pacific opened with an almost unbroken string of disasters to the Allies that gave them little opportunity or incentive for any effective psywar against the Japanese enemy. In fact, the Japanese, operating against an enemy on the run or cut off and surrounded, had an excellent opportunity for effective psywar of their own; Nowhere was this advantage more evident than in the Philippines. There, U.S.-Filipino forces were driven out of the rest of islands and forced into the Bataan peninsula where they remained under siege for almost four months. The "Battling Bastards of Bataan" ("No Poppa, No Mamma, No Uncle Sam") were subjected to Japanese leaflet and loudspeaker propaganda which correctly summarized their hopeless position and played on the themes of abandonment and homesickness. Other messages portrayed the enemy as "liberating" the Filipinos. Two tiny leaflets

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<sup>512</sup>Harrington, 65-67. Blankenhorn also mentions the American use of leaflets on Bataan. "Combat Propaganda," 152.

proclaimed truly enough, "Last Hope for Retreat Shattered", and (referring to any supposed reinforcements from the States) "Broken Beyond Repair." A straightforward Japanese safe-conduct leaflet gave detailed instructions on how to surrender and assured its readers that any number could use this "ticket" to surrender. The very use of the American term "ticket" ("ticket out of here," "ticket to home") was ingenious, and the leaflet in some respects could well have almost served as a model for the later U.S. ETO *Passerschein*:

TICKET TO ARMISTICE  
USE THIS TICKET TO SAVE YOUR LIFE  
YOU WILL BE KINDLY TREATED

Follow These Instructions:

1. Come towards our lines waving a white flag.
2. Strap your gun over your left shoulder muzzle down and pointed behind you.
3. Show this ticket to the sentry.
4. Any number of you may surrender with this one ticket.

JAPANESE ARMY HEADQUARTERS

[General Homma's signature]

Sing your way to Peace pray for Peace.

The only missteps in this leaflet (aside from some punctuation problems) were in the use of "surrender" (better such euphemisms as "cease resistance" or "leave the battle"), "Show this ticket to the sentry" (what sentry?), and, of course, "Sing for peace pray for peace" [sic].

Much less professional was the crudely-drawn *Life or Death?*, which portrayed three skeletons, one draped in a bedraggled American flag, and surrounded by the broken remains of their equipment. Particularly cruel was the depiction of empty mess equipment, stark reminder of the hunger that stalked the American defenders of the Philippines. By every indication, such a leaflet, belittling its audience and offering no way out, simply annoys that audience. The Japanese used the sex theme in *Don't Wait to Die*, drawn by apparently the same student-artist as *Life or Death*, although the poetry was respectable:

Before the bombs fall, let me  
take your hand and kiss your

gentle cheeks and murmur...

Before the terror comes, let me  
walk beside you in garden deep  
in petalled sleep...

Let me, while there is still a  
time and place, Feel soft  
against me and rest...rest your  
warm hand on my breast...

One Japanese leaflet directed to America's Filipino troops showed good artwork featuring a Japanese soldier giving a light to a still-armed and dignified Filipino soldier, under the caption "Our Enemy is the Americans." The only false note here is in the upper right hand corner of the leaflet, where American troops retreating in a cloud of dust are outfitted in the uniforms of the Spanish-American War or the Philippine Insurrection of forty years previous! A third leaflet makes its origins obvious with its grammatical clumsiness and generally ominous tone:

#### TO THE FILIPINO SOLDIERS!

All banks in the city of Manila are under the regulation of the Japanese forces, and newly issued war note is controlling more and more the financial activities of Manila day after day. For this reason, the money you are receiving from the American Forces as your salary is losing its value and will be wastepaper in the near future. In a word, you are exposing your life in danger without any remuneration. There is nothing so foolish as this! In Manila, your fellow-countrymen are living peacefully with full co-operation with the Japanese forces. Give up useless fighting and surrender immediately to the Japanese Forces.

This effort was illustrated by a smudged drawing of the "Banks of Manila" issuing paper money, while other currency, presumably the old Peso, lies neglected and "x"-ed out.<sup>513</sup> Despite such botched efforts, it is not inconceivable that the Filipino-American forces in Bataan, bottled up, under constant air bombardment, hunger

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<sup>513</sup>Original Japanese leaflets in Fellers Papers, box 4, "PWB" folder. See also [anon.] "Jap Propaganda on Bataan," *Infantry Journal*, 51, #7 (October 1942). The author, said to have been a veteran of the Philippines campaign, claimed that the "pseudo poetry," "scare-'em" leaflets, and "mercenary" appeals had little or no effect on U.S.-Filipino troops. See also Ambrosia P. Pena, "Psychological Warfare on Bataan," *Philippine Armed Forces Journal* (April 1953); and M. Dyer, "Japanese Propaganda in the Philippines," typescript, n.d., USASOC History Archives.

gnawing at their resolve, and with hope of rescue eventually gone, might have lost some defectors to the enemy. But such was not the case, and even the Filipinos, badly-trained and poorly-equipped, did not significantly waver.<sup>514</sup> (This is not to say that a number of Filipino civilians, for one reason or another, accepted to some extent "cooperation" with the Japanese or their puppet Filipino government.)

The early fighting on Guadalcanal in 1942 provoked some U.S. interest in combat propaganda, although the psywar operations themselves were uncoordinated and small in scale. Matters were not helped by a leaflet encouraging Japanese defectors to come in any time of night or day. Japanese POWs were unanimous in saying that they had seen U.S. leaflets and were unimpressed, except for those picturing food. Perhaps in response, a bundle of ten leaflets was packed with a piece of bean curd, but, again, to no avail.<sup>515</sup> Furthermore, a memo for the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, entitled "Surrender Leaflets in Japanese for Japanese Troops," pointed out that it was "common gossip" on the embattled island that U.S. troops killed their prisoners, and claimed, with considerably less evidence, that most Japanese troops on Guadalcanal would surrender if they were convinced otherwise.<sup>516</sup> A later report gruesomely embellished the Japanese rumor; the Americans supposedly rammed wire through the palms of their captives, strung the unfortunates together, and then ran over them with bulldozers.<sup>517</sup>

OWI, which, as in Europe, drew up the bulk of U.S. leaflets, had prepared surrender messages for the embattled island garrison, stressing to cut-off Japanese units their lack of food and the futility and vain sacrifices of their resistance. A total of 358 POWs were taken in the brutal island battles, 50 percent from the targeted units. But these prisoners were "unanimous in stating that the leaflets had no effect," as they possessed "great confidence in their leaders."<sup>518</sup>

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<sup>514</sup>Martin Herz notes, however, that psywar against surrounded troops is rarely successful, as witness not only Bataan, but also Bastogne, Aachen, Leningrad, St. Malo, or Singapore (although it might be argued in the case of the latter "fortress" that its garrison surrendered too quickly for the Japanese to initiate psywar.) "Psychological Warfare Against Surrounded Troop Units," *Military Review* (August 1950).

<sup>515</sup>Vatcher Papers, box 15, "World War II" folder; W. H. Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese in the Central Pacific", Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1950, 38-48.

<sup>516</sup>Memo dated 21 October 1942, RG 407, entry 427, box 1622, "Propaganda and Psywar -Japan" folder; Vatcher thesis, 18.

<sup>517</sup>COL B. Fellers, "Report on Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-1945, n.d., 9. This imagined atrocity sounds more like something that the Japanese themselves would have carried out against the Chinese.

<sup>518</sup>CINCPAC/CINCPOA, *US Psywar: Developments and Responses*, 15 May 1945, RG 94 (AGO), entry 110-25 Operations Reports, to 110-SPHQ-1.14, 10<sup>th</sup> Army, box 3000, folder "110-39." Also FELO, "Report of Activities of Far Eastern Liaison



Surrender appeals on the Aleutian Islands garnered an even more dismal response: although the Japanese invaders were either routed from or forced to evacuate the islands in the spring of 1943, only 28 POWs were taken, a mere one percent of the enemy garrison.<sup>519</sup> On Tarawa at roughly the same time, U.S. Marines captured exactly no enemy POWs.<sup>520</sup>

And yet, as on Bataan, there were a few Japanese surrenders and POWs. By the end of 1942 enough had been taken to warrant the formulation of a policy against taking photographs of captive Japanese in which individuals might be identified because "Prisoners will not talk if they feel that retribution will be visited on their families."<sup>521</sup> But a few weeks earlier, Edwin O. Reischauer (who after the war became the dean of American Japanese scholars) had claimed that the Army was wasting its time on the "obedient, sheep-like" people of Japan, and that "cut-out and tailored" propaganda directed toward Japanese cultural and academic leaders would prove more likely undermine support for the war where it counted. Reischauer's thesis was bluntly refuted by an MI officer, who insisted that "There seems no need to treat the Japanese intelligentsia now to programs of good classical music and lectures of Japanese culture.", arguing that would be just what that intelligentsia would desire in the day of Japan's defeat.<sup>522</sup> Heber Blankenhorn made a similar criticism when he claimed that early in the war "A principal difficulty was to disabuse the minds of the OWI Japanese experts of ideas directed to unreachable Japanese civilians and buckle down to hitting with leaflets Jap troops in the jungles facing our troops."<sup>523</sup>

The first and most thorough of Allied Psychological warfare organizations in the Pacific theater of operations was the Australian-dominated Far Eastern Liaison Office of General MacArthur's South West Pacific Area (SWPA) command, established by MacArthur after his evacuation from the Philippines. FELO's mission, more or less identical to that of SHAEF PWD and AFHQ PWB, was to plan and

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Office for Period June 1942 to September 1945.", 38.

<sup>519</sup>Harrington, 146-147.

<sup>520</sup>"Marine Observers," "Washington Weekly Intelligence," No. 19, 2 December 1944, RG 208, entry 6g, box 12, "Washington Weekly Intelligence" folder.

<sup>521</sup>COL S. Merle-Smith, memo to SGT E. A. Witbain, untitled, 25 December 1942, G-2 files, SWPA, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder. In fact, this policy, which was evident in the blanking-out of the eyes of any POWs photographed close-up, convinced more than one enemy soldier that the Americans could not be as quite as barbarous as depicted by Japanese propaganda. "Reactions of Japanese," 21.

<sup>522</sup>Reischauer to COL Blakeney, 12 December 1942; George Kerr (War Department Military Intelligence), memo for the record, 12 December 1942, both in OWI Historian Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5, "Japan: Psychological Warfare" folder.

<sup>523</sup>Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda", 151. Blankenhorn made similar criticism of Crossman and most British psywar., *ibid.*, *passim*.

此ノ勸降狀ノ内容ハ諸君ハ人道的  
待遇ヲ受ケ好シ食物清潔ヲ兵舎且又  
手厚ク醫師ノ看護ヲ受ケルヲ證明スル  
テソノ米國兵士ニ此ノ勸降狀ヲ  
持参スルハ可ナリ。

# I SURRENDER

ATTENTION  
AMERICAN  
SOLDIERS

THIS LEAFLET GUARANTEES HUMANE  
TREATMENT TO ANY JAPANESE  
DESIRING TO SURRENDER. TAKE  
HIM IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR NEAREST  
COMMISSIONED OFFICER

BY ORDER C.G. U.S. FORCES

Early US psywar in the Pacific. Japanese troops would not "Surrender."


ATTENTION AMERICAN SOLDIERS!

# I CEASE RESISTANCE

THIS LEAFLET GUARANTEES HUMAN  
TREATMENT TO ANY JAPANESE  
DESIRING TO CEASE RESISTANCE. TAKE  
THIS IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR NEAREST  
COMMISSIONED OFFICER.

*By Direction of the Commander in Chief*

上。英文の内容は、人倫に反する  
國際條約の生かす責任の無い  
主の保護。云々意味不明  
出来は、紙と木の枝に  
守り、両手と場、及び、  
取、取扱、画、心、平、



....but some might "Cease Resistance"

# 生きこゐる姿

沖繩で投降した日本軍  
 将兵は七千五百十九名に  
 上つてかり、軍需を加へれば  
 一萬二千名に達してゐる  
 (七月五日迄)。一日に數百名  
 が投降した日もあり、なかには  
 将校に指揮された部隊も  
 ありました。相當な地位に  
 ある高級幹部の投降も  
 もう珍しいことではなかつたり  
 ました。一取らることは  
 ありません。

この消息は、吾ら戦友の  
 蘇つた姿です  
 救したり、虐待するどころか、  
 自國の兵隊同様の待遇  
 もするし、治療する  
 のです。

やがて平和が訪れ  
 た時、君の生きこ  
 つた姿を見たら、君  
 の姿は「やっばりよ  
 かった」と喜ぶたさよ  
 つてしまふ。




.....and become "happy POWs.", from United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, *Psychological Warfare, Part Two, Supplement No. 2*, CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 164-45 (15 August 1945), 213.

## 死にきれぬ！

おれが死んだら、家族はどうなる。  
政府の遺族待遇も、世間の劣りも當てになるものか。  
もみぢのやうな手を合せて、おれの歸りを待つてゐる  
姉や！  
死にきれぬ！

おれの平和な家庭を破つた戦争も先が見えた。  
おれたちをこんな鐵島に流し者にしたおれ  
ら方はひつこみ、親子水入らずで生活でき  
る時代が、きつとくる。どんなことをしても、  
生きるのだ、



決心したおれは、戦友の肩に頼つて水軍の  
ふとちへ とんていった (沖繩にて)



....far better to live to rebuild a new and better Japan., *ibid.*, 7-9. 23a. cover sheet for No. 23.

神鷲はどこへいった



首途  
 幕下全も日の丸の跡色にかへ戦火の煙草の味。  
 敵艦へ碎け散らん。



く・れぬ弾幕

岐路  
 救助に、アメリカの水兵  
 があつた！  
 敵艦ではあつたが、祖国の  
 ために最後とくしくして  
 散れた立派な男だ。



新生  
 生業方と精神力  
 今更なる、敵は内よる国よ！  
 この戦争はもう何人かの手で止まら  
 ず、敵艦へ、直に突撃する、新しい  
 日がたつた、それ、おれの命を止まらぬだ。

direct psywar against the Japanese and for the indigenous inhabitants of the area.<sup>524</sup> MacArthur imperiously banned the OSS from his command, arguing that FELO could do the work unaided. The main function of the OWI in SWPA was simply that of supplying leaflets; MacArthur rejected an OWI request that it assign a representative to his headquarters. And, unlike OWI or the OSS, FELO was entirely military. The SWPA commandeer did permit the establishment of an Allied Political Warfare Committee (APWC), which included representatives from the UK, the US, Canada, the Netherlands, and China. Headquarters SPWA psywar personnel consisted of both civilians and military personnel, although the latter assumed an increasingly dominant role. The SWPA commander, never behindhand when it came to publicity, would later give his Chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch direct access to his presence, when that branch assumed the duties of FELO in June 1944.<sup>525</sup>

U.S. combat psywar in the Pacific was complicated not only by the vast distances involved (8,000 miles from Honolulu to Tokyo, 6,000 from the Aleutians to Australia), and the widely-scattered Japanese garrisons, but also by the widely disparate area cultures and histories that were almost totally alien to the American experience. American psywarriors had to deal with peoples, such as the tetchy Burmese, who were not only polyglot (speaking something like 300 different dialects) but who, among at least the literate classes, resented their recently displaced colonial overlords. But those ejected overlords were also America's allies. Kicking out the Japanese became an increasingly popular goal for occupied Asians, but what then? Would the British, the French, the Dutch, the Australians return with the same pre-war arrogant assumptions of superiority. The answers to this question would have enormous consequences in the post-war years of de-colonialization. The ETO certainly had its own civilian problems but the question of post-war rule by another power was not one; PWD, for example, simply needed to assure, say, the French (who spoke French), that their nation would be restored to its full sovereignty as soon as the Germans were driven out. What happened afterwards was, at least publicly, not particularly America's business. It was precisely such considerations that led General MacArthur to delay the establishment of the SWPA Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) until after the New Guinea campaign, by which time U.S. forces were clear of former colonial areas and the problems they would present.<sup>526</sup>

<sup>524</sup>Gilmore thesis, 26.

<sup>525</sup>Daugherty, "US Psychological Warfare Organizations in World War II," *Casebook*, 132-133. It is also possible that MacArthur, from what he knew of the OSS's "Wild Bill Donovan," did not believe that his command needed two great egos.

<sup>526</sup>C. Laurie, "The Ultimate Dilemma of Psychological Warfare in the Pacific: Enemies who Don't Surrender, and GIs Who Don't Take Prisoners," paper presented before Conference of Army Historians, Washington, June 1994, 6. Some "progressive" Americans growled that the acronym for Britain's South East Asia Command - SEAC - actually stood for "Save England's Asian Colonies." One FELO leaflet showed a rather haughty Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands being helped out



FELO soon developed ten basic rules of psywar toward the Japanese that were remarkably sophisticated at a time of intense and widespread feeling that "The Only Good Jap is a Dead Jap." FELO psywar should: 1)Be paternal but not cold, 2)Avoid a superior attitude, 3)Not offend or humiliate the enemy, 4)Avoid boasting, 5)Never blame psywar recipients for the war, 6)Make clear that the quarrel is with the leaders, not the people of Japan, 6)Never corner the enemy without showing a way out, 7)Iterate that death is not the natural destiny of the Japanese soldier, 8)Be sincere, 9)Encourage psywar targets to draw their own conclusions, and 10)show that Japan could have a bright post-war future.<sup>527</sup> The final point was considerably more "liberal" than that formulated toward Germany, whose citizens were offered the cold comfort that their post-war life would be no worse than it had been under the Nazis. The Allied "Unconditional Surrender" demand did pose problems throughout the war; FELO could only iterate that the formula did not entail the destruction of Japan or the enslavement of the Japanese people.<sup>528</sup> And in all its psywar, as in that waged by PWD and PWB and the OWI, FELO consistently held to the line that truth was the best weapon.

FELO's first mission came in the same month as its activation, when it established a forward station at Darwin, Australia to monitor Japanese communications, while agents went behind enemy lines in Lae, New Guinea, denying to the natives Japanese reports that Australia had fallen.<sup>529</sup> The Army Air Forces dropped FELO's first leaflet, a Japanese-language bulletin telling of the Battle of the Coral Sea, and in the last four months of 1942, the agency disseminated 45 different Japanese-language and eight Malay leaflets, as well as "Pigeon English" and native dialect messages for Papua and New Guinea. By July of the following year, FELO had distributed 3 1/4 million Japanese-language and native-language leaflets. Many of these early leaflets stressed news from the warfronts: the Bismarck Sea battles, the Japanese withdrawals from Papua, New Guinea, Guadalcanal, the end of the Nazis in North Africa, conditions in the Home Islands, nostalgia, desertion of officers, failure of the Japanese Navy, (and Japanese high income taxes -a theme that might have more likely impressed Americans who felt overtaxed themselves) even German racial theories. But a weekly news letter pioneered the most popular of all leaflet forms.<sup>530</sup>

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of an aircraft, with the caption *The Netherlands Rise Again*, Fellers papers, "W.W.II Pacific" folder. Such an effort could hardly be expected to bring Dutch East Indies nationalists into the fight against Japan, particularly when the Japanese had given those Indies a nominal "independence", as they had the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma.

<sup>527</sup>Gillmore, 51-52.

<sup>528</sup>Ibid., 215; also based upon perusal of Pacific War leaflets.

<sup>529</sup>G-2, SWPA (350-Training-Allied Political Warfare Center, report, "FELO Activities in N. Guinea," Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder.

<sup>530</sup>Gillmore, 45; Allied Political Warfare Committee, Chairman, report on FELO Activities, 20 September 1943), Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder; FELO, "Report of Activities of Far Eastern Liaison Office for Period June

As early as June of 1943, SWPA had drawn up its "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Pacific Theater," which included a call for the encouragement of native resistance to the Japanese and pointed out Japanese vulnerabilities to psywar, such as love of the "charm" of their country, the fact that defeat in battle would undermine their spirit, their volatility and penchant for "short enthusiasms," their very human love of their lives, and the disunity between Japanese and Koreans and Formosans. The Plan also insisted that U.S. psywarriors "stick to the truth, never question the bravery of the Japanese soldier," avoid use of the term "surrender (*kosan, kofuk* ), and avoid telling Japanese that as POWs they would be sent to the United States; that they would remain with their comrades, and not to release any photos in which individual POWs might be recognized and their families victimized. These were all valuable points, but were only spasmodically carried out and, in the words of one veteran authority, "combat propaganda played an insignificant role from Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima."<sup>531</sup>

On the Asian mainland, the Assam Psychological Warfare Team (PWT), began operations in the late fall of 1943, dropping seeds and good will messages over villages in the Naga Hills. Although authorized by General Joseph Stillwell, U.S. commander in the CBI, the Team's chain of command went through the Overseas Branch of the OWI. Based at Ledo in Upper Assam, India, this isolated team, consisting of 15 Americans and 15 Asians conducted purely tactical psywar with a high degree of autonomy. It was, in fact, the first U.S. unit to conduct continuous combat propaganda.<sup>532</sup> But even this unit got off to a stumbling start when it first used New York and China-produced leaflets over Burmese villages. As its own combat report noted:

The art work in the early news and anti-morale leaflets was still, inaccurate, unsympathetic. The Japanese used was little better than a literal translation of English. "Jisei," the China-produced newspaper, was ill-suited to the Burma target, emphasizing as it did war events far from Burma. "Jisei" also suffered from bad topography and a "Chinese" flavor in its writing. The New York leaflets, although beautifully produced, were to prove somewhat over the heads of PWT's

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1942 to September 1945."

<sup>531</sup>"Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Theater," 9 June 1943, Fellers Papers, box 3, "Basic Plan" folder. Vatcher thesis, 28, 31. Heber Blankenhorn claimed that, "fed up with the preliminary blundering", he had submitted a plan for psychological warfare that "to put it mildly, was not greeted with enthusiasm." Mashbir, 339-344. Almost two years later, in April 1945, this plan was reissued by General Fellers...." Certainly, U.S. psywar in the Pacific was not fought on any systematic basis until after that date. Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda," 339.

<sup>532</sup>Bishop, 330-331.

audience, and in some cases even objectionable in tone.<sup>533</sup>

The arrival of a *Nisei* psywar team marked the turning point. Their first leaflet was addressed to Japanese forces assaulting a roadblock held by Chinese airborne troops. At about the same time the team also first used Japanese POWs in its work. The team dropped leaflets carrying the statements of four POWs attesting to their fine hospital treatment. Among the team's first locally-produced leaflets were *Burma Nights* and *The Death March* which emphasized the terrible conditions of Japanese troops in the area, and *Hunger*, which showed POWs being well-treated. The team enjoyed good success with civilians, warning them away from the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway and encouraging the anti-Japanese Kachin tribespeople, who later would prove one of America's staunchest and most effective allies in guerilla warfare against the Japanese in North Burma. When the U.S. 5307th Composite Unit and "Merrill's Marauders" moved into North Burma, they carried matches and mirrors bearing good will messages prepared by the Assam Team for the tribespeople.

The Team used the familiar concepts toward the Japanese of good POW treatment, the incompetencies of the higher command, the bad war news for Japan, and the surrender pass. But the Team also drew up a new theme, "The Higher Bushido," that rationalized surrender when faced with overwhelming enemy power. As with PWB, *Nisei* soldiers proved valuable in translating intelligence material. Possibly for the first time, POW quotes in their own handwriting were photographed and printed on leaflets dropped on the Japanese, who, of course, highly valued calligraphy. But the primary means the Team used to get its message to civilians and enemy troops alike was the newspaper, which gave straightforward accounts of Allied victories. They propagated world news through the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) newspaper *Gunjin Shimbun* and the tactical Burma news in the fortnightly *Senjin News* ("Battlefield News"). Special news leaflets announced such significant events as the fall of Myitkyina.<sup>534</sup>

The Team also broadcast daily local programs, highlighting the first capture of a large number of Japanese troops at Myitkyina and Japanese music and directing instructions to civilians. (The team had to be careful in its psywar to civilians to differentiate between the staunchly pro-American Kachin and the collaborationist Shan villagers.)<sup>535</sup> A long-serving missionary credited the pioneering Assam psywar team

<sup>533</sup>"Combat Propaganda in Burma," Section III, 4; quoted in Bishop, 333.

<sup>534</sup>Ibid.; "Leaflet News letter," vol. 1, No.11 (1 September 1945), RG 208, box 6, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder. Examples of Burma surrender leaflets for Japanese troops can also be found in USASOC History Archives. *News of the Week* claimed a circulation one and one-half times greater than any daily run of the *New York Times*. Fellers Papers, box 3, "Allied Air Force Summary", No. 2, n.d., 1.

<sup>535</sup>Bishop, 340. The team had its leaflet dissemination problems at first. Psywar personnel disseminated a somewhat unusual leaflet to the civilians caught in the siege

leaflets with not only with "saving their lives," but with causing hundreds of Kachin to join the U.S.-Kachin OSS Detachment 101 guerilla raiders, "as a direct result of our leaflets."<sup>536</sup> The team later employed a group of six POWs to write and provide the art work and calligraphy for its own journal which predated the SWPA's by six months, and like the SWPA version was the most widely-read leaflet among news-starved enemy troops. The group also made Japanese-language psywar broadcasts and developed leaflet themes. One such message was the facetiously-titled , which played on the much-resented practice of Japanese officers killing their own wounded if evacuation was impossible or even simply difficult. This particular leaflet was reported by POWs to have made a "sharp impression" on Japanese troops. Another effective leaflet, also drawing on POW intelligence, publicized the fact that the commanding officer of the Japanese 18<sup>th</sup> Division had escaped the Allied net at Myitkyina with his Burmese "comfort girls." The team also used its imagination while besieging Myitkyina, broadcasting through loudspeakers the mournful strains of a broken-hearted Japanese girl singing of her absent warrior lover. Then the "message": "Live! Come over to our side; we will not reveal your name." The team underlined this commitment to the anonymity of its prisoners by blanking out their eyes, probably for the first, but not the last time, in any close-up photos on its leaflets. Even more imaginatively, U.S. Burma psywarriors dropped an urn they had come across containing the ashes of a cremated Japanese soldier, with the message that even in death, the Japanese would be treated with respect by the Americans and in accordance with Japanese traditions.<sup>537</sup>

At the Myitkyina siege itself a two-week psywar campaign (13 July-6 August 1944) comprised front-line loudspeaker broadcasting in Japanese by a four-man combat propaganda team, coordinated with leaflet drops directed at the Japanese garrison. Other broadcasts were made in Urdu, Gurkhali, Kachin and English for the remaining civilians in the town, not to mention a program of news and popular music spontaneously composed for the American troops in the area. This campaign scored

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of Myitkyina: "Stay away from Allied lines; you could be killed." C. Ogburn, *The Marauders* (New York; 1959).

<sup>536</sup>"Leaflet News letter," OWI, Far East, 1, No. 4 (4 May 1945), OWI Historian, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder.

<sup>537</sup>R. C. Gask, "Japs Do Surrender," *Newsweek* (30 October 1944). See Mashbir, 344, for a similar ploy, which Mashbir said was to prove that the Americans were "not barbarians." PWB leaflet writers were not always so humane. One leaflet encouraged *suppuku* for officers who failed: "It is time that [military leaders] admitted this failure...and obeyed the [warrior] Code which they demand that their followers obey." Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Department, "Psychological Warfare" collection, 8093, 8094; Mr. Herbert Avedon, oral interview with author, North Potomac, MD, 13 September 1994. The Japanese were apparently not impressed by "unfaithful women at home" or "war profiteer" themes. "Fighting With Words," *Atlantic* (August 1945).

some tangible successes. Twenty-four Japanese defenders, including some NCOs, were induced at least to attempt surrender, and 244 native inhabitants came over either directly or indirectly as a result of Allied psywar broadcasts. Loudspeaker broadcasts were given partial credit for a successful assault after two previous attacks on the same positions, mounted without any psychological warfare preparation, had been thrown back with losses. The Myitkyina battle may also have seen the first use of "tame" POWs to go back to their comrades in an attempt to induce surrender.<sup>538</sup> By January 1945 the 490<sup>th</sup> Medium Bomb Squadron's twin-engine Mitchell B-25 bombers, were dropping one and one-half million such leaflets per month over North Burma. (The pilots came to consider these drops just as important as combat missions after they were officially counted toward the total needed for rotation back to the States.)<sup>539</sup> As one result, every village, without exception, in an 84-square mile area heeded another Assam Team leaflet warning natives to hide in the jungle as Allied forces approached. The Assam Team also conducted at least one deception mission, when its leaflets warned the people of Mohnyin to leave the combat zone. The Japanese then diverted troops from Hopin, where the Allies really did intend to attack, while a British force made a feint at Mohnyin. Then, just to retain the Allies' psywar reputation for veracity, Mohnyin was bombed!<sup>540</sup> In the final months of the Burma campaign, the POW group had a major role in developing and producing 21 of the final 26 leaflets disseminated by the Assam Psychological Warfare Team. These leaflets significantly influenced an entire unit of Burman mercenaries to turn upon their Japanese paymasters.<sup>541</sup>

But for all this, General MacArthur could reply in truth to a psywar inquiry from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "This headquarters has been completely engrossed

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<sup>538</sup>CINCPAC-CINCPOA, *Psychological Warfare*, 9. Vatcher thesis, 15-16.

<sup>539</sup>Bishop, 340. The Assam psywarriors had their leaflet dissemination problems. The first B-25s assigned for leaflet drops were soon after diverted to other missions. They then turned to the P-51 fighter, but found that the canopy would not open in its fast slipstream. The older P-40 carried a more amenable canopy, but it did hinder the pilot, particularly if the bundle broke open in flight. A belly tank was installed, but it never proved really satisfactory and had only a 7500 leaflet capacity. Only with the return of the B-25, as American aircraft production permitted such "peripheral" missions, could the Assam Team count on effective leaflet air drops. Ibid.

<sup>540</sup>Berger, 73.

<sup>541</sup>OWI "Leaflet News letter, 1, No. 2, 6 April 1945, Area III, Far East, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter- Area III" folder; Bishop, 340-346. See also weekly reports of OWI Psywar Team attached to U.S. Army Forces, I. B. [India-Burma] Theater, OWI Historian Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 7, "New Delhi, Weekly Psychological Warfare Reports...1944-45" folder; and memos, reports, etc. in Ibid., "PWB: Pacific: Burma" folder, and COL F. B. Hayne, memo to LT Marshall D. Shulman, subject: "Memorandum on Psychological Warfare Operations," 30 August 1944, *ibid.*

in the planning and conduct of operations and has not, repeat not, made any study of possible propaganda programs." MacArthur also noted that Japanese brutality toward Allied soldiers made it difficult to induce his troops to do any less than kill their enemy.<sup>542</sup>

There can be little dispute that these early Japanese-language Allied leaflets were usually ineffective, due to their poor Japanese, a lack of general support ("The only good Jap...."), and the use of simplistic, inappropriate themes. One simply printed blocks of text quoting at length from President Roosevelt as to why war came. It would be difficult to imagine a less appealing leaflet.<sup>543</sup> The most egregious and well-known of these failures was the original "I Surrender" leaflet, drawn up and distributed in blithe disregard of the obvious fact that Japanese soldiers were indoctrinated almost from birth in the concept that surrender was literally an unmentionable, shameful act.<sup>544</sup> (The Japanese High Command, of course, had no compunction about calling on their enemies to surrender and then treating them vilely for doing just that; enemies were non-Japanese and thus lesser breeds -racism was not confined to the West.) Another leaflet, showing the progress of a surrendering Japanese soldier from the battlefield to medical care and vocational training in a POW camp, to his return to his family in a Japanese postwar "Levittown", was all wrong in its western iconography, even though Mount Fujiyama did loom over the ecstatic homecoming scene.<sup>545</sup>

Even *Nisei* were of limited help when it came to Japanese language complexities. Paul Linebarger, who was involved in Pacific psywar from the Combined/Joint level down to working with agents in the field, believed that they needed strict parameters to follow.<sup>546</sup> As late as the Marianas campaign in the autumn of 1944 a POW who worked closely with an American psywar officer dismissed the impact on the Japanese by claiming that "they all thought as Americans." At roughly the same time "The Psychological Warfare Information Review" complained that "wrong Japanese phraseology, spelling, grammar, and mixing of various forms of Japanese together, continues [sic] to hamper the success of our leaflets."<sup>547</sup> The earlier leaflets were seen also as "too simplistic," then they were "over-corrected," becoming too sophisticated, "too bookish."<sup>548</sup> At any rate, the Japanese language is so complex

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<sup>542</sup>Gilmore thesis, 105.

<sup>543</sup>Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 198.

<sup>544</sup>The Japanese Army Code, [significantly] Section 1, mandated "If alive, do not suffer the disgrace of being a prisoner.", quoted in Vatcher thesis, 30.

<sup>545</sup>Fellers Papers, box 15, "U.S. Psywar PWB" folder. This leaflet is discussed by Linebarger, 134.

<sup>546</sup>Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 194-195.

<sup>547</sup>Gilmore thesis, 124.

<sup>548</sup>Gordon Cotler, "Kobayashi," *The New Yorker* (26 August 1950). This particular POW became too "Americanized," turning his broadcasts into something of a disc jockey program, and had to be returned to the POW cages. Gillmore, 125-127. The

that even *Nisei* had to be trained in it.<sup>549</sup> A later authority also notes that although the *Nisei* were sought out to use in translating captured enemy documents and other printed material, letters, and the ubiquitous diaries, they usually failed to produce authentic-sounding propaganda similar to, say, the *Passierschein* of the European Theater. This was primarily due to the fact that few if any had served in the Japanese Army, and thus were quite unfamiliar with its peculiar military terms, slang, and general way of life of a soldier of the Emperor.<sup>550</sup> Aside from linguistic failings, a Military Intelligence report pointed out "According to a consensus of opinion among Japanese PsW interrogators at this center, American leaflets without exception are considered to be child-like, stressing the American point of view rather than appeal to Japanese psychology."<sup>551</sup> Even later, a *Nisei* himself complained that

Our existing propaganda leaflets have a tendency of addressing them [the Japanese] in a juvenile sort of language. On reading them one gets the impression that a father is pleading to a diligent [?] child to give up fighting his opponent who is so much stronger than he.<sup>552</sup>

Another problem, in this case not of Allied psywarriors' making, was the fact that, as BG Bonner E. Fellers, SWPA psywar chief, later noted, that "They [Japanese troops] knew the Japanese propaganda to be notoriously false and naturally felt our would be the same."<sup>553</sup> In sum, and in the words of a psywar report of May 1945, "we [SWPA and OWI] had to go through a year of fumbling experimentation before we had any sense of success about effective approaches to points of vulnerability in the thorough spiritual indoctrination of the Japanese soldier."<sup>554</sup> The U.S. psywar themes

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*Nisei* might be "too American" but they were on dangerous ground in the Far East, for the Japanese government considered them to be in truth Japanese. (as, unfortunately, did many Americans.) Gillmore, 303.

<sup>549</sup>*Yankee Samurai, passim*. A veteran of the CBI psywar wars agree: "Even most *Nisei*...having spent all or most of their lives in America, are unqualified to write propaganda in Japanese. [anon.], OWI Psychological Warfare Team, "Personnel Problems of OWI Assam Psywar Team," *Casebook*, 188.

<sup>550</sup>Sparangara, 112.

<sup>551</sup>Memo from MI Service, Captured Personnel and Material Branch, 23 September 1944, subject: "Suggestions for American Propaganda Leaflets," Lilly Papers, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder.

<sup>552</sup>Tech 3 Harold S. Nishimura, 7<sup>th</sup> Division Language Team, "Effective Propaganda," n.d., OWI "Washington Weekly Intelligence," No. 27, 28, 27 January, 3 February 1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 12, "Washington Weekly Intelligence" folder.

<sup>553</sup>Fellers, "Report on Psychological Warfare," 11.

<sup>554</sup>"Proposal for Establishment of a Central Combat Propaganda Unit," n.d., conference on Area III, Monterey, California, 24-27 May 1945, Records of the OWI, RG 208, entry 6d, box 6, "Conferences, Area III" folder. The term "spiritual

themselves appear to have been appropriate for the most part; the failure lay in their execution.

The Bougainville campaign of early 1944 illustrates the improvised nature of American psywar earlier in the Pacific war. No equipment or personnel were available exclusively for psywar on the island, but as elsewhere, *Nisei* filled in as best as they could. Leaflets were drawn up first in English, then translated into Japanese by members of the XIV Language Section. Although every effort was made to use correct Japanese, later POW interrogations established that "many of the more forceful rhetoricisms would be missed by the average Japanese soldier whose education is very limited."<sup>555</sup> The leaflets, about 25,000 in all, were dropped by hand from low-flying aircraft. Only two leaflets offered any opportunities for surrender. After the campaign only 20 of the 49 Japanese POWs taken said that they had seen or even heard of the leaflets, 5 of whom were thus influenced to desert and another 5 made that decision on the basis of the leaflets alone.<sup>556</sup>

This disheartening situation had already begun to change in late 1943, when COL Sidney Mashbir, MacArthur's Military Secretary, began to put into effect many of the earlier psywar recommendations, and to put their linguistic and intelligence assets to a more systematic use. The *Nisei* pointed out the value of Japanese diaries, previously discarded as "junk" when found on dead enemy soldiers or ignored when taken from POWs, but often containing important intelligence information. (By the end of the war U.S. troops had captured more enemy diaries than enemy POWs.) The word went out more vigorously that a live POW was more valuable than a "dead Jap," and could, in fact, save American lives. In fact, Army authorities in the Pacific came to value POWs so highly that they lavishly rewarded their captors: three cokes for one POW.<sup>557</sup> The innate kindness of many American soldiers also came through on occasion. During the Bougainville campaign, one POW proclaimed to his comrades in the field (with perhaps some exaggeration) that the Americans "had been like parents" to him.<sup>558</sup>)

Further, the "Surrender" leaflet was changed at about this time, after Japanese POWs had strongly protested this "dishonor." Now the phrase was "I Cease Resistance," and POWs were pictured eagerly lighting up cigarettes. The Japanese

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indoctrination" reads strangely, and seems to have been used only in this one instance. A later authority, a veteran of the Central Pacific psywars, claimed that U.S. propaganda to Japanese troops "played an unimportant role from Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima.", Vatcher thesis, 10.

<sup>555</sup>United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, *Psychological Warfare Developments and Responses, CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 109-45*, 15 May 1945, 3.

<sup>556</sup>*Ibid*, 2-3.

<sup>557</sup>Harrington, 108-109.

<sup>558</sup>"Seized Japanese Uses Loudspeaker to Bid Comrades Quit Bougainville Fight," *New York Times*, 5 April 1944.



script on the various editions usually read "We respect the way you have fought under difficulties up to now." The new leaflet offered graphic instructions on the safe method of coming over: impale the leaflet on a stick and wave it vigorously, keeping the head low. English-language instructions dominated, for obvious reasons, and were printed on the obverse, ordering Allied troops to receive the enemy soldier - alive. Part of the obverse was often left blank so that messages to particular garrisons could be added by mimeograph machine. ("Imperial Soldiers in the Augusan River Valley, Mindinao.", etc.)<sup>559</sup> Many later "Cease Resistance" leaflets also had the eyes of happy Japanese POWs blanked out to protect their identities, thus further validating the solicitude of the Americans for their captives' protection from their vengeful government.<sup>560</sup> A later leaflet pulled the sting from the idea of defection by thoughtfully noting that "Many Japanese soldiers who have become unconscious during an engagement have already been received by American forces on the island [not named]."<sup>561</sup> Finally, it should be pointed out that the Japanese "no surrender" policy in some ways actually aided Allied psywar. The Japanese soldier, as noted, had not been indoctrinated into the Western response of "name, rank, and serial number" when captured. He felt lost, alone, and abandoned by his government. (The Japanese government, in fact maintained that there were no Nipponese POWs!)<sup>562</sup> So,

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<sup>559</sup>Berger, 77; Gillmore thesis, 292-294; "Psychological Warfare NCO Course #2," 4. Copies of the original "I Surrender" leaflet are found in the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, #8093, the Harry Baird scrapbook, the Military History Institute, and the Fellers Papers, as are revised "I Cease Resistance" versions, which latter may also be found in the Vatcher Papers. Some rather far-fetched objections were voiced at the time to such leaflets: a Japanese corpse holding such a leaflet could be photographed and used as proof that the Americans indeed did not take prisoners (But could the Japanese not simply fake such a propaganda photo?), the leaflets could be used to mask treachery, the Japanese could use them perversely as proof that Japanese troops do not surrender, and that the U.S. was getting desperate, that Japanese leaders could threaten the families of those surrendering, thus leading to even fewer surrenders. LTC B. Stern, memo to Directors, OWI and OWI Overseas Branch, subject: "Status of Psychological Warfare in the Pacific," 4 June 1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 11, "Stern" folder.

<sup>560</sup>Berger, 68. This policy was continued through the war, but not consistently, and was again used in Korea. CINCPAC-CINCPOA, *Psychological Warfare, Part II*, Supplement No. 2, CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin 164-15, 15 August 1945 for example, has samples of both styles, as do the Fellers Papers. It is difficult to account for the variation.

<sup>561</sup>Copy in Vatcher Papers, box 16, "World War II" folder.

<sup>562</sup>SWPA G-2 1350.01 Allied Political Warfare Committee, "Consideration of General MacArthur's Reply to the Chairman's Memorandum on the use of Japanese Prisoners-of-War," 21 September 1943, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder; "Basic Plan", 3. Later, the Japanese government made small grants of money,

with decent treatment, he could be "born again" in captivity to make his life worthwhile in such unprecedented circumstances.<sup>563</sup> (Paradoxically, although American or British soldiers could surrender in hopeless circumstances, those who collaborated to one-half the extent of that of many Japanese POWs would face quick courts martial and stiff sentences after repatriation.) The PWB interrogators also never probed too deeply when their charges invariably insisted that they had not surrendered or even "ceased resistance," but had been tricked, caught while asleep or unconscious, or unable to commit suicide, etc. (Troops from capturing units often told a different story.)<sup>564</sup>

The Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), which in the words of one scholar, "was perhaps the most important asset to personnel engaged in combat propaganda in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA)," at COL Mashbir's prompting now began systematically to interpret, sort, and distribute its findings from POW interrogations and enemy publications, replacing the previous individual hit-or-miss use of intelligence for Allied Pacific tactical psywar. Mashbir later claimed that, in the end, not one of the 14,000 ATIS-interrogated Japanese prisoners failed to talk.<sup>565</sup>

The earliest known enemy reaction to this invigorated Allied psywar came through a captured Japanese Army document of August 1943, stating that enemy propaganda techniques were becoming more effective, and ordering an investigation of the appeal of such "subversive ideas."<sup>566</sup> Allied psywar first showed significant results at Noemfoor in July-August 1944. There, about 1500 Japanese troops came across 300 to 400 SWPA leaflets, which their officers ordered immediately burned. But about half of the troops believed the leaflets' promises of good treatment, according to one POW. Others said that after the treatment they endured in the Japanese Army, the Americans could only be an improvement. When their officers ordered a retreat, about half of the group managed to desert and OWI reported that 256 Japanese soldiers, in groups of about 30 each, made their way to American lines, greatly distressed with their officers.<sup>567</sup>

The Saipan campaign, in the fall of 1944, also saw some favorable psywar

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through the Swiss Embassy in Australia for its "nonexistent" POWs - and SWPA drew up a leaflet publicizing the new development to Japanese troops in the field. SWPA, "Report on Psychological Warfare, Dulag to Palo", n.d., n.p.

<sup>563</sup>Gillmore thesis, 184-185.

<sup>564</sup>Daugherty, "Evaluation of Combat Propaganda," *Casebook*, 692.

<sup>565</sup>GHQ, FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, *Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, SWPA*, Intelligence Series (Tokyo: 1948); Gillmore thesis, 265; Mashbir, *I Was an American Spy* (New York: 1953), 227.

<sup>566</sup>ATIS SWPA, "Important Items Current Translation No. 75," 22 August 1943, RG 407, entry 427, box 1622, "Propaganda and Psywar -Japanese" folder.

<sup>567</sup>Gillmore thesis, 321-322.

results, where U.S. forces for the first time came into contact with significant numbers of Japanese civilians, and where PWB made its first large-scale effort to coax civilians out of the battle areas, although with only modest success.<sup>568</sup> Loudspeaker personnel and *Nisei* convinced about 200 Japanese civilians hiding in caves to come out to safety. After loudspeakers had broadcast for about an hour, one *Nisei* actually went into the cave and convinced the Japanese officer in charge that as a man of honor he should allow the civilians to leave and receive food and medical attention. Finally, a trickle of children began to make their way to U.S. lines. The children's laughter as they were given candy by the Americans convinced the hidden adults that they would not be killed and they raced downhill to join their children. On another occasion, a *Nisei* went into a cave, naked except for his helmet, to show that he was unarmed, and was able to talk a number of enemy soldiers into surrender.<sup>569</sup> *Nisei* broadcast Japanese music and a carefully-worded surrender appeal that brought out 53 enemy, half of whom were troops. A unique effort was the erecting of a "Flag of Humanity" (colors or design unspecified) over an area that leaflets had earlier specified would be the safe site for surrender. Japanese civilians and captured troops were allowed to return to the hills to prevail on their compatriots to come out. One came back with 14 Japanese, while a superior private brought in six soldiers, including one officer.<sup>570</sup> A *Nisei* who had earlier strongly criticized Allied psywar "rats in a trap," and "Sad Sack" caricatures of the Japanese, now concluded that "Most of them [POWs] say that our propaganda has had a vast effect within their units, requiring the officers to issue an order to their men not to pick up propaganda leaflets." Nonetheless, many Saipan civilians killed themselves rather than come over to the American lines, and about 50 percent said that they still believed that Japan would somehow win the war.<sup>571</sup>

<sup>568</sup>P. C. Bosse, "Polling Civilian Japanese on Saipan," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer 1945).

<sup>569</sup>J. Beaufort and C. Green, "Japs Don't Want to Die," *Colliers*, 14 October 1944; *Yankee Samurai*, 209-210, 221.

<sup>570</sup>CINCPAC-CINCPOA, "Psychological Warfare," 3.

<sup>571</sup>Tec 3 H. S. Nishimura, SWPA File Weekly Report, File 1, "Critique," Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder; Vatcher Papers, box 15, "World War II" folder; Vatcher thesis, 51-59. PWB leaflets at Saipan, economically printed on captured Japanese paper, were criticized, again, for their poor Japanese, clumsy sentences and childish texts, although those offering food and water were praised. Washington Document Center E1359-A-171, MID Captured Personnel Branch, report A-171, 27 October 1944, Lily Papers, RG 218, box 14, "Topical File" folder. This critique of "rats in a trap", etc. was picked up and iterated by the Army Ground School's NCO Psywar course in March of 1951. Perhaps as a result, similar messages were not used in Korea. Psychological Warfare NCO Course, "Propaganda Methods and Techniques III," 1-2. For Saipan campaign see also Paul C. Bosse, "Polling Civilian Japanese on Saipan," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer, 1945); and Vatcher thesis, 50-51; and Washington Document Center, E 1359-A-171, MID

The Tinian operation, soon after Saipan, saw the rescue of a gratifyingly large number of civilians. As at Saipan, language personnel were in the front lines, appealing by direct voice and loudspeaker to groups of civilians to come to safety within the American lines. The usual technique was to secure the surrender of one civilian in a place where his subsequent good treatment could be witnessed by hiding groups of civilians. A total of 7,500 Japanese civilians and about 200 troops were gathered in this manner. In the final days of the campaign, 4,000 civilians were induced to leave their heavily-forested plateau and coastal cliff hiding places by a U.S. Navy landing craft loudspeaker broadcasting for 2 1/2 days in coordination with American troops on the plateau above.<sup>572</sup>

But the widespread Allied practice of shooting down surrendering enemy troops threatened to ruin any hopes of inducing large numbers of Japanese defections. After hearing accounts of such shootings, MacArthur in May 1944 ordered greater efforts to orient U.S. troops as to the value of POWs, although he did take into account the enemy's "cunning" and "treachery," as evidenced in false surrenders. One of the earliest reports, in late December of 1942, noted that "tragic experiences in the past imbue them [U.S. troops] with a distinct disinclination to take prisoners, whether they come in waving surrender passes or not....Pass or no pass Kapow! Bang! Bang!"<sup>573</sup>

Reports from Hollandia in May 1944 spoke of the shooting down of enemy troops carrying surrender passes. In January 1945, a G-2 officer bitterly complained to General Fellers that "Our problem of inducing the Japanese to surrender and explaining to them that they will get fair treatment is being terrifically impaired by our own troops....our own men make liars out of our command."

The following month SWPA quoted Filipino-American guerilla leaders (who would presumably know what they were talking about) "Even if we could convince the enemy to surrender to our forces, it would be almost impossible to get our troops to accept his surrender." In March 1945, SWPA reported that "There are persistent reports that small groups of Japs in scattered locations have attempted to surrender, were allowed to come into the open with leaflets held up, and were then mowed down by our own troops."<sup>574</sup> (It should be noted that many of these shootings attributed to

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Captured Personnel Branch, report A-171, 27 October 1944, in Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "Topical File" folder. Document Center

<sup>572</sup>Vatcher, 59.

<sup>573</sup>Gillmore thesis, 110-111; Assistant Chief of Staff, USFISPA, memo for the record, 28 December 1942, RG 407, entry 427, box 1622, "Propaganda and Psywar - Japanese" folder. (punctuation in original).

<sup>574</sup>Berger, 57; CPT W. R. Beard to Fellers, 3 January, 1945, G-2 files, SWPA, 350 Training Allied Political Warfare Committee. Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder; "PWB Estimate, N. Luzon," [from U.S. stay-behind forces], SWPA Weekly Report File, 11 February 1945, *ibid.*; PWB (SWPA) Weekly Report, #10, 10 March 1945, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder. It was just as

U.S. troops, were in actuality the work of Allied Chinese or Indian soldiers.)<sup>575</sup>

But the word was finally getting out. An August 1944 report noting the taking of 20 POWs at an unnamed site, concluded that "The fact that our front-line troops did take those Japanese prisoners instead of killing them seems to indicate that our troops have become very prisoner-conscious since the informal talk given to them." Certainly Allied Pacific authorities relied on more than "informal talks" to get the word out on POWs.

LTG Walter Kruger, commander of the 6<sup>th</sup> Army in the Philippines campaign ordered in March 1945 that "Every effort, consistent with security, will be made to obtain prisoners."<sup>576</sup> A report for the troops concluded that "The more Japs captured, the more information we will obtain. More information means more Japs killed and captured -- the circle continues." And a leaflet was drawn up putting the matter bluntly: Hold your fire Remember this -  
A dead Jap gives us no Information<sup>577</sup>

There is strong evidence that such exhortations, reinforced with command backing, did appreciably reduce the shooting of surrendering Japanese.<sup>578</sup> And in the

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well that Allied combat troops did not see the intemperate comments on the subject from one PWB captain, who presumably had not encountered the false surrenders or the unprintable, sickening atrocities of the Japanese in the field: "As for atrocities -we can't say with a straight face that the Japs are any worse than we are,". As if the killing of surrendering enemy soldiers in the heat of battle could be compared to the cold-blooded Bataan Death March or the Rape of Nanking., Gillmore, 112. As usual, William Daugherty should have the last word on the whole miserable business: "Whether through actual fear of treachery, carelessness among combat leaders in preventing their men from firing clandestinely on would-be captives, or wanton disregard or ignorance of promises made in propaganda leaflets and broadcasts, the results, all too often, were the same. Unit special action reports frequently repeat the allegation that enemy casualties were clutching surrender passes or gave other evidence that their intention had been to surrender. Daugherty, *Psychological Warfare Requirements of a Combat Division* (ORO, Chevy Chase: 7 July 1950), 12. A later generation, noting the scarcity of reports of shooting down surrendering Europeans (German and Italian troops) would be more likely simplistically to put it all down to American racism.

<sup>575</sup>Sparangara, 74-76; "Japanese Prisoners of War as a Source of Military Intelligence," lecture, no author, n.d., RG 208, entry 6e, box 14, "POW" folder.

<sup>576</sup>Directive of LTG Krueger, 18 March 1945, quoted in Berger, 58-59.

<sup>577</sup>SWPA, "Report on Psychological Warfare, Dulag to Palo", n.d., n.p.

<sup>578</sup>OMS-PWB #335, "Training," n.d. AGO SWPA file, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder; XVI Corps Training Memo No. 19, "Training in Psychological Warfare", 11 October 1944, Fellers Papers, "Correspondence" folder, deals with the value of live POWs over dead enemy. See also Sparangara, 161-162. Surrendering Japanese were not simply welcomed, however: they were to come over

field, by early 1945 reports were coming in from all directions that surrendering Japanese soldiers were accompanied by shouts of "Don't shoot the bastard!"<sup>579</sup>

Allied psywar was undoubtedly also improved with the activation of (another) Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) in SWPA in June of 1944, which assumed FELO's duties. This Pacific PWB was organized with the re-taking of the Philippines in mind, although its mission was to coordinate psywar throughout the SWPA by undermining enemy morale, discrediting Japanese militarists, and making the enemy surrender-conscious. General Fellers served throughout the remainder of the war as the commander this new PWB, working closely with ATIS, and reporting personally to General MacArthur.<sup>580</sup> Although ATIS was an Allied organization, it became predominantly American as the war progressed. In many ways General Fellers became the Pacific counterpart to General McClure in the ETO. In the words of General Marquat, "Fellers personally took an interest in PW way back when most military men thought that the only thing to do with the Japanese was to kill them all."<sup>581</sup>

Dissemination of Allied propaganda in the Pacific had to go through a period of trial-and-error, much as in North Africa, Italy, and Europe, but there is little evidence of any transfer of lessons-to-be-learned from the latter theater. In the early days of U.S. Army Pacific psywar, "it was found that propaganda material delivered to Air Force HQ was either not dropped at all, lost in transit between the HQ and the squadron, or no record of the distribution could be obtained." The problem with local AAF commanders was eased considerably by the assignment of liaison NCOs at each squadron, men who flew along with the air crews on all important drops.<sup>582</sup>

At least PWB was spared the necessity of begging the Army Air Forces for air drops of its leaflets; the Commanding General of the Far East Air Force (FEAF) supported the entire psywar program, according to General Fellers, and SWPA never had to issue orders for aerial dissemination.<sup>583</sup> The Monroe leaflet bomb never seemed to have made its way to the Pacific from Europe, probably because almost all of the drops in the former theater were low-level, and thus the problems of high-altitude drops by heavy bombers were absent. Leaflets wrapped up in parcels tied with twine seemed to land reasonably near their targets. Air liaison PWB officers often went

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only in daylight, unarmed, and waving a leaflet or white cloth. SWPA, "Report on Psychological Warfare, Dulag to Palo, n.d.

<sup>579</sup>Gillmore thesis, 120-121.

<sup>580</sup>Ibid., 27-28, 41, 49, 56-57.

<sup>581</sup>Marquat, "Statement on SW Pacific Operations," n.d., RG 208, entry 6e, Subject File, box 6, "Conference, Area III" folder. Mashbir, 225. General Fellers' papers, at the Hoover Institution of War, Peace, and Revolution, are a basic source for U.S. psywar in the Pacific during World War II.

<sup>582</sup>FELO, "Report, of Activities of Far Eastern Liaison Office for Period June 1942 to September 1945," 40.

<sup>583</sup>Fellers, *Report on Psychological Warfare*, 5.

along on these drops, seeing that the job was done right and earning the respect of the aircrews on these dangerous missions. The leaflets themselves were reviewed by a joint and combined Propaganda Committee anywhere from three to seven times.<sup>584</sup>

The Central Pacific also saw the first successful use of aerial loudspeaker propaganda as well as the probable first use of a wire recorder in combat. A combined "Polly" aerial loudspeaker aircraft and landing craft operation at Wotje atoll in March brought in seven Japanese naval personnel, who had been directed by wire-recorded Japanese language messages to the beach by the "Polly" plane to surrender to the landing craft. The surrender messages had been preceded by the playing of popular tunes (popular in America, at any rate), "My Blue Heaven" and "Red River Valley," for some reason. But by the end of March 1945, 21 Japanese had been taken, at no cost in American lives.<sup>585</sup>

On the ground, loudspeakers were usually mounted on the back of a jeep, and the announcer had to stand up to broadcast. As one *Nisei* noted later, the results were more often than not "a few rounds right through the loudspeaker.", as in Europe. But loudspeakers were found to be useful for the playing of sentimental Japanese music to induce homesickness. And, as in Europe, they were particularly valuable in dealing with indigenous peoples as U.S. combat forces moved in and immediately after.<sup>586</sup>

Typical combat loudspeaker messages from later in the Pacific war included the bad news from Iwo Jima and Manila and the bombing of Japan. The good news was that "ceasing resistance" was honorable, and that good food and medical care awaited. Loudspeaker units would usually present six minutes of world news followed by the "sponsor's message," read by a *Nisei*: "Why fight, Iwo has fallen, return to our beloved Japan." "Why not cooperate with the U.S. Army and enjoy its warm treatment?"<sup>587</sup> Some loudspeakers were mounted on light liaison aircraft and, in at least one case, broadcast rather poetic appeals written by POWs:

The morning star has faded away. The eastern star is slowly and peacefully awakening into dawn. Beneath the sky the national flag of Japan and our [sic.] American flag have been reborn and are unfurled together....you people with your opinionated ideas are forcing beautiful

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<sup>584</sup>Gillmore thesis, 74-78; 279-280; Berger, 89-90. For more detailed information on leaflet dissemination, see, CINCPAC/CINCPOA, *Psychological Warfare*, pt. 1, December 1944, 19-44, RG 94, AGO Operations Reports, 10th Army, entry 110-25, 110-SPHQ-1.14, box 3004, "110-39" folder.

<sup>585</sup>W. H. Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese in the Central Pacific," n.d., typescript, copy in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>586</sup>Harrington, 225.

<sup>587</sup>A.G., World War II Operations Reports, 1940-1948, Pacific Theater, 98-USF2-2-6; RG 407, entry 427, box 1622, "Psychological Warfare (Language Det., 25th ID)" folder. GHQ FECOM, *Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section*, entries for January through March 1945 contain material on *Nisei interpreters*.

Japan to fall back into a state of decadence.<sup>588</sup>

The results of such appeals are unclear, although it is known that one hardy loudspeaker aircraft was shot down twice on its missions.<sup>589</sup> Larger "Polly" patrol aircraft also were equipped with loudspeakers and dropped leaflets. Their crews found that heavy foliage and rough terrain did not seem to affect the broadcast clarity or range, but strong winds and battle noises did, and results were disappointing from 2,000 feet or higher.<sup>590</sup> Another airborne form of psywar, with equally ambiguous results was the broadcasting of combat noises, aircraft motors, whispers, ghost stories, lists of recently-deceased Japanese officers, as well as inspiring music and sounds for indigenous peoples. Such operations, probably by their very nature, displayed more imagination than results.<sup>591</sup> The Allied Pacific authorities relied very little on combat radio psywar, assuming that very few Japanese soldiers had access to a radio, and for those who did enjoy such privilege, short-wave strategic propaganda broadcasts from Australia and the United States would fill the need. Furthermore, Pacific radio psywarriors more often than not lacked accurate intelligence on their target audiences.<sup>592</sup>

However, the technical support for U.S. Army psywar in the Pacific was steadily improving and expanding. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the three major U.S. Armies in theater could employ three self-contained mobile field units,

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<sup>588</sup>25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Language Detachment, "Report on Psychological Warfare," 19 April 1945, RG 407, entry 427, box 1622, "Propaganda and Psywar" folder.

<sup>589</sup>Harrington, 225. Nonetheless, FELO reported that loudspeaker equipment gave indifferent results, due to the poor quality of component parts, incomplete tropical proofing, and excess weight and bulk. In many ways, combat loudspeaker operations would have to wait for the Korean War to prove effective, and even then primarily in static battlefield conditions. FELO, "Report of Activities of Far Eastern Liaison Office for Period June 1942 to September 1945," n.d., 14-15.

<sup>590</sup>Sparangara, 90-91; "Daugherty, "Checking Operational Efficiency of Loudspeaker Equipment," *Casebook*, 712.

<sup>591</sup>Sparangara, 92-93. Some SWPA psywar personnel also proposed to manipulate the Japanese supposed fear of foxes; they were to be coated with radioactive paint and turned loose on Japanese positions. Not surprisingly, higher headquarters turned down this harebrained scheme. *ibid.*, 137-138.

<sup>592</sup>Commander J. C. R. Proud, memo to MAJ J. W. Greene, Allied Land Forces HQ., Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO), 6 June 1944, subject: Japanese Loudspeaker Teams, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder. "A study of intelligence reports in Noumea and Brisbane reveals that officers and personnel in the Japanese navy and air force have heard and probably are hearing our west coast short wave broadcasts. LTC B. Stern, memo, to Director, OWI Overseas Branch, 4 June 1945, Subject: Status of Psychological Warfare in the Pacific, RG 208, entry 6g, box 11, "Stern" folder.



equipped for their own printing, photography and broadcasting.<sup>593</sup>

Allied forces in the Pacific did not make systematic use of POWs for their psywar until late 1944. General MacArthur's intelligence chief, MG Charles Willoughby, had obtusely argued that such use would violate the spirit, if not the letter of the "Rules of War," cause the enemy to retaliate on U.S. POWs, stiffen enemy resistance, and weaken their acceptance when these POWs returned to Japan. Willoughby insisted that Allied psywar should instead consist simply of a factual countering of Japanese propaganda. As a member of MacArthur's "Bataan Gang," who were convinced that they "understood the oriental mind," Willoughby claimed "Such propaganda directly affects one of the greatest weaknesses in Japanese character -the inability to tell and face the truth."<sup>594</sup>

Probably because of Willoughby's opposition, the first use of POWs on a large scale in the Pacific theater did not come in SWPA but in the CBI, part of the SEAC, and under the command not of MacArthur but of the aristocratic Briton, Lord Louis Mountbatten. Beginning in August of 1944, a six-man team of POWs in the Assam base, at the suggestion of *Nisei* personnel, proposed leaflets and critiqued scripts and artwork. From these POWs and from further interrogations the small Assam psywar team, composed primarily of OWI civilians, validated earlier *Nisei* claims that Japanese troops could surrender if they would not be asked to do anything that would indicate any disrespect for the Emperor, they were removed from the Allied lists of POWs, they were not to be exchanged or returned to Japan, and that they could settle in the USA or American-administered territory. Although the team could only give assurances on the first point, the POWs were eventually satisfied with the promise that the matter would be taken up in Washington and that they could work under assumed names. Soon all leaflets were being submitted to the POW team for pre-testing.

The POWs had originally been selected as a result of the Assam psywar team's realization that direct interviews did not always produce frank answers from the prisoners, particularly on such topics as *Bushido* and attitudes toward surrender. Again, the *Nisei* came to the rescue with the idea of *zadankai*, or group discussions among the POWs only. A "co-operative" POW took down the resulting frank discussion and handed over this transcript to the team. From these discussions the team was soon able to identify those POWs willing and able to work with Allied psywar.<sup>595</sup> Soon after, another such Assam team, composed of Japanese and Formosan POWs, garnered 40 Japanese and about 200 Formosan prisoners on a small island through leaflets stressing the hopelessness of Japan's cause and good treatment for POWs.<sup>596</sup>

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<sup>593</sup>Fellers, "Report on Psychological Warfare," 5.

<sup>594</sup>Willoughby to M. Stuer, 27 February 1943, OWI Historian Records of PWB , 1942-1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 2, "Australia" folder.

<sup>595</sup>OWI Psychological Warfare Team, "Use of Japanese Prisoners of War," [anon.], *Casebook*; Vatcher thesis, 25.

<sup>596</sup>SWPA File Weekly Report, File No. 1, "Propaganda," 20 September 1944, Lilly

One of the most sophisticated POW teams consisted of 27 Japanese prisoners held at Pearl City, Hawaii, and assisted by two Navy language officers. This team wrote, critiqued, and did the art work on leaflets to be dropped over by-passed enemy garrisons and Japan itself, as well as writing, editing and supervising *Marianas Jiho*, the CINCPAC-CINCPOA Japanese-language newspaper. It also monitored and critiqued Japanese-language broadcasts from the continental USA and Hawaii.<sup>597</sup> There can be no question but that the vast improvement in PWB Pacific Leaflets was in large measure due to the work of cooperating Japanese POWs. Valuable as the *Nisei* were, Japanese POWs had more up-to-date language skills and, of course, military experience that had familiarized them with soldiers' phrases and slang.<sup>598</sup> But the bravest of team soldiers surely had to be those, *Nisei* or Japanese, who went back to enemy lines to urge Japanese troops to cross the battlelines with them back to American positions.<sup>599</sup>

Thanks to Japanese POW input, the text on the "I Cease Resistance" and other leaflets often now fairly breathed respect for the enemy: "The battle you have put up has our sincere respect....[Your plight] is not your fault, it is clear, but the fault of the army and navy staffs." Later leaflets worked a similar theme: "We wish neither to insult nor make fun of you. Because at Bataan and Corregidor we faced the same miserable conditions you are now facing, we cannot but sympathize with you."<sup>600</sup> "Ever since our attack on the city of Manila you have fought bravely and you have fought well."<sup>601</sup> Even a leaflet depicting a dead Japanese soldier seemed designed as much to provoke pity as defection.

Why is this man lying dead in the jungle instead of living peacefully at home with his wife and children? He was told, when he left home, that the Allies were decadent and weak and would quail before the might of Nippon. Who told him this? It was the military leaders of Japan, with their insane ambitions, who so deceived him. Too late he learned the bitter truth....<sup>602</sup>

Another proclaimed "You fought gallantly", and outlined the "Road to a New Life," a

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Papers, RG 218; box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder. The name of the island was unrecorded.

<sup>597</sup>Colonel L D. W. Johnson, ltr. to General Fellers, 21 May, 8 July 1944, USASOC Archives. COL.Johnson termed the team members "probably twenty-seven of the best informed Japanese in the world." *ibid*.

<sup>598</sup>Spagangara, 171-173.

<sup>599</sup>Gilmore thesis, 284.

<sup>600</sup>Originals and translations in Translations in Library of Congress Print and Photographs Division (#8093) and Baird scrapbook, MHI.

<sup>601</sup>"Allied Air Intelligence Survey," No. 3, n.d. 1.

<sup>602</sup>Leaflet and translation in USASOC History Archives.

gleaming modern Japanese city arising from the remnants of rusted cannon and other paraphernalia of war, now happily discarded.<sup>603</sup> Yet another U.S. leaflet reassured potential defectors that "reception camps" for Japanese POWs

are open at all times to inspection by international commission in accordance with the provisions of the international treaty signed by all countries at the Hague in 1905. These commissions operate under the auspices of the International Red Cross Committee and are each composed of three members, two from a neutral country and one designated by the belligerent....<sup>604</sup>

A leaflet apparently distributed just after the securing of Saipan depicted a Japanese youth on the shoulders of a U.S. Marine, and may have been designed to smooth the way for a peaceful occupation of Japan itself, and, again, was unlike anything offered officially to the Germans:

When once the violent battle is concluded, a period of peace and relaxation ensues. The American forces which annihilated the Japanese troops on Saipan extend kind treatment and protection to the old and young of both sexes who were left behind. Japanese even become close friends of American troops. Both the boy and the marine [sic.] who is carrying him on his shoulders appear to be having great sport.<sup>605</sup>

Along similar lines, and showing a commendable knowledge of Japanese life, the "Boy's Day" leaflet depicted in impeccable Japanese iconography the kites in the form of carp that fathers fly with their sons on that national holiday (5 March), and designed to induce homesickness.<sup>606</sup> At roughly the same time, an ingenious campaign provided for the dropping of rubber boats accompanied by leaflets detailing their use and directing them toward a "rescue ship." The boaters were not to be intimidated by heavy swells: "keep courage and go on, humming the song 'UMI NO TAMI NARA OTOKO NARA.' You can be sure that the boat will not sink."<sup>607</sup>

But no two POWs seemingly reacted in the same manner to the same leaflet: the leaflet was excellent, it was poor, it effectuated surrenders, it was laughed at, it made the men think, it insulted them. But a consensus eventually did emerge around a

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<sup>603</sup>Library of Congress, Print and Photographs Division, #8093.

<sup>604</sup>Leaflet copy in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>605</sup>Leaflet (#SJ/46) and translation in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>606</sup>Psychological Warfare NCO Course #2, "Propaganda Methods and Techniques II, Army General School (Ft. Riley, KS: March 1952), 5. The leaflet is reproduced in Linebarger, 135. See also examples in Fellers Papers, box 4, "SWPA" folder.

<sup>607</sup>CINCPAC-CINCPOA, *Psychological Warfare*, 100-101.

number of themes that PWB then used profitably. As in Europe, news leaflets were the most popular for troops cut off from any objective recounting of events, although the Japanese preferred local news. It was due to POW input that PWB began its immensely popular *Rakkasan News* in March of 1945. Good treatment for POWs remained effective as did leaflets promising that captives would not be tortured. The use of sentimental Japanese music and themes of nostalgia seemed to have also impressed most POWs. The overwhelming majority of Japanese had never heard of the Geneva Convention and its strictures (some actually believed it permissible to kill prisoners of war), so PWB drew up a leaflet along these lines. The POWs also agreed that they needed more information on how, where, and when to "cease resistance," that is, the circumstances in which they stood a reasonably good chance of surviving the experience. They also confirmed the major "don'ts" of Pacific psywar, and they must have been familiar enough to PWB by now: don't lie, don't insult and avoid "foreign" phrases and grammar.<sup>608</sup> The first "don't" was violated on at least two known occasions: when PWB issued orders purporting to come from the Japanese high command to the effect that it was permissible for the soldiers of the emperor to surrender if they were surrounded, cut off larger units or were unconscious. Another message told natives that they could contract leprosy from the Japanese by working for them.<sup>609</sup> But these false messages seem to be aberrations; the simple fact that they were reported would further indicate their rarity.

The U.S. Pacific War leaflet campaign was not confined, of course, to the enemy. SWPA produced leaflets to appeal to the peoples overrun in Japan's Pacific conquests, emphasizing the "common enemy's" destruction of their societies, taking of their food and young men, and the profaning of their customs, and called for anti-Japanese sabotage, help for Allied airmen, evacuation of bombing targets, resistance to Japanese expropriations, and work for the Allies, whose victory was sure.<sup>610</sup> As early as the New Guinea campaign, FELO reported that as a result of its leaflets addressed to aboriginal New Guineans

Whole native villages have taken to the bush to avoid helping the Japs and to deny them food. These leaflets merely tell the natives what to do, stating that it is an order from the government.

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<sup>608</sup>Gilmore thesis, 235, 285-292; R. Kleinman, memo to COL F. S. Marquat, sub: "Leaflet Effectiveness," 3 January 1945, RG 208, entry 6g, box 12, "Washington Weekly Intelligence" folder; PWB Intelligence Report, "Criticisms of Japanese Language Leaflets by POWs, Criticisms of Specific Leaflets by POWs," 21 July 1945, OWI Historians Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 3, "OWI-PWB Intelligence Reports (Far East" folder; *ibid.*, box 5, "Leaflet News letter, Area III" folder. Harrington, 225.

<sup>609</sup>Sparangara, 144.

<sup>610</sup>*Ibid.*, 150-161; SEATIC Publication No. 137, Psychological Warfare Bulletin, 4 May 1945, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "Topical File" folder.

The natives, with their "simple but logical minds." were also to be convinced of Allied superiority to Japan by their chiefs being taken on tours of military depots, etc.<sup>611</sup> In fact, Allied New Guinea psywar proved so effective in convincing the natives that the Allies were winning the war that a special Japanese Army patrol was dispatched to persuade them otherwise.<sup>612</sup> American psywarriors also used "currency" leaflets, disguised as occupation money, but carrying pro-Allied/anti-Japanese messages of varying subtlety. One such message, overprinted on the back of a Philippines occupation note asked the bearer, "The [Japanese] Co-Prosperity Sphere, What is it Worth?"<sup>613</sup> On the other hand, those natives who cooperated with the Japanese were also targeted, as in this leaflet for New Guinea, drawn up by PWB at the behest of the British:

A serious warning from the big white chief  
to all natives of Puka Passage, Buin, and Kieta:  
This is straight talk. You must listen  
The village of Sorum has been disloyal, has  
taken orders from the Japs, and has helped the Japs.  
We have now bombed them.  
We have also bombed Pidia Pok Pok, Toberoi, and  
Sadi when they helped the Japs.  
If any villagers help the Japs, we will bomb  
them and destroy them altogether.  
We have many planes, many bombs, and many soldiers.  
We will not hesitate to carry out the work.  
Before long we will come with all the American  
Soldiers to dislodge the Japs and kill them all and punish  
all natives who helped them  
That is All  
You have been Warned.<sup>614</sup>

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<sup>611</sup>G-2 File, SWPA, "FELO Activities in New Guinea," n.d., Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder.

<sup>612</sup>SWPA Weekly Report, No. 11, 15 August 1944, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder.

<sup>613</sup>SWPA G-2 File No. 611, memo from CPT P. T. Anderson, to LTC J. W. Greene, GHQ G-5 (PWB), n.d., Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 22 has "Co-Prosperity leaflet and other examples, and the Vatcher Papers has copies of a Japanese "10 Yen" leaflet, with a comparison on the reverse the damage inflicted by "Co-Prosperity" on such currency in terms of purchasing power., box 16, "World War II" folder.

<sup>614</sup>W. F. Halsey, *Admiral Halsey's Story* (New York: 1947), 53.

U.S. psywar leaflets in Burma and occupied China instructed natives to stay away from military installations, designated railway structures docks, etc. Even Burmese bullock cart drivers were warned that their vehicles were legitimate targets if carrying Japanese Army material. One long-range fighter dropped leaflets over North China warning of Allied air strikes against area railways. Judging from the Japanese reaction these leaflets did succeed in keeping Chinese railway workers off their vital jobs.<sup>615</sup> And in Hollandia a native chief, inspired by American psywar leaflets, brought in 22 captured Japanese soldiers.

An extremely imaginative and effective message was the "Door God" poster drawn up by the OWI China Division and dropped over occupied China. Because of the war, many peasant families could no longer obtain their traditional New Year's good-luck Door God picture. The Americans thoughtfully supplied the need, with their own poster of such a deity, but the "god" was now an American aviator stamping on the base form of a supine Japanese. The Chinese were thus made familiar with (and perhaps put in awe of) American pilots who might have to descend from the skies over their land.<sup>616</sup> A similar leaflet carried a drawing of a downed U.S. flier, with his crashed aircraft in the background. On the reverse was an outline of the USAAF P-51 fighter. The caption stated that:

The Chinese and Americans have a common enemy - Japan....As the scope of the U.S.-Chinese air-offensive increases, more of the planes pictured below will appear. They are your planes as well as ours. Learn to recognize them that you may help the airmen who may make forced landings.... get him back to his own lines. Who helps a friend is helped by a friend.<sup>617</sup>

SWPA also managed to send leaflets through the Japanese lines to Filipino-American guerrillas, who then passed them on to American civilian internees, greatly

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<sup>615</sup>Daugherty, "Bomb Warnings to Friendly and Enemy Civilian Targets," *Casebook*, 361. Examples of these "friendly" warning leaflets in China may be found in "History of Psychological Warfare in the China Theater," [anon.], n.d. typescript, USASOC Archives, along with several Burmese leaflets.

<sup>616</sup>Copy in Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 189.

<sup>617</sup>Copy in USASOC History Archives. For an informative, but brief, account of OSS-Army "black" operations in China, see Howard Furumoto, "Black Propaganda" n.p., n.d. Furumoto gives the example of a patent medicine popular throughout Asia being enlisted in the service of U.S. psywar by this poster: "Do you know that 20% of our armed forces are suffering from dysentery, that another 10% are carriers of the dreadful disease leprosy, that 25% more are afflicted with beriberi....? Buy Jintan today and cure your ailments.", 6. Furumoto's team of POWs also smuggled depressing calligraphy letters from putative Japanese soldiers in China through the Japanese Army postal system and on to the Home Islands., 7-8.

increasing the morale of both groups. One such leaflet, "Government by Law," served to deter the execution of Filipino collaborators.<sup>618</sup>

Formosan troops seemed particularly receptive to such appeals. At Cape Sansapor, a Formosan medical officer surrendered with a leaflet and subsequently brought in 92 of his fellows. At Noemfoor, no less than 200 Formosans surrendered, along with 20 Japanese soldiers, after reading civilian leaflets, one of which was written by a Japanese POW Warrant Officer. And two Formosans in the Infanta area of the Philippines, allowed to return to their units, brought in 292 fellow Formosans, 30 Japanese, and 5 Chinese to U.S. lines.<sup>619</sup> Allied psywarriors also appealed with great success to another, emphatically, non-Japanese ethnic group, the Koreans serving as laborers for the Japanese military.<sup>620</sup> And with an eye to the anti-colonialism preached by the Japanese, the April 1945 SWPA *Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan* ordered "Psychological Warfare agencies to inform oriental peoples of the idealistic and unselfish purpose of our war aims."<sup>621</sup> In all, despite harsh reprisals and threats from the Japanese, Allied psywar directed to non-Japanese peoples of the Pacific enjoyed a high measure of success, and in the words of one authority, was considerably "more promising" than that waged against the Japanese.<sup>622</sup>

One of the more unlikely activities of SWPA/OWI personnel in the Pacific was the *Nisei* mission into the Chinese Communist home base at Yanan. The psywarriors were to see for themselves the techniques used by these "agrarian reformers" to transform captured Japanese soldiers, indoctrinated into the beliefs of *Bushido*, into dedicated, proselytizing communists. While never validating, of course, the full range of what came later to be known in the Korean War as the "brainwashing" of POWs, the mission did recommend the adoption of many of the communists' interrogation techniques and forwarded to higher headquarters the critiques of many of the leaflets they had brought with them on their odyssey.<sup>623</sup>

<sup>618</sup>"Leaflet News letter", vol. 1, No. 2, 6 April 1944, Area III, Far East, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder.

<sup>619</sup>SWPA Weekly Report, No. 11, 15 August 1944, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder. *ibid.*, "Topical" folder.

<sup>620</sup>Berger, 72. CINCPA-CINCPOA "Psychological Warfare" noted that "With the last group of civilians, the Koreans, it was merely a matter of information to win them over.", 4.

<sup>621</sup>HQ USAFP, *Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan*, Appendix

<sup>622</sup>Sparangara, 183-187, 196.

<sup>623</sup>Harrington, 298-299; Sparangara, 2. The mission did seem to miss the most obvious reason for the communists' success with their POWs, that is the prisoners' realization that they would not be returning home for the foreseeable future. They had little choice but to adopt a new life on their captors' terms. See also the highly-laudatory CINCPAC-CINCPOA, "Psychological Warfare," which claimed that membership by Japanese POWs in the "Japanese Peoples Emancipation League" was

A memo from the OWI Far East chief, Owen Lattimore (in the post-war years to gain notoriety as one of those in high government places who supposedly "lost China" to the communists) also influenced SWPA PWB toward methods used by the Chinese communists. Lattimore suggested using communist methods by releasing POWs, with their arms, to return and spread the good word amongst their comrades. He further made the perceptive point that releasing the "recalcitrant" rather than the "cooperative" POW would increase American credibility all the more. Later campaigns would indeed make more use of POWs, but none armed and none "recalcitrant."<sup>624</sup>

The re-taking of Guam, in July-August 1944, saw a repetition of something like the "Flag of Humanity" ploy used earlier on Saipan. Here a U.S. Navy landing ship was positioned off the coast, guns pointed skyward, all flags and pennants flying, and designated the "Peace Ship." Two Japanese POWs were then sent ashore in a dinghy to talk their fellows into giving up. The "Peace Ship" brought in a total of 16 POWs, perhaps a somewhat disappointing return for so grandiose a gesture. The extensive use of POWs proved more successful, according to several accounts. A *Life* magazine story told of a Japanese soldier, who, exasperated by the "strange" voices and accents of *Nisei* loudspeaker troops, volunteered to do the job himself. The new-found ally boomed out from a Marine Corps sound truck to his comrades that their families were praying daily for their safe return; they should honor such prayers by giving up the unequal struggle and returning to their families to help rebuild a new Japan. Soon other POWs were roaming the island in loudspeaker jeeps, broadcasting their own material, praising the devotion to duty and heroism of the Japanese garrison, but emphasizing that "ceasing resistance" offered the only way out of a futile struggle. The "legendary" MAJ Sato, was given sufficient time to surrender so that he could report to his superiors that he had held out against the Americans for a full year.<sup>625</sup>

One source has documented the emphasis of Allied psywar upon the Japanese Army's chronic supply shortages, which lowered enemy morale, and asserted that "The primary objective of the psychological warfare campaign waged against the Imperial Japanese Army was to induce demoralization among Japanese

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"entirely voluntary" and never mentions the term "communism," although it did concede that the courses in the "comfortable, friendly atmosphere" surrounding the "Peasants and Workers School" did have "an unquestionable [in more ways than one!] leftist slant.", 12.

<sup>624</sup>Lattimore to George Taylor, n.d., Bonner Fellers Papers, box 3, "Correspondence" folder. Lattimore also suggested segregating "recalcitrant" from "cooperative" POWs, a technique later used in the Korean war against American prisoners of the communists, and a violation of the Geneva Conventions.

