

**GLAD TO SEE THEM COME AND SORRY TO SEE THEM
GO: A HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY TACTICAL CIVIL
AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1775-1991**

By Stanley Sandler

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CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT**

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“War itself is at heart a civil-military operation”¹

¹ C. Lord and John Brinkerhoff, et al. *Civil Affairs: Perspectives and Prospects*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (June 1993), introduction.

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PREFACE

This work had its origin in the classes in the history of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government taught by the author over the last decade to active duty and Reserve, enlisted and commissioned Army and Allied personnel at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and the Special Operations Command.

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all ages; of animals; of smashed buildings; shattered communications; hospitals in rubble; empty court rooms; broken water lines; pocked roads; burned food warehouses; shelled churches; destroyed schools; pillaged libraries and looted galleries and museums. Out of this physical and human debris of war it must speedily bring order; establish law; get a government going; provide food, water, shelter, and medical care and carry off wastes; organize and supply labor both to itself and the combat forces. All this it must do by indirection and decentralization and, as it rebuilds government, it must redesign it in the general pattern of democracy and prepare it for extended Allied supervision during and after the deliberations of the peace-makers.³

Every author should spell out the parameters of his work. The eminent Prussian military historian and savant, Carl von Clausewitz, hoped that his work *On War* would not serve as "a sort of manual for action," but rather "to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference." That is also this author's hope. There is no better "frame of reference" than history. The futurists (who seem consistently to get their every prognostication wrong) are of little use here; the future remains, as always, resolutely veiled. Post-World War I thinkers, for example, assured us that the defense was now supreme. Post-World War II savants opined that the next war would be over in a few weeks in the nuclear era. Post-Korean War analysts assured us of "no more Koreas" on the Asian mainland before Vietnam, and few indeed predicted a World War II-type armor-air clash on the eve of DESERT STORM. The more we study this almost completely consistent record of miscalled and mistimed prognostication, it becomes the more evident that, we can only compare the present with the past. By doing so we can also avoid the eternal heresy that our own times are unique, either uniquely challenging or uniquely depraved, or even uniquely "advanced." Any honest study of the past should prove a humbling exercise as we come to wonder just how much progress we have truly made from our "primitive past." Certainly the magnificent record of U.S. Army military government in, say, the now-nearly forgotten German Rhineland post-World War I occupation has hardly been surpassed.

This volume will concentrate as much as possible on the tactical operations of U.S. Army Military Government and Civil Affairs, and is so far the first book-length work to do so. Obviously, one cannot concentrate on operations of units in the field and ignore the strategic, even the political, considerations that sent them out there in the first place. These considerations, the debates, the high-level politics of, say, the occupation of Germany, have been analyzed at some length and in some detail by journalists at the time and by historians in the fullness of time. We are probably no longer in need of another study dealing with Douglas MacArthur and the Japanese constitution, or the formulation of U.S. occupation policy for Germany. However, we can indeed profit from a work that details the operations of a Military Government team in Nagoya, the establishment of a military court in Munich, or the operation of a Displaced Civilians facility in Panama.

To be more specific, this book will endeavor to tell the story of tactical United States Army Civil Affairs and Military Government in the following circumstances:

- 1) The establishment and operation of Military Government and Civil Affairs in areas where U.S. armed force has displaced the enemy government. (e.g. the occupation of Montreal in the War for Independence or the occupation of Germany after V-E Day.
- 2) The establishment and operation of Military Government and Civil Affairs in the wake of U.S. federal government policy, even though an indigenous government remains in place. Examples would be Reconstruction in the Southern states after the political overthrow of President Lincoln's moderate reconstruction policy, the U.S. Army's occupation of the German Rhineland immediately after World War I or the military occupation of Japan after V-J Day.
- 3) The dispatch of armed forces, including Military Government and Civil Affairs units and/or personnel to sovereign nations in peacetime to implement some U.S. government policy, such as peacekeeping, the restoration of order, protection from foreign interference, restoration of democracy, humanitarian assistance, etc., with or without that nation's consent. (e.g. the various Caribbean interventions and the occupation of Vera Cruz in 1914 or Operations JUST CAUSE or PROVIDE COMFORT).
- 4) Civil Affairs in the United States itself or its territories, particularly the very widespread Army activities through the less settled areas of the United States in the first half of the 19th century (e.g. U.S. Army railroad surveys, and Military Government in newly-acquired U.S. territories. (e.g., the Army's government of Alaska).

Obviously, there will be overlapping in these categories, particularly between 2 and 3. For example, the United States imposed a standard military occupation of Japan, which retained a functioning government, in the wake of World War II. (category 2) But it also held to the policy of demilitarizing Japan, reforming its institutions and leading it into democracy. (category 3).

What this work will not cover, at least in any detail, are the multifarious and impressive U.S. Army "civic action" programs overseas or in the United States itself, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, or the restoration of order in racial or labor disturbances, the providing of emergency disaster relief, education, recreation, humanitarian projects, scientific and medical research, etc., foreign military assistance programs or the imposition of martial law. At any rate, most U.S. Army civil programs in those areas, for example Thailand in the 1960s, would fall into the category of civic action. Whether one agrees with all of these omissions, it can hardly be disputed that to do them justice would make this work impossibly unwieldy.

This volume was written with the U.S. Army Civil Affairs specialist in mind. It is not an exercise in "lessons learned," however. History, as a record of human activity, is far too elusive, debatable and even unpredictable for anyone to insist with any legitimacy, "Here is a good example, follow it.", or vice versa. At the most we can discern patterns and principles that seem to have held true through the years. We

can further say that the historical evidence is strong enough that people in all their group and individual complexity and diversity, have not changed that much over the ages. If General Scott's sensitive military government pacified a foreign people in Mexico in 1847, we should not be surprised to see a similar success with U.S. Army Civil Affairs in, say, Panama City in 1989-90. Conversely, a slovenly military occupation like that of General Wooster's in Montreal could be counted on to alienate the population, as did that of General Taylor's in the same war in which General Scott enjoyed so much success.

Military and non-military historians and their students should find this work useful to fill in a major blank page in American military history. It is also hoped that non-CA specialist soldiers will gain an insight into and an understanding of Civil Affairs that will enable them to plan for its use during and after the battle.

¹ Actually, on several occasions U.S. Army Provost Courts or Military Commissions did hand down and carry out death sentences, during the Mexican War and during and after World War II.

² Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: 1 December 1989), 67.

³ Malcolm S. MacLean, "Military Government--Fact and Fancy," *Public Administration Review* (Autumn 1947), 275.

THE ARMY IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: OCCUPIERS, FIGHTERS, EXPLORERS, BUILDERS, DIPLOMATS

Starting off on the Wrong Foot: The Occupation of Montreal

"As to my opinion of the Canadians, I think there is nothing to fear from them while we are in a state of prosperity, and nothing to hope for when in distress." (Sir Guy Carleton to the Secretary of State for the Colonies)¹

The U.S. Army's experience of Civil Affairs and Military Government opened with an unmitigated disaster, the invasion and military government of Canada. The Continental Congress sensed an opportunity for rebellion among the French Canadians, subjugated by the British in the French and Indian (or Seven Years) War, 1756-1763. The British, however, in an act of statesmanship that would be sorely missed in the lower 13 colonies, guaranteed the existing economic, social and religious arrangements of *les Quebecois*. As a result, in the words of one authority, "It seems that in 1775 [the year of the American invasion of Canada] the vast majority of the inhabitants of Quebec were content to walk the knife-edge of neutrality." A member of the Continental Congress' Canada Commission reported in May of 1775 that "The inclinations of the common people are so to be in general with us. But they are timorous and unsteady. No [overt?] assistance can be expected from them."²

At the outset of the invasion American troops were strictly enjoined to look upon the Canadians as separated brothers, fellow victims of royal tyranny. The American officers before Quebec City, for instance, were directed "Strictly to observe the conduct of their men... so that any disorder could be suppressed in the Verry [*sic*] Bud."³ The Americans, however, had bitterly denounced the Quebec Act, including that portion granting establishment status to the Roman Catholic church. Many stout spiritual descendants of the Puritans also had little sympathy with the pervasive "papistical" religious observance of *les Canadiens*. Continental Army Chaplain Ammi Robbins was not unique in characterizing Quebec as nothing less than "the dwelling place of Satan," and claimed that "Tis grievous and affecting to see the superstition, every mile and sometimes oftener I find a cross fixed and on some the spear, sponge, hammer, nails, &c."⁴ Chaplain Robbins and his ilk made no secret of their opinions, making the new-found protestations of amity with their Canadian brothers from *les bostonnais* (New Englanders/Americans) ring hollow. The French clergy challenged the Rev. John Carroll (a member of the Continental Congress' Canada Commission and later a bishop of the Catholic Church) to name one colony in which the Catholic religion enjoyed privileges already guaranteed in the Quebec Act.⁵

However, *Quebecois* attitudes were indeed on a "knife edge" and might have been tipped against the British and a "fourteenth colony" raised in revolt. But it was not to be. Although the American commander, General Montgomery, made a good impression upon the inhabitants, he was killed in the failed assault on Quebec City.

His successor, General David Wooster, was a poor choice indeed, a religious bigot with little understanding of the people in his charge and of his opportunity. Wooster took a high hand in his dealings with the civil population, and on one occasion, in response to local protests, termed the *Quebecois* "enemies and rascals." A convinced Protestant in a center of intense Roman Catholic devotion, Wooster, in an act of unbelievable stupidity, further alienated the powerful clergy by closing the "mass houses" on Christmas Day!⁶

Further, the invading troops had exhausted their supply of specie and had to resort to paper money, which the thrifty *Quebecois*, with good reason, tried to reject, provoking the insensitive Wooster even further. The maladroit commander did have the good sense to report frankly to the Continental Congress on the deteriorating situation in his command. Congress dispatched Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, Father Carroll and a French printer to Montreal. It was typical of the situation that when the commissioners were quartered in the home of an American resident in Quebec they found that very domicile so vandalized by American troops that hardly a door or window remained.

The hardheaded commissioners immediately reported that the want of real money and the resultant requisitions that were little more than seizures of local property had done more than anything else to undermine the American cause:

Therefore, until the arrival of [hard] money, it seems improper to propose the federal union of this province with the others, as the few friends we have here, will scarce venture to exert themselves in promoting it, til they see our credit recover and a sufficient army arrived to secure the possession of the country.

The energetic Franklin set his printer to running off broadsheets and reversed some of the more obnoxious of Wooster's policies. The two other members of the Commission, Chase and Carroll, meanwhile accurately reported to Congress that "General Wooster is ... unfit, totally unfit to command your Army and conduct the war."⁷ It was all too late. The American troops, by now a mutinous, unpaid, underfed, disease-ridden mob, and now the object of French Canadian scorn, abandoned by "The Friends of Congress," melted away southward and the whole expedition ended in mutual blame shifting.⁸ As for the Canadians, Governor General Sir Guy Carleton himself reported rather sourly to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that "As to my opinion of the Canadians, I think there is nothing to fear from them while we are in a state of prosperity, and nothing to hope for when in distress."⁹

It would be difficult to exaggerate the short and long-term consequences of this maladministration of military government at the very beginning of the history of the United States. Had the American occupiers been better behaved it was possible that not only would *les Quebecois* have sided with the Congress, but might have comprised a fourteenth colony. Presumably this would have meant that, for better or worse, British North America and Canada would have become but an historical memory, with the dominion of the United States extending to nearly the North Pole.¹⁰

"In general, the Army is important for economic development." (Karl Marx to F. Engels)¹¹

In the wake of the signing of the treaty of peace between His Britannic Majesty's government and the newly-independent United States in 1783, the U.S. Army was practically disbanded. Yet the new nation had a huge territory to control, and its army was the only force with the discipline and organization for the task. The U.S. Army through most of the 19th century would remain the nation's largest organization and the only enterprise capable of mobilizing and sustaining large numbers of persons on a project.¹² Not until the building of the Erie Canal early in the 19th century did a civilian enterprise come even close to the Army's manpower mobilizations of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. That army was much more involved in the development of the nation than any contemporary European military force. As a former Supreme Commander in Europe and U.S. Military Academy Superintendent concluded about the same period, "The American army had learned to move in concert with the rest of American society, and it had finally become a corporate part of that society."¹³

The Indian tribes presented the most persistent problem for the Army and would remain so, with the interruptions of the Mexican and Civil Wars, until the closing of the frontier in the early 1890s. The Army's basic mission was to keep whites out of Indian territory and tribal Indians out of areas opened for settlement. Even in time of peace the Army was deputed to deal with the Indians in the absence of federal government Indian Agents, who, at any rate, were thin on the ground and not particularly noted for their honesty.

In April of 1785, the Continental Congress recognized and supported this mission with legislation raising 700 troops for the unprecedented peacetime enlistment term of three years. This legislation spelled out the U.S. Army's balanced task as "the protection of the northwestern frontier, to defend the settlers on the land belonging to the United States from the depredations of the Indians, and to prevent unwarrantable intrusion thereon."¹⁴ The Army certainly had its work cut out. One commentator has noted that in 1800 the area west of the Mississippi River was as about as much *terra incognita* as the moon is today. A map of America published in 1806 by a London cartographer left the huge area between the Mississippi River and the Pacific Coast largely a blank.¹⁵

The Army established garrisons at strategic points, as well as "factories", where the Indians might trade their goods for blankets, guns, traps, etc. These enterprises were forwarded by President Jefferson, who believed that they would keep the Indians tranquil and immune to British blandishments, both political and commercial, a hope, obviously, not entirely fulfilled.¹⁶ Although the War Department issued orders for commanders of posts to aid these factories, most commanders were too busy with the construction and upkeep of their forts to spare too much time or effort for such

commercial enterprises. At any rate, the factories were finally abolished in 1822 and their work taken over by private traders.¹⁷

Army officers also were responsible for arranging and protecting treaty councils with the Indians. For example, in June of 1815 BvBG Daniel Bissell, COL John Miller and 275 soldiers (who just after his assumption of command had been described by GEN Bissell as unpaid and "literally naked") journeyed to the council ground at Portage des Sioux, Missouri Territory, where negotiations with the Indians of the Upper Mississippi and the Missouri resulted in a series of treaties of peace and friendship. As another example, in the summer of 1822 COL Matthew Arbuckle, a veteran of the War of 1812, with four companies of the 7th Regiment, more or less forced a treaty of peace upon warring Cherokee and Osage chiefs at Fort Smith, Arkansas. A decade later now-BG Arbuckle was concerned that the Cherokees were selling liquor to his troops. One year later he reported that the Creeks were desirous that Fort Gibson be retained "to protect them from the depredations of the Osages." He still retained some sympathy for the Osages:

But when it is recollected that the Osage have ceded to the United States an immense territory for a mere trifle, I believe it will be regarded as an act of justice and gratitude on the part of our government to this thoughtless and improvident people to insure their well being hereafter.¹⁸

In fact, it can be said that the Army at this juncture was investing more time and effort in peace-enforcement among the various Indian tribes than in fighting them.

In 1825, the so-called Permanent Indian Frontier was informally established, a line beyond which it was naively believed that no white could, would, or should settle and beyond which the Indian could roam freely. To enforce this line, the Army erected a string of ten forts, from Fort Jessup in Louisiana to Fort Snelling in Minnesota Territory. All ten lay in the fertile valley of the Mississippi-Missouri river system. That fertility and those easily-navigated rivers, however, spelled doom for this frontier line and for any long-term hopes for an Indian refuge.¹⁹ Only four years later, the Army was escorting the annual caravan of the Santa Fe traders as far as the Arkansas River, then on the border with Mexico.²⁰ Later expeditions would demonstrate the porous nature of this artificial frontier. The Secretary of War summarized the choice for the Indians --and the Army:

Shall they be advised to remain or remove? If the former, their fate is written in the annals of their race; if the latter we may yet hope to see them renovated in character and condition by our example and instruction, and by their exertions.

Lewis Cass then outlined what would remain the Army's policy for the rest of the century: 1)"A solemn declaration" that lands reserved for the Indians would remain, " and a corresponding determination that our settlements shall not spread over it;" 2)Prohibition of liquor from the reservations, 3)The stationing of "an adequate force"

nearby the reservations, "to suppress at all hazards, the slightest attempt at hostilities among themselves, ... And if in checking this evil some examples should be necessary, they would be sacrifices to humanity, and not to severity.", 4) "Encouragement to the severalty of property," agriculture and its instruction. Finally, the Indians should be left alone "in the employment of their peculiar institutions, as far as may be compatible with their own safety and ours, and with the great object of their prosperity and improvement."²¹ Although a later generation would consider such opinions as at least condescending, they were nonetheless considerably in advance of most American civilian opinion, certainly at least among Western settlers.

The Black Hawk War of 1832 illustrates the Army's position between the Indians and white settlers pouring into the frontier. There had been some dispute about the validity of the treaty signed in November of 1804 by five members of the Sac and Fox tribes, ceding their tribe's lands east of the Mississippi. White squatters moved even into the principal Sac village on the Rock River, and demanded that the supposed "depredations of these irritated and bloodthirsty savages" be stopped by the wholesale evacuation of the Sac and Fox.²² A major provoking factor was the influx of tens of thousands of "immigrant" Indians, removed from their ancestral tribal lands by treaties with Washington. Between 1836 and 1842, for example, about 80,000 Indians had been removed from east of the Mississippi to the western frontier, where they met 250,000 indigenous Indians and about 900,000 whites in Missouri and Arkansas alone. Almost all demanded protection. As if to prove the value of Army forts and their troops, the withdrawal of the garrison of tiny Fort Towson, Arkansas, a few years later, led to almost total war in the area, with Comanches fighting Pawnees and white settlers fighting them both.²³ Nonetheless, it can be argued that the location of many, if not the majority of military forts throughout this period were sited more in response to civilian concerns, often deliberately exaggerated, than with any overall Army strategy.²⁴

Until 1832, the actual removal of Indian tribes was in the hands of civilian contractors. These entrepreneurs, however, generally proved a rascally lot, so in that year, this unpleasant task was assigned to the Army. To add to the burdens of the already hard-pressed military, Congress in that same year outlawed the introduction of liquor into Indian territory. This was another obligation that the Army took seriously, even confronting the powerful John Jacob Astor's American Fur Company by destroying an illicit still the company was defiantly operating near the mouth of the Yellowstone River.²⁵ Civilians seized by troopers in such nefarious activities were not tried by courts martial, but remanded to the civil courts --where their crimes against the Indians were rarely punished. This being the United States, these same civilians would often turn and sue the arresting officer, thereby cooling the latter's ardor to enforce the law.²⁶

In a not untypical situation in Alabama in the early 1830s, soldiers from Fort Mitchell (near Columbus, Georgia) frequently clashed with civilians, as the U.S. Marshal of that state did not hesitate to call on the troops to disperse white intruders on Indian lands. In 1833 the superior court of Russell County found the post commander in contempt for refusing to turn over to civil authorities a trooper who had killed a

white intruder in such an operation. The soldiers, in turn, looked upon nearby whites with disdain. One commander reported that "There is hardly a white man to be found in this section of the country, that is not looking out and waiting for the time when he expects to be able to swindle an Indian out of a good touch of land." Relations with the local populace were hardly improved when, after putting down a Creek rebellion (probably thoroughly provoked), the settlers then clamored for removal of the troops, and attempted to help them on their way by destroying the post hospital, breaking and stealing windows, even tearing up and carrying off the floor. The garrison was removed, undoubtedly to the relief of both sides.²⁷

A squalid brawl in 1836 illustrated the thankless task of the Army in trying to hold the worst elements of the settlers out of Indian territory and in keeping the peace. A group of whiskey traders in that year, unsuccessful in their attempts to sell liquor to a Potawatamee band, proceeded to steal eight of the Indians' horses. The Indians tracked the thieves down and, in a hail of gunfire, killed two and recovered their mounts. The Governor of Missouri then called out 200 volunteers to clear the Potawatamee from the state. The Western Commander, BvBG Henry Atkinson, advised against so rash a course, and, in fact, the Indian leaders had already surrendered to him. The general concluded that "If the authorities of the state raise troops at discretion and take the management of Indian difficulties into their own hands [he wrote the Secretary of War], I cannot be accountable for the result, as my authority is not paramount to the will of the governor." Eventually, the Potawatamee were removed. Four years later, General Atkinson displayed exemplary humanitarian concern when he ordered COL Steven L. Kearny to remove "Ioway" bands who were still on the west bank of the Missouri River, among the Pottawatamee:

You will use your own discretion as to the time of their removal, either at once, and as soon as they gather their corn in the fall, perhaps the latter will be the best time, as if they lose their crop, they may suffer during the winter, there being but little game on their own lands.²⁸

Throughout his career, in fact, General Atkinson and most Army commanders, for whatever reasons, revealed considerable concern for the welfare of the Indians and advocated a policy of military demonstrations and the swift apprehension of individual Indian malefactors, rather than the making of general war.²⁹

As the "military frontier" advanced, Indian Agents followed in relative safety. Then, in 1834 Congress replaced the existing informal Indian agent arrangements with a separate office of Indian Affairs within the War Department. The Secretary of War in 1843 spelled out succinctly the goal of the Army's Indian Agents: "to bring the influences of Christianity and civilization to bear upon them; to induce them to settle down permanently to the cultivation of the soil; and to become domesticated, as it were, on their own territories."³⁰ However, the paucity of such federal agents in the field led to their duties officially devolving upon ranking U.S. Army officers.³¹ This work was hardly sought after by those officers. Young Winfield Scott caught the military mood of the time when he complained that:

I have in no way sought out the duties of Indian Agent; on the contrary, I have entered on them with the greatest reluctance with the fear of not being able to discharge them without neglecting those of my proper profession in a manner to give satisfaction to the [War] Department, and to do justice to those poor miserable and degraded creatures.³²

Most Americans, however, would have agreed with President Martin Van Buren, who affected "sincere pleasure to be able to apprise [Congress] of the entire removal of the Cherokee nation of Indians to their new homes west of the Mississippi.", and who congratulated the local military commander that the Indians "have emigrated without any apparent reluctance.", as had almost "the entire Creek nation,"³³ By 1839, the Secretary of War was reporting hopefully that "the period is fast approaching when the States will be altogether relieved from their Indian population, which presented so serious an obstacle to their advancement, and the Indians themselves removed to a permanent and peaceful home, far from the causes which led to their degradation and were rapidly producing their ruin and extermination."³⁴ Even in their "permanent and peaceful homes," however, the Indians, "Scarcely capable of self-government," according to the Secretary of War three years later, remained "quite incompetent to protect themselves from the frauds and from the violence of the white man."³⁵

As the most important means of fulfilling its mission of Indian pacification, the Army carried on with its fort building, and the decade 1820-1830 saw more than sixty percent of the troop strength of the Army garrisoned on the western frontier. These forts and garrisons restrained the Indians from intertribal warfare as well from attacks on settlers, fostered and controlled the operations of American traders, kept out their British and Canadian commercial rivals, suppressed bandits and filibuster adventurers and encouraged orderly, legal American settlement.³⁶

The Army's direct non-military involvement with the American Indian ended in 1849, when Congress created the Department of the Interior and gave it extensive control over Indian affairs. Rather than welcoming this relief from its major burden, the Army command protested the changeover, arguing with considerable justice that it was the only organization fitted for such work, certainly better than any civilian agency.³⁷

The Army did retain its mission of Indian pacification. Its evenhanded efforts, however, were not duplicated by border volunteer troops, whose employment could well, in the forthright words of Secretary of War Jefferson Davis in 1858, degenerate into a mandate "to exterminate the Indians."³⁸ General E. A. Hitchcock, commanding the Department of Oregon, was in no way alone when he bluntly summarized the situation in words that give some indication of the Regular Army's exasperation with the white-Indian clash:

The Whites go in upon Indian lands, provoke the Indians, bring on collisions, and then call for protection, and complain if it is not

furnished, while the practical effect of the presence of troops can be little else than to countenance and give security to them in their aggressions; the Indian, meanwhile, looking upon the military as their friends, and imploring their protection.³⁹

The noted topographer, LT Gouverneur K. Warren, leader of three western exploration expeditions and a veteran of several Indian conflicts, summarized the army's paradoxical situation on the frontier. LT Warren admitted "that I regard the greatest fruit of the explorations I have conducted to be the knowledge of the proper routes to invade their country and conquer them." He did add that, "I almost feel guilty of crime in being a pioneer to the white men who will ere long drive the red man from his last niche of hunting ground."⁴⁰ In all, the Army's relationship with the Indians was a miserable business which did not end until the complete subjugation of the Indian nations. Still, it can be shown that because the troopers did not particularly desire anything from the Indians, certainly not their lands, but were there simply to keep order, their behavior toward the Indians was usually a distinct improvement over that of the settlers (which, admittedly, may not be saying too much).

Far more rewarding of the Army's non-combat activities in the first half of the 19th century was the exploration, description and mapping of the young nation's newly-acquired territories. As early as 1800 the financier and signer of the Declaration of Independence, Robert Morris expressed American impatience to expand and the optimism of the new nation, sentiments that later in the century would come to be known as "Manifest Destiny," the conviction that the United States of America had the right, if not the duty, to expand from ocean to ocean and possibly even from pole to pole:

As yet, my friend, we only crawl along the outer shell of our country. The proudest empire in Europe is but a bauble, compared to what America will be, must be, in the course of two centuries, perhaps of one.⁴¹

The greatest of these Army exploration projects, of course, was the Lewis and Clark expedition. Even before the news of the agreement transferring this vast territory from France to the United States reached Washington, President Jefferson had made arrangements to forward an exploring party under Army officers into Upper Louisiana. Jefferson was seeking a passage to the Pacific shores and ultimately to the Orient beyond. The President personally picked CPT Meriwether Lewis, who, in turn, selected 2LT William Clark to head the project. When the expedition left St. Louis for the west in 1804, it numbered four sergeants, twenty-two privates, plus interpreters and hunters --and LT Clark's personal slave. The two officers presented medals, flags and certificates to the various Indian tribal leaders to certify their allegiance to the new "great Chief of the Seventeen great nations of America" and to shut their ears "to the councils of Bad birds." (presumably British, French or Spanish agents). The party was organized into three squads, each under a sergeant. They reached their goal of the

western ocean on 7 November 1803, having marked the first clear trail to the west, and their reports of the lands they surveyed remain important to this day. Lewis called for the striking of a delicate balance between the necessities of the impending white settlements and the rights of the Indians ("these wretched people of America") and most accurately noted that "The first principle of governing the Indians is to govern the Whites-." This most historic and successful expedition was throughout its progress a military project with military discipline strictly enforced.⁴²

Two years after Jefferson had commissioned Lewis and Clark, 2dLT Zebulon Pike of the 1st Infantry was detailed by General James Wilkinson, the district commander at St. Louis, to explore the region of the upper Mississippi and to obtain permission from the Indians in the area to erect military posts and trading houses at key points. Soon after the completion of this successful mission, Pike was sent on another, somewhat mysterious, expedition into the Southwest to assess the geography, natural history and population of the region and to negotiate with warring prairie tribes. As a result of these expeditions, the Army and the nation had become far more familiar with the features of the Louisiana Purchase. (Although such knowledge was hardly furthered by LT Pike's stubborn belief that all the great rivers of the West had a common source, a mythic "Grand reservoir of snows and fountains," which, of course, he had never seen.)⁴³

After the signing of the Treaty of Ghent ending the War of 1812, the United States and its Army could once again turn much of its energies and resources to nation-building in the Old Northwest frontier, and, in fact, the Federal government embarked upon a definite program of westward military expansion beyond the lines of settlement. In the wake of fort-building and the abandonment of old forts as the line of settlement steadily advanced, the most significant Army enterprise became its extensive road building, once federal officials had overcome early doubts about the constitutionality of such work by the military. These roads were built for commercial and postal as well as military purposes and it is usually almost impossible to disentangle the primary reason for their funding, planning and construction. In many cases, the troops themselves participated in the actual construction. Between 1817 and 1820, for example, Army units improved the old Natchez Trace between the Tennessee border and Lake Ponchartrain north of New Orleans, and renamed it "Jackson's Military Road." The new road could now boast 35 bridges and no less than 392 causeways. In the North the 6th Infantry, beginning in 1818, laid out and constructed the road between Plattsburg and Sacketts Harbor, New York. Army engineers, in replacing a ruined stone bridge on the Cumberland Road at Brownsville, Pennsylvania, erected the nation's first iron bridge. Army personnel also worked on efforts to extend the Cumberland Road through Ohio, Indiana and Illinois to the Mississippi. In sum, Army Engineers at the least supervised practically all road-building by the federal government, even if the construction were by civilian contractors, and many even of these were funded by appropriations in the control of the War Department. President John Quincy Adams, an ardent advocate of "internal improvements," reported in 1828 that "The Quartermaster General...is engaged, not merely in erections and accommodations for the troops, but in the construction of roads and bridges for the citizens at large.", and

concluded that the Army contributed "more than any other equal number of citizens, not only to the security of the country, but to the advancement of its useful arts."⁴⁴

The Army did not stop at roads. COL Henry Atkinson's 1819 expedition up the Missouri carried the first official scientific specialists, half of whom were themselves Army officers, into the West on steamboats, the first use of such vessels on far western waters. As "primitive" as they might seem to a later generation, to contemporaries these mechanical marvels were freighted with the wonders of the age:

See these vessels, with the agency of steam advancing against the powerful currents of the Mississippi and the Missouri! Their course is marked by volumes of smoke and fire, which the civilized man observes with admiration, and the savage with astonishment. Botanists, mineralogists, chemists, artisans, cultivators, scholars, soldiers; the love of peace, the capacity for war: Philosophical apparatus and military supplies; telescopes and cannon, garden seeds and gunpowder; the arts of civil life and the force to defend them -- all are seen aboard. The freedom which waves over the whole proclaims the character and protective power of the United States.

Although about one-third of Atkinson's force would die of scurvy, exposure and starvation at Council Bluffs, the expedition was a very tangible affirmation that the United States was serious about its claims to the Trans-Mississippi West.⁴⁵

Almost simultaneously with the Atkinson expedition, the renowned Topographer and Engineer, MAJ Stephen H. Long of the Corps of Engineers led the first scientific expedition to the Trans-Mississippi west, spearheaded by an ingenious, but unsuccessful, steamboat of his own design. The historic reputation of this expedition, however, has been marred ever since by Long's ill-considered characterization of the West as "The Great American Desert," despite the presence of a botanist, geologist, naturalist and zoologist on board. Long's conclusions may have been distorted by the loss of the expedition's scientific notes, along with supplies and Indian presents, when three soldiers deserted. The miscreants and their booty were never recovered. Long's 1823 expedition went far to the north, into what is now Manitoba, Canada, where Long now grandly dismissed one section of the western territory stretching from Mexico to Canada as bearing a "manifest resemblance to the desert of Siberia (which no one in his expedition, of course, had ever seen) and the other as "a watery waste - a torn bug-infested landscape."⁴⁶

The Army itself needed no urging along these lines. In the words of one authority, "The Army conscientiously considered itself a force for national development."⁴⁷ As early as 1820, one contemporary authority claimed that "The ax, pick and trowel, has [*sic*] become more the implement of the American soldier than the cannon, musket or sword."⁴⁸

The reasons for such an attitude and such employment were not hard to find. First, the Army was the sole organization with the experience and ability to mobilize large numbers of men to work over extended periods, although it never could deploy

the manpower required adequately to pacify the frontier. Second, even by the standards of the time the United States of course, was an "underdeveloped country," and the demand for the Army's resources seemed inexhaustible.