<sup>625</sup>A. M. Josephy, "Some Japs Surrender," *Infantry Journal*, (August 1945); S. Mydans, "Guam Holdouts Give Up, Jap Prisoners, Help US Capture Other Japs," *Life* (16 July 1945); extracts from *Marine Corps Information Bulletin*, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "Topical" folder. Vatcher thesis, 69-70, 75-77.



combatants....", and that this line was the only theme used in all areas of U.S. psywar. Examples in addition to *Grenade Medicine*, included "Modern wars are won not by spirit, but by overwhelming industrial production.", or "war cannot be won by courage alone." A FEMAD report of August 1944 claimed that psywar against the Japanese was "particularly likely to be effective when the enemy is suffering severely from exposure, disease, lack of food, ammunition, and other supplies and when he feels that his situation is desperate."<sup>626</sup> By this time PWB leaflet writers were so confident of their Japanese language skills that they could even essay a punning cartoon message: CPT Pumpkin Head and PVT Big Ears of the Japanese Army see Hitler at the threshold of the "Hall of Defeat". The Captain asks whether Hitler is entering or leaving. The clever Private replies, "Yes, hairu Hitora", which can mean either that Hitler is entering the Hall of Defeat or "Heil Hitler." It should be noted that CPT Pumpkin Head and PVT Big Ears are not degrading caricatures, but rather amusing child-like stock cartoon figures. By this period of the war, the only doubtful leaflets were two that showed mutilated civilian victims of U.S. air raids and of an entire family being slaughtered in similar circumstances. Such leaflets probably aroused more resentment than the fear presumably intended.<sup>627</sup>

By the time of the Philippine campaign, Allied psywar was definitely attracting the attention of the Japanese military. A captured document on Mindanao ordered that "All Allied propaganda leaflets must immediately be taken from the men as the news that they broadcast caused definite unrest." An intercepted radiogram from Northern Luzon admitted that leaflets were adversely affecting the morale of the troops, who would surrender if not for their officers. A captured field order from the Baleta Sector Unit gave detailed instructions for the handling of U.S. leaflets: they were to be immediately burned. But the men should "bear thoroughly in mind that the enemy is scattering leaflets due to his difficulties in battle."<sup>628</sup> Another order, seized near Rizal, warned that

The enemy is planning constantly to crumble our army by means of skillful propaganda which is ordinarily difficult to detect. Therefore he [the Japanese soldier] must depend wholeheartedly on his officers and endeavor to fulfill his obligations.<sup>629</sup>

Yet another captured Japanese Army directive instructed commanders to order their troops not to believe the U.S. leaflets.<sup>630</sup> Somewhat more realistically, the troop

<sup>626</sup>Gilmore, "War of Supply," *passim*; quote from 21.

<sup>627</sup>Examples in Vatcher Papers, box 16, "World War II" folder.

<sup>628</sup>"Report on Psychological Warfare," 19 April 1945, HQ, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Language Detachment, RG 407, AGO, World War II Operations Reports, 1940-1948, Pacific Theater, "Report-Psywar (Language Report, 25<sup>th</sup> ID" folder.

<sup>629</sup>CINCPAC-CINCPOA, "Psychological Warfare," 11.

<sup>630</sup>Fellers, "Report on Psychological Warfare," 9-10. Earlier, in June of 1944 on

newspaper of the 33d Army in Burma wrote specifically of American psywar

Using her abundant material resources and superior planes, she has been disseminating all kinds of leaflets and newspapers and she is striving to achieve effective results. The purposes of this activity must not be lightly regarded.<sup>631</sup>

The official news agency, *Domei*, paid high tribute to "extremely well-planned," extremely realistic Allied psywar," conceding that it was presented in a "very fresh and interesting manner."<sup>632</sup> The prominent Tokyo newspaper, *Asahi*, conceded that U.S. psywar in the Philippines was "extremely realistic and there is an aura of truth and credibility surrounding it.", bold words indeed, written under the noses of Japan's infamous "Thought Police."<sup>633</sup>

As for counter-measures, the Imperial Headquarters Army Department, Kumamoto Division Staff Report outlined the future course of Japanese Army propaganda against Allied psywar: The war was vital to the empire "to the last man.", America's war aims were "neither clear nor just.", America's superior strength in the air, in material, and in "technique" was to be frankly recognized. But the report trotted out the outworn cliches to that "fear of death" and lack of disgrace in surrendering would in the end prove the undoing of this "nation of public opinion."<sup>634</sup> More succinctly, but somewhat unrealistically, another commander concluded that

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Morotai, the Japanese 32d Division commander spoke of the "meticulous care of the propaganda planning of the enemy and of his great persistence...." and exhorted his troops not to believe any of it. Berger, 123.

<sup>631</sup>"Leaflet News letter," OWI Far East, 1, No. 1 (4 May 1945), RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder.

<sup>632</sup>Gilmore thesis, 329-338.

<sup>633</sup>Quoted in CINCPAC-CINCPOA, "Psychological Warfare," 11.

<sup>634</sup>*Psychological Warfare Developments*, 19-22. In the field, a Japanese officer on the Ceram Islands, deprecated SWPA PWB leaflets, claiming that Australia had been virtually occupied by the Japanese, that Japan would send 7,000 aircraft, or ten times that number, if necessary, to combat U.S. air raids. At any rate, presumably lifting Napoleon's gibe about the British, termed the Americans were just "shopkeepers." The American report containing this self-defeating nonsense concluded that "According to informant this speech did not have much effect." "Reaction to Propaganda, No. 16, 15 January 1945, RG 208, entry 6h, box 5, "Various Divisions...of OWI" folder. It is significant that Japanese counter-propaganda now emphasized the superior "spiritual" qualities of the Japanese fighting man; during their earlier offensives had extolled the superior qualities of their weapons, although never, of course, neglecting to note their moral preeminence over the "decadent" Western imperialists.

"We must resist the enemy's paper bombs with our spiritual bombs."<sup>635</sup> In some Japanese units possession of Allied leaflets was now punishable by death. At Leyte a retreat was actually ordered to escape U.S. loudspeakers, while at Rabaul, at roughly the same time, the enemy command contended that the leaflets were "contaminated with dangerous bacteria."

Japanese Army leaflets directed to Americans continued to caricature their enemies as weak-kneed cowards. Japanese military propagandists must have believed that the Americans were also not very bright, at least judging from the leaflet that was entirely in Japanese except for the inscription at the bottom: "Please bring this leaflet to the nearest Japanese unit or soldier." So far as any possible American defector knew, this leaflet might have authorized the enemy to torture him to death.<sup>636</sup> On the other hand, Japanese propaganda could sometimes be couched in good, slangy English. But even the best language could not compensate for the invariable Japanese practice of caricaturing American soldiers, and putting them in the long-superseded "soup bowl" helmets of the early war months. Not surprisingly, the Japanese ignored the "happy POW" theme, perhaps realizing that such propaganda would prove unbelievable; the one surviving copy rather spoils any effect it its opening line, "Hello Chaps!" Further, most of the print in these leaflets was of a definite oriental cast.<sup>637</sup>

A Japanese leaflet air dropped over Pelelieu (the aircraft was shot down) was as typical as any, and should be quoted completely to obtain the full flavor of such messages:

#### TO RECKLESS YANKEE DOODLE

Do you know about the naval battle don by the American 58th fleet at the sea near Taiwan (Formosa) and Philippine. Japanese powerful Airforce Force had sunk their 19 AEROPLANE CARRIERS, 4 BATTLESHIPS, 10 SEVERAL CRUISERS and DESTROYERS, along with sending 1,261 SHIP AEROPLANES into the sea. From this result, we think that you can imagine what shall happen next around Palau upon you.

The fraud Rousevelt, hanging the President Election under his nose and from his policy ambition worked not only poor NIMITT but also MACCASIR like a robot, like this, WHAT IS PITY!! must you

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<sup>635</sup>SWPA PWB, Collation Section, "Psychological Warfare Reactions and Developments," 1 June 1945.

<sup>636</sup>USASOC History Archives, "Japanese Propaganda" box.

<sup>637</sup>M. Chaukas, *Propaganda Comes of Age* (Washington: 1965), 1651; Herz Papers, box 1, folder 24; other examples are found in Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, #8093. See also Vatcher Papers, box 16, "World War II" folder. Some Japanese leaflets completed their clueless obsolescence by referring to American "doughboys", *ibid*.

sacrifice you pay.

Thanks for your advice notes of surrender. Be we haven't any reason to surrender, to those who are fated to be totally destroyed in a few days later.

ADD TO YOU, AGAINST THE MANNER OF YOUR ATTACK PAYING NO HEED TO HUMANITY, YOUR GOD SHALL MAKE JAPANESE FORCE TO ADD RETALIATIVE ATTACK UPON YOU. SAYING AGAIN, AGAINST THE ATTACK PAYING NO HEED TO HUMANITY CONTRARY TO MUTUAL MILITARY SPIRITS, YOU SHALL GET AN VERY STERN ATTACK WE MEAN AN CRUEL ATTACK!!

JAPAN MILITARY<sup>638</sup>

The Japanese news sheet, oddly termed *The Newsette*, was directed toward Filipinos, and was considerably better, presenting straightforward news items, many reprinted from Portuguese news sources not particularly favorable to the Allies: "1 Enemy Cruiser, 5 Transports Sunk or Damaged off Mindoro," "British Air Vice-Marshall Reported Lost," "U.S. War Production Board Bans Civilian Production".<sup>639</sup> Another fairly subtle leaflet, purportedly from "U.S. Army" was undoubtedly designed to drive a wedge of mistrust between the Americans and Filipinos, warning the former, in fractured English, to "Guard Against Venereal Diseases":

Due to hard times and stricken conditions brought about by the Japanese occupation of the islands, Filipino women are willing to offer themselves for a small amount of foodstuffs. It is advisable in such cases to take full protective measures by use of condoms, protective medicines, etc.; better still to hold intercourse only with wives, virgins or women of respective character.[!]<sup>640</sup>

"Anything With Skirts On" was considerably less subtle: "Yankee love of women is a widespread knowledge...whether she be a virgin or a wife makes no difference to them."<sup>641</sup>

Probably more than any other military power the Japanese used sexually-oriented leaflets and broadcasts against their enemies. One of the more printable Japanese Philippine campaign sex leaflets almost seemed to promise sex in a POW camp:

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<sup>638</sup>Quoted in Blankenhorn, "Combat Propaganda", 18.

<sup>639</sup>Selected issues in Library of Congress Prints and Photo Division, #8093; and Fellers Papers, box 3, "Enemy Leaflets" folder.

<sup>640</sup>Leaflet copy in *ibid.*, #8093.

<sup>641</sup>*Ibid.*

That unforgettable embrace under the beautiful  
moon with the warmth of HER shapely body  
néstled against yours, that blood-tingling kiss; that  
overpowering sense of passion that sweeps over you-  
These and many other pleasant memories you'll be able  
to realize again if you'll throw down your arms, surrender  
and get out of this hell hole.  
If you continue to resist....  
Then, under the beautiful tropical moon,  
only DEATH  
Awaits you  
Bullet hole in your guts...organizing death!

One American reader facetiously remarked that "This searing copy may have been lifted from a 1921 Hollywood correspondence course on scenario writing...."<sup>642</sup> An American report concluded that

The Japs are neither as prolific nor as subtle as the Germans, but they make up in crudeness and obscenity what they lack in quality and finesse....Some of these nifty items make old-fashioned tourist postcards look like Bible illustrations by comparison. As such they have inspired a brisk Pacific GI trade in leaflets as souvenirs.


In fact, the "tariff" among GIs for a racier Japanese version could go as high as \$10 or one bottle of whiskey for a single leaflet.<sup>643</sup> American troops invariably studied Japanese sex leaflets closely, then concluded that their enemies had dirty minds.<sup>644</sup>

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<sup>642</sup>"Leaflet News letter: Area III, Far East," 2 (6 April 1945), OWI Historian, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letters: Area III" folder. Original and numerous other examples of Japanese leaflets in Vatcher Papers, box 16, "World War II" folder.

<sup>643</sup>Ibid.; "Nicklerolling," *New Yorker* (28 April 1945). The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division reported that Japanese leaflets gave "special attention to the pornographic, giving the Jap leaflets a high souvenir value." "Psychological Warfare with the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division," mimeo, n.d., n.p.

<sup>644</sup>J. W. Eaton, "Psychological Warfare," *Handbook of Applied Psychology* (New York: 1950), 32. This work claimed that such leaflets also made American troops "fighting mad." Of course. Mild examples of Japanese "oestrous" leaflets can be found in Fellers Papers, such as one showing a scantily-clad reclining young woman, with the subscription "Please do not open." Those who resisted the injunction found, perhaps to their disgust, simply an anti-war message. A Christmas card showed a row of traditionally decorated homes - with a crippled soldier outside in the snow. Both examples came complete with the standard "soup bowl" U.S. Army helmets and



"But no, it was not John embraced by Death---it was YOU - and it was not Joan looking in the mirror but YOUR wife." One of the few of the printable Japanese leaflets on this theme.

# MIRROR — WISE

## A Precarious Story

Joan was in her room and just about to change because she intended to go to the Cinema with Bob. She had done that quite often since John, her husband had left for the front. — Why shouldn't she? Bob is a good friend of John's and he certainly wouldn't object. Everybody understands that Joan cannot always sit at home alone for years, without any companionship. —

Yesterday Bob came a little earlier than usual and entered Joan's room just as she was adding the last touch of rouge. She didn't mind his staying for they were really good friends — and so accustomed to each other.

As she rolled on her stockings, Bob told her all that he had done during business hours that day; and then she noticed that the elbow of his jacket had a little grease spot; so she took it and cleaned it. — What could anybody think wrong about that — among friends.

And then — — — Neither knew how it happened, she felt his strong body leaning gently against her — and then — they kissed — for a long — long while.

Joan was in a dream — — — she was feeling that marvellous something that she had missed for so long — it was so wonderful.

Then she opened her eyes — and there was that horror before her. Was it a dream — or was it reality?

She looked in the mirror and saw . . . . . John! John in the arms of another! In the arms of Death!

But no, it was not John embraced by Death — — — it was YOU — and it was not Joan looking in the mirror but YOUR wife.

Joan is still alone.


And so are all the millions of other wives and girls.

But war goes on.



It could be argued that this effort was directed against British Empire/Commonwealth troops. ("bloody war"). But note U.S. flag among the corpses.





Japanese psywar. Basically, "how not to do it." Note World War I-style uniform, oriental iconography and caricaturing of U.S. soldier. The whole thing is alien and repulsive.

# JILTED, RE-JILTED



Cute and clever, but note again "wrong war" garb.

That blankety-blank President  
and his two-cent promises---

As in the ETO, radio broadcasting was the only enemy propaganda that American military authorities took at all seriously. The Portuguese-American-Japanese "Tokyo Rose," in particular had a wide audience, most likely due as much to her playing of the latest popular music as to her seductive voice, and certainly not as a result of her "message." To forestall this "heavy troop listening to Tokyo Rose," American military radio broadcast Charlie McCarthy or Jack Benny programs at the same time as their propaganda rival's broadcasts and claimed success in thus forestalling the "turncoat" broadcaster.<sup>645</sup> As for Japanese loudspeaker operations, the only recorded example was primly dismissed by one authority as making only "vulgar and preposterous accusations."<sup>646</sup>

Army reports increasingly spoke of numerous psywar-influenced surrenders of enemy soldiers. The XXIV Corps claimed that the majority of the 278 POWs taken as of January 1945 had either surrendered with leaflets in hand or claimed to have been directly influenced by American psywar; a later report made the same claim for 18 of 39 POWs recently taken.<sup>647</sup> A loudspeaker team on an assault boat off Kwajalein and Eniwetok atolls recorded, somewhat confusingly, that as a result of its messages ("Terminate your warfare honorably by walking to our lines unarmed and with friendship.") "Many Japs laid down arms and came up naked." A majority of these POWs said that they had been influenced by previous leaflets and radio broadcasts.<sup>648</sup>

But the Kwajalein battle could also demonstrate that the Japanese spirit of fighting to the death was still about as strong as ever.

Captain Jones reconnoitered the ruin and thought he heard children whimpering and crying inside. One whole platoon gathered around.

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reference to "doughboys.", Fellers Papers, box 3, "Enemy Leaflets" folder. The Army Ground School "Psychological Warfare NCO Course," "Leaflet Types" section, noted demurely that "It should be noted that U.S. policy prohibits the use of pornography in white operations.", 3.

<sup>645</sup>Remarks of Commander Dyle, Information and Education Theater Officer (and former VP of NBC) "Psychological Warfare Conference," Manila 7-8 May 1945, USASOC Archives. Japanese propaganda methods, such as they were, are analyzed in "Japanese Propaganda Methods," by "A Captured Japanese Propagandist," in "Leaflet News letter," OWI, Far East, 1, No. 7, (15 June 1945), OWI Historians Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5, "Leaflet News letter, Area III folder. Although German "malingering" leaflets were taken seriously on the Italian front, for some reason similar Japanese efforts were apparently ignored, although in at least one case the theme was well-enough executed ("It is Dangerous to Read the Following"). Example in Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 125.

<sup>646</sup>Vatcher thesis, 119; Russell Howe, *The Hunt for Tokyo Rose* (1990).

<sup>647</sup>"Leaflet News letter," 1, No. 3, Area III, Far East, 20 April 1945, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder.

<sup>648</sup>Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 2, "SWPA Untitled" folder

For ten minutes the men took turns repeating the phrases on their language cards, trying to get a surrender. There was no answer. Then came a voice in clear English: "Go away, you God damned white sons of bitches." Jones shrugged his shoulders in a helpless motion, walked to the door and threw in a satchel charge. That silenced it.<sup>649</sup>

Of the 3,056 enemy captured following landings at Hollandia and Aitape, 614 were recorded as having surrendered due to leaflet persuasion. Although OWI Foreign Morale Analysis Division said only 16 percent were so influenced, POWs themselves claimed that it was closer to 50-60 percent. These figures, if at all accurate, are the more impressive in that the Japanese authorities continued their propaganda to the effect that the Americans tortured and killed their prisoners.<sup>650</sup>

In the giant campaign to recapture the Philippines, U.S. psywar played a major role directed to both civilian and military targets on a scale unprecedented in the Pacific War. In preparation for the first Philippines landings, on the island of Leyte, a small number of psywar personnel were assigned to temporary duty with the 6th Army. Their initial duties were to write warning leaflets to the Filipino population and proclamations by General MacArthur and exiled Philippine President Osmena reestablishing the latter's civil authority and outlawing the Japanese puppet government, as well as demanding proper treatment of U.S. and Filipinos captured in the Japanese conquest of the islands. Surprisingly at this late stage of the psywars, this team had to intercept scores of tactical leaflets, printed in Australia in advance of the invasion, which ridiculed the Japanese military and caricatured enemy soldiers.<sup>651</sup>

Prior to the Negros landings, B-25s made a special drop at tree-top level drop of 80,000 leaflets warning Filipinos of the forthcoming bombardment. There could be no question about the reception of this message. ("Received with tears in our eyes.")<sup>652</sup>

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<sup>649</sup>W. H. Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda against the Japanese in the Central Pacific," typescript, 16. Copy in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>650</sup>Gilmore thesis, 319-320. FELO also claimed, in September 1944, that an average of 21 percent of enemy troops captured in Dutch New Guinea had surrendered as a result of its psywar, and about 38 percent at Noemfoor and Sansapor., *ibid.* See also "Comment on the Influence of Propaganda," OWI FMAD Semi-Monthly Report, No. 14, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "Topical File" folder. This "comment" is notable for drawing attention to "padding" of figures and sloppy statistics in many official psywar reports.

<sup>651</sup>Berger, 111-115. None of these condemned leaflets have apparently survived. The psywar campaign throughout the Philippines was based on the "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare," approved 26 July 1944. Fellers, "Report on Psychological Warfare Against Japan, Southwest Pacific, 1944-1945," n.d., GHQ, SWPA. (copy in Center of Military History).

<sup>652</sup>SWPAPWB "Report on Psychological Warfare, Dulag to Palo, n.d., 5. Japanese propaganda directed toward civilians proved "dull and uninteresting." *ibid.* For

On Negros the entire population seemed to run out from their villages to snatch them up. As a SWPA PWB report noted, "It has usually not been necessary to persuade, but merely to announce....The people ran after the leaflets, grabbing them for each other in their excitement."<sup>653</sup> Another PWB report said that "from San Jose to Tacloban, the roads were lined with Filipino citizens, many of them with our combination Filipino-American flag leaflets in their hands, many more with them tacked up in front of their houses." Even such leaflets as "Don't Block the Roads" were scooped up and avidly read. Just as Japanese and German troops were starved for news from the real world, so the Filipinos were almost frantic to find out what had really been happening in the world during their three years of brutal Japanese occupation.<sup>654</sup> Throughout the Pacific, the Japanese were "an easy act to follow," even among those people, like the Burmese, who had initially welcomed them. Almost all the good will they had garnered as "liberators from colonialism" had been dissipated by their own far more brutal exploitation of native peoples, a process remarkably similar to that of the Nazi treatment of initially welcoming Soviet border peoples.<sup>655</sup>

On Leyte island the XXIV Corps disseminated by liaison aircraft and patrol more than 50,000 leaflets, mainly of the surrender type. By January 1945 278 enemy POWs had been captured. In addition, many Japanese dead were noted with leaflets on their persons. And as the CINCPAC-CINCPOA report on psywar noted dryly, "the enemy penalty for retaining a surrender leaflet is too severe to allow for any possibility that such leaflets were kept for souvenirs."<sup>656</sup>

The most widespread and popular civilian PWB Philippine news sheet was *Free Philippines*. This daily journal had actually pre-dated the American landings, being delivered to waiting guerrillas by submarine. It began publication in the Philippines during the battle for Manila, when it was run off on small guerrilla presses between the

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examples, see Fellers papers, box 3, "Correspondence" folder.

<sup>653</sup>SWPA Weekly Report, No. 13, 31 March 1945, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder.

<sup>654</sup>Extract from report of Psychological Warfare Branch Hq., 5<sup>th</sup> Air Force, n.d., Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder; Vatcher Papers, box 16, "World War II" folder.

<sup>655</sup>Just one example of the contempt the Japanese ignited among their conquered peoples is found in the hilarious defacing of a banknote printed in Japanese-occupied Shanghai. A Chinese printer had altered the image of the "ancient scholar" depicted on the note to where he was now making a universally-recognized gesture of sexual contempt. By the time the Japanese overlords noticed the contemptuous laughter their new currency generated among the long-suffering Chinese, the printer had long gone. The leaflet is reproduced in Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 141.

<sup>656</sup>United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC-CINCPOA), *Psychological Warfare, Developments and Responses*, CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 109-45 (5 May 1945), 10.

lines as the city burned. *Free Philippines* was published in both English and Tagalog, but English was strongly preferred as being the more "official." Citizens would wait patiently in line for up to an hour for a copy.<sup>657</sup> Another SWPA report recalled that "In all the area through which we passed the people were famished for news. Wherever we stopped to deliver a few copies of *Free Philippines* people literally stormed the weapon[s] carrier." for their copies.<sup>658</sup> Another group of civilians, American internees from the Japanese conquest of the Philippines, were no less grateful for leaflets directed to them. "It was like having a good meal, and after living on rice and salt for three months, I can think of no higher praise."<sup>659</sup> And it was at those internees' prison, Santo Thomas University, that psywar *Nisei* negotiated surrender terms with the Japanese garrison: they could march out with the honors of war if they released their prisoners.<sup>660</sup>

In Manila, over infantry protests, loudspeaker crews gave 100 Japanese barricaded in the Finance Ministry building one-half hour to give up, and ticked the minutes off: "Only one minute left - do you want this to be the rest of your life?" With seconds to spare, one Japanese soldier tumbled out of his hole, hands in the air, followed by 29 of his comrades. Ten more committed suicide, and it took a hard fight to eliminate the remaining 60. Still, a one-third success rate (if one does not count the suicides) was impressive enough even to the hard-bitten infantry.<sup>661</sup> After the liberation of Manila, PWB continued its work with Filipino civilians, publishing, in addition to *Manila Free Philippines*, *Photo Review* as well as establishing the first post-liberation cinema in the city.<sup>662</sup>

The very popular and effective *Rakkasan News* was also published in Manila, but, of course, for the enemy. COL Marquat claimed that "all prisoners interrogated say it is a very professional Tokyo-type newspaper.", high praise indeed. Even those overwhelming majority of Japanese troops who did not defect were "starved for

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<sup>657</sup>Frederick S. Marquat, "Statement on Southwest Pacific Operations," n.d., Conference on Area III (Psychological Warfare), Monterey, California, 24-27 May 1945, OWI Historians Records, Subject File, RG 208, entry 6e "Conference on Area III" folder. SWPA Weekly Report, file 1, 4, "Propaganda," n.d., Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder. *Free Philippines* issue of 5 November 1944 in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>658</sup>SWPA PWB Weekly Report, 24 February 1945, Lilly Papers, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder.

<sup>659</sup>"Reactions to Propaganda from Santo Thomas University Internees," SWPA PWB Weekly Report I, Appendix II, n.d., Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder.

<sup>660</sup>Harrington, 263.

<sup>661</sup>"Training Films Suggestions," 29 May 1945, SWPA G-2 (350<sup>th</sup> Training, Allied Political Warfare Committee), *ibid.*

<sup>662</sup>Marquat, "Statement." PWB even issued a detailed comic book leaflet dealing with how to kill rats. Vatcher Papers, box 15, "World War II" folder.

news," and could be influenced by U.S. psywar news sheets.<sup>663</sup>

In the embattled countryside, PWB SWPA targeted badly-hit, demoralized and battle-weary enemy units, and reported "Success attained was very gratifying....In later stages of the [Leyte] operation nearly all prisoners either surrendered using a leaflet or stated that had read and been influenced by them."<sup>664</sup> Of the 251 POWs taken throughout the islands between 15 January and 15 March 1945, only 18 had strongly resisted capture or attempted suicide, and one officer had formally surrendered with six of his men, something unique to date.<sup>665</sup> Between 20 and 26 May, 110 Japanese surrendered to XI corps troops, and for the most part admitted that they had been influenced to do so by American psywar, even though they were in fairly good condition; they particularly appreciated *Rakkasan News*.<sup>666</sup> A Japanese *Domei* news agency correspondent's report, found by Filipino guerrillas, stated that he actually looked forward to each issue, due to its timely news.<sup>667</sup>

The Japanese high command quickly realized the threat posed by *Rakkasan*, warning that:

In the future, this type of demoralizing propaganda will be widely used in general. Therefore it is requested that each unit CO inform his men in advance and take measures to collect all leaflets immediately to avoid regrettable results.<sup>668</sup>

Of 300 POWs taken between 3 and 9 June 1945 by I Corps, 107 said that they

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<sup>663</sup>Ibid. (emphasis added). GHQ, FECOM, *Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section*, following 63. Also FELO, "Notes Recorded on Instructor Course in Psychological Warfare Given by Officers of FELO", n.d. 2. (in Fellers Papers, box 11 "Jap Reactions" folder).

<sup>664</sup>SWPA PWB Weekly Report, 5-12 February, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "SWPA Untitled" folder.

<sup>665</sup>SWPA PWB "Leaflet News letter," 1, No. 11, 1 September 1945, RG 208, box 6, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder. See also 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Language Detachment, "Report on Psywar," 19 April 1945 for similar results at the same time. AGO World War II Operations, Pacific, RG 407, entry 427, box 1622, "Propaganda and Psychological Warfare" folder.

<sup>666</sup>OWI Leaflet News letter, Area III, 1, 15 June 1945, OWI Historians Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder.

<sup>667</sup>U.S. Army Forces SWPA Collation Section, "Reactions and Developments," 1 June 1945.

<sup>668</sup>SWPA PWB, Collation Section, "Psychological Warfare Reactions and Developments", 1 June 1945. Note that the Japanese authorities conceded that such leaflets would prove "demoralizing" and could well lead to "regrettable results." One of the arguments as to the effectiveness of U.S. Army psywar was that the enemy took it seriously enough.

had been directly affected by U.S. psywar, as did a majority of the 215 captured by XI Corps at roughly the same time.<sup>669</sup> At precisely the same time, American forces negotiated the largest single Japanese surrender in the SWPA area, on Luzon. Here 6<sup>th</sup> Army intelligence claimed that the majority of the 215 surrenderees "admitted that they had been directly influenced by American Psychological Warfare activities."<sup>670</sup> An American guerilla leader on Luzon reported that "According to our agents who are covering this area, leaflets from Allied planes are affecting the morale of the Japanese soldiers here, who wish to surrender but are prevented by their officers." And an intercepted radiogram from Northern Luzon said that American leaflets were affecting the morale of Japanese soldiers, who, again, would surrender if not prevented by their officers.<sup>671</sup> In all, between 7,000 and 12,000 Japanese troops were reported to have surrendered by the end of organized resistance.<sup>672</sup> Yet these figures pale into near-insignificance compared to the more than 110,000 enemy dead of the Philippine campaign.<sup>673</sup>

After the fall of Manila, U.S. psywar officers and civilians met to determine the course of propaganda against Japan itself. The final *Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan* that emerged from this conference recommended that the forthcoming campaign focus on Japanese characteristics "susceptible to exploitation [which] include inferiority complex, credulousness, regimented thought, tendency to misrepresent, self-dramatizing, strong sense of responsibility, super-aggressiveness, inflexibility, tradition of self-destruction, superstition, face-saving tendency, intense emotionality, attachment to home and family and ancestor worship."<sup>674</sup> It is indeed surprising that from these predominately unattractive

<sup>669</sup>OWI "Leaflet News letter," Area III, 1 No. 3, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder.

<sup>670</sup>Gilmore thesis, 324. Such mass surrenders were, nevertheless, rare in the Pacific War.

<sup>671</sup>SWPA PWB "Leaflet News letter," 1, No. 11, 1 September 1945, RG 208, box 6, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder; Fellers, "Psychological Warfare Against Japan, SWPA, 1944-45," 10.

<sup>672</sup>Fellers, *Report on Psychological Warfare*, 11. By some straight-line logic, Fellers concluded that since it cost one American dead soldier for every 5.3 Japanese troops killed, the 12,181 Japanese surrenders saved 2,300 American lives. *ibid.* OWI Area III, Far East "Leaflet News letter," 1, No. 01-06-45, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letter" folder gives the lower figure.

<sup>673</sup>*Ibid.*, 5; R. R. Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, U.S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington: 1968 [1963]), 651-652.

<sup>674</sup>*Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan* (Manila: 12 April), 6-10. In the words of General Fellers, "Japan had lost her fleet and merchant shipping; her air force was becoming impotent; her troops had been destroyed in the Philippines and her Pacific Islands; her industry was disrupted. The only obstacle preventing surrender was *psychologic.*", *ibid.*, 4.



supposed characteristics, SWPA PWB was able to continue fairly sophisticated psywar that yielded some tangible successes.

The *Basic Plan* first was put into action during the Okinawa campaign, in the spring of 1945. Okinawa indeed saw the first large-scale U.S. psywar effort in the Central Pacific and the first large-scale Japanese surrenders. The commander of the Okinawan assault, LTG Simon B. Buckner, (who was to lose his life in the battle) may have been the first Pacific high-ranking commander to pay more than lip service to psywar. Several months before the battle, General Buckner, realizing that this island was considered by the enemy as an integral part of Japan itself and thus would likely be defended to the death, requested PWB to prepare a series of leaflets designed to keep civilians out of the way of battle and weaken Japanese morale. It is significant that Buckner was not looking primarily for enemy surrenders. He was also undoubtedly aware of the declining ratio of U.S. and Japanese battle deaths between earlier campaigns and Iwo Jima and was and willing to try almost anything to cut American losses. Buckner attached to his staff a PWB officer, who went ashore with the invasion force. In addition, PWB troopers were assigned to Buckner's G-1 (Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Operations), and G-4 (Supply), as well as to his field artillery (for leaflet shells), the attached Tactical Air Force, Military Government sections, and tank units.

PWB had already printed up between six and eight million leaflets (the records give varying totals), on water-proofed paper, carrying six themes for Japanese troops and civilians. Loudspeakers drenched enemy troops in propaganda, proclaiming that their cause was hopeless and that they could come over with honor, and telling of the earlier surrender of Japan's ally, Germany. ("Although Germany was defeated, nobody can deny that Germans are brave soldiers.")

The 350,000 civilians on the island were targeted with warnings that "Civilians who remain in coastal area will be destroyed together with Japanese soldiers and installations used by the Japanese Army. If you value your lives, follow these instructions."<sup>675</sup> The "instructions" seem indeed to have been followed. Tenth Army reported on D-Day that civilians, far from wandering about, "cooperated with our

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<sup>675</sup>German surrender leaflet copy in Vatcher Papers, box 16, "World War II" folder. Memo by 10<sup>th</sup> Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, n.d., Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 2, "SWPA Untitled" folder; "Leaflet News letter," 1, No. 10, RG 208, entry 6g, box 5, "Leaflet News letter: Area III" folder; Margolis, "Paper Bullets." AC of S., G-2, Tenth Army, "Intelligence Monograph, Ryukyus Campaign,, G-2, Tenth Army," Pt. iv, "Psychological Warfare and Morale," (August 1945, reprinted, Washington: September 1946), copy in USASOC Archives; Vatcher thesis, 145. PWB had anticipated events by printing up quantities of Japanese-language leaflets announcing the German capitulation, as well as the entry of the Soviet Union into the war. Gilmore thesis, 64; Fellers, *Report on Psychological Warfare*, 7; R. E. Appleman, et al, *Okinawa: The Last Battle*, U.S. Army in World War II, War in the Pacific (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Washington: 1948), 463.

troops by obeying leaflets.<sup>676</sup> The basic civilian leaflet showed civilians gazing at American aircraft taking off ("Stay Away From Airfields!"), watching a passing jeep ("Keep Away From Roads!"), walking away from a gun emplacement ("Keep Away From Installations!"), looking at a dump enclosed by wire ("Keep Away From Ammunition Dumps!"), and at the end, a dead civilian ("If you ignore these instructions, this sort of fate may befall you even though it is unintentional.") The reverse of this generic leaflet bore the legend:

To Okinawan Evacuees:

Those of you who have decided to enter the American occupied area may do so during the day with safety. Do not enter the American occupied area and loiter around at night because we fear that you will be mistaken for a Japanese soldier.

Furthermore, be sure never to wear arms, military uniforms, leggings or other items of Japanese military equipment, for you may be mistaken for a Japanese soldier. Those of you who, by following the above instructions, come to the American occupied area during the day and who place complete trust in the American Army, will be given food, water and medical care and will be treated with kindness

Commander of American Forces<sup>677</sup>

A later leaflet depicted a smiling Okinawan girl "Saying 'give me candy' and 'Let's play.' She has found her big American friend. Isn't this a pleasant scene?"<sup>678</sup>

American psywarriors also attempted to drive a wedge between the Japanese garrison and homeland civilians, and the Okinawans. ("This is not your war, but you are being used as a cat's paw by the *naichijin*." "Is this your war? Or is it really the war of Japanese leaders who have dominated you for many decades?")<sup>679</sup> These were not new themes, but had nowhere in the Pacific, even in the Philippines, been used so extensively in so relatively confined an area.<sup>680</sup>

Leaflets addressed to enemy troops told the now-familiar "happy POW" story, with the eyes of the prisoners illustrated once again blanked out, and how to use the "Safe Conduct Pass" ("If you try no tricks, we will give you kind, dignified treatment.") Others minimized the stigma attached to surrender (or rather "honorable terms of negotiations", "ceasing resistance", "coming over to our side", etc.), cited past Japanese military failures, attempted to undermine the soldiers' confidence in

<sup>676</sup>Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese," 16. Okinawan civilian leaflet copies in Vatcher Papers, box 16, "World War II" folder.

<sup>677</sup>Tenth Army G-2, "Ryukus Campaign," 3.

<sup>678</sup>Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, #8093. Other original examples are found in Vatcher Papers, box 15 "World War II" folder.

<sup>679</sup>Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese," 19, 24-28.

<sup>680</sup>E. L. Jones, "Fighting With Words," *Atlantic Monthly* (August 1945).

their officers, their cause and final victory; derided earlier Japanese communiqués trumpeting phantom victories, and even harked back to the treatment of veterans of the Russo-Japanese War of four decades previous.

Japan won a decisive victory in the Russo-Japanese War. You all know what kind of life the heroes who lost their arms and legs for the country led. You know that most of these crippled soldiers became medicine peddlers....

Another leaflet depicted brightly-colored foods, captioned "Shikata ga nai," which roughly translated means "Such is life" or "It can't be helped," a common Japanese expression. The expression tried to convince the Japanese soldier that "ceasing resistance" and enjoying good food in captivity was simply the way things went. ("In time of war, soldiers fall into the hands of the enemy. It is not the fault of the individual if he becomes half-dead from lack of food,....").<sup>681</sup>

However, "the outstanding piece of written propaganda" used on Okinawa, according to the POWs themselves, was *Ryukyo Shuho*, a news sheet that was so subtle as well as persuasive that many prisoners taken on the island reported that they were actually permitted to read it by their officers. Almost all other leaflets were referred to by the POWs as *senden* ("propaganda"), but not *Ryukyo Shuho*, which was drawn up by Japanese prisoners with journalistic backgrounds. Some POWs did complain that the news therein was too "one-sided," but, as one official report noted dryly, "There was not, at this time, much news favorable to the Japanese."<sup>682</sup>

Another, more intriguing, appeal was that personally made through loudspeaker and leaflet by General Buckner to his Japanese counterpart, LTG Mitsuru Ushijima. General Buckner took up the suggestion of the 10<sup>th</sup> Army Propaganda Team and his personal appeal was dropped by two U.S. Navy torpedo planes:

1. The forces under your command have fought bravely and well, and your infantry tactics have merited the respect of your opponents, in the battle of Okinawa Shima.
2. Like myself, you are an infantry general long schooled and practiced in infantry warfare. You fully know the pitiful plight of your

<sup>681</sup>Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese," 86.

<sup>682</sup>"Report of Psychological Activities: Okinawa Operations," 15 September 1945, RG 94 (AGO), Operations Reports, 10th Army, 110-25 to 110-SPHQ-1.14, box 3004, "110-39" folder; Tenth Army G-2, "Ryukus Campaign," 3-5 (quote on page 5); Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese," 30-32. One U.S. psywarrior felt that "It's almost unfortunate that there were no Japanese successes anywhere to report.", to make U.S. news sheets even more believable. H. G. Henderson, memo to COL W. Green, "Subject: 'Parachute News,' No. 1, n.d., Fellers Papers, box 15, "U.S. Army Forces PWB" folder.

defense forces. I believe, therefore, that you understand as clearly as I, that the destruction of all Japanese resistance on the island is merely a matter of days, and that this will entail the necessity of killing the vast majority of your remaining troops.....

6. I am therefore prepared to enter into negotiations with you....

7. It is hardly necessary for me to recall to your mind the instances in the past where Japanese military commanders, in both the feudal and modern eras of Japan have saved their forces to prevent needless bloodshed after the battle has been decided....

When this invitation was ignored, as was expected (General Ushijima subsequently committed *suppuku*), General Buckner then appealed directly to the Japanese officers and enlisted men under Ushijima's command, scoring some success, at least with the latter:

It is the duty of your officers to protect you by not misleading you, and to care for you. However, they have refused to accept this duty by failing to negotiate with us. But the American offer of good food, medical treatment, and place of shelter in which you can safely await the end of the war is extended to each of you. Now it is your individual decision, not your officers.<sup>683</sup>

Two absurd psywar ploys probably served more to discredit psywar to the Americans themselves than to impress the Japanese. In the first case, a surrendering Japanese officer wishing to continue to live with his Okinawan nurse girl friend was married with considerable publicity. A neatly-pressed new Japanese Army uniform was presented to the groom, while the bride was dressed in a traditional kimono. The ceremony was performed by the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps chaplain, amid mutual congratulations. The couple spent a one-night honeymoon in a U.S. Army tent. But U.S. troops were understandably bitter: they had no new uniforms and certainly no women; perhaps the U.S. Army would oblige them as well? In fact, a *Life* magazine report claimed that the three GIs who had actually captured the Japanese officer in question were turned away from the nuptials for being "too dirty." In the second incident a small Army team made its way to the Okinawan off-shore island of Aka Shima and met with the

<sup>683</sup>ILT J. Rogers, Jr., "Psychological Warfare on Okinawa," n.d., RG 94, AGO, Operations Reports, 10<sup>th</sup> Army, 110-25 to 110-SPHQ-1.14, box 30004, "110-39" folder; "Report on Psychological Warfare Activities, Okinawa Operation," 15 September 1945, *ibid.*; Vatcher, "Appeal to General Ushijima," *Casebook*. Text of appeals in RG 94, AGO, Operations Reports, entry 110-25 to 110-SPHQ-1.14, 10<sup>th</sup> Army, box 3004, "110-39" folder; Tenth Army G-2, "Ryukus Campaign," 7; Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese," 35-41.

island's Japanese commander to effectuate a surrender. An amicable conference ensued, garnished with pineapple juice and other refreshments all around. The Japanese-American group then knelt in the sand as a prayer for peace was offered by the American chaplain. Later, the Japanese commander respectfully informed the Americans that although surrender would not be consonant with his honor, American troops would be welcome to use his island for recreation! Both incidents received adverse publicity, with good reason, and the U.S. Army Okinawa Combat Propaganda Team had offered serious objection to both from the start.<sup>684</sup>

Although Japanese morale on Okinawa was supposed to be high (and was certainly not lowered by the "Okinawa Wedding" or Aka Shima japes), the early surrender of several enemy officers, including the commander of a front-line machine-gun unit, gave some hope that in this invasion the Japanese might not all fight to the death. In fact, captured enemy documents showed commanders from the Commanding General down to company commanders urging their troops to show a more firm and resolute, "to hold the belief of positive victory," but ever "to remember the spirit of martyrdom and of dying for the good of the country." To cover the possibility that some Japanese would be so dishonorable as to attempt surrender, an unidentified enemy document warned of the American trick of using Okinawans dressed as Japanese soldiers, "who will wave a white flag feigning surrender. Front line units will kill all without exception."<sup>685</sup>

Japanese psywar directed toward the invaders remained unsophisticated to the end. One leaflet challenged U.S. soldiers to "Just stop to think the fact that your very leaders and capitalists are given to play with wine and women, discussions and profit - dividing in your country.", and claimed that no less than 412 Allied warships had been sunk off the island.<sup>686</sup> Another, more bizarre, enemy leaflet, written in longhand, proclaimed:

We must express our deep regret over the death of President Roosevelt. The 'American Tragedy' is now raised here at Okinawa with his death. You must have seen 70 % or your aircraft carriers and 73% or your battleships sink or be damaged carrying 150,000 casualties. Not only the late President but anyone else would die in the excess of worry to hear such annihilation damage. The dreadful loss that led your late President to death will make you orphans on this island....<sup>687</sup>

<sup>684</sup>Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese," 32-35.

<sup>685</sup>Tenth Army G-2, "Ryukus Campaign," 14. This order was certainly an invitation to fratricide.

<sup>686</sup>Typesheet in *ibid*.

<sup>687</sup>S. Haaraldsen, "Psychological Warfare, *Militaer Orientering*," [Norway], No. 10 (1949) trans. and repr. in *Military Review* (1950). Tenth Army G-2 reported that there were two such leaflets and said that both claimed that FDR had committed suicide over the heavy U.S. losses on Okinawa. The last line of the leaflet quoted in

Another Japanese leaflet was addressed to "front line colored troops," although there were no such American troops on Okinawa. Even had they been there, black soldiers would hardly have proven receptive to propaganda that incoherently tried to remind them of their "darlings, fun and jazz, poor mother." Apparently the Japanese attempted to distribute these efforts by infiltrators; none are known to have reached American lines, but were rather found on dead Japanese soldiers or in seized enemy command posts.<sup>688</sup>

On numerous occasions in this campaign "converted" Japanese troops (sometimes referred to as "bait boys") proved quite successful in convincing their comrades to come out of their bunkers and caves and give up. The loudspeaker broadcasts of one such soldier, a sergeant, brought in numerous Japanese, probably because of his authoritative NCO manner. Two "bait boys," dubbed by the Americans as, "Murraymoto" and "Goto," were instrumental in securing the surrenders of several hundred enemy. The two were so trusted that they were actually accorded the rare and dangerous privilege of being permitted to carry arms and to sleep in a company perimeter at night. *Nisei* again played an invaluable role, coaxing from the sea cliffs in which they had hidden, some 500 to 600 Okinawan civilians. They then ferreted out some 70 Japanese soldiers who had hoped to pass as civilians.

The only other consistently successful means of psywar dissemination on the island was that by torpedo bomber and liaison light aircraft. An early attempt at aerial loudspeaker dissemination ("Polly" plane) failed to carry out its mission due to mechanical difficulties and damage sustained by enemy air attack while on the ground. Shell dissemination was used on only a limited scale; there was a fear that the shells could kill or maim their targets, and difficulties were experienced in transporting and firing the ammunition.<sup>689</sup>

But toward the end of the campaign fairly large-scale surrenders were being negotiated, and in the last ten days of enemy resistance the CINCPAC-CINCPOA "life saving" pass was disseminated in bulk: "THE BEARER HAS CEASED ORGANIZED RESISTANCE. TREAT HIM IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. TAKE HIM TO THE NEAREST COMMANDING OFFICER." To make sure that all American troops got the message, 10,000 of these

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the text could be so interpreted. Original in Vatcher Papers, box 16, "Word War II" folder. The other leaflet referred to by Tenth Army G-2 has not survived. Tenth Army G-2, "Ryukus Campaign," 10.

<sup>688</sup>Ibid.

<sup>689</sup>Tenth Army G-2, "Ryukus Campaign," 4. "Polly" did carry a harbinger of the future with its early wire recorder, which permitted the elimination of a broadcaster. Over Wotje, "Polly's" recorder played "Red River Valley" and "My Blue Heaven", with unascertainable results. Undoubtedly more for the crew's satisfaction than for anything else, one "Polly" was flown over Tokyo just after the Japanese surrender, playing "I Surrender, Dear.", Vatcher thesis, 110.

leaflets, 15 per company, were issued to the men a day or two before large-scale dissemination began.<sup>690</sup>

The 7<sup>th</sup> Division enjoyed less success in an orchestrated operation. Its artillery and armor ceased firing for a full hour on 17 June while loudspeakers broadcast surrender pleas. The result was one American wounded, and a loudspeaker shot full of holes.

But by the end of the campaign PWB could count a record 11,409 POWs, of whom 7,780 were combat troops; 110,412 Japanese died, many of whom may well have been civilians.<sup>691</sup> Of the POWs, 61 percent said that they believed that Japan would somehow still win the war. This response may well have prompted the memo sent from the area to the Director of the Overseas Branch of OWI concluding that, although surrender leaflets were useful, as were the *Nisei*, "Statements from Japanese prisoners indicate that we have not reached a satisfactory goal in designing our propaganda."<sup>692</sup> And a little over a month later the Chief of PWB wrote to the Deputy Director of Area III, the Overseas Branch, OWI that psywar on Okinawa had been hampered by U.S. troops continuing to shoot down Japanese soldiers trying to surrender and by "juvenile language".<sup>693</sup> Tenth Army G-2 also reported "It was the opinion of several G-2s, however, as many prisoners had been lost when, trying to surrender, they were killed by American troops."<sup>694</sup>

With the end of organized resistance, SWPA PWB faced its first large-scale consolidation operations. It intelligently mobilized the skills of division language personnel (all Caucasians), but also enlisted the support of Okinawan civilians to reassure civilians who had fled into the countryside during the fighting that, with American assistance, they could now get on with their lives, and sent in American personnel to protect villages from marauding Japanese. Leaflets were distributed to this effect, (although one was decidedly premature in announcing "Japanese High Command Negotiating Capitulation"). Unfortunately PWB language personnel were

<sup>690</sup>Ibid.

<sup>691</sup>"Report of Psychological Warfare Activities, Okinawa," Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, RG 94, AGO, Operations Reports, entry 110-25 to 110-SPHQ-1.14, box 3004, 10th Army, "110-39" folder; Appleman, et al, *Okinawa*, 465-467.

Tenth Army G-2 gives a figure of 10,617 combat and 4,440 labor troops surrendering by 15 September, but no civilian figures. "Ryukus Campaign," 11.

<sup>692</sup>"Buetter", memo to Director, Overseas Branch, OWI, subject: "Propaganda Operations in Okinawa," 4 June 1945, Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 2, "SWPA Untitled" folder. The Japanese government dismissed the fall of Okinawa to its own people as "not highly important." Fellers, Report on Psychological Warfare, 12.

<sup>693</sup>Ibid., 20 July 1945; CINCPAC-CINCPAA, "Psychological Warfare," 13.

<sup>694</sup>Tenth Army G-2, "Ryukus Campaign," 10. But the report continued that "Allowances, these officers stated, must be made for the temper of men in battle and for instances in which enemy soldiers tried to surrender in an unorthodox or suspicious manner.", Ibid.

then transferred for China duty, and the surrenders tapered off.<sup>695</sup>

On the Asian mainland, OWI had established a Psychological Warfare Unit on a very limited scale in early 1944 under the control of the military CBI, as was the Assam Team. Although its primary mission was to represent the United States to Free China, implicit in its charter was authority to disseminate propaganda directed at Japanese-occupied China and the Japanese military. The unit at first consisted of a small language detachment, a few radio receivers and one Davidson press, with the language and radio units located at Chungking and the reproduction personnel at Kunming. At the end of a most tenuous supply and communications line, the Unit experienced the utmost difficulty in disseminating its leaflets, being almost entirely dependant on the 14<sup>th</sup> Air Force, the latter itself operating with insufficient equipment and supplies. Japanese-language surrender leaflets consisted of a newspaper, a pictorial newspaper and a series of anti-morale leaflets. The Unit recognized early that the best propaganda to use against the Japanese was simply the war situation, by then steadily turning against Nippon. They also circulated news from the Japan Home Islands, emphasizing, naturally, deteriorating conditions. They could do so without deviating much from the truth, as, in truth, there was little such news that was not bad and thus depressing: air raids, all-encompassing mobilization, strict rationing, closing of places of entertainment, etc. After the first three editions of the newspaper, the journal was expanded to include photos, thus adding graphic evidence to the paper's arguments. From *Japanese Soldier, Can You Defeat the Entire World?*, *Okinawa Invaded*, *Germany Surrenders*, *The American First Army is Coming and Anniversary of B-29 Bombings of Japan*, to *B-29s Drop Atomic Bomb on Japan* to the final *Japan Surrenders*, the Japanese soldier was fed a steady diet of truthful, depressing news. Warning leaflets were also occasionally dropped, as in the case of the enemy's murder of shot-down fliers. Believing that the Japanese soldier was particularly "emotional," Unit personnel drew up leaflets that played on a homesickness nostalgia theme, a typical example depicting a pretty, kimono-clad Japanese girl against a background of cherry blossoms. Another series iterated that Japan was not doomed as a nation. A sixteen-page booklet in full color, half text and half drawings, laid the guilt for Japan's war of aggression upon its militarists and promised a decent future when these offenders were removed. Combat leaflets were directed at retreating or surrounded enemy units. For example leaflets informed the 34<sup>th</sup>, 116<sup>th</sup> divisions and other enemy units retreating from Chihkiang in April and May of 1945 that their plight was due to the revitalized Chinese Army, reminded them of previous defeats and dwelled on the surrender of Germany. Another informed enemy soldiers that the real target of Allied military might were the militarists who had brought such misery to Asia.

Although the Unit report admitted that large-scale surrenders never took place in China, it did insist that Japanese morale had been undermined by its psywar. Its

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<sup>695</sup>Daugherty, "Rounding Up Military Stragglers," *Casebook*. One PWB psywar team on Okinawa claimed, somewhat improbably, to have saved the lives of more than 30,000 Okinawan civilians., Harrington, 329.



POW interviews concluded that the Unit had established credibility among Japanese troops with its straightforward reporting of war news and news from home. It cited numerous cases where hard-fighting units had retreated after a heavy barrage of bad news.

Unlike U.S. Army psywarriors in the Pacific, the China Unit found itself involved in political movements, particularly those against "Western colonialism," for example in Indo-China. (It is intriguing to note that the China/Burma/India Theater Political Adviser, John P. Davies, his supervisor of psywar in China, John S. Service; and Owen Lattimore all saw their careers destroyed in the post-war outcry over "Who Lost China?" to the Communists).<sup>696</sup>

Meanwhile, in July of 1945, the PWB had begun its outstanding "city" leaflet campaign. As suggested by General Curtis Lemay, Commander of XX Air Force, his B-29s would drop leaflets over specified cities, warning the inhabitants of impending destruction by bombing. The message speaks for itself:

These leaflets are being dropped to notify you that your city has been listed for destruction by our powerful air force. The bombing will begin in 72 hours. The advance notice will give your military authorities ample time to take defensive measures to protect you from our inevitable attack. Watch and see how powerless they are to protect you. There is nothing they can do to stop our overwhelming power and iron determination. We want you to see how powerless the military is to protect you.

Another "city" message read claimed that the raids were solely to destroy the tools of war.


But, unfortunately, bombs have no eyes. So, in accordance with America's well-known humanitarian principles, the American Air Force, which does not wish to injure innocent people, now gives you warning to evacuate the cities named and save your lives.

On 27 July, eleven cities had been so designated and warned. The following night six of the eleven were bombed. The process continued to the end of the war, causing immeasurable harm to Japanese production and morale. No less than 6 1/2 million Japanese left their cities, about one-third of the urban population.<sup>697</sup> In the

<sup>696</sup>"History of Psychological Warfare in the China Theater." Copies and translations of "representational" OWI/Army China leaflets may be found after p. 170; OWI Historians Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 9, "PW: Pacific: China" folder.

<sup>697</sup>CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Bulletin No. 164-45, *Psychological Warfare, Part Two, Supplement No. 2* (15 August 1945), 189-191; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report: Pacific War* (Washington: 1946), claims that 8,500,000 persons

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"B-29" leaflet, one of the most effective of World War II in the Pacific. One even wound up in the Emperor's garden., *ibid.*, 190-191.(cities' names have not yet been added.), CINCPAC-CINCPWA Bulletin No. 164-45,

words of one Tokyo official "The military had no time to prepare special defenses and practically all personnel rushed out of town."<sup>698</sup> It was depressing for the Japanese, military and civilian alike, to realize that the Americans could "telegraph their punches" with impunity. The B-29 heavy bomber itself proved to be itself an instrument of psywar, the Japanese Air Force having nothing like it, even on the drawing boards. The Chief of the PWB Leaflet Section reported after the war that the "city leaflets" also spread rumors, none of them particularly uplifting to Japanese morale. ("This city will be bombed next.", "No, it is a feint by the Americans.", "The Americans have even bigger, more powerful bombers.", etc.)<sup>699</sup> The "city leaflets" were not, strictly speaking, combat psywar, but they affected tens of thousands of Japanese troops in the Home Islands, and would be used again, this time against specific enemy military units in the field, in Vietnam and in the Gulf War decades later. In fact, it could be argued that the city leaflets were the single most successful psychological warfare message in history.

PWB was also able to drop leaflets over Japanese cities announcing the entry of the Soviet Union into the war on the very day that nation declared war, due to the American psywarriors anticipating that event and pre-printing the leaflets.<sup>700</sup> Another leaflet, very-professionally drawn, "Earthquake From the Sky," depicted a bomber raid over Japan on the one side and the Goddess of Mercy on the other: "Peace With Honor."<sup>701</sup> Another leaflet was directed specifically to the kamikaze suicide pilots. ("My life is important for the new Japan which will rise from the smoking ruins.")<sup>702</sup>

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fled the targeted cities, one-fourth of the Japanese Home Islands' population., 13; MAJ G. Taylor, memo to Chief, Central Pacific Operations, PWB, subject: "Monthly Narrative Report, No. 17," 4 August 1945, OWI Historians Records of PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 9, "PW Pacific -General" folder; Daugherty, "Bomb Warnings to Friendly and Enemy Civilian Targets," *Casebook*. Crane, 197-198. *Asahi* had warned that, with the fall of Saipan, the Americans could now drop leaflets over Japan itself, but added, "of course we do not believe our people will be taken in by such propaganda, but the United States and England are clever old hands at it. They were successful in Italy and other places." CINCPAC-CINCPOA, "Psychological Warfare," 13.

<sup>698</sup>Fellers, "Report on Psychological Warfare," 12-13.

<sup>699</sup>*Views of World War II*, 196; *Life Magazine* reported at this time that "Every B-29 raid on Japan drops about 750,000 pieces of propaganda over Japan. "Jap Surrenders are Increasing," 16 July 1945. A Japanese newspaper *Yomuri-Hochi*, on 3 June 1945, reported accurately enough that "the enemy is seeking to strike into the pith of our hearts by converging upon us with all available military power and the power of propaganda.", in OWI Historian's Records of the PWB, RG 208, entry 6g, box 9, "PW: Pacific: Japan" folder.

<sup>700</sup>Fellers, *Report on Psychological Warfare*, 7.

<sup>701</sup>Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, #8093.

<sup>702</sup>United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas: *Psychological Warfare, Part*

PWB now had increasingly to concern itself with the larger questions of unconditional surrender, the position of the Emperor and post-surrender Japan. The PWB psywar "Basic Plan" called for reassuring the Japanese that their enslavement was not an Allied aim, that a constitutional government would be in their own best interests, that Japan would recover its self-respect and that there would be no interference with their spiritual life (reverence for the Emperor). For the rest of the war, PWB generally followed these guidelines, but was hampered by its inability to make definite promises to the enemy in the wake of the Allied Unconditional Surrender mandate.<sup>703</sup> Finally, PWB dropped the Emperor's imperial surrender rescript throughout Japan, giving many Japanese their first knowledge of that momentous act.<sup>704</sup> In words indicating the professionalism of PWB, Paul Linebarger later wrote:

The Japanese texts were checked between Washington and Hawaii by radiotelegraph and cryptotelephone; the plates were put into presses at Saipan; the big planes took off. Leaflets properly loaded in the right kind of leaflet bomb. It took three and a half years to reach that point, but we reached it; nowhere else in history can there be found an instance of so many people being given so decisive a message, all at the same time, at the very dead-point between war and peace.... We got in the last word, and made sure it was the last.<sup>705</sup>

Practically the last mission of PWB was the dropping of leaflets over camps for Allied POWs. These gave instructions to the Japanese guards as to the protection of the prisoners and the turning over of the camps to Allied forces.

With the Japanese surrender, the PWB's original mission had ended, and it was eventually redesignated Civil Information and Education. The CI&E's occupation mission consisted of 1) Making clear the fact of Japan's defeat, 2) Acquainting the Japanese with their responsibility for the war and for Japan's atrocities during the war, 3) Making the Japanese realize that the militarists were to blame for their nation's misery, 4) Assuring the Japanese that the Allies had no intention of enslaving them, 5) Promoting religious, political, class and racial tolerance, 5) Explaining that the Allied (really American) occupation forces would destroy Japanese war potential, and would be withdrawn when that mission accomplished.<sup>706</sup>

In addition, the CI&E even before the end of the year of victory, 1945, conducted interrogations to ferret out war criminals, translated documents for war

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*Two, Supplement No. ,2 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 164-45 (15 August 1945), 203.*

<sup>703</sup>Fellers, "Basic Plan," 76; Gilmore thesis, 283.

<sup>704</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>705</sup>Linebarger, "Psyop in World War II," pt. 2, *Infantry Journal* (June 1947).

<sup>706</sup>Fellers, *Report on Psychological Warfare*, 5.

crimes trials, and obtained the reactions of Japanese civilian officials to American propaganda. For the most part, the results of the post-war interrogations of high-level Japanese military and civilian officials as to the effectiveness of Allied psywar were gratifying for CI&E. Starting, quite literally, at the very top, the Emperor himself (who according to his Keeper of the Privy Seal, personally picked up enemy leaflets in the Imperial Palace grounds) paid a somewhat backhanded compliment:

That Psychological Warfare leaflets and newspapers were very effective -maybe too effective; that Psychological Warfare prompted him to cancel a scheduled Marshal's conference on the critical war situation over which he would have presided and that Psychological Warfare forced him to hasten the end of the war because he feared that if the soldiers got hold of those leaflets they might take drastic measures such as a coup d'etat.

General Hideki Tojo, Japan's chief warlord (and destined to die on the gallows as a war criminal) admitted that there was no comparison between the Allies' "skillful exploitation of the facts" (in itself a fine definition of that propaganda) and the "blundering fabrications of the Japanese." A projected Manila prison interview with General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the "Tiger of Malaya" and Japanese commander in the Philippines, gave more ambiguous results. Yamashita himself did not respond; a General Muto, incarcerated with Yamashita interjected that Allied leaflets were useful for toilet paper and for starting fires. But Muto was, in turn, interrupted by General Yokoyama, Commander of the Shimbu Group, who claimed that the leaflets were truly effective in that they were written in "in a typically Japanese fashion" and had a real appeal to the Japanese soldier. He cited the references to the now-silent Yamashita, and other high commanders in the leaflets which were always of "a respectful nature, and therefore the pamphlets did not alienate the Japanese soldier, because they were talking to him on his own terms."

Unlike Yamashita, General Masaharu Homma, conqueror of the Philippines (and like Yamashita destined to hang for war crimes in the Philippines), was not at all reticent on the subject, terming PWB psywar "exceptionally good" in that it was devoid of any abuse of Japan as a whole" and that there was nothing in it "to arouse hostile emotions in the Japanese mind. Homma did criticize a tendency to "stress the obvious." But the infamous "Tokyo Rose" (Iva I. Toguril) was not about to give much credit to her rivals, claiming that "the people were so well indoctrinated" that they took Allied psywar "as pure propaganda with no truth behind it."<sup>707</sup> At any rate, even CI&E personnel would have admitted that the most effective psywar against the

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<sup>707</sup>Ibid., 17; "Reactions of Japanese," *ibid.*; Sparangara, 192-193; Department of the Army, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section. "Interrogations of Japanese Official on World War II," 2 vols. (Washington: 1946).

Japanese was simply the obliteration bombing of their cities.<sup>708</sup>

In the field, PWB modestly claimed that of 4,397 POWs garnered by American forces between July 1942 and July 1945, 17.29 percent reported that they were influenced by enemy psywar.<sup>709</sup> (A later scholar gives the much larger figure of 16,000 total Japanese POWs.<sup>710</sup> The difference may lie in the distinction between POWs and surrenderees.) An authoritative post-war article concluded that those POWs had responded mostly to honest, factual news, safe-conduct passes, the promise of fair treatment as a POW, and the themes of the futility of continued resistance, inevitable defeat and items of local significance, such as being surrounded, poor leadership, food, etc. Political themes had proved a waste of time. Leaflets and loudspeakers were by far the most used and the most effective forms of dissemination (as in Europe), with radio less used due to the Japanese Army's lack of individual receivers.<sup>711</sup> An American scholar later concluded that "The evidence shows that Japanese soldiers and officers did testify to having been influenced by Allied propaganda and did surrender to Allied forces as the war progressed." But another researcher drew a more circumspect conclusion: "The evidence gleaned from official Japanese statements and documents betrayed concern among the high officials that Allied propaganda could potentially damage Japanese morale." (emphasis added).<sup>712</sup> And, as always, it should be remembered that the U.S. Army's primary goal throughout this war was not surrenders, but the undermining of enemy morale.<sup>713</sup>

Not all Pacific U.S. commands were as amenable to psywar as was SWPA. A Marine Corps OWI officer envoy assigned to Admiral William Halsey's South Pacific Command reported that his successor "would be treated politely, get no place, and after three months be invalided to the States because of a nervous breakdown."<sup>714</sup> As

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<sup>708</sup>Sparangara, 198-199.

<sup>709</sup>USFCT S-2 Periodic Report No. 30, for 29 July-4 August 1945, appendix A, "Psychological Warfare," Lilly Papers, RG 218, box 14, "Topical File" folder.

<sup>710</sup>Sparangara, 346.

<sup>711</sup>Kehm, "Can Psywar Pay its Passage?" PWB disseminated a rounded total of 82,800,00 leaflets in the Philippines, 71,876,000 over Japan, 28,509,700 in China and Indo-China, 26,000,000 in the Pacific Islands, 12,000,000 in Burma, 9,000,000 in Thailand and 1,600,000 over Formosa. PWB "Leaflet News letter," 1, no. 11, 1 September 1945, RG 208, box 5, "Leaflet News letters: Area III" folder.

<sup>712</sup>Gilmore thesis, 33; Sparangara, 166.

<sup>713</sup>Gilmore thesis, 346. This priority was also explicitly spelled out by the Assam Team. Hayne, "Memo on Psychological Warfare," 12. See also Gilmore, "The War of Supply is the key to Victory: The Impact of Japanese Supply Shortages on the Allied Propaganda War in the Pacific," paper presented before the Conference of Army Historians, Washington. June 1994.

<sup>714</sup>LTC B. Stern, USMC, memo to Director, OWI, subject: "OWI South Pacific Information Command Team," 18 April 1943, RG 208, entry 6g, box 11, "Stern" folder.

a matter of fact, OSS and OWI personnel were refused clearance to operate in the command.<sup>715</sup> In the Central Pacific Command, under Admiral Chester Nimitz, indifference and lack of understanding by the top command ensured that psywar operations remained "small-scale, uncoordinated, unsupervised...." Just five days before the Japanese surrender the command established a Psychological Warfare Branch, far too late, of course, to engage in any operations.<sup>716</sup>

The odyssey of OWI civilian Willard Hess is instructive as to the general lack of interest throughout the non-SWPA Pacific. Hess, assigned to the 96<sup>th</sup> Division, couldn't even find the unit in the face of obdurate "security" restrictions imposed by unsympathetic officers. He was finally able to locate the division and to post propaganda orientation material on his troop ship's bulletin board that evoked some troop interest. But officials' attitudes were summarized by one officer's comment: "We won't be firing any leaflets at the enemy for some time. We'll be using real bullets." The enlisted men simply felt that "the only good Jap...." When Hess took a liaison aircraft to Tacloban in the Philippines to obtain some guidance from another OWI officer he was considered technically AWOL. Hess' travails and travels came to an end when he was injured by a Japanese bomb blast and evacuated.<sup>717</sup>

Far more successful was MAJ David Tuke, who early realized that the most significant omission in his psywar training was that of convincing friendly troops of its worth. "We were looked upon as a nuisance by those in command and as something of a harebrained joke by the enlisted personnel." At Leyte, however, MAJ Tuke, discovering that U.S. troops were almost as hungry for news as were their enemies, "really went to work on our own troops.", giving daily loudspeaker newscasts and as well as jive music to 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry troops from his jeep. At the end of each program Tuke announced that what the troops had just heard and read was exactly the kind of propaganda that he was giving the enemy. Once the troops had seen (or heard) psywar in action, they became almost enthusiastic converts, even to the point of assisting in gathering intelligence, bundling leaflets or packing leaflet shells.

From then on out in every single loudspeaker broadcast, directed against the enemy, psychological warfare to them was no longer a weird and improbable activity dreamed up by impractical Pentagon pen-pushers. They had seen it in action, they had seen it clean out caves in

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<sup>715</sup>Daugherty, "Psychological Warfare Organizations in Word War II," *Casebook*. "Admiral Halsey, the area commander, simply did not want to have anything to do with psychological warfare.", *ibid.*, 132.

<sup>716</sup>*Ibid.*, 133.

<sup>717</sup>W. Hess, memo to John Hiestand, subject: "Report of Experience and Activities on Assignment to Philippines," n.d., RG 208, entry 6e, box 13, "Philippines" folder. Rather moderately, all things considered, Hess called for the assignment of psywar personnel early to their units. "When I joined the 96<sup>th</sup> at Manus the die was cast. Their plans were absolutely complete."

which isolated but desperate enemy soldiers were holed up. Often this was accomplished without the loss of a single American life. In time we lost that improbable name, psychological warfare. We became known with the usual kidding affection soldiers reserve for other outfits for whom they have developed a healthy respect as the "paper bullet guys."<sup>718</sup>

The Pacific campaign had seen a steadily improving ratio of killed to prisoners. At Hollandia, New Guinea, 3,450 Japanese were killed and 656 taken prisoner, a ratio of 1 to 5. By the end of August 1944 the ratio for all of New Guinea had fallen to one to every 14. Later, at Noemfoor, where psywar was used more widely, the ratio fell to 970 killed to 470 surrenders, about a 1 to 2 ratio. By the end of the war with Japan, about 2,600 Japanese military had surrendered, approximately one surrender for every 43 Japanese killed. (These figures do not include Japanese civilians, Formosans, Koreans, and native islanders. Of course, the improvement in the killed-to-surrender ratio was due also to Japan's deteriorating military position. Each successive island from which the "cowardly Americans" were officially reported to have been ejected seemed to be closer to the Home Islands.)<sup>719</sup> But dug-in Japanese defenders could still fight bitterly to the death, as at Iwo Jima, where there was little psywar preparation, although the U.S. Marine commander did attempt, as on Okinawa, a general officer-to-general officer appeal.<sup>720</sup> But something like 75 percent of SWPAPWB leaflets were designed to attack Japanese morale, not particularly to induce surrenders.<sup>721</sup>

Overall, the U.S. psychological warfare effort in the Pacific, as in Europe, adhered to the tenants of truth-in-propaganda, as in the ETO.<sup>722</sup> Despite the marked

<sup>718</sup>Daugherty, "Indoctrination of Friendly Troops," *Casebook*.

<sup>719</sup>GHQ, FECOM, *Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section*, G-2 Weekly Report, No. 56, August 1944. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Morale Division. *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale* (Washington: 1946), 12.

<sup>720</sup>CINCPAC-CINCPOA, "Psychological Warfare," 23-24. At Iwo 22,322 enemy died, and 392 surrendered (61 Koreans) as of 7 April, and most of the surrenders were after the island had officially been declared secure. Two POWs were killed attempting to induce surrenders. *ibid.*, 12-13; Vatcher, 132. Vatcher claimed that it was the high American death toll on Iwo that finally convinced the U.S. military that some other way had to be found to take these Pacific islands besides simply killing every Japanese soldier on them. *ibid.*, 45.

<sup>721</sup>SWPAPWB Collation Branch, *Report No. 7*, 10 May 1945.

<sup>722</sup>This tenet is found throughout the main sources cited above. See also CINCPAC-CINCPOA, *Psychological Warfare*, pt. 1, December 1944, RG 94, AGO Operations Reports, 10<sup>th</sup> Army, entry 110-25-11-SPHQ-1.14, "110-39" folder: "It is imperative that care be taken to do nothing which may give the Japanese the impression that the



contrast in enemies, the successful themes of Europe were duplicated in the Pacific, although there seems to have been no conscious copying of the European experience. These themes were 1) Use of simple, straightforward language, 2) accurate news, 3) phrasing that permitted the Japanese soldier to "cease resistance" with dignity, 4) promise of good treatment while a POW, 5) hopelessness of further resistance, and 6) promise of no killing or torture of POWs.<sup>723</sup> U.S. Army psychological war in World War II could be said to have been the more effective the closer one came to the front. Clear successes against enemy soldiers in the field can be contrasted with the uneven record in strategic propaganda. Only in the Pacific War, where American psywarriors persuaded the Japanese hierarchy that surrender would not mean the end of the Emperor or the nation, could U.S. strategic propaganda claim any unambiguous success.<sup>724</sup> As Wallace Carroll put it decades later, "As you got closer to the front, the Americans got more successful.", claiming that U.S. psywar was "only moderately successful" in strategic psywar.<sup>725</sup> Much of this local success and strategic failure is undoubtedly due to the fact that the Army overall took little interest in psywar. As the official history of psywar in the Mediterranean Theater put it forthrightly: "The War Department had made little, if any provision for an over-all psychological warfare representation in Washington." The report continued that "although the manuals stated that psywar was a G-2 General Staff (in itself probably a mistake), the Army "took almost no cognizance" of psywar groups in the Mediterranean and "certainly was of little assistance."<sup>726</sup> And the same could be said for each of the World War American theaters of operations. Paul Linebarger claimed that "The plans at the top [such as they were] bore no observable relation to the operations at the bottom."<sup>727</sup> (Many psywarriors likely thought such lack of "assistance" as more of a blessing.)

Army psywar war lacked any figure of stature in Washington to champion psychological warfare, to bring it before the counsels of government and to fight for its funding and inclusion in operations planning.<sup>728</sup> One need only think of the contributions of General "Wild Bill" Donovan in mounting very successful guerilla and subversive warfare against the enemy in the face of Army indifference, ignorance

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facts stated are either false or falsely presented.", 12.

<sup>723</sup>Sparangara, 173.

<sup>724</sup>Daugherty, "Captain Zacharias' Broadcasts to Japan," *Casebook*; Ellis M. Zacharias, *Secret Missions* (New York: 1946).

<sup>725</sup>Carroll videotape interview.

<sup>726</sup>"Psywar in the Mediterranean," 76. Another American psywar veteran claimed that "It is doubtful that Washington policy in psychological Warfare had much influence over field operations.", D. V. McGranahan, letter in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall 1946).

<sup>727</sup>Linebarger, "Psywar in World War II," 45.

<sup>728</sup>Laurie thesis, 348. This statement in no way detracts from the yeoman work of Generals McClure and Fellers; but these champions and practitioners of psywar in ETO and SWPA respectively, were, of course, field commanders.

and downright opposition to realize the effects of this absence on the fortunes of American psywarriors. The thorough study made after the war of the opinions of World War II psywarriors summarized that "Throughout the interviews, there was evidence of great resistance during World War II to the use of psywar on the part of military personnel not directly associated with psywar activities; their resistance was evident from top to bottom echelons."<sup>729</sup> But, in fairness, it should be pointed out that, in the words of a veteran authority on the subject,

Too many psychological warriors acted as though a special intelligence and intuition were required to prepare an attack on the morale of enemy troops. This not only caused some commanders to suspect their judgment, but also led to needless duplication of effort.<sup>730</sup>

American psywarriors were more or less on their own in the field, at the mercy of local commanders.

It was also unfortunate that at the end of the war no study was made of psychological warfare comparable to that of the massive *United States Strategic Bombing Survey* of the effects of Allied bombing on enemy nations. A similar survey of psywar during World War II might well have gone far to persuade the Army of its value during the Korean War only five years later. As it turned out, U.S. psywarriors had, once again, as in World War I and World War II, to begin almost anew the weary and wasteful process of attempting to enlighten their superiors as to what psywar was and how it could be used.

This loss was the more tragic, in that by 1945 psywar had developed to the point where "any combat commander, down to the regimental level, could request, and usually obtain, within hours, a specially designed, supposedly effective, propaganda leaflet for distribution by artillery shell or tactical aircraft to a specific enemy unit in his path of advance."<sup>731</sup>

World War II psywar personnel were virtually unanimous in their conviction that securing adequate personnel was one of the most significant and enduring problems they faced during that conflict. "We were so desperate for personnel that we literally grabbed anything we could get,"<sup>732</sup> Those who had the qualifications: language skills, writing, journalism and broadcasting experience were not likely to be drafted. Instead they primarily volunteered for intelligence or the many Home Front

<sup>729</sup>*Views of World War II Personnel*, 4. But staff officers who thought psywar "bunk" were still quite ready to interfere when they did not approve of a leaflet concept or when they felt they needed an answer to enemy psywar. Kehm, "Military Psywar."

<sup>730</sup>*Ibid.*, 118.

<sup>731</sup>C. Laurie, "Wonder Weapon or Reach Echelon Insanity: The U.S. Army and Psychological Warfare," typescript paper, n.d. (presented at Center of Military History: 1993).

<sup>732</sup>*Views of World War II Personnel*, 90.

government agencies. Those who did find their way into psywar faced the anomaly of the highly-paid, loosely-disciplined OWI civilians working in juxtaposition with military pay scale troops in the same units. The situation was fraught with tension, suspicion, and mutual misunderstanding. The only difference of opinion on this point was whether it had been a necessary evil to attract those who otherwise would go into some other line of war work, or whether civil employment should simply be abolished in any future psywar.<sup>733</sup> In the end, with the abolition of the OWI immediately after the end of World War II the question resolved itself; henceforth Army psychological warfare would be completely in the hands of the Army.

But military or civilian, ETO or Pacific, Army psywarriors distinguished themselves, in the words of Paul Linebarger, by their "industry, patience, and the delivery of a first-class news service." Although the *Passierschein* and the "I Cease Resistance" leaflets were very successful in the field, both German and Japanese soldiers agreed that the most welcomed Allied psywar publications were the news sheets, and in the ETO at least, there is almost the suspicion that in the final weeks of the war, some German troops surrendered just to keep up with the news. Such popularity cannot always be quantified in terms of numbers of POWs, but it must have had its effect on enemy troop morale: How convinced of ultimate victory can a soldier be who consistently can read only the enemy's newspapers?

Army psywarriors benefited from several lessons learned from World War I. The first was that "Atrocity propaganda begets atrocity propaganda." Further, an enemy soldier who reads of the atrocities supposedly committed by his army may be reluctant to surrender for fear that he may face the revenge of his enemies. At any rate, accounts of German atrocities in World War II had been widely disbelieved although they were all too true, due to the fact that Allied tales of German atrocities in World War I had been believed at the time, when they were for the most part untrue. Only in a few specific instances did PWD or the PWBs in World War II engage in such propaganda, as, for example, when several of the Doolittle Raiders were beheaded by the Japanese. Even here, counter-atrocity propaganda had as its goal, not the whipping up of sentiment against the enemy, but specifically the prevention of future atrocities.<sup>734</sup> Also, in contrast to their World War I attacks on the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, psywarriors in World War II, refrained from general attacks, confining their attacks to the Nazis, the high command or Japanese "militarists." Finally, Allied psywarriors avoided any of World War I's "revolutionary" propaganda. No one told the Germans or the Japanese to rise against their rulers who had brought them such misery.<sup>735</sup> Instead, they were given specific steps to take to get

<sup>733</sup>Ibid.; Kehm, "Organization for Military Psywar."

<sup>734</sup>Linebarger, "Psyop in World War II," pt. 2.

<sup>735</sup>Owen Lattimore, however, was enamored of the "political" slogans the Chinese communists instilled in their Japanese POWs: "Cease Hostilities Immediately!", "Make a Just Peace!", or "Improve the Living Standards of the Laboring Masses!", all quite impossible for the individual captured soldier. Lattimore memo to George

out of the war, i.e. to surrender unconditionally, both individually and nationally.<sup>736</sup> But these lessons were few in number, and the learning process painfully slow. The comment of an OWI executive just after the war after reading George Creel's account of American propaganda in World War I, if not entirely accurate, is indicative: "Good Lord, those people made the same mistakes we made!"<sup>737</sup>

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Taylor.  
<sup>736</sup>D. V. McGranahan, ltr to *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall 1946. There is no documentary evidence that psywarriors of World War II conscientiously tried to learn from World War I psywar experience, but the differences are obvious.  
<sup>737</sup>Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 103.

## THE KOREAN WAR

The Korean Conflict could be truly termed America's first "ideological" war. In previous major conflicts the nation felt physically threatened, and attempts to win, say, the Germans from Nazism to democracy in World War II were incidental to the goal of total military victory and national security. When the United States and the United Nations entered the Korean War within days of its outbreak the goal was not victory but rather to "halt the spread of communism," to "show the Free World's resolve," to "punish aggression," etc.<sup>738</sup> Conversely, the North Koreans and the Chinese proclaimed their "righteous cause" as one of driving the "imperialists" from the peninsula and uniting Korea under "socialism." For both sides, these were primarily ideological aims. The fact that peace in Korea was delayed by nearly two years of intense and acrimonious negotiations primarily over the very ideological issue of whether POWs should be repatriated against their will should give some indication of the passion of this conflict

In the field, not surprisingly, both sides waged intense psychological warfare.<sup>739</sup> Yet histories of this most ideological of wars have for the most part

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<sup>738</sup>The propaganda consequences of this ideological war theme are brought out in J. K. Kim's "Themes in Korean War-Era Leaflets: Implications for Future North-South Korean & Korean-U.S. Dialogues," paper prepared for delivery at the First International Conference on Korean Studies in the U.S. ....", Michigan State University, East Lansing, 7-11 July 1993; as well as material cited below and practically all popular media of the time. Throughout the war there was a strong feeling that the United States was losing the propaganda war and that the apocalypse of World War III might well be imminent.

<sup>739</sup>"Psychological Warfare" was the term employed throughout the Korean War, with occasional reversion to the World War I term "propaganda," now discredited through its usage by the Nazis. Shortly after the Korean armistice, the term "Psychological Operations" began to gain favor, primarily in recognition that U.S. propaganda could also be directed toward friendly civilians and that even operations directed toward enemy civilians also did not quite merit the suffix "Warfare." During the Korean War, U.S. Army psywar operated under the definition contained in Army *Special Text #5, Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations* (Department of the Army, Washington: August 1949): [Psychological warfare] consists of activities, other than combat, which communicate ideas and information intended to affect the minds, emotions and actions of the enemy, and which are conducted by a military command in conjunction with its combat operations, for the purpose of reducing the enemy

glossed over psychological warfare, and the official histories of the U.S. Army in Korea give the briefest of references to the subject.<sup>740</sup> Yet the U.S. Eighth Army, starting from very little, would conduct far-ranging, professional psychological warfare in the field against enemy troops and civilians. In fact, looking at the large volume of surviving Far East Command (FEC)/Eighth U.S. Army leaflets, it could be argued that the Korean War saw the highest development of the American psychological warfare (psywar) leaflet.

With the end of World War II, the U.S. Army had rapidly dismantled its extensive psychological operations network, one that on V-J Day stretched from Prague to Myitkyina, along with its gigantic military structure that had won the Second World War. To be fair, it should be noted that the Army did preserve slightly more continuity in military psywar than it had during the post-World War I years.

In Occupied Germany, the High Commissioner for the U.S. Zone, Lucius Clay, claimed to be ready for speedy counter-propaganda against the Soviets by 1947-1948. And General MacArthur in the Far East had a major propaganda support section on American-occupied Okinawa that not only could "reeducate the Japanese in the ways of democracy", but, like Clay, could supposedly counter Soviet/communist propaganda from the start.<sup>741</sup>

On the initiative of Under Secretary of War William Draper, the Army commissioned Wallace Carroll, an accomplished veteran of the OWI's wars within World War II, to prepare a study of the possible Army role in psywar. The Carroll Report, submitted in February 1949, recommended a separate "unit" to take charge of all Army psywar responsibilities.<sup>742</sup> Not surprisingly, nothing would come of this

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In the final year of the war, the definition had not basically changed, although "friendly, and neutral populations" were added to the "enemy" target. Psywar School, *Psychological Warfare, Field Operations* (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: February 1953), 2.

<sup>740</sup>Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, The United States Army in Korea* (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington) contains one footnote on the topic, as does Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951: United States Army in the Korean War* (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington: 1990), plus one brief text reference to enemy strategic PSYOP (56-57); James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction, the First Year: United States Army in the Korean War* (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington: 1972) also has entries only on enemy PSYOP. However, the Army did conduct numerous contemporary studies of psywar and its effectiveness, and reference will be made to these studies herein.

<sup>741</sup>Nelson O. Wood, "Strategic Psychological Warfare and the Truman Administration: A Study of National Psychological Warfare, Aims, Objectives, and Effectiveness," Ph.D. thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1982.

<sup>742</sup>Paddock, 60.

report's recommendations until the onslaught of the Korean War.

In September of 1949 the Chief of Information established the Army Information Committee, which included representatives from P&O, to coordinate Army psywar. But on 29 June 1949 that committee was abolished in the wake of the meat-ax military budget cutting programs of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson.

Far more significantly, psywar was dropped from Army training programs, from military schools and curricula, and from Tables of Organization and Equipment for Army units.<sup>743</sup> An indication of the Army's lackadaisical attitude toward psywar was the action of the Director of Organization and Training in May 1949 who casually lumped psywar with atomic, radiological, subversive warfare and guided missiles as "new developments [in warfare] or modifications of previous developments.", as though the extensive psywar of the First and Second World Wars had for all intents and purposes never taken place.<sup>744</sup>

In 1950 the Army did establish the rather obscure Psywar Branch of Military Intelligence Services, a division of G-2. Just three days before the outbreak of war in Korea this Branch became the Psychological Warfare Section of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff as a special staff in Army General Headquarters.<sup>745</sup> Most of this organization and reorganization seems more like paper-shuffling and wheel-spinning, the more surprising in that two Secretaries of War/Army at the time, Gordon Gray and Frank Pace, Jr, had expressed more than casual interest in the subject.<sup>746</sup> Looking back to World War II, a veteran psywarrior of that conflict had already warned that "The United States cannot afford to persist in its indifference toward political and psychological warfare [,] trusting that it will be able to rely on improvisation once

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<sup>743</sup>Undated report, (Army Staff), Psywar Administrative Office Records Branch, Record Group 319, Decimal File 1951-54, entry 338, box 17, folder 314.7; K. K. Hansen, "Psywar in Korea" (Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington: 1960), 6. Colonel Hansen's lengthy typescript is undocumented, but in that he was at one time chief of Far East Command/ Army Forces Far East psywar section, his work deserves serious consideration. *Tactical Psychological Warfare, Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations.*; Paddock, 65. An article in the influential *Air University Quarterly Review* claimed that "past wars and particularly World War II, have proven conclusively that psychological warfare is a major strategic and tactical weapon..." and warned that "the USAF, ... will be required to exploit to the fullest its capacity for waging psychological warfare,....", B. Peters, "The USAF and Psychological Warfare," *AUQR*, spring, 1949.

<sup>744</sup>Ibid., 64. The Army did, however, publish Field Manual 33-5, *Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations* (August 1949), a straightforward technical effort that incorporated many of the lessons from World War II psywar.

<sup>745</sup>W. Kendall and J. Ponturo, *FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Theater Staff Organization* (ORO, Baltimore: 1 January 1952), 14.

<sup>746</sup>Paddock, *passim*.

more.<sup>747</sup>

The Army did commission "Project POWWOW" in early 1949, a study "to determine, by scientific analysis and synthesis, the maximally effective weapons, instruments, and techniques that may be employed by ground forces in the conduct of psychological warfare operations.", which were an "essential factor in time of war and threat of war." Many of the studies of psywar in the Korean War, which can prove very useful to researchers, were the results of this study.<sup>748</sup> And exactly one year earlier, the Air Force had established its Psychological Warfare Division. But neither of these initiatives could show results until well after the outbreak of war in Korea.<sup>749</sup> More concretely, the Army published its first manuals on psywar since 1944, one in 1947, the other two years later.<sup>750</sup> In addition, the Army actually formed a special unit, the Tactical Information Detachment, armed with loudspeakers and leaflets, which participated in maneuvers in the continental United States, the Caribbean area, and Hawaii, attached to the "enemy" forces and directing psywar, oddly, against U.S. troops.<sup>751</sup>

The psywar situation had progressed somewhat further in the Army's Far East Command, where General MacArthur in 1947 had ordered the formation of an actual Psychological Warfare Section (sometimes also termed a branch), to be known as the "Special Projects Division," in his Intelligence section. This five-man office, headed by a civilian, and constituted for planning purposes only, had written the psywar annex to the Far East Theater Emergency Plan.<sup>752</sup>

On the eve of the Korean War, a contemporary report accurately stated that "it was abundantly clear that the 'know how' of psywar, gained in World

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<sup>747</sup>Hans Speier, "The Future of Psychological Warfare," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1948), 8.

<sup>748</sup>M. Dyer, J. Segal, *The POWWOW TMs: An Assessment of ORO Psywar Research* (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore: 13 June 1956).

<sup>749</sup>"Air Resupply and Communications Service Manual, Air Psychological Warfare: A Basic Guide," HQ, Air Resupply and Communications Service (Washington: 1 October 1953).

<sup>750</sup>Army Ground School, FM 33-5, *Tactical Psychological Warfare; the Combat Psychological Warfare Detachment* (Fort Riley, Kansas: September 1947), Department of the Army, FM 33-5, *Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations* (Washington: August 1949).

<sup>751</sup>Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 301; C. A. Brown, "Student Individual Study", Army War College student individual study, Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: April 1954), 8.

<sup>752</sup>George S. Pettee, *Psywar Operations in the Korean War* (Operations Research Office, Fort McNair, Washington: 23 January 1951), 13-14; Stephen E. Pease, *Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953* (Harrisburg: 1992), 15; Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 301; "Psychological Warfare in Korea: An Interim Report," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1951) (no author cited).



War II, had largely vanished and was not set forth in writing, but was locked up in the minds of operators who had gone back to civilian pursuits....<sup>753</sup>

Less than twenty-four hours after President Truman's decision, one C-46 transport aircraft of the 37<sup>th</sup> Troop Carrier Wing dropped the first leaflet of the Korean War urging South Korean troops and civilians to stand firm and pledging that Free World forces would soon come to their aid and throw back the aggressor. This first U.S. psywar effort, composed in typescript and with only the UN logo for illustration, was fairly primitive by World War II standards or in comparison with what was to come in this war. But almost twelve million were printed and dropped, by far the largest one-day dissemination of the war. The second leaflet basically repeated the same message, but also carried a photograph of General MacArthur. and his generals, presumably to build confidence.<sup>754</sup> Two thirds of the text of both leaflets were composed of Chinese characters, a commendable reflection of FEAF's realization that most literate Koreans of that generation had to do much of their reading in Mandarin Chinese. For the remainder of that conflict, leaflets would remain the primary media for U.S. psychological warfare.

The communists also were fairly quick off the mark in their psywar, with enemy-controlled Radio Seoul featuring the broadcast of a captured U.S. Army infantry officer denouncing American intervention only four days after the large-scale commitment of U.S. troops.<sup>755</sup> One of the earliest enemy leaflets, dropped just before the disastrous loss of Taejon in July, asked a lot in stilted English:

Dear Conscientious officers and sergeants! Do surrender as soon as possible with all the men under your command. Dear Friends! Be relieved and surrender.<sup>756</sup>

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<sup>753</sup>Dyer and Segal, *POWWOW*, 6.

<sup>754</sup>All UNC/Eighth Army psywar leaflets were printed on both sides. The work describes the art or messages on the predominant side. Many leaflets would have a particular theme or message on one side and a surrender message on the reverse side. Unless otherwise indicated, all leaflets cited or reproduced are from USASOC History Archives.

<sup>755</sup>"Answer to Sue," *Newsweek*, 4 September 1950. This article noted that while "Seoul City Sue" spoke "perfect English in a well-modulated voice with just the faintest suspicion of an accent..," captured GIs were "obviously recorded ...in a jargon no American would use unless he had spent his life reading the *Daily Worker*.", *ibid*.

<sup>756</sup>Hall; Harriss, 46-47; Gladys and Marcella Thum, *The Persuaders: Propaganda in War and Peace* (New York: 1972), 70-71). This early communist leaflet was undoubtedly the last enemy message disseminated by air; for the rest of the war the UN had complete aerial battlefield supremacy.

The Army continued its wasteful "shoveling out" of leaflets from transport aircraft, a practice that had led to complications throughout World War II. This "method" affected the trim of the aircraft and required two crewmen to leave their posts at the most critical period of the mission. Bundled leaflets might hit the tail unit or aerial. Loose leaflets swirling about inside the fuselage could foul controls and distract the crew, who might well be already under heavy enemy ground fire at the low altitudes generally flown to ensure some degree of accuracy for their deliveries. All of this was a well-known lesson from World War II, forgotten.<sup>757</sup>

One of the few major advances over the previous conflict was the realization that surrender or defection was a sequential process. To further this process, U.S. psywarriors began to use extensively the themes of homesickness, loneliness, and fear of death, to "soften up" enemy troops for surrender.<sup>758</sup> Even in its messages directed toward civilians, Army psywar ordinarily avoided political matters ("End the War!", "Communism is Slavery!") unless their military implications and significance were clear, and for the most part held to military subjects.<sup>759</sup> This sensible reluctance to use political themes was in strong contrast to communist propaganda, which often called upon GIs to end "the unjust war," "send a message to Truman," "Bring the Troops Home," etc.

Psychological warfare radio played an important role in this war, although primarily in a strategic mode. But it should be noted that the first U.S. radio psychological warfare broadcasts of the war went out over Radio

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<sup>757</sup>Charles Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare, 1939-1945* (London: 1977), 87; W. P. Davidson, "Air Force Psychological Warfare in Korea," RAND brief (n.d.) in Psychological Warfare Administrative Office Records Branch, Decimal File, 1951-54, box No. 7, "091 Korea" folder, p. 46. A photo of swirling leaflets inside a C-47 is in [anon.] "Paper Bombs in Korea, *New York Times Magazine*, 25 February 1951. The veteran and eminent psywarrior, Paul Linebarger, vividly recalled his light aircraft hugging the Korean valleys in a probably futile attempt to make his aerial public address system heard, and "instead of using up-to-the-minute gadgets to disperse leaflets the author joined the young officers in the plane in throwing the leaflets out of the plane door by hand." The veteran psywarrior thought wistfully of the leaflet bombs and dispensers used in Europe and Burma in the last war. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington: 1954), 265.

<sup>758</sup>Stephen E. Pease, *Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953* (Harrisburg: 1992), 17-18.

<sup>759</sup>D. M. Rauh, Office of the Chief of Military History, draft ms. "Psychological Warfare, 25 June 1950...through 30 January." 1951," 1-4. (Copy in Center of Military History Archives).

Japan almost 24 hours after the first leaflet drop, a rather surprising development, considering the more extensive preparation required for leaflet dissemination. The earliest broadcasts were of one-half hour duration, soon increased to one hour twice per day, consisting of news and propaganda. By mid-August, 19 medium and short-wave transmitters of the Broadcast Corporation of Japan were being used to transmit psywar programs to Korea, North and South, although only nine transmitters were used for any single program. Broadcasts later in the war, naturally, were considerably more sophisticated and ecumenical, adding cultural programs, commentaries, and even soap operas to their schedules.<sup>760</sup>

Later in the war, Eighth Army did use tactical radio psywar to some extent when it employed two dulcet-voiced Asian ladies, one Korean, *Moran Bong* ("Peony Peak"); the other Chinese, *Lhanssa* ("Flowery Grace"), to broadcast to enemy troops in the field. Both harped on, among other pertinent themes, the new Chinese marriage law permitting easier divorce if a wife had not heard from her soldier-husband for two years.<sup>761</sup> *Lhanssa* had proved so popular that Eighth Army psywarriors decided to have a "pin-up" leaflet made of the oriental imagined beauty, complete with slit skirt and jewelry, and dropped over Chinese lines. But Chinese POWs rejected the proposed pin-up as someone who "would never have time for poor peasants like us." The seductive *Lhanssa* version was quickly dropped and the Chinese restaurants of Tokyo and Yokohama scoured for a Chinese girl-next-door type. This new, fresh-faced peasant lass was posed with a fish knife beside a large red snapper and proved much more entrancing, according to responding Chinese POWs.<sup>762</sup>

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<sup>760</sup>George S. Pettee, *Psywar Operations in the Korean War*, Operations Research Office, (Fort McNair, Washington: 23 January 1951. Pettee gives figures of 30,000 radio receiving sets in the Republic of Korea in March 1949 and 20,000 in the Democratic Republic of Korea in December 1950, 49-50. Linebarger, points out that most U.S. broadcasting in Korea was of a strategic or Civil Affairs nature., 321; W. Schramm, Technical Memorandum, *FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio* (ORO, Baltimore [?], Tokyo [?]: 25 February 1952), passim.

<sup>761</sup>"Psychological Strategy as a Preventive of Larger War" (interview with General McClure), *U.S. News and World Report*, 2 (January 1953). BG Robert McClure, chief of Department of the Army psywar, noting the erratic power supply in North Korea (despite its enormous hydroelectric plants), the confiscated radios, police control, and worn-out batteries, admitted that "Radio broadcasting [was] probably the least effective" of U.S. psywar media in Korea.<sup>761</sup> Oddly, McClure did not cite responses from enemy POWs, who, judging from the *Lhanssa* episode, at least listened to U.S. radio broadcasts, those few who could.

<sup>762</sup>K. K. Hansen, "Psywar in Korea," Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army (Washington:

過年時你在異鄉想念她  
她却在家中焦急地  
盼望着你……

明年你能回家和她團圓吃年夜飯嗎？



"Lhansa," the Chinese "girl next door."

U.S. psywar troops did not make the first drop of a leaflet aimed specifically and exclusively at enemy forces until 13 July 1950. Four days later they dropped 800,000 copies of *Parachute News*, the first edition of what would later develop into *Free World Weekly News* into one of the most influential or at least most consistently read of American leaflet types of the war. But only in two of the first five months of the war did enemy troops receive as much leaflet attention as did Republic of Korea civilians and soldiers.<sup>763</sup>

Within less than a month after the beginning of hostilities in Korea, it had become obvious that the FEC Psychological Warfare Section could not handle both the planning and the operation of the rapidly-expanding war in Korea. These functions were thus separated, as in World War II. Strategic psywar would be waged by the 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1<sup>st</sup> RB&L), and tactical psywar by the 1<sup>st</sup> Leaflet and Loudspeaker Company (1<sup>st</sup> L&L). The 1<sup>st</sup> RB&L was primarily based in Tokyo, under FEC Psywar Section, the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L in Seoul and Pusan. By the middle of July the Army's single Tactical Information Detachment from Fort Riley, Kansas had been rushed to Korea to establish an organized tactical psywar capability. This detachment would form the core of the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L Company, which itself would not become operational until the end of the year.<sup>764</sup> Obviously, with no end of the conflict in sight and the UN military commitment increasing almost exponentially, there was a greater requirement for psywar in the field directed specifically to enemy units and soldiers. On the relatively few occasions it had been employed, such missions had, in the words of one official study "brought results out of all proportion to the efforts and resources involved,"<sup>765</sup> Tactical

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1960), 125-126, 160-165.

<sup>763</sup>"Korean War Leaflets" box, USASOC Directorate of History and Museums. Daugherty gives a date for the first leaflet for North Korean troops of 9 August, but the leaflet evidence in the album shows the earlier date.

Daugherty, "Evaluation and Analysis of Leaflet Program in the Korean Campaign, June-December 1950" (ORO, Washington: 23 January 1951), 9-10. But Daugherty was undoubtedly correct when he claimed that the news sheet during the first six months of the war was basically a waste of time, due to its poor quality and obvious propaganda nature; *ibid.*, *passim*.

<sup>764</sup>Jack K. Norris, "Tactical Psychological Warfare," student paper, Army War College, 1 March 1954, 15; Pettee, 8; Hansen, 8. Norris claims that the detachment was not operational until March of 1951, 8.

<sup>765</sup>Linebarger, 301-305; John Ponturo, *Psychological Operations at Lower Echelons in Eighth Army, July 1952-July 1953* (ORO, Washington: 25 January 1953), 5, 9; Daugherty, "Evaluation and Analysis of Leaflet Program in the Korean Campaign, June-December 1950," ORO, Washington: 23 January 1951), claimed that all of the leaflets to the end of 1950 were strategic., 3.

psywar was confined to a strip across the Korean peninsula 40 miles forward of 8<sup>th</sup> Army's line of contact with the enemy, although there was overlapping with strategic operations within this zone, particularly in radio broadcasting.

During the desperate Pusan Perimeter fighting, U.S. leaflets stressed the growing might of the UN military--"Time is Running Out!" (for the North)--and the alternative: surrender and good treatment.<sup>766</sup> Further messages of encouragement were dropped over South Korean troops and civilians, along with warnings to the latter to evacuate battle areas. A vivid red-and-blue leaflet also alerted citizens to evacuate ten major North Korean cities that would soon be bombed because of their military significance. These weeks saw the first specific safe conduct/surrender leaflet, which also carried a message in English ordering UN soldiers to treat the bearer "as an honorable prisoner of war." Unfortunately, before the war's end, there were to be no less than six different versions, which often confused possible defectors, who might wonder which was the current valid version. (to complicate matters further, many UN psywar leaflets stressing other themes, carried a surrender leaflet on the reverse side.).<sup>767</sup> In this grim war, the North Koreans, of all people, had some fun duplicating a UN leaflet and making exactly the same promises in the same words, changing only the sponsorship. ("Show this pass to any UN soldier or ROK soldier & they will guarantee for you:/"Show this pass to the Korean People's Army, or the Chinese Volunteers & they will guarantee for you:", etc.

Throughout the dispiriting UN retreat to the Pusan Perimeter and the fierce fighting along that line, U.S. psywar could point to little tangible success. Eighth Army had captured only a few more than 1,100 enemy troops by mid-September.<sup>768</sup>

But with the Inchon landings well behind North Korean lines, on 15 September, U.S. psywar personnel were able to claim increasing numbers of enemy POWs as evidence of the success of their efforts. Ten days after the landings, 13 B-29s dropped a large number of surrender leaflets. While some Far East Air Force (FEAF) officers thought the effort excessive, FEAF Intelligence rated the mission as "highly profitable." Near Seoul, for example, 104 enemy soldiers were reported as having surrendered, each carrying a copy of those surrender leaflets.<sup>769</sup> The highest-ranking enemy POW of the war, the Chief of Staff of the North Korean 13<sup>th</sup> Division, surrendered at this time,

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<sup>766</sup>"The Korean Safe Conducts," in D. C. Pollock, et al, *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application*, Pamphlet No. 525-7-11 (Department of the Army, Washington: April 1976), 407.

<sup>767</sup>Berger, 61.

<sup>768</sup>Appleman, 546.

<sup>769</sup>Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in the Korean War* (Washington: 1983), 167.

claiming that having heard of the Inchon landings through U.S. leaflets he had concluded that he was on the losing side.<sup>770</sup> In October, a C-47 loudspeaker plane, working with a T-6 spotter plane and four F-51 fighters, spotted two enemy trucks loaded with troops heading toward Anju (40 miles north of Pyongyang). In a finely-coordinated operation, the voice plane warned the troops that they would be attacked by the F-51s if they did not turn around and head south. Immediately reversing course, the trucks were joined by two more vehicles emerging from camouflaged positions and no less than 300 additional North Korean soldiers who had been hiding alongside the road.<sup>771</sup> In fact, it was at this time, September through November 1950, that the UN Command garnered by far its greatest number of POWs as the retreating North Korean armies streamed northward in disarray. But Chinese intervention late in the year and the UN retreat to south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel reversed the UNC's battlefield and PSYOP success.

However, the gloomy new year of 1951 did see a surprising number of studies published on psywar in Korea to date. The Army contract study *Psywar in Korea* concluded that "improvisation for psywar in Korea has been compulsory" due to the suddenness of the outbreak of war after years of the Army's more or less ignoring of the subject. The author pointed out further that although the 160,000,000 leaflets of 100 different types dropped to date in Korea might seem impressive, it was still small in comparison to the numbers dropped solely in the Philippines during World War II. Dealing with the effectiveness of Army psywar, the study noted that of 2,728 enemy POWs interrogated on one occasion, 904 claimed that psywar was responsible for their surrendering. A smaller sampling of 561 POWs reported that no less than 377 attributed their surrendering either to the reading a U.S. leaflet or to having been ordered by UN forces in one way or another to surrender.<sup>772</sup> Another survey attempted to avoid any pro-UN bias in its conclusions by asking roughly 750 POWs more indirect questions in a "probing, conversational" framework. These prisoners asserted the greatest obstacle to surrender was their fear of being killed. Oddly, this group also claimed that the word of local villagers was very important in overcoming this fear. The promise of cigarettes and freedom from hard labor as well as safety from aerial attack were important to these captives, most of whom claimed that they believed the "happy POW" accounts in many leaflets, and were also susceptible to homesickness themes.<sup>773</sup> Another group of 768 North Koreans and 238

<sup>770</sup>Rauh, no pagination.

<sup>771</sup>Hansen, 93-94.

<sup>772</sup>Pettee, 5, 7-8, 42, 48.

<sup>773</sup>R. C. Sheldon and H. Senft, *Preliminary Evaluations of Psywar Leaflets and Broadcasts from IPOR POW Interrogations* (International Public Opinion Research, Washington: 22 February 1951). The primacy of villagers'

이것이 바로 공산주의가 가져다 준 악마의  
마스크입니다. 이것이 바로 공산주의의  
진면목입니다.



弟兄們！這就是  
中蘇友好對你的結果  
立刻逃到後方去，  
或到聯合國這邊來！

7225

"You're going to die!" Hard to improve on this excellently-drawn leaflet.



FAR EAST COMMAND  
First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group  
APO 500

5 January 1953

LEAFLET: Support For Friendship  
LANGUAGE: Chinese  
DESIGNATION: 7225  
TARGET: CCF in Korea  
REMARKS: Leaflet (Divisive) designed to show that Sino-Soviet Friendship is a one-way bargain for China and means ultimate death to the CCF soldier.  
ART WORK: Front: Cartoon of Mao serving Stalin dishes labeled Port Arthur, Dairen, Changchun R.R., Sinkiang Special Rights, Chinese Petroleum and Metal Special Rights, Chinese Aerial Navigation Rights, Chinese Resources and Minerals, and Chinese Domination.  
Back: A skeleton wearing a CCF uniform.

TEXT:

Page 1: Cartoon with caption:  
Chinese-Soviet Friendship. This is how Mao supports it!

Page 2: Illustration:  
This is what Sino-Soviet Friendship means to you, soldier.  
Escape to the Rear or the UN now!

Note: The following message in Korean appears on both sides:

"This is a UN message to the CCF. Post it for them to see!"

Chinese prisoners gave roughly the same answers, ranking the U.S. psywar themes in order of effectiveness as: 1) Promise to be sent home after the war, 2) How to surrender, 3) Good POW treatment, 4) MacArthur's signature on any leaflet, and 5) "Preserve your life." This batch of prisoners claimed that they had discussed the leaflets among themselves, despite their officers' prophylactic and punitive measures, and that the leaflets had little influence on those officers or NCOs. The report made a useful distinction between those captives from "routed" and those from "going" North Korean units, noting that:

Actually in both routed and going armies those troops who saw leaflets revealed a markedly greater tendency to surrender than those who did not....Among those who saw leaflets there were four surrenders for every five captures. Among those who had not seen leaflets [one-half of the sample] the captives outnumbered surrenderees by two and one-half to one.<sup>774</sup>

The most far-ranging of these studies at this time concluded that "The enemy has shown, by his own emphasis on psywar, by specific imitations of U.S. methods so far as his resources permit, and by his strenuous counter-measures, that he takes psywar seriously." These were mere beginnings, however. The same study conceded that research in enemy culture, morale, issues, personalities, ideas, etc., "has barely been initiated."<sup>775</sup>

A more thoroughgoing critique of U.S. psywar efforts in the first six months of the war was offered by William Daugherty, a psywar veteran of World War II and one of the most experienced and prolific civilian authorities on combat psychological warfare. Daugherty found that the leaflet campaign still lacked concentration and precision of distribution, that some fundamental rules of propaganda had been disregarded, such as giving needless publicity to the charges of the enemy ("The UN does not mistreat its prisoners."), wasting messages on the converted (leaflets denouncing communism to refugees fleeing the communists); obscure messages: (informing the enemy soldier that his life is miserable under the communists but failing to spell out what he could do about it). Daugherty also found psywar intelligence particularly inadequate, with no systematic interrogation, no attempt to obtain a cross-section of POWs, but rather an easy reliance on the highest-ranking, most articulate captives.

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influences in this period was confirmed in *An Evaluation of Psywar Influence on North Korean Troops* (ORO, Baltimore: 23 July 1951). These POWs gave leaflets second rank, then persuasion by fellow soldiers, and finally, separation from units. Loudspeakers and broadcasts were in last rank., v.

<sup>774</sup>*An Evaluation of Psywar Influence*, vii.

<sup>775</sup>Pettee, 4.

Furthermore most prisoners had become "stale" in captivity before they were interrogated. Daugherty found to his horror English, Japanese, or Korean-speaking prisoners interrogating other Chinese POWs. ("This is not only inefficient, it is dangerous."). Daugherty had little good to say about the execution of what was at least an effective idea from World War II, the air-dropped news sheet. ("none of the issues in this *Parachute News* series contained news...."), and asserted that the sheet was generally poor propaganda.<sup>776</sup> Obviously, much had been lost since World War II.

Perhaps unsatisfied with Daugherty's negative analysis, the Army a few months later, called upon the critical services of Paul A. Linebarger, who was to strategic and civilian propaganda what William Daugherty was to combat psywar. Dr. Linebarger was more positive in his critique than Daugherty and concentrated heavily on theater-level psywar. Like Daugherty, though, he too recorded the lack of good POW interrogation, but he further noted a lack of Chinese-American radio personnel, translators, "idea men," and planners, while decrying the use of Japanese personnel. (The communists would not fail to make propaganda use of the latter: "the running dogs of Wall Street are resurrecting the accursed Japanese imperialists!"). Basically, Linebarger called for an "orientalization" of the U.S. psywar effort, strategic and tactical, with the use of Chinese-type stationery, cartoons on surrender techniques, the use of letters from Chinese-American families, "currency" leaflets written in English (due to the old Chinese suspicion of Chinese banknotes), POW camp news letters produced by the inmates, and a small news sheet which would display UN troops as "human." Finally, Linebarger advocated a combined (Republic of Korea and United States) psywar organization to remove any "taint" of U.S. domination of the field.<sup>777</sup> The Daugherty and Linebarger critiques were based on observed facts, and some were indeed implemented, but to the end of the war some of the more significant shortcomings of U.S. tactical psywar remained uncorrected.

The entry of Communist China into the war and the hurried retreat of UN forces from North Korea unleashed apocalyptic visions of World War III.

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<sup>776</sup>Daugherty, *Evaluation and Analysis*, passim. Almost eight years later, Daugherty remained critical, recalling some disturbing attitudes among U.S. psywar personnel in Korea, at least during the first year of the war. Division psywarriors seemed to feel that their job had been accomplished if they covered the ground with leaflets, any leaflets; and the officer in charge of Radio Seoul asserted that his primary job was to see to it that his Korea nationals performed their work on schedule. Daugherty and M. Janowitz, "Evaluation of Combat Propaganda," in Daugherty, ed., in collaboration with M. Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*. ORO, Baltimore. 1958.687-691. Interestingly, none of the offending leaflets seem to have survived.

<sup>777</sup>P. M. A. Linebarger, *Immediate Improvement of Theater-Level Psychological Warfare in the Far East* (ORO, Washington: 7 June 1951).

President Truman declared a State of Emergency on 16 December 1950 and accelerated national rearmament. As a part of this rearmament, the President, on 4 April 1951, established the Psychological Strategy Board, consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, along with representation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Board was charged with the planning, coordination, and evaluation of psychological warfare at all levels.<sup>778</sup> However, it lasted only two years, probably a victim of the general *ennui* with Korea manifest from about 1952 to the end of this seemingly interminable conflict.<sup>779</sup> The Korean War was becoming the "Forgotten War" well before it finally came to an end.

Less elevated but more lasting, the Army established the Psychological Warfare Department as part of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas. The Department/School's mission was to prepare training literature, establish curricula, clarify tactical and strategic doctrine and techniques in manuals, and provide instructors for active duty and reservist psywar training. The Department became an independent Army School and moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina in early 1952, became a part of the Special Warfare School, which, became the incubus for U.S. Army Special Forces, which, in turn, soon far outgrew its psywar roots.<sup>780</sup> The School was working on five new psywar manuals by early 1951 and there was a renewed emphasis on instruction in the subject throughout other Army schools.<sup>781</sup>

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<sup>778</sup>DOD Directive, 21 April 1952, NARA RG 319 (Army Staff), Psywar Administration Office Records Branch Decimal File, 1951-55, box #3, "defense" folder; *Military Propaganda* (Fort Bragg: February, 1953), no author, no publisher, 9; R. I. Perusse, "Psychological Warfare Appraised," *Casebook*, 25.

<sup>779</sup>Raymond J. Barnett, "Psyop: What is it? And What Should We Do about it?," *Military Review* (March 1972)

<sup>780</sup>Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (National Defense University, Washington: 1982), chapt. VII-IX. See also Psychological Warfare Center/School handbooks, etc. for this period in Herbert Avedon Collection, USASOC History Archives. The theory of U.S. Army psywar by early 1951 is covered in Hall, and in "Organization for Combat Propaganda," *ibid.*, May 1951.

<sup>781</sup>Hall; L. Schlesinger and Harriet Beckwith, *Psychological Warfare Job Requirements and Training: An Evaluation of the Psychological Warfare School Curriculum* (Human Resources Research Office, Washington: 1956). For a contemporary account of the school's functioning, see John Anspacher, "Report of Temporary Duty with Psychological Warfare School and Units-in Training at Fort Riley, Kansas (9 April to 10 September 1951)," to Brigadier Robert McClure, 20 September 1951, RG 319 (Army Staff) Psywar

Reflecting this general military build-up, in early 1951 the Army raised its existing Psychological Warfare Section to become the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare under BG Robert McClure, the former head of the ETO Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF. General McClure was undoubtedly the most experienced psywarrior on active duty in the U.S. military. In addition to activating and supervising the Psychological Warfare School, the new Office established psywar instruction at the Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania), the Command and General Staff School (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) and in training programs throughout the Army Field Forces and Reserve psywar training in each Army area. Two new Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Groups were also authorized, although only one, the 1<sup>st</sup>, saw action in Korea. General McClure's first official action was to recall to active duty as many World War II psywar reservists as possible, and oversee the activation of the 1<sup>st</sup> RB&L at Fort Riley for service in Korea. In addition to formalizing psywar intelligence and evaluation, McClure called for support for "dissident groups" and guerrillas in the Soviet empire, and later termed his new office a "hot war laboratory," a fairly commonplace sentiment at the time.<sup>782</sup>

In late January 1951, Eighth Army established its own Psychological Warfare Division, headed by Colonel, K. K. Hansen, under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) to which it attached the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L Company, thus assuming control of tactical psywar from the Psychological Warfare Branch in Tokyo, certainly a more rational arrangement. By that summer the unit had grown to more than 139 military, civilian and indigenous personnel, (which number included 10 professional Chinese and Korean translators and interviewers), and had its title changed to the Psychological Warfare Section.

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Administration Office, Records Decimal File, 1951-54, entry 338, box 17, "319 Report" folder; also "Student Summary, Psywar School," 1, for lesson plans, etc., and similar material in USASOC History Archives. (The USASOC History Archives inherited the historical holdings of the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the current title of the Special Warfare School.)

<sup>782</sup>"Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army," in *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense and Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, January 1 - June 30, 1951* (Washington: 1951), 93; BG Robert McClure, "Psychological Warfare: The Operational Stage", lecture before National War College, Washington, 21 February 1951, NARA RG 319, Psychological Warfare Administrative Office Records, Branch Decimal File, 1951-54, entry 338, box 24, "addresses" folder; Hansen, 25; W. W. Dowling, "Mightier Than the Sword," *Life of the Soldier and Airman* (June 1953); [anon.] "'Psywar' Plays All Angles," *Army Times* (June [?] 1951).

8<sup>th</sup> Army PWB was responsible for the processing of psywar intelligence, the preparation of leaflet and loudspeaker messages, the direction and production and dissemination operations, as well as the preparation of the reports, files, and records that go with any such Army activities. At corps level, psywar was handled by one full-time officer, usually a major in the G-3 (Operations), responsible for leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker operations, and could request leaflets and ground loudspeaker teams, as well as select targets and schedule operations. At the division level, one officer, usually a lieutenant or captain, also in G-3, was assigned additional psywar duties of target selection and the facilitation of psywar originating at higher echelons.<sup>783</sup>

Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) psywar was carried out by an Information and Education Battalion, while a Psychological Warfare Battalion conducted counter-psywar. This arrangement was just about the opposite of that in the U.S. Army, where Information and Education units traditionally worked with civilians to counter enemy propaganda, and psychological warfare units have directed psywar directly at the enemy. Attempts to counter any effects of enemy psywar on U.S. troops, at least beyond the "Why We Fight"-type of troop indoctrination, would, as always, prove a waste of time. Throughout this war the American soldier listened to the enemy's radio broadcast when the music was up-to-date and picked up his leaflets to complete a souvenir collection. But the ROKA 1<sup>st</sup> Information and Education Battalion produced, in the words of the FEC psywar chief, "a good proportion of 8<sup>th</sup> Army leaflet copy and artwork and was of immense assistance."<sup>784</sup>

By August 1951, the 1<sup>st</sup> RB&L Group had arrived in Tokyo to wage strategic psywar directed towards both North and South Korea, its professional slots manned in large part by reserve officers with backgrounds in journalism, newspaper printing, novel and script writing, artwork, and radio technology. The Psychological Warfare School had quickly trained many in current psywar techniques, but those who were not veterans of the psywar missions of World War II obviously lacked practical experience, and almost all needed grounding in the Korean language, customs, and society. Nonetheless, by the following year the 1<sup>st</sup> RB&L could turn out leaflets in 16 languages and dialects.<sup>785</sup>

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<sup>783</sup>Pease, 98; Daugherty, *Organization and Activities of Psywar Personal in the Lower Echelons of Eighth Army, 24 January-5 April 1951* (ORO, Baltimore: 21 September 1951), 11-13.

<sup>784</sup>Ibid., 27.

<sup>785</sup>Pease, 22, 24-25; Radio Operations Division, 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, "Report on Psywar Radio Operations in Conjunction with THE KOREAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM, August 1951 - March 1952," n.d; W. Schramm, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-20 (FEC), *FEC Psychological Operations: Radio* (ORO, Baltimore [?], Tokyo [?]: 20 June 1952, noted that the 1<sup>st</sup> was designed for mobile psywar, but instead had to transmit from fixed

US. Army psywar also became more professional at the tactical level after the arrival of the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L Company in late 1950, although, due to lack of equipment, it did not take up operations until early 1951.<sup>786</sup> In fact, the Chief of Psywar for U.S. Armed Forces Far East (successor to FEC) later went so far as to doubt whether any truly tactical psywar had been fought until the arrival of the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L.<sup>787</sup> Unfortunately, the unit missed its prime psywar opportunity of the entire Korean conflict, that against the hastily retreating North Korean Army. Instead, arriving at Sasebo (Japan), in the words of one unit member, "we sat," and the unit did not reach Pusan, Korea until 1 November. Within a few weeks the Chinese had entered the war and the UN forces, again in full retreat, had no opportunity for successful psywar against an enemy once again advancing.<sup>788</sup> Although situated in the 8<sup>th</sup> Army Commander's headquarters, the 1<sup>st</sup> found little awareness of its assets. As one rather disgruntled unit member noted in the last year of the war: "In the U.S. Army, despite all the experience of the Second World War, psychological warfare was still a new concept; one which got little welcome and no encouragement from old Army men." The writer did admit that "We were rather poorly informed on the customs, religions, superstitions, prejudices, taboos, political history and geography of the area when we arrived...."<sup>789</sup> Still, for better or for worse, the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L would remain the sole Army unit of its kind to operate in Korea.<sup>790</sup>

There seemed to be some interest at the highest defense levels in Washington. Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett wrote to the Secretary of the Air Force that "It has been brought to my attention that psychological warfare activities in recent Korean operations are paying off appreciably..." and called upon the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force to further "aggressive psychological operations in Korea."<sup>791</sup> Certainly, the Secretary of

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facilities and its personnel, "who had neither area nor language training adequate to their task, and "juggled and dispersed," 2-3.

<sup>786</sup>Pettee, 29-30.

<sup>787</sup>Memo, Chief of Psywar, USAFFE, to Chief, Psywar Branch, Department of the Army, Sub: "Comments on ORO PR-1, 21 January 1951," RG 319 (Army Staff), entry 339, Psywar Admin Office, Records Branch Decimal File, 1951-54, "020 ORO" folder.

<sup>788</sup>"Informal Comments of Korean War Psywar Operators" (ORO, Baltimore: December 1953), RG 319, entry 338, Psywar Administration Office Records Branch Decimal File, 1951-54, box 7, "091 Korea" folder.

<sup>789</sup>R. A. Gallant, "More Psycho than Logical", *The Reporter*, 31 March 1953.

<sup>790</sup>See "Introduction to 1<sup>st</sup> Leaflet and Loudspeaker Company", Korea: April 1953, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>791</sup>Lovett, memo to Secretary of the Air Force, subject: "Equipment for Psychological Operations in Korea", 9 June 1951, RG 319 (Army Staff),

the Army, Frank Pace, proved a strong supporter of psywar, and the UN Commander, General Matthew Ridgway stressed quality as opposed to "burying the enemy in paper", and gave priority to tactical psywar. Ridgway's successor, General Mark Clark, rendered even more particular and consistent support throughout his tenure of command.<sup>792</sup>

U.S. psywar was somewhat circumscribed by UN policy, even at the tactical level. For example messages could not be directed to the former Chinese Nationalists troops in the Communist armies because the UN had not made a determination regarding the disposal of enemy POWs prior to an armistice. No reference could be made to a reunited Korea, also because there had been no UN decision on that matter. In addition, during the first months of the war, in the words of one early contemporary study and undoubtedly to the disgust of General MacArthur's partisans, "Policy guidance has had to tread a narrow course in order to attack communist aggression while avoiding any tendency to provoke or commit the Chinese Government or the Soviet Union."<sup>793</sup>

General McClure, from his new vantage point as chief of Army psywar, issued his initial statistics as to the effectiveness of Korean psywar. For the first two months of 1951, McClure claimed that 68 percent of Chinese Communist and 65 percent of North Korean POWs responded that they had been influenced by U.S. psywar. Of the voluntary surrenderees the figures were no less than 90 percent of the Chinese and 77 percent of the North Koreans.<sup>794</sup> Another, more critical, study of the same period reported that soon

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Psywar Administrative Office Records Branch Decimal File, 1951-54, entry 339, box 19, "370.2" folder.

<sup>792</sup>Pease, 17. Pace contacted General McClure, who told the Secretary that he was "quite satisfied with the psywar in Korea.", Memo for the record, telecom Pace to McClure, 26 May 1951, RG 319, (Army Staff), Psywar Administrative Office Records Branch Decimal File, entry 338, box 4, "020 Army" folder. For Clark support, see Hansen, passim, and Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York; 1954), Chapt 14.

<sup>793</sup>U.S. Cong., Senate, *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt. 1, 29-45; pt. 2, 954-55, pt. 5, 3567-3605; Pettee, 2. Presumably Pettee's work was written before the Chinese intervention late in 1950.

<sup>794</sup>Memo, McClure to Comptroller of the Army, sub: "Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare in Korea," 6 March 1952, HRC GEOG V, Korea, 091.412, Center of Military History. McClure was always cautious in his claims. When a United Press dispatch reported that psywar was "primarily responsible" for the surrender of nearly one-third of 163,000 enemy POW's (An absurd figure to begin with: total UN POW's for the entire war were a little over 100,000), McClure noted favorably that the Secretary of Defense had quoted the report only to change the operative verb to "influenced."



after their capture the great majority of one group claimed they were not influenced by U.S. psywar. One month later, and presumably after understanding better what would please their captors and in response to what the study termed a "restricted and probably poor list of reasons to choose from", 55 percent of the POWs now agreed that U.S. leaflets had indeed induced their surrender. The study felt that the figure should be closer to 30 percent, but even that would be a respectable figure.<sup>795</sup>

U.S. psywarriors at this period also engaged in one of their rare deception operations. In March of 1951 they dropped large numbers of leaflets well behind enemy lines near beaches where they had good reason to believe that the communists expected another landing. Air Force and Navy elements coordinated strikes and general activity over and offshore of the beaches. The maneuver apparently enjoyed some success in diverting enemy troops to that area and away from the battlefield.

By the summer of 1951, the war of movement had stalled, as the United Nations entered into armistice negotiations with the communists, accepting the military *status quo* as a "substitute for victory." Under these conditions, the front lines remained fixed, except for occasional limited offensives mounted by either side. Heavy, pre-attack bombardments, trench raids, barbed wire entanglements, and troops living in bunkers, with a blasted "no-man's land" between the armies transformed the Korean combat zone into a unexpected resemblance to the Western Front of World War I (confounding Sunday supplement pundits who had been confidently predicting "the future's nuclear push-button war" since 1945).

Under these fixed front line conditions, desertion became physically much more difficult. Almost every foot of no-man's land could be hit by artillery and small-arms fire from both sides, and dug-in troops could rarely "melt away." Furthermore, the precipitate North Korean retreat of 1950 and the more measured Chinese withdrawals of early 1951 were over.<sup>796</sup> Although 8<sup>th</sup> Army put all the more pressure on its psywar personnel to bring in enemy troops for interrogation, the Deputy Chief of Staff of FEC, a recent 24<sup>th</sup> division commander, put the matter of surrenders most pungently:

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McClure to LTG Doyle O. Hickey, RG 338, FEC, Psywar Section, Decimal File, 1952, box 4316, "000.76" folder.

<sup>795</sup>Kilchoon Kim, and E. A. Johnson, *Evaluation of Effects of Leaflets on Early North Korean Prisoners of War* (ORO, Baltimore: 20 February 1951).

<sup>796</sup>Pease, 65; Clark, 210. In another such rare operation, in late 1952, the 1<sup>st</sup> RB&L broadcast compromising messages to individual cadre members in a simple and easily-breakable code to create "dissent and confusion among the enemy." The results remain unknown. FEC Psywar Section, RG 338, Decimal File 1952, box 4322, "319.1 Weekly Operations Report" file.

[Expletive deleted]. A red over there's a fool to surrender. As long as he stays in his hole he has only one army shooting at him. When he starts out of it he has two, and mines besides, We've got more prisoners than we want anyway. Don't tell 'em to surrender! Tell 'em to desert! Tell 'em to go home and help with the harvest! Every one that does is one less for us to fight or one less for us to feed!"<sup>797</sup>

In fact, it is remarkable that the Eighth Army secured any surrenders after the early summer of 1951, but Eighth Army psywarriors did take some pains to ease the way for would-be defectors across the battlelines.<sup>798</sup> One leaflet pointed out that "There are many opportunities for *resolute men* to escape from communism," and suggested escape "while in combat," or "while on guard," "on patrol," "on labor detail," "carrying party," even while "pretending death."<sup>799</sup> Occasionally a map was provided to show possible escape routes. Many of these themes were spread through cartoon stories. No matter how few, these "escape" messages were a first in the history of psywar. Previous similar messages had rather vaguely called upon the enemy to simply detach himself from his unit or to linger behind when the unit moved on.

A clever leaflet inquired of enemy troops "Can you keep your feet warm and dry?", under a photo of bedraggled communist soldiers in their worn-out uniforms, and graphically contrasting their sad state with the natty turn-out, complete with white leather footgear, of "Mr. White Boots," North Korean Lieutenant General Nam Il, at the Panmunjom armistice negotiations. According to one good source, for the next three months POWs gave wet, cold feet as a major reason for surrendering.<sup>800</sup> By September of 1951 Eighth Army psywarriors were repeating the successful World War II "B-29 leaflets." In place of Japanese cities, the new leaflets targeted Chinese troops through an illustration of bombs dropping from a B-29, the bombs merging into characters that read "These bombs of fire await you when you next attack." (emphasis in original).

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
<sup>797</sup>LTG Blackshear Bryan, quoted in Hansen, 113-114.

<sup>798</sup>Eighth Army psywarriors on occasion printed maps on surrender leaflets, showing more-or-less safe routes for enemy defectors, and also used phonetic English-language "I surrender" directions in its leaflet or loudspeaker operations. See examples in USASOC History Archives and the Vatcher Papers, Hoover Institution.

<sup>799</sup>Numerous leaflets from this period in USASOC History & Archives Korean War PSYOP collection contain maps. Herbert Avedon oral interview. "Escape" leaflet from Avedon, "War for Men's Minds," *Military Review*, (March 1954). (emphasis added.)

<sup>800</sup>Hansen, 75.

# 這裡是一條生路!



(一) 在你們陣地的前面，接近聯軍藏的地方，選好躲藏的地點。這個地點必須有掩護，不會被人發現。  
 (二) 在夜晚找機會溜開部隊，躲到這個地點。  
 (三) 躲好了不要走動，等待天亮。  
 (四) 丟掉武器，趁天亮到聯軍這邊來，把受傷的同志也帶過來。  
 (五) 走近聯軍陣地時，高舉雙手，五指伸開。

And here is how to escape the hellish battlefield and get to that fine UN POW camp. SLEAK 8621



- 到這個地點
- (一) 在你們陣地前面，接近聯軍的地方，選好躲藏地點。這個地點必須有掩護，不會被人發現。
  - (二) 在夜晚找機會溜開部隊，躲到這個地點。
  - (三) 躲好了不要走動，等待天亮。
  - (四) 丟掉武器，趁天亮到聯軍這邊來，把受傷的同志也帶過來。
  - (五) 走近聯軍陣地時，高舉雙手，五指伸開。

给你的  
救命禮物

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION, G3  
Headquarters, EUSAK  
APO 301

LEAFLET : Escape Route  
LANGUAGE : Chinese  
DESIGNATION : Serial No. 8621  
TARGET : 373rd, 374th and 375th Regiments of 125th CCF  
Division.  
REMARKS : Leaflet designed to welcome above units back into  
the lines. Gives them a psychological and physical  
way out - via a map with escape routes.  
ART WORK : Obverse: Good luck flowers.  
Reverse: 1:50,000 map of Division area.

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TEXT:

(Obverse: Captions and good luck flower border)

MEN AND OFFICERS OF THE 373rd, 374th and 375th REGIMENTS, 125th  
DIVISION:

WELCOME BACK TO THE LINES!  
THIS IS THE OPPORTUNITY YOU'VE BEEN WAITING FOR!

Recall how many times you've vowed you would free yourself  
from the clutches of the Communist Party members, who are making  
your life a hell!

This is the opportunity to keep that vow. And don't forget  
your vows to filial duty, the destiny which insists you beget  
sons, care for and adequately bury your aged parents. This is the  
opportunity you've been waiting for - but opportunity will not  
knock on your door too many times.

Don't tarry too long in the UN sea of fire. A snug building,  
a fire and warm rice, away from the cruelties of the Communist  
Party cadre members, are yours to have while you live to fulfill  
your sacred filial duties.

FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE OTHER SIDE,  
THEN FOLLOW THE ARROWS DRAWN ON THE MAP.

(Reverse: Escape routes with caption)

"THIS IS THE WAY OF LIFE!"

1. During the day select in your mind a hiding place well  
forward of your front lines and in the direction of the nearest  
United Nations position. For your security be sure this hiding  
place affords protective cover and concealment from your own unit.

2. During the night, at the first opportunity, break away  
from your unit and move to your previously selected hiding place.

(Over)

3. Remain concealed there until the first light of day.

4. Then dispose of your weapon, and in the light of the day come to the UN lines. Bring your wounded comrades with you.

5. As you approach UN lines raise your arms as high in the air overhead as possible with fingers widespread.

UN troops are expecting you --- they will treat you well -- and you will be moved immediately to the rear where warmth and safety are awaiting you.



동지들도 이렇게 되려는가?

...otherwise, "WILL YOU SOON BE LIKE THIS?"

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION, G3  
Headquarters, EUSAK  
APO 301

LEAFLET : Night of UN Artillery  
LANGUAGE : Korean  
DESIGNATION : Serial No. 8265  
TARGET : 45th NK Division  
REMARKS : Leaflet requested by X Corps as part of an intensified  
Psywar effort against 45th NK Division. Leaflet is a  
rebuttal to political officers claim that ROK troops  
have no artillery.  
ART WORK : Photo of dead NK soldier.

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(Obverse: Photo with captions)

"WARRIORS OF THE 45TH NK DIVISION"

"WILL YOU SOON BE LIKE THIS?"

(Reverse)

Heaven and earth have been rocking with the might of ROKA artillery.  
Day and night, ROKA artillery seeks you out!

Your political officers have told you that you need not fear ROKA  
artillery. Have they not lied to you once again? Have you had enough of  
their constant falsehoods? Must your comrades continue to die like dogs  
for Soviet Russia?

There is but one way to escape - Come to the safety of the UN lines.  
Many of your comrades are already here.

DO NOT HESITATE! TOMORROW MAY BE TOO LATE!



# 공습 예고

지금도 늦지 않습니다。  
한시 바빠 군사시설 근처에서  
몸을 피하십시오。  
한시가 급합니다。

Things aren't much better behind the lines, either: "CITIZENS OF PYONGYANG!....THESE TARGETS WILL BE BOMBED WITHIN 48 HOURS!....The United Nations want to avoid harm to innocent civilians."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff  
Psychological Warfare Branch

LEAFLET: Evacuation of Pyongyang  
LANGUAGE: Korean  
DESIGNATION: Serial No. 1020  
TARGET: Pyongyang  
REMARKS: Warning leaflet urging civilians to evacuate Pyongyang within  
48 hours.  
ART WORK: Bomb burst with large slogans.

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TEXT: Page 1: Large caption reading "AIR RAID WARNING." Below this,  
a sketch of a bomb burst, in the center of which appears the  
warning, "ACT QUICKLY! MOVE AWAY FROM MILITARY TARGETS."

Page 2:

CITIZENS OF PYONGYANG!

Your city still contains important military targets which must  
be destroyed in order to bring an end to the war of aggression  
which the Communist leaders started.

THESE TARGETS WILL BE BOMBED WITHIN 48 HOURS!

You are warned to leave Pyongyang immediately. The United  
Nations want to avoid harm to innocent civilians. To remain  
where you are is to place your own life in needless danger.

MOVE OUT QUICKLY!

Eighth Army also offered a considerable number of messages designed to splinter the "firm fraternal socialist unity" of China, North Korea and the Soviet Union. One of the more imaginative displayed a Soviet officer, his chest stiff with medals and his blowsy, made up wife, this at a time when Chinese officers wore no medals or even rank insignia and cosmetics were denounced as "bourgeoisie decadence." This scene was flanked by a bedraggled Chinese soldier lying in rags on the battlefield. Most effective for Chinese patriots with any sense of their history was the leaflet with maps of China as it had been and as it now was, shorn of so much of its territory by Russian imperialism. An actual photograph of Soviet soldiers dismantling factories in Manchuria at the end of World War II must have resonated among Manchurian troops who would have had fresh memories of their "ally's" behavior. Using a commendable knowledge of enemy culture and language, one such leaflet warned the Chinese that they were dupes of "Lao Mao Tzu," a play on the name of the "Great Leader" and the old Chinese term for Russians, "the old hairy." UN leaflets also sought to split the Koreans from their "fraternal Chinese comrades."

U.S. leaflets, as in previous U.S. wars, avoided any caricaturing or denigration of the enemy. ("To the men of North Korea; who with doubtless bravery hurled their bodies against a solid wall of flaming steel. We honor you for your courage," is hard to improve on.<sup>801</sup> Images of enemy soldiers at the worst depicted them as victims of their uncaring leaders, but never mocked, denigrated or caricatured them. Continuing the "respect" theme, U.S. leaflets for the first time honored an enemy statesman (that is, a dead politician), contrasting the principles of the Chinese icon, Sun Yat Sen, with those of China's communist overlords. ("The Father of Modern China", "His principles must never die," "Birthday of the great Sun Yat Sen"). Similarly, a Chinese communist flag proclaimed that the UNC had no quarrel with "The Great Chinese Nation." This type of leaflet, and the "currency" variety also protected the enemy soldier caught reading them. ("Comrade Commissar, I had no idea that the enemy would deface with their vile lies our flag/leader/money, which I simply found there, lying in the mud. I am shocked, shocked!")


With the front stabilized, U.S. psywarriors had the opportunity to consider more carefully their dissemination methods and how to deal with the obvious deficiencies that a year of combat had revealed. Some leaflet accuracy had been achieved in the first six months of the war by the "field expedient" of stuffing the messages into old "C" ration boxes and kicking them out of transport aircraft at between 300 and 500 feet altitude. But when a C-47 went missing over Wonsan, the decision was made to drop the leaflets from higher altitudes. The M-16A1 Cluster Adapter, a thin-skinned box, approximately the

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<sup>801</sup>USASOC History Archives, Vatcher Papers, box 13, "Korean War" folder.

# 俄帝侵略中國的事實

蘇俄 以前 現在 蘇俄



保家衛國先要保你自己的安全再從俄帝的統治下解救中國  
不要在韓國替蘇俄打仗

Esteemed Chinese soldier, look at your national territory lost, not to the "imperialist" Americans but to the "Great Hairy" -the Russians.



十月十日

山 中 孫 父 國

十月十日

7089

A great idea, for some reason not repeated in later conflicts: "Wonderful country, China; too bad its current Communist leaders betray the eternal principles of its immortal Sun Yat Sen."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Psychological Warfare Section  
First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group  
APO 500

27 September 1951

LEAFLET: Double Ten Celebration No. 2.  
LANGUAGE: Chinese  
DESIGNATION: Serial No. 7089  
TARGET: CCF  
REMARKS: Second in a series of three leaflets.  
ART WORK: Front: Photograph of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen  
Back: Double Ten archway with general festivity

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TEXT:

Page 1: Photo of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. His name appears together with the words "Father of China", below with the Chinese characters for "Tenth month, Tenth day."

Page 2: Double ten archway with general festivity.

(caption)-Double Tenth

Forty years ago, the Chinese people, under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen wiped out the alien, despotic Manchu Dynasty, and established a free, democratic and independent China,

But now the Communists set up their dictatorial regime, and invite the Soviets as super-rulers to control China.

Under the order of their Soviet masters the Communists force you to be cannon fodder in Korean while they massacre your people at home.

You are on the verge of death. If you want to save yourselves and your country, you must fight against the traitorous communists.

HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Psychological Warfare Section  
First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group  
APO 500

15 October 1952

LEAFLET: Communist Cap of Death

LANGUAGE: Chinese

DESIGNATION: 7203\*

TARGET: CCF in Korea

REMARKS: Asterisk after serial number signifies that leaflet was suggested and requested by Psywar EUSAK. Leaflet designed to exploit lack of helmets in CCF.

ART WORK: Front: Illustration of head of skeleton in CCF cap. Shrapnel passes through his thin cap. Hammer and Sickle at bottom.  
Back: Illustration of UN soldier wearing helmet. Shrapnel bounces off helmet. UN flag at bottom.

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TEXT:

Page 1: Illustration

COMMUNIST CAP OF DEATH

The communists hurl you into battle--wearing their thin cap of death!

Without a helmet to protect you, you may die with shrapnel through your skull!

But your bosses do not care for your life. They care only for aggression! You die for their aggression!

Don't die for those who refuse to protect you!

ESCAPE! SAVE YOUR LIFE!

Page 2: Illustration

HELMETS PROTECT UN SOLDIERS!

The UN protects its men!

UN soldiers are the best equipped in the world. Each man wears a strong steel helmet.

(Over)

# 蘇俄軍官們正在歡慶



# 中共士兵替蘇俄送死

R-7130

....and look at them! "RUSSIAN GENERALS CELEBRATE....WHILE CHINESE SOLDIERS DIE FOR RUSSIA."





# 共產黨這頂要人命的帽子

共黨把你趕上火綫——只給你戴一

頂像紙一樣薄，要見閻王的帽子。

沒有一頂鋼盔來保護你，彈片飛

來，鑽進你的腦袋，就

會要你的命！

但是你們的頭子對你們的

性命是毫不在乎。他們只管侵

略！你便為他們的侵略送死！

不要為不保護你們的人去送死！

救你們自己的命！快逃吧！

7203\*



“COMMUNIST CAP OF DEATH.” “HELMETS PROTECT UN SOLDIERS!” Your leaders don't care much about you, do they?

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Psychological Warfare Section  
First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group

2 February 1952

LEAFLET: Chinese Do Russia's Fighting  
LANGUAGE: Chinese  
DESIGNATION: 7130  
TARGET: CCF  
REMARKS: This leaflet prepared under provisions of "Plan Sell-Out"  
ART WORK: Front: 1st Photo: Russian General, Woman, Second Russian  
Officer drinking and talking.  
2d Photo: Injured Chinese soldier lying on the  
battlefield.

TEXT:  
PAGE 1: CAPTION OVER PHOTO AT THE LEFT:

RUSSIAN GENERALS CELEBRATE.....

CAPTION UNDER PHOTO AT THE RIGHT:

WHILE CHINESE SOLDIERS DIE FOR RUSSIA

PAGE 2: TEXT:

CHINESE SOLDIERS MUST DIE FOR RUSSIA!

The Russian warlords have good reason to celebrate; they live in safety while thousands and thousands of Chinese soldiers suffer and die for Russia.

The Korean war is the direct result of Russian ambitions. But Chinese soldiers do all the fighting while the Russian warlords pull the strings.

And the Russians have another reason to celebrate; while the Chinese are fighting in a foreign land, the Russians secretly seize control of China itself.

OPEN YOUR EYES, SOLDIER! SAVE YOUR LIFE!

<p>안 전 보 장 증 명 서</p>	<h1>SAFE CONDUCT PASS</h1>	<p>保 證 安 全 的 路 票</p>
	<p>대한민국 병사들에게 이 증명서는 북한 군 귀순병에게 인도 적대우를 할 것을 보증한다. 이 귀순병 을 포상관에 계인 도 할 것과 명예포로 로 대우할 것을 명 령한다. 유엔군 총사령관 다글레스 맥아더</p>	
<p><b>SOLDIERS OF THE UN FORCES:</b> This certificate guarantees good treatment to any enemy soldier desiring to cease fighting. Take this man to your nearest officer and treat him as an honorable prisoner of war.</p> <p><i>Douglas MacArthur</i> DOUGLAS MacARTHUR General of the Army Commander-in-Chief</p>		<p>帥到全合司 文好國令左 告的祇麥邊 的待要士克下 譯遇你兵阿面 文。們們瑟的 左立寬元英 邊刻待帥文 上停你簽文 面止們字告 的戰和的 朝國保麥 鮮就護帥 文可以帥 是得安命 麥得安聯總</p>

One of four different surrender leaflets in USASOC History Archives.

size of a standard 500-pound explosive bomb, was developed by November of 1951. This device could carry 22,500 5x8-inch or 45,000 4x5-inch leaflets. Aircraft normally carried 32 of these bombs, and released them at between 15,000 and 25,000 feet, fused to open at about 1,000 feet for a maximum spread over the target.<sup>802</sup> A RAND study claimed that this leaflet device was unreliable, with almost one-third failing to open on any one mission, and concluded that aerial dissemination was usually wasteful and unreliable. As for the aircraft, the reliable C-47 could carry more leaflets, but the B-26 medium bomber again proved more accurate with its ability to make fast, low runs over the target in reasonable safety. The C-47 carried its leaflets in fused, paper-wrapped bundles, the B-26 in leaflet bombs.<sup>803</sup> Light aircraft were also employed for low-level drops. But, as the Chief of USAFFE psywar reported to General McClure this "necessary expedient" had proved distinctly hazardous: "Anti-aircraft fire is both heavy and dangerous."<sup>804</sup>

The main burden of the aerial distribution of leaflets throughout the war fell to the USAF's 21<sup>st</sup> Troop Carrier Squadron ("The Kyushu Gypsies"), which commenced operations flying C-47s but which later was re-equipped with larger aircraft. The 581<sup>st</sup> Air Resupply and Communications Wing, engaged in air drops, aerial resupply of guerrillas behind enemy lines and special missions, using fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and even balloons, and remained almost totally independent of the Army psywar program. Its Printing Squadron even drew up its own leaflets at Clark Field, The Philippines.<sup>805</sup>

Due to the inaccurate nature of air drops, one Korea psywar veteran claimed that "artillery became the only means available in Korea to effect the accurate delivery of printed propaganda to specific front line units."<sup>806</sup> But artillery delivery, for some reason, was rarely used in the first year of the war, until a former artillery officer became Chief of 8<sup>th</sup> Army psywar, and even then it was not all that accurate. The 105-millimeter howitzer smoke shell M-84 (or

<sup>802</sup>Hansen, 198; Berger, 90-91.

<sup>803</sup>John Ponturo, *Psychological Operations at Lower Echelons in Eighth Army, July 1952-July 1953* (ORO, Baltimore: 25 January 1953). For early, possibly pre-Korean War, evaluation of aerial leaflet dissemination, see K. W. Yarnold and Jean Marie Daly, *The value of Propaganda Leaflets Disseminated by Aircraft* (ORO, Washington: 1950).

<sup>804</sup>Chief of Psywar, USAFFE, to Chief of Psywar, DA [General McClure], subject: "Comments on ORO-PR-1", 21 January 1953, RG 319 (Army Staff), entry 339, Psychological Warfare Administrative Office, Records Branch Decimal File, 1951-54, box 3 "020 ORO" folder.

<sup>805</sup>Pease, 28-32. Pease adds that "It was well known if you screwed up you could be transferred to the 21<sup>st</sup> as punishment.", 56.

<sup>806</sup>Norris, 19.

in a few instances, the British 25-pounder smoke shell) was modified by the removal of its smoke canister, and 400 4x5-inch leaflets inserted in an operation that could be performed in the field. However, the Army artillery manual *FT-105-H-4* (July 1951) did not even provide data for the M84 leaflet shell. This omission was understandable: the ballistics of the shell were deranged by the removal of the weight of the smoke canister. Shells fused at 100 feet would scatter leaflets between 50 and 100 yards and at 1000 feet from 500 yards to two miles. One authority termed the leaflet shell "inaccurate and unreliable." Furthermore, the smoke canister shells were costly and often in short supply, with artillerymen understandably reluctant to give them up for such shadowy missions.<sup>807</sup> As the Chief of Eighth Army psywar noted with asperity, "After three wars in which leaflets have been fired at the enemy, the U.S. Army still does not have a standardized artillery [leaflet] shell," although one was under development. The Commonwealth Division, with its 25-pounder gun, was the only UN unit that could fire its artillery leaflets with reasonable accuracy.<sup>808</sup> To make matters even more galling, the Chinese/Soviet leaflet mortar shell was very simple, very accurate---and in front-line use.<sup>809</sup> For all its vicissitudes, however, UN artillery dissemination had accounted for roughly 100 million leaflet deliveries by the end of the war.<sup>810</sup>

Oddly, one of the most effective means of psywar dissemination was only very rarely employed: the leaflet patrol, that could place its message in the most-traveled areas behind the enemy lines. It is unclear as to just why this method was not used, particularly in light of the fact that the enemy effectively itself used the technique, and that the U.S. Army itself certainly engaged in other (usually unnamed) "line crosser" missions.<sup>811</sup>

The only truly "pin-point accuracy" that U.S. psywar in Korea ever achieved was by the "streamer," a length of cloth with a weighted pocket at one end, for "special delivery" messages. "Streamers" certainly got the enemy's attention. On at least four occasions they were dropped right on enemy command posts. Another time, a "Freedom Mail" delivery was

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<sup>807</sup>Hansen, 72-73, 198; "Psychological Warfare in Korea", *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1951); Ponturo, *Lower Echelons*; Berger, 96.

<sup>808</sup>Hansen, 298-299.

<sup>809</sup>Norris, "Tactical Psychological Warfare," 19.

<sup>810</sup>Berger, 96.

<sup>811</sup>Ponturo, *Psychological Warfare Operations*, 50-52. Between 1 January 1951 and 25 April 1953 foot patrols disseminated 5,800,000 leaflets, compared to considerably more than one and one-half billion by air., USAFFE Psywar Chief to Chief Psywar, DA, 1 May 1953, RG 497, USARPAC, box 66, folder #1. Of course, there was no question that this was easily the most dangerous means of psywar dissemination.

dropped on a village post office behind enemy lines, and the method was also used to drop cards of thread and packets of needles, items in short supply in wartime North Korea.<sup>812</sup>

The tank-mounted loudspeaker, used to such advantage in World War II, was almost never employed in Korea. The reasons were primarily logistical. The distances involved travelling between, say, a division command post, and the zone of operations could take three and one-half hours over the Korean terrain, and, of course, that long to return the tank for necessary maintenance, which usually took a minimum of two hours.<sup>813</sup>

With the stabilization of the battle lines, loudspeakers, mounted on jeeps or on the ground, came into their own for both sides. Loudspeaker psywar enjoyed several advantages. It was not "wasted" like approximately 90 percent of the tens of millions of leaflets produced in this war, it had obviously more of an appeal to semi-literate peasants than leaflets, and the Korean language (Hangul) seemed more suited to the spoken than to the written word. In addition, enemy cadre could hardly forbid their men to listen, as they could prohibit their picking up leaflets; the target audience did not have to take any action to receive the message and it required no equipment to receive it other than the human ear.<sup>814</sup>

Prior to 1951, 8<sup>th</sup> Army loudspeaker psywar consisted of three trailer-mounted loudspeaker units. Details are scanty, but the unit attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division brought in 318 POWs from 22 September to 8 October 1950, while a further 300 attempting to surrender were scattered by gunfire (source unnamed). A report of 24 October claimed that another unit in one two-day period garnered something like 75 enemy during a two day period. Of course, it must be emphasized that these achievements all occurred during the time of the North Korean Army's rout following the Inchon landings. By 21 November the rugged roads of North Korea had rendered most of the unit's electronic tubes and generators inoperable, and loudspeaker operations actually ceased. At any rate, UN forces were soon in full retreat, with no time or stomach for broadcasts to an advancing, victorious enemy.<sup>815</sup>

All loudspeaker operations from the beginning of 1951 were conducted

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<sup>812</sup>Hansen, 72-73.

<sup>813</sup>"Operations of Loudspeaker Teams with Attached Tank," n.d., in J. V. Russell Papers, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>814</sup>Kim and Johnson, 7-8; Ponturo, *Lower Levels*, 53-56.

<sup>815</sup>Pettee, 23-24. The 1<sup>st</sup> L&L did report a useful leaflet drop above 3,000-6,000 refugees on 12 January 1951, in which the target audience "turned away from the I Corps MSR and made no further mass attempt to pass through our lines.", J. V. Russell, 1<sup>st</sup> L&L memo to 8<sup>th</sup> Army G-2. "Subject: Psychological Warfare Report Resulting from Personal Visit to I Corps, 16 January 1951.

by the Loudspeaker Platoon of the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L. The Platoon consisted of from 12 to 21 teams, with four or more usually posted to each corps and one per division on the line. Their World War II equipment was heavy, not particularly robust, designed for vehicle transport, and efficient only in the static conditions now prevailing across the Korean front. The range of their cumbersome speakers was from 1,000 yards to one mile.

U.S. loudspeaker units operated under ten general guidelines, which did not differ basically from those for leaflet operations. All messages should:

1. Be used as a tactical weapon, with no lofty strategic (or "political") messages ("End the War!", "Fight Communism!").
2. Use simple, easy-to-understand messages.
3. Take a firm note.
4. Always repeat "punch line."
5. Sound "official" in tone and language.
6. Personalize target, by name, if possible.
7. Give directions on how to surrender.
8. Preface message with English-language warning to friendly forces not to shoot defectors coming across the lines. (easier said than done)
9. Give up-to-date news.
10. Use native-speakers if at all possible, to avoid foreign accent.<sup>816</sup>

For the most part, these injunctions seem to have been generally followed for the remainder of the war, judging from surviving loudspeaker scripts in the Army Special Operations Command History Archives at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.<sup>817</sup> From January 1951 to the Armistice of 27 July 1953, 8<sup>th</sup> Army loudspeaker teams made 20,000 distinct broadcasts of about 20 minutes each.

As in World War II, some friendly units complained that loudspeaker units

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<sup>816</sup>"Student Summary, Army General Ground School", Conference on Loudspeakers, Air Dropped Newspapers," n.d., in Vatcher Papers, box 11, "Korean War" folder.

<sup>817</sup>1<sup>st</sup> Leaflet and Loudspeaker script books, USASOC History Archives. See also Herbert Avedon collection. Hangul native-speakers from the 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group who have examined these U.S. psywar scripts say that they are written in good, conversational Korean, author's oral interviews with 4<sup>th</sup> POG personnel, Fort Bragg, October 1993; Ponturo, *Lower Echelons*, 53-56. A memo from the PSYWAR Division, EUSAK claimed that "ground voice missions are apparently written in good enough style with a few glaring exceptions." memo to Chief, Projects Section, Psywar, EUSAK ADV, subject: "Plan for tactical support of EUSAK," n.d., USASOC History Archives.

at least did a good job in attracting more than their share of enemy fire. As one study reported, "Hardly a day went by during the last year of the war without reports that the enemy had countered broadcasts with a generous amount of mortar or artillery rounds." The former commanding officer of the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L later claimed that by the last year of the war "it was normal to receive retaliation by enemy fire for every broadcast....Normal reaction by the CCF to a single broadcast was a half-dozen rounds of mortal [mortar?] fire which scored infrequently...A good many of the ground loud-speakers...were destroyed by enemy counter fire."

Further evidence of the hazardous nature of the front-line loudspeaker team is found in the Army Ground School's NCO Course, which called for Sergeant-Announcers-Linguists who could maintain "a steady, assured tone of voice even when the position of the loudspeaker is under enemy fire.", adding that "Nothing could more damage the effect of a broadcast than a quavering, frightened-sounding voice or a sudden speed-up in delivery, obviously caused by enemy fire.", and adding reassuringly that one reason that broadcasts were to be kept short -60 to 90 seconds-was to reassure the Sergeant-Linguist-Announcer that "his mission will be accomplished before enemy arms are zeroed in on him."<sup>818</sup> Some observers optimistically concluded that enemy fire certainly proved that the message was getting through.<sup>819</sup> But one report also claimed that in a few cases, a portion of that "incoming" was, for whatever reason, from other UN units!<sup>820</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> L&L had resources for only 12 loudspeaker teams across more than 100 miles of front, although by scrounging personnel and equipment from ROK Army units it could field a total of 19. In addition to supporting U.S. and ROKA units, the loudspeaker teams also conducted psywar for the Commonwealth Division, the Ethiopians, the French, the Greeks, the Thais


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<sup>818</sup>Herbert Avedon, "Some Aspects of the CCF Propaganda Man," typescript study, Avedon Papers, 11, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>819</sup>Avedon, "War for Men's Minds," 58. As an official study put it, "friendly loudspeaker positions draw enemy fire assuredly as armor or automatic weapons.", "Psywar Deficiencies Noted in Korea - A Study," n.d., Army Staff, Psywar Administrative Office Records Branch, Decimal File, 1951-1952, "091 Korea" folder. Army Ground School, NCO Course, "Loudspeaker Platoon", Ft. Riley, KS: March 1952), 3. Some further material, including photos, on 8<sup>th</sup> Army loudspeaker operations can be found in Rose papers, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>820</sup>Ponturo, *Psychological Operations at Lower Echelons*, 53-56. One loudspeaker psywar veteran claimed that "In three of the Army divisions I listed we drew heavy, concentrated, and aimed fire from our own troops.", but were forbidden to report this embarrassing phenomena., Mr. Jerry Rose, ltrs to author, 25 May 1994; also ltrs of 10 April and 7 June 1994.





The Korean War saw the first use of tape-recorders in PSYOP operations., U.S. Army photo.

and the Turks. Each team chief, usually a sergeant but sometimes a corporal or even a PFC, had his work cut out. He had to perform a startlingly wide variety of tasks, and his job description is worth noting:

Writes loudspeaker scripts and programs and broadcasts to tactical audiences in accordance with the principles of psychological warfare. Has some knowledge of history, politics, sociology, customs, psychology, traditions or culture of enemy against whom he operates, and knows something of the language and dialects of principal enemy population groups and of the medium of mass communications. Has knowledge of enemy leaders, military and civilian.

Later, the Army laid on a *further* requirement, for combat experience.<sup>821</sup> This last requirement was simply a recognition of the fact that this psywar method ran risks next only to the rarely-employed patrol leaflet mission. (Note the bullet holes in the windshield of this 1<sup>st</sup> L&L Company psywar jeep.) Loudspeaker operatives were granted Class "A" time for rotation, which meant that they earned four points per month and after nine months in the line were eligible for rotation to Japan or the U.S.A., just as if they had been infantry. In some important ways they were: one member of the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L Company was reported killed in action on 16 July 1952, just after making a loudspeaker broadcast in support of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. Three teams were overrun by the enemy in November 1952, with two U.S. personnel and one Korean killed and one American and two Koreans missing.<sup>822</sup>

The usual broadcast lasted from between fifteen and thirty minutes of news, music and comment, as well as the transmittal of radio programs over the loudspeakers.<sup>823</sup> Typical U.S. loudspeaker messages, avoided overt political themes and usually offered a way out for the individual enemy soldier, e.g.:

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<sup>821</sup>Hansen, 188-189

<sup>822</sup>1<sup>st</sup> L&L Co., "Command Report" July 1952; Hansen, 205. An official study noted plaintively that loudspeaker operators had "most of the danger but few of the privileges [?] of infantrymen.", *Psywar Deficiencies Noted in Korea ---A Study*, n.d., 2, Staff, Psywar Administration Office Records Branch, RG 319, entry 338, Decimal File, 1951-52, "091 Korea" folder. It wasn't all one-way; an 8<sup>th</sup> Army psywarrior claimed much later that he had personally killed five enemy soldiers on various occasions., Rose, ltr. to author, 7 June 1994.

<sup>823</sup>Avedon, "CCF Propaganda Man," 11. Avedon later recalled that, having heard the garbled, often nearly unintelligible broadcasts of the Germans, Japanese, and communists, insisted that his loudspeaker talkers repeat every word and speak slowly: "Soldiers-Soldiers-of-of-the-the-184<sup>th</sup> -184<sup>th</sup> - Regiment-Regiment", Avedon interview with author, 9 September 1993.

Soon you will be committed to battle again to be sacrificed in the UN's sea of fire. Think of the thousands and thousands of your comrades who have already died for nothing in this foreign land. Friends, be wise, come to the UN lines, at the first opportunity you are guaranteed good treatment.

Or

You have been in the front lines a long time...in the lines a long time. You have done more than your fair share of the fighting. Did someone in the Communist high command forget about you?

or:

Here's how to escape and come to UN lines. Listen carefully to the instruction which follows... Listen carefully... This is the way to escape your unit and come over to the UN lines:....

U.S. loudspeaker messages also inquired solicitously about the welfare of their audience:

Greetings, combat veterans, combat veterans. We speak to those of you who have known the might of United Nations bombs and artillery. You are good soldiers, you are tough soldiers. You know how to take care of yourselves. Those who didn't are dead....But look around you, around you. How many combat veterans are there in your outfit, your outfit?

or:

How are conditions on your side...conditions on your side? Is there plenty of clean clothing...clean clothing? Do you have enough soap to wash thoroughly...wash thoroughly?....That is what we do and we have no sickness...we have no sickness. How are conditions on your side? We have enough soap to take care of many of you....<sup>824</sup>

One operation, mounted by a U.S. Army combat team in January 1952, was much more elaborate than the usual spoken messages, combining tank fire and a raiding party with loudspeakers. At 1000 hours, a few rounds of tank

<sup>824</sup>Loudspeaker scripts in "Contingency Scripts, Loudspeaker Platoon, 1<sup>st</sup> L & L", n.d., n.p.; and 1<sup>st</sup> L&L Co., "Command Report," for July 1952.

fire were delivered supporting a probing attack by the raiding party, while the loudspeaker broadcast a message on the horrors of modern war. At 1025, 50 rounds of 90-mm rounds were fired into the enemy positions and the first broadcast (horrors of war) repeated; at 1125 the same message was repeated once again; at 1225, 50 more rounds and at 1330, another broadcast announced a "lunch hour" break. The break was broken at 1400 by five more rounds of 90-mm fire, along with more loudspeaker messages interspersed with tank fire. At 2000 it was "Good Night" ("Irene"?), but a promise to return. The enemy's sleep was cruelly interrupted between 0200 and 0400 by 100 rounds of 90-mm fire discharged at erratic intervals. And at 0500 there was a successful infantry raid mounted on what must have been an thoroughly exasperated enemy.<sup>825</sup>

Six months later, the future commander of U.S. Army forces in Vietnam and Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel William Westmoreland, then commanding the 187<sup>th</sup> Regimental Airborne Combat Team, drew up "Operation Come-On." POW interrogations had convinced Colonel Westmoreland that enemy troops, at least in his sector, were "not at all satisfied with their lot." Westmoreland ordered up a public address system, which, of course, broke down after two days of manhandling up and down Korea's vertical terrain. With the system finally repaired, attached Eighth Army psywarriors broadcast for three nights messages of good treatment for enemy defectors, and set off a smoke screen to shield any who took the bait. But "no-man's land" was shelled by the enemy, presumably to prevent such defections, and none materialized. The undeterred Westmoreland called for another try sometime, but with "less cumbersome equipment."<sup>826</sup>

A February 1951 operation planned by the 3d Infantry Division was more successful and demonstrated what a well-planned psywar operation could do in the face of an enemy who still believed he was on the winning side. Intelligence lifted from dead infiltrating enemy soldiers was passed on to the 3d ID psywar officer, enabling the planned messages to identify specifically the opposing unit. After the 3rd Division's task force had flanked and decimated the targeted enemy, the loudspeaker team chief drew up a "threat-surrender" message for the survivors. ("Look around you to see your dead and wounded comrades.... Take this opportunity to save your own life.") and "many" enemy

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<sup>825</sup>Ponturo, *Lower Echelons*, 67. Perhaps as a result of such provoking operations, communist propaganda broadcasts began to characterize U.S. psywarriors as "criminals" who would be hanged if captured, and put a price of \$10,000 in gold on their heads., Rose, ltr to author, 12 July 1994.

<sup>826</sup>Report, Commander 187<sup>th</sup> Airborne Regimental Combat Team, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psywar Administrative Office Record Branch, entry 338, box 7, "091 Korea" folder. There is no evidence that Westmoreland made any other essays into loudspeaker psywar.

troops surrendered. The task force moved on to a small village. Another loudspeaker message was then directed to any civilians who might be about. "Instantly, people, began streaming out of the houses and started running toward the loudspeaker." Another broadcast was made to enemy troops, ordering them to surrender, lay down their arms and bring their wounded with them. A final message directed civilians to move the wounded out to the road. As a result, 30 North Korean soldiers surrendered. Yet, despite this obvious success, "During the surrender there was an air of suspense and even resentment on the part of a few individuals of the friendly force." By way of contrast, an uncoordinated 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division psywar operation, at roughly the same time, garnered no prisoners, although "severe damage" was inflicted on the enemy.<sup>827</sup>


American aerial loudspeakers proved far less successful than leaflets or ground speakers. William Daugherty reported on one early combat use, at between 8 and 10,000 feet over enemy-occupied Wonsan, in early October 1950. An American correspondent heard a "noise" coming from the aircraft. No one thought to ask nearby Koreans, civilian and military, who appeared bewildered by the "noise," what, if anything, they could make of it. The following March, tests were flown after a "determined clamor by a few individuals in Eighth Army PWD" with equally discouraging results. When the loudspeaker plane was flown above 1500 feet, only part of its message could be heard and any message broadcast below that altitude was more or less drowned out by the roar of the aircraft's engines.<sup>828</sup> As with World War II's ground speakers, aerial loudspeakers of the time were composed of many intricate and fragile parts, particularly tubes, easily affected under field and combat conditions. A few successful missions have been recorded, but as Daugherty pointed out, aerial loudspeaker operations are greatly affected by atmospheric, terrain, as well as by the language used and the announcer's voice.<sup>829</sup> Even the strongly positive chief of Eighth Army PWD acknowledged

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<sup>827</sup>J. V. Russell, "Psychological Warfare Ground Operations during the Attack," Student Monograph, Advanced Infantry Officers Course, Class #2 (1952-53), 5-11.

<sup>828</sup>Daugherty, "Checking Operational Efficiency of Loudspeaker Equipment," *Casebook*, 712-714; Pettee, 52. The incident is confirmed by Pease, 114-116. In November 1951 General Ridgway personally ordered more modern equipment and its immediate use. But one witness reported that, even so, ground fire forced the aircraft to fly so high that only short messages could be understood., Norris, 27. Robert Bishop writes of another aerial loudspeaker mission that "failed every test, but [was used] for six months without any evaluations.", Bishop, "The Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information." Ph.D. diss., The University of Wisconsin, 1966.104.