With the founding of the U.S. Military Academy in 1802, the raw new nation had its first (and until the opening of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1820, its only) school of technical application. One documented source has estimated that the number of "active or available" civil engineers in the United States in 1816 was no more than 27, that is, an average of two per state.⁴⁹ It is instructive that the enabling legislation for the Academy stated, that "a corps of engineers... shall constitute a military academy."⁵⁰ West Point's curriculum, remarkably at a time of almost complete emphasis upon the classics, was designed to turn out engineer-soldiers, rather than gentlemen-officers. A major mission of those soldier-engineers was, in the words of the 1830 Board of Visitors, "to furnish science for exploring the hidden treasures of our mountains and ameliorating the agriculture of our valleys."⁵¹ The nation's standard engineering text was by the Academy's Dennis Hart Mahan, who built the Academy's Engineering Department to respectable stature between 1830 and 1871. Academy graduates held the first Engineering chairs at Rensselaer, Harvard and Yale, and as late as 1836 the chief of the Corps of Topographical Engineers asserted that:

We have but one school in our country which may be considered as thoroughly mathematical in its course, the military school at West Point; and it is to this school only to which we can look for individuals sufficiently qualified to enter upon the duties of this [Atlantic coast] survey.⁵²

The Academy's curriculum was probably the first in the nation to offer an advanced course in "tracing," "copying," "topographical delineation of rocks and hills," "the art of shading geometrical figures" and aerial perspective, "all essential for industrial and architectural design. (It also, incidentally, pioneered the use of blackboard and chalk for instruction.)"⁵³

The Academy's unique blending of the practical and theoretical aspects of scientific learning can be seen in its Philosophical Society, which listed Thomas Jefferson as its President and which was presided over twice a month by the Academy Superintendent. By 1810 the Society's membership included no less than five past or future Presidents of the United States (Jefferson, John Adams, John Quincy Adams, William Henry Harrison, James Madison and James Monroe), as well as five state governors, eight senators, a mayor of New York, a Supreme Court justice and Zebulon Pike, not to mention Robert Fulton and Eli Whitney! President Wayland, of Brown University, generously asserted that the U.S. Military Academy contributed more "to build up the system of internal improvements in the United States than all [the other 200 or so colleges and universities] combined."⁵⁴

In less exalted company in the field, military personnel along the frontier territories in the first decades of the 19th Century found themselves serving as the first Indian agents, the first mail carriers, the first physicians to provide medical care to

civilians and Indians, and even the first jailers and inn-keepers. They became the nation's first weather observers when Medical Corps surgeons were required to report on local weather conditions, and military surgeons wrote the first textbooks on psychiatry and digestive physiology.⁵⁵

Army regulations at this time required commanders of frontier posts to draw up maps and topographical descriptions of the surrounding country and to forward copies with explanatory material to the War Department. This *ad hoc* mapping was soon assumed by the Topographical Engineers, under the Army's Corps of Engineers. The original, 1817, Army petition to Congress called for the establishment of a corps of topographical engineers to do no less than to carry out "a frontier military survey of the whole interior and exterior of the United States." Congress responded by allotting three topographical engineers and two assistant topographical engineers to each of the two military geographic divisions of the Army.⁵⁶ Here was the first official recognition of the growing engineering requirements for the expanding nation and of the fact that the Army was the primary means of meeting those requirements.

In 1821, the Corps of Engineers conducted the first thorough survey of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers and pointed out that the latter, "This magnificent River, which unites, in a manner, the Gulf of Mexico with the Canadian Lakes," had not, even then, been sounded throughout its length.⁵⁷ The General Survey Act of 1824, the nation's first true rivers and harbors Congressional enactment, empowered the President to order surveys (but no construction) of roads and canals, and the Bureau of Topographical Engineers to administer the act. By 1861 Army Engineers and the "topogs" had surveyed every major river in the United States.⁵⁸ To implement the General Survey Act, President James Monroe established a Board of Engineers for Internal Improvements in the same year. By the end of that year, all ten topog officers had been assigned to civilian internal improvement projects. The surveying work of the topogs for this board (none served on the board itself) increased their national image and prestige.⁵⁹ Both acts unleashed a flood of canal and road proposals, probably a majority based more on local aspirations or individual self-promotion than on engineering feasibility or fiscal soundness, and laying the foundations for the great era of "pork barrel" legislation after the Civil War and into the 20th century.⁶⁰

The new board laid down the first and only comprehensive scheme for internal improvements, and the topogs abruptly changed their focus from military to civilian engineering, dispatching officers on numerous mapping expeditions and border surveys, as well as surveying harbors and bays and even building lighthouses. In 1826 another Act specifically authorized the President to employ the Army Corps of Engineers on internal improvement projects. Most of the pre-Civil War work of the Corps of Engineers was concerned with military engineering, but the Topographical Engineers, in the estimation of one historian, were "the national scientific agency of the Federal Government for nearly two decades." (1831-c. 1852).⁶¹

Unlike the Corps of Engineers, the strictly military duties of the Topographical Bureau took up very little of its time or energy. On the other hand, the bureau directed or detailed officers to other federal agencies to carry out the exploration of the wilderness, the surveys of the national boundaries and

coast lines, the building of roads, the dredging of harbors, the removal of river obstructions, and the construction of lighthouses, piers, marine hospitals, etc. If the Topographical Bureau was not essential to the proper functioning of the War Department, it proved nearly so to a young nation almost destitute of engineers but anxious for results which only engineering and management skills could accomplish.⁶²

The federal government provided far less money for internal improvement than did state or local entities or private entrepreneurs. Washington could, however, call upon professionally-trained engineers/topographers, perhaps even more valuable assets than funding for an innumerable host of internal improvement projects. As with the Indians, the U.S. Army, relatively untrammelled by local interests and the possibilities of pecuniary gain, could provide the more impartial service to the civilian sector. As the editor of the influential *National Journal* noted:

instead of being stationed at the entrance of our rivers, or along the pregnable line of our sea coast, we find them [engineers/topographers] scattered over the interior of our country, finding the summit levels of our mountains, or tracking the route for vast lines of intercourse through our forests, swamps, and valleys.⁶³

By September of 1825 work was well along on the nation's first federally-constructed dam, a wood, rock and clay structure.⁶⁴ Five years later, topographical officers were leading 10 of the 13 road, canal and railway surveys. For each project, the topog survey groups, known at the time as brigades, made preliminary reconnaissance's, plotted the exact route and then prepared plans and specifications, including a cost estimate.⁶⁵

It is obvious in hindsight that the great majority of the canal projects, with the important exceptions of the Erie and the Saulte Ste. Marie, represented simply so much wasted money; these were vastly expensive and few indeed could eventually compete with the railroads. The same could also be said of many of the river programs. The growing public improvement movement did begin to focus on the emerging railroads after the decade of the 1820s, with much of the impetus for this new direction coming from military engineers. In 1826 Congress amended the General Survey Act of two years earlier specifically to authorize the President to commission the survey of alternate railroad routes.⁶⁶ The following year Army engineers were directing the laying out of the nation's first successful railroad, the Baltimore and Ohio, and no less than three "brigades" of the Engineer Department were assigned to the B. & O. in that year. As early as 1829, MAJ Long had published his *Railroad Manual* and later worked on a number of railroad projects in New England and the South as well as on the Baltimore and Ohio.⁶⁷ Between 1831 and 1837, topographical engineers carried out 18 railroad route surveys; in 1835 at least 15 railroad lines were receiving some type of aid from the Army Engineers. Fortunately, the supply of civil engineers was increasing rapidly in the 1830s. In 1837, of the 702 living West Point graduates, 107

were working as civil engineers and by 1850, 180 West Pointers had become builders in the civilian economy.⁶⁸

The Army's interest in railroad projects went well beyond that of internal civil improvement, of course, and officers were quick to grasp the military value of this novel form of transportation. For example, in 1838, the energetic General Edmund P. Gaines, commander of the Western Division at St. Louis, drew up an elaborate plan for a special system of seven western railroads, to be constructed by his troops to supply the eleven frontier garrisons of the time. However, the plan was vetoed by the Secretary of War, who believed that riverine and road projects would do the job better and cheaper, a decision probably correct in light of the technology of the time, despite the fact that within a decade the Iron Horse would begin its domination of American internal transportation for the next century.

Nonetheless, relations between Army engineers and civilian builders were often strained. CPT William McNeill, working for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, fastidiously complained of the "bad taste" and "rustic manner" of the mechanics he had to work with, and the chief topog tried to distance the army's reliance on unschooled civil engineers. Conversely, the civilian bridge engineer Charles Ellett (later to gain fame as an ironclad ram pioneer) refused to work with the Army on the Mississippi Delta Survey. The Smithsonian Institution's Ferdinand D. Hayden opined that an Army expedition "was the last place to do a large business in Natural History." Although the mutual tension was never completely resolved, it probably did serve to produce something of a more efficient blend of military scientific engineering theory and civilian craft practice.⁶⁹

The Army was also assigned the task of removing obstacles to navigation from western rivers. One particularly obstinate obstruction was the great "raft" on the Red River above Natchitoches, a 150-mile long (!) mass of entangled, stagnant, timber that was only cleared and kept open by specially constructed government steamboats known locally as "Uncle Sam's tooth pullers."⁷⁰ This "raft"-clearing project saw the only large-scale use of slave labor by the Topographical Engineers; slaves were engaged for about \$30 per day (for the owner, of course).⁷¹

Although small in comparison with what was to come, this "first era of national projects.":

created a vast civil-works jurisdiction for the Corps and the topographical bureau. It funded a half century of intense hydrographic investigation. It fused science with transport planning and allowed about seventy top West Pointers to manage water resources; to survey every major river, identify hazards, propose projects, supervise construction, and guide a Congress too weak and confused to design an intelligent plan.⁷²

By 1829 the Corps of Engineers controlled no less than 53 civil construction projects at a cost of \$1,200,000 over a two-year period. Among these projects was the surveying of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Cumberland Road, the latter under civilian

contract.⁷³ Orders from the Chief of Engineers to the head of a road survey brigade exemplifies how the Army followed Congressional mandates in the internal improvement projects of the era, and the military character of this work:

The Secretary of War has directed that you will fulfill the intentions of the House of Representatives as set forth in the report of the committee of Roads and Canals made in pursuance of a Resolution of the House of Representatives of the 16 January 1826 by making a "Survey and location of a road from the eastern termination of the Black Swamp Road in Ohio, to intersect the Cumberland road at-or near Washington in Pennsylvania, and a survey of a road from Pittsburgh in Penna. by the way of Beaver Town, New Lisbon, Canton and Wooster to the Eastern termination of the United States Road from the Rapids of the Miami of Lake Erie, to the Western boundary of the Connecticut Western Reserve in the State of Ohio...." You can divide your brigade into two parties for the purpose, selecting the officers to command the party which you will detach who in your opinion will be the best-qualified to direct the operations. A written report and topographical map will present the results obtained by your examination, and afford the facts and data upon which your recommendations of the routes examined will be predicated.... I must apprise you that it is expected by the Secretary of War that you will furnish, during the ensuing session of Congress, all the results of your examination.⁷⁴

The topographers duties, withal, remained quite modest and the bureau was dominated by the Corps of Engineers until the Secretary of War in 1831 abolished the Corps' Board of Internal Improvements, transferred its functions and responsibilities to the newly-established Topographical Bureau, and elevated the topographers themselves to the status of an independent bureau.⁷⁵

The Secretary of War outlined the four main duties of the new corps in January of 1831, emphasizing military requirements: 1) Surveys of military positions for purposes of permanent fortifications, 2) Surveys of the "inland frontier" for purposes of defense, 3) Examination of the seacoast, also for purposes of defense, 4) Surveying of military roads. All four duties, however, also held strong civil ramifications.⁷⁶ In 1836 the Chief of the topog bureau argued that although road and railroad surveying "may be considered a survey of a civil character, yet a finer school of practice than they furnish for the topographical engineer cannot well be imagined."⁷⁷

By 1838, their work had become so extensive that the bureau was elevated once again, this time to the status of an independent corps, now equal to the Engineers, the Medical Corps or the Department of Ordnance. The topogs were now responsible for all civil engineering works directed by the federal government, particularly the improvement of rivers and harbors, while the Engineers assumed strictly military construction projects. The 1838 enactment also prohibited topogs from any further employment as civilian engineers and removed all civil engineers from the newly-

created Corps.⁷⁸ The corps chief, COL John J. Abert, rejoiced that the day was past when "several of the distinguished officers of the corps of engineers," including its chief, "always viewed the superintendence of these civil works as an embarrassment to the proper functions of their own corps, and foreign to them."⁷⁹

Topog expeditions surveyed early state and territory boundaries, including Indiana Territory (1834), Ohio-Michigan (1838), Michigan-Wisconsin territories, Iowa-Minnesota (1849-1850), Kansas (1854, 1857), California and the territories to her east (1860-1861).⁸⁰ Several topogs also worked for the State Department on international boundary surveys: The Texas Boundary Survey (1840-1841), the Northeast Boundary Survey (1840-1850) and the Maine-New Brunswick Boundary (1845). CPT Benjamin L. E. Bonneville of the 7th Infantry, spent several years beginning in 1832 while on leave and at his own expense in the early 1830's surveying the territories between the Rockies and the Pacific for the fur trade. Of the two maps resulting from this expedition, one showed the sources of the Missouri, Yellowstone, Snake, Green, Wind and Sweetwater Rivers; the other portrayed the area from the Great Salt Lake to the Pacific Ocean. Bonneville may also have been spying the land for the Army, concerned as it was with British influence in and designs on the area.⁸¹

Although the connection has, for some reason, been muted, John C. Fré'mont, the Pathfinder", remains the most famous topog. His first, well-organized, scientific reconnaissance in 1842 of the Oregon Trail, represented the Topographical Corps first penetration of the mountain region. Its Congressional appropriation was secured by Senator Thomas Hart Benton, an ardent expansionist and admirer of Jefferson. Benton undoubtedly had the Jefferson-sponsored Lewis and Clark expedition in mind. Fré'mont's report was passed through the Topographical Bureau and placed before the U.S. Senate. The report itself illustrates the new, scientific orientation of Army expeditions to the West. It contained a table of astronomical data which included 68 observations for latitude and longitude, a table of more than 600 meteorological observations, as well as a map of the area covered, from Fort Laramie to the Wind River Mountains. The scientific recovery would have been even greater had not the impetuous Fré'mont risked his collections in an experimental India-rubber boat, which promptly capsized, dispatching its scientifically-priceless cargo to the bottom of the swiftly-flowing Sweetwater River. Nonetheless, Fré'mont and Senator Benton's expansionist aims were more than fulfilled. During Fré'mont's expedition of 1843 the romantic explorer could see for himself the results of his earlier foray; during this year of the "great migration" the Oregon Trail was so filled with wagon trains that the trace seemed more like a highway. In fact, his reports soon became a "guidebook" for western emigrants.⁸² Fré'mont's return by way of California was an epic of endurance but also considerably richer in lasting scientific discovery, as Fré'mont patiently collected plant and animal specimens and noted fossil remains, as well as creating the most useful map of the West of the decade. Fré'mont also did much to weaken the "Great American Desert" misapprehension.⁸³ The maps drawn up by the corps were some of the finest of the 19th century anywhere, extremely accurate and in distinct contrast to the sketch maps drawn up by Lewis and Clark. The proof of the quality of

the topogs' work lies in the fact that in all the troubles in the American West, few, if any were based upon disputed state boundaries, lines which remain fixed to this day.

One of the most fruitful topog expeditions of this era was the 1849-1850 enterprise led by CPT Howard Stansbury along the Oregon Trail. As well as also bringing in a wealth of scientific data and material, the return trip located a route that would be followed, in part, by the overland stage, the pony express and the Union Pacific Railroad.⁸⁴

Enthusiastic expansionists to a man in this age of "Manifest Destiny," the chief topog for the Minnesota Territory aptly summarized the corps' contemporary vision that reached well beyond parochial concerns:

the time is not far distant when this Territory will be the platform upon which is to be forged the iron link [the railroad] which is to connect the great commercial interests of the East with those of the valley of the upper Mississippi. The approximation of those interests by means of the New York and Erie canal, and the great chain of lakes terminating with Lake Superior at their head, as well as the feasibility of a railroad across thence to Saint Paul, ...give assurance that the day is not far remote when this Territory, too, will feel the electric influence of this powerful auxiliary in developing its resources. How important is it, then, that the Government should in the infancy of the Territory, do what it can in opening the country, by means of common roads, to settlers, and thus facilitate a work which would not be more territorial than national in character!⁸⁵

Still, the "topogs" performed their far-flung and varied duties with a complement that never exceeded 36 officers. In fact, incredibly, the total number of topog officers, from the Act of 1838 to the ending of the distinct corps some three decades later, was no more than 72.⁸⁶


The topographical chief set a realistic system of project priorities. Congressional enactments, with their funding, of course, came first. His next priority were those surveys ordered by Congressional resolutions and funded by the appropriations for surveys. Last came those surveys of national significance or that promised high commercial returns that were urged by states or corporations. This last priority also included the loaning of his officers to such private enterprises as railroads, skirting the 1838 prohibition in that the officers in question draw only their Army emoluments. In 1852, the Army loaned CPT Augustus Canfield and two successors to the Soo locks project to superintend construction as nominal employees of the state of Michigan, while the Corps of Engineers provided a newly-constructed dredge. Even so, the Topographical Bureau could not fill all requests in those years of a very limited number of American civil engineers.⁸⁷ The implied mission of the branch was to foster emigration to the West, which would, in turn, promote rapid economic growth and strengthen the government's hold on the area.⁸⁸

Army expeditions also began at about this time their mapping of the Great Lakes, which included not only extensive surveys but also improvements of the harbors on the Lakes. In the 1840's the Corps of Engineers may be said to have "saved" Boston Harbor from shoaling with a row of granite boulders set in an experimental mixture of volcanic ash and burnt limestone. The most lasting and the greatest contribution made by the Topographical Engineers to the Great Lakes was their survey, begun in 1841, of the basin's 6,000 shoreline miles. CPT George C. Meade (later commander of Union forces at the Battle of Gettysburg) headed the survey from 1857 to 1861, and established 19 weather stations on the five lakes. For the chief of the topogs, this project was anything but a response to local interests. COL Abert caught a vision of the lakes basin that went well beyond parochial pressures and enterprises. -- "These lakes constitute a great northern sea-board" -- and when the Topographical Corps later was reintegrated into the Corps of Engineers, the Great Lakes Survey was the one topog office to outlive its parent organization.⁸⁹

By the late 1840s the Army and its Engineer Corps was also engaged in a large-scale revitalization and building of coastal lighthouses, in part due to dissatisfaction with the U. S. Lighthouse Establishment of the Treasury Department. Topogs were thus spread down the East coast from New England to Florida and as far west as Michigan. Two Topographers brought back from Great Britain plans for the most advanced lighthouse construction of the time, using wrought-iron piles. These techniques were put to use in lighthouses on three coastlines and previewed the metal skeletal framing of the American skyscraper. In fact, Corps engineers demonstrated the strength of rolled iron I-beams as early as the 1850s, at the U. S. Assay Office on Wall Street (1853) and in a Texas post office and courthouse.⁹⁰

In the wake of the Mexican War cessions, the Army placed the West under the Western Division, established several military departments and assigned topogs to the departments of California, New Mexico, Oregon and Texas. The topogs providing the professional staff for the Mexican boundary survey after the Mexican War found matters considerably more complicated, beset as they were with Indian raids, the political appointees who headed the commission, Mexican disputes and the shifting nature of the Gila River. For all that, this expedition returned with a treasure trove of natural history specimens that were soon being collated and publicized by some of the preeminent scientists of the time, including Louis Agassiz, John Torrey, James Hall and the Smithsonian's Joseph Henry and Spencer Bairdiz.⁹¹ Army Topographical expeditions, closely attending to the expansion of secular learning of the time, were usually of a more scientific bent than those of their civilian predecessors, thus going well beyond mere narrative description, however colorful. The topogs were the first consistently to put geology, hydrography, ethnic studies, climatology, etc. on a systematic basis.

The Indians encountered were less likely to become hostile and more likely to be simply baffled by these white men who neither fought them nor tried to sell them anything and in fact, often treated them with some measure of respect. In one bizarre episode, LT Joseph Ives, commander of the first known expedition to the floor of the



U.S. Army boundary survey in the Mexican cessation. National Archives.

Grand Canyon (1857), had to overrule a proposal by the accompanying German artist that a visiting Hualapais Indian be shipped back East preserved in alcohol!⁹²

Even without preserved human specimens, these topog reports remain valuable reference works, well beyond the level of mere historical curiosities. For example, accounts of the ancient Pueblo peoples still commence with the discoveries made by LT James H. Simpson's New Mexico expedition. Only these scientifically accurate and painstaking reports could have prepared the way for America's greatest-ever engine of development: the railroad. Well might the authority on the "topogs" term the branch "a central institution of Manifest Destiny" which "functioned as a department of public works for the West --and indeed for the whole nation since the operations of the Corps extended to every state and territory of the United States."⁹³

It can also be argued that the Corps of Engineers and the Topographical Engineers served the nation well as a bridge for technology transfer between Europe and the United States. In the early years of the Republic, it was mostly a one-way flow, with French engineers entering the Corps/Bureau before 1833. That flow began to reverse after 1815, with a number of American officers sailing for Great Britain and France. In its "mature" phase, the flow was both ways, with French officers studying in the United States and vice-versa, and with both groups publishing reports on the science and engineering in each others' countries.⁹⁴

The later expeditions, however valuable, in reality masked the general decline of the Topographical Corps and the Corps of Engineers by the 1840s. Jacksonian resentment of the "aristocratical," "gentlemen soldiers" of West Point spearheaded a general attack on professional, centralized, government. Even the works of the Corps of Engineers were attacked, sometimes with good reason. The Office of Improvements of Western Rivers, hobbled by political interference, and by erratic Congressional appropriations, its activities varying widely in intensity and displaying a lack of overall continuity and planning, had little to show for its labors. The massive breakwater "harbor of refuge" project at the mouth of the Delaware, conceived by the Corps and managed chiefly by the Quartermaster General, proved an almost complete failure after the expenditure of almost \$2 million. A deep harbor project at Erie, Pennsylvania, went on for decades in profound ignorance of tides and currents, and resulted in a harbor probably in worse condition than when the works were begun. These were only the most egregious of the Corps' professional failures. President James Polk vetoed two large waterways bills and claimed that the Great Lakes ports were too distant from foreign commerce to be of any great importance. In response, disgruntled Chicago leaders mockingly named a growing sandbar at the mouth of the Chicago River, Mount Polk.⁹⁵ The Chief of the Topographical Corps defended the Army's works by grandly claiming that "Without these harbors the number of large towns which embellish the shores of these lakes would not have been built; the immense population upon their borders, and the extensive cultivation of such numerous tracts of land, would not have taken place."⁹⁶ With the perspective of history, it can be argued that the Corps with its public financing, had acquired a "preference for costly, permanent construction that was often problematic", and that was also certain to arouse opposition as Jacksonian, limited government principles, and sectionalism took increasing hold.⁹⁷

Reflecting this decline, between 1838 until after the Civil War only two significant rivers and harbors acts passed Congress, in 1844 and in 1852. Between the Mexican War and for several years after, topog operations were actually suspended for lack of appropriations. COL Abert was on occasion even reduced to selling equipment to meet congressionally-imposed funding limitations.⁹⁸ Further, when two topogs produced a pioneering comprehensive hydrological investigation of the Mississippi Delta after disastrous flooding in 1850-1851, the result was a wealth of valuable pioneering scientific data, a "scientific sensation" - but no public works.⁹⁹

In 1854 Secretary of War Jefferson Davis established the Office of Pacific Railroad Explorations and Surveys (later shortened to Office of Explorations and Surveys) to administer the great Pacific railroad surveys, thus effectively by-passing Topographical Bureau supervision. This move, and Davis' establishment of the Pacific Wagon Road Office of the Interior Department in 1855 had effectively taken them from western road surveys.¹⁰⁰ The following year, Congress, impatient with the topogs' meticulous but time-consuming pre-construction surveys, transferred federal road building to the new Pacific Wagon Road Office of the Department of the Interior.¹⁰¹ Congress's creation of other new federal agencies, such as the Naval Observatory, the Smithsonian Institution and the U.S. Coast Survey further detracted from the work of the topogs. As an historian of the Topographical Corps aptly noted, "Ever since the Mexican War, individual topogs had distinguished themselves while the bureau sank into obscurity."¹⁰²

Continuing public works projects after 1852 often had to rely on a combination of the Army, local funding, private entrepreneurs and even volunteer efforts, at least in the case of canals. For example, when the Louisville and Portland Canal had to come back for a new government loan, it had the chiefs of the Corps of Engineers and the Topographical Bureau lobby Congress with a topographical survey.¹⁰³

Still, the Army would continue its surveys of the western rivers through the 1840s and 1850, as these enterprises were relatively inexpensive compared to great public works. The 1859 Colorado Expedition served the dual purpose of exploration and of securing the submission of six warlike Mojave Indian bands. The chiefs, overawed by the largest concentration of U.S. troops ever seen in that area, agreed to allow the federal government to "establish posts and roads in and through their country, where and when the government chooses, and the property and lives of whites traveling through their country must be secure." These provisions, of course, spelled the end of any true "Indian country" in that valley.¹⁰⁴

In the spring of 1853 Secretary of War Davis dispatched five well-equipped exploring parties under the recently-created Army Bureau of Pacific Railroad Explorations and Surveys, "to ascertain the most practicable and economical route for a railroad from the Mississippi river to the Pacific ocean.", in Davis' words. Presumably the Army had been called in to deliver an impartial conclusion, free of sectional and partisan bickering. All but one of the leaders of the survey teams was a topog, and one topog would die in an Indian ambush. (Another had been killed by Indians during a California survey in 1849.) However, it must have been galling for this proud, proven band to have to serve under the upstart Bureau.




U.S. Army "nation-building," the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal under construction. An engineering marvel but a financial failure, losing out to the railroad. Signal Corps, National Archives

In all, the Pacific Railway Surveys lasted two years and conclusively proved that four routes were practicable. Davis himself recommended the 32d Parallel route, probably the least expensive and the most practical, and Davis here at least did not allow his sectional sentiments to befog the national interest. But it was not to be. The regionalism of others now joined with increasing anti-slavery sentiments to see to it that no Pacific railroad issued from these most professional surveys, although the enormous cost --the cheapest route, at \$69 million, would have equaled in cost the entire federal budget for 1856 --must have played its part as well.

All was not wasted, however. Again, the surveys returned with a great quantity of specimens and scientific data. Bound in 13-quarto volumes, and featuring newly acquired knowledge in the history, ethnology, zoology, paleontology, botany, and geography of the surveyed area, the reports have remained a natural history classic. The topogs also brought back the first scientifically accurate map of the entire American West, produced by the 26 year-old cartological genius, topog LT Warren. Thanks to the work of the Engineers and the topogs, by this time the Trans-Mississippi West had been basically mapped. When the transcontinental railroads following the Civil War all were constructed on or near the four routes survey by the War Department.¹⁰⁵ Yet the fact that the two possibly most vital transport passages in the United States of the time, the Sault Ste. Marie Canal and the transcontinental railroad did not directly utilize the professional skills of the Army's engineers and topogs is indicative of their declining role in American nation building.

The works of the Corps of Engineers and the topogs could still be seen at their best in the nation's capital and capitol, where the Corps could put its excellent political contacts to tangible use.¹⁰⁶ The Chief Engineer had already assisted in the rebuilding of the White House after its burning by the British in 1814. In the following decades Army topogs and Engineers worked on the capital's streets and avenues, a new War Department Building and the building of the original Smithsonian Institution "Castle."

That great engineer, CPT Montgomery Meigs, battling a powerful patronage system that began at the top with the Secretary of War, built the monumental Meigs Aqueduct (Meigs was no stranger to vanity), providing fresh water to the entire city of Washington in the face of penny-pinching oppositionists of dwarfed vision.¹⁰⁷ ("Let our aqueduct be worthy of the nation. Let us show that the rulers chosen by the people are not less careful of the safety, health, and beauty of their Capital than emperors [of Rome]")¹⁰⁸ The Cabin John aqueduct bridge boasted the largest masonry span in the world. The Rock Creek Bridge, a quarter-mile long wooden trough, permitted canal boats using the truncated Chesapeake and Ohio Canal to cross the Potomac River, and lasted from 1843 until the completion of Key Bridge in 1923. The latter structure actually rests on two aqueduct pipes which to this day, encased in concrete, carry the Pennsylvania Avenue overpass between Georgetown and Foggy Bottom. Meigs, later Chief of the Corps of Engineers, and his officers also toiled on the Washington Monument (interminably, due to lack of funds and to political machinations), and the expansion (with its new, glorious dome) of the Capitol building itself.¹⁰⁹ These grand projects were almost the exception to the rule of a declining role of the Engineers and the topogs after 1838. Riverine projects, as noted, had practically dried up and the



The nation's capital's Capitol rebuilding, a major project planned and carried out by carried out by CPT Montgomery Meigs, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 1857. National Archives



Another major U.S. Army project, the renowned Washington Aqueduct. Signal Corps, National Archives

railway surveys, although in the great Army mapping tradition, were overshadowed by the sectional controversy. Further, West Point had finally lost its engineering and construction preeminence to a number of civilian institutions.¹¹⁰

After the Civil War it can be argued that the United States had become, more or less, a developed nation. Although the Army and the Corps of Engineers continued to serve the country on a much-expanded scale, most importantly in rivers and harbors improvement and massive public edifices in the nation's capital, its works could not usually be said to come under the rubric of "nation building."¹¹¹ The same could be said of the Army as a whole, even though Army-sponsored research and development continued to hold important consequences for the civilian economy, ranging from disease eradication to atomic energy to the electronic information highway.

When one looks at the first century of the United States, particularly on the frontier territories, it becomes clear that the U.S. Army was nothing less than the greatest single force for the development of the nation. The Army negotiated as well as fought with the Indians, protected settlers, built roads, improved the nation's capital and waterways, laid out railroads, and conducted full-scale scientific expeditions, all tasks that could not be carried out on a such a large scale by the civilian economy. Yet as one authority notes, "so little has been written about the military-scientific connection that helped the nation mature as an industrial power."¹¹² Obviously, the long-standing historical interpretation of the United States Army as somehow separate from the people of the United States requires considerable reinterpretation.¹¹³

¹Robert McConnell Hatch, *Thrust for Canada: The American Attempt on Quebec, 1775-1776* (Boston: 1979), 193, 231.

²Samuel Chase to John Hancock (President of the Continental Congress), 17 May 1775, papers of the Continental Congress, RG 360, micro 247, roll 183. MG Philip Schuyler, commander of the Northern Campaign, wrote in July of 1775 to John Hancock that "Accounts from all quarters agree that the Canadians are friendly to us." The "all quarters" were merely scattered settler and Indian assertions., quoted in Justin F. Smith, *Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony: Canada and the American Revolution*, 1 (New York and London: 1907), 304-306.

³Quoted in Smith, 1, 225.

⁴The Rev. Ammi Robbins, *Journal of the Rev. Ammi R. Robbins, A Chaplain in the American Army, in the Northern Campaign of 1776* (New haven: 1850).

⁵Robert McConnell Hatch, *Thrust for Canada: The American Attempt on Quebec, 1775-1776* (Boston: 1979), 193.

⁶Ibid., 191.

⁷Chase and Carroll to Hancock, 27 May 1776, Records of the Continental Congress, micro 247, roll 183.

⁸Stanley, 109-117; 59-64; Pierre Foretier, "Notes and Reminiscences of an Inhabitant of Montreal during the Occupation of that City by the Bostonians from 1775 to 1776" *Canada, Report of the Department of Public Archives for the Year 1945* (Ottawa: 1946); John E. Hare, "Comportement de la Paysanniere Rurale et urbaine de la Region de Quebec pendant l'Occupation Ame'ricain 1775-1776," *Revue de l'Universite' d'Ottawa*, vol. 47, Nos. 1-2 (1977).