<sup>829</sup>A comparatively rare, successful, mission took place in May 1951, when an aerial loudspeaker unit spotted 1,800 Chinese soldiers just after a fierce UN



**"I never saw a dead PSYOPer!" But note bullet holes in this PSYOP jeep's windshield., May 1951.  
U.S. National Archives.**

that although aerial loudspeaker missions were "enormously successful," they had to be discontinued in the final months of the conflict, when Soviet-built radar-aimed anti-aircraft artillery arrived on the battlefield.<sup>830</sup> But perhaps the last word on aerial loudspeakers in the Korean War should go to the unnamed and somewhat disgruntled Reserve Army sergeant hurried to Korea and put to work testing the voice aircraft of U.S. Army headquarters, Taegu. For once, the system worked. A score of headquarters colonels dived for their phones as the sky message came through perfectly: "Why-don't-you-imperialist-sons o'bitches-go-back-to-Wall-Street-where-you-belong?"<sup>831</sup>

American interrogators rarely differentiated between leaflets and loudspeakers in determining psywar's effects on the enemy. But one survey, based on an impressive sample of 3,000 Chinese POWs from October of 1951 to June of 1952 found 62 percent claiming to have been influenced by UN loudspeakers and/or leaflets; of 825 North Korean prisoners, no less than 70 percent made similar assertions.<sup>832</sup>

Communist loudspeaker broadcasts, were something of an art form, revealing profound ignorance of U.S. life and attitudes, not to mention the English language itself. Enemy loudspeaker themes for American audiences could be generally grouped into the familiar themes of good POW treatment and desertion appeals as well anti-ROK, we want peace, we didn't start the war, and end the war --or else: "You have expended all of your left-over

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barrage. After friendly troops had been alerted, the stunned enemy were directed to UN lines. Obedient Chinese troops left behind their weapons, but brought out their pack horses and mules. The number of enemy surrendering on this occasion was not given, but it is doubtful whether the entire 1,800 walked out, because apparently no propaganda play was made of this incident. Pease, 55.

<sup>830</sup>Hansen, 302. A 1951 source claimed that loudspeakers mounted on the bottoms of planes provided a "considerable increase in efficiency.", which is not saying too much., Davison, "U.S. Air Force Psychological Warfare in Korea," 46. Pease points out that U.S. aerial loudspeakers, if nothing else, undoubtedly did reinforce the message that the UN dominated the skies over Korea., 116. Hansen tells the delightful story of one enemy' soldier's reaction to U.S. aerial psywar: "Four months ago I heard a woman broadcasting in Chinese from one of your voice planes. I thought if the Americans can circle a slow plane over our positions with a female in it, then I am fighting on the wrong side.", 191.

<sup>831</sup>Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 286-87.

<sup>832</sup>Memo for UN and FEC, Chief of Staff, PW Section, from Chief Psychological Warfare Section, 8<sup>th</sup> Army, subject: PW. Operations 29 June thru 5 July 1952, dated 10 July 1952, RG 338, FEC Psywar Section Decimal File 1552, 319.1, box 4322, unmarked folder.

equipment from World War II. It will start costing you to continue.", "Tell your officers you want peace", (and those officers will promptly forward your concerns to Washington?) "You should play it safe and stay inside."; "You are merely tools for capitalist gain."

One of the few verbatim translations gives the flavor of a standard communist loudspeaker script which reflected an almost engaging naivete rather than the more usual clumsy Marxist jargon and which did not mutilate the English language:

Now we can achieve peace even though we are firing at each other. Now is the time to lay down our arms. Your big man, General Clark, and our big man should get together. How can we have peace when your planes and our planes bomb each other. The Chase National Bank had 2,700,000,000 and now has 5,400,000,000. [no dollar signs given] This is an increase of 3 billion dollars. It is a shame to travel 5,000 miles to fight a war which is not yours. We are spending money; the big-wigs are making it. There should be no more war. Then everyone could go to school and grow up to be an intelligent person.

But the execution of many of these messages vitiated any appeal they might have had -- or something was lost in translation: "United States soldiers, write and ask your families to sign a peace treaty that was drawn up in Philadelphia a couple of years ago." [?!] Another message directed to the 40<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, claimed:

We have plenty of food, victuals, intercourse, and time off to play cards. Your artillery has broken our microphones.... We now must work at night and are required to yell.

Another announcer proclaimed "All good commies blame the U.S. for not signing the armistice. Good night to 179<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment.", "Katusas and riflemen in 179<sup>th</sup> Regiment and mama-sans stay home with baby-san and chop chop have no." (But the same broadcaster ran down the 179<sup>th</sup>'s current "chop chop" menu correctly, word for word.) GIs might be tempted by "Will play you good music. GI music no good." The "good music" turned out to be, if not exactly "Top Ten," a fair cross section of popular U.S. music of the era: "Home, Sweet Home," "There's No Tomorrow," "Come Back to Sorrentino," "Dancing in the Dark," and "The Lord's Prayer" [!].

The Communists were not above using sexual messages: [female voice] "Come on over and surrender. I will give you a good time. We have lots of prisoners having a good time." With mounting irritation, the same voice



asked, "Do you want peace? Do you like to fight? Why don't you answer me?" Another voice informed GIs that "We will meet in no-man's land and get drunk and be happy." More sinister was "Why don't you shoot your GI buddies?" GIs understandably failed to respond to "GI's are the lowest form of life....North Korea and China are po'd and will shoot up Pork Chop and Hill 347 and then take no more PW's," or "Cold War is all over, the world's no good." Other messages, even less intelligible, were reported simply as "shouting."<sup>833</sup>

The enemy's leaflets ranged from the professional to the pathetic, although they were usually superior to their loudspeaker messages. Lacking air power, these leaflets were often distributed by farmers or even small boys carrying their propaganda in nondescript sacks, although the excellent Communist mortar leaflet shells were occasionally employed for short-range delivery.<sup>834</sup>

Such leaflets called upon GIs to follow the "bright path" or make the "righteous move" to the communist side. A highjacked American magazine beer advertisement for the Christmas season, juxtaposed with an unattributed famous photograph by David Duncan of a fatigued Marine during the epic retreat from the Chosin Reservoir, was pressed into service for:

Christmas - Home - Happiness. Those who love you want you back home, safe and sound. Find a way out! It's no disgrace to quit fighting in this unjust war!<sup>835</sup>

Other typical "political" leaflets included "You risk your life, Big Business rakes in the dough.", featuring the stereotypical Marxist 19<sup>th</sup> century big businessman, complete with derby hat, cigar and paunch.

Communist jargon and mangled names undermined any appeal of the leaflet proclaiming that "The real fact is that the American capitalists and their running dog ["running dog"?]- Truman Clerk [Clark?] turns [*sic*] your lives into cannon fodder."<sup>836</sup> "Do You Want to Know the Real Things of the Kaisong Truce Parley?" displayed some problems with the English language." Then

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<sup>833</sup>RG 497, Reports of USAFFE Psywar Section to Chief, Psywar, DA, 19-25 April, 3-9 May, 31 May to 6 June, 12-18 July, 1953, box 66, folders 1,2; "Communist Loudspeaker Appeal," Case #1, 14, October 1953. In studying these messages, one is reminded of the aphorism attributed to Mark Twain: "The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the difference between lightning and the lightning bug."

<sup>834</sup>Berger, 98.

<sup>835</sup>USASOC History Archives, "PSYOP slides" book.

<sup>836</sup>D. F. Hal, "Psychological Warfare Training," *Army Information Digest* (January 1951); Hansen, 10, 314.

CHRISTMAS —  
HOLIDAY —  
HAPPINESS —



Frozen rations eaten on the run.  
Any moment he may have to run again,  
to fight or die — and so may you.



Those who love you want you back home, safe and sound.

*FIND A WAY OUT!*

**It's No Disgrace To Quit Fighting  
In  
This Unjust War!**

With no apologies to the David Duncan (U.S. combat photographer) or to American brewers, either.

# USE YOUR HEAD, SOLDIER!

**If You Want to Keep It!**

*Associated Press* reported from Seoul, October 8:

"North Korean artillery fired 39,000 rounds within 24 hours ending 6 o'clock October 7. Soldiers were pinned down for long hours in the trenches and bunkers by enemy fire which continued for days and nights."

Hanson Baldwin, *New York Times* military commentator wrote June 12:

"Superiority on the battlefield, which the UN had a year ago, has now moved to the enemy side."

*U.S. News & World Report* wrote June 21:

"U.S. air superiority in Korea is no longer absolute."

## EVERY G.I. THAT'S BEEN IN BATTLE KNOWS THE SCORE:

- Bullets and shells hit everything above ground. He's smart to get in a hole and stay there.
- To go out on patrol is the best way to get killed. Don't do it.
- The first man forward in an assault is the first man to get hit. What's the good of looking for death?

## USE YOUR HEAD AND PLAY SAFE!

167

"USE YOUR HEAD, SOLDIER! If You Don't Want to Lose it!", just play it safe. More straightforward enemy psywar.

**"OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE"**

**But YOUNG Ones Do!**

**BRING OUR BOYS HOME FROM KOREA!!!**

**MAKE PEACE WITH CHINA!!**

**AMERICAN PEACE CRUSADE**

**166 West Washington Street**

*Reproduction of "confetti" leaflets distributed in Chicago during MacArthur parade.*

MacArthur had gone home in safety. How about you soldiers?

According to a Washington UP dispatch of June 29, 1951, the U.S. troop casualties in Korea for past one year both on and without the battlefield included total roughly more than 226,000 men. We hope you will never add your name to the sad list.

**THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS'  
HEADQUARTERS**

(這是美國和平十字軍在芝加哥散發的反戰傳單，並說明美軍傷亡慘重。在前線散發給敵方用。)

"'Old Soldiers Never Die' -But YOUNG ones Do!" excellent twisting of MacArthur's farewell speech line, but probably spoiled by the impossible "political" message: "Bring Our Boys Home From Korea!!! Make Peace With China!!!"

**RESTRICTED**  
Security Information

Case #4

PW 4832 (FE)  
14 Oct 53

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PROPAGANDA

1. MEDIA USED: Leaflet - disseminated by artillery and aircraft.
2. POINT OF ORIGIN: Enemy PsyWar unit - believed to be a theatre-level unit because of wide dissemination and use of Communist propaganda originating in the United States.
3. KNOWN PLACES OF RECEIPT: All front-line units containing non-Korean UN troops.
4. TIME OF RECEIPT: 1 May 1951.
5. MANNER OF REPORTING PROPAGANDA: UN troops turned in leaflet to unit commanders; leaflets forwarded through channels.
6. REMARKS: This leaflet was not dropped further back than Division level.

**RESTRICTED**  
Security Information

# The News-Sentinel

## Mr. Truman— What's Your Answer?

The following letter was received by the editor of The News Sentinel from a Fort Wayne Marine Corps Lieutenant in Korea since January. The letter has been checked and found authentic. The original has been forwarded to President Harry S. Truman as requested.

Tuesday, March 13, 1951

To the Editor of The News-Sentinel:

Dear Sir:

"Will you please relay the following questions to Harry S. Truman?

"How many YEARS are you going to let American manpower, materials, and money drain into this Korean sewer? How many more of my men must die on account of your stubborn refusal to pull out of Korea?

"The undersigned dares you to take the following issue to the people.

"Shall we pull out of Korea?

"Some day you will answer for this sellout of American man power and materials. Unfortunately, on account of you and your Administration, most of the boys over here won't be alive to register their righteous wrath against this sellout.

"Again the question Mr. Truman, how long must we stay here in the God-forsaken hole of Korea?"

Signed

GALE C. BUUCK,  
Lt. USMC

Note to the Editor.

"I believe that you stand a better chance of getting this message to H.S.T. than I do. Do what you will with it but I had to sound off.

"I could write 20 pages on the utter uselessness of this war in Korea. All my men hope for two Purple Hearts, or a wound severe enough, which will make them eligible to return home.

"Two days ago, I lost over 50 per cent of my men taking one hill—and for what? None of us know why we are here and none of us can understand why we stay.

"Never have American men fought in a more useless war. (At least, that's the way they feel about it.)

"Surely, someone back home ought to wake up Congress or somebody and get us out of here.

"Thank you for your kind attention."

Lt. GALE C. BUUCK  
"E" Co. 2nd Bn. 7th Mar.  
1st Marine Division  
Care FPO. San Francisco, Calif.

**RESTRICTED**  
Security Information  
SOLUTION

PW 4832 (PE)  
14 Oct 53

PLAN FOR PROGRAM OF DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY PROPAGANDA

CASE NUMBER: #6 SOURCE: Enemy theater level PsyWar unit.  
TIME OF RECEIPT: 29 July 1951 TARGET AUDIENCE: All U.S. troops.  
SUBJECT: Truman's War MISSION: Reduce will to fight; prepare  
for surrender appeal.  
MEDIA USED: Leaflet  
VULNERABILITY AIMED AT: UN soldier's lack of understanding of Korean war  
objectives.

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I. DEFEND BY: (a) Direct \_\_\_\_\_, (b) Indirect \_\_\_\_\_, or (c) Negative X Approach

Reason for selection of technique: Vulnerability is too real to risk  
further invitation to contemplation of it.

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II. SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR COUNTERING:

- a. Full, accurate, prompt information \_\_\_\_\_ f. Allow full access to enemy  
b. Partial release of information \_\_\_\_\_ propaganda: \_\_\_\_\_  
c. Encourage Discussion Groups \_\_\_\_\_ g. Restrict discussion and flow  
d. Direct Commander Conferences \_\_\_\_\_ enemy propaganda: X  
e. USE T&E FACILITIES X h. Other (list) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

III. SUGGESTED MEDIA TO BE USED:

- a. Newspapers \_\_\_\_\_ d. Radio \_\_\_\_\_ g. Lectures \_\_\_\_\_  
b. Leaflets \_\_\_\_\_ e. Loudspeaker \_\_\_\_\_ h. Films X  
c. Pamphlets \_\_\_\_\_ f. Special Publications \_\_\_\_\_ i. Other (list) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

IV. SUGGESTED ADMINISTRATIVE CORRECTIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY:

- a. Reduce Racial Disputes \_\_\_\_\_ c. Effect understanding of re-  
b. Correct disturbing morale factors \_\_\_\_\_ ligious problems, questions \_\_\_\_\_  
c. Increase Information \_\_\_\_\_ f. Better interpretation of mili-  
d. Effect proper training X tary policies X  
g. Other (list) \_\_\_\_\_
- 

**RESTRICTED** Security Information



# DON'T LET YOUR LOVED ONES MOURN FOR YOU!



"Don't Let Your Loved Ones Mourn For You!" -simply "Demand an Armistice in Korea and Early Home-Coming!", that's all.





**REMEMBER YOUR LOVED ONES WANT  
YOU BACK HOME SAFE AND SOUND**

*Why Are You Here,*  
5,000 miles from your homes,  
risking your lives,  
killing Korean men and women  
— even infants — who never  
harmed America or thought of  
attacking you? Why?  
Ask yourselves and keep asking  
until you get the answer.

**WHY?**

**Demand an Armistice  
in Korea and Early  
Home-coming!**

This leaflet can be used as a **SAFE CONDUCT PASS**  
to come over to the Korean Peoples Army.

12504

***You risk your life, Big Business  
rakes in the dough.***



TIN HAT, TIN BOX

***UN Soldiers:  
Avoid fighting whenever you can.  
If you don't shoot, you won't expose  
yourself.***

特早—113

“You Risk your life, Big Business Rakes in the Dough.”, probably too stereotypical to affect more than the most committed barracks radical.


9

So that more lives of Korean peoples and foreign forces in this country can be saved from disastrous casualties and a sea of bitterness, the Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People's Army Kim Il Sung and Commander of Chinese People's Volunteers Peng Teh-Wai wired Gen. Ridgeway agreeing that Kaisong be appointed as temporal neutral zone in the course of the parley, and permitting journalists to take part in. Upon this, the parley went on as from July 15.

Friends what does the above version accounts for? It illustrates the Sino-Korean peoples sincerity toward peace, and their vigorous efforts for peaceful settlement of Korean problem. While the U. N. Delegation under the pretext of trivial things, deliberately postpone the truce parley. This, we think, you can see clearly.

**DO YOU WANT TO KNOW  
THE  
REAL THINGS OF  
KAISONG TRUCE PARLEY?**

*The Chinese People's Volunteer Forces*



From  
CHINESE  
PEOPLE'S  
VOLUNTEERS

*Happy New Year*

*and*

*Very Xmas*



CHINESE

TEA

★ ★ ★

*Demand Peace,*

*Stop The War!*



Enjoy this Chinese tea as you "Demand Peace, Stop the War!"

there was the mystifying "If MacArthur says we are dead, he must have some lousy reason for it...."<sup>837</sup> But another leaflet exhorted in perfectly acceptable slang: Use your Head Soldier! If You Want to Keep It! Every GI That's Been in Battle knows the Score." A clever attempt to bridge the language gap was the phonetic aid to surrender: "say tow shong. tow rhymes with show, shon rhymes with long," a ploy employed against the Germans in World War II and also used "in reverse," for English-speaking UN troops to accept Chinese surrenders.<sup>838</sup> Considerably grimmer were the "gory" enemy leaflets displaying dead GIs, one example noting "He Waited for Rotation --But He Died Waiting."<sup>839</sup>

Particularly cruel were leaflets carrying letters from relatives to dead GIs:

Honey, I cry for you. Does it help any? Everyone here is talking about war. They're scared. I wish old Truman had to fight the next war by himself....Bill, Dad loves you more than anyone could ever tell you. Sunday he was all heartbroken...."Johnnie, this war makes me so damn mad I don't know what to do....Darling, I only ask one thing of life, Come back, come back. I cannot face the thought of life without you.

Commonwealth Division troops might have had more positive feelings than those of their coke-slugging U.S. comrades toward another Christmas enemy message on a packet of tea somehow delivered across the lines, plus the modest message "Demand Peace, Stop the War!" (No problem!)<sup>840</sup>

The homefront was dragged into the service of the communists as well. "'Old Soldiers Never Die', But Young Ones Do!", a great line, was allegedly copied from leaflets distributed in Chicago by something entitled the American Peace Crusade during a parade honoring General MacArthur.<sup>841</sup> Another enemy

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<sup>837</sup>"Psychological Warfare NCO Course #2, p. 4-5, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>838</sup>Ibid. and Vatcher Papers, box 12, "Korean War" folder. Eighth Army psywarriors used the same phrase in their own surrender leaflets.

<sup>839</sup>Another enemy safe conduct promised the BEARER, regardless of his military rank or nationality, is hereby unconditionally guaranteed freedom from personal injury, maltreatment or abuse....", as if such "freedoms" were not to be expected, J. J. Diffendorfer, "Give Up -- It's Good For You, *Military Review*, July 1967, 85. The wide variation in the quality of the English in these leaflets remains unexplained so far.

<sup>840</sup>Copy in USASOC History Archives. (minus the tea.)

<sup>841</sup>Ibid., reproduced, along with similar leaflets in *The Psychological Warfare*

leaflet quoted a letter to President Truman, supposedly printed in the Fort Wayne, Indiana *News-Sentinel*, from a Marine lieutenant who brazenly proclaimed that "Never have American men fought in a more useless war."<sup>842</sup>

The enemy made use of American POWs, of course. One showed "Life in a P.O.W. Camp," with GIs eating and claimed that "The POWs are provided with adequate meals." A communist surrender leaflet on its reverse side had three rows of U.S. POWs carefully lined up, appearing reasonably content, and was captioned "They smile because they are safe and happy with us." The 79 captive GIs whose names appeared on the leaflet were happy, "as we always had our bowl of soup and rice and what is more we had as much as we wanted," not to mention that "Cigarettes flowed steadily from their [Chinese] hands to ours."<sup>843</sup> This was but one in a series of "Happy POW" communist leaflets ("You sleep under warm blankets", "Life in a POW Camp," "Swimming for Pastime." Prisoners were apparently expected, however, to do more than just sit around, eat, sleep, swim and smoke: another POW leaflet claimed that "These pictures show the scenes of the 'Meeting of U.S. War Prisoners Rising Against U.S. Imperialistic -- Military Intervention.'"<sup>844</sup>

However, the enemy, as noted above, often made the major mistake of demanding the impossible goal of "end-this-unjust-war" from soldiers who wanted nothing more than to get out of Korea: "Demand an Armistice in Korea and Early Homecoming!" The American Peace Crusade example, (noted above) demanded "Bring our boys home from Korea!! Make peace with China!! Another example quoted a U.S. POW as merely asking the troops to "Cease all aggressive activities for the sake of world peace and our own national prestige..." but concluding with a more heartfelt "stop sending those damn planes!" A later enemy leaflet urged more direct action: "And taking good aim, turn your guns back against the American murderous imperialists who are the true enemies of you peoples."<sup>845</sup>

Some leaflets were also directed at U.S. black troops: **LEST YOU FORGET!....Between January 1950 and June 1951, 85 Negroes have been lynched in the United States....NEGRO SOLDIERS! You've got a fight on your hands at home. Don't come fighting coloured people here. The only fight that makes sense is the fight for your own rights!**" (emphasis in original). The Communists also targeted Puerto Rican troops-- in bad Spanish, and the Dutch

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School, "Communist Leaflets - Korea" (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: n.d.), n.p. Another leaflet was supposedly in the handwriting of a member of the rather sinisterly-titled "Central Committee, U S British War Prisoner's Peace Organization.", USASOC History Archives.

<sup>842</sup>Ibid.

<sup>843</sup>USASOC History Archives, "Korean War Collection" box.

<sup>844</sup>Vatcher Papers, box 14, "Korean War" folder.

<sup>845</sup>Vatcher Papers, box 14, "Korean War" folder.

# LEAVE KOREA TO THE KOREANS



*Photo of G. I. just back from Korea.*

**YOU TOO BELONG BACK HOME!**

Probably the best of the lot: "Leave Korea to the Koreans!", great enemy psywar that would have been heartily endorsed by almost all UNC troops. Much better than "Running Dogs of Wall Street," etc.

## ARMISTICE TALKS GIVE PEOPLE NEW HOPE

Your folks are longing you will soon be home—safe and sound. This is what they are writing—

July 4<sup>th</sup> 1951

My Dearest Darling,

Well, sweet, first of all let me tell you that I love you with all my heart. Oh, it was with such joy we heard the news of ceasefire talk in Korea, and there is a great hope in our hearts that soon you'll be home, darling please to look quickly to care for me and our lovable baby.

I'm terribly waiting for a letter me you're coming home, I'm praying for the day when I can see you walking in the door to me. I had a dream last night that I saw you quite clearly running towards me, I don't know why we have to have war, I wish you'll never leave me again, I know you can have your old job if you left the army. I need you dear, my life is empty without you.

Your everloving wife

The best way home is real peace in Korea. And the first step to real peace is to fix the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides for the establishment of a demilitarised zone.

THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY  
THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS

( 和 談 傳 單 )





U.S. soldiers terrified by North Korean propaganda poster., U.S. Army photo.

in passable German. For all that, undoubtedly the best available communist leaflet carried a photo of a returning GI on the dock, Stateside, with his arm around his ecstatic wife, and rather than proclaiming "End the War!", not "End the War!", "You Are the Tools of the [sic.] Wall Street", etc., but rather simply echoed a sentiment quite popular in UNC ranks: "Leave Korea to the Koreans."<sup>846</sup> Exercising "the propaganda of the deed," the Chinese would occasionally release wounded UN soldiers, bearing "peace" messages from their captors.<sup>847</sup> Perhaps the most fascinating of the tangible Communist

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<sup>846</sup>Copies of cited leaflets in USASOC History Archives. Also Hansen, 28, 316. Note use of British spellings and usages, such as "coloured. Hansen, picking up on other Anglo-English terms ("cinema," "torchlight," "labour," "honour," etc.) believed he detected in their composition the surreptitious hand of the odious Australian "progressive journalist," Wilfred Burchett, and his comrade, Alan Winnington (the latter at least man enough to admit that he was indeed a communist), both of whom wrote primarily from behind the enemy lines. Burchett, in Hansen's words, "fled like a doe when he saw anyone from psywar approaching [at Panmunjom]," *ibid.*, 260-271. North Korean printed propaganda did not seem to improve with time. A full-color leaflet of the early 1960's, *Fortune's Favorites* (at least no "Briticisms" here) dealt with two renegade American servicemen. The color and printing were impressive, depicting the happy life of the defectors in the people's paradise of North Korea. (here termed "the northern part of the country"). The text, however, was larded with such outlandish expressions attributed to the two as "dear fellow friends," or

"Quite so! As long as Yankees are staying there [in South Korea], there can be no freedom and liberty....For what they sacrificed themselves? They died only to fatten the Wall Street masters and enriched their big money bags.

But perhaps the cruelest imposition on the two was their being outfitted and photographed in Khrushchev-era baggy suits and Sam Spade snap-brim fedora hats., *Fortune's Favorites* (Pyongyang: 1962), from LTG (Ret.) William Yarborough collection, Southern Pines, North Carolina.

<sup>847</sup>R. R. Cardell, "The Relationship of Psychologic [sic] Warfare to Intelligence Operations," Army War College student paper (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 23 February 1951), 5; Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951*, United States Army in the Korean War (Center of Military History, Washington: 1990), 63. Leaflets directed toward the South Korean civilian population were far less easy on the Americans. One improbably claimed that "On 18 October 1950, about 900 people, including 300 children were murdered behind the Shinchun City People's Committee office building." by burning them alive, while "Harrison, then commander of the American

psywar techniques (except perhaps for that tea packet), however, was the imitation leather memo book "Christmas gift" of 1952, entitled "My Korean Diary." Although the lines for "name, rank, serial number, vital statistics," including sock and collar sizes, seemed innocuous enough, there were also blanks for "unit, movement date of unit, when drafted," and "first wounded" (emphasis added). Even more curious were the blanks for "watch number" and "bicycle number."<sup>848</sup>

Although General McClure contended in January 1953 that "The techniques of the communists are improving tremendously" and even that "It has some effect, of course," the head of 8<sup>th</sup> Army psywar, closer to the scene, asserted more realistically after the war that "The Communist leaflets were a waste of effort, extravagant and exaggerated. They mirrored a communist picture of America, but not America.", in which American adults rode around on bicycles, kept track of their watch number, wrote down their collar sizes - and drank tea. It is probably indicative of the effect of enemy leaflets that both Colonel Hansen and General McClure complained that GI souvenir hounds complicated their efforts to obtain enemy leaflets.<sup>849</sup> As Paul Linebarger concluded, "The Americans thought their enemies were funny or silly."<sup>850</sup>

In the Fall of 1951 FEC became a joint command, with the new Army Forces Far East (AFFE) assuming responsibility for Army operations under FEC. At the same time, the Civil Information and Education organization was charged with psywar directed toward enemy POWs. Thus FEC was charged with both undermining and raising the morale of enemy troops! Other U.S. psywar organizational change saw the establishment by General Clark in January 1953 of the Joint Psychological Committee, chaired by FEC G-3. The

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occupation forces...." took pictures of the scenes. USASOC History Archives.

<sup>848</sup>Hansen, 321-323. (emphasis added).

<sup>849</sup>McClure interview; Hansen, 11, 77. For further evaluation of Communist psywar during the Korean War see RG 338, FEC Psywar Section, Decimal File for 1952, box 4318 091 "419" folder; and Fred H. Barta, *The North Korean Propaganda to South Koreans* [civilians and military] (ORO, Washington: 1 February 1951). Undoubtedly, far more attention was paid by the United States to enemy propaganda during the Korean War than in any previous American conflict, which is not saying much.

<sup>850</sup>*Psychological Warfare*, 287. Or in the words of the contemporary "Psychological Warfare NCO Course #2," "The North Korean Army recently bombarded American soldiers with what may go down in psychological warfare history as the classic example of what not to do. [referring to the the 'If MacArthur says we are dead....' effort.]. Crudely printed on light news stock....Its use had a rebound effect, and served to amuse the GI rather than assure him of safe conduct and fair treatment.", 4-5. Unfortunately, the leaflet seems to have been lost.

new committee included the Deputy Chief of Staff of the UN Command, a Major General from the British Army, the Deputy for Operations of the Far East Air Force, his opposite number from U.S. Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE), and the AFFE Chief of Psychological Warfare. Meeting at least once a month, the committee considered policy matters which might have to be taken up at the Department of the Army level, and provided generally satisfactory cooperation and coordination of all US Korean War psywar. At about the same time, General Clark had also established two Special Korean Information Guidance Committees, one in the State Department in Washington, the other in FEC, Tokyo. These met at the start of each business day, seven days a week, and processed information and suggestions regarding UN psywar both ways, and cooperated with the United States Information Service (USIS) and other federal agencies.

Reflecting this new high command interest in psywar, AFFE Psywar drew up "scientific principles" to guide all subsequent U.S. psychological warfare. These principles centered on the supposed main drives of the enemy: 1)hunger/thirst, 2)sex, 3)escape, 5)prestige, 6) conformity, 7)possessions, 8)gregariousness and eschewed political themes even more than earlier message guidance. As many of these drives as possible were to be included in every U.S. psywar message. In theory, at least, "Psywar was for the first time to be scientifically psychological."<sup>851</sup>

In an effort to achieve some such "scientific" basis for its work, Eighth Army's psywar section established a more formal leaflet pre-screening panel, composed of North Korean and Chinese POWs. This was a good idea, but somewhat tricky in practice. Certain individual POWs tended to be used time and again, and the more literate and assertive among them soon took informal leadership roles, at some cost in objectivity. Over time, the panels tended to lose their freshness, as they increasingly reflected the opinions of their captors or of their dominant members, who, of course, were progressively out of touch with the battle situation. Furthermore, as William Daugherty pointed out, it was considered bad manners in the Orient to criticize the efforts of another, particularly to his face, and particularly if one were a guest, albeit unwillingly. Thus the very POWs who were most amenable to U.S. propaganda were not only becoming "stale", they would feel themselves the more obligated to their "hosts," reluctant to criticize their psywar efforts and unwilling to "bite the hand that was feeding them" better than their own army ever did."<sup>852</sup>

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<sup>851</sup>Hansen, 109-110.

<sup>852</sup>USAFFE Chief of Psywar, to Army Chief of Psywar, subject: "Comments on ORO Pr-1", 21 January 1953, RG 319 (Army Staff), entry 339, Psywar Administrative Office Records Decimal File, 1951-54, box 3, "020 ORO" folder; *Psychological Warfare: A Long-Range Program, I, Essential Background Information, Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean*

The interrogations themselves were fairly sophisticated, lasting for from two to three hours per prisoner in an informal atmosphere "to get the prisoner to volunteer the information desired rather than answer specific questions." Interrogators took notes, which were later written up by the linguists and distributed to the various psywar and intelligence agencies.<sup>853</sup>

The POW panels were, of course, in addition to the regular interrogations of recently-captured POWs, some of which could produce startling results. For example, General Ridgway had personally called for a leaflet showing enemy dead. After some initial hesitation (There was a feeling that, as with atrocity propaganda, this theme would simply be picked up by the enemy, with nothing to show on balance for the effort.) Eighth Army psywar personnel went ahead with a photo showing Chinese troops killed by the Turks. Recently-captured POWs branded the leaflets as an obvious "lie" since "everyone knew" that the Turks had been wiped out by the Chinese in November 1950.<sup>854</sup>

Other POW pitfalls were documented in the reaction to a leaflet dropped in the early spring of 1951, showing what seemed to be an indubitably Chinese-appearing soldier fleeing UN tank and jet-fighter plane fire. But at

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*War* (ORO, Human Resources Research Office, Washington: March 1953) (no author), 60-61. Daugherty, "Problems Involved in Pretesting Leaflets," *Casebook*, 754. Daugherty also pointed out that the average Chinese peasant was not used to someone asking him his opinion about anything. Of the POWs he interviewed, more were Christian than Confucian and more were former Kuomintang troops than Communist, and thus doubly able to sense and tell their interrogators what they would like to hear. "Evaluation of Combat Propaganda," *Casebook*, 692. One study which dealt with the question as to why so many North Koreans, not to mention Chinese, were so cooperative in captivity concluded: These troops were exhorted never to surrender; thus if they did or were captured, many were mentally adrift, and not having heard of the Geneva Convention, had no idea what their rights, if any, were. Then, as noted, there was the oriental culture of politeness to one's host-captor. Oddly, and most unlike German POWs of World War II, a majority denied, for some reason, that they had fought hard before capture., Kim and Johnson, *Evaluation of Effects of Leaflets on Early North Korean Prisoners of War*, passim.

<sup>853</sup>Graphic evidence of POW interrogation methods and POW leaflet reactions can be found in the captions under series of 1<sup>st</sup> L&L photos in Herbert Avedon Papers, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>854</sup>R. P. Yountz, Lessing A. Kahn, J. Segal, *et al*, *Pre-Testing Procedures for Psychological Warfare Printed Media, Phase 1: The Group Interview Method* (ORO, Washington: 17 April 1952), 21. The tough Turks, although suffering casualties, were anything but "wiped out" in North Korea.

first not one of a group of "cooperative" POWs could figure out the nationality of the fleeing figure. Hoping for some clue from their American questioner, the most articulate of the prisoners ventured, "Oh, I get it now, the figure is supposed to represent an American soldier," and the others soon agreed. (The case is the more baffling in that no Chinese jets were ever seen over the battlefield, and the tank is plainly marked with a U.S. Army white star.)<sup>855</sup>

Equally baffling and a salutary indication of the complexities and difficulties in bridging different cultures was a rather complex leaflet for New Year's 1952, showing a traditional Chinese family feast, with a ghost-like soldier at the table, and the caption "Your Place Will Be Empty." Americans with considerable Chinese experience criticized the leaflet in detail for its supposed inappropriate features (food arranged in the wrong order, incorrect seating arrangements, family too rich to have a son in the army, "the food itself seems to be quite odd," the "ghost" is a Caucasian concept, and the picture of a bounteous feast would hardly convey the picture of the miseries of communism the U.S. psywar was trying to convey, etc., etc.) A Chinese scholar with a freshly-minted U.S. Ph.D. was just as loquaciously critical ("the children shouldn't be there," the children, mother or grandmother should have a cup of tea; the boiled egg dish would not have been on the table at the same time as the other dishes, no one since 1937 would have such a feast, etc., etc., etc.) Yet two four-man POW panels found not one error in the illustration, agreed among themselves that the presence of the "ghost" showed that the family was starving (!) ("There is no food to eat. It is a miserable situation," "family situation has become hopeless with the drafting of the son," "A spirit has come back to his home for New Year's Reunion feast."), but missed the psywar point entirely: Communist soldiers were unlikely to return to their families, except as ghosts.<sup>856</sup> It was enough to make Eight Army psywarriors weep. Their morale was not helped by the fact that although Eighth Army G-2 had funds for cigarettes and candy to put POWs at ease, Eighth Army psywarriors had to purchase these items out of their own pockets, just one more

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<sup>855</sup>Daugherty, "Credibility in Leaflet and Poster Illustrations," *Casebook*. Diffendorfer, 86, says that the reason for the leaflet's failure was that it featured "a stereotype --an American conception of a Chinese soldier.", and that another leaflet showing a photo of a dead Chinese soldier next to one of a smiling compatriot with his family "was very effective." Original of leaflet in Vatcher Papers, box 13, "Korean War" folder.

<sup>856</sup>Daugherty, "Problems Involved in Pretesting Leaflets," *Casebook*, passim. Berger makes the same points. A skeleton was not so identified by POWs, a cartoon depicting Stalin pushing a Chinese soldier, who, in turn is pushing a North Korean soldier into war was interpreted as Stalin kicking the Americans; the photo of Sun Yat Sen, intended to express U.S. respect for a great Chinese patriot was identified with "foreignness," etc.; Berger, 132.



"The Ghost at the Feast." Source of much confusion among 8th Army psywarriors.

manifestation of the Army's continuing lack of knowledge or appreciation of psywar.<sup>857</sup>

Also on their own resources, 1<sup>st</sup> RB&L Group personnel drew up a basic Chinese language dictionary. The written Korean language was quite straightforward, and easily understood by soldiers and civilians alike and North Korean POWs had a considerably higher literacy rate than their Chinese comrades in arms. Mandarin Chinese was not so simple a matter. U.S. psywar units simply could not muster enough good Chinese or American interrogators or writers in the language, and those they had often could not resist using an elevated literary phraseology that was over the heads of the average Chinese peasant-soldier, 80 percent of whom the UN Command found to be illiterate. As early as the summer of 1951, U.S. psywarriors began to use wordless cartoons, appealing to illiterate enemy troops.<sup>858</sup> In the summer of 1952, Eighth Army psywarriors began work on a simple, basic Chinese dictionary of about 1,400 characters (A typical metropolitan Chinese daily newspaper of the time used no more than 4,000 characters.) at about the same time that the Peking government was also simplifying the language for civilian and military personnel alike. Good results were reported in the remaining months of the war.<sup>859</sup>

Eighth Army psywar personnel also proposed a variety of new technological developments in the field, including radio-controlled leaflet-dropping aircraft, guided and unguided missiles, "pliofilm" or aluminum leaflets, surrender discs (possibly appealing to enemy troops as souvenirs), and even what later would be termed "biodegradable" leaflets. None of these ideas ever seemed to go anywhere.<sup>860</sup>

Other, more bizarre, schemes included the dropping of leaflets imprinted with phosphorescent inks (confusingly justified as helping "to

<sup>857</sup>Hansen, 204.

<sup>858</sup>Avedon, "CCF Propaganda Man," 13-14.

<sup>859</sup>Ibid., 140-146; 1<sup>st</sup> RB&L Group, *List of the 1400 Most Frequently Used Chinese Characters* [Tokyo: 1954 edition]; Avedon, "CCF Propaganda Man" (May 1954), 14-16. Avedon never forgot the look on the face of a Chinese POW, who presented with a message in the new, simplified script, exclaimed in rapture, "I can read!", Avedon interview.

<sup>860</sup>USAFFE Psywar Section report to Chief Army Psywar, for 3- May 1953, dated 15 May 1953, RG 319 (Army Staff), entry 339, box 8: "Psywar FECOM" folder; Pease, 45; *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army, June-December 1951*, 94; "Some Psywar Highlights," n.d. RG 319 (Army Staff), Decimal File, 1951-54, Chief of Staff for Special Warfare, box 4, no folder number. Ordnance Corps, Redstone Arsenal, Test Report, "Flight Testing of the Rocket, Leaflet, 115mm, T229, Dates Fired: 7 April 1953 thru 21 May 1953" (Huntsville, Alabama: 7 December 1953).



overcome the degree of sophistication steadily rising among the enemy regarding the novelty of leaflets being dropped on him by airplane and leaflet shells." ), or the placing of propaganda buoys under the ice of Korean rivers, to bob to the surface, emblazoned with propaganda messages, at the first spring thaw. A simple pencilled notation of "No funds!" put an end to a some unknown psywar genius' scheme to drop leaflets with "lucky numbers," good for prizes of from US\$10 to US\$100. The winners' prize money would then actually be dropped over the communist lines. At the most, this novel lottery would provoke considerable enemy attention; at the least, the "lucky numbers" holders would become disgruntled if their prize money was (as seemed more likely) confiscated by their officers. But the most macabre scheme involved the actual cremation of a dead Chinese soldier and the dropping of his ashes over enemy lines. An accompanying message piously stated that UN forces were sensitive to the customs of even dead Chinese and Koreans and that the living would receive similarly thoughtful treatment.<sup>861</sup> It is difficult to escape the impression that most of these schemes were conjured up more from boredom and frustration over the stalemated front than from any realistic hope that they might actually be used.

A more conventional innovation, put into effect on a fairly large scale, were U.S. gift boxes for the enemy, which included writing material, cigarettes, matches, and a chess set, probably the first time in U.S. psywar history that tangible gifts were offered a foe before he surrendered.<sup>862</sup> Along similar lines, a gift bag contained five cigarettes, a box of matches, six sheets of stationery, a chess game, a calendar and a greeting card. The accompanying message read:

The UN soldiers present this bag to the NK soldiers. All the

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<sup>861</sup>Avedon interview. This ploy was similar to the dropping of boxes or an urn containing the ashes of enemy dead, occasionally used in the Pacific. But in these earlier cases the bodies had already been cremated, presumably by local civilians.

<sup>862</sup>Report, USAFFE Psywar Section to Chief of Army Psywar, from 3 May to 9 May 1953, dated 15 May 1953, RG 497, box 66, folder 1; Psychological Warfare Division, G3, HQ, EUSAK, in Avedon Collection, USASOC History Archives. Translation of "gift" accompanying leaflet in *ibid.* Credit for the most ingenious propaganda gift, however, must go to the Germans in the Soviet Union in World War II. Attempting, with considerable success, to win over the Moslem population under their occupation, German authorities distributed miniature Korans so tiny that they had to be read with a magnifying glass, also thoughtfully provided by the Germans., J. H. Buchsbaum, "German Psychological Warfare on the Russian Front, 1941-1945" (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army: February 1953), VI-56 - 57.

free nations stood up firmly to repel Communist aggression with which the Communists intend to destroy the ROK. We, however, have no animosity toward the NK soldiers who were forced to fight with the Communist Army. This bag is our humble gift to you in recognition of our friendship. You will see much more of our friendship when you come over to the UN line.<sup>863</sup>

The sentiments here could have been repeated by the communists themselves simply by changing a very few key words: ("The Chinese Volunteers present this bag to the US soldiers. All progressive nations stood firmly to repel imperialist aggression by which the loathsome imperialists intend to destroy the DKPR. We, however, have no animosity toward the US soldiers who were forced to fight with the imperialist army.")

One fearsome "innovation" that was fortunately not considered by U.S. psywar at any level was the threat of the atom bomb. Although U.S. politicians brandished this seemingly "ultimate weapon" in a way that would seem frighteningly irresponsible to a later generation, General McClure assured the American public that "We have kept very quiet on that.", adding "We can't bluff."<sup>864</sup>

U.S. psywar efforts in the field were consistently hampered by the personnel situation. Rapid turnover became a problem after the personnel rotation policy was introduced in 1951. For example, one corps with four divisions rotated out no less than eight different psywar officers in a single month and one division ran through six psywar officers in one year. Requests for psywar officers at the division level were likely to be met by giving the assignment to the under-worked chemical warfare officer as "additional duty." At the enlisted level, the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L reported that "many enlisted men of those about to be rotated in July were developing jitters...", and as a result, the "programming was amateurish, poorly exploited." A further complication, as USAFFE's psywar chief reported, was that "none of the U.S. Army personnel in Eighth Army Psywar Division know Korean or Chinese language" (although they did have access to good interpreters).<sup>865</sup> Another problem may have been

<sup>863</sup>HQ. U.S. Army, Pacific, *Psychological Operations Guide (Leaflet Operations)* (San Francisco: April 1965), 100.

<sup>864</sup>McClure interview, *U.S. News and World Report*. Of course, it could be argued that the entire mutual nuclear weapons deterrent culture was based on bluff.

<sup>865</sup>Chief of USAFFE Psywar, memo to Chief, Army Psywar, subject: "Comments on ORO-PR-1," 21 January 1953, RG 319 (Army Staff), entry 339, Psywar Administrative Office Records Branch Decimal File, 1951-54, box 3, "020 ORO" folder. The division historical officer could also find

that of troops "over-educated" for the work they were doing. The enlisted men of the 1<sup>st</sup> RBL, for example, held more Ph.Ds than there were officers in the group and one-third of the enlisted men were college graduates (who for the most part had excellent job prospects awaiting them in the booming Stateside economy.)<sup>866</sup> To fill the personnel gap, the Army mandated 60 officers of Continental Army Command (United States) to attend a one-semester course on the subject at Georgetown University. But psychological warfare was hardly seen as a career-enhancing move. When the position of chief of Eighth Army psywar came open, a number of fast-track young lieutenant colonels nonetheless turned down the offer with alacrity, even though it meant promotion to full colonel. And it seemed unlikely that such attitudes would change any time soon. A Department of the Army-level study made sometime in 1951-1952, asserted that "the Army is filled with individuals who think psywar is something for college professors," compared to red-blooded combat or even combat-support specialties.<sup>867</sup>

Indigenous Korean civilian employees posed another problem. Their work for the most part was excellent, but their pay remained abysmal, due to the Korean government's fear of inflation (one of the few areas where that government seemed to take the problem seriously). U.S. psywar personnel managed to obtain supplemental rations for their employees, but the most appreciated "fringe benefit" was their new exemption from the ROK Army draft. The problem was compounded by the fact that Chinese nationals employed by the Army were paid in military script and enjoyed post exchange privileges, benefits that added up to something like four times the compensation of Korean employees doing the same psywar work.<sup>868</sup> Perhaps the brightest spot in the U.S. psywar personnel picture was, as noted, high-

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himself performing tactical psychological warfare, as was the case with in 45<sup>th</sup> Division. *Informal Comments of Korean War Psywar Operators* (ORO, American Institute for Research, Washington: December 1953).

<sup>866</sup>Ponturo, *Lower Levels*, 16; 1<sup>st</sup> L&L, Command Report for June 1952, RG 338, FEC Decimal File 1952, box 4324; Hansen, 189, 88-89. A report dealing with the last year of the war asserted that the psywar effort "diminished markedly at the lower-echelons.", and that "lower-echelon psywar officers seldom initiated, planned or directed specific action in conjunction with local military operations.", Ponturo, *Psychological Warfare Operations*, 3.

<sup>867</sup>"Psywar Deficiencies Noted in Korea - A Study", n.d., RG 319, entry 338 (Army Staff), Psywar Administrative Office Records Decimal File, 1951-52, "O91 Korea" folder.

<sup>868</sup>Office of the Chief of Army Psychological Operations, memo for Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, subject: "Quota for the Psywar Officers' Course commencing 1 August 1952," 16 July 1952; Hansen, 203, 201-210.

level support from Secretary of the Army Pace and Generals Ridgway and Clark, the latter, in the words of the chief of Eighth Army's psywar section, "psywar's greatest supporter and certainly one of its best copywriters."<sup>869</sup>

Combined psywar may have been somewhat utilized at the higher levels, but apart from distributing all of its psywar leaflets to all UN commanders, the U.S. psywar effort included only modest combined arms coordination with its allies, including the Republic of Korea. One New Zealand officer, with 30 years of China experience, was assigned to U.S. psywar, and, as noted, 1<sup>st</sup> L&L loudspeaker teams did conduct psywar for the other UNC national units. Aside from the ROK Army, only the Commonwealth Division conducted its own psywar, although Thai, Greek, Canadian, UK, and French liaison officers showed interest and gave some assistance.<sup>870</sup> This was an odd state of affairs, considering that U.S. military operations Korea were conducted officially as part of the United Nations' effort in that nation.

Eighth Army's psywar products improved markedly in the last year of the war, despite personnel problems and the continuing general ignorance of its mission among other Army arms. Much of this improvement was simply due to accumulating experience, but an Eighth Army order of 27 March 1953, mandating that lower echelons "conduct tactical propaganda operations...using organic light aircraft, artillery, patrols, and attached Eighth Army loudspeakers", also helped give psywar some needed validity.<sup>871</sup> Leaflets were printed in multi-colors and used more oriental graphic idioms. By 1953, psywarriors attached to the 45<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, for example, could persuade a POW to tape a message and could broadcast it back to his comrades in a matter of minutes, and 1<sup>st</sup> Corps demanded and got leaflets ready for dropping within 24 hours carrying photos of defectors. The average time between leaflet production and dissemination could vary enormously, however; between 24 and 60 hours, depending particularly on whether these were "general purpose" leaflets (e.g. "surrender," "you cannot defeat the UN's might") or specific, such as a leaflet directed at the 2d North Korean Division.<sup>872</sup> Understandably, most psywarriors preferred the former, which could be stockpiled, with unit names added at the last minute, and which took much less work.<sup>873</sup>

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<sup>869</sup>Ibid., 79.

<sup>870</sup>Ibid., 7, 29-30, 223-224, 99; Pease, 18-19.

<sup>871</sup>Ponturo, *Lower Levels*, 19.

<sup>872</sup>Pease, 43.

<sup>873</sup>Ponturo, 189; Brown, "Tactical Psywar," 7. Still, some people are never satisfied. One psywarrior veteran claimed that "A tactical propaganda detachment should be able to turn out a leaflet from ideas to bundles in three hours....While I was in Korea, this never occurred.", B. B. Bintliff, "Informal Comments of Korean War Psychological Operators," December 1953, RG

# 福壽宮

！待招好又錢要不既

有醫藥



有穿的



有吃的



有玩的



軍國合聯  
兵士國中待招好

“Happy POW” theme, eyeballs out.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff  
Psychological Warfare Branch  
APO 500

LEAFLET: The Doorway to Survival  
LANGUAGE: Chinese  
DESIGNATION: Serial No. 7027  
TARGET: Chinese Forces in Korea  
REMARKS: Chinese "Good-Treatment" Leaflet  
ART WORK: Panel of 4 photographs of Chinese PW's, showing food, cigarettes and new shoes being issued, medical treatment being dispensed, recreation being enjoyed.

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TEXT:

Page 1 Four photographs, as described, with individual captions: "Medical Treatment", "Food", "Clothing", "Recreation"; a caption across the top of the page: "The Doorway to Survival - Enter Free"; and a caption at the bottom of the page: "Chinese Soldiers Receiving Good Treatment from the United Nations Forces".

Page 2 SAFE CONDUCT PASS (printed in Chinese and English)

You Chinese soldiers who served in the last war with the American soldiers know of the traditional friendship between the Americans and the Chinese.

You know that you will be well-treated when you come over to the side of the United Nations, if you have been wounded, or if you suffer from frostbite or illness of any kind, you will be given proper medical treatment.

Food, warm clothes and cigarettes are provided, and you will be given opportunity for recreation and the right of free assembly.

우리는 "유엔"군 병사에서 안전하게 지내고  
있는 그대들의 전우다. 많은 식량과 진절한  
치료를 받고 있다.



....eyeballs in.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

LEAFLET: Good Treatment of Prisoners

LANGUAGE: Korean

DESIGNATION: Serial No. 1025

TARGET: North Korean Troops

REMARKS: Leaflet urging surrender and stressing good treatment accorded prisoners of war.

ART WORK: Photograph of a group of eighteen broadly grinning North Korean prisoners.

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TEXT: Page 1.

SOLDIERS OF NORTH KOREA-I

Here is a picture of a few of your comrades who have found out for themselves what good treatment the UN and ROK forces give to prisoners of war. You can see how happy they are in their new surroundings. More than 55,000 North Korean soldiers have now surrendered or been captured. Instead of risking each day the danger of violent death in a useless war, they are safe in UN camps where they get plenty of good food and have their wounds promptly treated. They know, too, that General MacArthur has said that North Korean prisoners will be allowed to return safely to their homes as soon as possible after the war is over. They are looking forward to this day, and hoping that you who are still in the battle zone will soon come over to the UN side and join them.

Page 2.

Photograph with caption as follows:

"Here are a few of your comrades who are now safe in a UN camp, receiving plenty of food and good medical care."



Psywar chiefs even made some attempts to curb the more immoderate leaflet "papering" of enemy lines. Whereas previous practice, based purely on guesswork, had been to lay down 20-100 leaflets per 1,000 square meters, new, more refined data in early 1953, showed that 5-12 leaflets could do the job for an average enemy field unit, and 6-30 leaflets for a village, town, or city. Some observers used the logical argument that "familiarity breeds contempt," that the enemy would be unlikely to treat with respect leaflets he was almost literally wading through. A few good leaflets, on the other hand, were more to be saved, even shared, if for no other reason than their relative scarcity and curiosity value.<sup>874</sup> Leaflets were now also more pinpointed, targeting units known to have suffered heavy casualties, to "welcome" green troops, etc. Many of these messages were now drawn up ahead of time, with the enemy unit designation to be added just before dissemination

Perceptive UN psywarriors picked up on the new Chinese divorce law, which permitted a soldier's wife to sever a marriage if she had not heard from her husband within two years, and made sure that enemy troops got the word. One intriguing change had been made in the leaflet photos faces of POWs, previously covered to protect their families. The Communists began to spread the word that the faces had been blanked out because they had been "disfigured by chemical warfare" experiments. So Eighth Army psywarriors had to revert to the earlier practice of leaving the faces untouched.<sup>875</sup> Some leaflets showed impressive imagination: one printed on flimsy paper stock solicitously noted "Perhaps your supply services are not providing you with cigarette paper. We know that you have been using our leaflets to roll your cigarettes." Well, this leaflet now contains such paper, but the soldier really would do even better in a

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319, entry 338, Psywar Administrative Office Records Branch Decimal File, 1951-54, " box 7, "O91 Korea" folder. (emphasis in original). See also Vatcher Papers, box 12, "Korean War" folder. Ponturo, *Psychological Warfare Operations*, 21-22. The use of audio recording tape was a "first" of Korean War psywar (along with air-conditioned facilities). Throughout World War II, U.S. psywarriors in the field had had to rely on the much more clumsy record cutting machine.

<sup>874</sup>L. A. Hannum, et al; *Determinates of Optimum Leaflet Dissemination, Phase 1 of Leaflet Dissemination for Psychological Warfare* (ORO, Baltimore; March 1955.) On the other hand, it might be argued that "papering" an area with leaflets showed the wealth and power of the UN Command.

<sup>875</sup>Pease, 81; Berger, on the other hand, reported a slightly different explanation for the change; the Communists claimed that the POWs' eyes had been gouged out. Whatever. "The Korean Safe Conducts," in D. C. Pollock, et al *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application*, Pamphlet No. 525-7-11 (Department of the Army, Washington: April 1976), 407.



# 捲煙用紙

7092

吧命進

或許你們的後勤部沒有供給你們捲煙紙，我們知道你們對中法軍火捲煙煙草是聯合國軍隊需要門替你們準備的捲煙紙。

聯合國深愛這作現成的看煙。

快來享受舒適的生活，和充分的香烟吧！什麼麼，快跑到聯軍這邊來吧！

吧命進

吧命進

吧命進

"Here's some cigarette paper, but if you want tobacco also, a well-run UN POW camp will supply this also."

UNC POW camp, where he could smoke his lungs out. A grim third leaflet drew attention to the "Cap of Death," the ubiquitous Chinese fabric military headgear (praised, along with the Chinese uniform, by "progressive" journalists in the West for its "simple," "light-weight," "rugged" qualities, but which provided absolutely no protection against flying steel.) The leaflet made the point that apparently the communist authorities cared much less for their men than did the UN Command, whose troops were issued steel helmets. Perhaps one of the most effective of 8<sup>th</sup> Army leaflets iterated this "death" theme. One side showed nothing more than a carefully-drawn skull, framed by icicles, under Chinese Army cap. The message was simple enough, and believable to Chinese troops under constant UN air and ground bombardment: "You're going to die!"

More positively, UN leaflets continued to emphasize the "happy POW" theme, showing even a camp orchestra as well as the ubiquitous smokes all around. U.S. leaflets also continued their "political" campaign in appealing to Chinese and Korean nationalism, threatened by Soviet "domination. A typical such later effort featured a happy Korean family under the traditional Taikuk flag (used by South Korea), contrasted to the miserable life found in North Korea, crushed under an alien power and an alien ideology. Another leaflet showed the flags of no less than 60 nations in some tangible way or other supporting the UNC in Korea, and whose desire for peace with the North Koreans and the Chinese communists was being thwarted by their wicked communist leaders. A similar leaflet displayed a drawing of the troops of those many nations, with their racial diversity: this was not just a war of Caucasians against Asians. Far East Command specifically requested the leaflet featuring the deadlocked armistice talks at Panmunjom, boycotted by the communists over the question of POWs who had refused repatriation. The leaflet's message was that the communists refused even to discuss the matter, thus revealing their unconcern for individual freedoms.

Nonetheless, at least one of that campaign's missions backfired, due to a misreading of enemy psychology. An enemy division opposite X Corps had a reputation of being the worst in the North Korean Army. This unfortunate unit was specifically pounded by U.S. artillery almost continuously for a full week. But the division came out of the bombardment as if tried by fire, its morale better than ever! ("Our lads can take anything the enemy dishes out and give it right back in full.") Certainly no defectors were garnered from that outfit, although a few did come over from adjacent units, fearful that their turn would come next. As for a mean-spirited leaflet encouraging enemy troops to commit suicide, one can only hope that this proved equally unsuccessful.<sup>876</sup>

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<sup>876</sup>Hansen, 72. Hansen also writes of another failure, the distribution of 40 divisions' worth of plastic bags, suitably inscribed with messages on how to use the bags to carry rice, and on the joys of surrender. Enemy soldiers simply

# 自由世界

聯合國軍總司令部 週報




## 杜魯門總統重申保衛自由世界

伊爾南斯拉夫邊境而最重要的

杜魯門總統在週日對美國國會說，美國必須保衛自由世界。他重申美國在威爾遜總統的遺囑下，致力於使世界各國在自由與和平中生活。杜魯門說，美國必須不斷注意蘇俄帝國主義的擴張，並防止其對自由世界構成威脅。他呼籲各國團結一致，共同保衛自由世界。

## 聯軍為自由而戰

為世界各國作戰的士兵，來自世界各地，他們膚色不同，但目的是一致的——自由。他們大都來自像法蘭西、英國、丹麥等小國，但他們的勇氣和決心是巨大的。他們都為自由而戰，他們所認為自由而可貴。他們不願坐視一個自由國家為共產主義所摧毀。他們為自由而戰，他們為自由而戰。他們為自由而戰。



七月廿四日聯軍代表在中華前進二千碼空軍轟炸北韓軍事目標。開城會談重開，杆城西南山區展開激烈戰鬥。中沙里院車站噴射機炸毀六八次。七月廿六日第十次開城會談討論自韓撤軍問題。雙方同意議程。聯軍猛烈砲擊金化以東共方增援部隊。海軍再度砲轟元山軍事目標。七月廿七日聯軍首席代表在開城宣佈：設非武裝區空軍共出擊八三五次。



### 空中救護飛機

泰國戰士到達韓國。泰國戰士在日前由曼谷乘船前往韓國前線。他們係增援現在韓國作戰的泰國武裝部隊。泰國已經有大量軍隊加上海軍部隊和運輸機在韓為聯合國服務。

聯合國宣佈：共軍在韓的傷亡總數從戰爭開始到七月十九日止已達一百二十萬人。七月十三日止又增加了一千四百三十四人。七月十八日又增加了一千八百九十人。和它的自由國家相聯繫。總統在結論中說：在韓國駐了成千計的自衛隊。他們使成百萬計的人們可以不必在一個世界戰爭中失去生命。

### 韓戰一週

上週中開城會談已達一個階段。從三天的休會到一個僵局。戰線上戰事規模不大。情況很激烈。新聞和後方兵相接。週七廿二日停戰會談休會。聯軍首席代表返東京和李奇威將軍晤談。請總戰況寂靜。聯軍海軍砲火轟擊北韓沿海。七月廿三日聯軍官署等待休會期滿。聯軍空軍在黃州及沙里院共方機場投彈二千枚。發砲砲四萬九千發。

七月廿八日共方代表在第十二次停戰會談中宣稱：要沿三八線設非武裝地帶。聯軍代表答稱：三八線不易防守。會談九成僵局。下次會議在廿九日晨十一時舉行。

聯合國在韓停戰的目的：(一)可以實施的停戰協定。(二)以現戰線為準的二十哩寬非武裝地帶。(三)國際委員會和空中巡察來監視實行停戰協定。



# 自由世界



## 杜魯門總統重申保衛自由世界


社魯門總統對美國說：自由世界在威正，我們必須注意。伊爾南斯拉夫邊境，伊爾南斯拉夫邊境，伊爾南斯拉夫邊境...

### 聯軍為自由而戰

為聯合國作戰的士兵，來自世界各地，他們膚色不同，但目的是一致的。自由世界，自由世界，自由世界...

本國境內所發生的一切，杜魯門總統說：自由世界不放棄防衛，他將一直擴展軍力。我們必須注意，蘇俄帝國主義不斷推進行動...

聯合國宣佈：共軍在韓的傷亡總數，從戰爭開始到七月十九日，已達一百二十萬人。七月十四日止，又增加了一千四百三十四人。七月十三日止，又增加了一千八百九十人。



上週中開城會議已進入一個階段，從三天的休會到一個僵局，戰事激烈，沿綫都有短兵相接。週新聞如後：七月廿二日，停戰會議，杜魯門總統代表返京，李奇威將軍代表返京，李奇威將軍代表返京...

七月廿四日，聯軍代表在漢城前線，與共軍代表在漢城前線，與共軍代表在漢城前線... 七月廿五日，開城會議，討論朝鮮半島南區展開戰事，二十九架飛機炸毀江東附近橋樑，空軍出動六八〇架次。

泰國戰士到達韓國，泰國戰士在前週由曼谷乘船前往韓國，前週他們係增援現在韓國作戰的泰國武裝部隊。泰國武裝部隊和運輸機在上海軍部隊和運輸機在韓為聯合國服務。

空中救護飛機，聯合國軍受傷時，即乘空中救護飛機運送後方醫院診治。



Probably the most read leaflet of this war was the newsletter *Free World Weekly Digest*, which had improved enormously after Daugherty's earlier criticisms. The USAFFE chief of psywar claimed that POWs unanimously agreed that this was their principal source of unbiased information. Of course, the news letter itself was "biased," but its contents do seem to have been presented in a subtle way to troops starved for information of the outside world and of their own countries.<sup>877</sup>

U.S. psywar also mounted extensive leaflet drops that would come under the heading of strategic psywar against civilian and military targets in North Korea, but which were drawn up often by Eighth Army psywarriors in the field and which also had their effect upon enemy front-line troops. Probably the most extensive were the "humanitarian warning" leaflets dropped over North Korean cities. "Operation Strike" of July 1952 targeted no less than 78 cities and towns, giving them a 30-minute warning. This was too little time to bring in additional anti-aircraft defenses, but enough for civilians to evacuate the area and also to note the alacrity with which Communist cadres

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scrubbed off the messages and used the satchels as tote bags. Ibid., 136. UN psywar was presumably also hindered by instances of the shooting of enemy troops attempting to surrender, as reported by one U.S. psywarrior late in the war. Another, in February, complained that the mistreatment of captured guerrillas at the Kwangju compound was specifically hindering his work., R. L. Furan, "Informal Comments of Korean War Psywar Operators," December 1952", RG 319, entry 338, Psywar Administrative Office Records Branch Decimal Files, 1951-54, box 7, "091 Korea" folder., 1LT W. L. Eilers to Chief, Psywar Section, thru 1st RB&L Group, subject: Treatment of Prisoners," 2 February 1952, RG 319 (Army Staff), Psywar Administrative Office Records Branch, Decimal File 1951-54, entry 338, box 30, "POW" folder. The Eighth Army Provost Marshal reported that he was assured by the KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) representative at Kwangju that these were "isolated cases." Of course., LTC C. G. Folan, MPC, subject: "Treatment of Prisoners," 19 February 1952, *ibid.*

<sup>877</sup>Chief, USAFFE Psywar, memo to Chief, Army Psywar, 21 January 1953, RG 319 (Army Staff), entry 339, Psywar Administrative Office Records Decimal File, 1951-54, box 3, "020 ORO" folder; Hansen, 16, 211. Selected copies of *Free World Weekly Digest* are in USASOC History Archives and Vatcher Papers, box 12, folder #36. The psywar veteran Wilbur Schramm claimed that "one of the most welcome and appreciated items of the United Nations psychological warfare production has been the "Free World Weekly Digest", a news sheet published and dropped over enemy troop areas in the form of leaflets." , W. Schramm, *FED Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio* (ORO, Johns Hopkins University, General Headquarters Far Eastern Command: Tokyo(?), Baltimore(?): 20 June 1952.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Psychological Warfare Section  
First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group  
APO 500

29 March 1952

LEAFLET: Communist Obstruction  
LANGUAGE: Chinese  
DESIGNATION: 7145\*  
TARGET: CCF in Korea  
REMARKS: Asterisk after serial number signifies leaflet suggested and requested by Psywar EUSAK.  
ART WORK: Front and Back: Photos of Nam Il and two Chinese soldiers.

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TEXT:

Page 1: Photos  
Text at right: While Mr. White Boots delays the peace talks.  
Text at left: The Chinese soldier suffers.

Page 2: Photos and text:

While your North Korean bosses continue to prolong the war, thousands of Chinese soldiers die needlessly for them.

Why should the Chinese soldiers, rather than the Korean soldiers, be forced to do most of the fighting? While your Korean bosses strut their stuff before the world the Chinese soldier is forced to bow to them.

Your leaders say you are "volunteers." If you are, and since there are more Chinese than Koreans fighting why should you have to take orders from Korean bosses?

OPPOSE COMMUNISM!      RESIST RUSSIA!

(cut lines for photos read):

Right: North Korean General Nam Il, Chief Communist Delegate at the peace talks.  
Left: Two Chinese soldiers.



7145\*



你們中國士兵繼續挨苦



白靴先生  
拖延停戰談判

....certainly not "Mr. White Boots."



**Korean workers load PSYOP leaflet bombs., U.S. Army photo.**



Before....

7079

的飲你  
 快傷食好  
 過口和的  
 來立符  
 保刻國  
 全區軍  
 性命治  
 命你的  
 給

到嗎明今砲  
 了喂？天天彈昨  
 ，，再能爆天  
 死老聽活炸你  
 期鄉砲得咁聽  
 到，彈過？到  
 了死期爆去多  
 ！炸，你少

也炸你，一，兩遠  
 是死的這黑也處  
 那。頭些的夜好  
 樣你上砲飛也，  
 被的來彈來好天  
 炸同，快。晴來  
 死伴把要不還也，  
 的們你到久是好  
 下由



and after. (flip side).

also loaded trucks and cleared out. The warnings further emphasized, of course, UN command of the skies. The drops of July 1952, just before the massive bombing of the capital, Pyongyang, brought "reliable reports" of the emptying of entire villages and towns in the area, if not the city itself, whose remaining citizens were reduced to a troglodyte existence.<sup>878</sup>

U.S. psywar also increased its radio and leaflet programs to non-repatriate Communist POWs, whose disposition remained the only major hindrance to an armistice.<sup>879</sup> Eighth Army performed what must have been one of its most unusual psywar mission of the war in connection with the non-repatriate enemy POWs. Some of the most virulently anti-communist prisoners had taken to tattooing irretrievably on their bodies such messages as "Down With Kim Il Sung!", or "Freedom or Death!" with unsterile ink and consequently developing blood poisoning. Eighth Army psywarriors chipped in with their own money to buy sterile ink to keep producing non-toxic anti-Communist messages.<sup>880</sup> Perhaps in response to such imaginative operations Eighth Army awarded a Meritorious Unit Citation to the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L in February of 1953.<sup>881</sup>

By the third and final year of the war it could be said that U.S. psywar, for all its continuing shortcomings, had become a wide-ranging, well-coordinated, systematic operation.<sup>882</sup> The extent of its success, as in every U.S. war, can be debated. But it was difficult to argue against the more than 22,000 non-repatriate, anti-Communist enemy POWs. This was in marked contrast to a miserable 22 U.S. troops who refused to return. (Those who had not died in their Communist havens eventually returned quietly to the horrors

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<sup>878</sup>Futrell, 516, 521; Hansen, 107-108; Elliot Harris, "Operation Strike," in *The Un-American Weapon* (New York: 1967). The State Department initially opposed these leaflets, fearing that the United States would be seen by world opinion as targeting civilians (One could argue just the opposite.) State, however, did have a point, but later dropped its resistance in frustration over a war that seemed to have no end., Pease, 83-85. The FEAF deputy for operations frankly noted that "Whenever possible, [air] attacks will be scheduled against targets of military significance so situated that their destruction will have a deleterious effect upon the morale of the civilian population, actually engaged in the support of enemy forces.", C. C. Crane, *Bombs, Cities and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II* (Manhattan, KS: 1993).

148. None of the actual leaflets seem to have survived.

<sup>879</sup>Hansen, 250-255; USAFFE Psywar Chief, memo to Chief, Army Psywar, subject: "Psywar activities report, 31 May-6 June 1953," dated 12 June 1953, RG 497, USARPAC, box 66, "psywar activities" folder.

<sup>880</sup>Hansen, 219.

<sup>881</sup>"General Orders #243," 28 February 1953.

<sup>882</sup>Ponturo, *Psychological Warfare Operations*, 15.

of capitalism. Fortunately for them none had tattooed their bodies with "Down With Truman!")

One study of U.S. psywar effectiveness, going back to February 1951, showed 55 to 65 percent of North Korean and Chinese Communist POWs saying that UN leaflets made them think about or even precipitate the act of surrender. Although it should be noted that all had surrendered on their own, i.e., there were no captured enemy in this sampling, an incredible 46 percent claimed to be Communist Party members.<sup>883</sup> A survey of 273 POWs in the late summer of 1951, roughly evenly divided between North Koreans and Chinese, indicated 75 percent seemed favorably inclined to U.S. psywar. An indication of the independence of the respondents was that one-half of Chinese respondents stoutly claimed not to have believed U.S. leaflets.<sup>884</sup> Roughly the same results were reported by the chief of FEC psywar: 62 percent of Chinese POWs influenced by UN loudspeakers and leaflets and 70 percent of North Korean prisoners.<sup>885</sup> A comprehensive study made in February 1953 analyzed the results of psywar POW interrogations over the previous two years. It found that of 1,708 North Korean POWs interrogated between 1 February 1951 and 31 January 1952, more than 63 percent said that they had been influenced by UN psywar. Of 1391 Chinese POWs, 68.4 percent made the same assertion. Of those who had voluntarily surrendered, more than 90 percent of the Chinese (798) and 77 percent of the North Koreans (1,028) claimed such influence. Of surrenderees interrogated between 1 January 1952 and 9 June 1953, the results were remarkably similar: 85.6 percent of 243 Chinese and 68.5 percent of 447 North Korean POWs claimed UN propaganda influenced their decision to surrender.<sup>886</sup> But an ORO contract study made over an overlapping period, 4 May to 26 October, 1951, claimed that of 1,482 Chinese and North Korean POWs interrogated, only 10.9 percent of the Chinese and 7.6 percent of the North Koreans said that they had been influenced by U.S. psywar but did not surrender. (Presumably they had been captured). However, 67.5 percent of the Chinese and 68.0 percent of the North Koreans who did surrender claimed that psywar had been influenced their decision.<sup>887</sup> Still another ORO study of this time dealt primarily with the non-

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<sup>883</sup>L. Kahn and J. Segal, *Psychological Warfare and Other Factors Affecting the Surrender of North Korean and Chinese Forces* (ORO, Washington: 1953), 3.

<sup>884</sup>*An Evaluation*, 36.

<sup>885</sup>Memo for UN and FEC Chief of Staff, Psywar Section, subject: PW Operations 29 June thru 5 July 1952, RG 338, FED Psywar Section, Decimal File, 1952, box 4322, unmarked folder.

<sup>886</sup>USAFFE Chief of Psywar, report to Chief of Psywar, DA, RG 497, USARPAC, box 66, folder #2, 2 November 1953.

<sup>887</sup>Ponturo and Wilmoore Kendall, *Psychological Warfare Operations*:

defector aspects of U.S. psywar, and concluded from its survey of more than 2,000 Chinese Communist and North Korean POWs that the Chinese officers and enlisted men were the most strongly disaffected from their leadership, and North Korean enlisted men only slightly less so. On the other hand, North Korean officers, the hand-picked, indoctrinated cadre of a renewed army fighting on its own soil for national unification, seemed impervious to the UNC's blandishments.<sup>888</sup> Another careful ORO study of August 1952 concluded that

The amount of PW (psywar) received by the target audience appears to be a definite causal factor in producing disaffection behavior and willingness to surrender.... Psychological warfare acting even without the 'favorable' influences of lower morale and lesser battle experience tends to influence disaffection behavior.

The authors added realistically that "It does not, however, appear to increase willingness to surrender unless jointly acting with these other experience factors." (e.g. bombing, cold, hunger, hard labor, etc.).<sup>889</sup> General McClure himself, early in 1953, cautiously claimed that something like one-third of enemy surrenderees had been "influenced in their decision" by U.S. psywar.<sup>890</sup>

These conclusions, roughly similar throughout, must be given weight, even when discounted for any of the interviewers' self-advertisement or mission pride; or for their erstwhile unfamiliarity with their subjects' language and culture, and, of course, for the POWs' "camp-wise" attitudes. The ORO studies merit particular respect in that the interviewers were independent researchers, albeit on contract for the Army. Figures so large and so positive cannot simply be dismissed as self-serving arguments.

Numbers of enemy POWs garnered is, however, only one measure of

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*Intelligence* (ORO, Washington: 28 April 1952), 50. For an instrument on which these figures are based, see the quite sophisticated questionnaire distributed to POWs by Eighth Army psywar personnel in T. G. Andrews, D. D Smith, et al, *An Investigation of Individual Factors Relating to the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare* (ORO, Chevy Chase: 13 August 1952), 31-55.

<sup>888</sup>L. A. Kahn, and J. Segal, *Psychological Warfare and other Factors Affecting the Surrender of North Korean and Chinese Forces* (ORO, Washington: 16 February 1953).

<sup>889</sup>T. G. Andrews, et al, *An Investigation of Individual Factors Relating to the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare* (ORO, Washington: 1952).

<sup>890</sup>McClure interview, *USNWP*; McClure lecture before Army War College, 16 February, 1953, typescript in AWC Archives, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

psywar success, and one that became very attenuated, as noted, six months into the war with the development of a military stalemate across Korea. As General McClure noted early in 1953

Our primary purpose is not to take prisoners. The primary purpose is to cause dissention behind the lines....Basically we would like to change the ideological motivation of the people....<sup>891</sup>

Whether the "ideological motivation" of any significant numbers of Communist troops was changed is an open question. However, a Chinese authority forthrightly reported decades after the war that:

the strongest challenge to the political control of the CPV was US/UN psychological warfare....These propaganda measures had a great effect on the Chinese troops. CPV political personnel found out that many soldiers kept the US/UN "security passes" [safe conduct leaflets] in case they were captured ....Maintaining high morale among the CPV rank and file became a serious challenge.<sup>892</sup>

Psywar could also be said in one sense to have more than literally "paid its way." A study carried out early in the war calculated that it took about \$1,100-\$2,200 to garner one POW by way of psywar, contrasted to an Eighth Army estimate of \$150,000 for each enemy soldier killed, a 70:1 ratio in favor of psywar.<sup>893</sup>

Yet even the eupeptic Colonel Hansen conceded that "there can be no question that there was too much emphasis on surrender psywar in a situation in which it was virtually impossible to surrender...."<sup>894</sup> The acting chief of Eighth Army psywar added to the familiar criticism of "scatter shot" messages ("We were putting all types of merchandise, soap, dresses, brassieres, corn

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<sup>891</sup>McClure interview, *USNWP*.

<sup>892</sup>Gan Siqi and Li Zhimin, eds. *Zhongguo Renmin Zhiyanjun Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanaheng Ahengzhi Gongzuo Zongjie [A Summary of the CPV Political Work in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid [Korea]]* (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press: 1985)159-160, quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence, Kansas: 1995), 213-214..

<sup>893</sup>Kilchoon Kim and E. A. Johnson, *Evaluation of Effects of Leaflets on North Korean Prisoners of War* (ORO, Fort Lesley J. McNair: 20 February 1951), 7-8.

<sup>894</sup>Hansen, 112-113.



flakes, apples and garbage cans in the window with the hope that a sufficient number of customers might be attracted to buy some of our goods.") and added that the promising theme of "China Vs Korea" was too often subordinate to local, specific targets. (But specific targets were just what many Eighth Army psywarriors thought produced best results.)<sup>895</sup>

An undated contemporary study, "Psywar Deficiencies Noted in Korea," repeated all of these themes, adding in some detail that the literary level of most U.S. messages was pitched too high because indigenous translators felt that they would "lose face" by "talking down." The study further claimed that POW interrogation was "poor [and] imperfectly organized," that leaflet dissemination remained inaccurate ("A great many POWs have read none....[Either] the enemy is walking about in piles of leaflets up to his ankles. [or] the billions of leaflets disseminated are being wasted on untenanted terrain," and that a target of one billion leaflets was set for 1951 ("Unfortunately, that...effort was successful."), and that "the Army is filled with individuals who think that psywar is something for college professors."<sup>896</sup>

A searing critique, forwarded to his superiors in November 1952 by the former Commanding Officer of the 1<sup>st</sup> L&L Company, argued (again) that far too many leaflets were turned out on too many themes. CPT Avedon continued that there was a lack of coordination within EUSAK psywar offices, that psywar intelligence was seriously flawed, that surrender appeals were made to enemy troops who already enjoyed good morale, and that messages were usually slanted by an "immovable, white-collar, pseudo-intelligentsia, exiled White Chinese clique." Avedon closed by claiming that ground loudspeaker personnel remained basically untrained, and that leaflet dissemination was wildly inaccurate. The author made the drastic recommendation (rejected) that since Eighth Army psywar was so poor, all such psywar cease for sixty days to apply the needed corrections.<sup>897</sup> By then, however, it was too late for any significant changes to be made in the psywar of this stalemated struggle before the Armistice was signed.

A second official study, "Informal Comments of Korean War Psywar Operators," a study completed in December of 1953, showed that CPT

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<sup>895</sup>Ibid., 207-212.

<sup>896</sup>"Psywar Deficiencies Noted in Korea - A Study," n.d., RG 319, entry 338, Psywar Administrative Office Records Branch, Decimal File, 1951-52, "091 Korea" folder, passim.

<sup>897</sup>CPT Harry Avedon, "Psywar Commentary No. 1," 14 November 1952, and Avedon, "CCF Propaganda Man", 12, Avedon collection, USASOC Archives.

Avedon's superior concurred completely in this critique, and added that "I consider [Avedon] to be one of the most experienced psywar officers in the Division.", Ibid.

Avedon's criticisms were not singular. The respondents (who were named) once again denounced the "Quantity over quality" approach, the excessive literary message levels (again attributing this failing to translators, who did not wish to offend superiors by speaking their minds.) Once again the complaint was raised that "Most officers never heard of psywar.", and if they had, viewed its practitioners "with suspicion everywhere." A printer, after noting that the ink he had to use in Korea dated from World War II, bitterly claimed that the "opinions of men that actually knew their jobs were cast aside because of some low brain officers who knew nothing about it had to try their wet ideas." Another respondent took a wider view that has held up well historically, arguing that psywar deficiencies in Korea stemmed from "the idea that Korea was just a 'bastard operation' and that the lessons learned there did not have too much effect in preparation for the 'big show' [i.e., war in Europe]. Several psywar veterans lamented the failure to use indigenous personnel to their fullest, ("The entire concept of lines and curves are [sic] different in the Orient"), the failure to use oriental scholarship, particularly in the unused resources of the library of the Japanese Diet. A somewhat different point of view was expressed by a respondent who noted that

We had Asians who were American citizens sticking pins in maps. The closest they ever got to reading or checking copy turned out by the indigenous Asians was probably [in] sweeping up the floor in the afternoon.<sup>898</sup>

Most of these criticisms were valid to some extent, and there was widespread agreement on the major failings of Eighth Army psywar in Korea: the "papering" of the front line well after the stabilization of that line precluded all but the most determined defectors, the misuse of indigenous personnel, the multiplicity of themes and (perhaps) the overly-literary writing in many leaflets. But a study of those leaflets and of surviving loudspeaker scripts as well as POW responses nonetheless reveals for the most part a competent U.S. battlefield psywar effort that was certainly well ahead of anything put out by its enemies, who were generally presumed to have been "masters of propaganda." U.S. Army psywar in Korea was a flawed weapon, just like any other tool of war.<sup>899</sup>

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<sup>898</sup>8<sup>th</sup> Army PWB (?), "Informal Comments of Korean War Psywar Operators," Seoul (?), n.d., typescript, passim. (quotation on 17-18). On the other hand, the veteran Jerry Rose reported that after he or his comrades had composed the theme and general language of a leaflet, "Ming, Yoon, and Lee (my various translators) would then put them in real language complete with swear words. By the response, they worked." Rose, ltr to author, 12 July 1994.

<sup>899</sup>The "masters of propaganda" belief falls into a category similar to that

Undoubtedly as a result of the uproar over "brainwashing," the Army conducted just after the end of hostilities its only extensive program to inoculate American troops against enemy propaganda. A cross-section of enemy leaflets from the war were analyzed and counter-measures proposed. To counter bothersome U.S. POW letters with their political messages, the course planners recommended the use of "Stars and Stripes articles and personally conducted command conferences designed to reveal communist technique....and destroy intended credibility of implied claim of good PW treatment," and that "Reference should be made to the publicized account of Communist murder of UN PWs early in the war...." As for the "American Peace Crusade" message (noted above), whose purpose was to "Disgruntle [sic.] troops," "The fact that the American Peace Crusade is a cited subversive organization is the principle [sic.] defense weapon to be employed against this leaflet." The analysis concluded that "Our defense against enemy propaganda and technique has been highly effective. In each leaflet [studied], our rebuttal was successful in revealing the falsity of it." and congratulated itself by claiming that:

The enemy, to offset our action, resorted to stronger measures, and took good lessons from our defense. When we pointed out there was no evidence to support his statements, he attempted to produce evidence; when we showed the weakness and falsity of one testimonial, he came back with one designed to be more convincing, etc.<sup>900</sup>

The Army might just as well have saved its time and effort. U.S. troops were only marginally affected, if at all, by enemy propaganda. Communist propaganda calling for "an end to the war" by political action was simply ignored. As far as Americans in Korea were concerned, their war

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"brainwashing," a wildly-exaggerated psychological ploy which seemed to have affected few Americans and that for a short time only. The relatively peaceful "implosion" of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, as well any dispassionate historical analysis, should put an end to both of these myths. It should also be noted that another supposed "master of propaganda", R H. S. Crossman, predicted in 1952 that "no psychological warfare could be successful in Korea because of the confusion about the aims and objectives of the United Nations.", Crossman, "Psychological Warfare," lectures given before the Royal United Services Institution, *Journal of the R. U. S. I.* (August 1952

<sup>900</sup>"Plan for Program of Defense Against Enemy Propaganda," PW 4832 (PE), 14 October 1953, USASOC History Archives. (contains copies of enemy leaflets analyzed.)

would end when they happily rotated Stateside.

The most famous psywar "payoff" of the Korean War, brought in only one enemy soldier, and that after the signing of the Armistice. Yet it is reliably supposed to have caused considerable confusion, if not dissention, behind enemy lines. This was "Operation Moolah," the offer of US\$50,000 and political asylum to any pilot who would fly a Soviet-built military jet aircraft to UN-controlled territory in South Korea. The bonus of another \$50,000 would be added to the first enemy pilot who flew his jet south. USAFFE Psywar initially opposed the idea, not because it didn't believe that it had merit; it simply lacked the \$100,000. Air Force Headquarters, far more interested in obtaining its first complete MiG than in any psywar aspects of the offer, quickly put up the reward money. The offer was then broadcast and made into the only Russian language leaflet of the war, drawn up and signed by General Clark himself. Clark, doubting that any defecting pilot would survive trigger-happy UN airmen or air defense troops, nonetheless thought the offer was good psychological warfare. But on 23 September 1953, the lucky first enemy pilot, braving his own and UN air defenses brought his MIG-15-BIS into Kimpo airfield. Lieutenant No Kom-sok somewhat spoiled the jubilation by claiming ignorance of any financial inducement and to be simply disgusted with his lot in the North Korean Air Force. But in 1955 two air crew who flew their Yak-18 to South Korea had indeed heard of the offer. They claimed that several of their compatriots had been shot down while trying for the capitalist jackpot, confirming the goal of the operation, the spreading of distrust throughout the enemy's air arm. The last two months of the war did see a disastrous falling-off in the already-low skills of MiG pilots encountered, as the Soviet pilots were presumably withdrawn and replaced with their more ideologically pure and enthusiastic but far less trained Chinese counterparts. From May to June 1953, USAF Sabre jets shot down MiGs at one of the highest kill-loss ratios in aerial combat history.<sup>901</sup>

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<sup>901</sup>Hansen, 230-250; Berger, *Wartime Leaflets*, 74-76; USAFFE Chief of Psywar, report to Chief of Army Psywar for period 26 April to 2 May 1953, dated 8 May 1953, RG 497, box 66, folders 1, 2, "Psywar Activities.", Futrell, 610-613. Note that the offer was for any communist military jet aircraft, not necessarily a MiG-15, although reference is usually made to "the MiG leaflet." Numerous copies of this eaflet in USASOC History Archives. See also C. A. MacDonald, "Operation Moolah," in James L. Matray, ed., *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War* (New York, London, etc: 1991), and Don Murray, "How to Knock the Reds Off Balance," *Saturday Evening Post*, 8 May 1954. "Operation Moolah" was something of a reprise of the World War II ETO Operation Huguenot which spread rumors that Luftwaffe pilots were deserting with their aircraft. It is not known how successful "Huguenot" proved to be either in discomfiting the Luftwaffe or whether Korean War

# 英勇的飛行員！

假使你愛好自由……

假使你有勇氣……

假使你要過良好和光榮的生活……

這是你千載一時的機會！  
從共黨暴政下解放你自己！  
駕了你的噴氣飛機，飛向自由世界！

英勇的飛行員朋友們！美國遠東軍總司令部貢獻這神聖的自由，給予一切有勇氣、要自由、要良好和光榮生活的飛行員們。

朋友們！遠東軍總司令克拉克將軍保證給你政治上、精神上和物質上的保護，保證給你人道的尊嚴和優待。遠東軍總司令部完全負責保守你的姓名秘密。任何飛行員凡帶了一架新式、

이것은 미국사람이 중국말을 아는 영트기. 조총사에게 보내는 통신이다. 이통신장을 알거든 이것을 그에게 주라. 이 가운데 유엔국으로 드림하는 방법이 서 있다.

完整、作戰用的噴氣飛機，在可飛的狀態下，飛到聯軍這邊來的，為獎勵他的英勇起見，一律給予獎金五萬元美金。第一名帶了這種噴氣飛機飛到聯軍這邊的，除應得的獎金外，再額外獎賞五萬元美金。(美金五萬元約合人民幣十二億八千一百餘萬元)  
這張傳單背面有一封信，指點你奔向自由的道路。  
讀過後，請照指示飛向自由！

## 自由和獎金 都等待着您！



這是一位蘇聯軍少尉的相片，他駕了飛了一架蘇俄製造的MIG一五式飛機，在丹麥的一處海岸上降落，他已得到政治上的保護，現在他正舒適地住在英島。他已飛來了，——作他以前所沒做！

The famous "MiG" leaflet. (Photo is of Soviet pilot who had earlier flown to sanctuary in Denmark.)

# 英勇的噴氣機飛行員們！

## 向自由的道路飛行！

美國遠東軍總司令部願盡一切力量，幫助所有要自由、要過良好和光榮生活的飛行員們。

遠東軍總司令部保證你的安全，保證你在沒有共黨統治的國家中安居。如願將姓名永遠保守秘密者，遠東軍總司令部亦必依其所願。

飛行員朋友們！你的勇敢行為，不但可以使你自己獲得自由，使你有機會永遠生活於沒有痛苦和恐怖的政府下，而且因為你的決心和勇敢，幫助了全體正義的人們，這些人們正為解放共黨獨裁奴役下的人民，而英勇地反抗人類的敵人。

任何飛行員，凡是把一架新式、完整作戰用的噴氣飛機，在可飛的狀態下，交到南韓聯軍這邊來的，美國遠東軍總司令部將獎賞他美金五萬元。凡第一名把這種噴氣飛機交到自由世界的，除應得的獎金外，再額外獎賞美金五萬元，以獎勵他的勇敢行為。

凡志願解放自己，脫離共黨束縛的飛


行員，都可照下列指示安全降落南韓：

逃出來的飛行員，須先飛到白翎島，該島離椒島以南三十英里（約合五十公里），由白翎島再前進至金浦機場，以二萬（二〇〇〇〇）英尺（合六，一〇〇公尺）的高度飛行，至金浦機場時低飛，然後作迅速的降落。聯軍的飛機將始終在逃亡飛機的上方和稍後方，來保護它。如因雲層太低或視度不足，致逃亡飛機無法尋到金浦機場，不能作看得見的降落時，他須以二萬（二〇，〇〇〇）英尺（合六，〇〇〇公尺）的高度，飛往漢城地區上空，將降落輪放下，在上空盤旋。這時，聯軍的飛機就會和他並肩飛行，引導他到降落的機場。如果和聯軍飛機剛遇見時，或遇聯軍飛機有攻擊模樣時，逃出來的飛行員必須立刻把降落輪放下，並劇烈地搖動他的機翼。

自由世界等待你們飛來。

遠東軍總司令

美國陸軍上將 克拉克



公元一九五三年

四月

二十日

**FREEDOM AND REWARD WAIT FOR YOU!**

This is the picture of a Polish Air Force Lieutenant who, piloting a Soviet-made MIG-15 jet, flew and escaped from the iron curtain and landed safely undamaged on the Danish Island of Bornholm. He received political asylum and is now living comfortably in England. He did it -- so can you!

Note: The following message in Korean appears on one side: "This message is from the Americans to any jet pilot who can read Chinese. If you know such a person, please give it to him. It tells him how to escape to the UN Forces."

Escapee pilots will fly to Paengyong-do Island, approximately fifty (50) kilometers south of Chodo Island. From Paengyong-do escapee pilot will proceed to Kimpo Air Base at 6100 meters altitude, descend over Kimpo Air Base, and proceed to make an immediate landing. UN aircraft will accompany escapee, remaining always above and to the rear. If low clouds or visibility prevent escapee from locating Kimpo Air Base and if escapee is unable to make a visual let-down, he will proceed to the Seoul area at 6100 meters and circle with his gear down. A UN aircraft will then fly close abreast and lead the way to the landing field. Upon initial contact with UN aircraft, or if at any time UN aircraft attempt attack, escapee will immediately lower landing gear and rock his wings violently.

The free world waits your arrival.

MARK W. CLARK  
General, United States Army  
Commander-in-Chief  
Far East Command

Page 2: Illustration with text:

Courageous Pilots!

If you like freedom.....

If you have courage .....

If you want to live a better, honorable life.....

This is your opportunity of once in thousand years! Free yourself from the communist tyranny! Fly your jet toward the free world!

Courageous Pilots! The Far East Command U.S. Forces is offering the divine freedom to all brave pilots who desire freedom and want to lead a better, honorable life.

General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, Far East, guarantees your political, spiritual and material protection and guarantees human dignity and care. The Far East Command completely guarantees keeping in secret your name. There is a reward of 50,000 US dollars for the bravery of any pilot who delivers a modern, operational, combat-type jet aircraft in flyable condition to the UN side. The first pilot who delivers such a jet aircraft to the UN side will receive an additional reward of 50,000 US dollars.

On the other side of this leaflet, there is a letter pointing out to you the instructions to the road of freedom

AFTER READING THE INSTRUCTIONS, FLY TO FREEDOM ACCORDINGLY.



HEADQUARTERS  
1ST RADIO BROADCASTING & LEAFLET GROUP  
8239th AU, APO 500

20 April 1953

LEAFLET: Pilot  
LANGUAGE: Chinese  
DESIGNATION: 5502  
TARGET: Chinese Jet Pilots  
REMARKS: Leaflet designed to induce Chinese jet pilots to defect with a jet-type aircraft. Translated from original Chinese.  
ART WORK: Front: Stationery of Far East Command.  
Back: MIG-15 in flight over-printed with text, Picture of Lt. Garecki, Polish Air Force.

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TEXT:

Page 1: TO: Courageous Jet Pilots

SUBJECT: Flying Toward The Road of Freedom

The Far East Command U.S. Forces is offering the utmost aid to all pilots who desire freedom and want to lead a better, honorable life.

The Far East Command guarantees your safety and guarantees your living in a country without Communist domination. If you desire to keep your name in permanent secrecy, the Far East Command will comply with your wish.

Jet Pilots! Your bold action not only gains freedom for yourself and gives you an opportunity to live for a long time without suffering and terror from the government, but also, because of your determination and courage, helps all righteous people who are fighting against the people's enemy for the liberation of people from the enslavement of Communist dictatorship, by showing them to road to freedom.

Any pilot who delivers a modern, complete, combat-type jet aircraft in flyable condition to the UN Forces in South Korea, the Far East Command will reward 50,000 US dollars. The first pilot who delivers such a jet aircraft to the free world will receive an additional bonus of 50,000 US dollars for his bravery.

Pilots, who desire to free themselves from the Communist yoke, follow the following instructions flying to land safely in South Korea ;

The final U.S. tactical psywar mission of the Korean War was the dropping of Chinese and Korean-language leaflets on the last night before the Armistice was to go into effect on 27 July 1953. This last leaflet, also written by General Clark, was almost poignant in its spirit of respect and humanity offered an enemy at the close of a bitter war in which neither side could claim victory. Although the leaflet itself has been lost, it is still worth quoting in full:

With the signing of the armistice, peace and quiet returns [sic] to the hills and valleys of Korea. Over the war-crushed countryside, peace once again reigns. We are happy to know that the days of fear, hunger, cold and exhaustion are over for you. We hope that your leaders will now permit you to leave the service. With good fortune, you may now turn from the bloody waste of war to the achievement of man's traditional right to rebuild his shattered homeland, till his fields, rear his sons --and given this good fortune, you may now do this. May you be permitted to return to your homes speedily, may you soon be reunited with your families, may we never meet again on the field of battle.<sup>902</sup>

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psywar planners had Huguenot" in mind., [Richard Hollander], *The Psychological Warfare Division: Allied Forces, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force: An Account of its Operations in the Western European Campaign, 1944-1945* (Bad Homburg: October 1945), 56. The fact that the leaflet was written in Russian is significant. Officially, both sides maintained the idiotic fiction that there were no Soviet pilots in Korea.

<sup>902</sup>Futrell, 686; Hansen, 80; USAFFE Psywar Section, Report of Activities, 19-27 July 1953, dated 31 July 1953, RG 497, USARPAC Historian Files, box 66, folder No. 2.

## VIETNAM

The end of the Korean War and the advent of the Eisenhower presidency saw a determination that there would be "no more Asian land wars," "No more Koreas." The United States would henceforth pursue an even more vigorous campaign against communist expansion, but the primary reliance would rest upon the U.S. military's deterrent nuclear power, rather than manpower (although the draft was retained) or conventional weapons - "More Bang for a Buck" as the policy was vulgarly termed. Although the new administration gave considerable attention to strategic propaganda against the communists, tied to such well-publicized international initiatives as the "Roll-Back" of unspecified communist-held areas, the "Unleashing" of Chiang Kai-Shek, or an "Agonizing Reappraisal" (of America's defense policies if European allies would not do more for their own protection), tactical psywar was almost ignored. If the nation were unlikely to become involved in any future ground wars in Asia or elsewhere and if nuclear weapons would settle the issue anyway soon enough, what would be the need for battlefield psychological warfare? Even Paul Linebarger, who certainly should have known better, believed that the day of broadcast and printed psywar as an adjunct of military operations had ended with Korea.<sup>903</sup> Another veteran authority, William Daugherty, doubted the value of psywar against the armies of totalitarian nations like the Soviet Union, arguing somewhat contradictorily that "With the highly disciplined armies of totalitarian countries, it is questionable whether one need to create low morale; it is probably already there."<sup>904</sup>

But, as with Korea, most of the experts and the Army high command did not foresee another ideological rice-paddy-and-jungle limited war until the advent of the Kennedy administration in 1961 and in many cases even after, continuing to focus on an increasingly unlikely massive Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

Limited U.S. tactical propaganda was disseminated during the Lebanon landings in the summer of 1958, and a widely distributed leaflet carrying a photograph of President Eisenhower informed the Lebanese that "The forces of the United States have entered your country at the request of your own established government...to assist you in your efforts to maintain the independence of Lebanon." But the effort went almost unnoticed in the Army.<sup>905</sup>

Some attention was paid as early as 1954 to psychological operations to support the American political-military mission to the deteriorating situation in the South Vietnam "backwater." But that mission's focus, at least in the earlier years, remained primarily on a defense against a conventional invasion from the North -- "No More

<sup>903</sup>Quoted in Erdmann, 376-377, 15.

<sup>904</sup>Daugherty, *Evaluation and Analysis*, 15. But one Han-Joachim Hupfgarten insisted that, nuclear era or no, psychological factors, "the fortification of the mind by psychological influences in all armies," would still play a decisive role in future conflicts. *Military Review*, 37 (1957).

<sup>905</sup>Berger, 9; (anon.) "Lebanon", *Psywar Society Bulletin* (December 1958).

Koreas." Even with the advent of the Kennedy administration and its well-publicized concern with countering "Wars of National Liberation," the Army went along only reluctantly. (In fact, with the loss of South Vietnam in 1975, the Army returned with relief to its more congenial focus on Europe.)<sup>906</sup>

Although there were significant differences between the Korean and the Vietnam wars, both were primarily ideological and thus both sides would stress psychological operations.<sup>907</sup> As in Korea it was difficult for the soldier in the field to see any direct threat to the United States from the Communist enemy. There were no economic, territorial or economic issues involved. As in Korea, American forces operated under the psychological disadvantage of knowing full well that if they simply went home (as folks at home increasingly urged --a major difference with Korea) the war would end, and a unified, albeit Marxist, nation would emerge with the peace. The anti-communist forces, as in Korea, could offer little more than the status quo and a better life.

But whatever its strategic psychological disadvantages in Vietnam, the United States did enter this war, for the first time, with a functioning psychological warfare training center. This was the Psychological Warfare Center, first located at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1951, then, in June of 1952 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Center consisted of the Psychological Warfare School, a Psychological Warfare Board, --the 6<sup>th</sup> Radio and Broadcasting Group, the 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group, and after July -1953 the 77<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group. The Center's mission was to train psychological warfare and Special Forces, to develop and test their doctrine, procedures, tactics and techniques; and to test and evaluate their equipment. Although the Center became active in the last year of the Korean War, after the Armistice it

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<sup>906</sup>A number of articles did appear in the military journals, indicating some continuing interest in psywar/PSYOP. See E. Diesen, "Psychological Preparedness," *Military Review*, October 1954; J. W. Warren, "War of Words (Warfare of the Future will be Directed at the Body and Mind.)," *Infantry*, January 1958; R. D. Connolly, "The Principles of War and Psywar.," *Military Review*, March 1957; [anon.] "US to Chute Words at Enemy Troops," *Air force Times* 11 May 1957; A. R. Love, "The Importance of Objectives in Psychological Warfare," *Signal*, June-July 1958; J. E. Fletcher, "Psychology in CA," *Infantry*, 11 December 1963. See also AR 515-1, "Psychological Warfare Activities, Army Activities in the Cold War" (26 November 1958).

<sup>907</sup>The Vietnam War, for all the rhetoric on both sides, was free blessedly from apocalyptic or ideological imaginings, unlike the Korean War, where the U.S. Home Front was bombarded with such tripe as "The West in Mortal Peril," "World War III is Imminent," even *America Too Young to Die*. The Pentagon "Whiz Kids," the denizens of the Johnson White House Situation Room were too "sophisticated" to allow anything as crude as nationalist passion to carry themselves away. The "Best and Brightest" planned at the top in cold blood -- probably the greatest mistake of the war.

slipped into a backwater, and "by the early 1960's the Army's psychological operations capability had eroded."<sup>908</sup>

But in the meantime the Army had made a significant terminological change. The term "Psychological Warfare" was replaced by that of "Psychological Operations" (PSYOP) in the January 1962 FM 33-5, *Psychological Operations*. The change reflected a growing awareness that in "brush fire war," "unconventional war," "guerilla war," etc., or "Wars of National Liberation" (as the communists and their sympathizers termed them) psychological campaigns would have to be directed not only to the armed enemy but as much toward the civilian population, and here the term "warfare" would be inappropriate.<sup>909</sup>

Despite the parlous state of Army psywar in the early 1960s the 1<sup>st</sup> Psychological Warfare Battalion was able to carry out a "classic case of successful interagency cooperation in a crisis situation" during the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965. Although the USIS was responsible for all in-country messages the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion and other military contingents provided direct support, protection, and intelligence to the civilian agency. In fact, the entire 1<sup>st</sup>, plus all of its transportable - equipment was sent to the Dominican Republic from Fort Bragg. By the summer of 1965 most of the 1<sup>st</sup> could return to its home base, although a small contingent

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<sup>908</sup>A. H. Paddock, Jr., "No More Tactical Information Detachments": US Military Psychological Operations in Transition," typescript (July 1992). See also Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 143; Dale Story, "Army Psychological Warfare Training," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall 1951); Charles Karlstad, "The Psywar Center Story," *Army, Navy, Air Force Journal* (1 November 1952). The USIA liaison officer at the Center termed PSYOP training there "amateurish" as late as 1974. But by then mutual hostility between USIA and the Army, dating from the Vietnam War, was well-established., Watson, *War on the Mind*, 327.

<sup>909</sup>FM 3, *Psychological Operations* (Washington: January 1962) 3-5. But to confuse matters the edition of January 1962 defined the new term as operations directed toward "enemy, neutral, or friendly foreign groups." But 33-1 (May 1965) subsumed "Psychological Operations," and (peacetime) "Psychological Activities" under the rubric "Psychological Activities." Occasionally the term PSYOPS would be used interchangeably with PSYOP. Chester Bowles, Democratic activist and Ambassador to India, was an early critic of the term "psywar":

Psychological warfare is a cynical phrase borrowed from Goebbels and Stalin. If we insist on employing it to describe our activities we will continue to lose the respect of millions of people throughout the world who were brought up to believe that America is more than a clever gimmick or a cynical maneuver."

(quoted in Daugherty, "Changing Concepts," *Casebook*, 15. Roland Perusse claimed that "The term 'psychological warfare' never did set well with the American people," but offered no alternative. *ibid.*, 33.

remained to provide support to Army Civil Affairs nation-rebuilding efforts. The 1<sup>st</sup> seems to have carried out its support mission efficiently with the only complaint being that much of its equipment dated from World War II and was bulky and heavy by 1960s standards. Psywar in the Dominican Republic was an interdepartmental effort, in which the Army, the US Information Agency (USIA), the State Department, and other U.S. agency personnel pooled assets and personnel, and Army psywar units in the field were under operational control of USIA, which wrote up most of the leaflets. U.S. psywar radio was able to monitor and answer rebel radio diatribes about "Yanqui imperialismo" and put out the first newspaper since the outbreak of the revolt. Cooperation between the U.S. agencies was cordial and, in fact, USIA made its Award for Distinguished Service, its highest commendation, to the First Battalion.<sup>910</sup>

In some significant ways the Dominican intervention could be considered a low-level "rehearsal" for psychological warfare in Vietnam, where the situation was rapidly deteriorating: a civil war/insurrection of leftists with considerable nationalistic support, no hard-and-fast battle lines, no sure way to determine who was a rebel and who a student (when often they could be both), and semi-orchestrated U.S. home front and international opposition to American intervention.

When the time came for a commitment of U.S. Army PSYOP to the deteriorating situation in the Republic of [South] Vietnam (RVN) there was an insufficient supply of PSYOP-qualified officers in 1965 when the 6<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion was activated in Vietnam. The first actual U.S. Army PSYOP units were, however, from the 7<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (POG) in Okinawa and began arriving in-country in March of 1965. Like almost every phase of the American effort in Vietnam at that time, these troops were sent on the assumption that that effort would be brief; in this case they were told that they would be "in-country" for three months.<sup>911</sup> In those early days three separate U.S. agencies: the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), USIS, and the Agency for International Development (AID) handled PSYOP in South Vietnam, and generally worked at cross-purposes. But US Information Service Director Carl Rowan and Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, recommended after their visit to the Republic of

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<sup>910</sup>Bert H. Cooper, "Teamwork in Santo Domingo," *Art and Science*, vol. 1; W. J. Moulis, "Key to a Crisis," *Military Review* (February 1966); Moulis, oral interview with USASOC Command Historian, 13 September 1992. The London *Observer*, reporting on U.S. psywar troops in the Dominican Republic concluded sagely that this was indeed an historic occasion: "It marks the first time they have been used in what military jargon calls a 'battle situation.'"[!] It also erroneously claimed that no photo of President Johnson was used: "Self-abnegation can hardly go farther.", issue of 3 July 1965.

<sup>911</sup>Paddock, "No More Tactical," 4; R. D. McLaurin, et al., "PSYOP in Vietnam: A Many-Splintered Thing," *Casebook*; D. Yaeger, "Winning Vietnamese Minds was what the U.S. Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group was All About." *Vietnam* (December 1990).

Vietnam in April 1965 that U.S. foreign information and PSYOP activities in South Vietnam be integrated. President Lyndon Johnson approved ("Damn it, I want it all under Westy." [General Westmoreland, MACV Commander]) and ordered the establishment of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO).<sup>912</sup> JUSPAO, under the dynamic Barry Zorthian, would be responsible for the supervision, coordination and evaluation of all in U.S. PSYOP in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and for the giving of PSYOP support to RVN programs. The Army would continue to provide logistical and administrative support to the U.S. and Republic of Vietnam tactical forces through its Psychological Operations Directorate and support to PSYOP pacification efforts through its Psychological Operations Division of its Civilian Organization Revolutionary Development (CORDS). MACV remained responsible for the execution of PSYOP in the field and for the printing of all tactical leaflets.<sup>913</sup> JUSPAO would provide tactical tapes for loudspeaker use in support of Allied military operations and the Chieu Hoi program. In fact, the MACV Directive prescribing the organization and function of PSYOP in Vietnam, mandated that "Psychological operations are planned and conducted in support of each military operation and pacification program."<sup>914</sup>

In the ever-shifting, fluid scrambling for influence and power that


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<sup>912</sup>General Johnson to General Westmoreland, 27 March 1965, COMUSMACV Message File, 1 January-31 March 1965, CMH; McLaurin, *et al.*, "Many-Splintered Thing," 225; H. Latimer, *US Psychological Operations in Vietnam*, Brown University Monographs in National Security Affairs (Providence: September 1973), 4-5. The veteran American insurgency leader, BG Donald Blackburn, recalled later that "You had to set up that organization because there was such a division of opinion and views on this thing [PSYOP in Vietnam].", Military History Institute Senior Officer Oral History Program, interview with BG Donald Blackburn, USA, ret., 1983, vol.2, 339. Johnson quotation from *Newsweek*, quoted in Robert Chandler, *War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam* (Boulder: 1981), 30.

<sup>913</sup>By far the best source for JUSPAO tactical leaflets are the 40 volumes of bound JUSPAO leaflets themselves with their translations (and in later volumes) their requesting units, number printed, targets, etc., (Saigon?), n.d. Extensive collections are also found in other collections in the USASOC History Archives and the JFK Museum.

<sup>914</sup>JUSPAO, *General Briefing Book: JUSPAO Vietnam* (Saigon: January 1966); HQ, MACV, Directive #10-1, "Organization and Functions, Psychological Operations," 11 December 1967. (emphasis added). Taped messages had been used sparingly first in the Korean War, but in Vietnam they seemed to be predominate over live aerial broadcasts for various technological reasons. One reason for the popularity of taped messages, as the 19<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Company wryly put it was that, "Tapes do not get airsick.", 19<sup>th</sup> POC, memo to distribution, subj: Production and Aerial Broadcasting of Local Tape Appeals, 10 May 1967.

# JOINT UNITED STATES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (JUSPAO)



JUSPAO "flow chart."



characterized the U.S. Vietnam war effort in Saigon as well as in Washington, JUSPAO enjoyed the inestimable advantage of having been granted license to serve as an active participant in the U.S. Mission Council. The Council was the U.S. Ambassador's highest policy-making body and the Ambassador himself was the head of the entire U.S. Mission to Vietnam. Since the U.S. war effort had "escalated" beginning in 1965 this participation meant that JUSPAO was at the right hand of power and influence almost from the beginning.<sup>915</sup> And from the beginning of his tenure as MACV Commander General William Westmoreland remained a strong supporter of PSYOP in Southeast Asia, as were many of his staff.<sup>916</sup> As early as August of 1964, almost one year before the activation of JUSPAO, Westmoreland told a Civil Affairs and PSYOP conference that "psychological warfare and Civic Action are the very essence of the counterinsurgency campaign here in Vietnam...you cannot win this war by military means alone."<sup>917</sup> Westmoreland's successor, Creighton Abrams, is known to have sent down guidelines to the 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (4<sup>th</sup> POG[A]) that resulted in the drawing up of no less than 17 leaflets along those lines.<sup>918</sup> In fact, the interest in PSYOP went all the way up to the Presidency;

<sup>915</sup>Chandler, 25-28. See also Memorandum of Agreement, Zorthian and Westmoreland, 10 August 1966, in C. K. Hausman, "Levels of Command Conducting PSYOP Planning," *Art and Science*, 182; R. J. Barnett, "PSYOP: What is It? And What Should We Do About It?", *Military Review* (March 1972), 68; "PSYOP in Vietnam: A Many Splintered Thing," by the editors of *Art & Science*, vol. 1.

<sup>916</sup>This support is evident throughout the Westmoreland Papers, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. In the words of one authority, "Unlike some skeptical military men in World Wars I and II, General Westmoreland's officers for the most part appreciated the uses of propaganda and had confidence in JUSPAO.", Thomas Sorenson, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York: 1968), 290. On the other hand, and on the General's own evidence, Westmoreland indicated that he did not completely understand the mission of PSYOP. Westmoreland termed the overall PSYOP record "disappointing" because "Mass surrenders never developed despite our intense psychological warfare efforts....", thus missing the point that U.S. PSYOP is basically directed at undermining enemy morale, an undermining that is no less effective if large numbers of enemy troops do not cross over., Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, NY: 1976), 282.

<sup>917</sup>Westmoreland speech before opening of 8th Quarterly Psychological Operations/CA Conference, 6 August 1964, Westmoreland Papers, 27 July-31 August 1964. In his official *Report on the War in Vietnam*, Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964-June 1968, (n.p., n.d.), Westmoreland stated for the record that JUSPAO "was established with my strong support in 1965 under Mr. Barry Zorthian of USIA.", 237.

<sup>918</sup>4th POG, S-3, memo to CO, subject: "General Abrams' Leaflet," 28 January 1969, RG 472; U.S. Army in Vietnam, PSYOP and CA units, 4th POG, box 2, "4th POG General Correspondence" folder. See also pamphlet outlining the value of the Chieu

weekly reports from JUSPAO were sent to the White House, as well as to the Pentagon and the Ambassador in Saigon.<sup>919</sup> In sum, it is a myth that the United States, stubbornly fixated on a World War II-style conventional war, was unaware of the "other war." (Although, as noted above, this attitude was indeed prevalent in the early days among the American Military Mission.)

But despite such high-level interest and support from the start, JUSPAO suffered from a lack of qualified personnel. The problem was certainly not one of quantity; at any one time an average of 2,000 Americans and U.S.-paid Vietnamese were on JUSPAO's rolls. This was in addition to about 13,000 U.S. Army, USAF, and Marine PSYOPS personnel.<sup>920</sup> But the dry years after Korea had left their mark, and there were few qualified personnel "in the pipeline," although the "career" 12-week training program and the "short" 5 1/2-week Military Assistance Training Adviser (MATA) courses at the JFK Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, were being rapidly expanded. (But even the "career" course dealt only with the principles of propaganda, psychology, and dissemination techniques, did not provide language instruction and was not oriented toward Vietnam. General Westmoreland recognized the personnel problem within two months after the activation of JUSPAO but there was little even he could do other than to give priority to requests to Washington for better qualified PSYOP personnel.<sup>921</sup> Even as late as 1967, the Army had only 41 trained PSYOP "specialists," although 346 officers were actually filling such positions. Few, if any, had graduate training in psychology or the social sciences, while experts in the culture and history of that part of the world were almost equally rare. Later, more officers began to receive a short Vietnamese language course. Also, of course, military personnel served only their one-year tour of duty in Vietnam and rotated back to the States at just about the time when they were beginning to understand how things worked "in-country." Civilians served between 18 and 24 months, but they too were often absent for two 30-day home leaves and periodic "long weekends" in Bangkok, Hong Kong or Manila.<sup>922</sup>

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
Hoi program and exhorting U.S. troops to receive defectors with respect, concluding with personal message to this effect over signature of General Abrams. USASOC History Archives, "Psychological Warfare, The Vietnam Campaign," box 3.

<sup>919</sup>Latimer, 42. How lower-ranking officers appreciated the value of PSYOP is considerably more problematical. See COL T. Katagiri, "Senior Officer Debriefing Report" (1970), 13.

<sup>920</sup>Chandler, 239.

<sup>921</sup>Westmoreland to Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson, 9 June 1965, COMUSMACV Message File, 1 April-30 June 1965, Westmoreland Papers. At least in numbers the situation had improved several years later. Whereas in December 1967 only 40 percent of the 4th POG's officers had been trained at the JFK Center, by 1969 the figure had increased to 85 percent. LTC W. J. Beck, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (1969), 14, copy in MHI Archives.

<sup>922</sup>Bardain and Bardain, 23; Latimer, 28-29, Chandler, 241; W. F. Veaudry, "Let's



From, U.S. Army Concept Team in Vietnam, "Employment of Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam", Saigon?, n.d., 2.

The situation had changed rather substantially by 1968, with more than 80 percent of 4<sup>th</sup> POG officers now graduates of the unit or staff officer PSYOP course at the Special Warfare School, although the was still deficient in area and language-qualified personnel. But in the field, less than 40 percent were PSYOP-qualified or School-trained, and with the deficiencies particularly noted among enlisted men.<sup>923</sup>

Nonetheless, JUSPAO's mixture of military and civilian personnel, reminiscent of World War II's numerous Psychological Warfare Branches and Divisions, was well-suited to the dual nature of this war and at least testified to the Americans military's early awareness that "winning hearts and minds of the people" (to use another vastly-overworked cliché of the war years) was fully as important a PSYOP target as the armed enemy himself. In fact, more often than not, the "people" and the armed enemy were the same: the "harmless peasant" by day could become the Viet Cong fighter by night. Zorthian's successor as JUSPAO chief actually stood the usual PSYOP-serves-the-military formulation on its head, claiming that the contrary was now true:

It must be recognized that propaganda and psychological warfare are the primary weapons system of the era and that the function of military operations is, in essence, limited to supporting them.<sup>924</sup>

In this war there were basically military PSYOP target audiences: the Viet Cong guerilla in the South, the North Vietnamese "regular" troops, the civilian population of South Vietnam, and the civilians of North Vietnam. Psychological operations directed toward each target had to be distinct even though, as Zorthian noted, "there is not and therefore cannot be a sharp line between political and military

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Improve Military PSYOP Planning," student paper, Army War College, 13 January 1967, MHI Archives. The lack of degrees in psychology and the social sciences does not mean that U.S. Army PSYOP personnel in Vietnam were uneducated. A former Commanding Officer of the 4th POG recalled that only two persons in his headquarters did not have the MA degree "or better": the NCOIC -- and the CO. Unfortunately, the CO also reported that among the lower-ranking draftees in the 4th, about 20 percent had drug problems but none were PSYOP specialists., transcript of oral interview, COL J. Wells, 14 June 1974, MHI.

<sup>923</sup>Army Concept Team in Vietnam, "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam" (San Francisco: 7 Jun 69), II-14 -- II-15.

<sup>924</sup>R. S. Nathan, "Psychological Warfare: Key to Success in Vietnam," *Military Review* (April 1968), 28. This interpretation was certainly not that of the Army's PSYOP manual of the time, FM 33-5, *Psychological Operations, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington: October 1966), which clearly stated that "psychological operations are a combat *support* weapon that the commander should employ habitually to *assist* in the accomplishment of his mission.", 4. (emphasis added).

aspects of an insurgency situation...."<sup>925</sup> These targets were, in fact, little different in kind from that of World War II and Korea, where U.S. psywar was directed against enemy troops and civilians, and toward friendly civilians. The difference lay in the early recognition and support by MACV of such extensive PSYOP and, of course, in their much more extensive nature. As in previous U.S. wars there also seems to have been little attempt, except in the critiques of the World War II psywar veteran, Martin Herz, to apply any of the psychological warfare lessons of these previous conflicts to the situation in Southeast Asia.

Despite JUSPAO's extensive mandate tactical PSYOP was to be directed and supported by MACV's Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD). (In fact, JUSPAO's stated first mission priority was not the enemy but the Government of [South] Vietnam's image. The second priority was the Chieu Hoi - "Welcome Return" -defector program.)<sup>926</sup> And by August of 1968 JUSPAO began to plan to target the VC infrastructure itself.<sup>927</sup> The Army's PSYOP campaign in the field was initially conducted by four Psychological Operations companies, one in each of the major tactical zones. In fact, as early as 1964 Reserve Component U.S. Army PSYOP units deployed a Consolidation Company to support Civil Affairs (CA) in liberated or government-occupied areas; these Consolidation companies were usually assigned or attached to U.S. Army PSYOP battalions.<sup>928</sup> This operational cooperation with CA

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<sup>925</sup>Chandler, 239. Diffendorfer, *passim*. For an early and optimistic overview, see "Psychological Operations in Overseas Internal Defense," *Army Information Digest* (January 1966). For JUSPAO "targets," see "JUSPAO Guidance," #20, reissue of "National Psychological Operations Plan for Vietnam," Saigon: 12 September 1966; H. R. Simpson, "The Guerilla and His World: Psychological Aspects of Guerilla Warfare," *Naval War College Review*, November 1968.

<sup>926</sup>The Chieu Hoi program had been "buried" in the Saigon bureaucracy until JUSPAO revitalized it in the summer of 1965, pressuring the government to make it a separate ministry. It used sophisticated kinship patterns to pin-point potential converts and sent Armed Propaganda Teams composed of *Hoi Chan* ("ralliers") to the government side to conduct face-to-face PSYOP on their former comrades. The program was decentralized on the province level. Significantly, it did not emphasize ideology, simply the good things that would happen to a "rallier" in the south. Judging by the numbers of defectors alone it must be credited as one of the success stories of the Vietnam War or any other U.S. conflict. See "Some Salient Facts About the Chieu Hoi Program," typescript, n.d.; and Chieu Hoi Directorate, "Chieu Hoi Program" (MACV, Saigon: n.d.); USASOC History Archives; G. D. Brewer, "The Surrender Program," *Military Review* (October 1967).

<sup>927</sup>LTG [John] Cushman, U.S. Marine Corps, "Combined Psychological Operations Order 5-68 (PSYOP Support for the Attack on VC Infrastructure)," Danang, 26 August 1968, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>928</sup>W. F. Veaudry, "A New Look at Psywar," *Army* (August 1964). (Note the obsolescent terminology.)

was unique to date to the Vietnam conflict. But with the continuing military build-up of the U.S. effort in Vietnam these four units found themselves overwhelmed in the field.

Accordingly, on 1 December of 1967 the 4<sup>th</sup> POG(A) was activated, with its headquarters in Saigon but with its four battalions (the 6<sup>th</sup> 7<sup>th</sup> 8<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> operating in direct support of U.S. and Allied forces in each of the four Corps Tactical Zones -- (CTZ). Thirteen HA (command and control), 32 HB (loudspeaker) and 33 HE (audio-visual) three-man teams were deployed by the battalions to units and areas in their respective CTZs. The HA Teams provided command and control to the HB and HE Teams and supported pacification and stability operations as well. Team HE was ideal for "one-on-one" PSYOP, as it gave civil medical assistance (MEDCAP), distributed leaflets and posters, ran movies (revolutionary development, public safety, GVN image --as well as Walt Disney films), carried out public opinion polls, reported local attitudes and opinions, and gathered information on enemy weapons and food caches as well as intelligence on the local VC infrastructure. Usually each Allied division had one attached Team HE.<sup>929</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> POG's battalions also provided direct PSYOP support to U.S. Army combat divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as training the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to assume its duties when "Vietnamization" of the struggle had been completed. The mission of the 4<sup>th</sup> was succinctly summarized by its commander at the time as "In essence, the mission of the 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group is to sell GVN (Government of [South] Vietnam) to the Vietnamese people."<sup>930</sup>

Each battalion was placed under the operational control of the senior U.S. force commander in each CTZ. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG was under the control of MACV although JUSPAO continued to provide support to military PSYOP activities in the field.<sup>931</sup> By the date of the activation of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG the U.S. military adviser in each

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<sup>929</sup>[4<sup>th</sup> POG], "Field Team Handbook" (n.d., n.p.); Army Concept Team in Vietnam, "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," [San Francisco] 7 June 1969, H-2 -- H-5; Yaeger, 16; Moulis interview.

<sup>930</sup>Katagiri, "Senior Officer Debriefing Program," 8; 4<sup>th</sup> *Psychological Operations Group*, reprint, (Republic of Vietnam: n.d.) An overview of U.S. Army PSYOP philosophy in Vietnam can be found in "Report of the Internal Defense/Development Psychological Operations Instructor's Conference" (U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, NC: [1966].)

<sup>931</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG Report for Quarter ending 31 January 1968, February 1968; 10 [sic] PSYOP Battalion Quarterly Report for period 31 January-30 April 1970, Vietnam Archives, Military History Institute; Chandler, 28; Katagiri, "The 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group: Organization, Operations, and Observations", *Art & Science*, 220. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG headquarters carried a unique Propaganda Development Section (PDS), something between an S-2 (Intelligence) and an S-3 (Operations), which, as its title indicates, was responsible for the actual drawing up of the Group's PSYOP products. 4<sup>th</sup> POG briefing (n.d.), RG 472, US Army Vietnam, PSYOPS and CA, 4<sup>th</sup> POG, box 1, "4<sup>th</sup>

RVN province included a PSYOP officer, usually a Lieutenant or a Captain. At the regional/corps level the advisory staff included military and civilian PSYOP officers although at the district level the U.S. military advisor rarely had any PSYOP assets.<sup>932</sup> In addition, in February of 1968, the 4<sup>th</sup> POG established Mobile Advisory Teams, each consisting of a PSYOP-trained officer and NCO, to establish unit PSYOP programs or to evaluate existing programs. Team personnel acted as PSYOP advisers to units who needed such support but which lacked their own organic PSYOP capability.<sup>933</sup> Adding to their labors in the field, leaflet distributors and loudspeaker teams often worked with Civic Action Groups and the Kit Carson Scouts.<sup>934</sup>

The activation of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG practically doubled the number of U.S. PSYOP personnel in South Vietnam and gave the specialty greater visibility. In the field, U.S. Army commanders often found their troops enthusiastic about PSYOP, anxious to "do their own thing," in the evanescent terminology of the 1960's, but usually handicapped by their lack of language skills. However, as one commander reported later, they never ran out of paper.<sup>935</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> POG deployed Mobile Advisory Teams, which could respond to changing PSYOP situations in the field and could conduct instruction on PSYOP techniques for all requesting allied units and evaluated low-level programs.<sup>936</sup> As might be expected in such an insurgency situation, there was considerable overlapping of missions but also an intelligent sharing of resources.<sup>937</sup> For example, JUSPAO would receive POWs who had defected as a result of MACV operations and use them for their own PSYOP. Less positively, numerous commanders reported that their difficulties with "incompetent" or "lazy" USIS civilian personnel were proving to be their main frustration in the field. Most observers

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PSYOPs Gp." folder.

<sup>932</sup>Latimer, 27-28. For an outline of the Army's PSYOP organization and mission in Vietnam, see 2d Psychological Operations Group, *Planning Guide* (JFK Center for Special Warfare, Ft. Bragg, NC: November 1966).

<sup>933</sup>"PSYOPS Takes Charge," *Credibilis*, 4<sup>th</sup> POG, 5, No. 2 (Summer 1971).

<sup>934</sup>Copy of ltr, M. Donegan (Intelligence Sergeant) to D. G. Underhill, undated, Underhill Papers, USASOC History Archives. Donegan and Underhill were Vietnam PSYOP veterans.

<sup>935</sup>Wells interview, 12. The 1st Cavalry (Air Mobile) Division, for example, devised its own "quick-reaction helicopters," which could enable any enemy defector to have his words heard through loudspeakers and tape recorders by his former comrades while the battle still raged., "Psystrikes," *PSYOP-POLWAR*, 4, No. 2 (Saigon: 28 February 1969). The interest in PSYOP varied between Allied units. As examples, the 9<sup>th</sup> (U.S.) Infantry Division was particularly active in PSYOP, the 5<sup>th</sup> ARVN hardly at all. The Australians, New Zealanders, and Thais were Generally responsive, the Filipinos and Koreans much less. Latimer, 37-38.

<sup>936</sup>4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group, reprint, "Mobile Advisory Team," (Saigon: n.p.).

<sup>937</sup>Latimer, 14.

attributed these shortcomings to a lack of USIS quality control.<sup>938</sup>

A useful means of improving PSYOP coordination between the U.S. Army and the ARVN was the Combined PSYOP Center (CPOC), established at each CTZ in 1969. The CPOCs pooled, collated, evaluated, distributed PSYOP intelligence, and planned combined operations. Each CPOC differed to some degree in its functions and team composition, but each was headed by a Vietnamese, with an American as his deputy. Many observers on the scene thought that combined Vietnamese-U.S. PSYOP was almost at hand. But combined PSYOP in Vietnam did not move beyond the CPOC stage; in Saigon, in fact, it never approached the level of the CPOCs in the field.<sup>939</sup>

Two "spectacularly successful" U.S. Army field psychological campaigns later in the war illustrate what the intelligent use of joint and combined assets could accomplish. The two, "Operation Roundup" and Project FALLING LEAVES were carried out in Kien Hoa and Kien Giang provinces respectively. In both campaigns Army PSYOP was tackling a strong enemy who had held the territory since 1954. In fact, the U-Minh Forest in Kien Giang Province had even held off the Japanese in World War II. Understandably, Viet Cong morale was high in both areas; in all, not fertile ground for propaganda success, at least in theory. But in practice, joint and combined ARVN and U.S. forces in the three-month period of Operation ROUNDUP in the fall of 1970 effectively saturated enemy-controlled populated areas. The operation used assets of the 9<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron, the USAF, the Vietnamese Air Force, the 10<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion, the 40<sup>th</sup> ARVN Political Warfare Battalion, the 4<sup>th</sup> POG and Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS) PSYOP personnel from IV Military Region. Enemy forces began to break under this extensive pressure and come over to the Allied side. Some agreed to make surrender appeal leaflets to send back to their former comrades. Their close-up pictures were taken on Polaroid cameras while the "rallier" himself composed a simple message on a blank leaflet form. Within a matter of hours the completed leaflet was dropped over enemy positions pointed out earlier by the rallier. These leaflets, in turn, produced more ralliers, who produced more leaflets, and the enemy positions were depleted. Former Viet Cong soldiers also used loudspeakers to bring in enemy troops and even, very bravely, made face-to-face contact to persuade their former comrades to give up. Operation ROUNDUP brought in the highest number of ralliers in the entire seven-year history of the Chieu Hoi program -- no less than 1400 Viet Cong soldiers.

The face-to-face segment of this operation is significant in that the Vietnam war was the first conflict in which U.S. PSYOP used this technique on any scale; previous operations, even those using *Nisei* in the Pacific in World War II, rarely had come closer to the enemy than loudspeaker distance.<sup>940</sup> Of course, there were

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<sup>938</sup>Latimer, 34, 47.

<sup>939</sup>Katagiri, "The CPOC," *Art & Science*, vol. 1; and Katagiri, "Senior Officer Debriefing Report" (1970), 7-8.

<sup>940</sup>See MACV, Memo. to Dist., Subject: Lessons Learned No. 30: Psychological



limitations on this dangerous technique, most obviously in contested areas.

Project FALLING LEAVES, like Operation ROUNDUP, concentrated on the use of local assets and personnel, including the U.S. Sector Advisor, four Navy personnel, "on call" aircraft from the 221<sup>st</sup> Aviation Company, an ARVN Political Warfare (POLWAR) Company, POLWAR Loudspeaker teams, and two Armed Propaganda Teams (APT), composed 100 percent of surrendered Viet Cong soldiers).<sup>941</sup> Practically all PSYOP media were utilized in the operation, (end of January through April, 1970) including television appearances of Viet Cong defectors that gave vivid proof to relatives of VC still in the field of good treatment for defectors. Loudspeakers teams penetrated deeply into the forest, while others forayed through its waterways using gigantic, boat-mounted loudspeakers, probably one of the earliest uses of waterborne PSYOP in U.S. military history. Armed Propaganda Teams, a sector POLWAR company, and personnel from the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) made extensive face-to-face contacts with the enemy. The ARVN 21<sup>st</sup> Division's clearing operations in the U-Minh Forest, supported by FALLING LEAVES, garnered no less than 1150 "ralliers"; in the six weeks before and four weeks after this PSYOPs support the same division in the same area could claim only 211 defectors. On average, 41 percent of these ralliers stated that they had been

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Warfare and Civic Action Operations, 30 August 1963, Westmoreland Papers, 30 March- November 1963. As the Commander of the 4th POG wrote later, "psyoperators knew that face-to-face communication using Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) composed of ex VC were the most effective media for supporting the Chieu Hoi Program.", Katagiri, "A Former PSYOP Group Commander," 141. Latimer also agreed that face-to-face was the best technique, even superior to leaflets when possible., 23, 32. For more on face-to-face PSYOP operations in Vietnam, see "Field Handbook," n.d. These techniques are outlined in Special Air Warfare Center, *Psychological Operations and Civic Action in Special Air Warfare. Psychological Operations Methods* (Eglin AFB, Florida: n.d.), A-15.

<sup>941</sup>The Government of Vietnam General Political Warfare Program (GPWD), established by decree in July 1965, combined motivation and indoctrination of each ARVN armed force, psychological operations, civic action, military security, and social welfare into a single unified program. U.S. Army advisors carried out liaison with ARVN POLWAR officers from sector, corps and division levels, on down to company level. MACV, Directive #515-1, "Psychological Operations Political Warfare," 26 April 1966. The first APT companies were activated in October 1964 in an effort to exploit better the experience and knowledge of selected Hoi Chanh following their release from Chieu Hoi centers. These para-military companies consisted of 74 personnel composed of two 32-man platoons. They were considered the "primary action arm of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi for face-to-face inducement of enemy military and political personnel to change sides.", conducting their operations in "uncertain or contested areas." MACV?, *APT Handbook* (Saigon?: n.d.), 2-3.

influenced by Allied PSYOP.<sup>942</sup>

Finally, another seemingly typical PSYOP operation in May 1968 saw an HB Team supporting the 2d Brigade of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division with an AN/UIH-5 Public Address Set. An enemy force, estimated at about 700 troops, was dug into a deserted village, which had already been heavily bombarded by artillery and air strikes. No enemy had as yet surrendered. The team set up its equipment on the village outskirts and proclaimed that the village was surrounded, that escape was impossible, and proceeded to describe the glories of the Chieu Hoi and weapons return programs, promising good treatment for surrendering troops. These broadcasts continued throughout the day to an enemy who appeared confused and began to come over to Allied troops individually and in small groups. By the next morning a total of 108 North Vietnamese troops had surrendered without resistance.<sup>943</sup>

The North Vietnamese Army surrenders/defections were particularly gratifying. Only the year before the 1968 operation, JUSPAO had conceded that:

The North Vietnamese soldier in South Vietnam presents a particularly difficult target....He has a relatively high state of indoctrination, reinforced by a range of psychological controls....[and was] the product of a closed, totalitarian society," although he, unlike his VC comrade found himself "fighting in a region unfamiliar and semi-antagonistic to him,"<sup>944</sup>

The study documented this conclusion by pointing out that for all of 1967 only 146 NVA military personnel "rallied" to the GVN as opposed to an astounding 27,000 VC in the same year.

An independent study, not overwhelmingly favorable to the U.S. PSYOP effort in Vietnam, termed the typical NVA defector "atypical" with "many negative and no positive motivating factors." But the study concluded that up to early 1970, the period of FALLING LEAVES, about 10 percent of NVA troops (a very impressive number by any standard if correct) in the field had rallied to the Allies.<sup>945</sup>

The total number of "ralliers" was also increasing. Another, highly critical,

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<sup>942</sup>C. B. Lovett, "Effective Combat PSYOP in the Delta," *Art & Science; 4th Psychological Operations Group*, reprint, n.p.; (4th POG?), "Field Handbook", n.p. A similar operation, NGUYEN TRAI II, in the fall of 1969, brought in a total of over 14,000 regular force (including VC and North Vietnamese), Regional Force, guerilla and cadre "ralliers.", *PSYOP-POLWAR News letter*, v, No. 6, 4; No. 10, 3; Yaeger, 17.

<sup>943</sup>"Field Handbook," n.p.

<sup>944</sup>JUSPAO, "The NVA Soldier in South Vietnam as a PSYOP Target," *Psyop Policy*, No. 59 (20 February 1968), 1-2.

<sup>945</sup>Bardain and Bardain, 146.

study gives the number for 1970 alone as over 32,000.<sup>946</sup> Not even a majority of these enemy defectors could necessarily be attributed to U.S. Army tactical PSYOP; the Chieu Hoi program itself was administered by the South Vietnamese. And it would be impossible to break down the number of enemy who surrendered as a result of the work of the Government of Vietnam or other U.S. PSYOP agencies, for the two campaigns were so interwoven as ROUNDUP and FALLING LEAVES amply demonstrated.<sup>947</sup> However, a circa late 1968 study of 337 Hoi Chanh throughout the I CTZ claimed that no less than 90 percent were "influenced by what [they] read." A full 96 percent said that they had seen PSYOP leaflets and 91 percent that they had heard aerial broadcasts. (The study did not indicate what percentage of the latter actually could understand those broadcasts.)<sup>948</sup>

One model small-scale action, however, showed a more direct relationship between military force and defectors. A U.S. Army unit had badly mauled a battalion of the 95 North Vietnamese Army Regiment, and after two days of heavy fighting remnants of the enemy unit were trapped near Tuy Hoa. The American commander called in an Army PSYOP team to broadcast surrender appeals over mobile loudspeakers:

Soldiers of the 95<sup>th</sup> do you want to be buried in an unmarked grave?  
That is the only honor you will have left if you continue your senseless  
fight. Do you think that right?....There is no escape....Approach the  
Americans with your hands above your heads....This is your last chance  
and only hope. Life or death...the choice is yours.

This appeal brought in 36 enemy soldiers and most of them cited the broadcasts as decisive in their decision not to fight it out.<sup>949</sup> Another such operation saw one VC defector to the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division use a taped appeal to his former company commander, by name. Within 24 hours, 88 of his former comrades had defected.<sup>950</sup>

U.S. loudspeaker messages, unlike those of their enemy counterparts, avoided the larger, political questions of the war:

**SOON YOU WILL BE BOMBED BY AIRPLANES!**

Your fortifications and trenches will be smashed by the power of these  
explosives. There is no safe place to hide. Surrender now and you will  
escape a terrible and useless death. Soon you will be bombed by

<sup>946</sup>Chandler, 93.

<sup>947</sup>Katagiri, "The 4th PSYOP," 223.

<sup>948</sup>"Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units," F-9, USASOC History Archives, "Psychological Operations: The Vietnam War Collection," box 3.

<sup>949</sup>Chandler, 43

<sup>950</sup>D. G. Pappas, "PSYOP Staff and Unit Officer Prerequisites," *Art & Science*, vol.

1. Similar examples may be found in Chandler, 86; 4<sup>th</sup> POG reports, etc.

airplanes. Surrender now! Avoid a flaming death!

or

Attention Soldiers of North Vietnam:

You have been deceived. You have been led not to victory but down the road that leads to death. We know the hardships you face; lack of food, no medicine, no time to rest. Every day you are closer to a lonely death far from home -- far from your ancestors. What a shameful way to die. LISTEN! You can return. You will be well treated. CHOOSE LIFE - NOT DEATH!

Even loudspeaker messages directed to civilians avoided "politics:"

The GVN/Allies are conducting a search operation in this area, to rid your villages of the Viet Cong.

In order for us to conduct this operation without having you suffer any misery, we ask that you come down to the Allies until the operations are over. Then you will be free to return to your homes.

You will be welcomed by the GVN/Allies and receive good treatment.

The most "political" loudspeaker message on record still mostly stuck to specifics:

Dear People

Due to the harmful life of the people under the communist yoke, the local government and RVNAF are launching a Special Pacification Program to bring peace to our beloved country.

Help the GVN, its armed forces and RD [Rural Development] groups, in order to break the VCI[infrastructure] and protect your village.<sup>951</sup>

The spring of 1968 brought no less than four of what were termed "mass surrenders" (although they were not "mass surrenders" by World War II in Europe standards), averaging 40 enemy POWs or defectors. Both leaflets and loudspeakers were used in three of the operations, although many enemy troops asserted that they could not understand the latter's messages. In each case Allied PSYOP personnel used the themes of the Communists' hopeless position and of good treatment for POWs. Surrendered enemy sent messages to their former comrades telling of their good treatment; in one case a NVA soldier, after being fed and treated for minor wounds by

<sup>951</sup>Combined Psychological Operations Center, 7th PSYOP Battalion, "ICTZ [I Corps Tactical Zone], Taped Propaganda Catalog (Saigon?: July 1970). For the organization and duties of Vietnam-era U.S. Army loudspeaker units, see (4th POG?), "Field Team Handbook" (n.p., n.d.), Section III.

a loudspeaker team voluntarily appealed to others to follow his example. In another case a former VC Colonel directed his leaflet messages to the executive officer of the Quyet-Thang Regiment and actually induced the latter to rally to GVN forces. A loudspeaker message from the latter brought about the defection of yet another enemy company executive officer and 43 of his men. Another case, in May of 1968, saw a field team from the 8th Battalion of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG use powerful ground loudspeakers to coax 95 North Vietnamese troops from a shattered village north of Hue. In each instance it should be noted that the enemy formations were surrounded and had been battered by Allied firepower. Still, these were impressive results, coming so soon after the imagined Tet "disaster" to Allied arms, as reported in Western media.<sup>952</sup>

As if to prove the point of the value of on-the-ground, face-to-face PSYOP, a promising situation may well have been aborted when the 1<sup>st</sup> ARVN Division overran an NVA Field Hospital in Quang Tri Province, north of the A Shau Valley. An estimated 200 enemy sick and wounded scattered to the hills. A C-47 was called in for a night leaflet mission, dropping 240,000 safe conduct passes and broadcasting one hour of standard tapes on the treatment of sick and wounded. But these impersonal appeals garnered no discernable responses.<sup>953</sup>

In addition to its combat PSYOP the 4<sup>th</sup> POG enlightened civilians about South Vietnamese Government programs and provided information services that would normally come under the heading of "nation building," and was, in turn, supported by JUSPAO and other military and civilian agencies in-country. JUSPAO often noted areas needing PSYOP. The office, for example, pointed out in June of 1966 that conditions were so "shockingly bad" in some refugee camps (as opposed to the "show-place" camps) that resentful inmates were now saying that at least while under VC control they could live in their own homes, and that "We can't fill our stomachs with hollow promises.", and urged that "The need for psychological and physical attention is critically urgent."

In dealing with the VC in areas they dominated PSYOP often became something closer to Civil Affairs (CA) to a far greater extent than in any previous U.S. conflict. For example, the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division mounted a vast combined tactical operation in Hoai Nhon District, Binh Dinh Province, early in 1966 to destroy battalion and regional size North Vietnamese and VC units, and much of the action took place in populated areas. The PSYOP coordination was made among ARVN, ROK, II Corps MACV, MACV Sector, JUSPAO and the 245<sup>th</sup> PSYOPs Company in order that there would be no conflicting aerial loudspeaker or leaflet themes. PSYOP support consisted of teams from the 245<sup>th</sup> and a U-10 aircraft from 5<sup>th</sup> Air Commando Squadron, as well as a JUSPAO field representative to provide guidance and direction for message content and to advise commanders generally on PSYOP. The necessity

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<sup>952</sup>4th POG PSYOP Development Center Special Report, "Mass Defections and Surrenders," 11 September 1968. Ibid., *4th Psychological Operations Group*, reprint, "Group History."

<sup>953</sup>Report of 7th PSYOP Battalion, 4th POG for July 1969, 8.

for air strikes also mandated warning messages to civilians to evacuate their villages. Initially, only the VC took advantage of these warnings while the civilians retreated to their underground shelters. But subsequent messages warning that these bunkers could not provide adequate protection from artillery and air strikes were effective in inducing villagers finally to evacuate.

Another operation directed toward civilians involved Audio-Visual Team 2 and Loudspeaker Operations Team 6, which were supporting the 2d Brigade of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division in Bien Hoa Province early in January, 1970. The teams discovered that the only village in their area of operation was considered to be VC-controlled. The initial mission was to pacify this village, a task made considerably more difficult by "numerous ambushes, booby traps, and road blocks"; and standard civilian broadcast tapes had little effect in inducing villagers to abide by curfew regulations. The teams prevailed upon the village chief to tape a message for his people. When the villagers heard his voice they became more compliant. Even so, when the first Medical Civic Action projects were conducted the people were suspicious and only 12 turned out for treatment. But several days later a seriously-injured boy was medevaced by helicopter to Saigon and at the next Medical Civic Action project more than 100 people attended, even resisting VC pressures to stay away.<sup>954</sup> Civilian PSYOP operations could also be mounted on a quick, *ad hoc* basis; when a local defense guard was injured by a booby trap while working in a rice field outside Phoung Tho village, in December 1970, the PSYOP liaison team attached to the First Armored Cavalry Division quickly exploited the incident. A tape was made informing the local people of the man's injuries and pointing out that the victim could just as easily have been an innocent villager or a child and that only through the villagers payment of VC taxes could the enemy afford to purchase such weapons of indiscriminate warfare.<sup>955</sup> The U.S. Air Cav Division conducted its own standardized four-part operation to both VC and civilians in the area, primarily by shell-delivered leaflets. As the Americans moved deeper into this formerly VC-dominated territory they found the area festooned with slogans painted on rocks, walls, trees, bridges, etc., calling for the driving of the American "Imperialists"/"Warmongers," from Vietnam. But it was also found that most of the civilians had survived the battle and almost all had a safe conduct pass on their persons, although the VC had gone to

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<sup>954</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, Monthly Operations Report for January 1970, USASOC History Archive. For emphasis on civilian priorities, see JUSPAO, "PSYOP Support of Pacification," in *PSYOPS Policy*, particularly No. 53 (22 January 1968), in which every issue deals with this topic. For airborne PSYOP see [anon.] "Propaganda Flight," *Air Force Times* (8 July 1963); "USAF Psychological Operations," TIG Brief (9 April 1965); M. J. Holsinger, "Air Mission -Psychological Warfare," *Airpower Historian* (April 1965); [anon.] "Psywar Tools Get Sharpened," *Air Force Times* (September 1965); [anon.] "Psywar Push Made During Viet Holiday" (15 February 1967).

<sup>955</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, Monthly Operations Report for December 1970, USASOC History Archives.

considerable trouble to find and confiscate all such leaflets. Not only had the civilians been spared in this large-scale operation, more than 400 Chieu Hoi were garnered in the Hoai Nhon District, many from the district and approximately 300 were carrying Allied safe conduct passes. At all levels the Allied forces had called upon PSYOP support. It is difficult to determine how typical all this was, but the JUSPAO report on the operation does not treat it as anything unusual.<sup>956</sup>

U.S. Army PSYOP could find itself in particularly lengthy operations if civilians were involved. Operation RUSSELL BEACH took all of six months in 1969 to complete. This combined operation, conducted in the Batangan Peninsula of Quang Ngai Province, used U.S. Navy, Air Force, Marine, Army and ARVN forces. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG's 7<sup>th</sup> Battalion field teams took part in all phases of the operation, with ground loudspeaker teams supporting combat units on their cordon and search operations. Battalion personnel also flew numerous leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, while audio-visual teams assisted in crowd control of civilians gathered into the Combined Holding and Interrogation Centers and along with JUSPAO Vietnamese cultural drama teams even provided entertainment.<sup>957</sup>

But undoubtedly the most intensive civilian PSYOP of the war was that conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces among the Montagnard tribes of the Central Highlands. As early as July of 1964 Special Forces had put together a remarkably scholarly booklet, *Montagnard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Vietnam*, which outlined the customs and mores of these 28 strategically-located tribes. The publication relied heavily upon information gathered by Special Forces troopers themselves who had lived with the tribespeoples, had helped to protect them from the communists and had helped to improve their lives, and welded them into an effective fighting force that would interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex and provide intelligence.<sup>958</sup> Special Forces worked through the Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), originally established by the Central Intelligence Agency, and welded them into an effective indigenous force that both protected the villages and took the war to the enemy.<sup>959</sup>

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<sup>956</sup>JUSPAO, *Psychological Operations in Vietnam*, 29-31.

<sup>957</sup>4th POG, "4th PSYOP Group Unit History," 12-13. For HE Teams entertainment in Pacification and Stability operations, see "Field Handbook," n.p. The "Handbook" noted that "It is important for US personnel to remain in the background in these operations.", and should always be accompanied by Vietnamese PSYWAR, POLWAR, or information teams.

<sup>958</sup>U.S. Army Special Warfare School, "Montagnard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Vietnam," 2d ed. (Fort Bragg, NC: 1964); (S)"The U.S. Special Forces CIDG Mission in Vietnam"(U). (Information used herein is UNCLASSIFIED.); *The U.S. Special Forces CIDG Mission in Vietnam: A Preliminary Case Study in Counterpart and Civil-Military Relations* (SORO, Washington: 1964).

<sup>959</sup>S. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975* (Novato, California: 1985); F. Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-*

Special Forces were especially successful in the "propaganda of the deed." A good example was the campaign, in conjunction with the 245<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Company, JUSPAO and the Vietnamese Information Service to bring the area around Du Co in Pleiku Province back to the government from its current "contested" category. All villages and hamlets within a ten kilometer radius of base camp were targeted by a combined team Special Forces and the Vietnamese Information Service. MEDCAPs treated more than 800 villagers and the security provided by Special Forces troopers enabled VIS representatives to talk face-to-face with the villagers and try to convince them of Saigon's benevolent intentions and of the communists' in impeding the return of peace. The combined team also distributed school supplies and pro-government publications and posters depicting ARVN victories. The needs of the villagers were recorded and forwarded to USAID, CARE and other relief organizations. Most importantly, the team discovered evidence of widespread resentment toward Viet Cong methods of recruitment and forcing attendance at interminable propaganda sessions. (This at a time when Free World "experts" stressed how the VC moved easily among a sympathetic population alienated by the Allies' mindless bombardments of their villages and by their perception of the Saigon government as puppets of the uncaring American "imperialists.")

Another, typical small-scale Special Forces psywar and civic action project was the setting up of the Tra Bong Sawmill Cooperative by 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne) in the spring of 1967. The cooperative soon provided cut lumber for local housing and then sold the surplus, with members receiving their pay in money, rice or sawn lumber. It was a good indication of the nature of this war that the 5<sup>th</sup> reported that "To lend credibility to the theme [the good life under the government of the Republic of Vietnam] the CIDG at Tra Bong, as well as elements of the 25<sup>th</sup> and 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, have been conducting intensive combat operations in the area while operating sawmill..."<sup>960</sup> Combined PSYOP directed toward local VC emphasized the Chieu Hoi program, assuring Communist troops that they could return to their families with all forgiven; the term "surrender" was never mentioned.

Throughout the Central Highlands combined Vietnamese and U.S. Special Forces formed intensively-trained CIDG Civil Affairs/PSYOP teams which also conducted face-to-face meetings with the Montagnards, put on musical and cultural performances through their own POLWAR Cultural Drama Team, conducted sick calls, distributed school supplies and health kits and organized athletic events. They provided construction materials and relief items for refugees and the needy, as well as leaflet and loudspeaker missions. Although these missions and the CIDG program did not bring in large numbers of defectors they made life difficult along the communist infiltration routes to the south and helped immensely to hold the Highlands for the

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1971 (Washington, Department of the Army: 1985).

<sup>960</sup>Company C, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), memo to Commanding Officer, 5<sup>th</sup> SFG(A), subject: Report on Sawmill at Trabong, 25 May 1967; quoted in 5<sup>th</sup> SFG(A) "News letter," June [1967] issue.



Allies. General Westmoreland has recorded his belief that it was the influence of U.S. Special Forces upon the Montagnard tribes people that helped prevent a major defection from the Saigon government (no love was lost between these parties) during the uprising of the Montagnard "United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races." Westmoreland concluded two years later that

Our Special Forces continued their valuable contributions in Civic Action and psychological operations.... They brought some 45,000 fighting men and a proportionate population under government control or influence, all of whom might otherwise have been recruited or dominated by the enemy.<sup>961</sup>

These operations, directed at least as much toward civilians as to the enemy military, were no aberrations; in fact, after the enemy's failure in the 1968-1969 Tet offensive the 4<sup>th</sup> POG reported that it could now increasingly target civilian audiences.<sup>962</sup> An excellent example was a combined and intense PSYOP/Civil Affairs/U.S./ARVN operation at an hamlet in Tam Binh District, Vinh Long Province in June 1969. An "Earlyword"-equipped PSYOP U-10 loudspeaker aircraft persuaded the villagers to assemble on the outskirts of the hamlet. The Field Team then went in to counter months of enemy propaganda to the effect that the "Imperialists" came only to destroy and conquer and that the Government and Army of South Vietnam were its "Corrupt Puppets." A combination of entertainment and medical services as well as the physical presence of the Deputy District Chief, VIS representative and local public health and agricultural services brought home to the locals the benign and independent nature of their overt government.<sup>963</sup>

The experience of one Special Forces officer, LT James "Nick" Rowe, formed the basis for at least one U.S. PSYOP leaflet. Rowe had been held in a VC bamboo cage for no less than five years, but just before his escape he had noticed that his captors were confused and bewildered because their old sanctuaries were being invaded by what had been dismissed by their cadres as "weak" U.S. and GVN forces. Many of them would have liked to give up the struggle but were afraid of being killed while trying to defect. A leaflet was quickly printed up with a message from LT Rowe reassuring his former captors that they would be welcomed and treated

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<sup>961</sup>W. Yarborough, "Special Forces Psychological operations in Southeast Asia," *Art & Science*, vol. 1; JUSPAO Planning Office, *Psychological Operations in Vietnam* (Saigon: n.d.), 13-14; *ibid.*, "The Montagnards," Policy Number 47 (Saigon: 16 October 1967); J. Hudson, "More than a Song and Dance," *Green Beret*, 4 (1969)

<sup>962</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, "4th PSYOP Group Unit History," n.d. [1969], 9, USASOC History Archives; G. D. Brewer, "The Surrender Program," *Military Review*, October 1967.

<sup>963</sup>*Ibid.*, "Monthly Operations Report" for June 1968. For nearly identical operations, see, for example, the "Field Team Feeder Report HE Team, June-July 1969", 23.

LEAFLET TRANSLATION

LEAFLET THEME: No. 2: Chieu Hoi/Dai  
Doan Ket

LEAFLET NUMBER: 4241

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

PAPER WT: 20 lb

DISSEMINATION DATA: Vo-2,5; RTTO-1.11 SIZE: 3 x 6

FRONT:

(Photo) - RETURNEE LIVES PLEASANTLY WITH HIS FAMILY IN A CHIEU HOI CENTER

BACK:

To friends still remaining on the other side: The life of returnees in Chieu Hoi Center fully reflects the National Reconciliation Policy of the Government of Vietnam, which wipes out hatred and animosity with love and compassion. Since inception of the Chieu Hoi program, over 177,000 returnees have enjoyed a new life with freedom and well being.

Today, they don't have to hide in jungles and mountains suffering privations, hardships, and constantly facing the threat of death. They earnestly wish their friends remaining on the other side of the frontline to come back soon to the GVN, so as to heal the wounds of the country and reconstruct a free and thriving South Vietnam.



Những anh em  
Hồi chánh viên  
đang sống thoải  
mái cùng gia đình  
tại các Trung-tâm  
Chiêu-hồi

## CUỘC SỐNG MỚI

CÙNG CÁC BẠN CÁN BINH CÒN Ở BÊN KIA CHIẾN TUYẾN,

Cuộc sống hiện tại của anh, chị em Hồi-chánh trong các Trung-tâm Chiêu-hồi thể hiện chính sách ĐẠI-ĐOÀN-KẾT DÂN-TỘC của chính-phủ Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa, chủ trương lấy tình thương xóa bỏ hận thù. Quốc-sách Chiêu-hồi; ban hành đã đem lại cho hơn 177 ngàn anh, chị em Hồi chánh một cuộc sống mới trong tự do, no ấm.

Ngày nay, họ không còn phải lẩn trốn trong rừng sâu, chịu đựng mọi thiếu thốn và nơm nớp lo sợ những cái chết oan uổng. Họ thành khẩn mong mỏi những người bạn còn ở bên kia chiến tuyến sớm quay về với Chính Phủ Quốc-gia để hàn gắn lại những thương đau cho dân tộc, xây dựng một miền Nam Tự-Do và Thịnh-Vượng.

Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") program. "Happy POW" theme.

LEAFLET TRANSLATION

THEME: No. 2A Surrender/POW

LEAFLET NUMBER: 3435

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

SIZE: 6X3

PAPER WT: 16 lb

DISSEMINATION:  $V_0 - 4.7$ ;  $R/T_0 - 1.04$

FRONT:

WHERE IS THE TRUTH?

Many times you have heard from the Political cadres of the Front that if you are captured by the GVN troops you will be tortured, starved or killed.

These prisoners are living comfortably in GVN PW camps. This truth reveals the false propaganda of the Communist Political Cadres.

If you are captured, do not despair. Fortunately, you will be treated well like your comrades in this picture.

BACK:

Captured soldiers are treated well.



3435

**BINH SĨ CỘNG SẢN ĐƯỢC ĐỐI XỬ TỬ TẾ**

**ĐÂU LÀ SỰ THẬT ?**

Đã nhiều lần các bạn được nghe cán bộ chính trị của «Mặt trận» tuyên truyền rằng : Nếu bị quân đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa bắt làm tù binh là phải chịu cảnh tra tấn, đói khát, chết chóc...

Đây, chính những binh sĩ Cộng Sản đang sống thoải mái trong các trại tù binh của VNCH. Sự thật hiển nhiên này sẽ vạch trần luận điệu tuyên truyền hịp hợm của bọn cán bộ chính trị Cộng sản.

Nếu các bạn bị bắt, các bạn chắc chắn sẽ được đối xử như những đồng chí của các bạn trong hình này.

3435

ditto

LEAFLET THEME: Treatment of POW

LEAFLET NO: 4511

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

SIZE: 6X3

PAPER WT: 20 lb

DISSEMINATION: VO-2.5; RT/TO-1.11

## "PROTECTION OF PW HEALTH"

Sick PWs are examined and are treated carefully by the doctors of the RVNAF. This is not only an article in the International Treaty concerning PWs which has been strictly executed by the GVN, it also shows the humanitarianism of the men living under a genuine Democratic and free government.

Because they have lived many years in the jungle. Most of the Communist soldiers were already sick when they were captured. The GVN consider a PW as a human being. Therefore PWs are treated in GVN hospital just as other soldiers are without discrimination.

## BẢO VỆ SỨC KHỎE CỦA TÙ BINH

Sau những năm dài sống ở rừng núi phần lớn các tù binh khi bị bắt đều đau ốm Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hoà quan niệm rằng những tù binh cũng đều là con người. Vì vậy, tù binh được điều trị tại các bệnh viện của Chính phủ VNCH như mọi chiến sĩ khác mà không có một sự kỳ thị nào. 4511



Tù binh bị đau ốm đều được các quân y sĩ của quân lực Việt Nam Cộng Hoà khám bệnh và chữa trị chu đáo.

Đây không những là một điều khoan của luật pháp quốc tế về tù binh được chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hoà thi hành một cách đúng đắn mà còn thể hiện lòng nhân đạo của con người sống dưới chính thể Dân Chủ Tự Do thực sự. 4511



decently.<sup>964</sup>

Army PSYOP in Vietnam utilized practically all of the themes of previous U.S. psywars, including the surrender pass, "Happy POW," "Allied Might," nostalgia, good soldier-bad leaders, etc. But there were a few themes unique to this conflict. One, fortunately short-lived, was the 4<sup>th</sup> POG's "sex" leaflet "Don't Deny Yourself the Right to Be a Man," featuring a bikini-clad oriental young woman. The U.S. Information Agency's Saigon office had warned that such photos would offend local ideas of good taste, and recommended that the Army stick to attractive young Vietnamese women in traditional garb. This advice must have been taken, for all known future "pulchritude" leaflets showed such women so clad. (There certainly is no indication that the "sex" leaflet in question brought any positive results.)<sup>965</sup> As noted above, U.S. troops felt the enemy lowered himself with such appeals, even as they studied them more closely.

Allied surrender appeals in Vietnam were usually closely tied to the Chieu Hoi program, established in 1963 by the South Vietnamese government. The program was activated at the urging of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel who were familiar with the amnesty programs used so successfully by Philippine President Ramon Magasaysay against the communist Hukbalahap rebellion of the early 1950s. U.S. Army PSYOP leaflets increasingly featured the new, prosperous life that a "rallier" (Hoi Chanh) to the Chieu Hoi program could lead, away from the hunger, disease and death of the battlefield. Here was one difference with World Wars I or II or Korea. In the former conflicts, U.S. psywarriors could only promise a decent life inside a POW camp and the hope of eventual return to homeland and family after the war. But in Vietnam the promise could be made and kept that the defector could taste the delights of civilian life after only a few weeks. These leaflets particularly emphasized vocational training: pig farming, motor mechanics, barbering, brick-making, carpentry, etc.<sup>966</sup> The VC trooper who refused

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<sup>964</sup>"10-69 Series," *Dimension* (news letter of 10<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion), 1, No. 10; James N. Rowe, *Five Years to Freedom* (Boston and Toronto: 1971). LTC Rowe was assassinated in 1989 while serving as a Special Forces adviser to the Philippine Army., "Rowe File," USASOC History Archive.

<sup>965</sup>Chandler, 22. This conclusion is based upon a perusal of the large number of 4th POG/JUSPAO leaflets and their accompanying translations and work sheets on deposit in the USASOC History Archives and the JFK Museum. See also JUSPAO, "Use of Sex Appeal in Propaganda Programs and Material," *Psyop Policy*, No. 70 (29 October 1968, which concluded that "The large majority of Vietnamese, particularly in rural areas, are still as conservative as Americans were eighty years ago.", and that to the North Vietnamese, "The 'cheesecake' approach is looked upon as decadent and symptomatic of 'hedonism and moral rot' in capitalist society." (para. II).

<sup>966</sup>Chieu Hoi leaflets from USASOC History Archives. Another such leaflet carried a photograph of a happy POW wedding party. See also "Interim Report on 'Ex-Hoi Chan Survey,'" which featured randomly-selected Hoi Chan interviews, n.d. (1966?)

the Chieu Hoi blandishments faced "rapidly developing ARVN forces and the anti-communist feelings of the people" and as well as "more new sufferings and grief for you and your family.", in the words of a 1966 leaflet, illustrated with very happy defectors and smiling ARVN soldiers.<sup>967</sup>

The program was directed toward, and was most successful with, the indigenous Viet Cong. The North Vietnamese, of course, could hardly be expected to "rally" in significant numbers to the alien South Vietnamese government and remain separated from their families; for them, simple good treatment after surrender was the promise:

North Vietnamese soldiers who are captured in South Vietnam receive good treatment from the South Vietnamese and the Allied forces. They participate in sports and games, have good food to eat, and are also free to do such things as painting and singing and learning how to do embroidery.

Many North Vietnamese soldiers have been killed in the Lao Dong's [Communist Party] aggression.... Those who become prisoners of war are lucky. Communist soldiers who are captured in South Vietnam receive good care as they wait for the day when they can return to their families.

all appropriately illustrated by photos of happy POWs.<sup>968</sup>

The GVN promised each returnee:

1. Good treatment
2. Full citizenship
3. Medical treatment in the Chieu Hoi Center
4. Permanent Reunion with his family
5. VSN 30 daily for food for each returnee, his wife and older children
6. VN 200 monthly pocket money. VN 100 monthly for each member of

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and statistics, *ibid.*, The program may, in one way, have been too successful: there is good evidence that a significant number of hoi chanh used Chieu Hoi for "R&R" (rest and relaxation), circulating from camp to camp and back to the field. See, for example, COL H. Youmans oral interview with author, 15 April 1993, MacDill AFB, Florida. A contemporary history of the Chieu Hoi program is in Chieu Hoi Directorate, "Some Salient Facts About the Chieu Hoi Program," (Saigon: 14 March 1967). For program statistics for 1968-1969, MACV/COG, see "Chieu Hoi Corps Trend," (10 December 1969), all in *ibid.*; W. P. Spencer, "Chieu Hoi," *Infantry*, September-October 1969.

<sup>967</sup>Original copy and translation in *ibid.*

<sup>968</sup>USASOC Historical Archives, Vietnam leaflet collection; Chandler, 40.

family in Center.

7. Rewards for weapons brought in
8. Two suits of new clothing or VN 1,000
9. VN 1,000 per family for resettlement
10. Help in finding a job
11. Those who settle in Chieu Hoi hamlets will receive 10,000 to build a house, plus free cement and roofing, VN 2,000 to buy furniture, and six months rice subsistence<sup>969</sup>

Less happily, "atrocities," propaganda was extensively used for the first time tactically since World War I, and again also heavily directed toward the civilian population despite some feeling that such messages could frighten that audience into acquiescing to the demands of the enemy.<sup>970</sup> An Army-commissioned study warned that the technique could be taken too far, that "a nauseated audience is not necessarily a receptive audience."<sup>971</sup> A typical such leaflet, illustrated with mutilated children, demanded

Do You Want to Exterminate the Viet Race? Your leaders claim that they fire at military installations only. The fact is only one soldier had died as a result of these attacks. Most of the victims have been Vietnamese women and children....<sup>972</sup>

A somewhat similar approach, sometimes called the "gory" leaflet, was used on a large scale for the first time by U.S. PSYOP forces. The corpses of enemy soldiers and cadre, sometimes named, were shown in close-up detail, sometimes with holes in their heads, sometimes with portions of those heads missing, their revolting fate contrasted with the life awaiting defectors:

The death of Tran Do proved that the Communist aggression policy to take over South Vietnam has severely failed....Then why do you still hesitate? Try to find opportunities to return to the National community and rejoin your families, as tens of thousands of other soldiers did.<sup>973</sup>

Another, showing a sprawled VC corpse, importuned:

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<sup>969</sup>JUSPAO leaflet binder, vol. 22, leaflet number 21100.

<sup>970</sup>R. S. Nathan, "Psychological Warfare: Key to Success," *Military Review* (April 1968).

<sup>971</sup>Latimer, *U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam*, 103.

<sup>972</sup>Chandler, 68. Further examples are found throughout JUSPAO binders, USASOC History Archives.

<sup>973</sup>Chandler, 50-51.

FRONT:

From the day I left you, mother, to follow my companions on the trip to Central Vietnam through Laos, I have endured the hardships of climbing up the green mountains and marching through rain and shine, although with my young age life should blossom like a flower. For the sake of peace, I don't mind enduring hardships and dangers. For several months I marched during the day and rested at night. My shoes' heels have worn out and my jacket's shoulders were rubbed thin through which the cold seeps in, when evening comes, besieged by loneliness in the heart of the Truong Son range. O, Mother, I miss our home, I miss the blue smoke, the gourd arbor, the little butterflies, the old temple roof. O how I miss them all. So I am here on strangers' soil but the South is also our country. Here, I saw the same green-leafed coconut trees. The same roads perfumed with the scent of rice paddies. The same blue smoke filling the evening sky.