⁹Hatch, 231.

¹⁰Conversely, it should be remembered that undeterminable but significant numbers of Americans in the thirteen colonies/states were either neutral in the struggle or actively loyal to the British Crown. Certainly the British authorities were concerned about the loyalties of *les Canadiens*. Governor Carleton appointed a commission to investigate local collaboration, which reported pockets of sympathy for the rebels along the south shore of the St. Lawrence, but which concluded that the mass of French Canadians had remained neutral. See Appendices I, "Listes Des Nomes Ceux Se Sont Mis A La Solde Des Bostonnais Pendant L'Hiver De 1775-1776," in L'Abbe' Ivanhoe Caron, "Les Canadiens Francais et l'Invasion ame'ricaine de 1774-1775," *Memoires de La Societe Royale du Canada*, Section I, Troisieme Serie, Tome 23, Section 1. (n.p. 1929). J. J. Lefebvre's "Les Canadiens et la Revolution ame'ricaine," *Societe' historique-ame'rique Bulletin*, 1946-1947 (Boston: 1949), contains regional listings of *Canadiens* who purportedly supported *les Bostonnais* at the time. See also Stanley, 124; Hatch, 230-231.

¹¹Ltr. to F. Engels, 1857, quoted in B. C. and Sally Hacker, "Military Institutions and the Labor Process," *Technology & Culture* (October 1987), 746.

¹²See William B. Skelton, "The Army Officer as Organization Man," in Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenninger, *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People* (National Archives and Records Administration, Washington: 1987).

- ¹³Andrew J. Goodpaster, "West Point, The Army, and Society: American Institutions in Constellation," in Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenninger, *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People* (National Archives and Records Administration, Washington: 1987), 7. In the words of one scholar, "The Army consciously considered itself a force for national development.", Francis Paul Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846*. (Bloomington and London: 1969),
¹⁴*Ibid.*, 9.
- ¹⁵Forrest R. Blackburn, "The Army in Western Exploration," *Military Review* (September 1971), 76.
- ¹⁶R. L. Fisher, "The Western Prologue to the War of 1812," *Missouri Historical Review*, (April 1936); Jacobs, 341.
- ¹⁷Henry P. Beers, *The Western Military Frontier, 1815-1846* (Philadelphia: 1975), 36-37.
- ¹⁸BG Arbuckle to Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, 6 December 1834 and 1 February 1835, NARA, Micro 1302, roll No. 1; *ibid.*, 5 May 1835. BG Arbuckle attributed the Osage depredations to the depletion of their game., *ibid.*
- ¹⁹Henry P. Walker, "The Enlisted Soldier on the Frontier," Tate, ed., *American Military on the Frontier*; Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History* (El Paso, reprint: 1960), 2.; Henry P. Walker, *The Wagonmasters: High Plains Freighting from the Earliest Days of the Santa Fe Trail to 1880* (Norman: 1968). That this policy was not always followed was usually the fault of the civil, not military authorities.
- ²⁰Walker, "The Enlisted Soldier," 120; Otis E. Young, *The First Military Escort on the Santa Fe Trail, 1829* (Glendale, California: 1952), *passim*; W. B. Hughes, "The First Dragoons on the Western Frontier," *Arizona and the West* (summer 1970).
- ²¹*Report of the Secretary of War* (1831), in *Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress*, 22d Cong, 1st Sess. (Washington: 1831), 34-35.
- ²²R. L. Nichols, *General Henry Atkinson: A Western Military Career* (Norman: 1965), 93.
- ²³Beers, 67-68-72 and *passim*. Another authority is not so impressed with the value of Army forts on the frontier, claiming that they "tended, however, to lure white adventurers beyond the regions where the military could guard them with reasonable adequacy, thus to stir up troubles with the Indians, and to scatter the posts beyond mutual support." R. Wiegley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. (Bloomington: 1977), 69. These sentiments were echoed by an authority on the Army on the Western frontier, Robert M. Utley, "The Contribution of the Frontier to the American Military Tradition," in James P. Tate, "The American Military on the Frontier," *Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium*, United States Air Force Academy, 30 September-1 October 1976. (Washington, Office of Air Force History and U.S. Air Force Academy, 1978), 8. This seems a blanket indictment, and neither Utley nor Wiegley suggest alternatives.
- ²⁴Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1846-1865* (New York: 1967), 348.
- ²⁵J. E. Eblen, *The First and Second United States Empires: Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912*. (Pittsburgh: 1968), 250. Similar Indian liquor laws had been passed by territorial legislatures in previous decades., *ibid.*, 259.

²⁶A. Millett and P. Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York and London: 1984), 132.

²⁷Elaine C. Everly, "Red, Black, and White: The U.S. Army at Columbus, GA," in Gary D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenniger, *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People* (National Archives and Records Administration, Washington: 1987).

²⁸Atkinson to Kearny, 22 July 1840, RG 393, Pt. 1, Entry 45, Letters Sent, Western District, 1834-1846.

²⁹Nichols, 193-194 and passim. General Atkinson's sentiments are seen throughout his letters sent in RG 393, Pt. 1, entry 45.

³⁰"Report of the Secretary of War," *Executive Documents, 28th Cong., 1st Sess.*, 1843, 58.

³¹Henry P. Beers, *The Western Military Frontier, 1815-1846* (Philadelphia: 1975), 33-34; J. E. Eblen, *The First and Second United States Empires: Governors and Territorial Government, 184-1912*. Pittsburgh: 1968), 251; Francis P. Prucha, *American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834* (Cambridge, Mass: 1962), passim.

³²*Ibid.*, 196.

³³Martin Van Buren, *Message From the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Third Session of the Twenty-Fifth Congress* (Washington: 1838), 15.

³⁴"Report of the Secretary of War," *Message from the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress of the Twenty-Sixth Congress* (Washington: 1839), 51.

³⁵*Ibid.* for 1842, 189. John Spencer also noted a small Army "civilization fund," for Indian education. At the time of the report the Army was operating no less than 52 schools. But these were providing some sort of education for a mere 2,132 students., *ibid.*

³⁶Beers, 50 and passim.

³⁷Robert Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue and Red: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865* (Lincoln, Nebraska and London: 1981), 10-11; George D. Haromn, *Sixty Years of Indian Affairs, 1789-1850* (Chapel Hill: 1941), 172-173.

³⁸Quoted in Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 15.

³⁹Secretary of War, *Annual Report* (Washington: 1852), 30; Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 101. The year earlier, the governor of Oregon had described the Indians of the Oregon-California mountain ranges as "among the most treacherous and untamed of the West," and enclosed a letter from a friend who put it bluntly, "Our people will go to the mines and they must have protection.", Governor J. P. Gaines to President Millard Fillmore, 13 June 1851; Joseph Lane, Ltr. to Gaines, same date, *ibid.*, for 1851.

⁴⁰Frank N. Schubert, *Explorer on the Northern Plains: Lieutenant Gouverneur K. Warren's Preliminary Report of Explorations in Nebraska and Dakota, in the Years 1855-'56-'57* (U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Engineers, Historical Division (Washington: October 1981), xxvi. Topog veteran Warren's fine eye for terrain may well have saved the day to Gettysburg, when, noting the dominating position of Little Round Top, he rushed troops to the hill just in time fend off a Confederate assault on the Union Army's left flank. Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative*, vol. 2, *Fredericksburg to Meridian* (New York:

1986), 503-504. Warren's reports of his 1858 western expedition are found in *Report of the Secretary of War, 1858* (Washington: 1858), 620-623, 625-670.

⁴¹Quoted in George Armoyd, *A Connected View of the Whole Internal Navigation of the United States, Natural and Artificial, 1830 Present and Prospective* (New York: 1971, reprint of 1830 edition), iii. Most expansionists, of course, were hardly willing to wait one century, much less two, for the completion of America's Manifest Destiny.

⁴²Ibid., 81-85; W. H. Goetzmann, *Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West*. (New York, Boston: 1966), 3-8; Fred R. Bahr, "The Expanding Role of the Department of Defense as an Instrument of Social Change." DBM diss., The George Washington University, 1963, 19-20. Quotes from Prucha. An excellent concise source for the Army's non-violent role in the West is R. Danysh, "The Explorers," in W. G. Bell, *et al*, "Two Centuries of Service: The Army's Contributions to American Society," draft typescript (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington: December 1975); Forrest R. Blackburn, "The Army in Western Exploration," *Military Review* (September 1971), 78. There was also a "downside" to Lewis and Clark. The expedition showed that there would be no easy route to the Pacific and the riches of Cathay; it would take a very difficult, lengthy, overland journey to the coast, or the fever-and-jungle Panama overland trek or the storm-battered voyage around Cape Horn.

⁴³Bahr, 20-21; Goetzmann, *Army Exploration in the American West, 1803-1863*. (Lincoln, Nebraska and London: 1959, 1979), 36-38.

⁴⁴Harold L. Nelson, "Military Roads for War and Peace - 1791 -1836." *Military Affairs*, Spring 1955; Schubert, 55-56. In its repair of the Cumberland Road, the Engineers imported the latest such technology from Europe, the Macadam Plan. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *The History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers* (Washington [1986]), 33. For detailed Army Engineer Department specifications for a road of this period, the continuation of the Cumberland Road into Ohio, see letter of authorization and instruction from Chief of Engineers, Alexander Mcombe, to Superintendent of the Cumberland Road, 9 April 1825, Office of Chief of Engineers, Letters Sent Relating to Internal Improvements, reel 1.

⁴⁵Goetzmann, 58-59; Shallat, 68-69; Roger L. Nichols, *General Henry Atkinson* (Norman: 1965), *passim*; Blackburn, 80-81.

⁴⁶Long's first expedition is described in detail in Edwin James, ed., *Account of an Expedition From Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, Performed in the Years 1819, 1820....*, published, oddly, in Great Britain (London: 1823). See also Roger L. Nichols, *Steven Long and American Frontier Exploration* (New York: 1980); See also Henry P. Beers, *The Western Military Frontier, 1815-1846* (Philadelphia: 1935), 24, 39; Frank N. Schubert, *Vanguard of Expansion: Army Engineers in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1819-1879* (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Historical Division, Washington: 1980), 1-13; Cardinal Goodwin, "A Larger View of the Yellowstone Expedition, 1819-1820," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 12 (1917); Edgar B. Wesley, "A Still Larger View of the So-Called Yellowstone Expedition," *North Dakota Historical Quarterly* (July 1931). Long was dismissing what was to become America's (and to some extent at times, the world's) breadbasket. Shallat speculates

that Army explorer/surveyors determined a land's value by the state of its rivers; if unnavigable, the land was worthless for an agrarian society., Shallat, 68-77. Long's 1823 expedition is detailed in *ibid.*, 71-73; Goetzmann, xii. See also R. G. Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846*, vol. 17 (Cleveland: 1904-1907), 147; *Report of the Board of Engineers on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers...made in the Year 1821*, House Doc. 35, 17th Cong., 2d Sess. (1823)

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 182-188, 192.

⁴⁸Prucha, *Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest* (Madison: 1953), 104.

⁴⁹Daniel H. Calhoun, "The American Civil Engineer, 1792-1843," Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1956, 19, quoted in Ryan, 103.

⁵⁰Shallat, 80.

⁵¹Goetzmann, 13; Sidney Forman, "The First School of Engineering," *Military Engineer*, 44 (1952); Todd Shallat, "Science and the United States Army in Early Public Works," *Technology & Culture*, 31, No. 1 (January 1990), 22-23. On the shortage of competent builders in the early Republic, see Daniel Hove Claxon, *The American Civil Engineer: Origins and Conflict* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1960); T. Shallot, *Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the Rise of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers* (Austin: 1994), 40. There is also an enduring anti-Army/West Point engineering tradition that reached a crescendo in the 1970s, uniting with the ecology movement and distinct from the century-old "pork barrel" critique. See, for example, Arthur Amass, *Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1951), Leonard Shabman, *Decision Making in Water Resources Investment and Potential of Multi-Obligation Planning: The Case of the Army Corps of Engineers* (Ithaca: 1972), and Arthur Morgan, *Dams and Other Disasters: A Century of Army Engineering in Civil Works* (Boston: 1971).

⁵²LT J. J., *Topological Engineers Report* (12 January 1834) House Report No. 95, 24th Cong., 1st Sess.

⁵³Foreman, 43.

⁵⁴E. B. Glick, *Peaceful Conflict: The Non-Military Use of the Military* (Harrisburg: 1967), 54-55. (quotation on page 53). The Chief of the Corps of Topographers stated that "We have but one school in our country which may be considered as thoroughly mathematical in its course, the Military School at West Point; and it is this school only to which we can look for individuals sufficiently qualified to enter upon the duties of the [coastal] survey, and thusly aspire to a knowledge of its highest practical operations.", Abert, "On an Increase in the Number of Officers and a Reorganization of the Corps of Topographical Engineers of the Army," House Doc. 626, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836), *American State Papers*, 8. Still, the authoritative Shallat claims that for all its practicality in contrast to comparable European institutions, "Even after the Erie Canal, when Europeans praised the inventive Yankee as a symbol of republican progress, the academy's cosmopolitan science was the bunker of a bookish tradition that distanced army construction from improvised frontier technique." Shallat, 79. Curriculum information in *ibid.*, 115-116. Still, that "bunker of a bookish tradition"

managed to turn out more railroad presidents than generals., Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: 1957), 199.

⁵⁵Glick, 54-56.

⁵⁶*American State Papers, Military Affairs*, 3 (Washington: 1832-1861), 492; Garry David Ryan, "The War Department Topographical Bureau, 1831-1863," Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1968, 21-22.

⁵⁷BG S. Bernard and MAJ J. G. Totten, *Report of the Board of Engineers on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers...* (New York: 1822), quotation on p. 18., in *House Document No. 35, 17th Cong., 2d Sess.* (1821); Carter Goodrich, "National Planning for Internal Improvements," *Political Science Quarterly*, 53 (1948), 121-122.

⁵⁸Todd Shallat, "Building Waterways, 1802-1861: Science and the United States Army in Early Public Works," *Technology & Culture* (January 1990), 19.

⁵⁹Ryan, 36-37; Frank N. Schubert, ed., *The Nation Builders: A Sesquicentennial History of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, 1838-1863* (Office of History, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 1988), 13, 14; Adrian G. Traas, *From the Golden Gate to Mexico City: The U.S. Army Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War, 1846-1848*, Office of History, Corps of Engineers and U. S. Army Center of Military History, U.S. Army (Washington: 1993), 13-14.

⁶⁰George Armroyd, *A Connected View of the Whole Internal Navigation of the United States*. (Philadelphia: 1926), 187-188; Nelson, "Military Roads."; Traas, *Topographical Engineers*, 13; W. Stull Holt, *The Office of the Chief of Engineers of the Army: Its Non-Military History, Activities and Organization* (Baltimore: 1923), 5-7. For correspondence, directions and contracts generated by this act, as well as pressures from local worthies, see Office of the Chief of Engineers, Letters Sent, Topographical Engineers/Corps of Engineers, Relating to Internal Improvements, 1824-1827, RG 77, entry 307.

⁶¹Shallat, *Structures*, 231. (emphasis in original).

⁶²Ryan, 342.

⁶³*National Register*, 22 October 1825, quoted in Ryan, 37.

⁶⁴Schubert, 13-14.

⁶⁵Traas, 14; Schubert, 13.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 217-219.

⁶⁷Even earlier, LT Long had completed an extensive railroad survey, [Long and J. Knight], *Report of the Engineers on the Reconnaissance [sic.] and Surveys Made in Reference to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (Baltimore: 1828)*. See also *Long's Railroads - Atlantic to the Mississippi*, House Doc. No. 177, 23d Cong., 2d Sess. (1835), in which he surveys several routes, and reasons that a double track line from the Atlantic to the Mississippi would pay for itself out of the enormous reduction in freight and mail haulage costs that the railroad would bring. Long concludes that the government could loan the money to the railroad companies, forgive the debt, and still come out ahead if those enterprises agreed to transport, at regular rates, troops, arms, Indian supplies, etc., *ibid.*

⁶⁸Glick, 47; 98, 153; Schubert, 66. Ryan, 103-105; Beers, "History of Topographical Engineers," 289. The state or company requesting the survey paid all expenses except the salaries and instruments of the topographical engineers involved. The topogs themselves could also receive emoluments from the state or company, an arrangement much criticized, rightly, as fraught with the possibilities for speculation., *ibid.* Senator James Buchanan of Pennsylvania grumbled that Army engineers were banking "large fortunes" while neglecting their government work., Shallot, 98, 153. Ryan states forthrightly that "Since 1817 the topographical engineers had been so occupied with surveys of possible sites for permanent military works and later with surveys of internal improvements and river and harbor works that they had neglected one of their primary functions, the gathering of topographical information for the use of armies in the field.", Ryan, 116.

⁶⁹Shallat, 98-99; M. Reuss, "Politics and Technology in the Army Corps of Engineers," *Technology & Culture* (January 1985).

⁷⁰See "Rivers and Harbors" reports to Chief of Engineers, 1842-1860, RG 77, entry 117; *ibid.*, entry 459, box no. 1, "Engineer Boards, Correspondence, Reports, Orders, and Regulations, 1851-1853." William Bell, *et al.*, "Two Centuries of Service: The Army's Civil Contributions to American Society.", draft ms., U.S. Army Center of Military History. (Washington: 1975), 11; Nichols, 98; Beers, 114-115, 136-137; Stella M. Drumm, "Robert E. Lee and the Improvement of the Mississippi," *Missouri Historical Society Collections*. February 1929; Forest G. Hill, *Roads, Rails, and Waterways: The Army Engineers and Early Transportation*. (Norman, Oklahoma: 1957), 23; Fred R. Bahr, "The Expanding Role of the Department of Defense as an Instrument of Social Change," DBA diss., George Washington University, 1970, 25-28; Goetzmann, 10-11; Traas, *Topographical Engineers*, 14; Shallat, 144-148; N. W. Caldwell, "The Red River Raft," *Chronicles of Oklahoma*; 19 (1941); H. S. Drago, *Red River Valley: The Mainstream of Frontier History from the Louisiana Bayous to the Texas Panhandle* (New York: 1962), 97-98; Fair Hardin, "The First Great Western River Captain: A Sketch of the Career of Captain Henry Miller Shreve, Founder of Shreveport, Louisiana, with His Own Reports of the Removal of the Great Raft of the Red River," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* (January 1927), 25-67.

⁷¹Ryan, 232.

⁷²*Ibid.*; Shallat, 118

⁷³*Ibid.*, 128; Holt, 8. The Cumberland Road was the greatest of the Corps' road projects, and work on it did not end until 1841. RG 77, entries 179-213 are devoted solely to this program. The C&O Canal, sometimes termed "the great national project" and compared by an excited President John Adams to the Great Wall of China, was supposed to make the national capital into a commercial entrepot by crossing the Appalachians and connecting the West with the East Coast. It came nowhere near to either of its proposed termini, and proved to be the greatest engineering-financial fiasco of the era. The Board for Internal Improvement's lofty attitude toward the escalating costs of the project is instructive: "When a nation undertakes a work of great public utility, the revenue is not the essential object to take into consideration; its views are of

a more elevated order", Simon Bernard, et al, *Report from the Board of Engineers... Concerning the Proposed Chesapeake and Ohio Canal*, House Executive Document No. 10, 19th Cong., 2d Sess. 1826, 66; Shallat, 130-131; Walter S. Sanderlin, *The Great National Project: A History of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal* (Baltimore: 1946). To complete the discomfiture of the C&O canal, when that enterprise went bankrupt it was taken over by its great rival the Baltimore and Ohio Railway Company, which, in turn, sold its economically valueless property to the Federal government to be transformed into a scenic recreation area., *ibid.*, 279-280.

⁷⁴Chief of Engineers to MAJ S. Kearney, 14, 18 October 1826, Topographical Engineers/Corps of Engineers, Letters Sent, 1824-1826, RG 77, entry 307.

⁷⁵For the origins of the topogs, see Shallat, 60-64; Traas, *Topographical Engineers, 14-14*; Frank N. Schubert, *Vanguard of Expansion: Army Engineers in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1819-1879*, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Washington: 1988); Holt, 8. Of this period, Steven Long wrote to the topog chief, "Are we to be mere chain carriers in the great work of internal improvement?", Ryan, 70. On the ending of the Board of Internal Improvements and the elevation of the Topographical Bureau "from a mere depot of instruments, charts, and books..." to "an independent bureau equal in status with the ... other staff offices of the War Department as a distinct and independent office of the War Department, see *ibid.*, 81-83; Schubert, 19.

⁷⁶J. H. Eaton, *On the Importance of the Topographical Engineers of the Army*, House Doc. No. 465, 21st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 January 1831.

⁷⁷J. J. Abert, "On an Increase of the Number of Officers and a Reorganization of the Corps of Topographical Engineers of the Army," House Doc. 626, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836); *State Papers of the United States*, 8.

⁷⁸*Annual Report of the Engineer Department*, 1 November 1842, in *Report of Secretary of War*, 1842, 258; Traas, *Topographical Engineers*, 16; Shallat, 153; Schubert, 24; Beers, "History of U.S. Topographical Engineers," 291. The act is partially quoted in H. C. Corbin and R. Thian, *Legislative History of the General Staff of the Army of the United States... From 1775 to 1901*, Adjutant-General's Office (Washington: 1901), 502.

⁷⁹Quoted in Schubert, 27.

⁸⁰Beers, "History of Army Topographical Engineers," pt. 2, p. 351.

⁸¹Goetzmann, 148-157; Blackburn, 81.

⁸²Beers, "History of U.S. Topographical Engineers," 2, p. 201.

⁸³Yet as Goetzmann notes, the scientific value, as opposed to the publicity and novelty, of Fré'mont's data was slight. The careless explorer's measurements were often off, he failed to pinpoint the location of South Pass, which was the main purpose of the expedition, and, in his 1843 expedition, finding no outlet from the Great Salt Lake, romantically speculated on "a terrible whirlpool, through which its waters found their way to the ocean by some subterranean communication.", Goetzmann, 84-93; Schubert, *Vanguard of Expansion*, 26, 31-33. For reports on most of these expeditions, see Adelaide R. Hasse, *Reports of Explorations Printed in the Documents of the United States Government* (Washington: 1899).

⁸⁴Blackburn, 86.

⁸⁵1LT J. Simpson, Topographical Engineers, to Chief of Corps of Topographical Engineers, 15 September 1851, *Message from the President of United States to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the First Session of the Thirty-Second Congress* (Washington: 1851), 442.

⁸⁶For topogs and Manifest Destiny, see Goetzmann, *Army Exploration*, 4-6, 429; Schubert, 54, 56-57. Topog reports are included in *Reports of Secretary of War* for each year in this period. Blackburn, 82.

⁸⁷Schubert, 41-42; *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, 3, p. 109.

⁸⁸Goetzmann, 231. The topogs enjoyed high prestige among the officer corps. Although the Corps of Engineers was the first choice of West Point graduates, surveying was their second choice. As one class of 1848 officer put it, "engineers were a species of gods, next to which came the "topogs" - only a grade below the first, but still a grade - they were demigods." Shallat, 44-45.

⁸⁹Schubert, 43-44; Ryan, 289-293, *Annual Reports of the Bureau of Topographical Engineers; Beers*, "History of U.S. Topographical Engineers," pt. 2; John Gibbon, "Government Survey and Charting of the Great Lakes from the Beginning of the Work in 1841 to the Present," *Michigan Historical Magazine* (October 1917).

⁹⁰Shallat, 108-113; Schubert, 28-31; Henry P. Beers, "A History of the U.S. Topographical Engineers," *The Military Engineer*, June 1942, 290; George Weiss, *The Lighthouse Service: Its History, Activities and Organization* (Baltimore: 1926), 11; Ryan, 158-167.

⁹¹Thomas M. Marshall, *A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841* (Berkeley, California: 1914), 225 and passim. Traas, 18; Schubert, *Vanguard of Expansion*, Chapt. 4. The riverine problem was not settled until the Gadsden Purchase, surveyed again by topogs, provided a more settled international boundary., *ibid.*, 63. In fact, the Army administered the Gadsden Purchase from its acquisition in 1854 until the end of the Civil War., C. W. Altshuler, "Military Administration in Arizona," *Journal of Arizona History*, vol. 10, No. 4. (1969); Blackburn, 85.

⁹²LT Ives, however, showed little insight into the future, stating that his expedition was not only the first to the floor of the Grand Canyon, it would be the last; the place was useless. Schubert, *Vanguard of Expansion*, 88.

⁹³The most thorough account of the Army's "topogs" is William H. Goetzmann, *Army Exploration in the American West, 1803-1863*. Lincoln, Nebraska, London: 1959, 1979. (quotation on p. 4); Henry P. Beers, "A History of the U.S. Topographical Engineers, 1813-1863," *Military Engineer* (June 1942); Traas gives an authoritative background on the Corps of Topographers, 9-23. For most of these expeditions, see Adelaide R. Hasse, *Reports of Explorations Printed in the Documents of the United States Government* (Washington: 1899); Beers, "History of the U.S. Topographical Engineers," ,pt. 2, p. 201.

⁹⁴Shallat, "Science and the United States Army," 46.

⁹⁵Schubert, 46-48; Shallat, *Structures in the Stream*, 163-171; J. W. Kershner, *Sylvanus Thayer, A Biography* (Ann Arbor: 1976), 295-303; 7; House Document No. 85, *Report of Major Hartman Bache...Relative to the Delaware Breakwater*, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. (27 January 1844). The breakwater project was determined by the Board of River and Harbor Improvements to be "of national importance.", undoubtedly the reason why the work was persisted in for so long with so little return. Board to Chief of Engineers, 26 March 1853, RG 77, entry 459, Engineer Boards, Board on River and Harbor Improvements, 1851-1853, box no. 1, folder no. 5; M. L. Williams, "The Chicago River and Harbor Convention, 1847," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 35 (March 1949), 610. Only one public works project was budgeted for the years 1845, 1846, 1847; and none in 1848, 1849. See "Reports" of Chief of Engineers and Chief of Topographical Engineers for years cited.

⁹⁶John J. Abert, "Report of the Chief of the Corps of Topographical Engineers," Senate Doc. 1, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. (1845), 297-98.

⁹⁷Shallat, *Science and the United States Army*, " 48.

⁹⁸Schubert, 36. See also Annual Reports of Chief of Engineers, RG 77, entry 117, vols. 1, 2, and printed volumes for those years; Holt, 9.

⁹⁹"Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River," *American Journal of Science and Art*, 33, 2d Series (March 1862); Shallat, 175; Schubert, 48-51; Ryan, 265-270.

¹⁰⁰Schubert, 96; Ryan, 185; Shallat, 178; Goetzmann, 341-342, 346, 354.

¹⁰¹Schubert, 65. This move probably made matters considerably worse. One authority terms the post-topog road-building period, during which time three superintendents, political appointees, were indicted for fraud, as the "gloomiest [period] in the history of federal aid to road building in the Trans-Mississippi West." W. T. Jackson, *Wagon Roads West: A Study of Federal Road Surveys and Construction in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1846-1869* (Berkeley: 1953), 325. More positively, the Army did commission one CPT Randolph Marcy to prepare a manual on Western travel, *The Prairie Traveler*, published in 1859. This manual was directed toward Army travel, but it could be used by civilians., Birtle, 64.

¹⁰²Ibid., 74.

¹⁰³For other examples see Shallat, 178.

¹⁰⁴BVLTC W. Hoffman, to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of California, 24 April 1859; and ibid., 18 May 1859, RG 393, pt. 1, entry 3621, Colorado Expedition, 1859, Post Letters.

¹⁰⁵William Goetzmann, *Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West* (New York and London: 1966), 307, 378, 341-342, and passim; Chapt. 9; Prucha, 349-350; Schubert, *Vanguard of Expansion*, Chapt. 6; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *The History of the US Army Corps of Engineers* (Washington: January 1986), 30-31. The Corps of Engineers was well aware of the transcontinental railroad's military value, emphasizing in its 1850 Report to the Secretary of War that "Even the completion of the great rail-way, by which some persons hope at an early day to open a quick communication with that coast, will augment the importance and necessity of such [West Coast harbor] defences. "Report

of the Chief Engineer, 1850," [p. 34], RG 77, entry 117, vol. 2, Annual Reports to Secretary of War, 1842-1867. Reprinted in "Report of Chief of Engineers," *Report of Secretary of War for 1850*, 232; Beers, "History of the Army Topographical Corps," pt. 2, p. 201; George Leslie Albright, *Official Explorations for Pacific Railroads*, University of California Publications in History, vol. 11 (Berkeley: 1921), passim. Pacific Railroads reports are in *Senate Ex. Documents*, 33d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 13, parts 1-11; and *ibid.*, 35th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 18, no. 46; Blackburn, 87.

¹⁰⁶Shallat terms the Corps, "Politically savvy but professionally isolated," "Science and the United States Army," 47.

¹⁰⁷Albert E. Cowdrey, *A City for the Nation: The Army Engineers and the Building of Washington, D.C., 1790-1967*, (Office of the Chief of Engineers) Washington: 1978?), 17; Schubert points out that the aqueduct was not begun until after a serious fire at the Capitol., 34-35. The progress of the aqueduct can be followed in the Reports of the Chief of Engineers to the Secretary of War, between 1855 and 1860., RG 77, entry 117, Annual Reports to the Secretary of War of the Chief of Engineers, 1842-1867, under "Rivers and Harbors, etc." R. J. Hellman, "Corps of Engineers U.S. Army and the Water Supply of Washington, D.C.", typescript (Corps History Office, Washington: 1983); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *History of Washington Aqueduct* (Washington, DC District: 1953); Harry C. Ways, *The Washington Aqueduct, 1852-1992*, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Washington: n.d.). Meigs's aqueduct was actually more advanced than that of Paris, a metropolis far larger and more populous than Washington, D.C., Shallat, 183. The act giving statutory superintendence of the aqueduct construction, care and maintenance is partially quoted in Corbin and Thian, 506. Meigs name was engraved into some of the stonework and cast into the valves of his aqueduct. *Quartermaster General of the Union Army: A Biography of M. C. Meigs*

¹⁰⁸R. Weigley, (New York: 1959), 61.

¹⁰⁹Cowdrey, 19-21; Glick, 48; "Capitol Extension," in "Report of the Secretary of War," *Message from the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the First Session of the Thirty-Third Congress*, pt. 2 (Washington: 1853), 69-84. See also RG 77, entry 276, Monthly Reports of Operations and Letters Sent by CPT M. C. Meigs to the War Department Relating to Work on the Capitol Extension and the Washington Aqueduct. Meigs lost his battle with the fiscally pliable Secretary of War, who later defected to the Confederacy. The great engineer was temporarily exiled to Florida's Dry Tortugas, Weigley, 130. Shallat asserts that the statue, *Armed Freedom*, that Meigs placed atop the new Capitol dome, was a "metaphor for progress through militarized science.", 187. Not until 1925 did the District of Columbia's Public Buildings and Public Parks department assume the functions of the Chief of Engineers for the national capital.

¹¹⁰The best that Shallat can say of this period is that "the Engineers had learned to survive in the cracks between jurisdictions.", 184; Goetzmann, 346.

¹¹¹See the bitter remarks of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff on the waste of resources as Congress approved funding for "some of our driest rivers hitherto only navigable to

pedestrians.", MG James Harbord, "National Defense," *Infantry Journal* (March 1923), 276.

¹¹²Shallat book, 114.