BACK:

The buffalo returning to its shelter, the sound of the flute which makes one feel homesick. As I got over my feeling of estrangement, I began to look around and wondered what there was here to liberate? The markets were crowded with people in gay mood, the rice field was green with paddies. From a curve-roofed pagoda came the sounds of a worship bell. The classrooms were full of cheerful children singing a song in chorus. And in a plot of garden the small butterflies were busy on the yellow cabbage flowers. Peace and happiness reigned throughout the country. But why they ordered me to burn the villages, destroy the bridges, explode the mines and sow death around? When I had to lay a mine, often my hands trembled, only to later witness people blown up and blood sprayed around. Whose blood was it? It was the blood of the people like you, mother, and myself. That night my eyes were filled with tears and my sleep was interrupted by nightmares.

The above letter in poetry form was found on the body of a dead soldier of the Hanoi Regime killed in the Duc-Co battle.


Eloquent poem extolling the happy life encountered in the South by an infiltrating North Vietnamese soldier - killed in the Duc-Co area.



Thư gửi Mẹ

(Tâm sự của một thanh niên miền Bắc)

Cái buổi con lên đường, mẹ mẹ  
 Theo anh em sang Lào rồi đôi lúc vào Trung  
 Non thành, núi biếc chập chùng,  
 Sơn mông biển, chim màu rừng già  
 Trời thanh vắng, cuộc đời như hoa nở  
 Ở Hồ Chí Minh đầu ngõ liễu gian nguy  
 Mây trắng trời đêm yên, ngày đi,  
 Giày vết gót, áo sờn vai, thân lạnh  
 Nhưng chưa từng sờn mũi súng có quanh  
 Mẹ buồn vì, con chết như quê hương  
 Khỏi tên chiến, gần chiến, là là xanh  
 Con buồn nhớ, mái trúc, cửa sổ quê  
 Vào nơi đây tay đặt người xa lạ  
 Không nhìn như cùng quê một quê hương  
 Vẫn lòng đê xấp, vẫn nhấm cơm đường  
 Thơm hương lúa ngọt ngào  
 Vẫn khêu, lam chím...  
 Con thân vì chúng ta  
 Tiếng kêu gọi anh  
 Để qua đời bạn dân lao khổ



Con nhớ họ, nhớ quê, phòng gì đây?  
 Phải chờ đống này, đống kia xanh màu  
 Mái chùa cong lưng trời chuông ngân  
 Lớp học tiếng trống những đờn hồ nhỏ  
 Ngày nghỉ ruộng lúa hạt bắp đòng cò  
 Và hàng vườn bưởi cây vú sữa  
 Đón bình minh, ra nhàn về buổi mát  
 Yêu đời hay tên miền núi ngàn ngàn  
 Sao người ta hỏi con đất con quê con  
 Phải gì em, giờ này bất thường  
 Em có anh em tay con rau rẫy  
 Khi gọi em, đi làm lính thép  
 Xé rách tay máu đỏ chưa hòa  
 Máu của ai, máu của bà con ta  
 Của những người như con như mẹ  
 Đem hồn em, mất con thân ta  
 Ấy nghĩ về, con thân học thi  
 con

Bài thơ trên đây là của một thanh niên miền Bắc gửi cho mẹ là Bà Trần-Thị-Phân ở Hải-Dương. Người thanh niên tâm đường này đã bỏ xác tại chiến trường Búc Hồ trung tuần tháng Tám vừa rồi. Tuy nhiên vong hồn của anh chắc vẫn còn oan hồn Đàng Lao Đông đã đẩy anh vào Nam để làm một công cụ xâm lược cho Đảng. Chúng tôi mạn phép vong hồn người quá cố để in hai bài thơ tâm lý thú vị này tặng tất cả các bạn thanh niên miền Bắc cùng một cảnh ngộ với người thanh niên xấu số này.





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By way of contrast, "Take a Husband, My Love, for my life is fast ebbing." In the North. US leaflet designed to induce despair among long-serving VC troops. When did you last see your wife? Note thorough Vietnamese iconography in all of these leaflets.



## KHUYÊN EM LẤY CHỒNG

Thôi! Nghe anh: Em lấy chồng đi nhé  
Vì đời anh cố lẽ thế là xong  
Tuy khuyên em là anh tự đời lòng  
Nhưng anh nghĩ: Đời em về sau nữa.

Manh đàn di em: Thôi đừng lách lữa  
Phương trời Nam ngọn lửa hãy còn cao  
Anh đã rời tay bên cạnh chiến hào  
Anh lấy máu viết khuyên em lần cuối.

Em hãy nghe anh, xin đừng từ chối,  
Để lúc tàn hơi anh đỡ ăn năn.  
Em! Chớ giận anh, đừng trách phận mình,  
Mà trách kẻ đẩy anh vào trận chiến.

Em hãy đi đi, thôi đừng lưu luyến,  
Kỷ niệm ngày xưa em hãy vùi chôn.  
Cho tình ta tan theo bóng hoàng hôn,  
Cho vầng hình anh trên miền quê Bắc.

Thôi em nhé! đây không ai là giặc,  
Mà chính anh, người ra súng đầu tiên.  
Anh chết đi là đáng, tội đã đến,  
Chỉ đau khổ cho em, người ở lại.

Tôi đã trót vào rồi ôm hận mãi,  
Bạn dưới đi ghe chẳng tiếng lòng tôi.  
Tuổi hai mươi tôi đã ném đi rồi  
Bạn hãy chọn tình yêu làm lý tưởng.

LEAFLET TRANSLATION

LEAFLET THEME: Undermining morale of NVA/VC

LEAFLET NUMBER: 4365

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

SIZE: 6 x 3

DISSEMINATION: Vo 2.5 RTTO 1.11

PAPER WEIGHT: 20 lb

SIDE I

This is an excerpt of the diary of VU CONG HOAN, a soldier of Post 70 whose sweetheart by the name of Tran Thi Kiem Hoan lives in 3rd Hamlet, Muong Chua Street, Tu Ne Village, Tan Lac District, Hoa Binh Province (North Viet-Nam) and is a student of the Middle-level Teachers School in Hoa Binh Province.

Text: "...In the morning, I move from an auxiliary camp to a principal camp "T3." I go up and down along the ravine and am very tired. I see batches after batches of skinny and weak men going from South to North, especially the disabled soldiers. How terrified and fed up with the war I feel! At last, I camp at "T3" for two days, I feel so very tired. I keep on sneezing and do not feel well at all. My mind is full of thoughts for my family and my darling. As I look at my darling's picture, I miss and love her so much.

(signature of the soldier)

SIDE II:

COMMUNIST CADRES AND SOLDIERS OF NORTH VIET-NAM!

Friends, read the lines of a NVA soldier's diary and you will understand the fate of your comrades-in-arms who have been wounded. The thin silhouettes of weak and sick men on the road back to North were really a pitiful sight.

You must find a way out for yourselves to avoid worthless sacrifices and separation from your families and loved ones.

CÁC BẠN CÁN-BÌNH CỘNG-SẢN BẮC-VIỆT

Các bạn hãy đọc những lời ghi trong sổ nhật ký của một binh sĩ Bắc-Việt thời rối tình trạng của các đồng chí của các bạn khi bị thương. Những thân hình gầy gò ốm yếu đang trên đường trở về Bắc trông thật là thảm thương.

Các bạn hãy tìm một "lối thoát" cho các bạn để khỏi phải "hy sinh" một cách vô ích, xa gia đình và người yêu.

4365

Dưới đây là một đoạn trích trong sổ nhật-ký của binh-sĩ Vũ-Công-Hoàn, đồng-tai đồn 70 có người yêu là Trần-Thị-Kiểm Hoan ở xóm 3, phố Muong-Chia, xã Tả-Nê, huyện Tân-Lạc, tỉnh Hòa-Bình, sinh-viên trường Sư-Phạm Trung-Cấp (SPTC), tỉnh Hòa-Bình.

Sáng hôm qua anh Tuấn phải đi thăm chú bác ở T3, đi ven rừng, anh thấy nhiều người già yếu, ốm yếu, những người bị thương, anh thấy họ rất thảm thương. Anh nghĩ đến em gái mình, anh nghĩ đến em gái anh, anh nghĩ đến em gái anh, anh nghĩ đến em gái anh, anh nghĩ đến em gái anh.

4365

FRONT:

**"HOW TO SAVE YOURSELF"**

Lack of adequate transportation and medical facilities seriously jeopardize the chances of survival for VC/NV soldiers wounded in the field. Certainly you must know why? In order to survive, a seriously wounded soldier requires proper medical attention without delay.

BACK:

**"THEN HOW CAN YOU SAVE YOURSELF?"**

- The best way is to avoid being wounded. Try to escape before the fighting starts.
- If engaged in combat with RVNAF/Allied Forces, lay down your weapon to avoid being killed. If you are captured you will be given food, clothing, shelter and medical attention if you need it.
- If you are wounded, try to stay in the area - out in the open if possible where GVN Forces can find you and administer first aid. You will then be taken to a hospital and cared for by medical doctors. Have no fear of being captured. You will receive the best of care possible. Most important you will save yourself.

## LÀM THẾ NÀO ĐỂ TỰ CỨU MÌNH ?

Những cán binh Bắc Việt và Việt Cộng rủi ro bị thương ở chiến trường rất ít hy vọng sống còn vì thiếu phương tiện vận chuyển cũng như thuốc men. Chắc các bạn biết rõ điều này. Nếu muốn được sống còn, một thương binh cần phải được săn sóc thuốc men ngay không chậm trễ.

3660

## LÀM THẾ NÀO ĐỂ TỰ CỨU MÌNH ?

- Phương cách tốt nhất là đừng để bị thương tích. Trốn ngay trước khi trận chiến mở màn.
- Nếu chạm súng với Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh, buông ngay khí giới để tránh bị tiêu diệt. Nếu bị bắt, các bạn sẽ được cung cấp lương thực, quần áo, nơi ăn chốn ở và thuốc men cần thiết.
- Trong trường hợp bị thương, cố lết ra nằm nơi trống trải để Quân Đội VNCH và Đồng Minh có thể tìm thấy bạn mà giúp đỡ cứu chữa cấp thời. Các bạn sẽ được đưa ngay đến bệnh viện để bác sĩ điều trị. Khi bị bắt đừng sợ gì cả. Các bạn nhất định sẽ được đối xử tử tế và điều quý giá hơn hết là **BẠN ĐÃ TỰ CỨU ĐƯỢC TÍNH MẠNG CỦA MÌNH.**

3660

WHY? "Why did this young man from North Vietnam come to die here, outside the mud wall of a lonely outpost in Ba Long? His place should have been at his home, in his farm, where his labor is needed to help feed his compatriots in the North....Perhaps at the last minute he saw the truth, but it was too late, the Labor Party has already "spent" him like an expendable item for its bid to take over South Vietnam." (reverse) You can avoid this fate. Watch for your safe conduct pass and directions to cross the lines to the protection of the GVN....

Another such leaflet that must have had an impact, showed a close-up of the battered head of a high-ranking identified Communist officer: "Major General Tran Do was killed...in Cholon while he was personally commanding the 'general offensive' against Saigon and other cities in South Vietnam during the recent Tet holiday." The writers of this leaflet did not fail to note that the deceased general was "personally" leading his troops; no denigration here of enemy courage.<sup>974</sup> However, by 1967, according to at least one authority, this line was becoming played out and such appeals were boomeranging; many Hoi Chanh (Chieu Hoi ralliers) felt that the Americans were gloating over the deaths of their compatriots, and that "brotherly love" was proving to be a more effective theme than "rally, or die like this."<sup>975</sup>

U.S. PSYOPs also played upon the Vietnamese peoples' inveterate desire to be buried properly, in their home villages.

IS THIS A GRAVE? Unfortunately, it is not. But it is the final resting place, many, many kilometers from the graves of his ancestors, for this young North Vietnamese Soldier.....<sup>976</sup>

The First Infantry Division's G-5 staff used "Wandering Soul" broadcasts of eerie sounds intended to "represent the souls of enemy dead who have not found peace." (i.e. by being buried in the village family plot.) Communist troops, of course, knew perfectly well that the sounds were coming from a tape recorder on an enemy helicopter, but the idea was that the sounds would at least get a Communist soldier to think about where his soul would rest in the likely event of his being killed far from home.<sup>977</sup>

The "nostalgia" theme seemed to enjoy great success. The First Infantry Division's G-5 broadcast a "family appeal" designed to make the enemy think of home and family. This leaflet, addressed to the VC, depicted a lissome Vietnamese beauty amid a traditional Vietnamese landscape, and carried this plaintive message from her husband: "Take a husband, my love....Don't delay for the fires here in the South

<sup>974</sup>Ibid., 102.

<sup>975</sup>Chandler, 48; Johnson, 24-25.

<sup>976</sup>USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection."

<sup>977</sup>PSYOP-POLWAR News letter, 30 November 1969.

LEAFLET TRANSLATION

LEAFLET THEME:

LEAFLET NUMBER: .3

LANGUAGE: VIETNAMESE

SIZE: 6 x 3

PAPER WT: 20 lb

DISSEMINATION:  $V_0 - 2.5$ ;  $R_T \sqrt{T_0} - 1.11$

FRONT:

(Photo of dead NVA soldier)


BACK:

IS THIS A GRAVE?

Unfortunately it is not. But it is this soldier's final resting place, many kilometers from the graves of ancestors. His body cannot be identified, his grave cannot be marked, and his soul will never find rest. You avoid this fate, pick up a Safe Conduct Pass and cross to the safety of the Government of His Majesty the King

**ĐÂY CÓ PHẢI LÀ  
NĂM MỒ KHÔNG?**

Bất hạnh thay, đó không phải là năm mồ. Nhưng đó là nơi an nghỉ cuối cùng của người chiến sĩ ở một nơi cách xa phạm mộ tổ tiên rất nhiều cây sô. Không thể nhận diện được thi thể năm mồ" không bia và linh hồn chiến sĩ đó không bao giờ được yên nghỉ? Bạn có thể tránh khỏi tình trạng này. Hãy nhặt một tờ giấy thông hành và bước sang nơi an ninh của chính phủ Hoàng Gia.



**ĐÂY  
CÓ PHẢI  
LÀ  
NĂM MỒ  
KHÔNG ?**

"Gory" leaflet. "Is This a Grave?"

LEAFLET THEME: B-52 Air Interdiction

LEAFLET NUMBER: 4-75-70

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

PAPER WT: 20 lb

DISSEMINATION DATA:  $V_0 - 2.5$ ;  $R_T/\sqrt{T_0} - 1.11$

SIZE: 3 x 6

FRONT:

Illustration: B-52 Flying Fortress

Caption: This is the B-52 evil genius, a constant threat to you.

BACK:


Dear NVN Communist Cadre,

On your supply routes into the south, you have surely heard a lot about the terrible death and destruction of the B-52 evil genius.

The B-52 evil genius is capable of carrying many different kinds of bombs. It usually flies at an altitude of more than 10 Km., so that you can neither hear nor see it.

Unmarked graves on both sides of the road are the consequences of bombing by the B-52 evil genius. Therefore, whenever the NVN Communists make you move supplies into the South, you will be bombed. Do you still hope to escape the angel of death and return to your families?

You had better find a way to escape and save your lives. The GVN will welcome you with open arms.



ĐÂY LÀ  
 HUNG THẦN B.52.  
 THƯỜNG DE ĐOÀ  
 CÁC BẠN



4-75-(70)

Hỡi các bạn cán binh trong hàng ngũ Cộng Sản Bắc Việt!  
 Trên đường di chuyển vật liệu tiếp tế vào Nam, chắc hẳn các bạn đã nghe nói nhiều về sự tàn phá kinh khủng của hung thần B.52 từ bấy lâu nay.  
 Hung thần B.52 là loại máy bay có sức chứa đựng nhiều bom nhất trong các loại. Nó thường bay cao trên 10 cây số, không thể thấy và nghe được tiếng động cơ.  
 Những đám mồ vô chủ hoang vắng hai bên lề đường là hậu quả đau thương sau những cuộc dội bom của hung thần B.52. Bởi vậy ngày nào Cộng Sản Bắc Việt còn tiếp tục bắt buộc các bạn di chuyển dụng cụ tiếp tế vào Nam, ngày ấy các bạn sẽ vẫn còn bị ném bom. Liệu các bạn còn có hy vọng thoát được tử thần để trở về với gia đình không?  
 Các bạn nên sớm lo lấy một lối thoát để tự cứu lấy tánh mạng. Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa sẽ chào đón các bạn với vòng tay rộng mở.

4-75-(70)

burn fiercely. My arms are torn from my body and with my life's blood I write this last plea...." Some could wax almost poetic:

As I stop hère, my heart is full of sorrows longing for the North. I miss the village bamboo[.] I miss the old banyan tree by the deserted pagoda. I miss the small lentil pond on which blows the cold wind. I miss the high dike on which herdsmen walk slowly in the fading evening beams.... I wonder when I will ever be able to stand again on the high dike and let my soul vibrate along with the kite-flute, up high in the sky.

or:

In my village there is rice and mulberry. There are flocks of white storks and flirting women[!]. There is a banyan tree and a temple roof....Sad, oh how sad!....In the long night, the rhythmic sound of hammock brings back lullabies from the distant past.

or:

My village lies beside the river bank, the red earth path borders the blue water....The people of my village are kind, like potatoes with manioc, like coconut with areca....The people are not rich, but they are not covetous of wealth. At the evening market, a date is made to take the ferry. Village boys and village girls cross the river....

Such respectful descriptions of an enemy country was in sharp contrast, of course, to Communist propaganda, which depicted the RVN as an exploited, debauched "colony" of the United States, while the latter was itself a land of economic and racial repression, crime and violence (although somewhat redeemed by "progressive" opinion in this capitalist hellhole opposing the "immoral, unjust" war.)<sup>978</sup>

A new theme was the offer of money-for-defectors or for weapons. One such leaflet promised as much as the equivalent of US\$20,000 for any enemy infantry company that defected with its commander, political officer, platoon leader and at least 80 percent of its men. Another listed a price scale offered for weapons turned in by defectors.<sup>979</sup> In at least one case 4<sup>th</sup> POG personnel could not resist using a phrase of the 1960's as they urged their enemy to "Make Love, Not War."

The impact of these leaflets was often heightened by the speedy reproduction of photocopies of actual letters or diaries from VC or North Vietnamese troops, often

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<sup>978</sup>Representative leaflets from USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection." These themes and concepts are also well covered in Chandler, 44-94.

<sup>979</sup>Johnson, 22; "4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group, After Action Report, 1968," n.p.



LEAFLET THEME: Inducing Deceit

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

SIZE 3 x 6

PAPER WT

FRONT:

You should Return to your native Village

BACK:

Make a Decision for Your own destiny.

NVA cadre and troops.

Ask yourself, how many of your comrades who have gone to the South ever returned to their families in the North? Only a very small number have ever returned to the North. Most of them were killed on the infiltration routes or on battle areas in the South.

The SVN population does not need to be liberated. Unless you act now, your family may never see you again. Consider your situation carefully. Do not die needlessly. Slip away from your unit as soon as possible and make your way back to the North to your family.



NÊN TRỞ VỀ VỚI QUÊ HƯƠNG VÀ GIA ĐÌNH

## HÃY QUYẾT ĐỊNH LẤY SỞ PHẬN CỦA MÌNH !

Các bạn cán binh trong Bộ-đội Bắc Việt !

.241

Các bạn hãy tự hỏi có bao giờ các bạn trông thấy đồng đội vào Nam trước đây được trở về Bắc với gia đình không? Từ trước đến nay chỉ có một số rất ít được trở về Bắc, còn thì đa số đã bỏ xác nơi chiến địa, trên đường xâm nhập Miền Nam rồi.

Đồng bào Miền Nam không cần ai giải phóng cả ! Nếu các bạn không quyết định ngay, chắc chân gia đình sẽ không thể gặp lại các bạn được. Hãy suy gẫm về thực trạng của các bạn và đứng chịu chết một cách vô ích. Hãy bí mật rời bỏ đơn vị càng sớm càng tốt và tìm đường trở về Bắc để xum họp với gia đình.

"Homesickness" leaflet. "You should Return to your native Village."

with their photos, and who were now dead or defected.

Below is an excerpt from a letter by Pham Dong to his wife Nguyen Thi Yen....For two years now I have been waiting in vain for news from you and father too...I feel very worried...., etc.

Like your comrade Pham Loc, you all long to be able to return to your families after having been sent to fight for days on end and undergoing all kinds of hardships....

I am Nguyen Minh Tri, former guerrilla of Chanh Phu Hoa Village. I rallied on 17 Oct 67 and came back home to get my wife and child on 19 Oct 67. Now I am living a happy life with my family, thanks to the help of the GVN....

The now-ubiquitous photo-copying machine made it possible quickly and cheaply to copy such writings and photos. One such quick-and-cheap leaflet shows a young VC soldier in a jeep holding a soft drink can:

I am Pham Hoang Chinh, a member of the 5th Co, 5th Bn, 308th NVA Div. I rallied to the Allied forces on April 1, 1971. I was warmly welcomed. I ask all of you to rally to the GVN for a peaceful and happy life.

Some could wax poetic in their misery: According to "Aspirant Platoon Leader Hguyen Huy Nam of C5-D2":

What sorrowful sentiment we feel in our hearts!  
Seeing the war going on endlessly!  
All over the country are devastation and mourning!  
How many of our northern and southern compatriots are left helpless!

The theme of "Our Overwhelming Might" also was not neglected.

Members of the NVA, Gunships and artillery will hit your positions....The darkness of the jungle will no longer hide you. Our electronic devices will detect and locate your positions at any time, day or night....Gunships, artillery, and air strikes will continuously hit your positions if you choose to remain in this area.


One such leaflet was noteworthy for boldly inviting enemy units to "please inspect your unit to see if it is in full strength. You will realize immediately who has won and



Đảng thì vung-phí tiền của đồng-bào vào một cuộc chiến-tranh tuyệt-vọng. Khi chiến-tranh còn tiếp-diễn, sẽ chẳng có gì mấy để mua. Chiến-tranh thì tàn-phá quê-hương đồng-bào. Tiền đồng-bào để dành sẽ trở nên vô-giá. 4510

“Currency” leaflet, guaranteed to get attention. It also illustrates the civilian focus of so much of US PSYOP in Vietnam.

Hãy coi chừng  
một cuộc cải tiến  
tệ nữa. Các bạn  
có thể mất tất cả  
tài sản, công  
lao mồ hôi nước  
mắt của bạn. 4540



who has been defeated."

Some leaflets also contrasted the rich life in the South with that of communist propaganda about "landless peasants," "exploited proletarians," groaning under the repression of the American "imperialists" and their "puppet" Saigon regime. Several simply showed, in full color, a marketplace in a RVN city. This theme perhaps should have been even more exploited, in that Communist troops could see for themselves that conditions in the RVN were not as ghastly as depicted by their cadres; after all, the communists emphasized Dialectical Materialism.<sup>980</sup>

Finally, U.S. PSYOP brought back the "bomber" leaflet of World War II in the Pacific. This time, in place of a B-29, was the intercontinental B-52 strategic jet bomber and the target was troops in the field, not city dwellers. But the message was basically the same: "This weapon is deadly and there is nothing you can do about it, except give up."

#### YOU WILL NEVER SEE ONE OF THESE

And you probably won't hear it. It is a B-52 bomber, used by the South Vietnamese people's powerful American allies to blast aggressors out of their hiding places. One B-52 carries 29700 kilos of bombs and can drop them with pin-point accuracy, dealing certain death to everything within the target area. The B-52 can strike you at any time during all seasons and weather conditions.

Your chance to avoid this fate will come. Look for your safe-conduct pass.

(A scrawled note on the translation sheet of this leaflet warns "Not to be used in Laos -per order the Amb[assador].") The bombing of Laos was a secret at the highest political levels.) At least on the basis of surviving examples of U.S. military PSYOP, the above examples are fairly typical. The PSYOP unit attached to Special Forces Detachment B-43 at Chi Lang added its own twist: Almost immediately after the B-52 raid, a C-47 transport followed up with a leaflet drop just to let the survivors know what had hit them.

The B-52 theme was also used on Safe Conduct pass leaflets:

This is the mighty B-52. Now you have experienced the terrible rain of death and destruction its bombs have caused....Your area

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<sup>980</sup>Examples found in USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection" and JUSPAO binders. "Inspect your unit" leaflet in 4th POG After-Action Report for 1968. (no pagination). Letters written by homesick troops of the elite Quyet Thang (Resolved to Win) Regiment are bound in "A Return to Human Nature" typescript, n.d., USASOC History Archives. Although probably most effective, few examples of photo copies of diaries with photos of the author are rare. Some examples of the "good life" in the ARVN can be found in JUSPAO binders.

will be struck high to be seen or heard....Leave this place to save your lives. Use this again and again, but you will not know when or where. The planes fly too leaflet or the GVN National Safe Conduct Pass and rally to the nearest government outpost....

Again, however, the prime aim of this leaflet campaign was not to induce desertions. The goals, as officially given, were to: reinforce fear of the bomber, lower enemy morale, create friction between cadre and troops, encourage malingering, desertion, create a "spoiling effect of impending enemy operations" and (and only then) defection.<sup>981</sup>

Responding to the fears of potential defectors that their families in VC-controlled territory might face reprisals U.S. the 4<sup>th</sup> POG ran a successful program of inducing such families to leave their dangerous areas and allow themselves to be resettled by the Chieu Hoi authorities:

**YOUR FAMILY IS IN DANGER IF IT IS LIVING IN VIET CONG-CONTROLLED TERRITORY!!!** As the war rages over these areas there is no way of protecting your children, women, and elders. **BUT THEY CAN BE MADE SAFE.** Move them into free government-controlled territory....

Such arguments also served as a roundabout way of helping to deny civilian support to the VC and to demonstrate Allied humanitarian sensibilities.<sup>982</sup>

Finally, most of these themes had the goal as well of disillusioning Communist troops and cadres.<sup>983</sup> One of the better leaflets along these lines pointed out, logically enough:

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<sup>981</sup>Unless otherwise noted, "B-52" leaflets in USASOC Archives, "Vietnam War Collection. A description of the program is in "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," G-1. Goals quote from *ibid.* At least one leaflet referred to the mighty bomber as the "evil genius" of death and destruction. Chandler, 47. See also F. J. Orians, "Psy Ops!," *Green Beret*, 4 (1968) and Watson, *War on the Mind*, 314.

<sup>982</sup>Examples in Chandler, 65 and USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection," JUSPAO binders.

<sup>983</sup>See the JUSPAO *PSYOPs Policy #39* publication, "Viet Cong Cadre Vulnerabilities" (Saigon: 30 June 1967) for a straightforward analysis of the dissensions, suspicions and hierarchical impositions among the supposedly selfless VC cadres, as well as JUSPAO guidance for their exploitation., USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection."

The Party is always advertising: "We've dealt deadly blows on the enemy, or "The enemy is agonizing on his bed, or "We've won, and the enemy is defeated." However, side by side with that, the Party is always repeating like a parrot: "However, the enemy is extremely perfidious, obstinate; he will not drop his dark plot of aggression, etc...." and always concludes: "We have to carry on a long resistance and fight until final victory."....If the enemy is "agonizing on his bed," why are the Communists being harassed on the South Vietnam and Cambodian battlefields, and recently in Laos? THE PARTY'S LOGIC IS PURE AND SIMPLE NONSENSE!<sup>984</sup>

An excellent later example of a "disillusioning" JUSPAO leaflets carried photos of Communist China's Mao Tse-tung and Chou En Lai in their historic meetings with President Nixon. The reaction, particularly among the indoctrinated cadres, to the widely-disseminated spectacle of this "Mad Imperialist," this "Running Dog of Wall Street," this "Mad Bomber" cordially conferring with the "Elder Brothers" of the anti-imperialist forces must have indeed been sobering to the selfless Marxist cadres. ("Who are you fighting now?" "THIS IS WHAT YOU DIDN'T KNOW, BUT IT IS GOOD FOR YOU TO KNOW") To rub in the point, JUSPAO several months later disseminated another leaflet, this time showing Leonid Brezhnev amiably proposing a toast to the same accursed Richard Nixon. ("Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev drinks a toast to US President Richard Nixon after signing the agreement on Strategic Weapons Limitation on May 26, 1972.") A similar line was used as U.S. troops began their withdrawal and peace talks opened in Paris.<sup>985</sup>

As is obvious, many of these themes could overlap. A surrender pass could emphasize nostalgia, or a nostalgia leaflet could point out the terrible killing power of the Allies, or a "gory" leaflet could paint a contrast with the good life in the South, etc. In fact, most leaflets used one or more themes.

Unlike the situation in Korea, JUSPAO saw to it that there was just one official, standard surrender leaflet, which displayed the flags of Allied powers fighting

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<sup>984</sup>Ibid.

<sup>985</sup>Another version showed Nixon and Kissinger sharing a moment of considerable hilarity with their Communist confreres: "President Nixon (second from left) and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai (second from right) share a laugh at the start of their conference Tuesday 22 February 1972 in Peking." Translations and reproductions of both leaflets in USSOC History Archive, "Vietnam War Collection." Brezhnev leaflet in JUSPAO binder, No. III of III. See also J. C. Wise, "Coordinated Litterbugging," *Armor*, May-June 1971"; W. Draper, "Flying Litterbugs Lure VC Defectors - PSYOPS Aids Chieu Hoi," *Air Force Times*, 18 September 1968; C. A. Bain, "A Carrott or a Stick for Charlie," *Army*, April 1968; M. R. Bullard, "POLWAR in Vietnam," *Military Review*, October 1969.

LEAFLET TRANSLATION

LEAFLET THEME: President Nixon Meets with PRC Leaders

LEAFLET NUMBER: 4486

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

SIZE: 6 x 3

DISSEMINATION: Vo 2.5 RTTO 1.11

PAPER WEIGHT: 20 lb

SIDE I (Photo: Nixon and advisors meet with Chou En-lai and advisors across the conference table in Peking. Caption reads:)

President Nixon (second from left) and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai (second from right) share a laugh at the start of their conference Tuesday 22 February 1972 in Peking.

SIDE II (Photo of the Nixons and Chou En-lai at the Grand Reception in Honor of U. S. President and Mrs. Nixon. Caption reads:)

U. S. President and Mrs. Nixon at a banquet given by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Peking on Monday night 21 February 1972. The Chinese Premier is standing between the President and Mrs. Nixon.

....and they all seem to be enjoying each other's company.

### Cuộc hội nghị Mỹ — Trung Cộng tại Bắc-Kinh




Tổng Thống Hoa Kỳ Nixon (thứ hai bên tay trái) và Thủ Tướng Trung Cộng Chu Ân Lai (thứ hai bên tay phải) đang vui vẻ cười với nhau khi bắt đầu cuộc hội nghị tại Bắc Kinh ngày thứ Ba 22 tháng 2 năm 1972

4486

### Đại Yến đón mừng Tổng Thống Hoa Kỳ Nixon và Phu Nhân

Tổng Thống Hoa Kỳ Nixon và Phu Nhân dự tiệc do Thủ Tướng Chu Ân Lai khoản đãi tại Bắc Kinh tối thứ Hai 21 tháng 2 năm 1972. Họ Chu đứng giữa Tổng Thống Nixon và Phu Nhân.

4486





LEAFLET TRANSLATION

**THEME:** While the U. S. and PRC are talking of Peace in Peking, the Lao Dong Party still wants war Vietnamese

**LEAFLET NUMBER:** 4488

**AGE:**

**SIZE:** 6 x 3

**MINIATION:** Vo 2.5 RTTO 1.11

**PAPER WEIGHT:** 20 lb

**I**  
(Photo of President Nixon shaking hands with Chairman Mao Tse-tung titled "an Historic Meeting." Caption reads:)

Chinese Communist Chairman, Mao Tse Tung, receives U. S. President Nixon in Peking. The two Chiefs of State exchange a friendly handshake at the meeting in Mao's palace on 21 February 1972.

**II**

**THIS IS WHAT YOU DIDN'T KNOW,  
BUT IT IS GOOD FOR YOU TO KNOW**

**NVA BROTHERS!**

A passage in the U. S. - PRC joint communique released in Shanghai on February 27, 1972 reads:

- " - With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:
- " - Both wished to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
- " - Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia - Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."

**NVN BROTHERS!**

Through this you'll see that it is useless, even foolish to continue to fight and die for the Lao Dong Party's "final victory" when both the U. S. and the PRC want PEACE.

## TAY BÁT, MẶT MỪNG

Mao Trạch Đông, Chủ tịch  
Cộng Đảng Trung Hoa  
thân mật bắt tay chào  
mừng Tổng Thống Hoa Kỳ  
Nixon khi đôi bên gặp  
nhau trong buổi tiếp kiến  
tại tư dinh họ Mao ở Bắc  
Kinh ngày 21 tháng 2 năm  
1972

4488



## BẠN KHÔNG BIẾT ĐIỀU NÀY, NHƯNG BIẾT ĐƯỢC THÌ TỐT

**ANH EM BỘ ĐỘI BẮC VIỆT !**

Một đoạn văn trong bản thông cáo chung Mỹ-Hoa được công bố tại Thượng Hải ngày 27 tháng 2 năm 1972 viết như sau :

« Trong những nguyên tắc bang giao quốc tế này, cả hai bên tuyên bố rằng :

— Xúc tiến việc bình thường hóa bang giao giữa Trung Quốc và Hoa Kỳ phù hợp với quyền lợi của mọi quốc gia ;

— Cả hai quốc gia đều mong muốn giảm thiểu hiểm họa của các cuộc tranh chấp quân sự quốc tế ;

— Không một quốc gia nào được tìm cách thống trị vùng Á Châu — Thái Bình Dương và mỗi quốc gia (Hoa Kỳ và Trung Quốc) đều chống lại mọi nỗ lực của bất cứ quốc gia nào hay nhóm quốc gia nào để thiết lập quyền thống trị này ».

**ANH EM BỘ ĐỘI BẮC VIỆT !**

Qua đoạn văn trên tất nhiên các bạn sẽ thấy rằng thật là vô ích và điên rồ nếu cứ tiếp tục chiến đấu và chết cho chiêu bài « chiến thắng cuối cùng » của Đảng khi cả Hoa Kỳ lẫn Cộng Hòa Nhân Dân Trung Quốc đều mong muốn có HÒA BÌNH.

4488

The "Mad Bomber" (Richard Nixon) greets the "Elder Brother" (Mao Tse Tung).

in Vietnam, the flag of South Vietnam, and a happy defector/returnee being welcomed by an ARVN soldier. But, as in other wars, the U.S. surrender pass gained such credibility that a campaign had to be mounted to reassure the enemy that he was not required to carry such a leaflet to receive good treatment.<sup>986</sup>

A few U.S. leaflets were poorly thought-out. In addition to the short-lived "sex" effort there was a "gory" leaflet of 1966, featuring an enemy corpse and the Ace of Spades as an omen of death. The leaflets were well-executed, but had only one drawback -- the Vietnamese did not include the ace of spades in their card decks. Despite a JUSPAO directive actually forbidding the use of this symbol, U.S. forces took it up again, in 1971. This mistake was undoubtedly a reflection of the one-year tour-of-duty personnel turnover that made continuity of almost any U.S. project in Vietnam most difficult.<sup>987</sup> Another failure, for obvious reasons, was

If you do not rally, we will kill you to the last man. We really don't care whether you rally or not; we are quite willing to accommodate your desire for death by killing you.

The response to this effort was probably the Vietnamese version of "drop dead."<sup>988</sup> Another showed a massive U.S. tank crushing scurrying VC soldiers, or blasting them with fire from its anthropomorphic mouth.

Viet Cong beware! There is nowhere to run, nowhere to hide. The tanks and armored vehicles of the Blackhorse Regiment will find and destroy you!

Another leaflet caricatured VC as "Sad Sacks" about to be blown away by giant artillery.<sup>989</sup> And another JUSPAO tactical PSYOP program, drawn up to convince Vietnamese civilians that defoliation was accomplished by completely benign chemical agents, reads as unconvincingly today as it did in 1967.<sup>990</sup> But these were exceptions.

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<sup>986</sup>Chandler, 73.

<sup>987</sup>Ibid., 48; JUSPAO Field Memorandum No. 36, "The Use of Superstition in Psychological Operations in Vietnam," 10 May 1967, in "Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 23 thru 46: Compiled Oct. 1, 1967," USASOC History Archives. D. M. McElroy, "PSYOP -- The Ultimate Battlefield," *Military Intelligence* (July-September 1990).

<sup>988</sup>From JUSPAO *Communicating with Vietnamese Through Leaflets* (Saigon: November 1968), 33; quoted in P. Katz, "Psyop and Communication Theory," *Art and Science*, vol. 1, p. 34. See also example described in Johnson in which a photo of a heap of VC corpses carried the leGeneral, "The Viet Cong Are Always Welcome in Town -- Come Back Anytime," *Gulf Paper War*, 23.

<sup>989</sup>Chandler, 231, 234.

<sup>990</sup>JUSPAO Field Memorandum No. 31, "Psyop Aspects of Defoliation," 25 February

In fact, one authority claims that after 1966, there were few "bad" leaflets; any such efforts were likely to be picked up by "quality control" at some level of JUSPAO or the military.<sup>991</sup> Another authority maintained that "On the whole, it is clear that the armed forces generally followed the JUSPAO directives very closely in preparing communications for both enemy and non-enemy targets."<sup>992</sup>

All but a few specialized U.S. PSYOP leaflets in Vietnam were written by Vietnamese nationals, although JUSPAO or other U.S. authorities often suggested the themes. The leaflet formats were then checked by both U.S. and Vietnamese PSYOP officers for three basic criteria: 1) Does it follow present policy guidance, 2) Is it credible and culturally acceptable?, and 3) Is it grammatically correct and understandable? The final testing, whenever possible, was with hoi chan, POWs or civilians who most closely approximated the target audience.<sup>993</sup> There is good evidence that the system did keep U.S. leaflets consistent with each other and consonant with JUSPAO guidance.<sup>994</sup>

Although U.S. loudspeaker operations followed fairly closely those themes used in World War II and Korea, new approaches had to be introduced to deal with a situation in which civilians and the enemy were seemingly inextricably intertwined. The new messages concentrated upon the burdens heaped by the VC on the people:

You had to work very hard to get rice and money. If you report to the ARVN and Allied forces when the VC come to collect taxes, the GVN troops and Allied forces will come to chase the VC cadre from your area.

(Chasing away tax collectors must have proven a popular message -- on both sides!)

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1967.

<sup>991</sup>Latimer, 46. But another study concluded that even after 1966, "The Vietnamese argue that the leaflets are written in literary Vietnamese, rather than [in] the peasant's vocabulary." (as in Korea), but conceded that "On the other hand, the traditional figures of speech and folk tales couched in the language of the countryside are conducive to communication of a favorable view of GVN perception and interest.", Janice H. Hopper, "Leaflet Operations, Vietnam: An Analysis," in *Report of the ARPA-Supported Committee on Psychological Operations Vietnam, 1967*, Kenneth R. Clark, Chairman (McLean, Virginia: Human Sciences Research: 12 November 1967), Chandler, 243.

<sup>992</sup>Ibid., 230.

<sup>993</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, briefing (n.d.), RG 472, U.S. Army in Vietnam, Psywar and CA, box 1, "4<sup>th</sup> POG" folder; Army Regulation No. 515-5, 20 November 1968, "Psychological Operations: Pretesting, Post-Testing, Evaluation and Review/Critique Procedures for Propaganda," *ibid.*, box 17, "4<sup>th</sup> POG S-1" folder.

<sup>994</sup>Hopper, "Leaflet Operations, Vietnam," D-6, quoted in Chandler, 228.

Don't quietly watch the VC injure innocent citizens and destroy property....Report VC mines and booby traps to the GVN or Allied soldiers. Your identity will be kept secret.

The Phung Hoang ("Phoenix") program was also a theme unique to this war:

You should energetically support this campaign by reporting all information about the VC and their arms or food caches. You will be generously rewarded and your name will be kept secret.

Enemy troops were warned "If you continue to resist against [sic] the legal government which was elected by South Vietnamese people you will surely be annihilated." More positively, they were advised that

We know that you are trying to evacuate your sick and wounded. You know that you do not have the medical facilities to help these people. Why not save your life and at the same time get the care that your people really need? You can do this by rallying to the GVN.

Such "rallying" was simple enough:

Hide your weapon where you can find it later for a reward. Report to any GVN or Allied unit during daylight hours. Shout "Chieu Hoi" as you walk in. You will be warmly welcomed and treated well.

The alternative?

Your leaders have planned a new offensive....Once again you have to confront the awesome strength and the strong firepower of the Allied forces....Death is following you day and night....Do you want to get out of this living hell?<sup>995</sup>

The 4<sup>th</sup> POG also disseminated a number of apparently effective journals for both civilians and enemy troops. Among these were a daily two-page news summary *Tim Chien Troung* ("News From the Front"), and *Kanh Hoa*, a single-page news update distributed during field operations.<sup>996</sup>

And, as in Korea, loudspeaker teams were exposed to close-in enemy fire. On

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<sup>995</sup>Loudspeaker scripts, with translations, in USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection." See also ICTZ, *Taped Propaganda Catalog* (Combined Psychological Operations Center, 7th PSYOP Battalion [Okinawa]: July 1970.

<sup>996</sup>Yaeger, 16.

one occasion, a Loudspeaker Combat Team attached to the Americal Division, engaged in a 30-minute fire fight with VC guerrillas, with the enemy breaking contact only at the appearance of an Allied helicopter. The unharmed team must have drawn blood: "a search of the area revealed (1) VC KIA with an SKS rifle, and a blood trail which led away from the area." Two months later, one trooper from the 79<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion was killed and three wounded in a VC ambush. In all, 11 U.S. Army PSYOP soldiers were killed in action.<sup>997</sup>

Earlier, a loudspeaker operation in support of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Brigade operation of May, 1967 in II CTZ saw heavy enemy fire destroy several 19<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Company loudspeakers set up outside an enemy-occupied village. SSG Pedro A. Cruz, who just the day before had been awarded the Purple Heart for wounds received in a previous action, ran back under enemy fire to set up the speakers again. SSG Cruz succeeded in re-mounting the speakers and tape deck, but a "tremendous fire" directed toward the speakers then killed the intrepid soldier.<sup>998</sup>

This being Vietnam, even rear-echelon troops were not particularly safe, at least until the crushing of the 1968 Tet offensive. On 4 December 1966, 6<sup>th</sup> Battalion headquarters in Saigon was severely damaged by an enemy bomb blast, although only a few personnel were injured. Four months later, the headquarters of the 19<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Company was also bombed, an attack that, again, resulted in no fatalities.<sup>999</sup>

One leaflet operation, in April of 1969, further illustrated the dangers but also the opportunities of on-the-ground loudspeaker operations in a combat zone. PSYOP troops attached to the 11<sup>th</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment came under fire from a large number of enemy soldiers in a bunker complex. Accompanying the infantry, the PSYOP troops observed a white flag over one bunker. The attached ARVN interpreter rushed to the bunker opening with a bullhorn and talked three enemy troops into surrendering, while the team leader and NCO kept friendly troops from firing on the bunker. The remaining troops inside the bunker refused to come out. The interpreter tried again and after 20 minutes warned that the bunker would be blown up. After one minute the remaining three enemy emerged. The PSYOP interpreter walked one of the surrenderees back into the bunker and found many small arms and rocket-propelled grenade rounds, ready to fire.<sup>1000</sup>

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<sup>997</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, "Monthly Operations Reports for April, June 1969," USASOC Historical Archives, "Vietnam War Collection"; Yaeger 17. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG Commander gave the figure of seven U.S. Army PSYOP killed in action and two killed in aircraft crashes as of late 1969. ltr, 4<sup>th</sup> POG Commander to 2d POG Commander, 14 November 1969, USASOC Archives.

<sup>998</sup>"Honor Role for Psywarriors," 10 June 1967, *Psy Observer*, in "The 6<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion," n.p., n.d.,

<sup>999</sup>6<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion "Observer," 1 January 1967; *ibid.*, 5 May 1967

<sup>1000</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, Monthly Operations Report for April 1969, 5. The team leader and the interpreter were recommended for the Bronze Star with "V" device for this action. An almost identical success had been scored in September of 1967 when loudspeaker

In addition to leaflets and loudspeakers, U.S. PSYOP forces in Vietnam employed a few techniques that, as in the Korean War, could be said to have been "bordering on the bizarre." One of the more notorious was "PSYOP Soft Soap," 25,000 bars of Japanese-made, strongly-scented bars of soap, each containing seven successive differing Chieu Hoi messages.<sup>1001</sup> Another was the projection of PSYOP messages on clouds, buildings, mountains, etc. by use of giant 85mm slide projectors. (To what effect has never been determined.) Then there was "Operation Tintinnabulation," which featured two C-47 "Spooky" gun-ships with mounted "Gabby" loudspeakers. During the first phase, "Gabby" used pulsating noisemakers to harass and confuse the enemy during the night, while "Spooky" provided air cover. The second phase saw the harassing continued, plus the playing of Chieu Hoi taped messages. The missions were also designed to lessen the security the enemy felt during the night. Improbable as it may seem, the mission claimed that one operation of 24 missions trebled defectors in one area from 120 per month to 380. A PSYOP unit attached to Army Special Forces Detachment B-43 played Buddhist funeral music that supposedly "scares the hell out of them." (presumably enemy troops, not civilians).<sup>1002</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> POG also dabbled in astrology, publicizing the works of the 14<sup>th</sup> century Vietnamese astrologer Trinh Trinh and other prognosticators whose writings could be interpreted as foretelling good news for the Allies in the coming year. A former 4<sup>th</sup> POG Commander, denounced such "gimmickry" as "not good PSYOPS," but explained their prevalence on frustration caused "by the lack of signs of tangible success in the PSYOP program."<sup>1003</sup>

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Team #9 of the 244<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Company, attached to the 3d Brigade, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, garnered an entire VC squad. The team was called upon when the heavily-armed enemy squad had been chased into a tunnel complex north of Duc Pho. The loudspeaker team was called upon which, through the Vietnamese interpreter, told the VC squad that it would be wiped out by the waiting troops. When the time limit had expired, one VC emerged from the tunnel. Seeing that he was not harmed, the rest of the nine-man team surrendered, along with their weapons. 6<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion "Observer," 10 September 1967.

<sup>1001</sup>Chandler, 90; Watson, 318; Paul Vivian, "Unsung Heroes: The Deactivation of the 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group," 4<sup>th</sup> POG (Fort Bragg, NC: n.d.), 14; "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations in Vietnam," I-8.

<sup>1002</sup>"Operation Tintinnabulation Meets With Success," *Psyop-POLWAR*, 4, No. 2; Watson, 315. "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," I-3. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG reported an identical mission in 1969, which a Hoi Chanh claimed was "extremely frightening" to himself and his comrades. 4<sup>th</sup> POG "After Action Report - Operation Nui Coto," 1 May 1969.

<sup>1003</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, Operational Report of 4<sup>th</sup> POG, period ending 31 January 1970, (dated 15 February 1970), RG 472, PSYOP and CA Units, 4<sup>th</sup> POG S-3, box 16, "4<sup>th</sup> POG G-3" folder; LTC W. J. Beck, Senior Officer Debriefing Program" report (1969), 12; J. DeGraci, "War of Words," *Green Beret*, 4 (1970).

The operation by the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division in November 1969 was somewhat more straightforward, hounding the enemy in the daytime with Armed Propaganda Teams and loudspeakers to keep awake the VC hidden in the villages and subsequently too drowsy at night to be effective fighters. After dark, helicopters overflew the villages, broadcasting far into the night and for two hours between midnight and 6am, and also playing nostalgic music or eerie sounds to represent unhappy souls of the dead not yet at peace, again, to lower the enemy's alertness. Another of these peculiar operations was "The Wandering Soul," an eerie, primarily nocturnal tape reminding NVA soldiers of the hardships they were enduring and what they had left behind. But in light of the very small number of NVA troopers defecting, it is difficult to determine this tape's effectiveness.<sup>1004</sup>

As in most wars, however, the bulk of the action consisted of the far less spectacular patrolling and small unit combat. Thus U.S. PSYOP personnel in the field in South Vietnam spent their time on the move, advising their Vietnamese counterparts and conducting the down-to-earth propagandizing that seemed the best hope for winning over a primarily peasant people, both civilian and military. As typical as any, were the field activities of the 7<sup>th</sup> Battalion's advisor to the ARVN Lam Son Armed Propaganda Company in September 1968 during Operation DAN TAM:

18 Sep 68

The morning was spent in An Gia, Than Binh, and Phu Le hamlets in distributing leaflets. [e.g. letters written by Hoi Chanhs, rewards for information on Communist leader's whereabouts, denounce VC Cadre Campaign.] A project was also undertaken to remove all VC propaganda written on walls. Examples: Towards PF forces - "Why don't you take the American weapons given you, turn them against them (American) and join us.".... "Take the blood of the Americans to wash the pride of our country." These slogans were painted over and replaced by various Chieu Hoi appeals. Examples:

"Chieu Hoi is the road to a new life."

"More humanity and less vengeance."

"Rally and return to those you love."

During the afternoon the teams began a survey to establish the feelings of the families concerning the VC, RVN and the Americans. If they sympathized with the VC, why? An explanation of the Chieu Hoi program was given during the survey.

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<sup>1004</sup>Watson, *War on the Mind*, 315-316. See also JUSPAO Field Memorandum No. 36 "The Use of Superstitions in Psychological Operations in Vietnam," 10 May 1967, in "Consolidation of JUSAPO Guidances 23 Thru 46, Compiled Oct. 1, 1967"; Yaeger, 17.

At 1900 hours the combat loudspeaker team from Da Nang, SGT Hien, one armed propaganda team and LT Mazur held a meeting in An Gia hamlet. The Village Chief, Hamlet Chief and members of the local PF attended....

19 Sep 68

The Armed Propaganda Team was active in restoring a well that was damaged by a storm on 4 Sep 68, in Phu Le Hamlet.

A continuation in all three hamlets of acquiring general feelings of village on issues stated before. From 1930 to 2100 hours, an armed Propaganda Team in Thu Le broadcast at the southern tip of the hamlet, directed towards a suspected nine-man VC force that had moved into the area....The broadcast was followed by approximately one-half hour of music.

20 Sep 68

COL Chuyen spoke of his dealings with the VC, the life he led with them compared to the life he is leading at the present time. The feeling he has, to be able to work with the Armed Propaganda Team program. To show the people the true side of the VC and to show the people how to combat them in their own way....The afternoon was spent in Hue. At the [ARVN] 101<sup>st</sup> POLWAR Company, coordination was made with the G5 of the 1<sup>st</sup> ARVN Division.

21 Sep 68

At 1100 hours, a 10 man team from the 101<sup>st</sup> POLWAR Company arrived from Hue. The team had ground loudspeaker capability as well as a medic.

At 1200 hours, a Combat Loudspeaker team (SP4 Palmer, SP4 Brown) arrived as replacements, for team losses.

At 1300 hours, the team from the 101<sup>st</sup> POLWAR Company took care of the basic medical needs of the people of the Thu Le Hamlet. At the same time the team passed out leaflets (Chieu Hoi letters - Rewards for information on VC Cadre).

The teams in the three hamlets began wrapping up the family surveys. During these and all surveys, PSYOPS was incorporated. If any one family showed any VC sympathy, the armed propaganda member would ask questions as to VC activities during Tet, whether they lived in their houses, ate their food, etc.. In this way they tried to determine their sentiments and attempted to change the attitudes of the people



from pro-VC to anti-VC....

In the area of civic action, the teams in An Gia and Thanh Binh assisted the people in repairing roofs which had been damaged by a storm.....

23 Sep 68

The first Hoi Chanh as a direct result of our operation rallied (Nguyen Cu, from Nien Pho hamlet which is just to the south of us). From what he told us, his sister who lives in Phu Le more or less convinced him to rally. He also gave a lot of information concerning the VC (fifteen people) who live in and around Quang Ninh Village.

24 Sep 68

LT Finch arrived at Sub Sector Headquarters with a speaker chopper for broadcast over our area and the village from which our first Hoi Chanh came from (Quang Ninh)....The broadcast was directed to possible VC and VC families in Quang Ninh village as well as Quang Phuoc. A Chieu Hoi appeal, with the names of recent Hoi Chanh's, and the coming monsoon were used as the theme.....The Village Chief explained some of his needs: basic medical attention, food, clothing and civic action work. This information was given to the District Chief.

25 Sep 68

The team from the 101st POLWAR commenced med cap activities. They set up facilities in a classroom, and treated people as they came in. During the process they also handed out leaflets: "Denounce VC Cadre" and the new "Rewards leaflet".....

Information on five Hoi Chanh's:

Nguyen Trang - Chief Hamlet Economic Section  
Tran Dinh Ninh - Hamlet Chief  
Quang Dau - Chief Hamlet Administrative Section  
Le Cong Tu - Chief Hamlet Administrative Section  
Le Cho - Guerilla

All came from Quang Loo village which lies about two kilometers to the east of our first AO (Quang Phuoc Village). When asked why they rallied, they gave no helpful answers; their attitude was one of defeat and surprise that we should ask such a question (all info available from S-2).

26 Sep 68

At 2000 hours, a meeting (rally) was held on the outskirts of the village, and was attended by the Village Chief and approximately 250 village members. Described VC TET offensive. Termed it as a propaganda effort. The task of the APT. To show the difference between the VC ideology and way of living from that of the free people of RVN. To help the people in any way possible. Spoke about task of the civilian defense group. Their responsibility toward the village, protection from the VC. Unfortunately the meeting was cut short by rain. Information on Hoi Chanh from Thu Le Hamlet (our first AO). Le Thi Be - Nurse. 36 years old. Reasons why rallied: Dissatisfied with VC way of life - tired of hiding and living in caves.

27 Sep 68....A few problems began to crop up. Village chief expressed need for food, clothing, medical and civic action. Basic medical care we can take care of. Although our supplies have all but diminished, resupply seems to be a problem....LT Du and myself will have to inquire about it again....

29 Sep 68

The Armed Propaganda Team spent the day in consolidating their reports. During the period 1900-21 hours, the audio visual team from Danang showed four movies in Quang Phuoc Village, however high winds cut the showings short.....

2 Oct 68

SGT Hien arrived to observe the progress of the operation....Later in the evening SGT Hien talked to the members of the RF Company (113) who provide security for the village headquarters compound. Highlights of his speech: Introduction of himself and the Armed Propaganda Team. Explanation of their work. How they became members of the Armed Propaganda Team. How they lived as VC and how they live now. He talked about the various VC propaganda attempts, and that we must see them for what they really are - last ditch efforts of a dying cause. He praised them for the fine work they are doing and warned them not to be duped by Communist propaganda.

7 Oct 68

The 101<sup>st</sup> POLWAR team again conducted med cap activities in the hamlet of Phu Le treating 200 people. Again in the process leaflets were distributed.

The Cultural Drama Team from Da Nang arrived for a performance in Quang Vinh village. At 1500 hours the team put on a performance at Quang Vinh village Headquarters Compound. The Village Chief, hamlet chiefs and approximately 250

people were present. The program consisted of the singing of songs which expressed the fighting spirit of the Viet Soldier. Also songs expressing the national spirit. The 101<sup>st</sup> POLWAR team conducted med cap activities at Ha Cong hamlet in Quang Phu village treating 200 people.

A guerrilla (female) rallied to us in Phu Le hamlet. She was found to have a bad bullet wound in her mouth. It was suggested that this be used as a PSYOP possibility; that is, to have her wound taken care of, and have a leaflet made up showing her before and after.<sup>1005</sup>

The work load was obviously enormous, and far more involved with everyday civilian life than in any other previous American conflict. In retrospect, it may well be that the job was simply too much for a nation that was not mobilized for all-out war. The marvel is that so much was done in the countryside among civilians and the VC. In all of this, enemy surrenders, although welcome, were secondary to defectors, as far as U.S. PSYOP was concerned; the latter could be used in the Chieu Hoi program, enlisted in the Kit Carson Scouts or could in many other ways prove far more useful than surrenderees sitting about in POW camps.<sup>1006</sup>

Individual VC or NVPA POWs, however, might likely assert that Allied PSYOP played little or no part in their defection, attributing their situation to having been captured by superior force, or having come over due to terrible conditions on the battlefield.<sup>1007</sup> But captured enemy documents tell a different story, exhorting the faithful to be on constant guard against the "deceits" and "tricks" of enemy PSYOP. One such document warned that

These efforts surely influence our troops. If we do not closely control cadre and soldiers' thoughts, we shall face many difficulties. For this is a dangerous, wicked scheme by the enemy....

Only the cadre, with its superior political consciousness, would be permitted to read "these efforts." The troops, even though-horny-handed sons of toil and

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<sup>1005</sup>LT Emil Masur, 7<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion, Annex D (Daily Report) to After Action Report, Operation Dan Tam 2-68, RG 472, box 16, 4th PSYOP S-3 Command Reports, "PSYOP and CA Units" folder. For similar missions see "An Loc-Binh Long Province: PSYOP Getting It All Together," *Credibilis* (October-December 1970).

<sup>1006</sup>HQ, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Kit Carson Scout Summary of Activities," 22 December.

<sup>1007</sup>Harry Latimer warned that North Vietnamese POW should be interrogated within the first few hours after they were captured or defected. After that, their military discipline reasserted itself and they either refused to be interviewed at any length or gave facetious answers., 47-48.

presumably of impeccable proletarian persuasion, were to "tear them up." Occasionally the VC leadership would proclaim that Allied leaflets, like those disseminated in Korea, were literally "poisoned."<sup>1008</sup> Another document, issued to a North Vietnamese division in October 1969 warned of the Allies "cunning plots and maneuver, especially...psychological warfare.", and another cautioned that such propaganda was affecting both high and low-level cadres.<sup>1009</sup>

A top-secret resolution of the Saigon Military Region Committee in 1966 admitted that

Our cadre and soldiers were demoralized. A number of them were influenced by the Chieu Hoi program....We must unmask the enemy's deceitful propaganda

and outlined a counter-propaganda program.<sup>1010</sup> Apparently that program had not worked too well, for the following year the Viet Cong command again called for a counter to the effects of Chieu Hoi, and recommended as well that a study be made of deserters and suicides. As the cadre of Ba Ria Province reported, "We failed to have any clear plans to deal with enemy open arms activities or soldiers who deserted." In the words of another, undated, document:

During the last year there were deserters from all agencies and units, specially before and after each battle. This is an important problem....Many influenced by the Chieu Hoi program....We must train our troops to hate the U.S."<sup>1011</sup>

A VC document of 1966 warned that:

The impact of increased enemy military operations and "Chieu Hoi" programs has, on the whole, resulted in lowering the morale of some ideologically backward men, who often listen to enemy radio broadcasts, keep in their pockets enemy leaflets, and wait to be issued weapons [before going over to the enemy side]. This attitude on their part has generated an atmosphere of doubt and mistrust among our military men.<sup>1012</sup>

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<sup>1008</sup>Youmans interview.

<sup>1009</sup>Katagiri, "A Former PSYOP Group Commander in Vietnam Looks Back," *Art & Science*, vol. 1, 142.

<sup>1010</sup>Chandler, 59-60.

<sup>1011</sup>Watson, 325.(emphasis in original)

<sup>1012</sup>South Vietnam Liberation Army, Tan Uyen District Unit, "Communique," 20 December 1966, quoted in JUSPAO, *PSYOPS in Vietnam: Indications of Effectiveness* (Saigon: May 1967), 21-23.

(This enemy plaint undoubtedly pleased U.S. PSYOP planners, who were very much concerned with generating "an atmosphere of doubt and mistrust" as in garnering defectors.). Still another seized document warned that

defense against psywar is a top priority task....It sews [sic.] among our cadres and soldiers the bad seeds of pleasure-loving, fear of hardship, fear of sacrifice, etc....They dig deep into these erroneous thoughts and try to deface our fighting spirit.<sup>1013</sup>

A monitored broadcast from the National Liberation Front's Liberation Radio bemoaned Allied PSYOP's:

stimulation of a desire for a material, pompous and depraved existence....they also resort to women, money, glory and social position in the puppet regime to poison and eclipse the noble ideal of our cadres and combatants.<sup>1014</sup>

Apparently in some desperation, the VC Political Department called for the drafting of a "thought control" plan to counter "the loss of combat spirit, shirking from duty, self-injury or suicide etc...., more or less caused by psychological warfare and 'Chieu Hoi' activities,"<sup>1015</sup> Such documents have often been dismissed as "anecdotal" or "unrepresentative," but they can be found in abundance and, further, the enemy document has yet to come to light dismissing Allied PSYOP as of no particular consequence. Finally, the extensive use of Armed Propaganda Teams and the Kit Carson Scouts, both composed entirely of defected enemy troops and both armed, should strongly indicate that Allied PSYOP was making broad, if not deep, inroads

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<sup>1013</sup>W. F. Johnston, "Some Thoughts on Psychological Operations," *Art & Science*, vol. 1, 154.

<sup>1014</sup>J-3, MACV, *Psyop-POLWAR News letter*, v, No. 2 (Saigon: 28 February 1969), 12. Copies in USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection." Note that the wording indicates that these nefarious lures have enjoyed some success. In all, it would seem to be an unequal contest. The myth of VC "strong motivation" was mostly a concoction advanced by pro-VC elements in the West who basically felt that any organization fighting the United States had to be doing something right. LT James N. Rowe, a prisoner of the VC for five years, and thus one who knew his enemy quite well from the inside, asserted, that as far as he could tell, only the cadres were motivated; the rank-and-file were conscripts. Rowe oral interview with author, 9 July 1987, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

<sup>1015</sup>South Vietnam Liberation Army Political Department, "Reference Document on Counter Measures Against Enemy Psywar and Chieu Hoi Activity," 1 April 1967. JUSPAO translation, n.d.

into the enemy's forces.<sup>1016</sup> (Conversely, it would be difficult even to imagine the Communists arming and sending back into battle defected U.S. or ARVN troops.)<sup>1017</sup>

Enemy propaganda against U.S. forces was generally characterized by a woeful lack of understanding of their most dangerous enemy and committed most of the mistakes that are often attributed to the "politically naive" Americans. As in Korea, this is the more surprising in that, traditionally, Communist "agitprop" (agitation/propaganda) is often supposed by "experts" and observers to be far more thoroughgoing, far more experienced, than anything put out by the lackadaisical democracies. Indeed, in the words of one authority, everything the VC did, "was an act of communication."<sup>1018</sup> Communist efforts more often than not had problems with the English language, particularly in using everyday phrases. "Up Men! Struggle for Yourselves!" (to end the war) must have provoked nothing but ribald comments amongst GIs. And it would have taken a very politically-aware trooper indeed, to discern who or what was meant by the "Running Dogs of Wall Street," or the "Lickspittals of Monopoly Capitalism."

The writers of most enemy appeals could not resist inserting the usual official

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<sup>1016</sup>For Armed Propaganda Teams and Kit Carson Scouts, see Chandler, 89-90; Latimer, 33; Westmoreland, "Report on Operations in South Vietnam," 238; W. V. Cowan, "Kit Carson Scouts," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1969. *APT Handbook* notes that there were 75 APT companies by 1969, probably their peak strength. In September 1969, there were 2,101 Kit Carson Scouts, with 20 listed as deserted, and 13 as killed in action. Since December of 1967, 201 had been killed in action and 148 had deserted (not necessarily to the enemy), "The Story of the Kit Carson Scouts," MACV? (n.p., n.d.), and "Kit Carson Scout Briefing," (n.p.: 1968); HQ, MACV, memo to MACCORDS-CHD, sub: Kit Carson Scout Summary of Activities [sic], 22 Dec 1969, both in USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection."

<sup>1017</sup>The APTs were only lightly armed as their mission was face-to-face propaganda. "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," I-6. Some Vietnam veterans have insisted that they had seen or heard about on good evidence "salt-and-pepper" teams composed of Caucasian and Black former U.S. servicemen, fighting alongside the enemy. Nothing more than rumor supports these assertions. The strongest proof against any such defectors would lie in the fact that the Communists would have been expected to have trumpeted these Americans who had "seen the light." They never have. This is not to say that some Americans did not desert in Vietnam for similar reasons that led to desertions in America's previous conflicts: trouble at home, trouble in the Army, a girlfriend, the black market and (particularly in Vietnam) the drug traffic. But even here, one would think that the Communists would have either expelled such "parasites" or attempted their "reeducation" when they conquered all of Vietnam.

<sup>1018</sup>Douglas Pike, *Vietcong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of Vietnam* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1967), 124 and ff. See also C. A. Bain, "Charlie's Line," *Army*, October 1968.

Communist boilerplate: released GIs were quoted in leaflets as thanking "the Vietnamese people and the SVN-NLF for returning my freedom, once again.", and many referred in identical words to their "just and humane" treatment. The unwanted inference here might well be that the Americans were considered "war criminals" who were being let off lightly by their "caring" captors. The stilted language ("SVN-NLF," "cadres," "ralliedmen.") could also have a chilling effect. Had these Americans been tortured or brainwashed?

Enemy leaflet writers apparently also could not bring themselves to purge their products of "political" terms that had little bearing on the yearnings of the average American soldier to finish his tour of duty and go home: "The U.S. must directly negotiate with the NLF for an End to the War," "Fight the U.S.-lackey-clique", "Johnson's Strategic Plot.", etc.<sup>1019</sup>

The Communists continually made almost impossible demands upon U.S. troops. One example, from as late as 1970, merely called upon U.S. troops to

rise up and together with the progressive people in the U.S. and to use every appropriate form of struggle to demand that the Nixon administration end immediately the war of aggression,...To resolutely refuse to take part in terror, raid, refrain from bombing, shelling, firing and any other acts of massacre against the Vietnamese people....To struggle against the U.S. warmongers and their puppets and refrain from all hostile acts, etc., etc."<sup>1020</sup>

Another leaflet retailed a unlikely story of GIs who despite threats and repression, staged a rally and shouted

"Stop the war, bring all US troops home now." They came to the airfield destroying houses, cars. The conflict was took place, 3 U.S. officers were killed or wounded."<sup>1021</sup>

Enemy propaganda could also make the serious mistake of insulting or denigrating its target. For example, the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Cavalry Division

completely failed not only in its attempt to block the Liberation Armed

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<sup>1019</sup>Vietnamese Communist propaganda to date was briefly analyzed in "Review of Current Viet Cong Propaganda Efforts," JUSPAO Field Memorandum, No. 2 (30 September 1965).

<sup>1020</sup>Captured document quoted in 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, Lessons Learned, period ending 31 January 1971.

<sup>1021</sup>Memo, 173rd Airborne Brigade Assistant AG, to CO, 4th POG, 28 December 1970, subject: "Enemy Propaganda against U.S. Troops," RG 472, U.S. Army Vietnam, PSYOPs and CA, 4th POG, box 1, "4th PSYOP" folder.

**AMERICAN G.I.'s DO NOT GO OUT FIGHTING AND  
DYING AN USELESS, SENSELESS DEATH  
FOR THE CAPITALIST GUN-DEALERS AND  
THE ROTTEN PUPPETS IN SAIGON!**

VC propaganda to GIs.



Forces from afar, resulting in abandonment of a number of positions in order to shrink back, but also in escaping heavy losses.

was hardly a message to get troops of that unit to think kindly on the "Liberation Armed Forces."; nor would the Marines likely respond favorably to "U.S. Troops Shameful Withdrawal from Khe Sanh base." In a class by itself was the color leaflet, *Is This Fair?*, showing a photo of a GI dolefully picking at his C-rations; the next photo has a group of grinning officers contemplating a tableful of these canned combat comestibles.<sup>1022</sup> ("Second prize is two weeks in Philadelphia!")

The Communists did show some insight in their realization of the difficulties of safe surrender in the field. ("When the liberation armymen come near you, lie still and say 'Hong.' You will be safe and treated with leniency if you follow strictly these instructions." A Liberation Radio broadcast iterated the terms "drop your gun," "hands up" and "move quickly." It concluded that "A victorious battle would be more meaningful if enemy troops are taken prisoners.", an indication that not too many were.<sup>1023</sup>

Some 4<sup>th</sup> POG analysts did credit the Communists with "well-written and effective" treatment of the "Vietnamization" policy: it simply meant that the long-suffering Vietnamese would bear even more of the brunt of the war. And a sample Communist leaflet proclaimed straightforwardly:

Black American people will  
not have a happy life  
Until they have won freedom  
and equality.

But considerably more common was this near-unintelligible leaflet picked up by the 173d Airborne Brigade: "The undeclare war but lost a waste of lives and property if exchange by a heavy defeat in an ever great pain to the American people."<sup>1024</sup> Most enemy leaflets were also rather crudely drawn and poorly-printed on

<sup>1022</sup>USASOC History Archives Psyop 35mm slides.

<sup>1023</sup>Herz, "Lessons from VC/NVA Propaganda," *Art & Science*, vol. 1, 404-406.

"Puppets" was the official Communist description for RVN troops and even this obviously pejorative term was used constantly, as adjective and noun, in enemy propaganda. Ibid. Other leaflets cited in USASOC Archives. For early VC propaganda, see U.S. Army Special Warfare School, "A Summary of VC Propaganda, March through May 1964," (Fort Bragg, NC: n.d.).

<sup>1024</sup>Assistant Adjutant General, 173rd Airborne Brigade, Memo to CG, 4th POG, sub: "Enemy Propaganda Against U.S. Troops," 28 December 1970, RG 472, U.S. Army in Vietnam, PSYWAR & CA, box 17, "S-3 Enemy Propaganda" folder. Martin Herz reinforced these criticisms of enemy leaflets, adding poor paper and the fact that they were in typescript., Herz Papers, box 3, folder No.1.

flimsy paper, thus even more weakening their appeal.<sup>1025</sup> As one U.S. Army commander in the field put it later, VC propaganda toward the Vietnamese people was "very, very good,"; but against U.S. troops, "Oh, it was a joke..., nobody in their right mind would have given up to them."<sup>1026</sup> In sum, the communists' propaganda in the Vietnam War was, if anything, inferior to their products in the Korean War.<sup>1027</sup>

The dissemination of U.S. and Allied PSYOP showed considerable technical improvement even over that of the Korean War. New light-weight presses, photocopiers and the Polaroid camera made it possible to produce in many cases, almost complete PSYOP in the field. In fact, it could be said that in Vietnam, U.S. PSYOP was truly decentralized, more often than not going its own way, oblivious to JUSPAO control. The "ace of spades" gambit, for example, as noted, was in violation of JUSPAO guidance.<sup>1028</sup>

There was no need for the tank-mounted loudspeaker in Vietnam. Technical progress between those wars and Vietnam had made the Army's loudspeakers and microphones so light and powerful that PSYOPS personnel could get their message across to the enemy without having to come within small arms range. Typical loudspeaker messages included this one to VC and civilians:

We are dropping safe conduct passes. When you find one keep it - hide it - it is valuable. Safe conduct passes are honored by all Vietnamese government agencies and allied forces. This is your pass to freedom

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<sup>1025</sup>In the fall of 1969, troops of the Americal Division overran a "VC propaganda factory," and noted the "crude printing press, a Russian flag, and stacks of enemy PSYOP leaflets written in Vietnamese and broken English." The undistributed leaflets named leaders and places of anti-war rallies in the United States as well as the supposed good treatment of U.S. captives and their statements allegedly made to this effect. *PSYOP-POLWAR News letter*, 4, No. 10 (31 October 1969).

<sup>1026</sup>MHI Senior Officer Oral History program, interview with LTC G. L. Wells, "Combat Command in Vietnam," 1984. For a clear analysis of VC propaganda directed toward Vietnamese, see "Senior Officer Debriefing Report (1970)," 2-3, copy in MHI Archives.

<sup>1027</sup>Not only were many of the same terms used: "Running Dogs of Wall Street," "Imperialists," "puppet forces," but also the denigration of their enemies, the official boilerplate and, more intelligently, the appeals to American racial minorities. Even the phonetic surrender terms thoughtfully supplied to U.S. troops in Vietnam, mirrored similar leaflets in Korea. But the greatest Communist propaganda failing in both wars was simply their mindless ignorance of some elementary facts of American life.

<sup>1028</sup>Youmans oral interview. COL Youmans was a PSYOP veteran in the field in Vietnam. An excellent "nuts-and-bolts" manual of Vietnam-era U.S. Army PSYOP can be found in HQ, U.S. Army Pacific, *Psychological Operations Guide (Leaflet Operations)* (San Francisco: April 1965).

or this message to civilians:

Attention! This area will be bombed to destroy the VC. Report to the nearest GVN or military agency. They will direct you to a safe area. With GVN you are safe from the bombs.

or this one to VC:

VC come home. Your family needs you. They pray for your life. The government also wants you to come home. Contact the nearest allied soldiers or officials. You will be well treated. Return to the just cause and your family.

Another targeted a specific VC unit:

Members of the Tay Do Bn. Your forces have been dealt another defeat by the superior GVN ground and air power. Your latest defeat was the beginning of the end for the Tay Do Bn. You are now doomed to total destruction. Chieu Hoi today or there will be no tomorrow.<sup>1029</sup>

The aerial loudspeaker finally seemed to have overcome its earlier failings in the two previous wars in which it had been attempted. The U.S. Air Force developed improved, side-mounted speakers on its own PSYWAR converted venerable C-47 transport aircraft. By 1962, the results were remarkable, with messages "clearly audible on the ground." As one report noted, "It is an eerie thing to hear a C-47 droning high overhead, from which a monstrous celestial voice is enjoining the sinners to repent."<sup>1030</sup> In General Westmoreland's words, "Airborne loudspeakers have proved most effective means to communicate with people in inaccessible areas." The U-10 light aircraft with its 1000-watt system could fly above small arms fire and yet make itself heard intelligibly on the ground. Also "Earlyword" enabled units on the ground to broadcast radio messages through an airborne loudspeaker system; any radio signal which could be heard on the aircraft's intercom system, could then rebroadcast to the ground via the loudspeaker system. Soon after the system went into the field it

<sup>1029</sup>246th PSYOP Company SOP (Bien Hoa, RVN: 11 January 1967), no pagination. For loudspeakers in Vietnam see also [anon.] *Psychological Operations and Civic Action in Special Air Warfare. Psychological Operations Methods*. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (Eglin AFB, Florida: n.d.), A-19.

<sup>1030</sup>J. H. Napier III, "The Air Commandos in Vietnam, November 5, 1961 to February 7, 1965," graduate thesis submitted to Auburn University, 16 March 1967", quoted in M. E. Haas and D. K. Robinson, *Air Commando! 1950-1975: Twenty-Five Years at the Tip of the Spear*, (n.p. [1994], 95.

was used to track down an individual VC. An OBI PSYOP aircraft was directed to the man's hideout by his wife on the ground, through "Earlyword," and a patrol dispatched to the area, where the VC soldier turned himself in.<sup>1031</sup> Later in the war the 2,100-watt loudspeaker could be heard over an impressive two-mile radius at a height of 3,000 to 4500 feet. Not surprisingly, the Army-sponsored Bardain report noted that most POWs interviewed had heard airborne loudspeaker broadcasts as well as seen Allied leaflets. One authoritative report even claimed that such messages even penetrated the earth to VC troops sheltering in their tunnels. Most accounts of U.S. PSYOP operations tell of such loudspeaker support without complaint.<sup>1032</sup>

Airborne leaflet dissemination also had evolved well past its World War II/Korea stage. As in World War II and Korea the USAF devoted one squadron, in this case the 9<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron (SOS), for such work. The U-10 light aircraft was also equipped with a leaflet chute that proved an enormous improvement over the earlier "shovel 'em out" "technique." For the first time, using a simple equation of height, wind velocity and known rate of descent, leaflets could be cut to a size or printed on a weight of paper that would permit them to auto-rotate or glide to more pin-point landings. Even greater accuracy could now be achieved in this war by the dropping of small bundles of leaflets (1,000-2,000) held together with a rubber band which had a short time fuse which caused the bundle to burst at an altitude of 500 feet. This simple technique was developed by the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron (Eglin Air Force Base, Florida).<sup>1033</sup> For the most part the widespread availability of the

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<sup>1031</sup>Westmoreland to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 9 June 1965, message 0906452, Westmoreland Papers, Message File, 1 April-30 June 1965, Center of Military History; 4<sup>th</sup> POG Monthly Operations Report for April 1969, 8; (4<sup>th</sup> POG?), "Field Handbook", n.p.

<sup>1032</sup>Chandler, 29; E. F. and E. M. Bardain, *Final Technical Report: Psychological Operations Studies--Vietnam*, vol. 1 (Human Sciences Research, McLean, Virginia: 25 May 1971), 84-86. For technical details of contemporary aerial loudspeakers, see Army Concept Team in Vietnam, "The Heliborne Public Address system for Use in PSYWAR and Civic Action (U), 16 May 1963 to 1 January 1964" (San Francisco: 10 February 1964); "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," H-11. Apparently there were still some intelligibility problems; *Battlefield Reports: A Summary of Lessons Learned*, 3, #3 (May 1967), prepared by Headquarters, US Army Vietnam, noted that "it is imperative that the broadcast be checked with friendly ground elements closest to the target area to insure effectiveness.", 119; Yaeger, 17.

<sup>1033</sup>7<sup>th</sup> POG, *Low, Medium, and High Altitude Leaflet Dissemination Guide*, 4-8 and *passim*. The only remaining question about this elegant solution was why it had taken so long to work it out. 4<sup>th</sup> POG After-Action report for 1968 has exact dimensions of such leaflets. (no pagination); "Field Team Handbook", n.p. also indicated that, at least in the early days of the war, the workhorse C-47 was still being used for leaflet dissemination. Although this aircraft now had a chute for such work, a kitchen broom

helicopter and other means of aerial leaflet dissemination made the shell-fired leaflet or the leaflet bomb comparatively rare.<sup>1034</sup> When the Army did use leaflet artillery shell leaflets, the techniques differed little from those of World War II and Korea.<sup>1035</sup> By all accounts, most of the contested areas of South Vietnam had been well "papered" long before the end of hostilities.

Leaflet "turn around" times were vastly improved over the several days required during earlier conflicts. "Quick reaction" leaflets targeting particular units could be prepared and disseminated by the USAF within 24 hours after receiving a request from the field. One example was addressed:

ATTENTION MEN OF THE C-9 COMPANY, D-3 BATTALION,  
ROCKET/ARTILLERY REGIMENT

We think that the defeats and hardships you have endured are sufficient to make you aware of your dire situation. Recently nine of your comrades, including one platoon leader, were killed. Besides an onslaught of bombs and bullets, you are exposed to malaria, scabs, and other dangerous diseases that can completely exhaust you. Death will become a certainty if you do not rally right now.<sup>1036</sup>

New technology now made it possible for a "rallier" just out of the battle to have his message picked up by an orbiting PSYOP aircraft and broadcast "live" to his former comrades.<sup>1037</sup> The "personalized" rallier photo leaflet, noted above, could be quickly disseminated over enemy troops, thanks in large part to Polaroid cameras.

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can also be seen inside the fuselage, testimony to continuing "shoveling (or "sweeping") out of leaflets. Also "Drift and Dispersion Characteristics for Several Leaflets," Underhill file, USASOC History Archives. See Mary Donegan, ltr. to D. G. Underhill, n.d. for details of what was still a somewhat rule-of-thumb aerial dissemination. (Donegan was a 600-mission PSYOP veteran of the Vietnam Conflict), USASOC History Archives. For pin-point accuracy, see "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," I-6 -- I-7.

<sup>1034</sup>*Psychological Operations and Civic Action in Special Air Warfare*, A-16. Donegan also writes of leaflet missions in which the helicopter's two machine guns were firing as the leaflets were hurriedly jettisoned or in which the aircraft was used for a "dust-off," (i.e. evacuating friendly troops under fire.) Some of these extra-PSYOP missions may well be due to the fact, as Donegan points out, that the helicopter crews were not PSYOP professionals, and usually did not understand or often cared little about leaflet missions., *ibid*.

<sup>1035</sup>Chandler, 89; "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," H-9 -- H-10.

<sup>1036</sup>USASOC History Archives, "Vietnam War Collection," JUSPAO binders; Chandler, 86.

<sup>1037</sup>Chandler, 86, 88; Watson, 316.

LEAFLET TRANSLATION

LEAFLET THEME:

LEAFLET NUMBER: TINTD/083

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese

SIZE: 6 x 2

DISSEMINATION: Vo 1.3 RTTO .59

PAPER WEIGHT: 13 lb

SIDE I AND SIDE II

DO YOU WANT TO KNOW  
THE NEWS OF THE BATTLEFIELD?  
NEWS OF YOUR LOVED ONES?

- The Voice of Freedom broadcasts 20 hours daily to North and South Viet-Nam. It tells the truth about what is happening in Viet-Nam.
- You may receive it on any ordinary radio by setting the dial to: 461 meters.
- Voice of Freedom is on the air daily from: 1100 hours to 0700 hours.
- Fifteen times a day, the Voice of Freedom "Bridge of Love" program gives news of North Vietnamese soldiers who have been captured in the South. Names of soldiers who have been killed or wounded are also given.
- The "Bridge of Love" is on at the following hours:

1115	1655	0031
1231	1831	0231
1325	1925	0431
1431	2121	0525
1521	2225	0631

REMEMBER: 461 meters

Các bạn có muốn  
biết tin tức chiến  
trường và tin  
của thân nhân  
không?

— Đài Tiếng Nói Tự Do hàng ngày phát thanh 20 tiếng đồng hồ ra Bắc và Nam Việt Nam. Những buổi phát thanh này nói sự thật về những gì xảy ra tại Việt Nam.