¹¹³See, for example, Robert M. Utley, "The Contributions of the Frontier to the American Military Tradition," in Tate, ed., *The American Military on the Frontier*: "And rarely for a century, except in the Mexican and Civil Wars, were the soldiers intermixed with the people," 12. It is difficult to imagine any two groups of people more "intermixed" than soldiers and civilians on the frontier

"TO CONQUER A PEACE": MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE MEXICAN WAR

"It is foreseen that what relates to civil government will be a difficult and unpleasant part of your duty." (Secretary of War William Marcy to MG Scott)

Despite the noble work of the Topographical Branch over the previous decade, the Army command was surprisingly ignorant of Southwestern geography, although a "topog" had drawn up in 1844 a derivative map of Texas, which had remained unpublished.

In 1845, however, on the eve of war, the Army launched three expeditions, led by BG Stephen W. Kearny, a Regular Army veteran of the War of 1812; Fremont and LT James Abert. All three were as concerned with science and "nation building" (such as emigrant wagon train and transcontinental railroad routes) as in political and military purposes. These were soldiers, however, and soon after word of the exchange of mutual declarations of war between Mexico and the United States Kearny attacked a Mexican lancer unit in a cavalry melee that actually saw the Americans suffer considerably heavier losses than their opponents, who, however, did quit the battlefield. Whatever his military problems, when Kearny's little force completed its mission it had spanned the entire trans-Mississippi Southwest.¹

The American victory in Mexico was total; hardly a skirmish and never a battle lost in Mexico itself (California was another matter.) This overwhelming victory came even as U.S. forces, divided in command, with festering hostility between Regular and Volunteer and between the War Department and General Winfield Scott, plunged deeply into a strange and hostile country, were tied to a lengthy and tenuous line of communication and were vastly outnumbered by their enemies. The American victory is the more impressive when it is realized that almost two decades later French forces numbering 30,000 (compared to the Americans' 10,000) took 18 months (compared to the Americans' six) to fight their way to Mexico City, and suffered a decisive defeat at Puebla (which had fallen without a shot to the Americans).²

No less grand than the battlefield victories was the humane Military Government that General Scott imposed on the Mexican people in his area of command. In fact, with the Mexican government of the day in disarray it could be argued that for something like two months and in the absence of any coherent military government by Scott's rival commander, BvMG (after May 1846, MG) Zachary Taylor, Scott's was just about the only government with any extensive authority over Mexico at the time.³ With the Mexican War, the United States came as a conqueror of an alien people for a second time. This conquest, however, would end far more happily than the Quebec campaign of some 60 years earlier. In fact, the military occupation of General Scott would reward study by Army officers for more than a century following.

Scott had practiced law in Virginia, was a temperance advocate in that hard-drinking era, and in many ways was representative of the reforming, "improving" spirit of the Age of Jackson. A bookish officer, there is evidence that he was familiar with such works on

the laws of war and nations as those by Hugo Grotius, as well as de Vattel's *Law of Nations* (1762), Wheaton's *International Law* (c. 1836) and was apparently aware of the fatal problems of General Burgoyne while deep in hostile country during the American Revolution. He knew he would be in a similar situation as he moved over inhospitable enemy territory toward Mexico City.⁴


Upon entering Mexico at Tampico, Scott, who was also the Army's General-in-Chief, issued his memorable General Order No. 20 on 19 February 1847 governing the conduct of U.S. forces and Mexicans civilians under their jurisdiction. The order opened by noting that existing U.S. law and the Constitution did not apply outside the territory of that nation; specifically, these instruments did not provide for the protection of foreigners who might be under the control of the U.S. Army. Nonetheless, "The good of the service, the honor of the United States and the interests of humanity, imperiously demand that every crime, enumerated above, should be severely punished." Therefore the perpetrators, U.S. or Mexican, of any act illegal under U.S. law or the "rules and articles of War" would be tried and punished either by court martial or by special U.S. military commissions which would act in conformity with the punishments established in American state courts. In addition, the 59th Article of War decreed the death penalty for the violation of any safeguard issued by the Army for persons or property.⁵ The bi-lingual order was to be read before each Army company and was re-issued at Vera Cruz, Puebla and Mexico City. Scott meant what he said: at least one soldier and one Army-employed civilian were publicly hanged for outrages. When an American soldier was convicted of repeatedly striking a Mexican woman, he was strapped over a wagon, given 12 lashes and put at hard labor with ball and chain for the duration of the war.⁶

This was no expedient effort, to be dropped when the land was pacified. During the occupation of Mexico City months later, one soldier reported home ruefully that "Reverling in the halls of Montezuma means that if the patrol finds you in the street after 8 o'clock in the evening, you are taken to the guardhouse, and if noisy, handcuffed."⁷ Punishment could also overtake the commanders of offending units. One such officer found himself on the road back to Vera Cruz five days after Scott had received an adverse report on his troops' behavior.⁸

Scott did all of this entirely on his own authority. He could count on little or no guidance from Washington. The U.S. Attorney General, the Secretary of War, William Marcy; Congress and President James Polk all avoided the touchy issue of the military control of civilians, with Marcy returning Scott's first draft of GO 20 "as too explosive for safe handling", according to Scott, and warning him that "It is foreseen that what relates to civil government will be a difficult and unpleasant part of your duty." President Polk and Secretary Marcy, both good Jacksonians, undoubtedly recoiled in horror at the thought of civilians of either nationality being tried by military courts, as did Congress when Marcy finally bestirred himself to forward some of Scott's legal recommendations.⁹

Scott issued a series of further orders affecting the civil population as he moved inland. One mandated payment for all goods requisitioned by the Army. As for those miscreant Americans who:

rob, plunder or destroy....The General-in-Chief would infinitely prefer that the few who commit such outrages, should desert at once, and fight against



MG Winfield Scott combined military prowess with an understanding of Military Government and succeeded brilliantly in both. National Archives

us--Then it would be easy to shoot them down, or to capture and hang them.¹⁰

The Vera Cruz occupation apparently saw the first use of the term "Military Government" by the U.S. Army. After extending full military honors to the capitulating Mexican Army garrison, Scott re-issued GO No.20 (as GO No. 87) and later added the proviso that magistrates and priests were to be saluted on the streets of the city. In clerical matters Scott went ever further. Although a Protestant, the General attended a Roman Catholic mass and invited the local clergy to hold Roman Catholic services in two local churches for his troops of that communion. Later, when in occupation of Mexico City, Scott "earnestly requested of all protestant [sic] Americans either to keep out of the way, or to pay to the catholic religion and its ceremonies every decent mark of respect and deference." These were brave gestures at a time when the anti-Catholic, anti-foreign Know-Nothing party loomed on the American political landscape and would do nothing to advance the fortunes of an officer nursing political ambitions. (Scott ran for U.S. President as a Whig in 1848, loosing to the disappointing Franklin Pierce.)¹¹

Scott then turned over the reins of Vera Cruz military government to the capable hands of BG William Worth and moved on into the interior. Under Worth's model administration, the city's military government was divided into six offices: 1)fiscal affairs, 2)public works, 3)public health, 4)public safety, 5)legal affairs and 6)education. Worth and his successor interfered as little as was possible with the existing municipal authority and structure of Vera Cruz. For example, his military police aided the municipal officers of the law, and arbitrational courts were established in the absence of Mexican judges to try to take the place of civil lawsuits, which were discouraged. Worth even gave his Mexican courts jurisdiction over US soldiers, although here he was overruled by General Scott. Worth further establish a "temporary and moderate tariff of duties" for the port, at General Scott's orders. The moneys collected were to go to the American sick and wounded as well as to the poor of the city. He also collected all civilian arms, imposed a curfew, regulated prices of foodstuffs and other consumer goods as well as the hours of Mexican grog shops. Worth threw out American prostitutes as well as gamblers and other "undesirables" from his jurisdiction. American troops did not escape military government regulation, either; in the interests of peace and good order they needed a pass to approach the city, then only in daylight and usually in parties of ten or less.¹² One "free man of color, a resident of the United States of America" (but note, not designated a "citizen") was hanged for rape or attempted rape and robbery of a Mexican woman.¹³

Scott was not acting solely on his own or through entirely humanitarian impulses. Whatever its hesitation about military government in Mexico, the stated policy of the U.S. government was to treat the Mexicans as friends misled by evil leaders, and this fitted in well with Scott's "reforming" sentiments.¹⁴ As Scott wrote in a proclamation of 11 April 1847:

Mexicans: Americans are not your enemies; but the enemies for a time, of the men who, a year ago, misgoverned you, and brought about this unnatural war between two great republics. We are the friends of the

peaceful inhabitants of the country we occupy, and the friends of your Holy Religion, its Hierarchy and its Priesthood.¹⁵

Further, Scott realized that with his army deep in hostile territory, with his troops for the most part "up front," with few to spare for the protection of his lines of supply and communication, any confiscations or undisciplined behavior would, at the very least, jeopardize his sources of supply. In fact, "like Cortez, finding myself isolated and abandoned," Scott cut his supply train between Vera Cruz and Puebla, intending to make his army "a self-sustaining machine."¹⁶ His men were on their own. If nothing else, conciliation of the civil population made military sense. Scott had emphatically rejected Secretary of War Marcy's suggestion that he resort to requisitions from the local population for his armies' needs. Both he and General Taylor realized that such a policy would alienate those populations, but only Scott's troops consistently paid for what they required in "hard money" or U.S. Treasury drafts. If not, "they [supplies] will be withheld, concealed, or destroyed by the owners whose national hatred of us remains unabated."¹⁷ Marcy, on the other hand, quite improbably worried that "A state of things so favorable to their [the Mexicans'] interests may induce them to wish the continuance of hostilities."¹⁸

Puebla ("Unconquered Puebla!"), then Mexico's second largest city, had easily surrendered to Scott, who had been assiduously courting the church hierarchy in an area notorious for its anti-government sentiments.¹⁹ Responding to suggestions from the Bishop of Puebla, Scott issued yet another proclamation, which he grandly termed his "Crowning Act of Conciliation." This effort outlined a "true" history of the war and urged Mexicans to look to their "real" interests, i.e., cooperation with the Americans.²⁰ Scott's Military Governor for the city, again MG Worth, reported to Scott that his proclamation in Puebla "has produced more decided effects than all the blows from Palo Alto to Cerro Gordo" (which were decided American victories).²¹ Puebla for the remainder of the war was administered by a model Military Government.²²

General Scott's MG operations can be divided into two phases. The first was the immediate and tactical, designed to ensure the short-term success and survival of his force. The second, adopted after the fall of Mexico City, assumed a longer-range view, one of protecting his command and of ending the war on the most favorable terms for his own country. Scott forbade the payment of all taxes to the federal Mexican government. (surely a popular initiative.) In actuality, in the absence of the notorious "mordida" (bribes, pay-offs) to corrupt local tax gatherers, the citizens of Mexico probably enjoyed lower taxes, and certainly more honestly-enforced fiscal exactions under the invader than under their own government.²³ Still, Scott was to be disappointed in his revenue anticipations, for in the words of one scholar of the war, the state authorities "possessed wonderful dexterity in the arts of evasion."²⁴ Scott also abolished all lotteries in his conquered territory, but this measure was most likely a result of his puritanical convictions.²⁵

In Mexico City itself, after exhorting his troops to remain "sober, orderly, and merciful", Scott issued yet another order on the subject of Military Government, this one GO No. 287, which basically iterated his Tampico and later pronouncements, and again protected private property and put the city under the protection of the U.S. Army.²⁶ He busied himself with the innumerable issues of military occupation: the clearing of debris and rubble, enforcement of sanitary regulations, regulation of the liquor trade, personnel

control, even the fixing of prices for basic foods. He also saw to it that his soldiers were conspicuous by their absence during municipal and local elections.²⁷ Although Scott, again, wished to interfere as little as possible with local affairs, and decreed that Mexican law would remain in effect in cases involving only Mexicans, he did purge the city council to secure a body more amenable to his wishes. The resultant *ayuntamiento* (civil government) re-established its police force, which worked in collaboration with some four hundred picked troops, and soon commenced a municipal cleansing which saw the restoration of water supplies and the introduction of numerous sanitary measures. Army topogs, at the request of the council completed a survey to establish the level of lakes surrounding the city as a flood control measure.²⁸ As at Tampico and Puebla, American officers even established that most American institution, a chamber of commerce.²⁹

In all of this General Scott remained primarily the soldier, and he could be severe when his military objectives were challenged. When his entry into Mexico City was hampered by snipers, not to mention *leperos*, released convicts and general disorder, Scott's artillerists loaded and raked the mobs with canister, then blasted and pillaged structures from which shots had been observed, while U.S. Army sharpshooters picked off individual offenders.³⁰ General Worth forthrightly recorded that "I caused heavy guns to be turned against every house [from which a shot came]...and after a few hours of such application, not regarding where or who it hit, quelled the dastardly villains." When an exasperated Scott threatened to raze the city and give it over to pillage, the municipal authorities bestirred themselves to restore order.³¹ Thus was a city of some 200,000 souls, defended by a garrison of from 18-20,000 enemy troops, turned over to and effectively administered by a force of no more than 6,000 U.S. soldiers.³²

Scott's first military governor of Mexico City showed forbearance and ingenuity the equal of his commander. When the churches of the metropolis were found closed, BG John Quitman simply informed the clerical authorities that he would remove the U.S. flags from their pinnacles. Fully aware of the vast displays of precious metals and stones in these ecclesiastical edifices that would now be bereft of U.S. Army protection, the clerics soon enough opened their doors. Relations with the *ayuntamiento*, however, cooled when Scott levied an assessment of \$150,000 on the city for the support of his army, although he did refrain from simply seizing revenues or the Mexican treasury, saying that his was not a "war on civilization."

As was to be expected, the *ayuntamiento* was caught between its concern for the welfare and good order in the city and the opposition of patriotic Mexicans who viewed the civil government as collaborators with the aggressor. These feelings were brought out in a bitter letter from the council to General Scott, published in *El Monitor Republicano*, which denounced the occupying forces for outrages against civilians and at the same time appealed to the American governor against "these [Mexican] demagogues without country, without conscience, and without honor."³³ The council was then dissolved by the Military Governor. This municipal body could hardly have been accused of basely truckling to the American occupiers. At its insistence, for example, American military courts abandoned corporal punishment in cases involving Mexican civilians, punishment which the Mexicans found particularly "barbarous and humiliating."³⁴ The capital metropolis settled down to a nine-month occupation.

Perhaps in some compensation for these exactions of war, Scott from the beginning mounted an effective campaign of what, in the 20th century, could be termed "public relations." In addition to his public disciplinary actions against U.S. offenders and his proclamations of peaceable intentions and his attentions to the Roman Catholic church, Scott also saw to it that as noted, American offenders against Mexicans were publicly punished. The general's peaceable proclamations were given wide circulation, and his attentions to the Roman Catholic confession have been noted. Further, in each captured city, a bi-lingual American newspaper soon began publication, painting the U.S. Army in the brightest possible hues for the local citizens.³⁵

Scott's military government policies were obviously not without tangible effect. At least one Mexican writer of the time was brave enough and generous enough to record that the occupying Americans had, on the whole, ensured security of person and property better than their own governments had.³⁶ Although he later came to despise this war, young LT U.S. Grant, witnessing the evacuation of Monterey at the conclusion of peace, "question[ed] whether the great majority of the Mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming."³⁷

Although never on the scale of their operations against General Taylor, Mexican "rancheros," "banditti," etc. did somewhat harass Scott's attenuated supply lines. In one authority's possibly exaggerated words, "the routes from the Rio Grande to Monterrey [*sic*] and from Vera Cruz to Mexico [City] came to be little more than black swathes of desolation."³⁸ Scott himself spoke of the corridor to Vera Cruz requiring protection against "guerrillas, rancheros, and other robbers," and noted a supply train "attacked by a numerous body of the enemy, and suffered a loss that looks like a disaster - [but also noted that this attack was] the first we have sustained." General Worth at Puebla wrote Scott "that there may be some 6 to 800 of beggarly cavalry between us...but no force that could [not?] be whipped to the assault of 100 of our men in compact order and good array."³⁹ As a final note on the subject, a cabal of prominent Mexican annexationists after the end of the war offered Scott the dictatorship of Mexico!⁴⁰

By contrast, General Taylor, on receiving his copy of GO No. 20, supposedly threw aside the offending document as "another of Scott's lessons," and subsequently did little to foster Mexican civilian acquiescence, although he did go to some pains to put himself on the record as strongly in favor of such sentiments.⁴¹ In fact, almost a year before Scott, Taylor himself had drawn up an order quite similar to Scott's before he even entered the territory disputed with Mexico. In it, Taylor mandated "utmost respect" for the civil inhabitants and the payment for all requisitioned goods "at the highest prices." Taylor neglected to state in what currency these "highest prices" would be paid. He obviously did not follow through on his admirable order, although he did have it printed up in both Spanish and English, and widely distributed. On the contrary, his men, or at least the volunteers, would become a byword among the Mexicans for violence and atrocity. One authority notes:

[The volunteers] robbed the Mexicans of their cattle and corn, stole their fences for firewood, got drunk and killed several inoffensive inhabitants of the town in the streets....Their officers had little control over them and often were obviously afraid of them;⁴²

Some reports indicate even worse depredations. During the first days of the occupation of Monterey, no less than 100 Mexicans were said to have been shot down in cold blood.⁴³ Taylor appeared to have given up in despair his responsibility to keep his troops in order, even complaining that "There is scarcely a form of crime that has not been reported to me as committed by them.", and concluding logically enough, "Were it possible to rouse the Mexican people to resistance, no more effectual plan could be devised than the very one pursued by some of our volunteer regiments now [fortunately] about to be discharged."⁴⁴ One authority terms Matamoros and Monterey, under Taylor's troops as no less than "infernos" of murder, drunkenness and rapine.⁴⁵

This indiscipline was not entirely the result of lack of control from the command. Many of the volunteers were Texans, with understandably bitter memories of the massacres at Goliad and the Alamo a decade earlier during the Texas War for Independence. Taylor, in fact, requested that no more Texas troops be sent to his forces.⁴⁶ Texans or not, Taylor's men paid for their sins by suffering far more from Mexican guerrilla/"ranchero"/"banditti" depredations.⁴⁷

Whatever the reasons, American military indiscipline may have had at least one result that went well beyond that of alienating the local civil population. President Polk, the most ardent expansionist of any U.S. president, entertained hopes that the northern provinces of Mexico might of their own volition secede from Mexico and, following the manner of Texas, petition to enter the Great Republic. After Taylor's volunteers had rampaged through those provinces, however, all such sentiments were doubtless extinguished.⁴⁸ The situation is eerily reminiscent of the dashed hopes of those Americans of the Revolutionary War generation whose attempts to detach Quebec from its weak British allegiance were frustrated by the undisciplined and insensitive behavior of the occupying troops (although Quebecois had not usually been shot down in the streets). In sum, had these two Military Governments been better administered, the United States today might be a much larger and much different nation.

Scott's and Taylor's were not the only military governments of the Mexican War. In August of 1846 BvBG Kearny was ordered by Secretary of War Marcy to take New Mexico and California, to "establish temporary civil governments therein", and "to continue in their employment all such of the existing officers as are known to be friendly to the United States, and will take the oath of allegiance to them." Secretary Marcy also warned (in identical words that he had used to Scott) that "It is foreseen that what relates to civil government will be a difficult and unpleasant part of your duty." Kearny had already issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of New Mexico actually stating that he "entered New Mexico with a large military force for the purpose of seeking union with and ameliorating the conditions of its inhabitants.", and proceeded to establish a 40-page "organic law" for the province, drawn up by COL A. W. Doniphan and one PVT W. P. Hall (who soon after was democratically granted a discharge to run, successfully, for his state's legislature).⁴⁹ This new constitution abolished official stamp paper, offered U.S. citizenship to all New Mexicans, organized a licensing system, established *habeas corpus* and scheduled elections for delegates to the U.S. Congress and the new territorial general assembly, open to all free, white (male) inhabitants.⁵⁰

For all his good works, Kearny faced open rebellion across New Mexico, with the provisional governor scalped alive and decapitated. ("We want your head, gringo, we do not want for any of you gringos to govern us.") and numerous other U.S. officials and citizens as well as Mexican supporters of American rule assassinated in several towns.⁵¹ In a series of pitched battles and a final siege back at Fernando de Taos, the enraged American troops suppressed the rebellion and hanged its ringleaders.⁵²

President Polk later agreed that Kearny had exceeded his instructions by extending citizenship to the New Mexicans, and the Secretary of War, with punctilious legality, pardoned those accused of treason against the United States, of which they were now adjudged to never have been citizens. In its other provisions, however, the Kearny Code stood. Those who had violated the criminal provisions of the code had to suffer the consequences; this was legitimate military government by right of conquest, and Secretary of War Marcy forthrightly informed Kearny that his was a military government and not one established under the laws or the Constitution of the United States. In fact, in that Kearny was establishing a permanent government for New Mexico territory, he was in violation of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which gave Congress sole jurisdiction over the establishment of territories and their government.⁵³

Unfortunately, Kearny was no Scott. His forces were described by a responsible British traveler as "The dirtiest, rowdiest crew I have ever seen collected together." The former editor of the *Washington Globe* wrote that "It seems that even respectable men at home have become so depraved by the license of the region that they are in that they stick at no enormity whatsoever."⁵⁴ New Mexico endured its military government until the general assembly was elected under Kearny's Code, framed a territorial constitution and scheduled popular elections. In September, 1850 Congress established the Territory of New Mexico and the rather restive military government of that territory became history.⁵⁵

When news of war between Mexico and the United States reached the Mexican province of Upper California, John C. Fremont of the topogs was already in the chaotic Mexican province on a mapping expedition, but under orders to be prepared as well for war. Commodore John Sloat, commander of the Pacific Squadron, in July of 1846, and on the heels of the "Bear Flag Revolt" of Anglo-California citizens against Mexico, proclaimed at Monterey the province to be U.S. territory. The following month, Commodore Robert Stockton, Sloat's successor, organized a civil government at Los Angeles, proclaimed again union with the U.S. and formulated regulatory edicts. Stockton also built the first school house, set up postal facilities, drew up a code of laws that he forwarded to Washington for Congressional approval and set aside the following month for local elections. Finally, Stockton separated the civil government of California into three segments, with himself as military governor of the territory, Fremont as military commandant in the north and Captain Gillespie, USN, commanding in the south. American military government, nonetheless, was indeed thin on the ground. Kearny had in the meanwhile moved into California, and one of his officers reported that:

General Kearny is supreme -- somewhere up the coast; COL Fremont is supreme at Pueblo de los Angeles; Commodore Stockton is "Commander-in-Chief" at San Diego; and I at San Luis Rey; and we are all supremely

poor, the government having no money and no credit; and we hold the territory because Mexico is poorest of all.⁵⁶

Hardly five months into his military government, Stockton faced another California revolt, this one against himself and U.S. military government. The reasons given for the revolt are incomplete, but do indicate a resentment over foreign military government. COL Richard B. Mason (later to become Military Governor of the territory) reported that "the people resent the change of flags, whatever may be said or written to the contrary, and in the southern part of Upper California would rise immediately if it were possible for Mexico to send even a small force into the country." Even without the "small force" from Mexico, CPT Gillespie was expelled from Los Angeles in September. Reinforcements under Commodore Robert Stockton were then defeated in October at the Battle of Dominguez Ranch. The string of defeats continued as BG Kearny, moving his forces into California from New Mexico, was badly defeated by Mexican Army *Californio* Lancers at the Battle of San Pascual, the only serious American defeat of the entire Mexican War.⁵⁷ The civilian revolts did seem halfhearted, and American military professionalism prevailed fairly easily. The reconquest of California was validated by the Treaty of Cahuenga on 13 January 1847, which provided for citizenship and pardons all around.

The travails of U.S. military government were not over. Acting on the most recent instructions from the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, Commodore Stockton's successor turned over the new civil government's reins to Dennis Kearny. Kearny had proclaimed that all Californians would now be considered "as citizens of the United States," which meant that American citizens were now under military rule. Secretary of State James Buchanan rightly termed the situation "anomalous."⁵⁸ In light of the recently-suppressed rebellion, it was also dangerous.

To complicate the situation further, Fre'mont continued to assert his authority. Kearny then drew up court martial charges for "mutiny, disobedience of orders and conduct prejudicial to the public service" against Fremont.⁵⁹ Fre'mont was convicted on all charges and resigned, even though the court recommended executive clemency.

Kearny was succeeded by COL Mason, who basically reissued Kearny's New Mexico code, which provided for the keeping intact of most Mexican laws, and which gave the Californians a measure of the order they so desperately needed.⁶⁰ Although, in general, American military government under COL Mason was ably administered, particularly in those areas where the Mexican population was dominant, American-dominated communities paid scant attention to Mexican-derived jurisprudence, particularly after the end of war with Mexico, and near-anarchy could prevail therein. For example, Military Governor COL Bennett Riley, issued a circular requesting assistance to missionaries in their good work among the "neophytes" (i.e. Indians). In time, however, the "neophytes" would be exterminated to a man.⁶¹

The details of military government could also become quite complicated. A British sea captain was fined by the still-functioning *alcalde* court for receiving deserters from the U.S. Navy. In other words, a foreigner was tried by a hold-over Mexican court for violating the laws of the United States. Anglo citizens continued to chafe under Military Government and after the proclamation of peace with Mexico, petitioned for an end to a

government which had only functioned "by virtue of the right of war." However, the military commander pointed out that the existing government would have to continue until Congress should appoint another. The Civil Governor, noting the growing restlessness, even lawlessness of what were, after all, American citizens, called in August of 1849 for elections of delegates to a constitutional convention to frame a state constitution or territorial organization. In the meanwhile, the discovery of gold had caused even more tumult. As if the Gold Rush were not enough, the slavery controversy inflamed the issue of California's admission to the Union. This question was not settled until September 1850 with the end of military government and the admission of California to the Union under the provisions of the Compromise of 1850.⁶²

—The revolts against military governments in New Mexico and California, along with the Philippine Insurrection at the end of the century, represent the only serious resistance to such governments in American history. In fact, aside from the American Civil War itself, they were the only armed insurrections against local, state or federal governments ever undertaken by what were (at least by proclamation) American citizens.⁶³ The relatively prompt extension of U.S. citizenship to all the non-Indian inhabitants thereof, however, helped to cool nationalist passions. Thanks to U.S. Army MG the huge new territories of the United States entered the Union with a minimum of trouble or disturbance.

¹Kearny's report of his 1845 expedition is in Report of Chief of Engineer, in Report of Secretary of War, from *Report Message From the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress, 29th Cong., 1st Sess*; Goetzmann, *Army Exploration*, 109-152; Frank. N. Schubert, ed., *March to South Pass: Lieutenant William B. Franklin's Journal of the Kearny Expedition of 1845* (Office of the Chief of Engineers, Historical Division, Washington: June 1979); John Galvin, ed., *Western America in 1846-1847; The Original Travel Diary of Lieutenant J. W. Abert who Mapped New Mexico for the United States Army* (San Francisco: 1956).

²Edward Wallace, "The U.S. Army in Mexico City.", *Military Affairs*, Fall 1949.

³Scott noted to President Polk's diplomatic emissary that "You are right in doubting whether there be a government, even *de facto*, in this republic." Scott to Trist, 7 May 1847, *House Document No. 60*, 959.

⁴Gabriel; Provost Marshal School, *Military Government*, 2.

⁵"General Orders No. 20, Headquarters of the Army, Tampico, February 19, 1847" reproduced in Daugherty, *Review*, Appendix A. Scott was influenced by the comparable British Articles of War when the forces of the Crown were engaged abroad. Henry O. Whiteside, "Winfield Scott and the Mexican Occupation," *MidAmerica* (April 1970), 105-106. For an example, see the military commission that tried a Lieutenant of the 5th Tennessee Volunteers for the murder of an unnamed Mexican civilian as late as February 1848. RG 94 AGO Letters Received, micro 567, reel No. 319. Scott's legal reasoning can be found in his Project, drawn up at Washington in October 1846. *House Ex. Doc No. 60*, 1264.

⁶Justin H. Smith, *The War with Mexico* (New York: 1919), 2, pp. 220-221. These punishments were written up in dramatic detail in the Army's local --and bilingual-- newspapers. Daugherty, *A Review*, 87. Quotation in John S. D. Eisenhower, *So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848* (New York: 1989), 296.

⁷Smith, vol. 1, 226. All accounts agree on the peaceable occupation, broken only by individual rowdiness, of the American Army's military government of Mexico City.

⁸*House Ex. Doc.*, No. 56, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 218, 221.

⁹Scott, *Memoirs, Written by Himself* (New York: 1864), 2, pp. 393-394; Gabriel; Whiteside, 106; Congress did debate the question of military government, but focused on the treatment of Mexican civilians by the U.S. military, rather than the discipline of U.S. troops and civilians in a foreign country. Daugherty, *A Review of U.S. Historical Experience*, 76-78. March "civil government" quotation from Gabriel, 438.

¹⁰Quoted in full in Provost Marshal General's School, Military Government Department for OTC Units, *Military Government Under General Winfield Scott* (n.p., n.d. [Fort Gordon, Georgia?]), 26-27.

¹¹Gabriel; Eisenhower, 267; Kyles, 51-52. GO 87 (1 April 1847) is in *House Ex. Doc. No. 60*, 914. Scott also utilized the church hierarchy to obtain more binding paroles for Mexican prisoners of war: "Do you swear before God our Lord and on this Holy Cross, that you will not take up arms during the present war, unless duly exchanged?" *ibid.*, 1058.(emphasis in original).

¹²Smith, "Four Occupations"; *ibid.*, *War With Mexico*, 70-71, 230; O'Brien, 51. Those who cooperated with the Americans in any official capacity knew full well that Mexican law decreed death or lengthy imprisonment for any official who continued to serve under a foreign invasion force. Scott did observe that many neutrals, through their consuls, had put in claims for damages, and "deplore[d] the disgrace brought upon our arms by undetected villains.", Scott to Macy, 5 April 1847, *House Exec. Doc.*, No. 60, 911. Vera Cruz tariffs, controlled prices, liquor licensees, etc. are in *ibid.*, 931 and 934.

¹³General Orders No. 101, Vera Cruz, 9 April 1847, in *House Ex. Doc. No. 60*, 935-936.

¹⁴Eisenhower, 100; Smith, 221.

¹⁵"Major-General Scott, General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States of America: To the Good People of Mexico.", Vera Cruz, 11 April 1847. in *House Ex. Doc.*, 937.

¹⁶*House Ex. Doc.*, No. 59, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 8.

¹⁷Whiteside, 103-104. General Worth shrewdly noted that "There must be the semblance of coercion," to protect locals from any taint of collaboration when Mexican authority was resumed., Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," 292.

¹⁸Marcy to Taylor, 22 September, 1847, in *House Ex. Doc. No. 60*, 341. Marcy need not have worried. There were sufficient instances of American troop misbehavior, and worse, to keep any Mexican desire for a continuation of the war and military occupation in check. See, for example, "Statement of Nicholas Dorich, an agent of Colonel Kinney, viz:" in *ibid.*, 938. Dorich claimed that as a result of the near-total destruction of his property by marauding volunteers, and his close brush with death at their hands, "the people have lost the confidence they had previously, and have gone into the woods." To make matters worse, Dorich, a Spanish citizen, was a supplier to the U.S. Army., *ibid.*, 938-939.

¹⁹Smith, *War with Mexico*, 65-66.

²⁰Scott, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, p. 549.

²¹Worth to Scott, 19 May 1847, *House Ex. Doc. No. 60*, 967.