— Các bạn có thể đón nghe Đài này bằng cách vặn bớt cứ một máy thu thanh thường nào trên làn sóng 461 (tức 655 kilô chu kỳ).

— Đài Tiếng Nói Tự Do phát thanh liên tục từ 11 giờ sáng cho tới 7 giờ sáng hôm sau

— Mỗi ngày 15 buổi Đài Tiếng Nói Tự Do phát thanh chương trình «Nhịp Cầu Thiên Yêu», nhằm cung cấp đầy đủ tin tức về các binh sĩ Bắc Việt đã bị bắt làm tù binh tại Miền Nam. Trong chương trình này tên và tuổi tất cả các binh sĩ đã bị chết hoặc bị thương được loan đi.

Chương trình «Nhịp Cầu Thiên Yêu» được phát thanh vào những giờ sau đây:

11g.15	21g.21
12g.31	22g.25
13g.25	00g.31
14g.31	02g.31
15g.21	04g.31
16g.25	05g.25
18g.31	06g.31
19g.25	

NHỚ GHÌ:  
461 thước (tức 655 kilô chu kỳ)  
TINTD/083

Các bạn có muốn  
biết tin tức chiến  
trường và tin  
của thân nhân  
không?

— Đài Tiếng Nói Tự Do hàng ngày phát thanh 20 tiếng đồng hồ ra Bắc và Nam Việt Nam. Những buổi phát thanh này nói sự thật về những gì xảy ra tại Việt Nam.

— Các bạn có thể đón nghe Đài này bằng cách vặn bớt cứ một máy thu thanh thường nào trên làn sóng 461 (tức 655 kilô chu kỳ).

— Đài Tiếng Nói Tự Do phát thanh liên tục từ 11 giờ sáng cho tới 7 giờ sáng hôm sau

— Mỗi ngày 15 buổi Đài Tiếng Nói Tự Do phát thanh chương trình «Nhịp Cầu Thiên Yêu», nhằm cung cấp đầy đủ tin tức về các binh sĩ Bắc Việt đã bị bắt làm tù binh tại Miền Nam. Trong chương trình này tên và tuổi tất cả các binh sĩ đã bị chết hoặc bị thương được loan đi.

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14g.31	02g.31
15g.21	04g.31
16g.25	05g.25
18g.31	06g.31
19g.25	

NHỚ GHÌ:  
461 thước (tức 655 kilô chu kỳ)  
TINTD/083

Radio broadcast guides: "Voice of Freedom" and "Bridge of Love," the latter kindly broadcasting 15 times per day gives names of North Vietnamese casualties in the South.

One of the quickest examples was the "surrender-or-die" leaflet to the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3d Regiments of the NVA 2d Division disseminated by the 7<sup>th</sup> Psychological Warfare Battalion. A line drawing from another leaflet was used for the reverse of this leaflet, while an interpreter from the 7<sup>th</sup> POB's Joint Propaganda Center hand lettered the message for the front. The text was photographed and prepared for printing. Four hours later 120,000 6x3 leaflets had been printed, cut, boxed and delivered to a waiting USAF 9<sup>th</sup> Special Squadron aircraft and by the following hour the mission was completed, a mere five hours from conception.<sup>1038</sup>

Tactical radio also finally came into its own in this war. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG operated a 50,000 watt radio station at Pleik in II Corps area, ten hours per day, targeting just about all population groups in the RVN, including the VC and NVA troops, within a 200-mile range. Personnel from the 4<sup>th</sup> staffed and maintained that station but the actual broadcasting was left to the Vietnamese to avoid any "taint" of American domination. These broadcasts undoubtedly reached far more of the enemy than in World War II or the Korea Conflict when radios were much more heavy and bulky. For the first time 4<sup>th</sup> POG personnel also dropped thousands of small transistor radios, pre-tuned to the U.S. Pleiku station, over enemy troops. Although evidence of the success of these radio operations is conspicuously lacking, the VC did target the facility, and it was completely destroyed by enemy sappers in March of 1968, although transmission was interrupted only for a few hours.<sup>1039</sup>

Audio-Visual Teams made particular use of films, some propaganda and others simply Hollywood entertainment, for civilian audiences. Most villagers seemed to prefer Westerns and action films to the more earnest propaganda efforts ("The Tet Offensive," "The Chieu Hoi Story") of the GVN and the U.S.<sup>1040</sup>

Allied PSYOP also employed television for the first time in the field, beginning in 1966. Again, the Americans made a conscientious, but not always successful, effort to keep Vietnamese nationals in the foreground. The main work in the field was the providing of 3,500 community viewing sets in the villages. These attracted large crowds, sometimes including the VC, who occasionally shot up the sets. (a tactic that could definitely backfire!) But substantial segments of the population never received government television sets and so remained out of reach of this medium. The U.S. radio and television PSYOP program was but a part of the massive Government of Vietnam communications and information complex, built up

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<sup>1038</sup>"Quick Reaction," *PSYOP-POLWAR News letter*, 4, No.8 (31 August 1969), 6-7. PSYOP troopers did not receive flight status or flight pay, although many of them were flying daily. Army Concept Team, "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," II-17.

<sup>1039</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG briefing (undated), RG 472, U.S. Army in Vietnam, PSYOP and CA, box 1, "4<sup>th</sup> POG" folder; "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," H-6 -- H-7; Yaeger, 16-17; 6<sup>th</sup> Psyop Battalion "Observer," 10 June 1967

<sup>1040</sup>For U.S. film PSYOP, see Monthly Operations Reports of 4<sup>th</sup> POG for 1969; Yaeger, 17.

primarily with American money. Between 1965 and 1971 more than \$22 million was provided to the GVN for a motion picture center, a printing plant and equipment, as well as for the establishing of national radio and television networks. One authority claims that Allied television in Vietnam became "one of the most credible propaganda mediums, despite the fact that JUSPAO itself admitted that about half of the programming was solely for enjoyment."<sup>1041</sup> But overall, information on the effects of Allied radio and television PSYOP in the field in Vietnam is conspicuously lacking.

The only available study that utilized the category of radio broadcasts (none listed television) merely gave percentages of ralliers and POWs who had been exposed to Allied PSYOP radio: 98 percent of VC ralliers and POWs "saw radio sets," and roughly 69 percent of NVA ralliers. Sixty-nine percent of VC ralliers and 43 percent of NVA ralliers had heard Allied radio broadcasts, but only 21 percent of VC and 17 percent of NVA POWs. Missing in all of this is the respondents' evaluation of this Allied PSYOP radio.<sup>1042</sup> The U.S. PSYOP dissemination effort in Vietnam was accurately summarized by a Defense Department-funded study published in 1967:

We believe that in the main, leaflets do get dropped on desired target areas; loudspeaker appeals are often (but not always) heard, radio signals reach many, but certainly far from all, intended target areas; newspapers reach far fewer target groups than any of us would wish; face-to-face appeals are far below the desired level.<sup>1043</sup>

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<sup>1041</sup> Chandler, 35. But Chandler goes on to quote *Time* magazine that many of the supposedly entertainment programs were really heavy-handed political dramas not far removed from the notorious "socialist realism," boy-meets-tractor efforts of the Communists., *Time*, "South Vietnam: The Tube Takes Hold," 30 November 1970. See also Katagiri, "A Former PSYOP Group Commander," 141; Latimer, "U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam," 23, 32; "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," I-4.MACV, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, Psychological Operations Division, Directive #8-1, "Vietnamese Community Television Program," 15 August 1968. This directive directs that the "custodian" of individual sets, "will not tune in a non-THVN [Vietnamese Television Network] channel.", 10.

<sup>1042</sup> Bardain and Bardain, "Psychological Operations Studies," 69. For selected POW interviews, see "POW folder," USASOC Archives.

<sup>1043</sup> W. J. Beck, et al, "ARPA-Supported Committee on Psychological Operations, Vietnam, 1967" (Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, VA: 16 October 1967), 7. There can be little doubt that the Communists excelled their enemy in face-to-face propaganda for good reason: Americans were always foreigners, who might leave at any time. Talking to them was obvious and could prove dangerous. Talking to a VC cadre, on the other hand, could be carried on much more surreptitiously; peasant X simply discussing the weather with peasant Y. See Youmans oral interview.



By 1967 JUSPAO could point to numerous and valuable "Lessons Learned" over the previous five years, the mistakes and the successes. A field memorandum called attention the importance of credibility and the avoiding of "incredible truths," such as the enormous disparity between U.S. and enemy casualties. "As a result, a simple report of the kill ratio of the U.S. forces would be totally incredible to them"--even if completely true as true as the promise of fresh eggs for breakfast to Italian POWs in World War II. Every item used should be viewed as putting the whole U.S. PSYOP effort on trial; one incredible or untrue message could seriously undermine that entire effort. All products should avoid anything that might link it to an American source except in specific instances ("The Americans are here to help you.") Technically, local artists should be used as much as possible, again, to avoid the "taint" of U.S. origin; photographs should be used as often as possible and in preference to sketches. (Although some of the sketches, particularly by Vietnamese illustrators are impressive for their delicate treatment of native themes and were undoubtedly as effective as any photograph). Photographs should not be blurred, and not only for the obvious reason of not undermining the professional impression of a message but also because "Such photos are sometimes viewed as attempts at misrepresentation." With good reason. The Communists had long made an art form out of the airbrushed photograph, removing current "enemies of the people," intruding present-day leaders into impossible photos from the past, and adding "artistic touches," all rather transparent efforts that probably did less to convince their viewers than to insult their intelligence.<sup>1044</sup>

U.S. PSYOP's accomplishments in Vietnam were impressive. Yet there were serious failings, failings that were detailed in a number of studies sponsored, significantly, by the U.S. Army. A former Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG pointed out the "cumbersome" layers of authority, weak coordination, a lack of effective liaison between Washington and Saigon and, more specifically, noted that he had been given no PSYOP guidance for handling the U.S. bombing halt of November 1968 nor for the subsequent U.S. troop withdrawal. He further recognized that, at least prior to 1968, the PSYOP community did not recognize their need to develop a profile of NVA soldiers, and, in fact, treated them and the VC as basically the same.<sup>1045</sup> As the

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<sup>1044</sup>JUSPAO Memorandum, No. 24, "Lessons Learned from Evaluation of Allied PSYOP Media in Viet Nam," 13 December 1967," in *Consolidation of JUSPAO Field Memoranda 42 Thru 58*, 3 (Saigon?: n.d. [1969]).

<sup>1045</sup>Katagiri, "A Former PSYOP Group Commander Looks Back," vol. 1, 138. Katagiri senior oral interview. But note above that the Washington-JUSPAO "axis" reacted quickly and professionally to the unprecedented trip of President Nixon to Peking. Katagiri also noted problems of supply and maintenance due to the 4th POG's use of "non-standard, low-density equipment.", *ibid.*, 11. COL Katagiri's predecessor agreed with COL Katagiri on the equipment problem. Beck Debriefing, 19-20. Herz emphasized the importance of differentiating between NVA and VC enemies., Herz Papers, *passim*.

veteran Martin Herz pointed out, "the evidence is overwhelming ...that it was easier for the NVA soldier to surrender and become a prisoner which a chance of returning home at the end of the war, than to cast his lot with the South Vietnamese....", perhaps for the rest of his life. The figures available certainly back up Herz's point: out of a total of over 161,000 "ralliers" between 1963 and 1970, only 870 were NVA troops.<sup>1046</sup>

Further, there was duplication of effort, with PSYOP messages being developed and disseminated by JUSPAO, MACV, the 4<sup>th</sup> POG, Civil Affairs units and the Advanced Research Projects Agency. This can be considered a major failing of JUSPAO, whose major reason for existence was to prevent duplication.<sup>1047</sup>

As in previous wars, conventional tactical unit commanders still often remained unaware of the mission or value of PSYOP. Some commanders even had PSYOP tactical units show movies to their troops. Combat officers assigned to PSYOP units often expressed reservations about their assignments and believed, probably with good reason, that it was anything but a "career enhancing" move. This situation was certainly not helped by the rapid Army turnover of personnel in the field, as bad as it was in Korea; in several units something like three or four different soldiers might be assigned in one year as division PSYOP officer.<sup>1048</sup>

Herz also felt that there had been too many different messages for the enemy, and few, if any evaluations of the effectiveness of particular messages; a failing due primarily to personnel turnover. He even criticized the B-52 leaflet: "Men who have through the hell of a B-52 bombing aren't interested in learning more about the B-52." Generally, Herz felt that these and other leaflets often gave the enemy no choice of action. There had been some "hair-raising psychological blunders (e.g. the

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<sup>1046</sup>Ibid., ltr, Herz to Frank Sreverts, 14 October 1976, Herz Papers, box 3, folder 7. See also JUSPAO Memorandum No. 19, "Profile of a Viet Cong" (1 April 1966), copy in USASOC Archives. Chandler, 93. Chandler gives belief in the Communist goal of "liberation" of the South, fear of mistreatment at the hands of the Southern authorities, and the equating of surrender with dishonor, as causes for NVA soldiers' rejection of Allied PSYOP messages that his leaders were wrong and that Hanoi's military strength was inferior to that of the Allies. But surely any NVA potential defector would realize that he would have to await "liberation" (either by the North or the South -the latter highly unlikely) if he ever hoped to see his family and friends in North Vietnam again. The NVA surrenderee, on the other hand, would simply await repatriation at the end of the war, who won., *ibid.*

<sup>1047</sup>Army Concept Team, "Employment of Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," III-3; MAJ Donald B. Kemper, debrief report, 10 October - 1 December 1968, dated 10 December 1968, makes the same points and more. MAJ Kemper was a former commander of the 7<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion.

<sup>1048</sup>Army Concept Team, "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam," II-16 - II-17.

"cheesecake" leaflet, and those taunting the enemy).<sup>1049</sup> But, in all fairness, it should be noted only one "cheesecake" leaflet has been found, and "taunting" messages are rare. Herz's call for "interviews" in place of the usual "interrogations" of POWs, and for these sessions to take place soon after capture are fair enough, although Army interrogators might well have replied that they lacked the time for more lengthy interviews, and that it was not always possible to get to "fresh" prisoners.

Another veteran critic pointed out leaflet mistakes: an offensive representation of VC troops as murders, terrorists, etc.; not giving sufficient assurances of good treatment for ralliers, depicting the VC resorting to force in recruiting and the indiscriminate use of the RVN flag and Pledge of Allegiance. A perusal of leaflet collections shows that there was considerable validity to these complaints.<sup>1050</sup>

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) report of 1967 questioned some significant overall aspects of the U.S. PSYOP effort in Vietnam: 1) Are precise psychological objectives formulated?, 2) What specific attitudes and behavior do we wish to influence and change?, 3) Are the desired responses clearly defined?, 4) Are competent personnel available?, 5) Is logistic support adequate? and 5) Is the required basic information obtainable? The study concluded that for each question posed, the "answer, in general, leaves much to be desired."<sup>1051</sup>

Another report concluded that at the MACV intelligence section level and just below the U.S. war effort was caught up in the day-to-day tactical military needs and slighted PSYOP despite the best efforts of PSYOP liaison officers, an opinion seconded by a former 4<sup>th</sup> POG commander, COL Taro Katagiri, (and the Army Concept Team report noted above).<sup>1052</sup> Privately, COL Katagiri reported back to the Commanding General of the then-JFK Center of Military Assistance that there was no centralized direction to combined U.S./GVN PSYOP and little consolidation of PSYOP and CA or exchange of information between the two specialties and the failure of commanders to integrate PSYOP into their military staffs or PSYOP intelligence into their planning or to use the weapon in operations, just as they would call in artillery or air support, and a lack of knowledge of Vietnam or Communism.<sup>1053</sup>

<sup>1049</sup>Herz Papers, box 3, folder 9. Herz was undoubtedly wrong about the B-52 leaflet.

<sup>1050</sup>D. G. Pappas, "Psyop Staff and Unit Officers Prerequisites," *Art and Science*, vol. 1. Pappas' points are validated also in the leaflets reproduced in Chandler, 231-235, and in Herz Papers, box 3, folder 9.

<sup>1051</sup>Beck, et al. "Summary Report of the ARPA Supported Committee on Psychological Operations," 6.

<sup>1052</sup>Latimer, 16-17; Katagiri to MG Edward Flanagan, Commanding General, JFKCMA, fact sheet, subject: 4<sup>th</sup> POG Group Evaluation of Stateside Training, RG 472, U.S. Army in Vietnam, PSYOP and CA, "4th POG" folder.

<sup>1053</sup>Katagiri to Flanagan. COL Katagiri repeated these sentiments in his senior officer report, going so far as to term "the lack of centralized PSYOP direction from above...the 'Doctrinal Void'," as "The source of *all* PSYOP problems in Vietnam.", 15 (emphasis added).

Nonetheless, to keep things in perspective, it was COL Katagiri who concluded that

Analysis of target groups, established conclusively that PSYOP messages positively enhanced the Allied effort....the large majority of captures contended that the decision to desert from their ranks was significantly influenced by Allied PSYOP messages...."<sup>1054</sup>

One of U.S. PSYOPS most far-reaching shortcomings was the failure of JUSPAO to become anything more than "a surrogate" for the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). This was not entirely JUSPAO's fault. The VIS seems to have been a patronage dump for ministerial cronies would might cause too much damage if placed in a "more important" ministry. According to Latimer, "Some...were hacks, others among the most corrupt of Vietnamese officials.", and, an indication that much was wrong here; between 1964 and 1971 the GVN had no less than 12 different Ministers of Information.<sup>1055</sup> A former 4<sup>th</sup> POG Commander, LTC William J. Beck, had little good to report about VIS or ARVN PSYOP personnel in general, complaining of their "inability to satisfy even the simplest requirements, their emphasis on 'indoctrination-type' training" and their "abysmally unscientific and inefficient" personnel selection system. LTC Beck iterated the "lack of identity of the [RVN] government with the people....the lack of evidence of substantial economic and social progress as hindering the U.S. PSYOP effort." He further claimed that GVN propaganda was mainly directed towards "insuring loyalties of the 'in-house group' (e.g. bureaucracy and armed forces)." The GVN's five "POLWAR" battalions in the field lacked initiative and were "not equipped for or trained in techniques of mass audience persuasion and cannot be considered a psychological instrument in the same sense as a US PSYOP battalion."<sup>1056</sup> Just how much the situation in the GVN and the VIS affected combat PSYOPS is unclear, but it certainly undermined the credibility of U.S. PSYOP that it was obviously involved with so corrupt and ineffectual a Ministry and government.

Because they could get so little effective work out of their Vietnamese counterparts JUSPAO personnel "went overboard" on their own (in the words of one high JUSPAO officer) in 1967 alone dropping some five billion leaflets over North and South Vietnam, in addition to setting up a 5-station radio network, a four-transmitter television net and distributing 300,000 private TV sets in addition to the

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<sup>1054</sup>Katagiri, "A Former PSYOP Group Commander," 143.

<sup>1055</sup>Latimer, 11; Chandler, 32-33; E. Wentworth, "Our Ally's Propaganda is Literally Too Flowery," *The Washington Post* (13 November 1966).

<sup>1056</sup>LTC W. J. Beck, Senior Officer Debriefing Program report (1968), 5, copy in MHI Archives. See also memo from a Mr. C. A. Richardson, a civilian JUSPAO employee, on his problems with one VIS worker. memo to Mr. F. M. Shaver, sub: "Excess Charges for PSYOPs Packages," 5 December 1968, USASOC History Archives.

community sets already in use.<sup>1057</sup> And as Chandler noted:

American provision of hardware and promotional materials 'boomeranged.' Saigon's shortcomings multiplied when JUSPAO over mechanized its Information Ministry and the VIS. As a result, the Vietnamese, emulating their foreign benefactors who could not speak directly to the enemy, also placed a greater reliance on the printed and broadcast word." [as opposed to face-to-face contacts.]<sup>1058</sup>

American PSYOP in the field, understandably, functioned as much as possible as though VIS did not exist. The ARPA study referred to above noted that "The emphasis on the role the Vietnamese must play is scarcely noticeable in our present activities throughout Vietnam."<sup>1059</sup> Nonetheless, the enemy could deprecate so much Allied PSYOP as simply lies from foreign "imperialists," and be the more believable as the bulk of that PSYOP had something of an American "cast."

Finally, no less than 51 percent of U.S. PSYOP in Vietnam was directed to a general audience, a significant failing considering the multitude of ethnic, political and religious groups in the country. Chandler ascribes this failure to the lack of trained and experienced JUSPAO specialists in Vietnamese life and culture, and to JUSPAO's "dumping great quantities of standardized national-level" propaganda on the field agencies."<sup>1060</sup>

Many of the shortcomings listed described above may well have resulted from the U.S. Army's alienation from the very concept of limited war, counter-insurgency, unconventional warfare, etc., war in which the "good guys" were not readily distinguishable from the "bad guys," civilians from soldiers or battle lines from behind the lines. In Korea, the "war before Vietnam," in which almost all senior commanders had served, these distinctions were obvious. The regime we had come to rescue in Korea was simply assumed to be "free" (despite much evidence to the contrary, although still considerably more free than anything the communists had to offer) and to have popular support. Thus the overwhelming bulk of psychological warfare in Korea could be directed against enemy troops. None of these postulates applied in Vietnam and it was difficult for commanders to drop most of those firepower, mobility, armor, artillery, etc. "lessons learned" from Korea or World War II.<sup>1061</sup>

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<sup>1057</sup>Latimer, 23, 32;. The veteran Duane Yaeger gives figures of one billion leaflets printed up in the six months between May and November 1968.

<sup>1058</sup>Chandler, 35.

<sup>1059</sup>Hopper, *ARPA-Supported Study*, 28.

<sup>1060</sup>*Ibid.*, 247.

<sup>1061</sup>See the *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Army Psychological Operations* (Washington [?]: June 1967) which concluded that the Army doctrine and organization for PSYOP had difficulty in adapting to "stability operations" (another

The very nature of psychological operations, of course, made it difficult to measure success or its absence. This was the Age of McNamara, of "quantification" and "body counts." But PSYOP simply could not fit into some deluded equation of  $x$  leaflets in =  $x$  defectors out. Such an "exercise in self-delusion" was actually attempted by a Pentagon statistician, but, not surprisingly, it could yield no "hard" evidence to the Pentagon systems analysts types.<sup>1062</sup> To give just one example of the slippery nature of any evaluation of PSYOP effectiveness, a private report concluded that "hardship" themes had little effect on NVA or VC troops -- they were expecting hardship when they got into the war.<sup>1063</sup> But a JUSPAO study stated that NVA troops, at least, were "shocked" by the hardships they found in the field.<sup>1064</sup> The reports' conclusions are not completely mutually contradictory, but they are illustrative of the near-impossibility of quantifying anything so immaterial as psychological operations, particularly those directed towards persons of a strongly differing culture.<sup>1065</sup> In the words of General Westmoreland, "The Psychological Operations program is the least understood, the most difficult to explain, and surely the hardest to measure of any of our efforts in Vietnam."<sup>1066</sup>

And yet, it is difficult to dismiss convincingly the figures of the no less than

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current term for counter-insurgency) and pointed out that in such conflicts the implications for PSYOP are much more widespread than in General or limited conventional warfare. In the former, almost every military act has psychological implications. On the other hand, the Army did recognize the value of psychological operations when the Chief of Staff directed that all psychological operations (along with Civil Affairs) be merged under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5/S5 in organizations that required a staff capacity for these functions, that is at army, down to battalion levels. U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Special Operations Agency, "The Civil-Military Operations Study," initial coordination draft (Fort Bragg, NC: 15 April 1973).

<sup>1062</sup>Katagiri, "A PSYOP Commander Looks Back," 147.

<sup>1063</sup>P. P. Katz, "PSYOPS and Communications Theory," *Art and Science*, vol. 1, 35.

<sup>1064</sup>JUSPAO, Field Development Division, *Guidelines to Chieu Hoi Psychological Operations: The Chieu Hoi Inducement Program* (April 1966), 14. For a good analysis of the major pitfalls in evaluating the U.S. PSYOP effort in Vietnam, see R. P. Morriss, "Psychological Operations in Vietnam: (Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level)", *Art and Science*, vol. 2.

<sup>1065</sup>But there are near-constant PSYOP principles more or less valid for most conflicts, and one of these is that POWs will tell their interrogators what the latter wants to hear. The prisoner who tells his questioner that he came over because of hunger, cold, disease, bombing, etc. salves his own conscience that he had put up a tough fight against strong odds while at the same time reassuring his interrogator that his comrades in arms are doing their job in the field.

<sup>1066</sup>Westmoreland, *Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964-June 1968* (Washington: 1968), 237.

200,000 enemy defectors, who, for whatever reason, defected to the Allied side, many of whom, as noted, were subsequently armed and returned to do battle for the Allies.<sup>1067</sup> And this number includes only defectors, not POWs, and does not count, of course, those enemy who simply slipped away from the battle zone back to their villages or wherever. But it does undoubtedly include "repeaters," that is, those enemy who used the system for some "rest and relaxation," then slipped out to rejoin their comrades. Admittedly, defectors were almost entirely low-level VC cadres, many of whom had been more-or-less press-ganged into the military. This composition of the Hoi Chanh has been used to deprecate the Chieu Hoi program and Allied PSYOP. But it is surely asking too much to expect that higher-ranking cadre, who would not have achieved such position without strong motivation and who have their careers to look to, would likely go over to the enemy. Such high-level defection certainly had never occurred in any of America's previous wars, at least before the final surrenders.<sup>1068</sup> (As noted, NVA troops, far from home, defected in minuscule numbers.)

But of those VC ralliers, according to the most thorough study made of U.S. PSYOPS in Vietnam, 79 percent claimed to have understood and believed some or all of the Allied PSYOP leaflets; about 87 percent understood and believed loudspeaker messages. The figures fall sharply among enemy POWs. Only 14 percent said that they believed leaflet messages and 22 percent loudspeaker messages. The survey, based upon lengthy interviews in 1970 with a total of about 1,000 NVA and VC POWs and ralliers, often within one day of capture, concluded that "PSYOP messages affect the decision to rally for approximately two-thirds of both NVA and VC ralliers." As for the messages themselves, the most effective, according to VC respondents were, in order of preference: family sentiment, death awaits, GVN welcome, hardship, chance for a new life, useless sacrifice and other.<sup>1069</sup>

Although it cannot be considered a "failure" of U.S. PSYOP in Vietnam, the fact that the Americans were very obviously, by their way of life and their very appearance, foreigners, made their propaganda "alien" and thus suspect to the Vietnamese. The evidence indicates strongly that U.S. PSYOP personnel were well aware of this disability and did their best by using Vietnamese translators, illustrators, etc. as much as possible. Furthermore, as noted, the very presence of the Americans

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<sup>1067</sup>Chandler, 93, gives a figure of 201, 421 ralliers between 1963 and 1972. Martin Herz 226,420 between 1963 and 1974. U.S. State Department, message to Embassy, Sofia, 16 October 1976; Henry Kissinger, message to Embassy, Sofia, 19 October 1976., Herz Papers, box 3, folder No.7. Herz felt these figures "inflated" and included many repeaters, but still believed that Hoi Chan numbered well over 100,000., Ltr to editor, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1 December 1976, *ibid*.

<sup>1068</sup>One authority does claim that an NVA colonel, a 19 year veteran of the struggle and a personal friend of President Ho, did defect to the U.S. 11<sup>th</sup> Armored Regiment and the *Chieu Hoi*., Yaeger, 17.

<sup>1069</sup>Bardain and Bardain, vol. 1, XV, 84; Yaeger, 17.

ensured that the war would go on and the nation would remain divided. The "unification" theme must have appealed to many Vietnamese nationalists and intellectuals. And the Communists had an enormous advantage that Ho Chi Minh had proclaimed that "Vietnam is One." In the GVN, the close ally of the United States, there was no one remotely of the stature of "Uncle Ho"; Hanoi's "trump card," in the words of one disillusioned PSYOP veteran, whose experience went back to working with the French against the Viet Minh.<sup>1070</sup> Further, many Vietnamese must have, by the late 1960s, yearned for "peace at any price," (and probably unification) even if that peace meant communism.<sup>1071</sup> In the absence of American will to mobilize for military victory or at least for stalemate, as was eventually won in Korea, the American military effort in Vietnam, including its PSYOP, in hindsight seems foredoomed to failure. In all, by the time that the 4<sup>th</sup> POG redeployed to Fort Bragg in October of 1971 in accordance with the Nixon policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, the U.S. PSYOP effort in Vietnam can be termed a substantial tactical, albeit temporary, success, as the numbers of defectors amply indicate.<sup>1072</sup> But there will always be those, particularly in the United States itself, who will insist that nothing their nation ever did in Vietnam could have been a success.

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<sup>1070</sup>Howard R. Simpson, "Psywar in the Early Days: The Reds Won That One, Too," *Army* (July 1988), 58.

<sup>1071</sup>Those who deride American "nation building" in Vietnam, point with some justification to the average Vietnamese peasant's primary attachment to his family, his clan and his land. Yet they fail to explain why the VC fought, in theory at least, as part of the *National Liberation Front* and claimed they were fighting, not for Communism (although, admittedly, there were a few such in their ranks) but for national independence from the "imperialists" and their "puppets."

<sup>1072</sup>See BDM Corporaton, *A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam*, vol. 6, *Functional Analysis* (McLean, Virginia: 1979), 13-18.



## POST-VIETNAM: OPERATIONS URGENT FURY, JUST CAUSE, AND DESERT STORM

Following the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Vietnam and the subsequent ignominious collapse of that embattled republic the U.S. Army went through a lengthy period of retrenchment, soul-searching and, eventually, rebuilding that transformed it to the much more effective fighting arm so evident by the late 1980s and early 1990s.<sup>1073</sup> The "Post-Vietnam Syndrome" and the phenomenon of the "Hollow Army" certainly affected PSYOP as well.<sup>1074</sup> Vietnam had supposedly been a war for "Hearts and Minds" as much as for anything else. Thus PSYOP seemed all too reminiscent of a misbegotten conflict that the Army was only too glad to forget as it got on with the "real threat," an increasingly unlikely Soviet thrust into NATO Europe.

Reductions in personnel and funding as well as lack of interest saw to it that the 4<sup>th</sup> POG, reactivated at Fort Bragg in 1972, remained as the Army's only active-duty PSYOP unit. PSYOP-specific equipment was rapidly becoming obsolete, particularly in the fast-changing electronics field. Instruction in PSYOP had virtually disappeared from the curricula of service schools and few PSYOP officer slots in headquarters levels above the 4<sup>th</sup> POG were filled by PSYOPS-qualified personnel. The only training for enlisted personnel in PSYOP was the two-week course now taught at the USAJFKSWC, after which the soldier would receive his Additional Skill Identifier. In the words of the *Psychological Master Plan*, drawn up in 1985, "The end of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War marked the beginning of a decade-long period of decline and atrophy of military psychological operations." More scathingly, one authority saw U.S. Army PSYOP in the early 1980s as having:

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<sup>1073</sup>J. Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army* (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia: 1993), PSYOP material on 83-84, 194; BG R. H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory*, United States Army in the Gulf War (Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington: 1993), chapter 1, "Forging a New Army." To put matters in a longer historical perspective, it might well be that the resurrection of the United States Army in the 1980s was so successful primarily because, unlike earlier military reform movements, such as the Cardwell or Haldane reforms in the UK and MacNamara's in the USA, which produced undoubted administrative efficiencies but seemed to have little effect in combat, the U.S. Army originated and carried out this effort mostly within itself and the Desert Storm battlefield was the proving. The only close historical parallel would be the rehabilitation of the Prussian Army after its defeats at the hands of Napoleon early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>1074</sup>For the decline and rebirth of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s see Scales, chapter 1.

no pretense of integrated psychological planning on a world-wide basis within the U.S. government. Channels of decision making and authority are unclear; personnel are inexperienced [in PSYOP] and committed primarily to other functions; equipment in many areas has fallen into disuse; and there has been scarcely any consideration of the impact of new technologies and research upon PSYOP,...

The author branded PSYOP "a career dead.", concluded that "Apart from some aberrations, PSYOP no longer exists within the U.S. government.", but sarcastically noted that "Oh yes, the 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group still exists at Fort Bragg, North Carolina."<sup>1075</sup> All of this, of course, was not much of an improvement on the situation after World Wars I and II and Korea.

But for all these deficiencies Army PSYOP personnel kept busy, providing radio and personnel support for a USIA mission, and in 1980, becoming intensively involved in the Mariel Cuban refugee resettlement program. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG's association with the newly-formed Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force gave PSYOP some planning visibility as did the change to uniform pronency for PSYOP planning to the G-3. In addition, PSYOP did not vanish from the professional journals, as in previous post-war periods.<sup>1076</sup>

But a turnabout did not begin until 1982 when the 4<sup>th</sup> POG's "PSYOP Enhancement action" was approved by the Department of the Army. The same year the Army approved additional military and civilian personnel spaces for the 4<sup>th</sup> POG.<sup>1077</sup> The main impetus for the revitalization of U.S. Army PSYOP and of the American military in general was the military buildup of the Reagan years (1981-1989) in the wake of Communist advances in Latin America, Afghanistan and Africa as well as the botched Iran hostage rescue operation. (Few, if any, Western "experts" saw the Communist adventures for what they really were, the last imperialist thrusts of a top heavy empire already in terminal decay.)

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<sup>1075</sup>R. McLaurin, *Military Propaganda*, 3, 5, 76.

<sup>1076</sup>See for example: R. J. Barnett, "PSYOP: What is it and What Can We Do About It?", *Military Review*, March 1972; W. J. Holton, "The TAC Role in Special Operations," *Air University Review*, November-December 1976; R. T. McCormack, "The Twilight War." *Army*, 20 January 1979; R. D. Page, "Psychological Warfare," *Air Defense Magazine*, January-March 1978; F. W. Timmerman, "Psychology, the Forgotten Tool." *Military Review*, April 1980; F. W. Walker, "PSYOP is a Nasty Term - Too Bad," *Air University Review*, September-October 1977.

<sup>1077</sup>Michael G. Lehti, "13th PSYOP Battalion: A Unique Unit in a Unique Field," PSYOP Association, *Perspectives*, 10, #2 (Summer 1994); A. H. Paddock, III, "PSYOP in the Early 1980s": The Way We Were," *Special Warfare*, 6, No. 4 (October 1993). COL Paddock was a former commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG.

## URGENT FURY

The year 1983 saw Operation URGENT FURY, the liberation of the Caribbean island nation of Grenada from a sinister clique of indigenous Leninists. The operation was activated so quickly that in the words of one official Army report on URGENT FURY "improvisation replaced planning for PSYOP and CA activities.", but recorded that once combat operations got underway, "The 4<sup>th</sup> POG reported that all combat units that had received PSYOP loudspeaker team support recognized that they should have requested the support earlier so they could have talked the enemy out of their holes instead of fighting them."<sup>1078</sup> After the invasion of 27 October, Army PSYOP personnel supported all combat operations.<sup>1079</sup> Their mission was to minimize civilian hardship and casualties, inform the population of the benign intentions of the U.S. and the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF), to undermine the will of the PRA and Cubans and to minimize CPF and U.S. casualties. Fourth POG loudspeaker teams attached to the 82d Airborne Division, in addition to persuading significant numbers of frightened Peoples Revolutionary Army (PRA) troops to turn themselves in, confirmed this enemy's low morale as well as the desire of even some of the Cuban "Construction Battalions" to remain on the island with their Grenadian wives and families. Face-to-face contacts reassured civilians and confirmed the calming broadcasts and the amnesty program that the Grenadian Governor General was able to disseminate over the Army's "outdated, cumbersome and relatively non-air transportable fixed radio equipment." (Grenada's only radio station had been destroyed in early combat operations.) A majority of the PRA troops dutifully turned themselves in at the Queen's Park Pavilion.<sup>1080</sup>

<sup>1078</sup>U.S. Army TRADOC, (S)*Operation URGENT FURY Assessment*(U) (Fort Monroe, Virginia), XII-7.

<sup>1079</sup>Ibid.; 4<sup>th</sup> POG, (S)"POTF OPLAN in Support of URGENT FURY(U)", Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. C. R. Bishop, E. K. O'Brien, (S)*FORSCOM/ARLANT Participation in Operation Urgent Fury - Grenada, 1983*(U) (Military History Office, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia: 1 April 1985). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; U.S. Navy, Second Fleet, (S)*Operation Urgent Fury: Lessons Learned, Executive Summary* [Norfolk, Virginia: 1983]. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. It is significant of the standing of Army PSYOP at the time that only the *Executive Summary*(U) deals with PSYOP. B. R. Pirnie, *Operation URGENT FURY: The United States Army in Joint Operations* (Center of Military History, Washington: 1986).

<sup>1080</sup>(U) Psychological Operations Task Force, "POTF OPLAN in Support of URGENT FURY"(S), n.d., info used is UNCLASSIFIED. USAJFKSWC Directorate of Combat Developments, memorandum for Commander, USAJFKSWC, subject: Lessons Learned from Employment of PSYOP in Grenada, 25 November 1983 (quote from p. 1); File 8, subject: "Comments on the Grenada After Action Report," 9 May 1984, USASOC History Archives.

U.S. Leaflets included the ubiquitous surrender pass as well as messages urging civilians to stay away from the area of operations. These were the standard and expected leaflets for any combat operation. But other, more specialized leaflets, emphasized that this was a combined operation with other Caribbean nations as well as the United States acting against a foreign threat. Something new was added when U.S. PSYOP troops photographed captured Grenadian Communist leaders in captivity, thus reassuring citizens that they now could go about their business unmolested by a cabal whom most genuinely feared. One such leaflet, headlined *These Hoodlums Are Now in Custody*, displayed most unflattering photos of the subjects while another showed the two chiefs of the Marxist clique, Bernard Coard and Hudson Austin, in safe custody on a U.S. Navy ship.

Former PRA Members: Your Corrupt Leaders have surrendered, knowing resistance is USELESS....Join your countrymen now in rebuilding a truly democratic Grenada.

Yet another leaflet theme was money-for-arms, which helped to disarm the countryside and direct some financial aid into the economy.

The use of counterfeit enemy currency for propaganda had not been used since World War II, for undetermined reasons, likely because such use is a violation of the Geneva Conventions. Yet it is certainly a compelling vehicle; money always attracts attention and any soldier apprehended for reading the PSYOP message therein could innocently claim that he could hardly be expected to ignore money lying about, and, of course, had no idea that the vile enemy would have dared to deface the motherland's currency.<sup>1081</sup>

But a U.S. PSYOP leaflet drawn up for the Cubans in Grenada was an exception to the generally professional execution of such efforts. This was a crudely-reproduced Cuban banknote, with "Salvo Conducto" at the top and the English text "Safe Conduct" at the bottom, with English and Spanish-language text assuring good post-surrender treatment for "those who are resisting the Caribbean Peace Force." The use of a Cuban rather than a Grenadian note showed that planners were understandably more concerned with resistance from the Cuban "construction

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<sup>1081</sup>Film and paper slides of URGENT FURY leaflets in USASOC History Archives.; Vivian, "Unsung Heroes," 27. Vivian reports that U.S. PSYOP used currency leaflets strategically against North Vietnam in the September 1971 LINEBACKER II bombing campaign against Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong harbor. But the Geneva proscription was evaded by the technicality of printing the same serial number on each leaflet., *ibid.*, 26-27. Mr. Austin's family, through the U.S. State Department, protested the depicting of him draped only in a towel. Actually, he was being held unclothed for fear that he might commit suicide., K. Wheatley, 8<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion SSD Chief, memo for dist., subject: Promised Slide and Explanation, 20 September 1991.

# What did the PRA produce ?



Death  
and  
Destructio

Support  
a New  
Beginnin

Brighter  
out of  
Darkness

workers" than any from the rag-tag Grenadian local defense forces. But the poor reproduction and the pink-violet color (presumably to stand out in Grenada's lush tropical environment), could hardly have distracted even temporarily any Cubans.<sup>1082</sup>

After combat, elements of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG distributed leaflets to the population giving guidance and information, held medical clinics for the civil population (MEDCAPS) and generally helped to disseminate calming information and publicize Army efforts to restore the island's run-down "socialized" infrastructure.

This first U.S. combat PSYOP since the Vietnam War did reveal some serious deficiencies. One veteran U.S. Army PSYOP commander concluded that although the weapon produced "outstanding results," it had not been employed early enough to yield its maximum potential.<sup>1083</sup> What PSYOP planning there was took place only at the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) level, and that was "inadequate." PSYOP personnel were unable to obtain adequate intelligence on the enemy in SITREP briefings and were, in fact, "frozen out" of the planning process at the higher levels in the name of "operational security" (OPSEC). A still-classified official study lamented the lack of timely PSYOP planning.

During URGENT FURY, improvisation replaced planning for PSYOP and CA activities. The small amount of PSYOP planning was conducted by LANTCOM level and above. However, this planning was inadequate, which may have been attributed to the timing of PSYOP and CA involvement or, more likely, to the inadequacy of contingency plans.....By the time PSYOP personnel became actively involved in the planning process, the 'thinking stage' had passed, and everything was required 'right now...."On arrival in Grenada, PSYOP elements had to spend a day trying to determine where to go and to whom to report."<sup>1084</sup>

All in all, PSYOP was not taken that seriously, and numerous opportunities were lost. For example, Ranger commanders later stated that they could have used PSYOP loudspeaker teams to talk PRA and Cubans out of their positions.

During the post-combat, "Consolidation" phase, "follow-on" PSYOP troops had to spend an entire day finding out where they were to be assigned, but soon enough noticed infantrymen haphazardly throwing food out of the backs of trucks to civilians or using documents of great intelligence value to warm up C-rations (and leaving the half-burned trash in Grenadian homes.) Obviously, "The behavior guide [for U.S. troops in Grenada]... prepared by qualified PSYOP officers not the

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<sup>1082</sup>Slides of these leaflets are in USASOC History Archives. See also A. Friedman, "Propaganda 'Bank Notes' of Two Recent American Wars," *I.B.N.S. Journal*, 30, No. 4.

<sup>1083</sup>D. P. Walko, "Psychological Operations in Panama (JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY)", in J. Moynihan, "Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies" (U.S. Special Operations Command, McDill AFB, Florida: December 1992), 166.

<sup>1084</sup>TRADOC, "Operation URGENT FURY," XII-7.

CINCLANT [Commander-in-Chief Atlantic] staff.", was being ignored.<sup>1085</sup> Matters were not helped by the fact that PSYOP was jumbled together with Civil Affairs and Public Relations. The large number of PRA and Cuban prisoners underlined the need for the Army's new Reserve Component (RC) 13<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion, which had the mission of looking after what were now being called Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs). But no Reserve PSYOP personnel were called up for URGENT FURY.<sup>1086</sup> In all, in the words of a post-conflict report, although "there [were] some [tactical successes]...." they "were only indicative of how much more successful a well planned, coordinated program could have been."<sup>1087</sup>

The Army would learn from Operation URGENT FURY, however. Grenada was also significant in showing that Americans had shaken off their "Post-Vietnam Syndrome" and were ready to support necessary military operations whose goal was not the sending of "messages" to the other side, but victory.

The year after Grenada, President Reagan, who certainly understood communications, directed the Department of Defense to rebuild its psychological operations capabilities. Acting on this directive Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, after a major evaluation, logically concluded that DOD's PSYOP capabilities had been allowed to atrophy in the post-Vietnam years. Two years later Weinberger approved the DOD Master Plan, which called, among much else, for the development of a comprehensive joint doctrine for PSYOP in time of war, peace or crisis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff published this doctrine in 1987. One of the most revolutionary initiatives of the Master Plan, the separation of PSYOP from Special Operations throughout the DOD, came in response to the feeling that PSYOP went well beyond the Special Operations context. But this initiative was never carried out, in the face of Army opposition.<sup>1088</sup>

In addition, the Secretary of Defense established in his office, for the first time in twenty years, a small psychological operations directorate, and the Department of the Army activated a Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs division in place of the single officer who had been devoted full-time to these activities. At the enlisted level the Department of the Army in 1985 established the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 96F in place of the previous intelligence MOSs 96B and 96C, which now provided specific professional development and career progression for PSYOP soldiers. Instruction in the new MOS began at the Special Warfare Center and School

<sup>1085</sup>Ibid., n.p.

<sup>1086</sup>Ibid.

<sup>1087</sup>"Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Low Intensity Conflict," JULS No. 99999-00029 (03829), JCS J-7 EAD (9 April 1992, quoted in Thomas Aslakson and Karen Robertson, "Psychological Operations at the Theater Level, U.S. Naval War College, Joint Special Operations forces (13 May 1992), 10.

<sup>1088</sup>The Hon. Richard Cheney, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc. subject: "Department of Defense Psychological Operations Master Plan," 10 February 1990; Paddock, 23-31.

in October of 1985 for both Active and Reserve Component soldiers. In addition a new PSYOP basic manual (FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*, 1987 edition) and training materials were quickly developed, the first doctrinal revisions since the Vietnam Conflict era. In 1990 all 96F troops were reclassified to the new MOS 37F.<sup>1089</sup>

The same memorandum which established the new MOS title also transferred PSYOP proponency and career management from Military Intelligence to Special Operations Forces [SOF]. This move gave the SOF community more control over PSYOP and ended the practice of PSYOP being an enlisted dumping ground for MI deadwood. Soldiers could now remain in the 4<sup>th</sup> POG longer for their career progression, concentrating on skill development in their jobs and improving their proficiency. In 1988 the Army began to make all PSYOP personnel Airborne qualified, bringing closer the day when they could deploy on most missions.<sup>1090</sup> The Pentagon established the combined US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987 at MacDill AFB, Florida, with a directorate for Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs (J-9). Further, in 1990 the Army created the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USASCAPOC) at Fort Bragg. The latter command was staffed primarily by Reserve Component personnel and reported to the new U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Airborne) (USASOC), also at Fort Bragg. Still, the shortages of qualified personnel remained through the 1980s although the Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School developed a Joint PSYOP Staff Planning Course in 1988 to address this need. But there was still little evidence that PSYOP was being integrated into the service schools at the time and the 4<sup>th</sup> POG, although roughly doubled in size, (with a little over 3,000 personnel) remained the sole active duty Army PSYOP organization, with insufficient resources to support all of the unified command requirements for mid- or high-intensity conflict. Thus more of the burden had to fall upon the Reserve Component PSYOP units.<sup>1091</sup>

## JUST CAUSE

Operation JUST CAUSE, the liberation of another Latin American nation, this

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<sup>1089</sup>Vivian, "Establishment of the 96th MOS," 4th POG (Fort Bragg, NC: n.d.)

<sup>1090</sup>U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Proponency Office, MSG Snyder, Memorandum for record, "Subject: Impact of Recent Developments on MOS 37F Leadership, 27 February 1992," USASOC History Archives.

<sup>1091</sup>Paddock, "'No More Tactical Information Detachments:' U.S. Military Psychological Operations in Transition," typescript (July 1992), copy in USASOC History Archives. Romjue, *Army of Excellence*, 83. For USACAPOC and USASOC see R. Stewart, *et al*, "Standing Up a MACOM" (USASOC Historical Review, 1987-1992), W. G. Boykin, *The Origins of the United States Special Operations Command* (MacDill AFB, Florida?, n.d.)



time Panama, from its tyrant, Manuel Noriega, was able to use many of the lessons learned from URGENT FURY. Now PSYOP was integrated into the planning process once again, as in Vietnam. And, in fact, throughout the operation, PSYOP was played a major role from beginning to well beyond the end of hostilities. Planning began as early as 1987 as the situation in Panama began to deteriorate into disorder and government-sponsored violence. PSYOP materials, including television, radio and loudspeaker tapes, radio and television scripts and music were being developed by the following year and pre-packaged for possible future use. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG even had a psychological profile drawn up of Noriega. The "lessons learned" from Grenada had been taken, in large measure, to heart.

One of the most significant moves in the preparation for an invasion contingency was the development of a PSYOP task force based on the regionally oriented 1<sup>st</sup> PSYOP Battalion of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG. The 1<sup>st</sup>'s commander was predeployed to Panama at the head of a 20-man element in case an invasion would be ordered. This team's predeployment was extremely important, for with the exception of three loudspeaker teams, it would be the only U.S. PSYOP asset in country until the PSYOP task force arrived on D plus 3. Virtually every battalion of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG was able to deploy personnel in and out of Panama well before hostilities. These troops familiarized themselves with the Panamanian terrain, people and military. A final preplanning operation was the signing of the bi-lingual surrender pass by MG Marc Cisneros, Commanding General, U.S. Army South, rather than General Max Thurman, CINC Southern Command; or LTG C. W. Stiner, Commander of Joint Task Force South. This was no reflection upon either of the latter estimable officers, but a recognition of the reputation that the fluent Spanish-speaking MG Cisneros had built up over the months among the Panamanians.<sup>1092</sup> General Stiner, in fact, was closely involved in PSYOP planning from the earliest stages, ordering, for example, that loudspeaker teams accompany combat forces down to the company level.

A major consideration in PSYOP pre-invasion planning was not only Panamanian civilians but also the large numbers of Americans, either military dependents or those employed on the Canal or elsewhere in a country that had such close, if tense, ties with the United States that its currency was the U.S. dollar. In fact, about 50 percent of all leaflets disseminated during combat operations were directed at civilians, either Panamanian or U.S.<sup>1093</sup>

One of the earliest U.S. PSYOP actions was the take-over of TV-2, Panama's

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<sup>1092</sup>Walko, "Psychological Operations," 169-170. Walko, oral interview. Army Training Activity, (U)"Operation JUST CAUSE, Army After-Action Report"(S) (Fort Leavenworth; 28 May 1990), 170, info used is UNCLASSIFIED.

<sup>1093</sup>For an overview early PSYOP planning and operations in JUST CAUSE, see USSOCOM, *Psychological Operations Support to Operation Just Cause*, USSOCOM History Archives, "Just Cause/CA/PSYOP/Promote Liberty" folder, 80-5a-6; LTC D. Walko, oral interview with author, USSOCOM HQ, McDill AFB, Florida, April 1993.

most popular TV stations, which had been inactivated and then reactivated by Special Forces troops. Immediately following TV-2's forced inactivation, prepackaged materials were broadcast over its frequency by VOLANT SOLO C-130 aircraft of the 193d Special Operations Group of the Pennsylvania National Guard, serving to calm a civilian population seething with fears and rumors.

Loudspeaker teams carried simple messages on pre-recorded Spanish (not Panamanian-Spanish)-language tapes and accompanied each major ground combat unit as well as each Navy SEAL company-size element and the Special Forces Task Force. This was probably the highest ratio to date of loudspeaker support to tactical combat units in U.S. military history. The mission of all of these PSYOP resources was the standard one of persuading the enemy to cease resistance and civilians to get out of the way. Loudspeaker messages stressed the legitimacy of the U.S. action, gave civilians news and information and worked to neutralize anti-American propaganda, arguing that the "Nord Americanos" had no quarrel with the people of Panama, only with Noriega and his corrupt and violent underlings.<sup>1094</sup> Leaflets had the same mission but, perhaps bearing in mind the ruthlessness of Noriega's para-military forces toward their own people, many of these messages were more blunt and threatening than anything used since Vietnam:

Attention, everyone in the building. You have 5 minutes to lay down your weapons and come out with your hands on your head. We intend to destroy the entire building and kill all of you in it....<sup>1095</sup>

An early indication in the field that PSYOP planning had paid off took place at the little village of La Chorrera, where Marines had faced heavy resistance for 24 hours from PDF and "Dignity Battalion" troops on the night of the invasion, 20 December 1989. After the Marines ceased fire for the night, loudspeaker teams broadcast surrender appeals and called in surrender leaflet drops. The next morning, without another shot being fired, resistance ceased and surrendering troops came forward clutching their safe conduct passes.<sup>1096</sup>

In at least two separate instances PSYOP troops were able to persuade enemy forces to release safely U.S. civilian hostages at the Torrijos/Tocumin International Airport. In both cases verbal persuasion proved sufficient. PDF forces holding two

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<sup>1094</sup>COL A. Normandy (former 4th POG CO) oral interview with USSOC Command Historian, MacDill AFB, Florida, 29 March 1993; Walko oral interview.

<sup>1095</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, "Psychological Operations Support to Operation Just Cause," briefing slides paper copies.; USSOCOM "Just Cause/CA/PSYOP/Promote Liberty" folder; Normand and Walko oral interviews with USSOCOM Command Historian, MacDill AFB, Florida, 29 March 1990; Walko oral interview with author; Walko, "Psychological Operations," 166-167. Other leaflets noted here are found in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>1096</sup>Ibid., Also, Walko interview.

female U.S. citizens in the customs room of the airport, "stunned" and "confused" by the initial Ranger assault, gave up their hostages when ordered to do so by a 4<sup>th</sup> POG loudspeaker team with its megaphones turned up to full power. In the other hostage situation at the airport, a PSYOP loudspeaker team leader was called in as an *in extremis* negotiator when a cornered PDF leader threatened to kill his hostages. The NCO called out:

Are you soldiers of Panama or criminals? Soldiers use only their weapons and their honor. They do not hide behind women and children.

The hostages were released soon after, unharmed.<sup>1097</sup>

Operation JUST CAUSE was also distinguished by the use of PSYOP by combat units on their own initiative. The literally most far-reaching example, was the "Ma Bell" technique. This gambit began when MAJ Gilberto Perez, a Spanish language-trained 7<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group officer, telephoned the commander of an enemy stronghold near the city of David from a local public school. MAJ Perez informed the PDF commander, a fellow student from Fort Bragg training days, that "We would like to arrange a personal surrender," and reminded the commander that the AC-130 gunship circling overhead could cut his garrison to ribbons in short order. He also pointed out that a Ranger force was headed his way by helicopter and that he had "better hurry." With only minutes to spare before the Ranger assault, MAJ Perez and other Special Forces troops landed on a baseball field behind the PDF barracks. There they found the garrison, lined up at attention, ready for the surrender ceremonies. (In these, punctilio prevailed all the more; the Panamanian flag was not hauled down, it was simply joined by "Old Glory.") "The Ma Bell" technique was catching; Special Forces "telephoned ahead" to secure the peaceful surrender of enemy resistance centers in the hinterlands of western and eastern Panama.<sup>1098</sup>

PSYOP troops also acted as mediators on several occasions, dissuading combat units from issuing "surrender or die" ultimatums, which would have been resisted to the death by "macho" Panamanians. In fact, the term "surrender" was never officially used; "cease hostilities" was the preferred phrase.<sup>1099</sup> In a repeat of successful

<sup>1097</sup>Open briefing by LTG Stiner, Fort Bragg Officers' Club, 15 February 1990.

<sup>1098</sup>Stiner briefing; classified taped briefing by COL R. C. Jacobelly, Commander of Task Force Black, Fort Bragg, 2 February 1990. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; MAJ Gilberto Perez, oral interview with USASOC Command Historian, 8 September 1992; MAJ Kevin Higgins, oral interview with USASOC Command Historian, 5 June 1992; DA, *Soldiers in Panama: Stories of Operation Just Cause* (Washington[?], n.d.), 13, 16-17.

<sup>1099</sup>D. C. Waller, *The Commandos: The Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers* (New York, London, etc.: 1994), 287; 4<sup>th</sup> POG, enlisted personnel group interview by author, 9 April 1990.

## SAFE CONDUCT PASS INSTRUCTIONS

THIS SAFE CONDUCT PASS IS FOR USE BY DIGNITY BATTALION AND CODEPADI MEMBERS. THE BEARER OF THIS PASS, UPON PRESENTING IT TO ANY U.S. MILITARY MEMBER OR PUBLIC PANAMANIAN FORCE, WILL BE GUARANTEED PROTECTION, MEDICAL ATTENTION, FOOD, AND SHELTER.



MAJOR GENERAL MARC A. CISNEROS  
CG, US ARMY SOUTH

## SAFE CONDUCT PASS INSTRUCTIONS

JUST CAUSE Safe Conduct leaflet, signed by MG Cisneros, CINCSOUTH.

# SALVOCONDUCTO

ESTE SALVOCONDUCTO ES PARA EL USO DE MIEMBROS DE BATALLONES DE LA DIGNIDAD Y EL CODEPADI. AL PRESENTAR ESTE SALVOCONDUCTO A CUALQUIER EFECTIVO MILITAR DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS, POLICIA MILITAR O FUERZA PUBLICA PANAMENA, LE GARANTIZAMOS SU SEGURIDAD, ATENCION MEDICA, COMIDA Y UN LUGAR DE DESCANSO Y RECUPERACION.

PARA MAS INFORMACION  
SINTONICE EL 1160 AM EN SU RADIO.



MAYOR GENERAL MARC A. CISNEROS  
COMANDANTE DE TROPAS DEL EJERCITO SUR

# SALVOCONDUCTO

Grenadian PSYOP, the Army and the new Panamanian government was again used the money-for-weapons bait.<sup>1100</sup> Quite early, it became obvious that U.S. Army PSYOP was working. Civilians warned to stay away from an certain area did as they were told, and those given a telephone number to call for information kept the lines tied up. "Wanted" posters were soon taken down by civilians, the better to memorize faces and write down numbers, and PSYOP newspapers were re-sold by Panamanians at a premium.<sup>1101</sup>

Perhaps less successful was a 4<sup>th</sup> POG Christmas card depicting a cigarette-holding U.S. soldier giving gifts to children which some observers felt was condescending to Panamanians and wondered about the cigarette. Others were critical of the pre-packaged Spanish tapes, pointing out that Panamanian Spanish, at least in pronunciation, was noticeably different from Puerto Rican or Mexican Spanish.<sup>1102</sup> Although the carefully pre-tested PSYOP news sheet, *Perspectivas*, seemed to get off to a good start with the general population, some American "experts" then claimed that the word "perspectivas" did not mean the same to Panamanians as it did to Americans. The *Perspectivas* staff, ever sensitive to the cultural nuances, accordingly changed the name on the masthead to the inoffensive *Nueva Republica*, only to discover a little later a new, briskly-selling pro-American Panamanian journal entitled (what else?), *Perspectivas*.<sup>1103</sup> Nonetheless, *Perspectivas/Nueva Republica* was so popular that enterprising Panamanians would seize bundles of the papers dropped off by 4<sup>th</sup> POG personnel and proceed to hawk them in the streets, at a price.<sup>1104</sup> Another example of the cultural meticulousness required in this campaign could be found in the

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<sup>1100</sup>Ibid., Walko, "Psychological Operations," 173. According to a PSYOP officer who subsequently became Commanding Officer of the 4th POG, the weapons buy back went "very well." COL J. Jones, oral interview with author, 2 February 1995. One Panamanian civilian actually turned in an armored vehicle. He was paid the top amount for a weapon: \$150, and seemed pleased enough. No one asked how he had obtained such an outsized piece of military equipment. U.S. Special Operations Command, *Psychological Operations in Panama*, 16.

<sup>1101</sup>USASOC History Archives PSYOP slides; Walko, "Psychological Operations," 174-176; Walko oral interview; U.S. Special Operations Command, *Psychological Operations in Panama*, 20-21 USASOC History PSYOP slides. Special Operations Command, Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J9, *Psychological Operations in Panama During Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty* (MacDill AFB: March 1994); Walko interview.

<sup>1102</sup>Copy in USASOC History Archives PSYOP slides; Personal accounts to author by 4<sup>th</sup> POG personnel. See also USSOCOM, *Psychological Operations in Panama, passim*.

<sup>1103</sup>Ibid.; oral communications from 4<sup>th</sup> POG personnel. The title also did not seem to bother enterprising locals, who, as noted, picked up many copies of the U.S. news sheet and sold them to compatriots. copy in USASOC History Archives slides.

<sup>1104</sup>U.S. Special Operations Command, *Psychological Operations in Panama*, 19.

# PERSPECTIVAS

No. II

28 de Diciembre de 1989

## ASILO NO! SANTUARIO SI.

## ESPAÑA NO ACEPTA A NORIEGA

**Panama, Panama (Reuter)** - El día de nochebuena, en la ciudad de Panama, Manuel Noriega intento obtener asilo politico en la nunciatura del Nuncio Papal.

El Vaticano expreso que no le ha sido garantizado el asilo y que acciones para resolver la situacion comenzaran, "a la mayor brevedad posible."

El portavoz principal del Vaticano, Joaquin N.V., publico una declaracion expresando que el gobierno del presidente panameño Guillermo Endara, es la fuente principal de informacion en respecto al problema del intento de Noriega para lograr asilo.

"El principal protagonista sera el gobierno legitimo de Panama con el que se sostendran todas las conversaciones y se haran los acuerdos." Cuestionado sobre la posibilidad de que Noriega sea entregado a las autoridades estadounidenses, J.N.V. expreso, "el dilema ahora es el estado legal de Noriega. No le ha sido otorgado el estado legal y oficial de asilado, y solo es huésped de la Nunciatura." Navarro Valle asadio, "puedo decir que Noriega expreso un deseo vehemente de concluir el conflicto. Esta es la principal razon por la cual le fue permitido permanecer en

la Nunciatura." Fuentes de informacion sostienen que la demora en tratar con el problema de Noriega, en respecto al asilo politico, es debido a los recesos de la epoca Navideña del personal de rotacion.

Quince diplomaticos fueron convocados para deliberar como manejar la situacion. Uno de los diplomaticos cree que el abalido "hombre fuerte" de Panama intento lograr asilo en Cuba o Espana.

Cientos de tropas estadounidenses, con 12 transportes de personal armados, sitiaron la Nunciatura Papal en la capital de Panama.

Cuando la sorprendente noticia, de que Noriega se habia ocultado en la Nunciatura se propago, multitudines se congregaron en los alrededores de la mision gritando, "Noriega asesino.", mientras los conductores hacian sonar sus vocinas. Algunas personas expresaron, en entrevistas de television, que retiraran las tropas norteamericanas para que ellos se pudieran encargar de Noriega.

Si Noriega fuera entregado a las autoridades estadounidenses seria tratado como un criminal bajo los cargos que le han sido formulados por trafico de drogas.

## MADRID, ESPAÑA (REUTER)-

El ministro de relaciones exteriores, Francisco Fernandez Ordoñez declaro que Espana entregaria el dictador depuesto Manuel Noriega, a las autoridades norteamericanas si buscara asilo aquí. Ordoñez dijo en la radio nacional que si Noriega viniera a España le enviaria a los EEUU a enfrentar juicio por el narcotrafico y el lavado de dinero, debido a un acuerdo (sobre extradiciones) de 1970 entre Washington y Madrid. El ministro indico que Noriega habia pedido asilo en varios paises, que incluye España y Cuba. Noriega se presento en la nunciatura en Panama, el Domingo pasado, despues de cinco dias de correr de los soldados norteamericanos. Ordoñez, quien antes consulto al primer ministro, Felipe Gonzalez, dijo que España no iba a participar en las negociaciones entre el Vaticano y los EEUU. Añadio que España no tiene nada que decir o decidir en cuanto a lo que el Vaticano decida hacer con Noriega.

## CANAL TIENE SERVICIO NORMAL

**Panama, (AC)** - El Administrador de la Comision de Canal del Panama ha recibido instrucciones para reanudar el uso del canal las 24 horas del dia. La Comision del Canal, las naves y los barcos que transitan las vias podran operar para conducir sus negocios de la forma usual. Los empleados del canal estan autorizados a efectuar transacciones de acuerdo a los procedimientos normales en lo que concierne a los vehiculos en el area. El gobierno de Panama, con el proposito de preservar la seguridad de los trabajadores de la Comision del Canal de Panama, no permitira excepciones en lo relacionado al toque de queda. El uso cotidiano del canal no sera impedido excepto bajo situaciones de emergencia tactica no predecibles.

## LINEA PATRIOTICA 82-3209 o 82-4272

Con operadoras de las 0600 a.m. hasta las 11:00 p.m. para reportar almacenamientos de armas y municiones, o actividades criminales como las de los criminales de los difuntos batallones de dignidad.

## RECONCILIADOS

Los siguientes oficiales de importancia decidieron reconciliarse con el gobierno legitimo del pueblo panameño:

**Arnulfo Castrejon** - Cmdte. Anterior de las Fuerzas Navales  
**Daniel Delgado** - Cmdte. Anterior de las Fuerzas Policiales  
**Carlos Arosemena** - Miembro Anterior del Estado Mayor del FDP

El pueblo panameño espera ansiosamente el retorno de los demas miembros engañados de las FF.DD.PP.

## CAPTURADO

### MAYOR CLETO HERNANDEZ

Director Militar de San Miguelito

### ORVILLE GOODIN

Ministro de Finanzas

### RAUL LEVY

Director de Ingresos

TU AYUDA HIZO LA DIFERENCIA  
LLAMA AL 87-4965 CON INFORMACION  
SOBRE LOS CRIMINALES DE NORIEGA

## SI, A SANTA CLAUS

**Panama (AC)** - El 25 de Diciembre de 1989 llego con espíritu de cristianismo y cooperacion cuando voluntarios panameños y soldados estadounidenses entregaron una sorpresa especial al cuartel general del Ejercito de Salvacion, en Balboa. Portado en tres camiones grandes, el envio incluyo vestidos, zapatos, y juguetes. El Sr. Allan Wiltshire, el director del ES de Panama, uso su red de personal para entregar los juguetes y vestidos a niños panameños.

## EL AEROPUERTO MEJORA

**Panama (AC)** - El aeropuerto internacional Omar Torrijos hace preparaciones para resumir operaciones normales en el corto plazo. Las actividades actuales parecen mas normales, mientras la rutina diaria reemplaza el cierre reciente.

Los obreros van al trabajo, las tiendas abren, y personal ha sido empleado para limpiar el aeropuerto. El Martes un avion venezolano llego a entregar abastecimientos de asistencia humanitaria y a proveer transporte a ciudadanos venezolanos que regresaban a su pais. Mas tarde una tripulacion costarricense y pasajeros salieron.

Las precauciones de seguridad deben ser obedidas todavia para evitar molestias a la gente o daños a las facilidades. El inconveniente es solo temporal, dijeron las autoridades. Los restaurantes estan cerrados, pero las tiendas libres de impuestos estan abiertas. Los otros servicios empiezan a funcionar. Pronto el aeropuerto empezara a bienvenir a hombres de negocios, turistas, y otros viajeros internacionales.

*Perspectivas, JUST CAUSE. Is there anything "wrong" with the Spanish language herein?*

printing of the Panamanian National Seal on a PSYOP Task Force product. The product proved technically excellent; the only problem was that the eagle atop the Seal was not that of the Panama but the bald eagle of the United States. The leaflet was hurriedly withdrawn before the levying of any charges of "imperialism" or cultural insensitivity could surface.<sup>1105</sup>

Indeed, in an example of how U.S. PSYOP could be used against the U.S., and somewhat reminiscent of what had happened in Vietnam, the Army's PSYOP success in the field was largely blanked out in the outside world by the vivid images and sounds of U.S. loudspeakers blaring out rock 'n roll toward the Papal Nuncio refuge of Noriega, a supposed opera lover. Whatever the reason for this action, the international image was one of cultural barbarism.

Finally, Army PSYOP brought in its own radio station, 1760 (10 kw) within hours, perhaps minutes, of H-Hour, and featuring one sergeant announcer by day and the other by night, broadcasting the usual announcements, information and exhortations, along with stretches of popular music. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG also had a television capacity, but found out soon enough that most Panamanians watched CNN.<sup>1106</sup>

As planned, PSYOP supported Civil Affairs in Panama, particularly in the 96<sup>th</sup> Civil Affairs Displaced Civilian camp, first established in Balboa. A tactical PSYOP loudspeaker team was set up in the camp, amplifying the PSYOP radio station over its loudspeaker system, relaying information, generally trying to put camp residents at their ease and exercising rumor control (one rumor was that all Chinese who were registered in the camp were on their way to the United States. Consequently, there was a flood of Chinese-Panamanians claiming "war refugee" status and entry to the camp.) The team also gathered information and reported problems, concerns and possible troublemakers.<sup>1107</sup>

After the restoration of order, the consolidation of the new government and the return of the indigenous public information system the PSYOP Task Force stood down and was replaced by a PSYOP Support Element (PSE) of nearly 50 personnel. The U.S. PSYOP effort now moved out into nation-wide activities. These activities formed part of Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, which provided PSYOP support to the newly-created Military Support Group, which, in turn provided military support to the fledgling democracy established in Panama. One of the main missions of the PSE supported or initiated a host of activities with the Panamanian Ministries of Government and Justice, Public Works, Health, Education and the National Air Service. The PSE, working and deploying with Special Forces teams, conventional

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<sup>1105</sup>Ibid., 23.

<sup>1106</sup>Walko interview; ltr, CPT Erin Gallogly to author, 24 June 1995.

<sup>1107</sup>Ibid., 173; taped oral interviews; author with 96<sup>th</sup> CA personnel, April 1990; U.S. Special Operations Command, *Psychological Operations in Panama*, 17; U.S. Special Operations Command, (U)"Operation Just Cause Final After Action Report"(S) "United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) chapter (MacDill AFB, Florida: 15 March 1990), 5, info used is UNCLASSIFIED.



units, military police, engineers and medical and Civil Affairs personnel actually produced and disseminated more messages and were involved in more activities than during JUST CAUSE itself until it stood down in May of 1991. For example, the PSE produced anti-drug and pro-democracy messages for elementary schools and produced thousands of leaflets warning of the causes and risks of the deadly dengue fever and its prevention. Throughout the Panamanian campaign U.S. Army PSYOP had displayed an effectiveness and professionalism indicating that the rebuilding effort of the 1980's had not been wasted and that many of the lessons of URGENT FURY had indeed been learned.<sup>1108</sup>

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<sup>1108</sup>Ibid., 178-179; SGT P. Jones and COL J. B. Jones, "Psychological Operations and Nation-Building in Panama Operation 'Promote Liberty,'" *Perspectives*, 8, No. 3 (Fall 1993); John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 15 April 1992); P. Vergara, COL Jones, "Psychological Operations and Nation-Building in Panama: Operation 'Promote Liberty'" (Fort Bragg: n.d.) (COL Jones was Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG at the time of this writing.); U.S. Special Operations Command, *Psychological Operations in Panama*, 25-29. The U.S. Information Agency Advisor to the Army's Special Operations Command wrote soon after JUST CAUSE that "the psychological operations plan for the removal of Noriega developed by Colonel Normand and the 4<sup>th</sup> Group, was worked to perfection." High praise indeed from an organization that a few years previous had looked down Army PSYOP as an unprofessional upstart., F. Scotton, USIA Advisor, Memorandum for COL McKnight, DCSOPS, USASOC. "Subject: Operation Just Cause After-Action Report," 24 January 1990. See also Ayers, Thomas C. (U)"U.S. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs During Operation Just Cause: An Assessment."(SECRET/NOFORN) U.S. Naval War College study. (June 1991). See also D. Walko, D. P., "Psychological Operations in Panama (JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY), in J. Moynihan, "Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies." U.S. Special Operations Command History Office (MacDill AFB, Florida. December 1992.)

## OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Operation DESERT STORM, the liberation of Kuwait, certainly continued the proof that the rehabilitation of the U.S. Army and its PSYOP assets during the 1980's had amounted to considerably more than the spending of a lot of money on a lot of new and exotic equipment and management systems. Building on the lessons learned from JUST CAUSE, Army PSYOP carried out successful and wide-ranging psychological operations that can be credited with netting a large proportion of the 87,000 EPWs counted at the close of that conflict. (By this time, the acronym "EPW" had replaced the old "POW," thus finally ending the terminological confusion of, "Whose POWs, ours or theirs?")

As quickly as 11 August 1990, that is only nine days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a cell of 12 PSYOP specialists, under the supervision of the commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG, COL Anthony Normand, assembled at MacDill AFB, Florida, headquarters of the joint services U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to commence strategic PSYOP planning for possible operations in South West Asia. This, of course, was well before the U.S. National Command Authorities had even agreed upon a response to Iraqi aggression. The overall plan was worked out in cooperation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), the joint services command responsible for any U.S. military operations in Southwest Asia.<sup>1109</sup> Within five days the cell, which had arrived in Saudi Arabia on 31 August, had briefed the CENTCOM Commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, on the plan, which he approved and promptly forwarded for approval to the Joint Chiefs.

The coordinated PSYOP plan took into account the cultures, languages and sensibilities of the peoples of Southwest Asia. It stressed that the coalition now forming had no designs of Iraq or its people, but had come together solely to evict the evil Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein from his stolen territory. It also encouraged the Iraqi government to remove Saddam and sought to stiffen the resistance inside Kuwait and encourage noncooperation with the invaders.

U.S. PSYOP benefited immeasurably from the presence of 4<sup>th</sup> POG specialists who were already in Southwest Asia, working with U.S. defense attaches in the Sinai with the Multinational Force and Observers, in Jordan, Djibouti, and Yemen, for the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait and even in Iraq itself. They had gained invaluable cultural, military and linguistic experience in these positions up to the invasion of Kuwait.<sup>1110</sup>

<sup>1109</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations During Desert Shield/Storm: A Post-Operational Analysis*, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), 2-5 to 2-6; COL A. Normand, oral interview with USASOC Command Historian, 10 October 1991.

<sup>1110</sup>COL J. B. Jones, *Psychological Operations in Desert Storm and Urban Freedom, Special Warfare*, July 1994. COL Jones commanded the 8<sup>th</sup> Battalion of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG

Operational planning proceeded on a "worst case" scenario, that of a protracted struggle with the "battle-hardened" Iraqi Army. The latter phrase had become something of a cliché among inside-the-beltway civilian military affairs pundits, who professed to be somehow impressed by the fact that the Iraqis had been able to mow down large numbers of Iranian teenagers---and still almost lose the war with Iran a few years earlier. Many of these "experts" had also posited that the future would see a series of guerilla and counter-insurgency campaigns rather than any large-scale "conventional" clash of arms in open territory, which, of course, was almost precisely what the Gulf War turned out to be. Most apparently took in all seriousness the "Mother of All Battles" nonsense of Saddam. After the rout of the Iraqis, these selfsame "experts" then proceeded to explain in some detail how the Coalition victory was, of course, an obviously foregone conclusion, due to the Third World nature of the Iraqi Army, Allied control of the air, blah, blah.<sup>1111</sup>

The PSYOP planning package was greatly revised, however, and was subsequently delayed in approval by its complexity, as well as the concerns of several Coalition partners, the number of federal agencies involved, as well as questions about overt and covert phases, as it was laboriously worked through the higher authorities in Washington. The resulting Department of Defense (DOD) subplan contained only 35 of the original 117 actions of the original plan. It took 21 days for this plan to make its way to the desk of the Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, although Cheney himself approved it in one day. Provisional approval of this document was transmitted to General Schwarzkopf, who, understandably, was not pleased. In what an official report terms "a strongly worded message," General Schwarzkopf urged the need to reincorporate immediately at least 21 important deleted PSYOP actions, which he fully intended to implement. General Schwarzkopf's impatience was understandable, for he

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during JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM and later became Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG.

<sup>1111</sup>One has only to peruse any popular news journals or scripts of television and radio newscasts to see just how few authorities took the opposite, but correct, view: that the Iraqi Army was a typical Third World force, with unprofessional, uncaring officers and cowed, conscripted soldiers. This ramshackle force had done very poorly against Israel on a number of occasions, as well as nearly losing its war with Iran that it had started with all the advantages of surprise, control of the air and modern Soviet-supplied equipment. Much was made of Saddam's artillery, missiles and chemical weapons. (If quality of weapons made the difference in battle the French would have stopped the Germans cold in 1940.) And at the moment that even intransigent Islamic nations like Syria were joining the coalition one could always find academic Middle East "authorities" with scare stories of the entire Islamic world rising as one against the "new crusaders." It all makes sobering reading and one cannot entirely escape the impression that some of these doomsayer actually wished for the U.S. to lose or at least to become bogged down in "another Vietnam" and see the resurrection "the '60s."

had pointed out (on 20 December 1990) that "Psychological operations are going to be absolutely a critical, critical part of any campaign that we must get involved in."<sup>1112</sup> By early December the Office of the Secretary of Defense had approved 16 of General Schwarzkopf's 21 proposals.<sup>1113</sup>

Weeks, even months, were lost in this bureaucratic to-ing and fro-ing, time put to good use by Saddam's propaganda mills, grinding out their well-financed, orchestrated campaign to the Islamic world. The secularist Saddam now, most improbably, "got religion," having himself photographed in traditional Islamic garb and calling upon the Arab world to rally against the "infidels," the "New Crusaders" against the true Islamic faith.<sup>1114</sup>

<sup>1112</sup>USSOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-1; (U)USSOCOM Classified Briefing(S), n.d., J-28. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. General Schwarzkopf's strong remonstrance over the glacial pace of DOD approval of the theater PSYOP plan demonstrated that he had more than just a command interest in PSYOP campaign. There is strong evidence that he wrote at least one leaflet and was involved more generally in others., CPT A. Mather oral interview with author., 3 December 1991.

<sup>1113</sup>U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), (U)"U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned,' DESERT SHIELD/STORM'"(S), Bragg, North Carolina, n.d., 3-8, info used is UNCLASSIFIED (emphasis in original); Memo for Commander, USASOC, from Chief of Staff, USACAPOC, subject: Lessons Learned from DESERT SHIELD, 15 April 1991; COL. J. Jones, oral interview with author, 20 September 1991; Memo from Chief, USAJFKSWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD)/PO/SOIS Division, subject: PSYOP Lessons Learned from DESERT STORM, n.d.; COL L. Dunbar (4<sup>th</sup> POG CO), oral interview with author, 29 July 1991; USAJFKSWCS DOTD, "PSYOP Lessons Learned from DESERT STORM," n.d. According to the 4<sup>th</sup> POG's commander, General Schwarzkopf's message was a blistering memorandum, excoriating "blundering bureaucrats." But it did break up the infarction., COL Normand interview. COL Normand's successor was equally denunciatory: "Quite literally, months of potential psychological preparation of the battlefield were wasted., COL J. Jones "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom, USAWC PERSONAL Experience Monograph, U.S. Army War College (1 March 1992), 1-2. For the "other side", see DOD, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington, April: 1992), J-27-31; R. R. Begland, "Lessons of Value to be Learned from Operation Desert Shield, Desert Storm - Provide Comfort," draft, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (Alexandria, Virginia: 5 March 1992), no pagination. Waller, 289-290.

<sup>1114</sup>Department of the Army, U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, (S)*Iraq's PSYOP War: Targeting the Arab World*(U) (Washington: October 1990). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; 4<sup>th</sup> POG(A), "Psychological Operations Assessment, Iraqi Propaganda and Disinformation in the

But things were finally moving in the United States and among its Coalition allies. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG, most of whose personnel were by now Airborne qualified, was still the Army's only active-duty PSYOP outfit. The unit, composed of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup> battalions and the provisional PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB) (the latter formed as a result of lessons learned in JUST CAUSE), assumed command and control of all PSYOP units and elements in Southwest Asia. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG, in turn, reported to USCENTCOM, which exercised operational command of all U.S. PSYOP assets in theater. Many of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG personnel, of course, brought with them their experience in tactical PSYOP from the very recent JUST CAUSE campaign.

In contrast to the glacial pace of the PSYOP planning approval process the deployment and mobilization of PSYOP personnel was rapid. In fact, the 4<sup>th</sup> POG S-3 claimed that there were enough PSYOP assets in country as early as the end of August to go to work, had the PSYOP plan been approved.<sup>1115</sup> Even in the Reserve Component units, there was timely alert, mobilization and deployment of individuals as small specially skilled PSYOP personnel. But only a relatively small number of such personnel --110-- were mobilized, in contrast to the approximately 900 total PSYOP personnel serving in DESERT SHIELD/STORM.<sup>1116</sup>

Although no complete RC PSYOP unit was mobilized for service in Southwest Asia, significant U.S. tactical RC PSYOP support elements were provided by:

13 <sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion (EPW)	Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota
18 <sup>th</sup> PSYOP Company,	St. Louis, Missouri
19 <sup>th</sup> PSYOP Company,	Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota
244 <sup>th</sup> PSYOP Company,	Abilene, Texas
245 <sup>th</sup> PSYOP Company, (Airborne),	Dallas, Texas
362d PSYOP Company,	Fayetteville, Arkansas
193d Special Operations Group,	(Pennsylvania Air National Guard.) <sup>1117</sup>

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Gulf Crisis. (Fort Bragg, NC: 18 September 1990); Bill Licatovich, "Iraqi Propaganda Ploys," *Soldiers*, 6 January 1991.

<sup>1115</sup>MAJ H. Perry, oral interview with author, 13 November 1991, Fort Bragg; Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield," 1.

<sup>1116</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 3-4.

<sup>1117</sup>USASOC, "Psychological Operations," 3-6 to 3-7; Johnson, 59. This author also pointed out that no RC women were mobilized for PSYOP duty in Southwest Asia; the reasons given were that the presence of female soldiers would outrage the typical Arab male, and that enemy EPWs would be much more hesitant about providing any information to a woman. Also, the Defense Department claimed that only loudspeaker teams were required for the war, and that these teams had to be entirely male, due to the physical demands of handling this heavy equipment. Yet certain RC non-loudspeaker teams were indeed sent to the theater, all male. Of course, numerous AC female soldiers served in Southwest Asia., Johnson, 59-60. Personnel from the USAF RC 193d Special Operations Group were able to self-deploy as early as 27 August

Although the mobilization of individuals rather than units did speed the validation process, a price was paid in the deployment of troops without the support of their own chain of command, and on cohesion, morale and combat efficiency.<sup>1118</sup>

It is illustrative of the Joint and Combined nature of their work that RC PSYOP personnel were spread, thinly, to support the following Coalition units:

- US VIIth Corps
- US XVIII Airborne Corps
- US 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force
- US 2d Marine Expeditionary Force
- UK 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Division
- French 6<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Infantry Division

This RC support was, of course, in addition to their work with the Kuwaitis and the Saudis.