²²Scott was not anticipating matters unduly when he wrote the Secretary of War that "Puebla, it is known, does not hope to resist our progress, but stands ready to receive us amicably, or at least courteously." Scott to Marcy, Jalapa, 6 May 1847, *House Ex. Doc. No. 60*, 954. Elliott, *Winfield Scott*, 486; Whitehead, "Winfield Scott and the Mexican Occupation," 110.

²³Whiteside, 104; Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," *American Historical Review* (January 1918), 292.

²⁴Smith, *War with Mexico*, 265.

²⁵Whiteside, 106; Smith "Four Interventions."; Scott, GO No. 395 (31 December 1847), *House Ex. Doc. No. 60*, 1063.

²⁶*Senate Ex. Doc.*, No. 1, 386.

²⁷Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," 297.

²⁸The Tampico *ayuntamiento* was also dissolved and replaced for incompetence and malfeasance in office., Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," 298; Whiteside, 107, 108; Berge, 249. A banquet given for the topogs by a grateful city council was denounced by its opponents as a "prostituting" and even a "clamoring and crying hoarsely for annexation." *ibid.*, 250.

²⁹Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," 298.

³⁰Whitside, 111; Elliott, *Winfield Scott*, 553.

³¹Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D., Written by Himself* (New York: 1864), 540-546. Smith, *War with Mexico*, 167. Quote from Smith, "Four Occupations."

³²*Ibid.*, *War With Mexico*, 142.

³³Dennis E. Berge, "A Mexican Dilemma: The Mexico City Ayuntamiento and the Question of Loyalty, 1846-1848," *Hispanic American Historical Review* (May 1970), 245. But it is also significant that although the American military governor then dissolved the *ayuntamiento* for its remarks on the occupation, *El Monitor Republicano* apparently continued its publication without hindrance in an occupied city in time of war.

³⁴Berge, 249. Nonetheless, a leader of the civic council, Sn. Suarez Iriarte, caught in Mexican political machinations, was tried and convicted after the war by the Chamber of Deputies, convicted, in a general sense, of treason, but died soon after. *ibid.*, 255.

³⁵These efforts included the *Tampico Sentinel*, the *Vera Cruz Eagle* and the [Mexico City] *American Star*, titles more redolent of back-home journals than of Mexican provenance. The latter newspaper was described as "a neat and saucy little sheet.", Smith, *War With Mexico*, 2, p. 227; Daugherty, 87.

³⁶J. M. Gutierrez de Estrada, J. M. *Mexico en 1840 y en 1847* (Mexico: 1848), quoted in Smith, *The War with Mexico*, 232.

³⁷U.S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 1 (New York: 1885), 53, 118. Perhaps Scott's later abrogating of the tobacco monopoly ("considering the interests of some five of our own tobacco growing states") as well as those of official stamped paper and playing cards had something to do with this popularity. Scott to Marcy, 6 January 1848, *House Ex. Doc.*, 1062.

³⁸Whitside, 109; Wallace, "The U.S. Army in Mexico City.,"; Quotation from Smith *AHR*. Also Smith, *War With Mexico*, vol. 2, p.p. 170-174, and "American Rule in Mexico," 290; Whitside, 113.

³⁹*House Ex. Doc.*, No. 56, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 180, 218; also Scott to Trist, 7 May 1847, *ibid.*, No. 60, 959-960. "Disaster" quotation, Scott to Marcy, 13 January 1848, *ibid.*, 1068. For the most part, however, these "banditti" or "rancheros" were a long way from any type of even semi-organized guerrilla resistance.

⁴⁰Scott, *Memoirs*, 2, pp. 581-582. Of course, Scott refused, but he had his political ambitions. Nominated by the Whigs in 1852, he had to endure defeat at the hands of his former subordinate, Franklin Pierce, one of the nation's least-regarded presidents. Did Scott, frustrated in his bid for the chief magistracy of the Great Republic, ever think back wistfully to his opportunity to become the chief executive of that other great republic?

⁴¹Scott, *Memoirs*, 2, p. 392. Smith, *War With Mexico*, 2, p. 220.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 212. Alfred H. Bill, *Rehearsal for Conflict: The War with Mexico, 1846-1848* (New York: 1947), 47; Gabriel. Taylor continued to rail against his volunteers' "many outrages... recently committed," and warned that the reputation of the United States would be "disgraced by scenes of plunder and marauding.", apparently to little avail. W. Daugherty, M. Andrews, *A Review of US Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776-1954*, ORO-TP-29 (Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase : May 1961), 49-50; M.

Dyer, *The Developing Role of the Army in Civil Affairs*, Special Study, ORO-T-398 (Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase: June 1961), 210. Eisenhower is considerably less condemnatory of Taylor's volunteers, blaming most of their unruliness on harsh conditions locally and in the camps., 100-103, as if Scott's men did not face similar problems.

⁴³Smith, "Four Occupations." An officer wrote his wife (somewhat confusingly) that volunteers "had killed five or six innocent people walking in the streets for no other object than their own amusement.", quoted in Whiteside, 115.

⁴⁴Taylor to Army Adjutant General, 16 June 1847, *House Ex. Doc. No. 60*, 1178. General Taylor herein gave no indication as to what counter-measures he was taking or contemplating.

⁴⁵Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," 294. One American warrior drew his pistol on the British counsel at Matamoros because he did not approve of that official's walking stick., *ibid.*

⁴⁶Taylor claimed that "but the mounted men from Texas have scarcely made one expedition without unwarrantably killing a Mexican [civilian].", *ibid.* Also Gabriel, *passim*.

⁴⁷See Taylor to Army Adjutant General, 14 November 1847, *House Ex. Doc. No. 60*, 1211. General Taylor was forthright in terming these irregulars "guerrillas."

⁴⁸Brainerd Dyer, *Zachary Taylor* (Baton Rouge: 1946), 215; Gabriel, *passim*. Note that Taylor's official bi-lingual military government newspaper was originally titled *The Republic of the Rio Grande and Friend of the People*. Robert Henry, *The Story of the Mexican War* (Indianapolis: 1950), 88; Bill, 129. Obviously, the poor behavior of the "Friend" squelched the "Republic.", 370.

⁴⁹Daugherty, 54. (Note that even for Marcy, a northerner, "United States" took the plural case, "them," a common usage before the Civil War settled that question.). Marcy warning is in 25th Cong., 2d Sess., *Executive Document*, No. 19, pp. 5-6; Gabriel, 438. Kearney's two proclamations are in RG 94, Letters Received by the Adjutant General, micro 567, roll 319, frames 145 and 151.

⁵⁰A sample of the offensive Mexican stamp paper is found in *ibid.*, frame 163. See also *House Ex. Doc. 60*, 30 Cong., 1st Sess., 178-228 for "Organic Law," and "Constitution," complete with "Bill of Rights," and down to the clerks' fee for executions (\$1). P. H. Taylor, and Ralph Braibanti, *Administration of Occupied Areas* (Syracuse: 1948), 104-105; Eisenhower, 235-237; James A. O'Brien, "Military Government in New Mexico and California," unpublished study, Historical Section, Army War College (Washington: July 1943); Ralph E. Twitchell, *The History of the Military Occupation of the Territory of New Mexico by the Government of the United States*. (Denver: 1909), 50, 73-74, 84.

⁵¹A. R. Sunseri, "Revolt in Taos, 1846-47. Resistance to U.S. Occupation," *Palacio* 1990, vol. 96, No. 1 (quotation); Taylor and Braibanti, 117-127.

⁵²Eisenhower, 235-240. The governor had warned Secretary of State James Buchanan that the conspiracy that would soon take his life had convinced him "of the necessity of maintaining here an efficient military force....recommend 1000 men...200 Dragoons, two full companies of artillery, 300 infantry armed with muskets, 300 armed with rifles. The riflemen to be trained as mountain men." C. Bent to Buchanan, 26 December 1846, Letters Sent by Governor of New Mexico, 1846-1847, RG 393, pt. 1, entry 3216. See also Robert

W. Larson, *New Mexico's Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912* [Santa Fe]: 1968, 6-7; "Insurrection Against the Military Government in New Mexico and California, 1847 and 1848," *Senate Doc. No. 442*, Case No. 141, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Division of Insular Affairs, War Department (1900).

⁵³Larson, 6, 8.

⁵⁴Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," 299.

⁵⁵Twitchell, *The History of the Military Occupation of the Territory of New Mexico*, 83.

⁵⁶Taylor, 182

⁵⁷D. E. Livingston-Little, "Composition and Activities of U.S. Military Forces in California during 1846-1848," *Journal of the West*, 11, No. 2 (April 1972). (Entire issue devoted to the Mexican War). Mason quotation, "Insurrection Against the Military Government," 694. See also Senate Doc. No. 18, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 488-504. Kearny's defeat was not complete; the *Californios* left him in possession of the field., Schubert, *Vanguard of Expansion*, 46.

⁵⁸Kearney's proclamation is in "Letters sent by Military Governors, Secretary of State, California, 1847-1848," Micro M182, Roll 1, frame 1. Thomas, 159-275. For Kearney's views of War, 27 April, 1847, 10 Military Department Records, Letters Sent, Micro 210 (RG 98), 1846-1851, roll 18.

⁵⁹Theodore Grivas, *Military Government in California, 1846-1850* (Glendale, California: 1963), 65.

⁶⁰ See *Laws for the Better Government of California: The Preservation of Order, and the Protection of the "Rights of Inhabitants during the Military Occupation of the Country by the Forces of the United States. by R. B. Mason, COL, Dragoons and Governor.* (San Francisco: 1848), in R. E. Cowan, "Bibliographical Note: Laws for the Better Government of California," *California Historical Society Quarterly*, vol. 2.; Flora Alice Wright, "Governor Richard Banner Mason and the Civil Fund," *California Pioneer Society Quarterly*, vol. 6, No. 4.

⁶¹Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," 299. COL Kearney, on the other hand, warned that if the Indians in the Sacramento area did not cease their cattle stealing, "they will most assuredly be punished by an armed force which I will send among them and I wish you to inform them that that they must now look to the President of the U. States as their Great Father:", Kearney to CPT John A. Sutter, (newly appointed Indian agent), 6 April 1847, Micro 182.

⁶²Daugherty, "U.S. Historical Experience with Civil Affairs," 70-71; Smith, 218-2220. Note that California did not go through the territorial stage leading to admission to the Union. That state's tutelage was military government. See also General Service Schools, *Military Aid to the Civil Power* (Fort Leavenworth: 1925), 64.

⁶³The inhabitants of the seceded southern states during the American Civil War would have argued, of course, that their allegiance to the Federal Union had been dissolved and that they were now citizens of their several states and of the Confederate States of America.

III THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

"Voting contrary to orders is a military offense"

In some significant ways, the term "American Civil War" is a misnomer. Despite considerable popular assertions to the contrary, brother usually did not fight brother, nor father, son. In fact, that description more accurately fits the Revolutionary War in the Southern Department. Rather, between 1861 and 1865 Pennsylvanians would fight Georgians; New Yorkers, Virginians; and Minnesotans, Floridians. The Army would operate in areas that considered themselves sovereign and independent portions of the Confederate States of America. From the start, this conflict would see a profound conflict between those U.S. Army officers who saw their duty as one of putting down armed rebellion, and those who looked upon Confederates as Americans who had taken their understandable resentment against "black abolitionists" and arrogant high-tariff Republicans to extremes. These two interpretations, often accompanied by violent assertion, would prevail until well after the end of the war.

The former interpretation was personified in MGs John C. Fre'mont, John Pope and Benjamin Butler. For them, most Southerners were rebels against just and legal federal authority, slave-driving Simon Legrees, whose human chattel should be immediately and without compensation freed and their other property subject to confiscation. They would have only the rights of the inhabitants of "conquered provinces" after their violent rebellion against the legitimate government of all the United States. Fre'mont moved into Missouri early in the war, breathing fire and slaughter, threatening "rebels" with summary execution as partisans, not to mention the confiscation of their property and freedom for their slaves. Lincoln quickly countered this bombast in order to preserve border slave states' loyalty to the Union, and Fre'mont's career faded.¹

John Pope took a similar course in Virginia the following year, when he detained civilians suspected of guerrilla depredations, and ordered all male citizens to take the oath of allegiance to the United States upon pain of banishment or execution if the oath were violated, all without benefit of court proceedings. General Pope did have provocation for his measures, as pro-Confederate guerrillas were indeed harassing his troops. One authority, writing within memory of the Civil War argued that:

A large part of the harshness shown to the inhabitants of the occupied area was due to the provocations which they gave to the occupant. The toleration of guerrilla bands, the ambush of sentries, the contumely openly shown to troops and officers, the conduct of "war traitors" and "war rebels," the treatment of prisoners - all these causes called down upon guilty and innocent alike the penalty which only the former should suffer.²

Similar arguments have been, made with varying degrees of accuracy, by military commanders throughout the ages while making war in an enemy's country. In setting up his

officers to act as judge, jury and constable, however, General Pope was violating Scott's GO 20, and the generally accepted laws of wars and nations at that time.³

The best-known (and best remembered by the citizens involved) cautionary example of frustrated military government was that of MG Benjamin F. Butler in New Orleans. This Massachusetts politician and "political general," this "P. T. Barnum character", was a incomprehensible choice for such a sensitive post. Butler early set the tone of his military occupation by proclaiming in his usual bombast:

The United States have sent land and naval forces here to fight and subdue rebellious armies in array against her authority. We find substantially only fugitive masses, runaway property-burners, a whisky-drinking mob, and starving citizens, with their wives and children.⁴

On his first day in the Crescent City, Butler quickly cleared an obstreperous but unarmed mob by dispatching a battery of the 6th Maine, bugles blaring, clattering down Canal Street. From then on, Butler never again had to call out the troops to keep order in the restive city. When a New Orleans fire-eater tore down the U.S. flag over the mint, Butler simply had the miscreant hanged --from a gallows facing the same mint. (Butler might have pointed out that he was only replying in kind. As Butler's men first landed, an German immigrant rashly shouted "Hurrah for the old flag!" He was shot to death and a mob flung his battered body into the river.) The next month, Butler forbade the churches of the city to observe a day of fasting and prayer "in obedience to some supposed proclamation by one Jefferson Davis,". He later burned down the neighboring town of Alexandria when nearby guerrillas fired on his troop transports, and held local citizens hostage against any such further attacks. Butler also made it a point to censor offending local journals and sold off a press whose owner was absent and serving in the Confederate Army. Butler put under house arrest at least one journalist, the editor of the rabidly pro-Confederate religious journal *La Propagateur Catholique*.⁵ (Again, it could be argued that Butler was simply following established local custom: censorship of abolition journals and books had been common in the ante-bellum South.)

Unfortunately, there was always a whiff of corruption about Butler's Military Government of New Orleans. (In that way, Butler and New Orleans might be said to have been made for each other.) There can be little doubt that General Butler's brother, COL A. J. Butler, engaged in what was, at least technically, the smuggling of goods from the city across Union lines and into rebel territory in exchange for cotton, and with the full knowledge and probably participation of General Butler himself.⁶ A special agent sent down to New Orleans by the State Department to referee Butler's disputes with foreign consuls reported a "state of fraud and corruption...without parallel in the history of the country."⁷ Of course, it may also be that the Butlers were simply going along with the traditionally flexible commercial morals of the Crescent City, and it could argued that this trade helped the economic life of the city.⁸ Any such help was certainly needed; for all of this real or imagined peculation, Butler's one main tangible failure at New Orleans was in restoring the city's economic life to any real health, although he did strengthen the local currency by driving out Confederate bills.⁹

Nonetheless, it was Butler's notorious "woman order," or "female order," that earned him New Orleans' undying opprobrium. It seems that the ladies of New Orleans were indulging in hissing at the occupying troops and by numerous other non-physical means expressing their disdain for the Union. General Butler thereupon issued a proclamation that should be quoted in full:

As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter when any female shall by word, gesture, or movement insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.¹⁰

Butler shrewdly reasoned that imprisoning such "females" would simply turn them into popular martyrs and rallying points against his regime. However, the Mayor of New Orleans realized that such an order would inflame the volatile city and he protested to Butler that he could not be responsible for the peace of the city if the order stood. Butler replied that if things had indeed come to such a pass, then the mayor himself would have to be lodged in the city jail for his own protection; that municipal worthy muted his protests and continued to discharge his duties from his office.¹¹

Nonetheless, a howl of protest went up that reached far beyond New Orleans, and a price was put upon "Beast Butler's head."¹² Butler was even denounced on the floor of the British Parliament's House of Commons by no less than Prime Minister Viscount Palmerston ("infamous, Sir, an Englishman must blush to think that such an act has been committed by one belonging to the Anglo-Saxon race.")¹³ Butler could point out in response that no woman of New Orleans really was ever abused by his troops. After all, he reasoned, U.S. troops were gentlemen, and as such never consorted with women of the streets. Like Scott, Butler backed up his theories and proclamations by action: four Union troopers found looting were speedily hanged. On the other hand, for all the brouhaha raised by his hanging of the flag desecrator, he also pardoned six convicted Confederate parole breakers who had merited death by all the contemporary rules of war.

Butler pressured various businesses and individuals of financial worth but doubtful loyalty to "donate" monies ranging from \$200 to as much as \$100,000 for poor relief in New Orleans.¹⁴ Journals made much of his undoubted good work in feeding the poor from such imposts on Confederate supporters and speculators.¹⁵ Butler dabbled in trying to divide rich from poor in his charitable activities, bombastically denouncing "the wealthy and influential, the leaders of the rebellion," who had "gotten up this war" to the great misery of "the industrious and good."¹⁶ His mouthpiece, the seized journal *Delta* crowed:

The poor must be employed and fed, and you must disgorge. It will never do to have it said, that while you lie back on cushioned divans, tasting turtle, and sipping the wine cup, dressed in fine linen, and rolling in lordly

carriages -that gaunt hunger stalked in the once busy streets, and poverty flouted its rags for the want of the privilege to work.¹⁷

For once, no scandal adhered to Butler in a financial matter. He reported to the Secretary of War that he had been distributing \$70,000 worth of food per month to needy families, \$2,000 per month to the support of five widows' and orphan's asylums and \$500 a month to the Charity Hospital, although he insisted that more was still needed.¹⁸

Butler certainly cleaned up a city that even at that time and area was known for its lack of sanitary provisions; for the first time in its long and colorful history, the dreaded "Yellow Jack" (yellow fever) kept its distance, a development "as gratifying as it was unexpected.", in the words of one Army medical officer.¹⁹ Even a venomously anti-Butler diarist later termed Butler "the best scavenger we ever had among us."²⁰ It must also be remembered that New Orleans still faced military pressure from Confederate forces at that time and Butler had to keep his rear area pacified. The Military Governor, in fact, had to recall his troops from Baton Rouge in August 1862, and that capital was not reoccupied until after he left Louisiana.²¹ Still, a more "sensitive" military governor might have accomplished most of Butler's good works without the tumults and broils that attended this military governor's rule and might have turned this sophisticated, morally-pliable, commercial metropolis (which had only barely voted for succession) into something of a Unionist stronghold. Indeed, most citizens of New Orleans found little enough to complain about in their city's military government, only about the person of "Beast Butler", but in a city and a section of the nation brought up on myths in which perception was nine-tenths of reality, that was enough.²² It is probably no coincidence that Louisiana's was the longest and most bloody "reconstruction" of the former Confederate states.²³ Finally, Butler also had no end of correspondence and controversy with the city's foreign consuls, who protested any seeming infringement of their nationals' commercial prerogatives or of their own diplomatic immunities.²⁴ Diplomatic protests probably had as much as anything else to do with his removal in December.²⁵ In all, Butler took a city that one of its own journals testified "has been at the disposal of the most godless, brutal, ignorant, and ruthless ruffians the world has ever heard of", and cleaned it up, fed the destitute and generally gave it a government better and more fair than anything it had suffered under previously. According to one authority on Butler, "He fed the hungry of all races and treated Negroes so well that blacks and whites of the poorer classes spoke highly of him for many years after the Civil War ended."²⁶

Most surprisingly, civilians had not seen the last of General Butler or his troops after that General's New Orleans MG. In November of 1864 the Lincoln administration, fearing that Confederate agents might attempt to disrupt the national elections of that year, dispatched a sizable contingent of troops, under Butler, to New York City. That metropolis seemed the enemy's most likely target, as it contained a large number of persons disaffected from the war, who were violently anti-Black, and who had, in fact ignited the bloodiest civil disturbance in American history, the anti-draft riots of the summer of 1863. Nonetheless, the city remained calm throughout the elections, probably due to the presence of Butler and his force. Nonetheless, two Confederate agents (who had, coincidentally, taken hotel rooms just above Butler's headquarters) used "Greek Fire" to ignite 13 major hotels, as well as amusement places and several ships at the Hudson River wharves. The

destruction amounted to \$400,000 and caused widespread panic, but the elections had already taken place in peace. Butler had also called in Wall Street financiers and personally excoriated them for their gold speculations, which were harming the war effort. (These persons of substance might well have questioned the sincerity of Butler-the-speculator in such matters.) On the other hand, after his experience in New Orleans, Butler must have been indeed gratified to receive the plaudits from a committee composed of the "loyal citizens" of New York, and to be wined and dined by the city elite, although the pleasure was soon spoiled by the demand within a few days for the immediate departure of his troops.²⁷

The "moderate" viewpoint toward the South was personified by MG George B. McClellan whose orders to his troops followed remarkably closely those of General Scott one war earlier: "Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights."²⁸ Of course, McClellan had a "political agenda" in that he was a Democrat adherent who may have personally disliked slavery but who detested abolitionists even more. He was inclined to give Southerners the benefit of the doubt over any "black Republican," including the President himself.

It was to sort out these contending viewpoints that President Lincoln, at the urging of General Henry Halleck, Commander in Chief of the Union Army, appointed in 1862 a commission to draw up a code of conduct for his armies in the field. The principal civilian member of that commission was Dr. Franz Lieber, professor of history and political science at Columbia University, compiler of the *Encyclopedia Americana* and perhaps the most distinguished academic in the land. The Lieber Commission drew up the *Code of War for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field*, which, in turn, was adopted by the Army as GO 100, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*. Although it was indeed entitled General Order 100, the Army published it as merely "information," and enforcement thus varied between commands. Nonetheless GO 100 did lay down parameters for the civilized treatment of Southerners by the Union Army in the field and through Military Government. Just as importantly, Lieber's work was the first known official codification in any country of the laws of war, building upon the works of the 17th century jurist Hugo Grotius and other scholars, whose works held no official standing.²⁹

Lieber was no cloistered academic spinning theories divorced from battleground reality, although his code was indeed criticized at the time as "academic," "diffuse" or "deficient." He had actually been a 15-year old soldier at Waterloo and had gone on to fight as a volunteer in the Greek war for independence. In Lieber's words: "I knew war as a soldier, as a wounded man in the hospital, as an observing citizen." This new conflict also touched him personally. Each of his three sons fought in the war. One, who had taken up residence in the south was killed while fighting for the Confederacy, while another lost an arm in Union Army service.³⁰ Although GO 100 faced up to the stern necessities of war, it also breathed a spirit of humanity that was very much a part of the century's new spirit of humanitarianism and "improvement." It is worth quoting at some length:

[I]t is incumbent upon those who administer [martial law] to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity -- virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men. (Sec. I, 4).

All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense. (I, 44).

The most quoted passage of the code asserts that "Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God." (I, 15). Lieber did not dodge the fact that he was dealing with war, however: "A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all public moveable property until further direction by its government, and sequesters for its own benefit or that of its government all the revenues of real property belonging to the hostile government or nation." I, 31. Even private property was not exempt from the right of an occupying army to "tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, lands, boats or ships, and the churches, for temporary and military uses." (I, 37).

Lieber's code also applied as much to military government as to the field of battle. Section I, 39, for example, authorized the continued payment of the salaries of "civil officers of the hostile government who remain in the invaded territory, and continue the work of their office,"³¹ Finally, it should be noted that GO 100 was basically drawn up to give Union commanders a legal recourse between the demands of Radical politicians demanding something like extirpation of the "rebels," and the requirements of foreign consuls, as for example those in New Orleans, punctiliously demanding of their rights in international law. The great fear of the Lincoln administration was that of foreign intervention in the war, which could well mean the loss of the Southern states. Union commanders now knew how far they could go in their military government policies. Even Confederate civil and military leaders paid a back-handed tribute to the Code when they contrasted its theoretical magnanimity with the supposed actual "barbarism" of Union forces in the territories they occupied. In a sort of "apostolic succession," the Lieber Code formed the basis of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, while the Army incorporated the principles of the Lieber Code in each of its successive *Rules of Land Warfare*, particularly those of 1914 and 1940. By the turn of the century, the Lieber Code had become almost sacrosanct among Army officers.³²

Almost no area of the South was untouched by U.S. Army military government. Probably the most successful of such regimes was that of Andrew Johnson, appointed military governor of his native Tennessee by President Lincoln. When no member of the Nashville City Council would take the oath of allegiance to the United States, Johnson had them all removed and replaced by Union men. Johnson also banished or jailed, incommunicado, clergymen of secessionist sympathies, and proved ruthless toward those suspected of actively supporting the Confederate cause. He made teachers, preachers, government officers, and citizens take the oath of allegiance, put the press and the pulpit under military control, levied taxes and raised troops. Johnson proceeded to jail the stubborn preacher. He also took possession of and even rebuilt the railroads.³³ On the other hand, he refrained from confiscating the property of Southern sympathizers or those

of doubtful loyalty, and kept the city functioning. This selective mildness paid dividends when Nashville was besieged by Confederate forces in November, 1862. Johnson, personally leading the defense of the city, was now supported by most of his fellow citizens. Nashville held firm and the state was eventually cleared of rebels and reentered the Union.³⁴

By contrast, President Lincoln ordered MG Ulysses Grant to install MG Stephen A. Hurlburt of Illinois in command of Memphis, Tennessee. Hurlburt was an incompetent, near-alcoholic, corrupt, political general of strong Republican views who, nonetheless, somehow enjoyed the President's patronage. The President wished to remove Hurlburt from his disastrous field command and to exploit Republican support for Hurlburt in the West. The predictable result was disaster, as MG Hurlburt plunged into the illegal cotton trade, solicited bribes for lucrative offices, and actually ran an extortion ring headed by his Provost Marshal that, medieval-like, ransomed their captives for a price. Removed on grounds of inefficiency, MG Hurlburt appealed to Lincoln, who again came to the rescue of his protégé and reassigned him to the command of New Orleans! There Hurlburt, ever true to form, set up a new cotton ring that did serious damage to the government of Union Louisiana.³⁵

Military governors occasionally removed local officials in the areas of operations, although usually for arguably good cause.³⁶ More dubiously, military governors and officers also interfered with local and state elections: General Nathaniel P. Banks ordered that in forthcoming Louisiana elections:

Those who have exercised or are entitled to the rights of citizens of the United States will be required to participate in the measures necessary for the re-establishment of civil government....Indifference will be treated as a crime and faction as treason.³⁷

In one Kentucky town Army officials were to see to it "that none but loyal persons either acted as election judges or voted and that no disloyal person was a candidate." A military government officer went even further in Missouri, declaring that "voting contrary to orders is a military offense."(!)³⁸

Military courts, or military-dominated courts, functioned throughout occupied Southern areas. These consisted of military commissions and provost courts. The former were consciously patterned on the courts established by General Scott in Mexico and were recognized by acts of Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court and the President. Composed of from three to five military officers, they tried offenses against military law and the regulations of the military government involved.³⁹ Even where civilian courts still functioned, they could nonetheless be under the authority of the local military commander or military governor. For example, in General Butler's Louisiana, the civilian courts were directed to dismiss all actions involving Army or Navy officers, and in that state a provisional court was established in which all officers from the judge down were on the War Department payroll. Eventually, however, if for no other reason than that the enormous number of cases on the military court dockets, civil courts gradually emerged, although there would be conflict between civil and military jurists to the end of military government.⁴⁰

These Army courts could do little to end or even control the cotton speculation and outright thievery so rampant at a time of "cotton famine," when northern or foreign markets would pay premium prices for any of the staple they could get. Confederate-owned cotton was confiscable, while that held by individual citizens of the South was, in theory, not. By one means or another, public or private, however, remuneration from sales of confiscated cotton found its way by various subterfuges into the pockets of Union Army officers, from Generals Butler, Banks and Hurlburt on down. The Congressional Commission investigating corruption in military government in the Trans-Mississippi West concluded that many officials, civilian and military had engaged in "gross misconduct."⁴¹ Indeed, the foundations of what came to be considered the uniquely corrupt practices of the Reconstruction South were well and truly laid in certain large jurisdictions of the war-time occupied Southern states.⁴²

It is almost impossible to imagine military government without press censorship and Union commanders frequently interfered with journalistic freedom. General Fre'mont, after establishing martial law in Missouri, silenced two St. Louisans for making what he deemed false statements on military matters, while military governors frequently suppressed the circulation of newspapers and journals printed in the North but carrying articles unfavorable to the prosecution of the war.⁴³ The Union command at Memphis went further. Dissatisfied with the pro-Confederate biases of the local journals, these officers simply started their own paper, the *Union Appeal*, which lasted for all of two months. Even under military pressure, the surviving Memphan journals, somewhat more circumspectly, retained their rebel sentiments.⁴⁴

Some military governors did not even draw a line at the regulating of matters spiritual, occasionally informing ministers what they could or not preach or pray about. The most common source of trouble was the calling down of divine blessings upon Confederate States of America President, Jefferson Davis, while conspicuously omitting such invocations for President Lincoln and his Cabinet. General Butler while commanding at Norfolk, removed and imprisoned an offending Presbyterian cleric, and in St. Louis the Army deposed another minister because "he had a rebel wife, rebel relations and expressed rebel sentiments."⁴⁵ When Methodist Episcopal Bishop Richard Wilmer recommended that prayers for the President and "all in civil authority" be dropped because no one should pray for a continuation of military rule, General George Thomas, although a deeply religious man, ordered the bishop suspended, as well as all who followed his guidance. In this case an outcry, North and South, caused Thomas to repeal his offensive order.⁴⁶

The most extensive activities of U.S. Army military government during the Civil War in the South, however, concerned the economy and the details of local government. Military personnel collected local taxes as well as special levies. In Chattanooga, the occupying Union forces, concerned about the fire hazard presented by a host of temporary wooden military structures, organized fire fighting companies. To provide water, Army Engineers built a reservoir and installed a steam pumping engine, and an ingenious engineer devised a scheme whereby civilian customers could tap into the pipeline, but still leave enough waterpower for a government grist mill. With the end of the war, the waterworks and a military iron rolling mill were sold to private investors, the military fire-fighting equipment and a military-erected bridge across the Tennessee River given outright to the

city.⁴⁷ Arguably, many Southern jurisdictions, certainly New Orleans, experienced with their military occupation in the midst of America's most destructive and bitter conflict often better government and general order and certainly improved public services than in their mythic ante-bellum years.

At Vicksburg, MGs James B. McPherson and later N. T. Dana imposed controls on inflation and profiteering, set prices for staples, established a provost martial court for minor offenses, imposed rent control and distributed food to the destitute through two civilian humanitarian agencies, the Western Sanitary Commission and the Northwestern Freedmens' Aid Society. Both the city's health officer and the streets commissioner were Army officers, and Army unit details handled law enforcement.

The freedmen of Vicksburg, however, found their conditions seemingly almost as onerous as under slavery. They specifically were not permitted out at night unless they carried written official permission, could not remain in the city without a letter of employment and were the only local people banished for anything but disloyalty. In defense of these measures it could be noted that Vicksburg was the center of a great influx of runaway and freed blacks, and the city's food and shelter was distinctly limited after its 47-day siege. It was also apparent, however, that some higher-ranking Union Army officers at Vicksburg were not above peddling licenses to reopen business, garnering hundreds of dollars on any one transaction.⁴⁸

Overall, certainly the most persisting of the civil problems facing the U.S. Army in the South was in its dealing with the slaves/contraband/freedmen. Just as various Union Army commanders differed widely in their attitudes toward Confederate civilians, so did their reactions to the hordes of runaway slaves who flocked to their lines and anticipated freedom. Some, reasoning that the war was being fought to suppress secession, not slavery, promptly returned runaways. During the spring of 1861, no less than 20 Union generals caught and returned escaped slaves, even permitting military camps to be searched by slave-catchers. BG William Harney asserted that he would as soon hear of the abolition of private property as that of slavery. Various orders from the Secretary of War and Congressional enactments, however, reflecting an increasing understanding of just how valuable the slaves were to the enemy war effort, provoked a change of attitude. General Butler's classifying of them as "Contraband of War" provided a concise means of justifying the retention of runaways and putting them to compensated work, first as laborers, then many as soldiers.⁴⁹ In fact, some labor-hungry Union commanders actually hunted down unattached blacks to put to paid labor in what even so must almost have seemed like the African slave-hunts of old.⁵⁰

Secretary of War Stanton spelled out for General Butler the Lincoln administration's current attitude toward the freed blacks at the time:

under the law of Congress they cannot be sent back to their masters; that in common humanity they must not be permitted to suffer for want of food, shelter, and other necessaries of life; that, to this end they should be provided for by the Quartermasters and Commissary Departments; and that those who are capable of labor should be set to work and paid reasonable wages

but Stanton was careful to follow administration policy by noting that "In directing this to be done, the President does not mean, at present, to settle any general rule in respect to slaves or slavery."⁵¹

The Army's first, and ultimately most successful, large-scale effort to deal with the freed blacks in any systematic manner took place along the South Carolina coast, where more than 15,000 blacks had congregated by late 1861. MG William T. Sherman divided the area into districts, over which he placed an agent, solely responsible for contraband affairs. Freed blacks were put to work on abandoned plantations, the produce shipped north and the proceeds retained for the workers' benefit. Groups of four or five plantations held 300 to 500 people. Civilian Army agents visited the plantations and saw that their workers obtained seed, implements and mules. The agents explained what was expected of them, what payments they would likely receive and to the disbursement of such payments, and generally kept abreast of the Freedmen's' conditions. Each refugee cultivator received two acres for his own use, for which he paid no rent, but which he was obliged to cultivate enough to pay his way. By the end of 1864 the military commander, BG Saxon, reported that the system was self-operating and self-sustaining and that he had nothing more to do with it than to see that the freedmen had written contracts of which he approved and to regulate the policing and sanitary arrangements of the area.⁵²

Although President Lincoln had told him merely to "get along" in matters of race, MG Butler should be credited as the first Army officer to give legal force to the status of the runaway slaves by famously terming them "contraband of war" who by rendering great aid to the Confederacy must be removed from enemy control and themselves controlled. He later personally raised three black regiments from runaway slaves and freemen well before this became War Department policy.⁵³ When Confederate forces compelled the evacuation of Baton Rouge and for a time seemed to threaten New Orleans itself, Butler wrote Stanton that "If it becomes at all imminent, I shall call upon Africa to intervene."⁵⁴ He set the hordes of runaways, about 150,000 in all, to compensated work in abandoned plantations outside the city, and forwarded to President Lincoln the first barrel of sugar ever produced by free men in Louisiana. No less than 50,000 adult male contrabands of war took work on 1500 estates, helping to feed New Orleans, and earning money by exporting cotton to the North and to Great Britain. All had to work and support themselves; as along the Carolina coast, the Army would only supervise their conditions of work and their contracts. Butler and his successor, MG Banks, also saw to the education of 10,000 black children in 100 schools and ordered city authorities to permit blacks to ride on the streetcars and to testify against whites in court. Banks, in fact, promulgated a "work or fight" order that required unemployed male blacks either to join the army or be bound out to work the privately-owned, confiscated plantations of departed Confederates. (There was no such requirement for White males in the area.)⁵⁵

In 1863, General U.S. Grant detailed an army chaplain to superintend "contraband" numbering about 113,000 in his camps and putting them to work throughout a vast area encompassing Mississippi, Western Tennessee and Kentucky and all of western Louisiana. All able-bodied freedmen were then ordered to pick standing cotton on abandoned plantations, while Union officers would instruct them on the meaning of their labor contracts, answer questions and oversee the signing of those contracts. These freedmen would be working for subsistence wages with their earnings channeled, if they worked for



Freedmen performing compensated labor on the U.S. Military Railroad, Civil War. USASOC History Archives

the government, into a general fund supporting the entire refugee population, or, if in private employment, paid out in food and clothing --as in the days of slavery. To make the analogy even closer, most of these freedmen worked in gangs in the field.⁵⁶ Grant's appointment of a chaplain for this work, however, is indicative of his belief that more was involved than just mobilizing these people for compensated work for his army; they were to be trained to become responsible and hard-working (although one would have imagined that they would have been familiar enough with hard work).⁵⁷ Grant's agents tried to keep contraband families together, and soon also became police, judges and arbitrators in setting wages and conditions of labor. Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas expanded on Grant's scheme, leasing abandoned camps to qualified contraband. Each was to be paid (\$7 per month for a man, \$5 per month for a woman) with deductions for any clothing issued. In addition, Thomas instituted a tax on these wages to provide for the children and those unable to work, an early and localized "social security system" several decades before Chancellor Otto von Bismarck instituted his program in Germany. Army officers worked with a number of civilian aid groups, such as the Cleveland Freedmen's Aid society, which had the advantage of being able to move about without specific orders. Taxes on cotton and produce financed the general program. In fact, the Army never had to call upon any government funding for its work with the contraband in these projects. Provost marshals were organized as supervisors of freedmen, and patrolled the countryside, to correct abuses on the plantations.

It was a thoroughly paternalistic system. As in other U.S. Army-run jurisdictions in the South, all able-bodied freedmen had to have a job; those found idle were put to work on public projects without pay, and a system of passes was instituted about as strict as anything in slavery days.⁵⁸ Just as in slavery days, blacks put considerably more into the economic system that they took out. To take one well-documented example, General Grant's original command in the West:

Of the 113,650 freedmen cared for by Colonel Eaton [in?] 1863, but 7,200 were paupers and they were cultivating 1500 acres of cotton besides almost as many more of corn and vegetables. An additional 7,000 acres were leased and managed by the negroes. By this labor the government was saved nearly \$43,000 a month. The following year, the gain must have been considerably greater for the negroes cultivated over 100,000 acres of cotton besides thousands of acres in corn and garden truck.⁵⁹

There can be little doubt that the Army or its agents literally saved the lives of tens of thousands of freedmen as well as southern white civilians during the Civil War, and would continue to do in the post-war decade or more. For all the bumbling and insensitivity or even chicanery of General Butler and a few other Union commanders, the Army also gave work and even a measure of dignity to these oppressed people. As for military government itself during the war, it was no worse than could have been expected in the midst of America's most terrible war, and in a significant number of cases, even better. Nonetheless, Americans traditionally have detested military government, even by their own. Inhabitants of the conquered South would soon suffer more such "tyranny" than even they could have imagined.⁶⁰

¹James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*. (New York, Oxford: 1988), 352-353.

²Jacob E. Conner, *The Development of Belligerent Occupation*, Studies in Sociology, Economics, Politics, and History, University of Iowa (Iowa City: 1918), 56-57.

³Daugherty and Andrews, 98; McPherson, 501; John C. Ropes, *The Army Under Pope* (New York: 1881), 10-11. Scott had requested that the U.S. Military Academy teach a course on the rules of war, but had been rebuffed; according to the Academy's Superintendent, the curriculum was already over-loaded. Frank Friedel, "General Orders 100 and Military Government: Rules for Occupying Armies Formulated in U.S. Civil War", *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 32 (March 1946), 500.

⁴GO No. 25, in Butler, *Correspondence*, 9 May 1862, vol. 1; *Official Records*, Series I, vol. 6, page 724. Note again the plural case for "United States" even for a fervent Unionist like Butler. This order was no isolated example. The following month, in Special Order No. 99, he exhorted his troops to "Go on as you have begun, true to your New England training and her religious influences, showing the men and women of the South that where our bayonets are, there are peace, quiet, liberty, safety, and order under the law." *Correspondence*, vol. 1. See also Chester G. Hearn, *When the Devil Came Down to Dixie: Ben Butler in New Orleans* (Baton Rouge: 1997).

⁵Ibid; Gerald M. Capers, *Occupied City: New Orleans Under the Federals, 1862-1865*. (Lexington, Kentucky: 1965), 177-178; Howard Palmer Johnson, "New Orleans Under General Butler," *The Louisiana Historical Quarterly* (April 1941), 471. Death sentence approval by Butler in Butler Papers, 14 May 1862, carton 12; David M. Nellis, "'The Damned Rascal': Benjamin Butler in New Orleans," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, vol. 12, No. 5 (August 1973), 4.

⁶Capers, 165. For Butler's closing down of the *Picayune*, see his Special Order No. 235, of 31 July 1862, in Butler, *Correspondence*, vol. 1

⁷Howard P. Nash, Jr., *Stormy Petrel: The Life and Times of General Benjamin F. Butler, 1818-1893* (Rutherford, Madison, Teaneck, New Jersey), 148, 154, 155 "The Administration of General Benjamin F. Butler while in Command of the Department of the Gulf, Final Report of Corruption in the South," 145-149. See also special appendix to Palmer, "New Orleans Under General Butler," 532-536, on the matter. Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon Chase, wrote Butler of "So many and surprisingly well-founded charges against your brother, Colonel Butler.", Chase to Butler, 29 October 1862, Butler, *Correspondence*, vol. 2.

⁸This argument is used by Capers, 170-171. RG 393, entry 1773, box #14, Department of the Gulf, Special Commission to Investigate Corruption in the Department of the Gulf, Mar-Apr 1865. Report to Stanton, 24 /4/85 "abundant evidence has since been furnished to prove that officers of the U.S. Government here employed their stations in oppression, peculation and plunder." Admiral Farragut, while commanding the U.S. Navy Gulf Squadron, complained of Butler that "His policy is allowing vessels to clear from New Orleans with merchandise, and his efforts generally to restore traffic, caused many adventurers to flock hither, and under the semblance of loyalty, abuse their privilege." But

note that Farragut stopped short of accusing Butler of personally profiting from this trade. David G. Farragut, *Life and Letters of Admiral D. G. Farragut*, 300-301.

⁹Butler, General Order No. 30, 19 May 1862, in *Correspondence*, vol. 1; Palmer, "New Orleans Under General Butler," 482-485.

¹⁰*Official Records*, Series I, vol 15, page 426. Also Nash, *Stormy Petrel*, 158-170. Why the well-educated Butler used the term "avocation," meaning part-time profession, instead of the "vocation" he meant, is unclear and has never even been remarked upon. (When quoting his famous order in a private letter, Butler did change the usage to "vocation.", Butler to J. G. Carney, 2 July 1862, *Correspondence*, vol. 2. Butler gave an indication of the origin of his order when he pointed out in the same letter that "When I passed through Baltimore on the 23d of February last, members of my staff were insulted by the gestures of the ladies there. Not so in New Orleans." *ibid*.)

¹¹Butler, *Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 498; Nash, 163.

¹²Butler's military occupation is dealt with, in a totally favorable light, by his contemporary James Parton, *History of the Administration of the Department of the Gulf in the Year 1862....* (Boston: 1866). As the partisan Parton wrote of the "female order": "Why, indeed should he permit his brave and virtuous New England soldiers to be insulted by these, silly, vulgar creatures, spoiled by contact with slavery?" 328. A considerably less favorable evaluation is in Martin and Joan Kyre, *Military Occupation and National Security* (Washington: 1968), 111-113. Butler himself wrote to a college classmate, now a New York editor, that his troops had to pass through "she adder(s)," and boasted that "A woman can walk alone from Chalmette to Carrolton, through New Orleans, at any hour, day or night, free from molestation or insult by citizens or soldiers. Can you say as much, oh, most Virtuous Editors, of New York?" Butler, *Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 83.

¹³MacPherson, 552. Butler, ever the student of the law, gleefully pointed out that his "female order" was almost a verbatim copy of a London ordinance. Nash, 165. Of course, Butler had his death threats, one in particular issued from the "President" of something entitled "The Council of Ten.": "And then, villainous coward, let your minions look to themselves, for we shall have ten lives for every act of aggression." Butler, *Correspondence*, vol. 1, entry for 13 July 1862.

¹⁴Protests of New Orleans merchants are found in Butler MS, Library of Congress, box 14, "August 1862" folder. Butler gave particulars of his exactions to Secretary of State William Steward on 26 August 1862. Butler, *Correspondence*, vol. 2. His poor relief can be seen in his Special Order No. 246, of 7 August 1862, *ibid*. See Nash, *Stormy Petrel*, 152; Palmer, "New Orleans Under General Butler," 476. On the other hand, if General Butler deemed a merchant loyal, he could be sympathetic and corrective. See plea of Cincinnati billiard table manufacturer, whose New Orleans agent had decamped and joined the Confederates, that his shut-up premises not be confiscated. J. M. Brunswick to Butler, 27 August 1862, Butler MS, box 14.

¹⁵See, for example New Orleans "Commission of Relief, Report No. 47," 31 July 1863, RG 393, pt I, Entry 1920, Department of the Gulf, Records Received, Bureau of Civil Affairs, 1863, box No.4.

¹⁶Butler, *Correspondence*, vol. 1, 442-443.

¹⁷Quoted in Palmer, "New Orleans Under General Butler," 477.

¹⁸Johnson, "New Orleans Under General Butler," 475-476.

¹⁹*Official Records*, Ser. 1, vol. 15, p. 445. Butler claimed that only 25 had died of the disease to date in July of 1862, compared to Boston's "54 falling off in one week" in Boston's presumably more salubrious summer climate. Butler to Mrs. Butler, 15 July 1862, *Correspondence*, vol. 2.

²⁰Parton, 496. (emphasis in original). At the beginning of the Federal occupation, a local journal reported the city even more filthy than usual, its gutters brimming with "unmentionable filth," the waters in them topped with "green scum," and another spoke with classical learning of "pools of molasses, rotting and festering in the sun, from which a reek sprung up like that from the throat of Acheron," Palmer, "General Butler in New Orleans," 477, 478. See also Sanford E. Chaille, "The Yellow Fever, Sanitary Condition, and Vital Statistics of New Orleans during its Military Occupation, the Four Years 1862-5," *The New Orleans Journal of Medicine* (July 1870).

²¹Capers, 75.

²²See Capers, *passim*; 941. Johnson also claims that New Orleans children for several generations were hushed not by tales of Blue Beard or Jack the Giant Killer, "but on tales of the Yankee fiend." [Benjamin F. Butler], *ibid.*; A. H. Carpenter, "Military Government of Southern Territory, 1861-1865," American Historical Association; D. R. Smith, "The Beast of New Orleans," *Civil War Times*, vol. 8, No. 6 (1969). Johnson, "New Orleans Under General Butler," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, 24 (1941);

²³On the other hand, Louisiana was the first and the only former Confederate state to re-enter the Union under Lincoln's moderate reconstruction, and duly sent two congressmen to the U.S. House of Representatives. John Hope Franklin, *Reconstruction After the Civil War* (Chicago and London: 1961), 15-16.

²⁴The protests of foreign consuls and Butler's lofty replies are found throughout the Butler Papers.

²⁵See Butler, *Autobiography*, vol. 1, p. 313; and his *Correspondence*, vol. 1, pp. 450, 463, 466-471, etc.

²⁶Nash, 173; Capers, 73. Butler's execution order for the looters and his commutation of the parole-breakers' death sentences are in his *Correspondence*, vol. 1, entries for 31 May and 3 and 14 June, 1862 respectively. Capers claims, without documentation that the mayor and city council of the city hoped, by not cleaning the streets "to hasten a yellow fever epidemic, which they expected to devastate the enemy." If this were indeed the case, then Butler had indeed every reason to congratulate himself on his moderation. The multifarious activities of Generals Butler and Bank's military government in New Orleans can be seen in Department of the Gulf, Bureau of Civil Affairs, Letters Received, RG 393, Pt I, Entry 1920, 1863-1865, *passim*. Perhaps the final evaluation of Butler's military government should go to a New Orleans historian: "With all his severity and crudity and tactlessness, it must be said that General Butler restored order, controlled his soldiers, and though he had no patience with those whom he considered traitors, conducted himself decently, and even kindly, toward those who were willing to admit defeat and to repent.",

Howard P. Johnson, "New Orleans Under General Butler," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* (July 1977).

²⁷Edward G. Longacre, "The Union Army Occupation of New York City, November 1864," *New York History*, vol. 65, no. 2 (1984). Longacre speculates that the Lincoln administration knew that Butler would be tough enough to face down anyone in the metropolis, "down to the lowest Tammany bully-boy," 139; Philip Van Doren Stern, comp., *Secret Missions of the Civil War* (Chicago: 1959), 201-205; 257-267; James D. Horan, *Confederate Agent: A Discovery in History* (New York: 1954), 209-210, 213-223.

²⁸Daugherty and Andrews, 95.

²⁹Frank Friedel, "General Orders 100 and Military Government: Rules for Occupying Armies Formulated in U.S. Civil War", *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 32 (March 1946), 543. There was some "institutional memory" at work here, for General Halleck had compiled a vast collection of notes on General Scott's military government in Mexico, as well as on other aspects of international law. Not without reason, he was known (not always with affection) as "Old Brains," *ibid.*, 544.

³⁰The best account of the life of Lieber is in Friedel, *Francis Lieber: Nineteenth Century Liberal* (Gloucester, Massachusetts: 1968). Quotation is from page 325; Ralph H. Gabriel, "American Experience with Military Government," *American Historical Review* (July 1944), 637-638. Criticisms of the Lieber Code are in Doris Appel Graber, *The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation* (New York: 1949), 18.

³¹U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series III, 3 (Washington: 1899), 148-154.

³²Friedel, "GO 100," 548, 553, 554. Friedel speculates that President Lincoln justified the Emancipation Proclamation by referring to the Lieber Code recognition that occupying armies may seize enemy property, public or private, for the prosecution of the war, provided such seizure does not result in great suffering to the owners., *ibid.*, 550. One authority notes that "GO 100 caused a sensation in Europe, as Prussia, France, and Great Britain all used it as a model to develop similar codes for their own armies," Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washington: 1998), 35.

³³A. H. Carpenter, *Military Government of Southern Territory*, House Document 548, pt 1-30.

³⁴Carpenter, "Military Government of Southern Territory," *American Historical Association Annual Report*, 1 (1900), 478.

³⁵Jeffrey N. Lash, "The Federal Tyrant at Memphis: General Stephen A. Hurlburt and the Union Occupation of West Tennessee, 1862-64," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring 1989).

³⁶Daugherty and Andrews, 105.

³⁷E. G. Scott, *Reconstruction during the Civil War* (Boston: 1895), 323.

³⁸Carpenter, 482.

³⁹Daugherty and Andrews, 106-107.

⁴⁰OR, I, vol. 48, page 1005; Carpenter, 485; T. W. Helis, "Of Generals and Jurists: The Judicial System of New Orleans under Occupation, May 1862 - April 1865," *Louisiana History*, vol. 29, No. 2 (1988).

⁴¹"The Organization of the State Government and the Government of the City of New Orleans," Final Report, Brady and Smith, 4. But it should be noted that trading with the Confederates was not *per se* an exercise in corruption. The Union government encouraged the purchase of the staple from whatever source until almost the end of the war in order to supply Northern and British mills and to minimize the likelihood of Great Britain intervening in the conflict. Butler's most accurate biographer renders a "negative verdict" on the charges. *Stormy Petrel*, 174.-177.

⁴²See Commission on Corrupt Practices in the South, Final Report, "Report of the Special Commission: Maj. Gen. Wm. F. Smith, & Jas. T. Brady, Esq." , 23 September 1865, RG 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1790s - 1917, entry 737.

⁴³Carpenter, 489.

⁴⁴Robert Bailey, "The 'Bogus' Memphis *Union Appeal*: A Union Newspaper in Occupied Confederate Territory," *West Tennessee Historical Society Papers*, No. 32 (1978). Oddly, the "Bogus" *Appeal* was revived after the war, demonstrated its independence, and remains today, as the *Commercial Appeal*., *ibid.*

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 488.

⁴⁶Sefton, 57-58.

⁴⁷G. E. Govan and James W. Livingood, "Chattanooga under Military Occupation, 1863-1865," *The Journal of Southern History*, vol. 17, No. 1 (February 1951).

⁴⁸J. T. Currie, "Civil Affairs Civil War Style," *Military Review* (December 1976); Currie, *Enclave: Vicksburg and Her Plantations, 1863-1870* (Jackson, Mississippi: 1980), 3-134; OR, II, vol. 6, page 776; *ibid.*, I, vol. 24, page 130; "Affairs at Vicksburg," Final Report, 173-182.

⁴⁹*Official Records*, Ser. 1, pt 4, 288; *ibid.*, pt. 1, 257, 753, 759761, 767; *ibid.*, ser. 2, pt. 1, 761, 771; *ibid.*, ser. 3, pt 2, 397, *ibid.*, ser. 2, pt 1, 774; *ibid.*, ser. 2, pt. 1, 775; *ibid.*, ser. 3, pt 5, 654, pt. 2, 275. K. Eggleston, "The Number, Care, and Disposition of the Negroes Freed by the Union Forces During the Civil War," M.A. diss., University of Wisconsin. 1929, 12. Nash, *Stormy Petrel*, 165-170.

⁵⁰OR, ser. 1, pt. 3, 31, 366, 367; *ibid.*, pt.2, 24.

⁵¹Stanton to Butler, 3 July 1862, Butler, *Correspondence*, vol. 1.

⁵²Eggleston, 122-124. General Saxton had even established a savings bank for the freedmen, which by the end of that year held \$65,000 in deposits., OR, Ser. 3, 4: 1022-1024; also Ser. 1, vol. 15, 592-595.

⁵³For his heinous crime of raising black troops, Butler was outlawed by Jefferson Davis; any officer captured leading such troops was to be put to death. *A Proclamation by the President of the Confederate States*, n.d., in Butler, *Correspondence*, vol. 2, pp. 557-562. The evidence is that Butler was reluctant to arm the blacks, preferring simply to put them to work. He forbade BG Phelps from arming the blacks in his jurisdiction, and wrote his wife the same day he issued these orders that "Phelps has gone crazy. He is organizing the

negroes into regiments, and wants me to arm them.", Butler to Phelps and Butler to Mrs. Butler, 2 August 1862; *Correspondence*, vol. 2.

⁵⁴Butler to Stanton, 14 August 1862, *Correspondence*, vol. 2.

⁵⁵For various petitions, requests, depositions and letters relating to blacks in the New Orleans area, see Department of the Gulf, Bureau of Civil Affairs, Letters Received, 1863-1865, RG 393, pt I, Entry 1920, passim. Eggleston, 114-118; Parton, 320-322 (Parton claimed that it was Butler who first ordered blacks to be allowed to ride all city streetcars.); [J. A. Marshal], *Benjamin F. Butler During the Period of the Civil War* (Norwood, Massachusetts: 1917), 2, pp. 426-427. Capers, passim; Eggleston, 115. For Butler's supposed sugar speculations, see also *Report of Joint Committee on Conduct of the War*, Senate Report No 108, Part III, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 360-362. Anything to do with MG Butler was attended with accusations of corruption and high-handedness. See final report "Freedmens Department and Negro Labor," 192-200. The report brought out that at least these freedmen were working about as hard as when under slavery.

⁵⁶Eaton, *Grant, Lincoln, and the Freedmen*, 18-29; Ronald F. Davis, "The U.S. Army and the Origins of Sharecropping in the Natchez District - A Case Study," *Journal of Negro History*, vol. 47, No. 1 (January 1977).

⁵⁷Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant* (New York: 1885-1886), vol. 1, 424-426; Davis, 64.

⁵⁸Eggleston, 105-109; *ibid.*, "The Work of the Relief Societies during the Civil War," *The Journal of Negro History* (July 1929).

⁵⁹Eggleston, "Negroes Freed by the Union Forces," 135.

⁶⁰It should be noted that at least once the heavy hand of military government, or at least interference in civil government in the North, was legally quashed. Military authorities arrested one Lambden P. Milligan, an Indianan who opposed the Lincoln administration's prosecution of the war, and held him to the end of the conflict. But soon after the war, the Supreme Court delivered itself of a landmark decision, *ex parte Milligan* (1866), which declared that Milligan had been unjustly imprisoned from the start. The state courts had been fully functioning, even if not swiftly enough for the military, and Milligan was ordered freed immediately. Thus was juridically validated the American legal principle that the military can only assume authority when the civilian government and courts are not in operation. This decision was a basic strengthening of the Constitutional principle of civilian supremacy over the military. But note that the decision came after the Union had been saved., D. Kelly, ed., "Lambdin P. Milligan's Appeal for State's Rights and Constitutional Liberty during the Civil War," *Indiana Magazine of History*, vol. 66 No. 3 (1970).

POST-CIVIL WAR RECONSTRUCTION

"Tyrant and Reformer" (Brevet Major General Charles Griffin, Texas, 1865-66)

The Army's immediate primary attention in the immediate post-war decades focused on the seemingly intractable problem of the Reconstruction of the Southern states. This attempt to change the political and social patterns of the South, as well as to police the area and protect and uplift the freedmen, lasted from 1866 to 1877, and was by far America's most long-lasting military government.¹ Imposing Reconstruction on American citizens was also the Army's most distasteful task ever. This was a unique episode in American history, for never before or since have large numbers of Americans been forced to endure the stigma of defeat and submit to military occupation and government.²

What was to have been a "moderate" reconstruction under President Lincoln's tutelage, at his untimely death became an embittering, lengthy and ultimately futile exercise in changing much of the social structure of a significant portion of the United States segregated by race, thus perpetuating a baleful system that would persist for a century, costing the South dearly.³

In May of 1865 the national government announced that Reconstruction of the southern United States would follow as much as possible a policy of establishing or retaining provisional governments until permanent ones could be elected by a loyal electorate in a step-by-step political process. The U.S. Army found itself in the middle of an intense political conflict between the Congressional Radical Republicans and "unreconstructed" Southern resistance that often turned violent. Yet at no time during Reconstruction was there any evidence that the U.S. Army called upon its extensive and successful experience with General Scott in military government during the Mexican War. Mexico, however, was a foreign nation and its military governance of little obvious relevance for the Southern states. Military government in portions of the seceded states during the Civil War might seem a closer parallel, but even here the fact that these were wartime operations caused Army officers to discount the experience.⁴ Certainly if policy-making officers or political leaders ever referred to the "Lieber Code" they have left no evidence of the fact. Legally and constitutionally also there was little or no precedent.

What they lacked in precedent, Union military governors seemed to make up for in zeal, at least in Reconstruction's early days, when everything seemed possible. Brevet Major General Joseph J. Reynolds claimed that "We must rub out and begin anew." in Texas.⁵ Thus the citizens of Little Rock, Arkansas, were prohibited vulgar language in public, their children from running about unclothed, their dogs from roaming, their horses from galloping.⁶ The Army commander at Savannah decreed that anyone picking up mail at the city post office had to present a certificate that he had

taken the oath of allegiance, while MG Henry Halleck at Richmond demanded the oath prior to any marriages. (Tongue in cheek, he reported to the Secretary of War that his measure would ensure "the propagation of legitimate rebels.")⁷


More positively, Army commanders cleaned up Southern cities, whose already rudimentary sanitary and health services had been run down during the war; initiated and supervised relief for the needy, and even saw to the restoration of destroyed railroad lines and levees. One of the more lasting efforts of military governors in the South was the establishment of public schools, often where none had existed before, certainly for blacks. More often than not, however, these establishments were and remained racially segregated.

Under the first Congressional Reconstruction enactments, the former seceded states would be governed through the five recently-created military divisions of the U.S. Army: the Atlantic, the Gulf, the Mississippi, the Tennessee and the Pacific, each administered by a Major General. This was the so-called Moderate Reconstruction advocated by the late President Lincoln and his successor, Andrew Johnson.

Apparently none of the commanding generals assigned to this unenviable work sought or desired the position. The coming years would demonstrate fully that these misgivings were not unfounded. In many ways these Reconstruction military governments, without particularly realizing it, followed policies of previous Army administrations. For example, and most significantly, loyal civil officials were to be retained in their posts upon taking the oath of office and good performance of their duties and the troops were to intrude as little as possible on the daily lives of civilians. That was the theory. In practice, the military district commander in the Columbus, Georgia area assumed many, if not most, of the functions of local government, issuing orders regarding the registration of voters and the treatment of blacks. He appointed the county registrar, selected members of the city council, preserved law and order through district provost marshals and supported the Freedmen's Bureau in its activities amongst local blacks. The bureau in the same area distributed food and clothing to the needy of both races, operated a hospital, witnessed labor contracts between the Freedmen and white planters and assisted teachers in the newly-established schools for the blacks.⁸

Each Military District commander was also involved in local and state elections through a Military Commission, headed by post commanders as "additional duties." These duties entailed the appointing of boards of registration, the registration of voters and the superintending of registration and elections in their districts.⁹

The orders issued by General J. B. Steedman are typical and instructive. First the troops themselves were exhorted to maintain strict discipline, while preventing insults to the national authority. His command's duty was to assist the state governor or his agents as well as federal agents in any way necessary for the performance of their duties. It was further to "sustain, not assume, the functions of the civil authority," except as a last resource, to preserve peace and quiet. No citizen would be arrested without due process. Those who were arrested were to be held in military custody until "duly authorized" civil courts could dispose of the cases. In addition, aid was to be given to the Freedmen's Bureau, plantations were not to force ill or aged



A Reconstruction confrontation. National Archives

former slaves off their property and, as during the war, the able-bodied blacks were warned not to remain idle.¹⁰

Soon enough, the more energetic and committed military governors found themselves involved in the broils and tumults that so characterized the Southern states in the wake of their lost war. In Texas, for example, BvMG Charles Griffin drove Governor James W. Throckmorton from office. General Nathan Banks removed the mayor of New Orleans for allegedly conniving with the Governor to supplant good Unionists with unreconstructed rebels and appointed in his stead an officer (white) of the 73d Colored Infantry. When General Banks departed his duties, his successor then reappointed the original mayor.¹¹ In 1868 MG Winfield Scott Hancock removed nine members of the city council "two white and seven colored, for contempt of the orders of the military commander...", an action upheld by General Grant, Army Commanding General.¹² In Richmond the Army simply nullified an election because too many unpardoned rebels had been elected.¹³ General John Pope, commander of the Third Military District, was the most committed Radical Republican of all the Army commanders (and perhaps still smarting from the beating he had received from Confederate forces at the Battle of Second Manassas or Bull Run). General Pope, upon taking office, averred that "it is surely better to have an incompetent but loyal man in office, than to have a rebel of whatever ability," and began liberally to remove office holders who displeased him. He attempted to stifle uncooperative newspapers by withholding federal contracts. On the other hand, Pope saw to it that those same papers, if they could survive economically, were also free to excoriate the general and all his actions.¹⁴

Few aspects of military government in the Southern states caused more complications than the operation of the courts system. Although these were states that had attempted to secede from the American Union, their citizens certainly remained American in their recourse to the courts, and the Army found itself in the middle of such litigiousness. In the Department of Texas, typical cases ranged from insurrection and attendant murder, to possession of children born to unmarried slave parents, to garden-variety burglary, theft and, of course, murder.¹⁵ Cases in southern property rights proved particularly troublesome, many dating back to before the war, but even more involved "abandoned," "confiscatable," and "captured" property and the differences between these terms as determined by the various military governors. General Terry in Virginia, impatient with the interminable delays in the state courts over these questions, simply extended the jurisdiction of Richmond's Court of Conciliation over the entire state, at great saving in time and money, but at some cost in legal exactitude.