Before proceeding to Southwest Asia, PSYOP Reservists had to undergo a USACAPOC validation program which in some cases imposed even higher standards than those of the Active Component Army. A gratifying 98 percent of RC PSYOP personnel met the validation requirements. (Those who did not were transferred by USACAPOC to assignments not requiring deployment skills.)<sup>1119</sup>

In the meantime, a PSYOP Task Force had been formed around the nucleus of the 8<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion, which was later succeeded by the *ad hoc* 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group, Forward, which assumed command and control responsibilities for the overall PSYOP effort, freeing the 8<sup>th</sup> POB to concentrate on product development.<sup>1120</sup>

In addition, a (Combined) Coalition Warfare Cell had been formed in October. The Cell was headed by a Saudi brigadier general, included COL Normand and reported to General Schwarzkopf. The Cell eventually numbered 100 Americans (from the 8<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion and the PDB), British, Egyptian and Kuwaiti representatives, who were involved in the operation of the Voice of the Gulf (VOG)

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because they were already serving on Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD) which required no activation orders, and the unit's charter specified that its members be available for short notice deployment., USASOC, "Psychological Operations," 3-8.

<sup>1118</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 5-8.

<sup>1119</sup>Ibid., 3-10; BG J. Hurteau (USACAPOC commander), oral interview with author, 9 August 1990. A good account of RC PSYOP mobilization is found in CPT J.

Richardson, oral interview with USASOC Command Historian, 23 April 1991, Saudi Arabia. See also U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command, G-3, message, subject: Operation DESERT SHIELD Validation Program for Mobilized Civil Affairs and PSYOP Units, n.d.; USARSOC Chief of Staff, Memorandum of Instruction, subj: Operation DESERT SHIELD Validation Program, 2 Oct 90.

<sup>1120</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-6 to 4-7.

translating and pretesting PSYOP products. Its first mission was to encourage Iraqi "line crossers."<sup>1121</sup> PSYOP liaison with the U.S. "country team", which included the U.S. Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the deputy chief of mission, representatives of the U.S. Information Service and members of the defense attaché office was close and even cordial.<sup>1122</sup>

The clandestine Voice of the Gulf, consisting of three AM and two FM stations, began operations on 28 November. Its 50 kW transmitter, backed up by the 4<sup>th</sup> POG's mobile 10KW stations used six broadcast "platforms": two EC-130E VOLANT SOLO, aircraft flown by the keen Pennsylvanians of the 193d Special Operations Group, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, and two each ground stations in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The VOG originally carried only music, then music, sports and news and, finally, news and PSYOP appeals for an average of 18 hours per day. The PSYOP messages emphasized the military hopelessness of Saddam's cause, his poor leadership, etc. Later broadcasts featured widowed Iraqi women, brothers, sons, etc., lamenting their losses in the Iran-Iraq war and blaming it all on Saddam. Many VOG broadcasts were also transmitted into the Coalition's EPW cages. The scripts were prepared by the 8<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion's representatives in the Coalition PSYOP cell and were broadcast by a Kuwaiti well-known throughout that part of the Middle East. To the end, the fiction was maintained that this was a purely Arab station. This deception probably had much to do with the fact that EPWs reported that the VOG was their third most listened-to station, after the BBC and Radio Monte Carlo. It is significant that the main objective of the VOLANT SOLO rebroadcasts was to demonstrate to Iraqi commanders the vulnerabilities of their communications, thus slowing down their responsiveness, sowing suspicion and generally degrading the enemy's communication efficiency. Enemy surrenders (and there was no evidence of any at the time) "would be a side benefit." The VOG was used tactically at least once, after an alert PSYOP officer had picked up in a EPW cage the intelligence that many men in a particular enemy unit believed that they were three to four days away from the Americans. He contacted VOG and had them broadcast that unit's true position, just one day from the Americans, and the defectors increased.<sup>1123</sup>

<sup>1121</sup>USACAPOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-5; Johnson, *Gulf Paper War*, 46; MAJ M. Littlejohn, MAJ H. Perry, oral interviews with author, 20 February 1992, 13 November 1991 respectively, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. MAJ Littlejohn and others have pointed out that it was almost impossible to interrogate these "line crossers," as they were quickly spirited away by the Saudis.

<sup>1122</sup>Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Storm," 29, writes that such "support for PSYOP could not have been better," 28.

<sup>1123</sup>Johnson, 54-58. CPT Auftegarten oral interview. The VOG's final deception was to broadcast that the Army's 82d Airborne Division and elements of the Kuwaiti armed forces were at that very moment executing a great combat parachute jump into Kuwait City, an operation that, of course, never took place., *ibid.*, 56; Jones, *Personal Experience*, 5.

In the field U.S. PSYOP units made much less use than expected of their transmitters (principally the 50 kw, backed up by portable 10 kW stations) which were bulky and heavy and limited by geological anomalies in the desert.<sup>1124</sup> Doubts had been expressed during World War II, Korea and Vietnam as to how enemy soldiers in the field could ever listen to U.S. radio messages in that they were in all likelihood closely monitored by their NCOs and could not at any rate be expected to listen to radio very easily. But in DESERT SHIELD/STORM there was little question that the Iraqi soldier often had access to fairly extensive electronic communications gear, and if that were not enough, also carried thousands of civilian radios looted from the prosperous Kuwaitis. In fact, the Iraqi Army command began to confiscate non-tactical radios soon into the air war. The Iraqi troops, starved for news however, proved all the more receptive to the blandishments of the VOG, the BBC, Radio Monte Carlo, etc., even to the putative "resistance" station, "Free Voice of Iraqi People."<sup>1125</sup> In purely tactical PSYOP radio operations the 4<sup>th</sup> POG broadcast instructions, news and morale sustaining material to the Kuwaiti resistance movement inside that occupied country. In addition U.S. Army Special Forces began in November to broadcast radio deception as well as scripted Arabic messages over Iraqi military and civilian AM frequencies.<sup>1126</sup>

Although it would fit more into the strategic than the tactical PSYOP picture, the video documentary, *Nations of the World Take a Stand*, should be noted. This message, produced by the PDB and shown throughout the Arab world, including (clandestinely, of course), in Baghdad, effectively and graphically outlined Saddam's isolation and the odds arrayed against him.<sup>1127</sup>

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<sup>1124</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-9, 4-19, 5-11. One promising PSYOP radio ploy was the broadcasting of a so-called "1-800-SURRENDER" message. Interested Iraqi commanders could call back on a designated frequency and receive information on how to surrender their units safely and with dignity. However, the war ended before U.S. monitors received anything more than a "nibble.", MAJ Perry oral interview with author, 13 November 1991.

<sup>1125</sup>Ibid. 4<sup>th</sup> POG, information paper, "PSYOP Support to JTF PROVEN FORCE," 14 February 1991; *ibid.*, "PSYOP Support, Radio Broadcasting - Sequence of Events," 13 February 1991. Johnson, noted that "In the Middle East radios are perhaps the most single common form of entertainment." 263.

<sup>1126</sup>Ibid., 54-55.

<sup>1127</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, Memo to USAJFKSWCS Directorate of Evaluation and Studies (DOES), sub: (U)"After-Action Report for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM," (S) 3 June 1991; 4-8, 10-11. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. Also 4<sup>th</sup> POG Briefing Slides, slides Nos. 23-27, 4 June 1991; COL L. Dunbar, oral interview with author, 29 July 1991; CPT R. Graves, 4<sup>th</sup> POG, oral interview with author, 5 December 1991, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.; Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Storm," 24. U.S. Army PSYOP veterans noted that some EPWs thought that the VOG was actually a Kuwaiti resistance station, others referred to "that Arab station," or "that Saudi



At the tactical level, coalition PSYOP targeted the Iraqi soldiers and officers of specific units to encourage their desertion, to deter them from war crimes and wanton destruction in Kuwait and again, to convince them that the Coalition had no quarrel with them and that the majority of the civilized world was against their occupation of Kuwait. In fact, one of the most effective themes throughout this war was the assurance that the Coalition had no designs on Iraq's territorial integrity. Before the opening of the ground war prisoners were fed and released and in "another gesture of concern," explicit warnings were made to Iraqi ground forces on the avoidance of border minefields. And throughout the war, as in most previous U.S. conflicts, the term "surrender" was again studiously avoided. In fact, even the "surrender" leaflets spoke benignly of "join[ing] the Joint Forces," "save yourself," "flee your location," "honorable commitment to peace," "wait for the Coalition Forces for help" or (the old standby) "cease resistance."<sup>1128</sup>


As the calendar moved inexorably toward the 15 January 1991 UN deadline for an Iraqi evacuation of Kuwait the earliest U.S. PSYOP leaflets were disseminated. The first officially confirmed drop took place on 12 January when two different leaflet messages were dropped over Kuwait City. One featured a cartoon of an Iraqi tank being destroyed by a F-117, an Apache attack helicopter and an Abrams tank. The second carried another cartoon of Saddam perched on an Iraqi tank as a wide variety of weapons menaced him. These leaflets were directed toward Iraqi troops inside Kuwait City and pointed out to them that they faced imminent death and destruction as the result of Saddam's aggression.<sup>1129</sup> Other early leaflets emphasized that time was indeed running out for the Iraqi soldier. One such message showed a stock Arab figure pointing out that fact to a non-plussed Iraqi soldier. Another stock figure from the Arab world, "Global Head," emphasized that "The World Sends You a Gift of Peace." But the main theme of the early Coalition PSYOP campaign was that of Arab brotherhood, emphasizing that this gathering of the nations armed was not some new infernal, infidel imperialistic venture but rather an international rescue effort that included many indubitably Islamic nations and that the enemy was Saddam, not the Iraqi people. To give these leaflets an authentic Arabic cast many were drawn up by the Saudi Royal Illustrator or by a well-known Saudi cartoonist and all were pre- and

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station."; CPT. B. F. Auftengarten (4<sup>th</sup> POG), oral interview with author, 17 December 1991, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Scales, 196. The BBC's reputation in the Middle East goes back to before World War II, when that service reported fairly accurately the clashes between Arabs and Jews in British Mandatory Palestine. To the end, according to EPW interrogations, the enemy in the Gulf War never twigged to the clandestine nature of the VOG.

<sup>1128</sup>Johnson, 73, 76 and *passim*.

<sup>1129</sup>Johnson, 91-92; Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Storm," 24. All U.S. leaflets, whether disseminated or not, are reproduced and described in Johnson. See also 4<sup>th</sup> POG "Target Analysis" (n.d.) in USASOC History Archives for analyses of the targets of these leaflets.



"Arab Brotherhood," first phase of leaflet campaign, Operation DESERT SHIELD.

# مع السلام سنيقي دائما يدا واحده

post-checked by the Arab members of the Combined PSYOP Cell.<sup>1130</sup> Some of the early leaflets, featuring clean-shaven Coalition troops, had to be given mustaches for a more "Arabic" cast. Interestingly, leaflet illustrations became progressively more simple in the wake of EPW reactions.<sup>1131</sup>

Judging from EPW comments, a particularly effective "brotherhood" message was the "feast" leaflet, showing Coalition Arab troops seated at an al fresco dinner with their Iraqi brothers, the latter portrayed with amiable dignity. Making good use of intelligence gleaned from early "line crossers" the Combined PSYOP Cell composers of that leaflet prominently featured bananas in the feast; the Iraqi love of that fruit had been unrequited because of the UN embargo of their country.<sup>1132</sup> Another "brotherhood" leaflet featured a stylized shadow image of two Arab soldiers, walking into the sunset, hand-in-hand ("In peace we shall always remain hand in hand."), and provoked ribald comments questioning the manhood of the leaflet's subjects until it was pointed out that walking about holding hands is a custom of Arabs of unimpeachably masculine persuasion.<sup>1133</sup> (Understandably, Kuwaiti members of the Combined Cell and other refugees who provided input for the Coalition's leaflets were not all that enamored of the "brotherhood" theme, and their enthusiastic proposals for "Iraqi Swine, You Will Die"-type leaflets had to be firmly vetoed.<sup>1134</sup>) The reverse side of most of these pre-combat leaflets carried a logo of the flags of the 27 most prominent nations arrayed against Saddam, many, of course, Islamic and Arabic, iterating the point that this was not simply a "crusade" by the West. (As an almost pathetic footnote to this theme, it was discovered later that many Iraqi soldiers, in their boredom, had used this logo as a sort of game, trying to match flag with nation.)<sup>1135</sup>

The leaflets continued to hammer home the Coalition's overwhelming military

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<sup>1130</sup>USASOC History Archives has originals of these leaflets. See also Waller, 292; and Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield," 2.

<sup>1131</sup>Johnson, 202.

<sup>1132</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-16. COL L. Dunbar, LTC J. Jones, MAJ W. Lee, CPT Auftengarten, CPT A. Mather, CPT R. Graves, CPT K. French, MAJ H. Perry, oral interviews of 4 March 1992, 20 September 1990, 17 December 1991, 3, 5 December 1991 and 8 January 1993, 4 February 1992, respectively. COL Jones oral interview.

<sup>1133</sup>Johnson, 176; Parker and Hale, "Psychological Operations in the Gulf War," and oral comments of 4<sup>th</sup> POG personnel. As late as the end of February 1991, "Some prisoners believed that only Arab Forces would treat them well as EPWs.", memo, 4<sup>th</sup> POG G-3, sub: PSYOP Support for SWA Operations #3, n.d.

<sup>1134</sup>MAJ M. K. Littlejohn oral interview, 20 February 1992. One PSYOP veteran claimed that the "banana" theme was simply a ploy by the Kuwaitis to denigrate the hated Iraqis as "banana-eating monkeys," but there is no confirmation of this assertion. CPT R. Badley oral interview with author, 11 September 1992.

<sup>1135</sup>Copies in USASOC History Archives; Johnson, 203.

superiority and the awful fate of those foolish enough to resist its application. Among the most effective of such messages, the famous "B-52" leaflet, was apparently initiated or at least encouraged by General Schwarzkopf himself and was air-dropped early in the air war. This leaflet was somewhat different from the B-52 message of the Vietnam War in that it noted and pinpointed specific Iraqi Army units which had been chosen because of their morale and leadership. The unit was warned by name (and through radio broadcasts) that it would be bombed the next day and urged its troops to leave the area. ("The 16<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division will be bombed tomorrow. Leave this location now and save yourselves.") USAF B-52 heavy bombers duly bombed the target unit on that day. Soon after, other broadcasts and leaflets reminded the stunned survivors of what had hit them and solicitously repeated the message of further bombing "for the last time."

We have already informed you of our promise to bomb the 16<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. We kept our promise and bombed them yesterday. Beware. We will repeat this bombing tomorrow....Now the choice is yours. Either stay and face death or accept the invitation of the Joint Forces to protect your lives.

The final B-52 strike could be counted on to produce heavy defections among the now-thoroughly demoralized Iraqis. (It didn't help matters for the Iraqi commanders that the B-52 could drop its load from high level, unseen, unheard and unhindered.<sup>1136</sup> Another airpower leaflet theme featured the F-17 Stealth fighter-bomber, particularly feared by the enemy as "The Plane Nobody Can See," and Coalition leaflets played on the theme of the Stealth's destruction of helpless Iraqi soldiers and equipment. (Apparently to make the Stealth seem even more stealthy, the aircraft was never named; a black triangular aircraft representation was apparently sufficient.) Several leaflets simply warned Iraqi soldiers to leave their equipment or face the consequences, leaving the choice of destruction to the recipients' imaginations ("Your equipment is subject to bombardment.", and "Leave your equipment or defend it and die! The choice is yours!"), with the reverse depicting the outline of a very large BLU bomb.)<sup>1137</sup>


Another "wrath of God" theme used the dropping of eleven BLU 82s, also known as the "Daisy Cutter, or "Poor Man's Nuke." These 15,000-pound bombs were launched in conjunction with leaflets similar to the B-52 message to impress on the enemy the devastating power of the Coalition.

You have just experienced the most powerful conventional bomb

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<sup>1136</sup>Auftengarten oral interview; CPT K. French, oral interview with author, 8 January 1993.

<sup>1137</sup>According to one writer on the subject, the "Leave Your Equipment Now" theme was proposed by General Powell., Waller, 293.



In similar vein, "[Brave Iraqi soldier], You are invited to an Arab feast."

قيادة القوات المشتركة ومسرح العمليات


## بطاقة دعوة

في ضيافة قيادة القوات المشتركة ومسرح العمليات أنت مدعو للانضمام للقوات  
المشتركة مع تمتعك الكامل بواجب الضيافة العربية والأمن والسلامة والرعاية  
الطبية . . والعودة للأهل بمجرد الانتهاء من الوضع الذي وضعت فيه صدام.  
أخي الجندي العراقي .  
هذه دعوة مفتوحة لك ولأحبائك ولجميع من ترغبون في تلبية دعوتنا نسبح الله  
الذي هدانا لهذا وما كنا لنهتدي لولا أن هدانا الله.

قائد

القوات المشتركة ومسرح العمليات

القوات المشتركة  
JOINT FORCES



The reverse of Phase I leaflets: all the nations of the anti-Saddam coalition, many of whom are impeccably Islamic and Arabic.



# آه يوليدي متي ترد



dropped in the war. It has more explosive power than 20 SCUD missiles. You will be bombed again soon. Kuwait will be free from aggression. Flee south and you will be treated fairly. You cannot hide."<sup>1138</sup>

These "intimidation" leaflets, although they undoubtedly made the enemy think, were, understandably, the least popular among the Iraqis, judging from EPW responses.<sup>1139</sup> But on a more positive note Iraqi troops were also given leaflet and broadcast instructions on how to escape death from above and how to surrender safely. Nearly all surrender leaflets carried illustrated instructions on how to "cease resistance.": remove the magazine from your weapon, sling the weapon over your left shoulder, muzzle down, place your hands over your head, and wave a white flag or a leaflet. Armored personnel should raise their weapons to maximum elevation, expose their vehicles' side to advancing Coalition forces and leave the hatches open.<sup>1140</sup>

Coalition PSYOP planners showed a commendable knowledge of their enemy by playing upon the recent and bloody eight-year Iran-Iraq War. One U.S. leaflet idea showed a taxi with a flag-draped casket driving past a startled Iraqi soldier, a reminder of how the many dead of that war had come home as Baghdad ran out of ambulances and hearses. Another leaflet poked fun at "Iran's Growing Air Force," referring to those Iraqi aircraft that had mysteriously flown to sanctuary among the hated "Persians." The reverse side of this message helpfully suggested that Saudi Arabia might make a better destination.<sup>1141</sup>

Neither print nor electronic Coalition PSYOP denigrated the Iraqi soldier. He was always depicted as a brave fellow, a good soldier, led astray by the evil Saddam, and one who would be received with dignity upon leaving the one-sided battle. By the

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<sup>1138</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-15; memo for commander, USACAPOC, "Subject: PSYOP Support for SWA Operations #3," n.d.; CPT Mather oral interview. For more on the BLU see H. A. Mason, Jr., "History of the Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida, 1 January 1990-31 December 1991," vol. 1., "Narrative." A British commando forward observer, seeing the BLU's characteristic "mushroom" cloud as well as its shock wave rolling across the desert, reported in awed, unbelieving tones, "The Americans have just nuked Kuwait.", Johnson, 235. The reaction was shared by numerous Iraqi observers, judging by radio intercepts, intercepts which then made possible strikes on those now-exposed communication sites. Information supplied by USASOC Command Historian, 12 April 1994.

<sup>1139</sup>CPT Auftengarten oral interview. Or as one EPW put it for his fellows, "We've seen death for ten years in Iran.", CPT Badley oral interview.


<sup>1140</sup>Examples in USASOC History Archives; Johnson, 66; Parker and Hale, *passim*.

<sup>1141</sup>Littlejohn, oral interview with author; CPT A. Mather oral interview with author, 3 December 1991. CPT Mather contended that the "X" over the Iraqi flag was meaningless to Iraqis.



البقاء هنا يعني الموت

How the dead of the bloody Iran-Iraq War came home: strapped to the tops of Baghdad taxis. Brave Iraqi soldier, are you next?






The "B-52 leaflet," inspired by World War II's "B-29 leaflet"?

سبق ان اخبرناكم بعزمنا على قصف الفرقة المشاة الثامنة واربعين  
ولقد حافظنا على هذا الوعد وتم قصفها بالامس

احذروا

سنكرر القصف مرة اخرى غداً....

الان اصبح الخيار لكم اما البقاء ومواجهة الموت  
او قبول دعوة القوات المشتركة للحفاظ على حياتكم



“For rescue, follow these instructions: Raise the gun tube as high as possible, , point the tube to the rear, open all hatches,....”, etc.

## FOR RESCUE

لنجاتك أتبع هذه التعليمات

### FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS

١. ارفع ماسورة السلاح  
RAISE THE GUN TUBE  
TO THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE  
AS HIGH AS POSSIBLE  
الى أعلى درجة ممكنة

٢. وجه ماسورة السلاح الى الخلف  
POINT THE TUBE TO THE REAR  
٢. اترك جميع ابواب الدبابة مفتوحة

٣. ضع يديك فوق رأسك  
OPEN ALL HATCHES  
٤. ضع يديك فوق رأسك

٥. اقرب بيظي  
PUT HANDS OVER YOUR  
HEAD & APPROACH SLOWLY  
واقترب بيظي

٥. لوح بقطعة قماش بيضاء  
HOLD UP SOMETHING WHITE  
كاشارة الى رغبتك السلامة والنجاه

٥. لوح بقطعة قماش بيضاء  
HOLD UP SOMETHING WHITE  
كاشارة الى رغبتك السلامة والنجاه

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end of February Iraqi EPWs were indicating that many more of their fellows would surrender if they could evade their officers, negotiate minefields and be guaranteed of no retribution against their families.<sup>1142</sup>

By this time PSYOP units were also dropping that classic appeal, the safe conduct pass. Most of these played upon the enemy's homesickness and war-weariness. Many leaflets that presented other messages also urged the equivalent of surrender or contained multiple messages.

Other leaflets added to the CENTCOM Commander's deception plan, reinforced by idle civilian media speculation, that hinted broadly at the probability of a spearhead Marine Corps landing on the beaches of Kuwait. (Presumably in order to retain the Coalition PSYOP's reputation for telling the truth, this leaflet did not state that "The Marines are coming," but rather simply called upon the Iraqis to "Cease Resistance --Be Safe.")<sup>1143</sup>

In another instance leaflets overprinted with the logos of the U.S. VII and XVIII Airborne corps were dropped along the central Kuwait-Saudi border. These messages were so persuasive in implying that the main U.S. advance would thrust inside Kuwait that General Schwarzkopf cancelled further missions in the area because of the large Iraqi reinforcement movement in front of the Arab Corps there.<sup>1144</sup>

In fact, an entire Combined unit, Task Force Troy (for "Trojan Horse?"), was created solely for deception work. No less than 460 soldiers from the 4<sup>th</sup> POG, U.S. Marines and British units used their five tanks and other wheeled vehicles, loudspeakers and dummy vehicles and emplacements to convince the enemy of massive troop movements --in the wrong direction. These deceptions, coordinated by a Deception Cell (a part of the Combined Cell) indeed diverted a significant number of the enemy's best units away from the Coalition's "end run" to the west. (As one indication of this success, the vacated Iraqi III Corps commander's sand table in Kuwait City depicted almost all coalition possible avenues of attack as coming from the sea.)<sup>1145</sup>

Other PSYOP teams broadcast recorded armor sounds and electronic message traffic near the front lines, then left the area quickly. The Iraqis would respond with a

<sup>1142</sup>Memo for Cmdr, USASOC, from G-3; 4<sup>th</sup> POG, sub: PSYOP Support for SWA Operations, #3, n.d.

<sup>1143</sup>Parker and Hale, *The 1,000 Hour War: Communication in the Gulf* (Westport, London: 1993).

<sup>1144</sup>Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Storm," 26.

<sup>1145</sup>For the CENTCOM deception plans, see Scales, 147; and Johnson, 50-51, 61-62, 245, 251. The coastal invasion deception was facilitated by a unique form of dissemination: 12,000 bottles stuffed with leaflets depicting a wave in the form of fierce U.S. Marine's head and sword-brandishing arm about to fall on helpless Iraqi soldiers on the beach. These bottle-borne leaflets landed on the very beaches that the Iraqis were heavily fortifying to repel the imagined landing. Parker and Hale, 97-98; Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Storm," 26-27.

barrage that hit empty sand. The enemy soon caught on to this ruse --only to be surprised and overwhelmed later by real coalition armor.<sup>1146</sup> And, unique in U.S. military history, a PSYOP unit, the 245<sup>th</sup> Company, actually captured in the field a working enemy tank.<sup>1147</sup>

The deception theme was also played out in a joint context. CPT James Richardson, Operations Officer for the RC 245<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Company (Airborne) of Dallas Texas was attached to a Marine division, where he instructed initially skeptical Marine officers in deception operations. Informed that Marine LAVs (Light Armored Vehicles) were being fired upon as they approached the border area CPT Richardson's men recorded the noises of LAVs starting up, stopping, moving around, even having mechanical troubles. That night loudspeaker teams moved up to the border berm and played the noises. Retiring quickly to a sheltered area they watched as Iraqi artillery and rocket rounds fell on the area they had just vacated. Then pre-alerted Marine artillery locating units pin-pointed the sites of the enemy pieces and called in air and artillery strikes to good effect.

The Iraqis must have been slow learners; for the next 15 evenings the PSYOP teams repeated their performance and each night a new enemy artillery position would rise to the bait and be hit by precise counter-battery fire. As a direct result of these joint deception operations the enemy lost 25 rocket systems, two radio direction stations and one vehicle convoy. And as a final service to his Marine Corps buddies, at the opening of the ground war CPT Richardson's PSYOP vehicle was third through the gap in the Iraqi lines, playing the *Marine Corps Hymn* at full volume.<sup>1148</sup>

PSYOP support to the U.S. Air Force Central Command (CENTAF) was limited to the preparation of a downed flyer "pointy-talkee," a multi-lingual "blood-chit," and broadcasts to support search-and-rescue missions. These products were not restricted to USCENTAF operations, but were issued to all in-theater pilots and aircrew.<sup>1149</sup>

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<sup>1146</sup>COL Jones interview; USAJFKSWCS, "U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned in DESERT SHIELD/STORM," 2-74; memo for Cdr, USACAPOC, from 4<sup>th</sup> POG, sub: PSYOP Support, n.d. Other noise deception operations are outlined by MAJ T. Barnes and MAJ K. French, oral interviews with author, 18 December 1992 and 8 January 1993 respectively.

<sup>1147</sup>Johnson, 245.

<sup>1148</sup>CPT C. Richardson, oral interview with author, 23 April 1992. Another team, at the request of their Marine battalion commander, played recorded Scottish bagpipe music as they went through the breach., *ibid.* See also LTC Jones oral interview, and MAJ T. Barnes oral interview with author, 18 December 1992, Fort Bragg and 4<sup>th</sup> POG "Psyop Support of Obstacle Breach" (24th Infantry Division deception plan) (n.d.), in USASOC History Archives. In all fairness it should be pointed out that Iraqis might have done better in uncovering Coalition deception measures had their aircraft not been swept from the skies by Coalition airpower.

<sup>1149</sup>Jones, "Personal Experience," 5.

During the ground combat phase, of course, loudspeaker teams were used in the field, down to the division level, providing support to each Coalition maneuver brigade, usually to coax enemy troops, who were often shell-shocked, from their bunkers. Forty-six such teams, consisting of one or two NCOs and an interpreter or communications specialist, were usually attached to a forward combat brigade. They used five different and mostly incompatible loudspeaker systems.<sup>1150</sup> Although the teams had been originally equipped with Modern Standard Arabic-language cassette surrender messages, the Defense Language Institute provided a linguist to re-record these messages into more acceptable regional speech and dialect. But even here something was believed lacking and in most cases the pre-recorded messages were used only when a native-speaker was not available.<sup>1151</sup>

A team supporting the Marines scored the most successful, indeed spectacular, loudspeaker operation of the Gulf War, as 1,405 enemy troops on Faylaka Island were induced by airborne messages to surrender without the firing of a shot.<sup>1152</sup>

In an operation that was not at all unusual, another loudspeaker team, attached to the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, talked 490 enemy troops from an underground bunker on 20 February. The 101<sup>st</sup> had to clear any sizeable enemy troop concentrations that could threaten its main supply route in its move up its assault positions for the opening of the ground war. The loudspeaker team had to persuade the company commander that as the 101<sup>st</sup> pounding of the bunker had yielded no results, "why not give us a try." With permission given the three-man team flew to the area in a Blackhawk helicopter.

When we arrived, we began dropping leaflets.

Nothing happened -no surrenders, no movement, nothing. We flew back to base and got the idea to try loudspeakers. We jumped back on the Blackhawk, this time with our speaker system and an audio cassette tape. We pointed to a spot on the ground about 800 meters from the bunker and started broadcasting downward.

Again nothing. We figured we couldn't be heard 'cause of the noise of the rotor blades. We motioned to our pilot to land us near the spot.

With what you might call serious reservation (but with a kind of feeling

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<sup>1150</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-10 to 4-12, 4-20; 4<sup>th</sup> POG; Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Storm," 25. (U)USSOCOM Classified Briefing(S), 69-70. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. See 4<sup>th</sup> POG, "Generic Tape Register" (n.d.) for translations of some loudspeaker tapes, in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>1151</sup>For other loudspeaker veteran comments, see oral interviews by author with SFG J. Piccone, 18 September 1992; MSG B. Kapusta, 19 November 1992; and SGT F. Borghese. Almost all PSYOP personnel interviewed give the highest marks to their native-speaking Arabic translators., Johnson, 63, 286.

<sup>1152</sup>Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Storm," 26.

of protection from another Blackhawk up to our right plus three Apaches in the area), the pilot eventually let us down. He took right off, yelling he'd stay with us over the radio.

Three of us were now on the ground staring at this bunker with [supposedly] 20 Republican Guards in it. Captain Wright lifted the speaker from the sand.

Troops from the 101<sup>st</sup> had reported the bunker complex but could see no signs of life. Accordingly, the loudspeaker team was flown to the complex in a Blackhawk escorted by Apache Scout helicopters. The team dismounted about 700-800 meters from the bunker and began broadcasting surrender appeals. As the Blackhawk was running short of fuel, the team was picked up almost immediately after the broadcast. Upon its return the team, expecting no more than ten or so defectors, was astonished to find the 490 enemy troops awaiting transport to the rear. These troops were well armed, their weapons in good condition and with plenty of ammunition. During subsequent interrogation the unit commander said simply that he was tired of the war and could see no point in getting all of his men killed. The next day 101<sup>st</sup> troopers returned to the bunker to find an additional 13 Iraqi troops only too glad to surrender. In fact, members of this group affected a somewhat "humorous indignation" that they had been overlooked the previous day, somewhat foreshadowing those other Iraqis who would later endeavor to be "captured" a second time.<sup>1153</sup>

A good example of the seemingly seamless integration of PSYOP with conventional combat units was displayed on 25 February (G plus 1) as the U.S. 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division advanced toward al-Busayyah:

Led by the 1-1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry, the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade made contact with additional elements of the Iraqi 26<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. After 2-41<sup>st</sup> Field Artillery prepped the area, TF1-7<sup>th</sup> Infantry overran a battalion of dug-in Iraqi infantry supported by a mechanized team. The Americans knocked out eight BMPs and a T-55 tank. PSYOP loudspeaker teams convinced nearly 300 Iraqis to surrender, and at 1:48 the battalion reported the area secure.<sup>1154</sup>

Generally, the Iraqis did not seem to object to an Arabic speaker with a Kuwaiti or Saudi accent. This attitude may have been something akin to the resentment sometimes discovered in earlier prisoner interrogations towards propaganda spoken by a native -- "the man must be a traitor." Then again, many were undoubtedly too shell-shocked and concerned with survival to dwell on accents or syntax.<sup>1155</sup>

<sup>1153</sup>MSG B. Kapusta, oral interview with author, 19 November 1992. MSG Kapusta was present at the interrogation of the Iraqi unit commander. See also Johnson, 259-261.

<sup>1154</sup>Scales, 240-241.

<sup>1155</sup>The 4<sup>th</sup> POG's commander wrote that appeals by Iraqi EPWs "contributed

One incident after the end of the ground war illustrates the nature of this conflict and the value of native linguists behind a loudspeaker. A loudspeaker team had come upon a civilian bus inside Iraq which seemed to contain soldiers in various remnants of uniforms mixed in with civilian refugees. The native-speaker team member was instructed to transmit to the passengers the order, "Throw out your arms!" Almost immediately, "Weapons came flying out the windows" and the now-demilitarized bus was allowed to proceed on its way.<sup>1156</sup> And even several days after the February 28 cease-fire, on 2 March, a helicopter loudspeaker team secured the surrender of 80 Iraqi Special Forces troops at Talil Airfield, again in Iraq.<sup>1157</sup>

One of the more improbable loudspeaker teams was the one composed simply of one 4<sup>th</sup> POG Sergeant First Class and a Kuwaiti "Holy Man" which broadcast in liberated Kuwait just after the Cease-Fire. The "Holy Man" worked the loudspeaker and the Sergeant provided the necessary technical support. Their messages were designed to talk Iraqi soldiers and belligerent civilians into either surrender or compliance with Army instructions. This combined operations duo also managed to broadcast their messages over a local AM radio station.<sup>1158</sup>

Army loudspeaker teams also worked with the Iraqi civilian population, flying over built-up areas and informing the apprehensive inhabitants that the quarrel was with Saddam not the Iraqi people, and informing them as to what they must do (mainly to keep their vehicles off the roads) to preserve their own safety. On the ground PSYOP personnel were usually warmly received although more often in dissident Shi'ite areas.<sup>1159</sup>

Nonetheless, the short duration and fast pace of ground combat in the Gulf War forestalled many loudspeaker operations. In addition, loudspeaker electronic equipment proved to be of limited range in the field.<sup>1160</sup>

The unique RC 13<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion (PW), which had the mission of dealing with EPWs and civilians (both interned and at liberty), reinforced this message by

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significantly to the large number of EPWs taken with little or no hostile fire., Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield," 5.

<sup>1156</sup>CPT French oral interview.

<sup>1157</sup>CPT J. Vesser, SSG D. R. Eller, and CPT C. Rose, oral interview by USASOC Command Historian, and author, 3 February 1992. CPT Rose modestly remarked, when asked about the surrender, "Well, captured, surrendered, you know, it's a little thing,....[we] were out in a vehicle and chasing after five of them, so we didn't know how many there were there. We went from chasing five of them to running away from like, 50 or 60...and I guess what had happened was those five soldiers had seen what was coming, went back and told all the other guys that we were in the airfield and a bunch of them came out and we sort of coordinated....", *ibid.*

<sup>1158</sup>Johnson, 299.

<sup>1159</sup>*Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>1160</sup>CPT French oral interview; SGT J. Freeman, oral interview with author, 18 November 1992; USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-10 to 4-12.

encouraging a number of their charges to broadcast to their fellows on the dignity and good treatment they were receiving in the cages which supported elements of the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade in the processing of about 70,000 of the 87,000 EPWs in four theater cages.<sup>1161</sup> The 13<sup>th</sup>'s 7-10 man teams directly supported MP commanders at theater prisoner of war and civilian internee camps and at corps-level facilities. Their mission was to obtain the cooperation of the POWs, condition the prisoners to accept authority, identify key communicators in the camps' populations, assist in crowd control, identify officers and English speakers who might be attempting to meld into the general prisoner population, assist the MPs and other military units in the area in establishing and improving relations with local civilian communities and to advise MP commanders on the culture and customs of their charges. They also provided EPW-related intelligence to the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force. The 13<sup>th</sup> had developed unique one-on-one techniques which they put to good use in their interrogations, interviews and face-to-face contacts with EPWs and civilians. But 13<sup>th</sup> troopers quickly suppressed the one camp riot (after a storm had blown down the prisoners' tents). Two 13<sup>th</sup> troopers walked into the camp and reassured the POWs. One soldier simply asked camp leaders "if we would be arguing about this if the situation were reversed and I was in an Iraqi prison camp."<sup>1162</sup>

It is difficult to imagine how those enormous numbers of EPWs could have been handled as efficiently and humanely as they were without the work of the 13<sup>th</sup>. As the first screening level for enemy prisoners the 13<sup>th</sup> retrieved EPWs from corps cages and transported them to the camps. Once there, the EPWs were segregated in the traditional manner, officers from enlisted men. But in addition 13<sup>th</sup> personnel also separated the various religious and ethnic sects and looked for English-speakers, informal group leaders, disguised officers, cooperative prisoners, intelligence officers and agitators. They also distributed signs, posters, information sheets and camp newspapers. As the commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG's 8<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion noted, however, a number of camp-support administrative requirements, such as signs, camp rules and EPW handouts, "became the responsibility almost by default."<sup>1163</sup>

The personnel of the 13<sup>th</sup> put their cultural sensitivity training to good use in advising camp commandants on matters of customs, language, religious practices, diet and their psychological significance. One of the most importance services of the 13<sup>th</sup> was the pre- and post-testing of Coalition PSYOP leaflets and broadcast scripts,

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<sup>1161</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-17.

<sup>1162</sup>Lehti, "13<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion."; oral interview, COL J. Jones with author, 24 May 1995; R. Browne, "Psychological Operations Helped Reduce Casualties," *Fayetteville Observer-Times*, 27 June 1991. MP guards had fired shots over the prisoners' heads, apparently to no effect. *ibid.* See also (S)Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLS) Long Reports, 31 March, 13 April 1991. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; James Noll, "The 13<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW) During Mobilization, Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Demobilization," Army War College student thesis (1993).

<sup>1163</sup>Jones, "Psychological Operations in Operation Desert Storm," 28.

### **PRISONER OF WAR HOLDING COMPOUND RULES AND REGULATIONS**

- \* Do not cross the three-meters barrier.
  - \* Place all trash in the containers provided. \* Obey all orders immediately and without failure.
  - \* All eating utensils must be returned after meals.
  - \* No large groups of prisoners may be gathered at any place at any time.
  - \* In order to avoid disease, latrines will be used.
  - \* Salute all officers. \* All lights will be extinguished by 2200 hours.
  - \* All prisoners must be in quarters at 2200 hours.
  - \* All prisoners must remain in quarters until 0500 hours.
  - \* All prisoners must have identification in their possession at all times.
  - \* Prisoners are forbidden to direct derogatory comments toward camp personnel.
  - \* Medical emergencies that cannot be treated by PW medical personnel should be brought to the guards' attention.
  - \* Gambling is strictly forbidden.
  - \* Possession and consumption of intoxicating beverages/chemicals is strictly forbidden.
  - \* Possession of weapons is strictly forbidden.
- Failure to comply with the above listed rules will result in disciplinary action. Such action may include:
- \* Fines. \* Withdrawal of privileges. \* Fatigue duty. \* Restricted diet.

POW cage rules and regulations, drawn up and administered by the RC 13<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion (PW).  
(Arabic version on reverse).





# PSYOP SUPPORT OF OBSTACLE BREACH

## SEQUENCE

I AS TAPE BEGINS TANKS/TRACKS ARE DOMINANT.


II SLOWLY, ENGINEER SOUNDS BEGIN TO INCREASE.

III ENGINEER EQUIPMENT WILL SLOWLY BECOME DOMINANT. ARRIVAL AT THE BREACH POINT SHOULD BE TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THIS EVENT, IF POSSIBLE.

IV FLASH/BANG

V FOLLOWING THE FLASH/BANG THE ENGINEER EQUIPMENT WILL FADE.

VI TANK/TRACK SOUNDS AGAIN BECOME DOMINANT, TO SIMULATE THE TEAM PASSING THROUGH THE BREACH.



bearing in mind, though that in the words of one PSYOP veteran, "defectors will tell you anything you want to hear."<sup>1164</sup>

Army PSYOP personnel did break with the more recent past in a number of message themes. For the first time since World War I they incited revolt, this time among Iraqi minority Shi'ia and Kurds, the latter having been bombed, shelled and even gassed-bombed by Saddam. Not surprisingly, some PSYOP personnel found themselves in the midst of civil insurrection in certain dissident areas of Iraq. A 4<sup>th</sup> POG trooper actually proceeded mounted U.S. infantry entering Al Khird, a town in which "anyone with a machine gun was in charge and almost everyone had a machine gun." As the inhabitants poured out of their homes, weapons in hand, a wrong move could have produced a tragedy. The PSYOP "point man" informed the inhabitants, in Arabic, that US. troops, abiding by the Geneva Convention would not fire on the civilians unless fired upon first. The townspeople, pleased and disarmed (so to say) by an Arabic-speaking American, expressed delight, and soon their children were mobbing the Americans. Their elders implored the Americans' help in their already-bloody struggle against Saddam, but U.S. troops could, at the most, simply "kind of look the other way" when their new-found friends pillaged abandoned Iraqi Army weapons stocks.<sup>1165</sup>

The Shiia population of Basra, Iraq's second largest city and a Shiia stronghold, was specifically called upon to revolt.<sup>1166</sup> The wisdom of refraining from such appeals was sadly validated when these two groups did arise, and, receiving only humanitarian aid from the United States, were systematically massacred by Saddam. The survivors understandably turned bitter about American "betrayal."

A more positive outcome resulted from the renewed use of a theme that had remained dormant since World War II, the food leaflet, in this case on the reverse of a counterfeit Iraqi 25 Dinar note:

Saddam's daily ration for you is ?

The daily ration for Coalition Forces is:

Breakfast: Eggs, bread with butter, meat, two fruits, juice, milk, coffee, and tea.

Lunch: Meat, beans or potatoes, biscuits with cheese, candy, juice and coffee.

Dinner: Meat, bread with butter, vegetables, cake, milk, juice, coffee or tea.

Prisoners are fed the same meals as Coalition soldiers.<sup>1167</sup>

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<sup>1164</sup>CPT Auftengarten oral interview. One group of EPWs, when approached from outside the wire by a television news camera crew began to chant, "George Bush!, George Bush!", *ibid.*

<sup>1165</sup>*Ibid.*, 300-312.

<sup>1166</sup>Johnson, 49, quote from 304.

<sup>1167</sup>Copy in USASOC History Archives.

PSYOP also felt no compunction in printing well-executed Iraqi counterfeit 10 and 25 Dinar notes (that invariably carried Saddam's visage) and adding its own anti-Saddam messages.<sup>1168</sup>

Much less reported, the Psychological Operations Detachment (PSYDET) of Joint Task Force "Proven Force" nonetheless waged effective PSYOP from facilities provided by a skittish Turkish government. The PSYDET's operations were carried out almost exclusively by an ad-hoc grouping of USAF assets designated the 7440<sup>th</sup> Composite Wing (Provisional), all under the control of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and consisting of 21 PSYOP troopers. The target area was Iraq's northern provinces. One of the PSYDET's earlier and continuing projects was a series of broadcasts encouraging Iraqi military and civilians to aid downed Coalition air crew. Other "Proven Force" radio scripts included:

- "7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division's Treatment of EPWs"
- "Hungry-thirsty"
- "Angel of Death, Horrors of War"
- "Joint Forces Speak 'Geneva Convention'"
- "Inevitability of Coalition Victory"
- "Kuwaiti Pilot Interview"
- "Saddam is the Cause, World vs. Saddam"
- "Death by Oil; Saddam is Leading you to Destruction," etc.<sup>1169</sup>

The goal of the PSYDET's radio and leaflet propaganda was not the garnering of defectors or EPWs but rather the dissolution of Saddam's military and governmental forces. Still, more than 40,000 Iraqi troops had defected across Iraq's northern border to be interned in Turkey without a shot being fired. This mass defection took place in spite of the fact that these Iraqis had to negotiate high mountain passes under several feet of snow.<sup>1170</sup>

The 4<sup>th</sup> POG's and the Combined [Saudi-US PSYOP] Cell's radio scripts included:

- "Where is Saddam?"
- "Thirty More Days of Bombing"
- "Medical Shortages"

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<sup>1168</sup>Examples, copies or originals, in *ibid.* It is unknown whether these currency leaflets were actually dropped.

<sup>1169</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, information paper, subj: "PSYOP Support to JTF PROVEN FORCE," 14 February 1991; Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert 'shield,'" 2.

<sup>1170</sup>Johnson, 313-322; Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield," 22; G-3, 4<sup>th</sup> POG, memorandum for Commander, USACAPOC...., subj.: PSYOP Support for SWA Operations #3, 01 Feb 91 thru 23 Feb 91, n.d.; SGT K. Albino, oral interview with author, 12 December 1994.

## "Surrender Appeal"

Samples of their leaflet appeals were:

"Attention Iraqi Soldier"

"EPW Plea" (EPW narration to induce defection)

"Qadahfi" (The Libyan dictator, of all people, condemns Saddam for destroying Arabism)

"Daisy Cutter"

"Safe Conduct Pass"

as well as in reference to Iraqi civilians killed by Coalition firepower because Saddam is emplacing weapons in mosques, playgrounds, etc.

Throughout the war, aerial dissemination remained the principal method of getting the Coalition's leaflets to their targets. A wide variety of aircraft, including the B-52, the F-16 fighter-bomber, the F-18 fighter, the MC-130 transport and helicopters, disseminated the Coalition's leaflets. These drops were always flown at night for safety and security reasons and also to give the enemy soldier a better chance to pick up a leaflet unmolested. The primary units for this dissemination were the USAF's 8<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Squadron, which manually dropped something like 19 million leaflets from the rear of its specially-designed MC-130 COMBAT TALON turbo-prop transport aircraft; and the 1708<sup>th</sup> Provisional Air Wing flying B-52s.<sup>1171</sup>

Originally, the drops were made from positions south of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border; prevailing winds would then carry the messages over into Iraq. With the opening of the air war F-16s boldly dropped their leaflets over Baghdad itself. (Many of the B-52 and F-18 PSYOP missions over Iraq itself remain classified.) Later, F-16s also dropped tactical PSYOP leaflets over the battlefield. By the time the Coalition's PSYOP campaign was at its peak during the ground war a leaflet could be in the hands of an Iraqi soldier of a specified unit only 96 hours from conception.<sup>1172</sup>

The actual primary aerial delivery system consisted either of a cardboard box attached to a aircraft static line with "100 mile-an-hour tape" (The tape could supposedly remain stuck to the outer skin of an aircraft proceeding at that speed.) The box would be kicked or pushed out of the ramp of a C-130 ramp, and would then turn over and empty its contents, which would (usually) auto-rotate to the target according to a complex table that gave wind velocity and direction, altitude, aircraft speed,

<sup>1171</sup>Johnson, 49-50.

<sup>1172</sup>CPT Mather, 4<sup>th</sup> POG, S-3, oral interview; information paper, "PSYOP Support to JTF PROVEN FORCE," 14 February 1991; Nonetheless, some hard-won experience in Vietnam had been lost. Some early leaflets were printed on a plastic-treated stock, which certainly enhanced durability but also made auto-rotation almost impossible. Further, far fewer of these heavy leaflets could be packed into containers for delivery. Johnson, 200-201.

height, weight and cut of leaflet. As in previous wars this method of dissemination put aircraft and crew in danger and ramp personnel served double duty in warning of any Surface-to-Air missiles (SAMs) sent their way by the enemy. B-52 bombers dropped their leaflet loads far more safely from special-purpose fiberglass leaflet bombs. One of their leaflets presented a unintentionally sardonic message to the enemy: "WARNING! THIS COULD HAVE BEEN A REAL BOMB." The leaflet was dropped along with the bomber's high-explosive "real bombs" upon troops that were for the most part dead or mutilated by the time that the "warning" came fluttering down on them.<sup>1173</sup>

The manner in which Coalition leaflets "mysteriously" appeared on the field convinced many Iraqis that the Stealth fighter must indeed have been responsible.<sup>1174</sup> Actually the slippery aircraft did no such work; the messages appeared as a result of careful design in which weight and dimensions carried them on the prevailing winds to auto-rotate more-or-less on target. Throughout the course of the war the USAF dropped 28 million leaflets over Kuwait and Iraq.<sup>1175</sup> Air Force Central Command (CENTAF) personnel, however, were for a time wary of the POTF liaison officer's requests for the use of their aircraft for something so nebulous as PSYOP and often referred to the leaflets as "bulls---t bombs." Yet, according to one reliable source, when the reports of overwhelming Iraqi troop surrenders began to flow in those same CENTAF officers gave that PSYOP officer a standing ovation.<sup>1176</sup>

Apparently, only six leaflet artillery rounds were fired during the Gulf War. The reason for this paucity was undoubtedly the fast pace of the ground war. The comparatively few rounds in theater also proved to be a logistics headache, with their requirement for special handling. Other U.S. PSYOP dissemination included up-to-date faxing, as well as the more traditional hand-carrying and (as noted) the placing of

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<sup>1173</sup>Johnson, 224. According to a 4<sup>th</sup> POG report high-altitude releases from transport aircraft did "not achieve desired dispersion ratios.", information paper, "PSYOP Support to JTF PROVEN FORCE," 2.

<sup>1174</sup>CPT Auftengarten oral interview.

<sup>1175</sup>For an overview of numbers of leaflets dropped by the Air Force and the operations of the AF Special Operations Command, see H. A. Mason, Jr., "History of the Air Force Special Operations Command, 1, Narrative, 1 January 1990 - 31 December 1991."

<sup>1176</sup>Scales, 196-197. One PSYOP Army veteran reported that the USAF was always looking for illustrated leaflets prominently featuring various Air Force aircraft pulverizing the enemy and concluded that he had to "stroke" the sister service by giving them something of what they wanted if he were to get most of what he wanted. MAJ H. Perry oral interview with author, 13 November 1991. Army PSYOP also provided the Air Force with the "blood chit" of previous wars, a multi-lingual card carried by USAF flight crew, featuring the American flag and the promise of a monetary reward for anyone assisting a downed flier. Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Storm," 26.

leaflets in bottles to wash up on Kuwaiti beaches.<sup>1177</sup>

Baghdad's propaganda may have reinforced anti-Western sentiments already at fever-pitch among the Arab civilian populations, particularly the Palestinians and the Jordanians. But that directed against the Coalition by Saddam could only be characterized as about on a par with his military operations, that is, pathetic, despite the announcers' accents that hinted of expensive educations in Britain and the United States.<sup>1178</sup>

Only Saddam's more committed partisans could have retained much faith after the broadcasts of his propaganda machine's more outlandish, but not untypical, claims: e.g. 142 Coalition aircraft and 23 cruise missiles downed in the first week of the air war --with some of these missiles retrieved and primed to be used against the Coalition, or Scud missiles impacting on Dhahran (Saudi Arabia) every thirty seconds, or that Kuwait had invited the Iraqi "liberation" and that its citizens were reveling in every minute of it. Baghdad Radio did gain some attention in anti-American circles in the United States and elsewhere with its bewailing of "indiscriminate civilian bombing," which included film of a "baby milk factory" whose surviving employees, oddly, carried this English-language legend on their uniforms. Finally, Radio Baghdad's salacious claim that

GI, you should be home...while you're away, movie stars are taking your women. Robert Redford is dating your girlfriend, Tom Selleck is kissing your lady, Bart Simpson is making love to your wife."  
(emphasis added)<sup>1179</sup>

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<sup>1177</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-14; MAJ T. Barnes, oral interview with author, 18 December 1992. Also CPT Mather oral interview and SGT J. Piccone oral interviews with author, 18 September 1992. German forces also used their balloon experience gained through decades of sending leaflets by that medium to East Germany, but this was a topic that the U.S. and German governments adamantly refused to discuss, presumably due to lingering sensitivity over "German militarism" by Germany's neighbors and the fact that the West German constitution forbade the use of German military forces outside the borders of the nation. Johnson, 236-238.

<sup>1178</sup>S. McKenzie, "Remembering Desert Shield/Storm: Broadcaster Recalls Psychological Warfare," *Fort Bragg Paraglide*, 3 October 1991. This source also noted that "All of us thought 'Baghdad Betty' played really stupid music."

<sup>1179</sup>Quote from C. P. Freund, "The War on Your Mind: Psychological Warfare from Genghis Kahn to POWs to CNN," *Outlook, The Washington Post*, 27 January 1991 (italics added). American troops in the Southwest Asia listened to Baghdad Radio's "Baghdad Betty" and "Iraq Jack" for the same reasons their grandfathers tuned in to Axis Sally and Tokyo Rose: the music was up-to-date and popular with many. Local stations provided a steady fare of classical Arabic music, which held no charms for the average GI. Armed Forces Radio attempted to broadcast more popular American fare, but suffered from "Poor to no reception....", leaving the BBC to fill the gap.



Iraqi leaflet, violating just about every rule in the PSYOP book: caricatured, cowardly enemy soldiers, crude drawing and iconography, etc. But then "Iraqi fire is fatal" was what most of the pundits were claiming on the TV talk shows.

certainly did nothing to depress American troop morale, quite the opposite. The twelve verified Iraqi propaganda leaflets were less well known because few, if any, reached their intended targets. It may have been just as well for Baghdad; these efforts violated just about every principle of successful PSYOP. They certainly displayed an unfamiliarity with the English language ("Your commanders have said that the war will take few days were they correct?... We assure that they won't be correct."), (...your aggression and killing civilians, innocent kids, mothers and olds.), and lack of knowledge of their enemy. ("Liberty Stadium [?] cries for help....", "Dear Soldiers..."). Just as counter-productive was the artwork. Even a leaflet presumably directed specifically at U.S. and U.K. troops depicted their intended readers as frightened, long-nosed caricatures. Another showed a frightened U.S. soldier (this time without the elongated nose) pulling off daisy petals ("I will fight...I will not fight...") while a heroic Iraqi soldier stands poised for battle, rather anachronistically sharpening a large knife. Almost identical faults characterized the leaflet *Is He Worth Dying For?*, depicting a Saudi sheik imbibing liquor at the Sheraton Taif with two comely women. But again, the U.K. and U.S. troops here were grossly caricatured. A leaflet directed toward "Arab Brothers" was more professional, reflecting a common culture. The "brother soldiers" addressed ("How do you allow yourselves to stand with the Americans and the Israelis against Iraq?") were depicted with dignity although the U.S. and U.K. troops looked thuggish. Some also carried a Islamic religious message. ("Whoever kills a believer deliberately, his punishment is eternal hell. God has said the truth." "The great truth is Allah.", "Our religion teaches us that we should fight together for one common goal, the repelling of interlopers, especially the American imperialists....", "The great truth is Allah.") It is difficult to imagine that these crudely-drawn efforts would have had any effect on Coalition troops even if they had been disseminated.<sup>1180</sup>

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Johnson, 341-353.

<sup>1180</sup>Copies of Iraqi leaflets supplied by office of Director of Field and International Programs, U.S. Army Center of Military History. As if the faults noted above were not enough, the Iraqi leaflets could not auto-rotate. Johnson, 357-373. For some reason they were also printed in rather exotic colors: glossy pink, red-pink, green glossy, purple bond, etc. "Iraqi Leaflets and Documents" (n.d.), USASOC History Archives. This report has attached the rare original Iraqi leaflets, as opposed to reprints. By contrast, Coalition leaflets seem to have committed few linguistic, grammatical or iconographical solecisms. See also H. A. Friedman, "A Brief Look at Iraqi Propaganda Leaflets," *Perspectives* (Fall 1992). These leaflets fetch high prices on the collectors' market. In fact some have been counterfeited for that market. *ibid.*, 7. Friedman also claims that some of the U.S. leaflets used poor language, but gives only one example. The commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG early in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT professionally dismissed Iraqi propaganda as "the most ineffective PSYOP you can imagine, because it was so comical.", interview with author.



As for Iraqi countermeasures to Coalition PSYOP, commanders threatened punishments ranging up to summary shooting for any of their troops found concealing a Coalition leaflet. And some enemy commanders resorted to the old ploy of warning their troops that Coalition PSYOP leaflets were somehow "poisoned," to little avail, judging from the thousands of healthy defectors clutching those messages.<sup>1181</sup>

But they were also aware that these were also men who didn't wish to die and that many, survivors of the Iran-Iraq War, had enough of battle. Finally, the 13<sup>th</sup> provided large-screen video entertainment for the EPWs on the MSQ-85 Mobile Audiovisual Shelter and used this "extra" as an incentive for good behavior among its charges: no cooperation, no video tonight.<sup>1182</sup>

According to 13<sup>th</sup> troopers, Coalition leaflet messages had gone out to 98 percent of the EPWs, 80 percent of whom had been influenced by it, and 70 percent of the surrenderees had been influenced enough that it affected their surrender decision. Radio gained a 58 percent target audience exposure rate, of whom 46 percent found it persuasive and 34 percent claimed it had a bearing on the surrender decision. Loudspeaker messages reportedly reached only 34 percent of the EPWs, a mere 18 percent said that they found it persuasive and 16 percent said it affected their decision to surrender.<sup>1183</sup> The much higher success rate of radio than in former conflicts undoubtedly reflects the high receiver access of Iraqi soldiers. (or all of those looted Kuwaiti radios).

The day following the cease-fire on 28 February 1991, a new PSYOP Task Force (POTF) provided support under Task Force Freedom for liberation and consolidation work in Kuwait City and its environs. Task Force Freedom, composed

<sup>1181</sup>Johnson, 72. CPT Auftengarten oral interview.

<sup>1182</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-18; Johnson, 67-68; 13<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion (PW/CI), (S)JULLS Long Reports(U), 29 March, 4, 11 and 14 April 1991, info used is UNCLASSIFIED; Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *News letter, Special Operations Forces (SOF)*, #92-X (n.d.), 16; 4<sup>th</sup> POG (S)After Action Report (U), 31-32. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; CPT Auftengarten oral interview; COL J. Noll (13<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion) telephonic oral interview with author, 29 August 1992. There is some evidence that the MPs were not completely happy with the 13<sup>th</sup> entertainment in the camps, and had reservations about "those spooky guys.", CPT Auftengarten oral interview. There is also evidence that a number of EPWs were actually "captured" a second time; they were Iraqis who crossed back into Kuwait after release to seek asylum in Saudi Arabia. Johnson, 229. A fascinating, and poignant, insight into the EPW mind is found in some of the cartoons drawn in the camps: "The War is Start... We Don't Want the War. We Need Piece... Oh My God!!"; "Thanks for the American Gaist [gift]... [clean-cut U.S. Army PSYOP trooper:] "Take Your Meal With Best Regards."; "Enjoy Your Time With American Freedom."; "Mama, Where is My Father.... I Don't Know." The cartoonists were bitter toward their British Captors, whom they accused of mistreatment. Johnson, 428-435.

<sup>1183</sup>Johnson, 69.

of PSYOP, Civil Affairs, engineers, medical personnel, military police and aviation units, provided for the emergency restoration of services and facilities to aid the resumption of civilian authority. POTF personnel assessed civilian morale, helped to re-establish Kuwait AM and FM and television facilities and disseminated a series of public service announcements, while print personnel helped to restore Kuwaiti commercial and government printing facilities. In addition they drew up more than one million posters, handbills, etc., dealing with the location of food, water and medical services and warning of unexploded ammunition. PSYOP soldiers, as did other members of Task Force Freedom, did what they could to keep the peace between those who had fled Kuwait and those who had remained, as well as to protect third country nationals from abuse at the hands of Kuwaiti civilians and troops.<sup>1184</sup>

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<sup>1184</sup>9<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion, 4<sup>th</sup> POG, (S)SITREP/INSUMs(U), 23-24 March 1991, USASOC Archives. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-18 to 4-19; CPT Badley, SGT Freeman, oral interviews.

## OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

American PSYOP personnel with their equipment began redeployment on 28 March, exactly one month after the Gulf War cease-fire. However, 29 members of the 6<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion (Airborne) of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG found themselves deployed from Saudi Arabia to Incirlik, Turkey on 25 April in support of Combined Task Force (CTF) PROVIDE COMFORT. This CTF directed air and ground humanitarian relief aid to Kurdish tribes people who had risen against Baghdad before, during and after the Gulf War and were now in danger of near-extirmination by Saddam.<sup>1185</sup> The task force eventually grew to include a Combined Air Task Force (CAF), Joint Task Force Alpha (JTF-A), which was composed primarily of Special Forces, CA and PSYOP personnel and held the primary mission of supporting the relief operations in the mountains; and Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B), responsible primarily for combat operations. In addition, the operation included a Civil Affairs Brigade, the Combined Support Command (CSC) and the US Navy Task Forces 60 and 61. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT would be the probably largest humanitarian relief operation since the Berlin Airlift of 1948-1949.

Elements of the 6<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion deployed from Fort Bragg and provided PSYOP support to the CTF, which was located at Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey. A Psychological Operations Task Force (POTF), consisting eventually of 78 officers and soldiers, a small command and control element, a propaganda development center and a liaison cell, provided PSYOP support for the CTF and was co-located at Incirlik. The POTF was further organized into support elements, each consisting of a four-man command and control cell and eight two-man tactical loudspeaker teams. One support element directly supported JTF-A, located in Silopi, Turkey and the second supported JTF-B in Zahku, Iraq. Another, seven-man, PSYOP element supported the Royal Marine Commandos at Sersink Airfield, also in Turkey. The POTF provided PSYOP planning support to the headquarters noted above and a wide variety of printed and audio PSYOP products for the relief operations and the administration of the refugee camps. The initial objectives of the POTF were to provide PSYOP support to prevent Iraqi military interference with the humanitarian operations in Northern Iraq, prevent Kurdish attack or interference with airborne operations and minimize chaos, confusion or panic among Displaced Civilians (DCs). During the transition phase the POTF directed its support to

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<sup>1185</sup>LTG G. W. Rudd, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: One More Tile in the Mosaic, 6 Apr - 15 Jul 91," for the U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.; USAJFKSWCS Directorate of Evaluations [*sic*: should read "Evaluation"] and Standardization, "Operation Provide Comfort: Lessons Learned, Observations," final draft, Fort Bragg, n.d. (1992?), 16, 227-237. A detailed overview of PROVIDE COMFORT is in J. R. Dabrowski, *et al*, (U)"History of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, 6 April 1991 - 30 June 1992"(S), 2 vols. (U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany: February 1993). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.

preparing DCs for the introduction of Humanitarian Service Support Detachments, preventing the major Kurdish guerilla organization from interfering with the humanitarian operations and to influence the movement of DCs. In the final phase of operations the POTF was to aid in the encouragement of DCs to return to their homes, convincing the Iraqi military to observe the UN resolutions governing the protected zone for the refugees, conducting population control efforts in transit centers, distribution points and way stations; and encouraging other Iraqis in the protected zone not to interfere with the humanitarian operations.<sup>1186</sup>

To carry out these objectives the Task Force had to get its message across to four audiences: the Kurds ("Self reliance and cooperation will insure survival and comfort of all."), the Iraqi Military ("Allied forces have the capability and will to protect humanitarian operations."), the Kurdish "freedom fighters" ("Attack against humanitarian relief will be counterproductive to cause."), and Iraqi civilians ("Humanitarian ops in N. Iraq are being conducted in accordance with U.N. resolution, and are morally correct in the eyes of Allah.")<sup>1187</sup>

As in the just-concluded operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, planning proved to be a sore spot for PROVIDE COMFORT. Initially, there was no overall Civil Affairs or PSYOP plan and subsequent planning always seemed to be reactive and formulated at the operational level. The initial lack of planning was not surprising, as no one could have been expected entirely to have anticipated Saddam's every genocidal move not to mention his resilience in defeat. But the persistence of reactive planning was not so easily explained. In the words of one official report, "PSYOP planning proposals were generally rejected until events dictated a need for action, which led to hastily planned responses."<sup>1188</sup>

Whatever the planning deficiencies the CJTF PSYOP contingent had quickly to draw up and distribute leaflets encouraging the Kurds to come down out of the mountains to obtain relief in the camps that the task force and other agencies were establishing. These leaflets outlined safe routes to the camps, where the refugees could find fuel, safe water and shelter. Others graphically depicted the dangers of wandering from these safe routes and falling victim to antipersonnel devices liberally scattered across the countryside.<sup>1189</sup> In the camps other leaflets explained the use of the Army's Meals Ready to Eat (MREs):

These Meals Ready-to-Eat are a gift from the United States. Beverage

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<sup>1186</sup>[4<sup>th</sup> POG (A)], *Psychological Operations Support for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT* [Fort Bragg, NC: 1994], 2-3.

<sup>1187</sup>LTG Shalikashvili, "Combined Task Force Provide Comfort: Psychological Operations" (7 April 1991), briefing slides.

<sup>1188</sup>USAJFKSWCS, DOES, "Operation Provide Comfort," 222.


<sup>1189</sup>Originals and copies of these leaflets are on file with 4<sup>th</sup> POG and USASOC Historical Archives. Also, MAJ J. Summe, oral interview with author, 15 August 1991.

أيها الشعب العراقي  
 قد وصلت قوات الجيش الأمريكي منلقة زاخو الآن  
 وستقدم قواتنا بالتعاون مع قوات عسكرية دولية  
 ومنظمة الأسمان الدولية الأخرى كثير من المساعدات  
 الإنسانية لكل من اللاجئين. لكي ستقدم قواتنا  
 الأاطعمة، المياه، كذلك الخدمات الصحية.  
 ستؤسس قواتنا لكم مؤقتاً المخيمات.  
 ان نعمل هذا مطابق تماماً مع قرار الأمم المتحدة  
 المرقم ٦٨٨، والله هو الموفق.  
 فضلاً حافظوا على قواتنا ومن معها تحت حمايتها  
 وساعدوا هذه الجهود الإنسانية الطاهرة  
 وشكراً.

People of Iraq!

Soldiers of the United States of America have arrived in Zaku. Our soldiers, international forces, and relief organizations are being sent to help your brothers who are suffering. We will be building temporary communities and providing food, water, and medical care. We are doing this in accordance with United Nations Resolution 688, and because it is right in the eyes of Allah.

Our soldiers will not harm you unless you attack them or the people they are protecting. Do not try to stop the humanitarian actions of the world; instead, join us in helping your brothers.

  
 John M.D. Shalikashvili  
 LTG, USA  
 Commander, Combined Task Force  
 الفريق/مان ام سي شاليكاشفيلي  
 قائد القوات المشتركة

Early aerial leaflet from PROVIDE COMFORT. From 4<sup>th</sup> POG, *PSYOP in Provide Comfort* (Fort Bragg: n.d.).

خطر  
الغام!



لا تبعدوا عن  
الطرق الرئيسية

(ARABIC)

"DANGER - MINES - STAY ON  
THE MAIN ROADS"

خه ته را  
ئالغام!




خۆتان دوور نابکه ن  
له ریگا .

(KURDISH)

"DANGER - MINES - STAY ON THE  
MAIN ROADS"

PROVIDE COMFORT leaflet for the Kurds



products are prepared by mixing one package with three glasses of water. Fruit can be eaten dry or mixed with cold water. To prepare the main dish, warm the sealed package in hot water, then open the package and serve. Remember, in the name of Allah, remain orderly and fair while food is being distributed.<sup>1190</sup>

Another leaflet included instructions for the preparation of powdered baby formula; incorrectly-mixed formula was causing dehydration, dysentery and death among the Kurdish infants.

In addition, PSYOP soldiers composed a registration tape that was played repeatedly over camp public address systems, providing immediate information to newly-arrived refugees and apparently cutting the camp registration effort in half. Another valuable PSYOP product was the language cards, which carried key phrases in the local tongues to assist JTF soldiers to communicate with the refugees and local government officials.<sup>1191</sup>

The tactical loudspeaker teams used their regional expertise and cultural awareness to disseminate information, control crowds and broadcast warnings to keep children away from the roads, which were heavy with relief and refugee traffic. Loudspeaker teams drew unexpected duty in running "kiddie patrols," roving loudspeaker teams that drew in refugee children, regaled them with songs and games - and kept them off the roads and streets as supply convoys pounded by.<sup>1192</sup> PSYOP troops in PROVIDE COMFORT faced an unexpected problem in the suspicion held by UN officials on the spot toward them and their profession. For these officials, PSYOP was "playing with heads" or "mind games" and thus something almost sinister. Although PSYOP personnel were able early to demonstrate that their work was entirely above-board, lingering suspicion remained to the end.<sup>1193</sup> But in the end it would not be an exaggeration to say that PROVIDE COMFORT saved the Iraqi Kurds from massacre at the hands of a vengeful Saddam and from starvation in the

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<sup>1190</sup>4<sup>th</sup> POG, *Psychological Operations Support for Operation Provide Comfort*, 9.

<sup>1191</sup>USAJFKSWCS DOES, "Operation Provide Comfort," 1991. MAJ Summe oral interview; Johnson, 405-415; 4<sup>th</sup> POG, *Psychological Operations Support for Operation Provide Comfort*, 3; USAJFKSWCS Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, "Operation Provide Comfort: Lessons Learned, Observations," (Fort Bragg: n.d.)

<sup>1192</sup>PSYOP Support to Operation Provide Comfort, 7; SGT K. Albino, oral interview with author, 12 December 1994.

<sup>1193</sup>MAJ Summe oral interview; SGT Albino oral interview. For further critique of PROVIDE COMFORT, see R. R. Begland, "Lessons to be Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM -PROVIDE Comfort," draft (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, Virginia: 5 March 1992), no pagination.



mountains.<sup>1194</sup>

By the middle of July 1991 virtually all Coalition forces had redeployed from northern Iraq and U.S. PSYOP in Southwest Asia came to an end. The Coalition had won an overwhelming, World War II-type of victory (which was celebrated Stateside by World War II-type enthusiastic "Welcome Homes.")

U.S. and Coalition PSYOP had done its work with few false steps. As noted the most significant and not, of course, the fault of any PSYOP personnel, was the late approval of the overall PSYOP plan and the calling up of individuals rather than units. It was also not the fault of PSYOP that the rest of the Army, in the words of a report from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) noted, "There was a fundamental lack of appreciation and understanding of PSYOP as a force multiplier during Operation DESERT SHIELD and the onset of Operation DESERT STORM." This "lack of appreciation" resulted in misapplications of PSYOP personnel and equipment.<sup>1195</sup>

In addition, several combat units questioned the whereabouts of RC PSYOP units who were supposed to have supported them and with whom they had been training for years ("Capstone Alignment"). There also seems little doubt that radio equipment did not play the role envisioned for this medium, that there were insufficient numbers of loudspeakers for the territory covered and that loudspeaker equipment was largely incompatible. Communications equipment was also often inadequate, with the 13<sup>th</sup> having to communicate to higher headquarters via commercial telephone and even by courier. Logistics support suffered, as noted, in that RC PSYOP units did not deploy as units and there was an attitude in theater that because PSYOP was a Special Operations asset then Special Operations should support them.<sup>1196</sup> An undetermined number of leaflets were judged to be failures; all but one of these featured excessive death and destruction cartoons and, significantly, all but that exception were withheld from dissemination. The exception to the failed death and destruction leaflet was one from the U.S. 7<sup>th</sup> Corps, which used that Corps's star motif. Enemy resistance in those areas where this leaflet was distributed was among the stiffest of the war; EPWs told interrogators later that they had come to believe

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<sup>1194</sup>LTG Shalikashvili, "Combined Task Force Provide Comfort," *passim*; USAJFKSWCS Department of Evaluation and Standardization, "Operation Provide Comfort Lessons Learned Observations," n.d., 16.

<sup>1195</sup>CALL *News letter, Special Operations Forces (SOF)*, #92-XX (n.d.), 17.

<sup>1196</sup>USASOC, *Psychological Operations*, 4-20 to 4-21; Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington: April 1992), J-28 to J-31; USAJFKSWCS, (C)"U.S. Army Special Operations"(U); 4<sup>th</sup> POG (S)"After Action Report,"(U), 14-16, 33-35; Chief, DOTD CA/PO/SOIS Development Branch, (S)"PSYOPs Lessons Learned from DESERT STORM"(U), 2-3 and attached questionnaires. Info used in classified studies is UNCLASSIFIED. "Psyop Lessons Learned from Desert Storm." (n.d.), USASOC History Archives.

from this leaflet that they were fighting Israeli troops.<sup>1197</sup>

Nonetheless, the impact of tens of thousands of bedraggled Iraqi soldiers clutching surrender leaflets was undeniable. The figure usually given is that a near-incredible 98 percent of Iraqi surrenderees had a PSYOP leaflet on their person and that 70 percent of EPWs were at least influenced by PSYOP messages. The commander of an enemy infantry division summarized the impact of Coalition PSYOP as "second only to allied bombing" in demoralizing his division.<sup>1198</sup> Most PSYOP soldiers would agree with that Iraqi officer, while at the same time realizing that the most successful PSYOP weapon in the Gulf, or in any war, is still the impact of superior military power and skill.

Critics could well argue that Iraqi soldiers, usually unwilling conscripts, sick of ten years of war with Iran, miserably led and pounded more-or-less continually by Coalition firepower, would have surrendered in droves anyway with or without PSYOP. But that argument ignores the fact that those soldiers had been nurtured on a diet of anti-American propaganda. The United States, if not the "Great Satan" of Iranian fulminations in the eyes of Iraqi troops, was still the patron and armorer of the "Jewish Entity" (Israel) and was now portrayed as embarking on yet another anti-Arab crusade. Who could say what the barbarously evil American troops might inflict on their prisoners? Apparently some Iraqi troops were told that U.S. Marines or Airborne troops had to kill members of their own families in order to enlist.<sup>1199</sup> In fact, Saddam had merely to retail tales of "American military atrocities" going back to Vietnam or, more recently Panama.<sup>1200</sup> Iraq's troops, stunned and disoriented by unrelenting air and ground bombardment, might well have determined in their despair to die in their bunkers without the "nudge" of psychological operations convincingly assuring them that there was a way out, that they could yet live in safety and dignity. Certainly, the value of PSYOP was not so evident in the U.S. on the eve of the war. Unnamed "skeptics" were reported by the *New York Times* as predicting that U.S.

<sup>1197</sup>Johnson, 175-183. Another supposed "failure" was a leaflet cartoon depicting Saddam the buffoon accidentally severing his own head, to the accompaniment of "oops," and "thud," hardly Arabic expressions. A number of interviewees referred to this leaflet. In actuality, the leaflet was actually an "inside joke" that somehow got caught up in "the system" and was widely disseminated., *ibid.*, 320. Copies in USASOC History Archives.

<sup>1198</sup>BG Scales, 197. The quotation has been widely disseminated.

<sup>1199</sup>Parker and Hale, plus numerous taped oral interviews with U.S. PSYOP veterans of the Gulf War.

<sup>1200</sup>At about the time of the Gulf War, a "documentary" film project was in the works claiming that American soldiers had "murdered thousands of Panamanians" in Operation JUST CAUSE. *Washington Post*, 15 August 1993. On the other hand it should be pointed out that, at least in the Iraqi Army officer corps, there may be a residuum of good feeling for the United States, dating from when those officers were trained at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center., Johnson, 272.

PSYOP "would be no more useful in eroding morale than the crude radio broadcasts...." By making such a comparison between Iraq's propaganda and the proven record of successful U.S. PSYOP, those "skeptics"/"experts," etc. forfeited any claim to be taken seriously.<sup>1201</sup>

One early Army study concluded that PSYOP, in conjunction with the air campaign

quickly took the heart out of the Iraqi army and contributed to its sudden collapse...many enemy soldiers were demoralized to the point of defecting, deserting, or being ready to surrender at the first shots of the ground battle.<sup>1202</sup>

The Congressional Research Service's *Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, 1986-1993*, argued that "PSYOP proved to be a classic force multiplier during the war with Iraq...."<sup>1203</sup> For PSYOP soldiers, undoubtedly the most satisfying result of their campaign in the desert was the more than 70,000 EPWs garnered by Coalition forces, 98 percent of whom had seen or heard a PSYOP message.<sup>1204</sup> Those were 70,000 enemy troops who would no longer pose a threat to Coalition forces and who were themselves now out of harm's way. It would be almost impossible in modern times to find a more complete or rapid military triumph than that of the Coalition arrayed against Saddam, and the PSYOP role in that triumph was incontestable.

Operations DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT were anything but the end of the history of U.S. Army PSYOP. There would be commitments soon after, primarily in Somalia, in the wake of the devastation wrought by hurricane Andrew in South Florida, in Haiti and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In fact, the 4<sup>th</sup> POG would be stretched in resources and personnel during this time as never before.

Nonetheless, looking back, it could be seen that the peak of Army psywar was during World War II in Europe. But that experience and that memory were lost after the war and had to be painfully and not completely re-learned in the obscure rice paddies and hills of Korea. By the coming of the Vietnam War, Psychological Operations had become an unquestioned part of the Army's arsenal, thanks in large measure to the Special Warfare Center/School. That arsenal had been again seriously depleted in the immediate post-Vietnam years. But as the U.S. Army rebuilt its

<sup>1201</sup>"U.S. Wages Psychological Campaign on Iraqis," *New York Times* (20 January 1991).

<sup>1202</sup>U.S. Army (Confidential) "Lessons Learned, Operation Desert Storm," 1, "Strategic Desert Storm Special Study Project," (U), (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: n.d. [upgrade date 28 August 1991]), 1-158. info used is UNCLASSIFIED.

<sup>1203</sup>J. M. Collins, Military Posture, CRS Report for Congress, *Special Operations Forces, 1986-1993* (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington: 30 July 1993), 24.

<sup>1204</sup>EPW figure from *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, 617.

effectiveness in those years so its PSYOP was also rehabilitated. By then no one could seriously question its value and this time the PSYOP rehabilitation proceeded with little controversy; if it needed any further proving, that proof was given in the Barrios of Panama and the sands of Southwest Asia. If not Grenada or Panama, then certainly DESERT STORM had finally laid low the infamous "Post-Vietnam Syndrome" throughout the Army.

Through it all U.S. Army psychological operations has hewed remarkably closely to its principle of truth-telling. This truthfulness has been, in a way, comparatively easy, for America's opponents in the 20<sup>th</sup> century have been predominantly of the totalitarian variety. Their self-defeating propaganda has been described by a Goebbels biographer as:

[bearing] witness to its own knowledge of the futility of its efforts in the capricious abruptness with which it alters watchwords and 'granite principles,' demands damning judgments or oaths of loyalty, hails the deadly enemy of yesterday as the faithful ally of today, brands the friend a traitor, revokes, annuls, rewrites its history, and obtains from the people protestations of faith in each of its erratic changes of course, wiping out at each switch all previous truths and oaths of loyalty.<sup>1205</sup>

Whether the American record of success can be attributed to the Army's truth-in-PSYOP, to the American advertising tradition, to professional development or even to learning something from past conflicts can be debated. But it is difficult to argue with the literally tens of thousands of greatly differing enemy troops who, over numerous quite different wars, have attributed some credit to Army PSYOP messages for their decision to "come over" or at least to think about it. Of course, as noted, Army PSYOP soldiers have not considered such surrenders an accurate gauge of success. Their goal is to undermine enemy morale, sow doubt and dissention, and to reassure the enemy of America's benign intentions. Even specific surrender messages are primarily designed to undermine enemy soldiers' morale and to assure them that they would be well-treated if they did defect. Soldiers with such an "insurance policy" in their boots or blouses (and in the German Army, the ratio of defector to those captured seemed roughly 10:1) could hardly be expected to "fight to the last man, the last cartridge." In fact, it can be argued that most surrender messages do not primarily target the individual soldier at all but his NCOs and officers, in an effort to put them on edge.

The reactions of enemy leaders, military and civil are logically even more convincing; again, it would be difficult to argue that such penalties, such fulminations, such exhortations are simply alibis for military failures. It is more consistent with common sense and the historical record, in sum, to give U.S. Army PSYOP its due.

PSYOP directed toward civil populations has been much more pragmatic and

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<sup>1205</sup>Fest, *Face of the Third Reich*, 97.

generally consists of directions for staying out of the way of military operations, and civil affairs messages to the end of restoring some semblance of civil order as soon as possible and leaving a pro-American people in their wake. And yet, paradoxically perhaps, this pragmatic PSYOP is the most difficult to evaluate. While civilians may crowd the feeding stations, keep off the roads, and maintain orderly camps, they still usually do not have to make any tangible break with their previous allegiances and they are not interrogated at length or in depth like EPWs. But the historical record reveals absolutely no civilian overt resistance to U.S. Army administration as administered by PSYOP and U.S. Army Civil Affairs. This record, of course, is in distinct and instructive contrast to, for example, German or Japanese administration of their occupied territories in World War II. But whatever the goals of U.S. Army PSYOP the target audiences seem to have been in little doubt as to the truth of its message: "Cease Resistance, It's Good For You."

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
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LEAFLET TRANSLATION

LEAFLET THEME:

LEAFLET NUMBER: .3

LANGUAGE: VIETNAMESE

SIZE: 6 x 3

PAPER WT: 20 lb

DISSEMINATION:  $V_0 - 2.5$ ;  $R_T/T_0 - 1.11$

FRONT:

(Photo of dead NVA soldier)

BACK:

IS THIS A GRAVE?

Unfortunately it is not. But it is this soldier's final resting place, many kilometers from the graves of his ancestors. His body cannot be identified, his grave cannot be marked, and his soul will never find rest. You can avoid this fate, pick up a Safe Conduct Pass and cross to the safety of the Government of His Majesty the King.

**ĐÂY CÓ PHẢI LÀ  
NĂM MỒ KHÔNG?**

Bất hạnh thay, đó không phải là năm mồ. Nhưng đó là nơi an nghỉ cuối cùng của người chiến sĩ ở một nơi cách xa phần mộ tổ tiên rất nhiều cây số. Không thể nhận diện được thi thể năm mồ" không bia và linh hồn chiến sĩ đó không bao giờ được yên nghỉ. Bạn có thể tránh khỏi tình trạng này. Hãy nhặt một tờ giấy thông hành và bước sang nơi an ninh của chính phủ Hoàng Gia.



**ĐÂY  
CÓ PHẢI  
LÀ  
NĂM MỒ  
KHÔNG ?**