Cotton represented one of the greatest temptations in those disturbed times, as it had during the war. The staple was in great demand in the North and in Europe because of the Union blockade strangling of Confederate exports during the war. Confederate government supplies were subject to confiscation, and large amounts simply went missing from official inventories as they made their way to the ports with the connivance of venal officials. However, none of the highest-ranking Army officers seem to have been involved in these illicit transactions.¹⁶ Nonetheless, the War Department finally reined in military involvement in property cases after a lower-

ranking Georgia military government officer became entangled in a case concerning 10,000 bales of cotton.¹⁷

The Southern court systems were endemically biased against blacks, whether as defendants, as witnesses, or against those brave enough to be plaintiffs or complainants. Not all of this attitude was based on malice. One Texas judge, apparently in all honesty, inquired of the state's Freedmen's Bureau assistant commissioner as to whether blacks could really use courts and give testimony against whites. As a result, the Freedmen's Bureau operated its own courts, usually a one-man panel composed of the local Bureau agent, having jurisdiction over minor legal matters between blacks or between blacks and whites. Bureau courts sentences could often be more harsh than those handed down in similar situations by civil courts. These courts were particularly enjoined to assume jurisdiction for any civil courts that refused to accept black evidence. Those that did found ways around Bureau oversight, scheduling court outlandishly far from the residences of black plaintiffs or witnesses, then dismissing the cases when the latter did not appear, "settling" cases out of court, and often using sheer local intimidation.¹⁸ Whites, on the other hand, firmly believed that they were the objects of discrimination and intimidation, as well as of the wholesale violation of states rights. For them, the Army and the Bureau were denying civil rights to whites in order to guarantee them to blacks. Military commissions also could hang civilians on a two-thirds vote of the panel, and neither the commissions nor the Bureau courts provided for trial by jury.¹⁹ Finally, the Bureau took a hand in reforming punishments as well, mandating that it was "the duty...of the Freedmen's Bureau to prohibit and prevent [the] whipping or maiming of the person as a punishment for any crime, misdemeanor, or offense, by any pretended civil or military authority in any State lately in rebellion until the civil government of such State shall have been restored..."²⁰

If the administration of the courts system proved one of the most complex problem faced by military governors, undoubtedly the most intractable was that of dealing with the South's black citizens. The Army was called upon to change in some basic ways a system of racial suppression that had prevailed for something like two centuries. The Army was generally conscientious in ensuring blacks their civil rights and in providing the enforcement for the work of the Freedmen's Bureau, thus earning the opprobrium of most Southerners. Its dealings with the Freedmen's Bureau itself were fraught with misunderstanding and confusion, understandable enough with a non-military organization that was an agency of the War Department and which had its own court system.²¹ Most Army commanders took it upon themselves to issue rather strict injunctions against black vagabondage and unemployment, measures that were then picked up by the civilian legislators in the form of the infamous "Black Codes," which attempted to keep the former slaves in a form of peonage.²²

In the spring of 1865 Congress had established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands under the War Department, and headed by General Oliver Otis Howard, a Regular Army officer. ("Beast" Butler had been considered for the post.) Many of its agents were recently-discharged Union veterans, and, on occasion, active-duty officers would be detailed to a local branch of the Bureau. The Bureau actually became more "militarized" in its first few years. By the end of 1868,

it comprised something like 553 soldiers and 348 civilian clerks.²³ The Freedmen's Bureau was established primarily to look after the interests of the newly-freed blacks. The overwhelming majority of blacks remained remarkably non-violent, considering the degradation and atrocities routinely visited on them over the centuries of slavery.²⁴ The Bureau's first and only Commissioner later recorded flatly that his agency "became out and out an advocate of negro manhood suffrage."²⁵ Southern whites, on the other hand, remained fearful of wandering groups of blacks and looked to the Army for protection --as did blacks themselves. In his first report to the Secretary of War, MG Howard noted that "the prompt intervention of armed force in cases requiring it, and the personal sympathy of commanders...has seldom been withheld." The work of the Bureau was enormous. General Howard reported on his agency's work in its Land, Medical and Claim Divisions, on transportation, commissary supplies, destitute relief, schools ("With few exceptions, the [Southern] State authorities have refused to provide...or in fact to do anything for the relief of the class of persons supported by the government."), ("The immediate patronage and funds for this work have been mainly from the benevolent associations of the north...multitudes, usually of the lower and baser classes, still bitterly oppose our schools."), justice ("many of the States of the south regard [the Negro] yet, in their legislation, as an alien."). The Bureau was without immediate funds for most of its relief work, but it could call upon the Army itself for resources, particularly food, transportation and medical supplies. In November of 1865 it was operating 42 hospitals, and its Medical Division treated both blacks and destitute whites.

In its earliest months of existence, its major task was that of feeding the hungry. By the end of that year the Bureau was distributing 50,000 emergency Army rations of pork, bacon, or fresh beef, flour or bread, with occasional issues of corn meal, peas, beans, hominy or coffee. In the near-famine conditions of 1868, the Civil War surplus rations of desiccated potatoes and mixed vegetables. (General Howard warned his agents that great care had to be taken in making soup of the latter if the product was to be anything edible, even for the very hungry.)²⁶ The following year, in response to a U.S. Senate resolution to relieve destitution in the southern states, the bureau issued rations to white and black alike, 32,612 to the former and 24,238 to the latter. Between September of 1866 and September of 1867 the Bureau was issuing 16,804 rations per day. Again, there was the understandable fear that such largesse would lead to widespread demoralization, and agents often worked with local magistrates or leaders of the freedmen to draw up lists of the deserving destitute. However, local leaders might distribute the food to obtain votes or influence. In the very Victorian words of one Bureau agent, "Practically it has been impossible to discriminate between the ...deserving poor and the vicious poor..."²⁷ The Bureau even resorted to something like forced labor, like Army commanders, insisting that freedmen enter labor contracts and that they keep those contracts. On the other hand, of course, such contracts, especially if noted and enforced by Freedmen's Bureau agents, could provide protection for illiterate blacks.²⁸

General Howard summarized the mission of any Bureau local agent as:

a magistrate with extraordinary judicial power - overseer of the poor of all classes in his district, agent to take charge of abandoned lands, and required to settle, in a few days, most intricate questions with reference to labor, political economy, &c, that have puzzled the world for ages.

One such agent pointed out that he had 2,000 square miles of sole responsibility.²⁹ A Florida agent (who had only 14 Bureau compatriots throughout the entire state) reported his duties in 1868: "Reading and approving contracts [,] visiting the various plantations - allaying strife between husband and wife - deciding the ownership of a hog and last but not least - answering questions in reference to the rations."³⁰

The Bureau also carried on and greatly expanded the educational work with the freedmen begun during the war by Army chaplains, individual officers and Northern philanthropists. The officer in charge of black education in Texas, one 1LT E. M. Wheelock, pursued his work in the face of consistent and violent opposition (One example of Texas womanhood informed a Texas district attorney that she would rather put a bullet into a black than see one educated.) Nonetheless, by 1867, when the work was turned over to a civilian, 1LT Wheelock could report that 10,000 blacks had been taught how to read and write.³¹ The Bureau was particularly concerned to move its charges out of rented or makeshift buildings and into specifically-constructed school buildings, thus making it that much more difficult for local whites to close them down. The Bureau was responsible for teacher examinations and payment and supplies, although it attempted as much as possible to have the freedmen themselves construct and maintain the schoolhouses. Certainly of all the works of the Bureau, none had nearly the lasting effect on the South than its establishment of something of a permanent system of black education, albeit racially segregated, which practically all blacks enthusiastically welcomed, and even many influential whites supported.³² MG Howard, a committed Christian, was able to call upon the considerable moral fervor and financial resources of northern humanitarian organizations to aid, particularly in education, his good works.³³ In fact, when the bureau withdrew from Texas in 1870, whites themselves had become reconciled to black schools, leaving those institutions as the only truly successful and lasting program of the bureau in that state.³⁴

Popular anticipation (or dread) among whites to the contrary, one activity that the Bureau did not engage in was that of land redistribution. (The less-informed might well have been so misled by the reference in the bureau's own title to "Abandoned Lands.") MG Howard had to issue a circular disavowing any such intention; the freedmen rather were "to look to the property holders for employment."³⁵ In fact, so far was the Bureau from any program of land redistribution, that it endorsed the sharecropping system as the best deal its charges could obtain under the circumstances.³⁶

The Bureau even concerned itself with the bonds of matrimony, although with only limited success. Wedding ceremonies, if held at all under slavery, had been usually of the most attenuated kind, shocking Northern divines and the pious. Bureau officials consequently officiated at mass marriages (or re-marriages). However, as was to be expected with most attempts to regulate enduring individual social patterns, the effort was only partially successful. Some freedmen objected to having long-term and

faithful common-law relationships questioned by outsiders, while, conversely, other freedmen took advantage to shed themselves of unwanted spouses and to acquire newer and younger wives.³⁷ Unsurprisingly, whatever the Bureau did for blacks, or for whites for that matter, it would remain an object of scorn and hatred by the Southern white leadership, an "engine of folly," "an annoying, irritating, abnormal expedient," an agency "guided by a manifest hostility to the white man an inordinate and preposterous partiality for the negro..." in the words of several contemporary Southern journals. Southerners did not so much object to the Bureau's policy of putting the freedmen to compensated work: like it or not, the Civil War had settled that issue. They strongly resented, however, its application by "foreign" agents (despite the fact that many local Bureau agents were from the area involved), the trampling of the "States Rights" creed, and feared that tangible aid to the freedmen would lead to challenges to revered Southern social relations. Bureau agents were stereotyped as coming from a "despicable class"³⁸

Black regiments in the South, whose numbers increased as white units mustered out and were replaced, were usually less well trained, experienced and disciplined, having been in the service for considerably shorter periods of time than their white counterparts. They were particularly resented for their supposed discouraging of the newly-freed blacks from going back to working for whites. Black regiments also upset the plans of "unreconstructed" southerners to keep the former slaves in a servile condition, as seen in the passage of the infamous "Black Codes" by southern legislatures immediately after the war. The units, however, were soon withdrawn, but not before having added their share to white Southern anti-Reconstruction feeling.³⁹ They would be replaced by the longer-lasting and even more resented primarily black state militias, all increasing the Regular Army's burdens in the South.

Army officers often found it difficult to distinguish between "disloyal" or "political" activities by locals and the endemic violence and disorganization that had always characterized many areas of the South.⁴⁰ One Texas citizen, who had the misfortune to have had his son hanged by a secessionist mob during the war was himself hanged by another mob after he had shot two men being brought in by a military patrol.⁴¹ As MG Daniel Sickles, Commanding General of the Department of the South put it:

The truth is, that in certain localities of these States, personal encounters, assaults, and difficulties between citizens, often resulting in serious wounds and death, have for years occurred without the serious notice or action of the civil authorities; and in those neighborhoods where it has heretofore seemed to the population officious to arrest and punish citizens for assault upon each other, they can hardly be expected to yield with any grace to arrests for assaults and outrages upon negroes.⁴²

The violence often could be specifically directed at Union men or black men, and, of course, against black Union men. The military governor of the Department of

the Cumberland, MG George Thomas, reported, somewhat ungrammatically, that in late 1866, provoked by unreconstructed local journalists:

Not confining themselves to threats, mutterings, or curses, Union men were murdered in their beds in cold blood, or were driven off from their farms. Soldiers and government employees were assaulted or shot at by unknown persons whilst in the performance of their duties; and when application was made to the civil authorities for redress, either through incompetency or the fact of a man's loyalty to the government, no action would be taken.⁴³

As just one example, MG Sheridan reported that two black troopers in Texas had been shot dead in cold blood in the fall of 1866 by a deputy town marshal. The murderous law officer was still in office several months later. Sherman complained, logically enough, that "It is strange that over a white man killed by Indians on an extensive frontier, the greatest excitement will take place, but over the killing of many freemen in the settlements nothing is done."⁴⁴ A black trooper was shot dead in the street in Columbus, Georgia by a white man who was subsequently released by local authorities, a travesty of justice that almost precipitated a riot by the victim's comrades of the 103d U.S. Colored Infantry.⁴⁵ As a result of such encouraged and directed lawlessness, the districts' Provost Marshals had to concern themselves with crimes of every nature.⁴⁶

All of this was mere prelude to Radical Reconstruction in the South, in which Northern and Radical reaction to what was perceived as unreconstructed Southern attempts to fasten some sort of peonage upon the freedmen resulted in a series of Congressional enactments that almost made most white Southerners yearn for the "easy" days of Lincoln/Johnson Reconstruction. Military governors now had much more direct control over the lives of Southern civilians, a control which was hardly exercised over enemy civilians in the Mexican War. Again, five military "divisions" were established, to be governed by the highest-ranking general officers.

All civil officers were required to take the oath of allegiance as a condition for holding their positions, and local law and political officers had to submit monthly reports of the crimes and their dispositions in their jurisdictions. Even more sweeping powers were given to the five military governors for direct military rule of the South, who now were to supervise the political activities of that vast area, although they were more or less left to their own devices as to the rigor and meticulousness with which they pursued and enforced their mandates. Thoroughly typical were just the civil administration responsibilities thrust upon the Headquarters of the Second Military District for 1867, as reported by the District's Bureau of Civil Affairs:

principally to the appointment and removal of civil officers and qualifications for office, the consideration of the powers and duties of civil officers as modified by military orders, questions relating to taxation to the reparation of wards, bridges, etc., and the qualifications and drawing of juries, the establishment of military tribunals and the preparation of rules and regulations for the government thereof and to

communications involving the construction of orders relating principally to the following topics: The abolition of imprisonment for debt...the staying of suits and executions in certain cases.⁴⁷

The Department of Texas and the 5th Military District not only had to record the expected "Statement of Charges and Trial Proceedings for Civil Cases, but also "Report of Persons Indicted for Felonies", "Monthly Reports of Persons Evading Arrest", "Monthly Report of Escapees from County Jail", tax questions, public nuisances, as well as the "Monthly Report of Jail Conditions."⁴⁸ Typically enough, a 2LT and a BvMAJ in the Second Division (Virginia) found themselves adjudicating legal disputes, personally inspecting conditions in the local jail, and devoting the majority of their time to sorting out requests for appointment to public offices.⁴⁹ By this time most Military governors must have longed for the straightforward life of fighting Indians on the frontier.⁵⁰ Yet when North and South Carolina ratified the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, guaranteeing freedom and citizenship to the blacks, the 2d Military District's Commanding General punctiliously passed on the orders from General Grant, ordering his commanders to forthwith "not interfere in civil matters...[in the absence of] insurrection or other disorder beyond the control of civil authorities."⁵¹ Most military governors did their best to stay out of strictly local administration matters, if for no other reason than the press of business in more general affairs.⁵² MG John Schofield steered a middle course in Virginia, believing that enfranchisement of blacks was premature. BG Lovell H. Rousseau, in fact, neglected his supervision of the freedmen of Louisiana to the point of abandonment. His unexpected death in January of 1869 provoked genuine lamentation from the white conservatives.⁵³

Typical (although far above average in its historical documentation) were the efforts of former CPT John William De Forest, Freedmen's Bureau agent at Greenville, South Carolina, in Military District Number Two from 1866 to 1867, under MG Sickles and MG E. R. S. Canby. During the harsh winter of 1866-1867, for example, De Forest distributed "thirty greatcoats, forty blankets, thirty pairs of trousers, seventy large brogans, twenty women's skirts, and twenty dresses...(of the coarsest imaginable cotton stuff, stiff enough to stand alone, and of a horrible bluish gray.)" The greatcoats, blankets and trousers came from condemned Army stores, and to receive them De Forest reported that "it was necessary to have duplicate requisitions, duplicate receipts, and duplicate invoices," and denounced "the paper-eating jugglers in the accounting offices....I decided that the Romans conquered the world because they had no paper, and I wished we had one of them at the head of the War Department."

All government aid was to go only to freedmen and refugees (that is, loyal Southerners who had been driven from their homes by the rebels) and all of the recipients, of course, claimed that they had been good Union people throughout. The Bureau agents also had to ensure that only the truly destitute received rations and that they did not then settle down indolently to the undemanding life of a public charge. In addition, De Forest had to encourage freedmen schooling, see to it that justice was administered and oversee wage and labor disputes, in both cases impartially as to race

and class. Most importantly, he was to keep the peace in an area of armed citizens which had its share and more of disaffected rebels and "banditti."⁵⁴ All of this was in addition to his other important duties of oath-giving and voter registration, and the careful distinguishing of registrants by race.⁵⁵ The Bureau certainly "played politics." Agents saw to it for the most part that the freedmen registered and voted Republican, often defying their former masters. The combined efforts of the Union League, military governors and the Freedmen's Bureau returned seven ex-Confederate states to representation in Congress (12 Republican Senators and 30 Congressmen) in June of 1868, after their ratification of the 14th Amendment.⁵⁶

Even before the Radical Reconstruction enactments went into effect, violence was increasing across the South. Between 30 April and 2 May 1866, large-scale rioting erupted in Memphis, Tennessee after a series of incidents between black troops and white peace officers. It took three days for troops under MG George Stoneman, commander of federal forces in the district, to put down the riots, and not before more than 46 black men, women and children had been killed and in excess of 80 wounded, but only one white man wounded. Two days later the Memphis *Avalanche* gloated that "Soon we will have no more black troops among us." Several months later a similar riot in New Orleans left 34 blacks and 4 whites dead and more than 200 blacks wounded. (The disparity between white and black casualties is instructive.) According to the district military governor, MG Phil Sheridan, the riot was actually "an absolute massacre by the police."⁵⁷ On the other hand, the fiery Sheridan was no disinterested observer; during his tenure he removed the mayor of New Orleans, a state judge and the state's Attorney General and sent a troop of soldiers to remove bodily the Governor of Louisiana. When election commissions displeased him he had them dissolved and more pliable commissioners appointed in their place. Finally, in spite of the U.S. Attorney General's ruling that any registrant who took the oath of allegiance could vote, Sheridan ruled that none could exercise this right unless he could prove his loyalty.⁵⁸

The situation had hardly improved several years later when BvMG Reynolds reported from Texas on secret organizations whose object seemed to be to "disarm, rob, and in many cases murder Union men and negroes, and, as occasion may offer, murder United States officers and soldiers." Reynolds concluded that "The murder of negroes is so common as to render it impossible to keep an accurate account of them." General Reynolds' report was not at all singular; the Governor of Louisiana claimed that "There seems to be a settled determination on the part of these men who adhered to the rebellion to either kill or drive away the Union white men and the leading colored men, so as to be able to terrify the masses of the colored people into voting as they shall dictate."⁵⁹

Race and loyalty were not the only major issues. Taxes had risen to unprecedented levels, with the Military Commander of the Gulf dispatching troops to what he accurately enough termed the "front" in New Orleans to prevent clashes between bodies of armed citizens. Maladministration and malfeasance of the city which had led to such levels of taxation that "if the laws were rigidly enforced, the effect would be the same as if the property were confiscated." Even so, this commander interfered only when one armed group issued a proclamation announcing

their intention to assault the state capitol and warning non-combatants to stay out of the way.⁶⁰ As if their local problems were not enough, commanding generals in the South now found themselves drawn into the bitter conflict between the Congressional Radicals and President Johnson. The President removed Sheridan in July of 1867 and replaced him with General George Thomas, a Virginia Democrat, and soon after replaced MG Sickles with another Democratic general officer. The record seems clear, however, that these generals, whatever their political coloration, did their conscientious best in the registrations and elections in the reconstructed states to see that blacks not only could exercise their newly-granted franchise, but that they were informed, with the help of the Freedmen's Bureau and the private Union League of their political rights and of the positions of the various candidates.

General Pope, commander of the 3d Military District, ordered the enrollment of all U.S. citizens, 21 years of age or older, of whatever complexion, who would take the oath of allegiance to the United States, but did bar any former office holder who had ever given aid or comfort to an enemy of the U.S. As an incentive to getting out the voters, General Pope paid his registrars no salary. Rather each received so much per voter. He also redrew the district lines, leaving himself open to the charge of gerrymandering. The elections were full of corruption, as was the subsequent Florida constitutional convention, but this was hardly the fault of the military government. In fact, far from imposing black Republicanism on a prostrate Florida, General Pope seems to have kept his Radical sentiments under control, governed moderately, and probably ensured control by moderate factions in Florida by 1868.⁶¹ To those worried about the large numbers of mostly illiterate blacks voting for the first time, it was pointed out that the wide extension of the electorate in the Jacksonian era did not exactly bring an influx scholars and gentlemen into the electoral process. It was difficult to argue that the German immigrant just off the boat was somehow more fit to vote than the former slave whose forbearers had been in this country for several centuries. In fact, considering the difficult, thankless, and sometimes hazardous jobs that three presidents gave the army during the years 1862-1877, the generals and their officers performed remarkably well, dealing with and ruling on matters of justice, finance, transportation, education, labor, and charity.

Military commanders and black leaders themselves were careful to point out that while striving for political equality, they were making no attempt to change the social relationships between the races.⁶² Whether they wished it or not, however, Army officers could find themselves involved in such questions. A Georgian railroad president, while complaining to the Commanding General of the Third Military District of the "social degradation in being compelled to ride on the same cars with negroes," conceded that by being charged equal fares as whites, blacks were thus entitled to "equal accommodations," the Chief of the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Third further took some pleasure in replying that the railroad should see to it that blacks not "be intruded upon by Whites."⁶³

White southern reaction to military Radical Reconstruction rule varied greatly; majority opinion seemed to feel that even military administration was preferable to civil black-Republican regimes. Southern political leaders, versed by decades of legalistic constitutional interpretations, based their abstract opposition to military rule on strong

constitutional grounds. (conveniently ignoring the fact that many had recently been in rebellion against the government established by that same Constitution). Most were willing enough to applaud military government when it brought relative peace and tranquillity to their areas. When two illiterate black police officers captured several bothersome thieves, the Galveston *Daily News*, which had opposed their appointment, now applauded "Keep up the practice - rid the city of thieves, and in this way restore order, peace, and security, and we don't care whether you're General Griffin's or anybody else's police -"⁶⁴

Still, violence remained endemic throughout the South, despite the best efforts of the dwindling army of occupation in an area where individual violence was often sanctioned as an expression of true manhood. Amidst reports of robberies, tax matters, appointments and loyalties of civil officers, and movements of troops, came increasing reports of night riders, "numerous cases of outrage." "The [Republican?] men of Wilkes County [Georgia]" sent off a heartfelt plea, reporting one murder and a severe wounding of another Union man, and naming names. It concluded that the civil authority has not arrested them now we call on the military authority....please send us some military protection, for our men are shot-down in the streets like dogs and we call on the military to protect our lives immediately." A year earlier, an Army officer had reported formally that the situation in Warren County, Georgia had so deteriorated that "the entire public are overawed and in mortal dread of losing their lives should they appear and testify the truth in such cases before an examining court."⁶⁵ One of the more sensational, but not untypical, cases concerned the editor of the Jackson, Mississippi *News*, who fatally stabbed the acting city mayor over a question of taxation. The editor was duly tried by military commission and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The editor spun matters out until Mississippi was readmitted to the Union, whence the case dropped from sight.⁶⁶ Texas, because of its near-frontier situation, posed particularly intractable problems of pacification, with roving mounted gangs murdering Union men and blacks. Between January and October of 1869, no less than 384 murders were officially reported in that state.⁶⁷ Increasingly, the Army had to rely almost solely on the psychological effect of the uniform. As one officer remembered, "Southerners don't care a fig for law, sheriffs, or marshals, but they would rather see the devil than the Federal uniform."⁶⁸ (The dignity of the uniform was hardly advanced when Union troops in Victoria broke into a jail to avenge themselves on a prominent Texan who had killed one of their discharged compatriots in a barroom altercation. The local worthy was killed with an ax and his remains then hung up outside the jail.)⁶⁹ As late as 1874, the White League of Louisiana threw up street barricades, defeated the state militia in New Orleans (25 dead) and basically overthrew the Reconstruction government of the state. Only the hurried arrival of six infantry companies, which meant that there were more U.S. soldiers in New Orleans than in any other location in the United States, restored some measure of domestic tranquility. This federal force ended the insurrection, and the White League leaders actually staged something of a surrender ceremony when turning over their State House stronghold.⁷⁰

In the next few years the numbers of federal troops was steadily being reduced in the wake of heavy post-war cuts in military appropriations and the demands of the frontier. By late 1869 there were only a little more than 1,000 such troops in Virginia,

and in Mississippi a mere 716. Many of these troops were simply stationed at one of the established military posts and having nothing in particular to do with military reconstruction. To fill the gap, the southern Radical Republican regimes succeeded in persuading Congress in March 1869 to repeal the law prohibiting militias in the former Confederate states. By then Army rule was light and thin throughout the South, and more recent scholarship has demonstrated that military occupation of the ex-Confederacy has been considerably exaggerated in both its extent and in its supposed effects.⁷¹

The South was recovering (if not "reconstructed"), nonetheless, and in the words of one authority, "The Army's work on the whole assisted rather than retarded this recovery."⁷² The numbers of troops involved may not have been large, but their mere presence did overawe even the most unreconstructed rowdies; they realized that overt resistance or defiance might provoke a severe military response and outraged reaction from Washington. Thus attacks on Union troop units or groups were exceedingly rare.⁷³ Neither the Freedmen's Bureau, a quasi-military organization, nor the Army itself could have transformed Southern mores within the post-Civil War decade. They did prevent the South from reimposing a form of peonage on the freedmen, however, and established something of a permanent system of education for southern blacks. The Army's government was credible, particularly against the dark background of physical and economic devastation after the Civil War, and in contrast to the often venal and¹ traditionally violent civil society in which they operated. Military governors, such as General Sheridan, were on occasion impetuous and officious, and some were misguided; few were ignorant and even fewer unscrupulous.

Reconstruction was a unique and unwelcome chapter in the Army's history, undoubtedly welcomed far more by the blacks and Union men of the South than by the military. General Howard himself admitted that the Freedmen's Bureau was "regarded by its best friends and promoters as abnormal to our system of Government."⁷⁴ It ran against the grain of one of the most fixed political, even emotional precepts of American life, the supremacy of civil supremacy over the military. In the words of one scholar of Reconstruction:

1865- southern governments disrupted or deposed, millions of ex-slaves uncertain of their rights and responsibilities, and thousands of ex-Confederate soldiers returning to their homes - the army was the only agency of the federal government that could have policed the South.⁷⁵

Only the Army came out of this dark chapter of American history with an intact reputation.

- ¹By contrast, the military government/occupation of Germany lasted only four years (1945-1949), and that of Japan seven (1945-1952).
- ²C. Vann Woodward, *The Burden of Southern History* (rev. ed., Baton Rouge: 1968), 19.
- ³James E. Sefton, *The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877* (Baton Rouge: 1967), 10.
- ⁴*Ibid.*, 6-7.
- ⁵William L Richter, "We Must Rub Out and Begin Anew: The Army and the Republican Party in Texas Reconstruction, 1867-1877," *Civil War History*, vol. 19, No. 4 (1973). General Reynolds did succeed in bringing "Radical Reconstruction" to Texas, but in so doing so alienated its white majority that Texas Republicanism was seriously weakened well into the next century., *ibid.*
- ⁶Thomas S. Staples, *Reconstruction in Arkansas, 1862-1874* (New York: 1923), 75-76.
- ⁷Sefton, 8-9; OR, Series I, vol. 46, pt. 3, pp. 990-991.
- ⁸Everly, 109.
- ⁹These duties are outlined in E. Everly, *et al*, *Preliminary Inventory of the Records of United States Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920*, Record Group 393 (Washington: 1973), 310. Robert Utley makes the interesting observation that the post-Civil War U.S. Army was actually two entities, "one serving Congress in the Reconstruction South, the other serving the Executive in the frontier West., Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 14.
- ¹⁰Sefton, 26.
- ¹¹*Ibid.*, 29; William L. Richter, "Tyrant and Reformer: General Griffin and Reconstruction Texas, 1865-66," *Prologue*, vol. 10, No. 4 (1978)
- ¹²The controversy is outlined in *House Ex. Doc. No. 209*, "Removal of City Council of New Orleans," 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
- ¹³James W. Patton, *Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 1860-69* (Chapel Hill: 1934), 109-110; *O.R.*, Series I, vol. 49, pt.2, p. 1093. See also election reports and returns in RG 393, entry 387, Letters Received and Reports of Bureau of Civil Affairs [4th Military District], box No. 3.
- ¹⁴Donna L. Dickerson, "Patronage and the Press: General John Pope and Newspapers in Reconstruction Georgia," *Atlanta History*, vol. 35, No. 4 (1992).
- ¹⁵"Statement of Charges, Proceedings of Trials, and Letters Received Relating to Civil Cases, 1868-1870," Department of Texas and 5th Military District, 1865-1870, RG 393, Army Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Pt I, Entry 4852. See also "Letters Received and Reports of the Bureau of Civil Affairs, 1867-69," Department of Arkansas and 7th Army Corps and 4th Military District, 1862-70, Office of Civil Affairs, *ibid.* Entry 387.
- ¹⁶Sefton, 38-39. During the war, MG Nathan Banks and General Butler were commonly supposed to have enriched themselves in this manner, but nothing was ever proved. Both, of course, were not Regular Army officers.
- ¹⁷Sefton, 35; *O.R.*, Series I, vol. 26, pt. 3, pp. 107-75.
- ¹⁸*Ibid.*, 152-160; Howard, *Autobiography*, 245-256.
- ¹⁹Richter, *The Army in Texas*, 43-45.

²⁰Corbin and Thian, 659.

²¹Ibid., 46-48.

²²Sefton, 43; Theodore B. Wilson, *The Black Codes of the South* (University, Alabama: 1965), passim; Bentley, 114-115.

²³Ibid., 136.

²⁴William S. McFeely, *Yankee Stepfather: General O. O. Howard and the Freedmen* (New Haven and London: 1968), 21-23; Bentley, 48.

²⁵Howard, *Autobiography*, vol. 2, p. 424. Howard, remarkably for the times, may even have believed in racial intermarriage., *ibid.*, 434.

²⁶For founding of Freedmen's Bureau, see Bentley, 30-75, and Howard, *Autobiography*, vol. 2, 256, 258. From the start, however, it was General Howard's policy to avoid the perpetuation of government largesse and put the freedmen to remunerative work., Bentley, 79, 142.

²⁷Ibid., for 1867, 641; Bentley, 140-143. The gist of the Congressional destitution resolution is in Corbin and Thian, 660.

²⁸Ibid., 148-149.

²⁹De Forest, *A Union Officer in the Reconstruction*, 75-76.

³⁰Bentley, 137. (Emphasis is in original.)

³¹Richter, *Army in Texas*, 42-43.

³²Bentley, 169-184.

³³Howard, *Autobiography*, vol. 2, passim.

³⁴Richter, *Army in Texas*, 43.

³⁵"Report of Commissioner of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands," in *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*, 1866 (Washington: 1866), 703; Bentley, 89-102. The *Charleston Courier* accurately pointed out that "So long as there is any suspicion, however slight, that certain portions of Southern lands will be confiscated, just so long will capitalists abstain from investing in them.," issue of 23 February 1866, quoted in Bentley, 244.

³⁶Davis, 79 and passim.

³⁷Bentley, 86-87.

³⁸Ibid., 104-105, 139; Richter, *The Army in Texas*, 32-46.

³⁹Sefton, 51-52. Marvin Fletcher, "The Negro Volunteer in Reconstruction, 1865-66," *Military Affairs* (December 1968). Adjutant General's Office *The Negro in the Military Service of the United States, 1639-1886*, 7 (Washington: 1886). Black troops were not assigned to the South deliberately to humiliate southerners, but this legend has endured, despite the lack of any historical documentation. Fletcher, passim. On the other hand, some of these raw black units were poorly-behaved. See William L. Richter, "The Brenham Fire of 1866: A Texas Atrocity," *Louisiana Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1975).

⁴⁰R. Granade, "Violence: An Instrument of Policy in Reconstruction Alabama," *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, vol. 30, Nos. 3/4.

⁴¹Richter, *Army in Texas*, 64. Although the case was well-publicized, attention focused on its particulars, not on the pattern of endemic violence it illustrated.

⁴²"Report of Major General D. E. Sickles," *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, Message of the President of the United States and Accompanying Documents to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress* (Washington: 1866), 59. The famous author, Charles Nordhoff wrote that "every trifling dispute" was "ended with the pistol" in the South., Nordhoff, *The Cotton States in the Spring and Summer of 1875* (New York: 1876), 78. A Congressional investigating commission noted that witnesses more often than not appeared armed, and that "no man is comfortable unless he has got his pistols, *U.S. Army and Reconstruction*, 3. For Reconstruction violence." Sefton, see also Barry A. Crouch and Donaly E. Brice, *Cullen Montgomery Baker: Reconstruction Desperado* (Baton Rouge: 1997).

⁴³Ibid. for 1867. "Report of Major General George H. Thomas, Commanding Department of the Cumberland," part 1, 182.

⁴⁴Report of MG P. Sheridan, HQ Department of the Gulf, 14 November 1866. 1, p. 301, *OR*, Ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 1, p. 301; William L. Richter, *The Army in Texas During Reconstruction, 1865-1870* (College Station: 1987), 32.

⁴⁵Everly, 109.

⁴⁶Provost Marshal crime records were meticulously divided into "Crimes by colored/Whites against the person/property of colored/Whites.", "Record of Reports to the Provost Marshal General, 2nd Military District, of Crimes Committed...in North/South Carolina," RG 393, entry 4304, vol. 91, 92, 1867-1868, passim.

⁴⁷See Provost Marshal General, Reports of Civil Officers, 2d Military District, RG 393, entry 4309, box No. 1, 1867-1868; and *ibid.*, "Monthly Reports of Crimes Committed, North Carolina"; *ibid.*, entry 4865, 5th MD, Office of Civil Affairs, Miscellaneous Records Relating to Civil Affairs, 1866-1870, box No. 2. See also *Report of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands for the Year 1867* (Washington: 1867), particularly the sections dealing with "Claims Division," "Transportation," (for refugees and freedmen), "Medical Supplies," "Commissary Supplies," "Schools," Pay, bounty, and prize money fund," and the reports for each Southern state.

⁴⁸These particulars found under RG 393, entries 4852, 4854, 4860, 4861 and 4862, for the years 1868-1870. Undoubtedly, the military district also had to handle proceedings, etc. of criminal cases, but these records have apparently not been preserved.

⁴⁹"Record of Cases Tried by the Military Commissioner for 2d Division, State of Virginia," 1868, RG 393, pt. 1, entry 5262, vol. 249.

⁵⁰Walter L. Fleming, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama* (New York: 1905), 413-414.

⁵¹MG R. S. Canby, to Commanding Officers, 3, 11 July 1868, RG 393, entry 4358, vol. 6, pp. 37, 86; General U. S. Grant, telegram to MG Canby, 3 July 1868, "Record of Cases Tried by the Military Commissioner for 2d Division."

⁵²See, for example, reply by Chief of Bureau, 3d MD, absolving the district headquarters from any involvement, to Georgia Post Master inquiring about his liabilities under the orders of the Road Commissioners. Also lt. from Chief of Civil Affairs Bureau reminding a Union County, Georgia sheriff that "The military order appointing you is not intended to dispense with the statutory provisions concerning official oaths and bonds and they are to be

observed.", 14 October 1867, RG 393, entry 5779, vol. 16, p. 211; *ibid.*, 26 February 1868, p. 295.

⁵³J. L. McDonough, "John Schofield as Military Director of Reconstruction in Virginia," *Civil War History*, vol. 15, No. 3 (1969); J. G. Dawson, III, "General Lowell H. Rousseau and Louisiana Reconstruction," *Louisiana History*, vol. 20, No. 4 (1979).

⁵⁴John W. De Forest, *A Union Officer in the Reconstruction* (New Haven: 1968), *passim.*, quotes pp. 69, 88. As early as 1867, General Howard was recommending that the direct relief effort by the Bureau be discontinued., *Report of the Commissioner for 1867*, 73.

⁵⁵Bureau of Civil Affairs, HDQ, 2d Military District, Charleston, South Carolina, report for year ending 30 September 1867., RG 393, Pt I, Entry 5336, Records of Civil Cases, 10-14.

⁵⁶Bentley, 185-199.

⁵⁷John Hope Franklin, *Reconstruction After the Civil War* (Chicago and London: 1963), 62-64; report of MG Sheridan, *OR*, Ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 1, p. 302 and *passim.* See also *Memphis Riots and Massacres*, Report of the Select Committee, 39th Cong., 1st Sess, House Report No. 101, Serial 1274. This horrendous situation may well have been in large measure the result of the corrupt and tyrannical wartime military government of Tennessee by the Illinois political general Steven Hurlburt, as noted in chapt. 4. Hurlburt was finally removed in April of 1864 for inefficiency, but the damage to the Union cause had been long done. P. D. Phillips, "White Reaction to the Freedmen's Bureau in Tennessee," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, vol. 25, No 1.).

⁵⁸The Governor of Louisiana claimed under oath that the riot was in actuality "a pre-arranged murder"...by the police," whom, he further asserted, were led by the city's Mayor, "one of the worst men in this community.", testimony of Governor J. Madison Wells, 10 October 1866. An Army investigative board found evidence of a "preconcerted plan and purpose of attack...., spearheaded by ex-Confederate troops. Department of Louisiana, "Proceeding of a Board of Officers Convened in Pursuance of the Following Order, Special Orders No. 161, Headquarters, Department of Louisiana, n.d. (commenced 2 August 1866, includes coroner's report and testimony), New Orleans, RG 393, Pt. 1, entry 1774, vol. 269; P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan* (New York: 1888), 253-270.

⁵⁹"Report of the Secretary of War," 1868, xvii; and "Correspondence and Instructions Submitted with Report of the Secretary of War," State of Louisiana, 1 August 1868, xix (Washington: 1868). See CPT and Brvt BG N. B. McLaughlin, 4th Cavalry, to LTC W. H. Wood, Commanding Officer, District of Louisiana, 2 January 1868, 5th MD, "Charges and Specifications, Statements,...Miscellaneous Crimes and Disturbances, Military and Civilian, 1867-1870," RG 393, entry 4588, box No. 1. Two years later, the situation in Texas was little improved; the State Convention resolved "there exists all over the State of Texas a class of desperadoes engaged in theft, murder and robbery, called for the appropriation of \$25,000 in reward money, and requested the approval of the Military Commander of the Texas District. Undated resolution (July 1870) and endorsements, *ibid.*, entry 4865, box No. 3.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, Report of Commander, Department of the Gulf (Washington: 1872), 95.

⁶¹Merlin G. Cox, "Military Reconstruction in Florida," *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, vol. 46, No. 3 (January 1968).

⁶²Franklin, 87. See, for example, the correspondence and orders of MG R. Canby, Commanding General of the 2d Military District, dealing with election matters, and his conclusions. RG 393, entry 4358, Letters Sent, 1868-1869, vol. 6. The instructions, together with pertinent Acts of Congress and GO No. 20, to the members of the Boards of Registration in the military districts ran to 16 printed pages. Commanding General, 3d MD to Commanding General, District of Alabama, 29 May 1867, RG 393, entry 5779, vol 16. See also *ibid.*, Letters Sent, May 1867-June 1868, 3d MD. The Commanding General of the 3d MD required of the Commander of the Florida District the names of delegates elected to the Florida Convention after the elections of December 1867, the full registered vote, and the registered vote for and against the convention. Ltr of 19 December 1867, *ibid.*, entry 5779, p. 151.

⁶³Chief of Civil Affairs Bureau, 3d MD, to John Screven, Esq., 12 June 1867, *ibid.*, p. 95-96.

⁶⁴Sefton, 153.

⁶⁵"The Men of Wilkes County" to MAJ Jacob Kline, Washington, Georgia 9 December 1870, Military District of Georgia, Letters Received, 1870-1871, RG 393, pt. I, Entry 5795, box No. 1; CPT F K. Corbett to Kline, 19 January 1870, *ibid.* See also petition by citizens of Amite City, Louisiana, in December of 1867, requesting that Company "E," First Cavalry's orders to remove immediately to New Orleans be rescinded. "Their withdrawal would be the signal for the commission of heinous crimes upon citizens without distinction of color.", Resolution of citizens of Amite City, drawn up at meeting of 12 December 1867. RG 393, entry 4588, box No. 2, Miscellaneous Records Relating to Civil Affairs, 5th MD, 1857-1870.

⁶⁶Sefton, 193-194.

⁶⁷*Report of Secretary of War for 1868-69*, 145. See exemplary reports of cases tried by 2d Military District, RG 393, entry 4358, vol. 6, report on cases in undated report of MG Canby, 112-119, and other cases., *passim*.

⁶⁸Sefton, 209.

⁶⁹Robert W. Shook, "Military Activities in Victoria, 1865-1866," *Texana*, 3, No. 4 (Winter, 1965), 350-351.

⁷⁰J. G. Dawson, III, *Army Generals and Reconstruction: Louisiana, 1861-1877* (Baton Rouge and London: 1982), 164-182.

⁷¹This revision of the traditional "tragic era" interpretation began to gather strength after 1961 with the publication of Professor John Hope Franklin's *Reconstruction: After the Civil War* (Chicago: 1959), *passim*.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 59.

⁷³Sefton, vii-viii, 87, 225, 226; William A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865-1877* (New York: 1907), 109. Richter documents that "the blue uniform seemed generally to provoke, not restrain armed resistance [in Texas], but also goes on to write of the army's "great political influence in Texas, as demonstrated by the very scope of

its involvement in civil affairs....". Further, that such "armed resistance" was usually individual., *Army in Texas*, 189.

⁷⁴Howard, *Autobiography*, 423. MG Sheridan, for example, did not even think it the concern of his command that the governor of Louisiana was filling posts with former Confederates. He summarized his attitude thusly: "...I would not allow the military to be used for party purposes, but...if the police in the State came into collision it would be my duty to maintain the peace of the Country.", Sheridan, Report on Department of the Gulf, 1866, *OR*, Ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 1, p. 302.

⁷⁵Dawson, 1.

THE FRONTIERS

("left in the breach to catch all the kicks and cuffs of a war of races")¹

Alaska

Almost exactly coincidentally with Reconstruction, the Army provided military government for the newly-acquired territory of Alaska in a considerably more successful and gratifying operation than its duties in the South. Most of this success was undoubtedly due to the simple fact that there were very few white settlers in the territory to embroil the Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts in disputes over mineral and farming rights. In fact, the federal government informed any potential homesteaders that their claims would prove illegal and that squatters would be evicted. Consequently, until the Klondike gold rush of the 1890's there was basically no immigration to the vast territory. Although bills were introduced for civil government from the beginnings of American sovereignty, all failed until 1884.²

From its beginnings Alaska's military government determined to avoid the Indian troubles encrimsoning the American prairies and deserts. This determination was aided by policies of the former Russian governors, who had kept the Indians and Aleuts quiescent by basically leaving them to go about their own business.³ MG Henry Halleck, commanding general of the Military District of the Pacific, presciently warned: "should our Indian system, with its treaties, annuities, agents, frauds, and speculation, be introduced there, Indian wars must inevitably follow."⁴ As a result of this intelligent beginning, the Army throughout its ten-year occupation experienced few serious troubles with the native Alaskans. That is not to say that the attempt was not made to inflict on the native Alaskans those evils that disfigured westward movement in the lower USA. Rascally traders did their worst to import liquor (one confiscated batch was reported by the military as "beyond chemical analysis") and gun-running was not unknown. To obviate these problems, Alaska was to be a "ward" of the War Department, and the commanding officer there to be general superintendent of Indian affairs.

These Indians were warlike, although the Aleuts were reputed to be "docile." Indian pacification was facilitated by the fact that the aborigines lived and traveled along waterways and thus could be far more easily controlled than the wide-ranging mounted Plains tribesmen. The Alaskan commander, Brevet MG Jefferson C. Davis (no relation, but a name which must have raised eyebrows at the time) could report by May of 1868 that, although tribal rivalries still festered, particularly between Stikine and Sitkas,

I observe a great change in the manners and disposition of the Indians at this place. They are peaceable and quiet, and seem much more disposed to submit to our government than at first. The Indians must be governed with a firm hand

and a watchful eye; but many of them understand justice and impartiality, and appreciate it.⁵

The few Indian troubles were quickly squelched by small expeditions to the offenders' villages, where the culprit was usually delivered up, sometimes after the village was at least partially destroyed.⁶ These broils were of an individual nature, almost always sparked by liquor.⁷ General Davis' allusions to fairness in dealing with the Indians was not just for the record; when a Sitka constable shot and wounded an Indian (his second such victim) Davis had the constable confined, and then proceeded, in accordance with local Indian custom, to distribute 50 Army blankets to pacify the victim's aroused fellow tribal members.⁸

One serious incident resulted from a New Year's Day, 1869 altercation between a drunken native chief (who had been given the fateful bottle by General Davis himself!) and a probably also drunken sentry. After several killings on both sides, General Davis ordered his supply ship to shell a Kake Indian village, which brought pacification. One year later, a Christmas, 1869 shoot-out resulted in the death of one officer and the post trader, and the wounding of another officer and the Stikine instigator, while the latter was intoxicated through liquor sold by two renegade whites. When the warlike Stikines refused to deliver up the culprit, the village of the original shooter was bombarded throughout the night and the following morning with shell and solid shot fired by a six-pounder and a mountain howitzer. The now-terrorized Stikines yielded the slayer, his mother and his sub-chief. Condemned by a court martial the following day, the unfortunate aborigine was speedily hanged on 29 December. General Davis also saw to it that the two white liquor salesmen were arrested.⁹

As far as the Army was concerned, Alaska was Indian territory, and liquor and firearms could be interdicted. The minuscule white population, who were permitted their spirits, did not see things in this light. The actual legal status of the territory was never settled during the military occupation and the Army's right to arrest and confine violators of liquor and firearms laws was often negated by the courts in far-away Oregon. In the words of General O. O. Howard, "The officers of the Army were denied the jurisdiction for an ordinary police, on the one hand, and held responsible for order and enforcement of the law on the other."¹⁰ Not surprisingly, BvMG Davis confessed that he had on occasion to "step a little outside of Army regulations."¹¹ To complicate matters further, and to add a new twist to the situation on the Great Plains, the Indians themselves developed the skill of brewing and distilling their own liquor and selling it to the whites. The isolated and bored troops were not particularly suited for prohibition duty. The Alaska Department's Medical Director claimed (somewhat confusingly) that the troops "mutually debauch each other, and sink into that degree of degradation in which it is utterly impossible to reach, either through moral or religious influences."¹²

Nonetheless, under the Army's benign supervision, a city government was established in Sitka, Alaska's only town of any pretense. Two months after the transfer of sovereignty, the Sitka town council petitioned General Davis to confine offenders in the garrison guardhouse, the town itself apparently lacking a jail.¹³ The city council

then established its first school, whose teacher salary of \$25 per month was supplemented by an additional \$50 from Army garrison funds

Another Army responsibility was that of protecting the Pribiloff seals in one of America's earliest conservation concerns. After 1868, the troops had not only to enforce seal quotas given to the Aleuts, but to protect the natives from being debauched at the hands of dishonest traders looking for more pelts.¹⁴

Although Alaska had been the subject of at least seven civilian expeditions in recent years, the Army in 1869 organized yet another, this time to determine whether Fort Yukon, a British fur trading post, was actually in American territory. CPT Charles Raymond and his party of 13 men also made a general reconnaissance of the country, its resources, native tribes, the extent and nature of the British fur trade. CPT Raymond, after meticulous astronomical observations, determined that Fort Yukon was indeed inside U.S. territory. The British fur traders there peacefully decamped, leaving the trade open for Americans. The next such expedition did not take place until 1881, when LT P. H. Ray established a station at Point Barrow, making meteorological observations, plant, animal and mineral specimens collected and a foray made into the interior. Throughout the 1880s, the Army continued to mount numerous such expeditions, including, in 1885, one by LT Henry T. Allen, future Military Governor during the U.S. Army's occupation of the Rhineland after World War I.¹⁵

The Army's small Alaska garrison, which never numbered more than 600 and which at one time dipped to a very dangerous low of 100 troops in five posts, had to contend with vast distances, ferocious weather, and tenuous transportation and supply lines, as well as a legal limbo, bickering between government officials and a white population that increasingly yearned for civil government. Yet the Army fulfilled its primary mission, that of keeping the peace, in sharp distinction to the recurrent Indian wars in the Continental USA. Rarely has so few troops controlled so large an area with so little discord.¹⁶

Nonetheless, by 1875, Army commanders themselves were recommending that their troops be withdrawn from Alaska. They logically argued that the Army had neither the means nor the authority to continue civil government for the vast territory. Even a revenue cutter under Treasury control could do the job better. The President and the War Department agreed, and on 14 June 1875 an Army transport with all Alaska military personnel on board left Sitka, bringing to an end the Army's civil government of Alaska.¹⁷

As a footnote to the U.S. Army's military government of Alaska, it should be noted that two years after the end of that administration, the citizens of Sitka, fearful of an Indian uprising, and receiving no aid from the American government, petitioned the British for help. Her Majesty's government immediately dispatched a Royal Navy vessel to Sitka. It remained there for one month until the American government dispatched *USS Alaska* to relieve it and the government of the embarrassment of having a foreign warship defend a portion of its territory.

The Western Frontier

In the lower continental American West, the U.S. Army faced three decades of Indian Wars, which have been extensively documented. Less well known, is the Army's continuing non-combat duties that probably had more than anything else to do with the "Winning of the West." In the words of one authority on the subject, "Each false-front hamlet and tent megalopolis demanded federal military aid, chiefly to subsidize its own somewhat premature economic enterprises."¹⁸ Army officers in the West were well aware that the westward reaching railroads were the engines of such economic progress. Or as General Sherman put it to General Grant the year after Appomattox, "It is our duty and it shall be by my study to move the progress of construction of the great Pacific railways...as safe as possible."¹⁹ This progress required a vast amount of intelligence about the Trans-Mississippi West. Consequently, the Army soon had to return to its great scientific explorations and surveys of the type that had so distinguished this service before the Civil War, even to reviving informally the old Bureau of Explorations and Surveys under the Chief of Engineers. Engineer officers in each of the six military districts into which the post-war West had been divided drew up maps and conducted mineral and wagon road surveys. As early as 1865-1866, COL R. S. Williamson was laying out military roads in Northern California and Oregon which also benefited the pioneering miners of eastern Nevada. In 1866, a cavalry detachment moving across the Mojave Desert to Fort Mojave on the Lower Colorado River, explored large portions of northwestern Arizona. Army exploration work was also instrumental in the creation of the Yellowstone National Park in 1872.²⁰ Civilian geologists, mineralogists and explorers relied often upon the Army for protection. Such escorting had its disadvantages. One expedition in early 1866 in California had to be canceled when the troopers' enlistments expired.²¹ The Army also provided two cavalry troops and an undetermined number of Sioux Scouts for the Northern Boundary Survey Commission of 1873-1874.²²

One of the last such Army missions was its escorting of the Northern Pacific Railroad survey expedition.²³ This fairly typical civil-military expedition of the era was organized in the spring of 1873. LTC George Armstrong Custer's entire 7th Cavalry as well as four companies of the 17th Infantry, five companies of the 22d Infantry and a mixed battalion of the 8th and 9th Infantry were detailed as escort to the Northern Pacific Railway Survey, which was also to make a scientific survey of the entire Yellowstone region.²⁴ Custer here foiled an Indian ambush at the Battle of the Big Horn. Three years later, in similar circumstances, the tables were turned at the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

The most extensive, and the last, of the major military scientific expeditions through the West were those conducted by LT George M. Wheeler, commander of Surveys West of the 100th Meridian. Between 1871 and 1878, when Congress refused further appropriations, LT Wheeler surveyed more than one-third of the lands west of that meridian, conducting one of the first scientific explorations of Nevada, Arizona, and the Plateau Province of southern Utah and western Colorado. He supervised some

25 publications and seven large tomes of final reports on the natural history of the area, plus some 71 maps, as well as some of the best paintings and photographs of the Old West. Nonetheless, Army survey work by the late 1870s was being superseded by more specialized and scientific investigations while Western surveys were assumed by the United States Geological Survey. This was undoubtedly as it should have been, with the military giving way to civilian authority as the nation continued to develop.²⁵ Still, in the words of one authority, "The truth is that the army was in the vanguard of western economic development."²⁶ Even the Army's phenomenally high desertion rate at the time could be interpreted as nation-building: One Secretary of War supposedly dismissed that rate with an airy, "Let them depart, they build up the West."²⁷

One of the more unexpected works of the Army on the frontier at this time was the distribution of rations to Nebraska homesteaders rendered destitute by a plague of grasshoppers in the summer of 1874. The Army, free of charge, gave out the basic staples of the time: sugar/molasses, cornmeal, tea, lard, salt and flour.²⁸

For all these good works it would be difficult to find another time when the Army was so isolated, even alienated from civil America. In the North, a "business pacifism" seemed to believe that war had become so expensive and destructive that no rational nation would ever again resort to large-scale armed conflict. In the wake of the Civil War it would have been hard to argue with such sentiments. Labor and Southern congressmen strongly resented the Army's pacification roles in their constituencies, and humanitarians, casting about for another cause after black emancipation, were horrified by the ruthless nature of so much Indian fighting. The veteran New York congressman Fernando Wood, for example, declared in 1876 that the Army "performs none of the legitimate functions of our Government in time of peace. It is inappropriate to such a period, having no use, no duties, no affinity, or sympathy with the workings of a political institution founded on free opinion." Wood, apparently in all seriousness, proposed abolishing the War Department and transferring its peacetime functions to the Interior Department. The influential *Scribner's Monthly* claimed that peaceful Indians could be deployed on the frontier as effectively as regulars. To avoid inflaming the sensibilities of such legislators, a War Department order of 1873 (but apparently a dead letter) prohibited officers from even entering Washington, DC without permission of the Secretary of War!²⁹ The fact that the Army's military actions took place in distant and sparsely-populated areas against a foe whose threat was distant from the nation's political and population centers strengthened civilian doubts as to the relevance of that institution. In the words of the *Army and Navy Journal* in 1877, "The present trouble with the Army is that it is separated from the knowledge and affections of the people who pay the taxes, and is only seen from year to year in the form of heavy appropriations."³⁰ So low was the Army in civil esteem that civilians often actually aided deserters. One officer wrote that "If a soldier deserts near a town or settlement, you will hardly find a person who would not offer the deserter shelter." This attitude was hardly surprising when seen in the light of the such journalistic comments as found in the *Independent*: "a respectable American citizen" would be no more likely to volunteer for the Army "than he would volunteer for the penitentiary." Thus, any "respectable American citizen" who found himself in the Army must have been tricked

into it.³¹ Desertion was undoubtedly the greatest problem faced by the U.S. Army between the Civil and the Spanish-American Wars, averaging an astounding 40 percent loss of recruitment gain through the 1880s.³²

Relations with civilians were not improved by the Army's mission to remove gold miners from Indian territories. For example, in the Sioux's Black Hills territory, something like 1500 miners were working the streams on unceded Sioux land. Sioux hunting bands then raided outside their territory reservation, leading to the Great Sioux War and Custer's annihilation.³³ In the end, however, the Army Commanding General happily noted in 1880 that in what had been Sioux territory, "Prosperous farms and cattle ranches exist where ten years ago no [white] man could venture. This is largely due to the soldier, but in equal if not greater measure, to the adventurous pioneers, add to that new and greatest of civiliziers, the railroad."³⁴

The Army's subjugation of the Indian on the Western frontier after 1865 was primarily an extension of its similar role before the Civil War. More often than not, it was again the only official organization trying to enforce some type of justice on a lawless area. Again, Army officers showed considerably more sympathy toward their foe than did the settlers flocking into areas that had been set aside for the Indian. The Army General-in-Chief, W. T. Sherman, accurately reported to the Secretary of War with some asperity that:

Our people continue as heretofore to settle on the exposed points of the frontier, to travel without the precaution which a well-known danger would suggest, and to run after every wild report of the discovery of gold or other precious metal, thus coming into daily contact and necessary conflict with discontented and hostile Indians. The co-ordinate departments of our government likewise continue to extend the surveys of public land westward, and grant patents to occupants; to locate and build railroads; to establish mail routes, with the necessary stations and relays of horses, as though that region of country were in profound peace, and all danger of occupation and transit has passed away. Over all these matters the military authorities have no control, yet their public nature implies public protection, and we are daily and hourly called upon for guards and escorts, and are left in the breach to catch all the kicks and cuffs of a war of races, without the privilege of advising or being consulted beforehand.³⁵

For such "protection" the Army was vastly over-extended. Its 116 posts were valued about as much for the jobs and markets they represented as for their shielding the civilian economy from marauding Indians, and local civilians strongly resisted attempts to close any one.³⁶ As for any "glory" in fighting the Indian, Sherman, testifying before the House Committee on Military Affairs in early 1876, might have had his later "War is Hell" aphorism in mind when he reminded the Congressmen that such wars brought only "exposure, toil, risk, and privations, with no honor." Before the same body LTG Philip Sheridan argued persuasively that the Army could far more efficiently

and honestly purchase and haul food and supplies, and disburse these rations to the Indians. The real enemy of the Indians were the "Indian rings" that often worked with corrupt agents of the Indian Bureau, to defraud the Red Man of what was his by treaty right, including his very lands.³⁷

General Nelson Miles, the premier Indian fighter of the time, complained that

The Indians have been half fed or half starved.... I do not think the government should disregard its promises and get the Indians into such a condition, and then order the military to prevent an Indian war.

Miles' personal rival, General George Crook, agreed with Miles on this point:

Were he [the Apache] a Greek or a Roman, we should read with pride and enthusiasm of his determination to die rather than suffer wrong; but looking at him as a native of our own soil and as the feeble barrier which stands between ourselves and the silver mines and gold measurers supposed to exist on his reservation it is not always possible to do justice to his virtues or to consider his faults as identical with those of which we ourselves should be guilty under similar provocation.³⁸


Such forbearance, even sympathy, on the part of such Army commanders as O. O. Howard, George Crook or Nelson Miles, is the more impressive in that the Plains Indians, fierce fighters, inflicted a number of defeats on the U. S. Army.

Of course, westerners had their own perspective on such matters, a perspective which diminished in its understanding of the Indian the closer they lived to the frontier. Delegate Thomas M. Patterson of the Colorado Territory was not unique in his sentiments:

While you sit in council and gravely deliberate as to what is humanity to the savage, he burns down the house of the settler over his head, scalps his children, and carries into captivity his wife to satisfy the lusts of demons.³⁹

Throughout this period, most Army commanders consistently strongly advocated transferring the Indian Bureau back to the War Department, of which it had been a part until 1849.⁴⁰ But this was not to be. Anti-Army sentiment prevailed and Indian affairs were left to civilian control. In post-Civil War America, if anything, the Army seemed to rank even lower in prestige than the Indian Bureau. Finally, the Army's jurisdiction over hostile Indians, a fairly obvious arrangement it would seem, was actually taken away by 1880 and given to the "reformed" Indian Bureau.⁴¹

The Army was not necessarily possessed of any higher form of morality than American civil society, but as in Reconstruction, few incompetent and no corrupt officers had advanced to the highest ranks, even during the period of rapid promotions of the Civil War. More mundanely, officers were relatively well-paid (although most



Troops guard the overland mail, c. 1880. National Archives



Troopers round up Philippine children for school, c. 1901. National Archives

would have disagreed at the time) and were almost unique in being able to look forward to a respectable pension at the end of their labors.⁴² Thus was strengthened their resistance to the temptation that so beset many of their civilian brethren in the Gilded Age. Nonetheless, that Army, understandably impressed by Prussia's battlefield triumphs and thoroughly charmed by the elegant theoretical military science of Europe, refused to draw up any doctrine other than that of conventional Napoleonic conflict between "civilized" opponents. Even the American Civil War, that greatest military spectacle of the second half of the 19th century, was slighted.⁴³ In fact, at the close of three decades of Indian fighting (or considerably more than a full century, counting the numerous Indian wars from the beginning of the Republic), the U.S. Army did not issue one manual or text dealing with aboriginal warfare. Aside from personal reminiscences, it was as if the Indian Wars from Fallen Timbers to the Little Big Horn had never happened.⁴⁴

¹"Papers Accompanying the Report of the General-in-Chief," in *Report of the Secretary of War*, 1868, 333.

²Neil R. Koeniger, "Alaska: The Forgotten Land - 1867-84," *Pacific History*, vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1967), 37-38.

³Valerie K. Stubbs, "The U.S. Army in Alaska, 1867-1877: An Experiment in Military Government," M.A. diss., The American University, 1956.

⁴Halleck to Army Adjutant General, *Report of Secretary of War, 1867*, pt. 1, 74,75. Sale of liquor to the natives was strictly prohibited from the start of U.S. military government., *ibid.*

⁵BvMG Davis to Assistant Adjutant General, Military District of the Pacific, 27 May 1868, RG 393, Pt. 1, Entry 137, Department of Alaska, Letters Sent, 1867-1870. Seventeen months later, General Davis could report that "Since the occupancy of the Territory by us, most of the Indian tribes have observed peaceful relations with the whites," *ibid.*, for 25 October 1869.

⁶See Davis to AAJ, Department of the Pacific, 14 March 1869 for apprehension of two murderers and the near-total destruction of a Chilcot village, after the inhabitants had fled., *ibid.*; Stubbs, 18; Headquarters, United States Army, Alaska, "Building Alaska with the US Army," 10 August 1962, 18-19.

⁷See, for example, BvMG Davis' account of a shooting affray, sparked by the Chilcot chief at Sitka on New Year's Day, 1869, which resulted in considerable excitement but no casualties, and the offending chief's brief imprisonment. Davis to AAJ, Department of the Pacific, 5 January 1869, *ibid.*

⁸Davis to Secretary of War, 7 January 1870; Davis to Provost Major General and AAJ, 18 January 1870, *ibid.*

⁹Davis to Provost Major General and AAJ, 18 January. Davis reported that "I anticipate no further trouble from this tribe for some time to come", *ibid.* See also Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 181-183.

¹⁰A. W. Greely, *Handbook of Alaska: Its Resources, Products, and Attractions* (New York: 1909), 35. MG Greely was twice military commander in Alaska at the turn of the century. For Army dealings with white Alaskans' liquor, see letter from (illegible signature) to BvMAJ Charles Wood, Sitka, 21 October 1868; and from General Davis to Collector and Special Agent, Sitka, 28 October 1868, *ibid.*

¹¹Davis to Secretary of War, 7 January 1870, *ibid.*

¹²Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 182. But note that the quotation does not accuse the soldiers of actually participating in the liquor trade with the natives, although Utley seems to make this accusation, uncritically based on the report of a Special Indian Agent who was "a bitter critic of the army's demoralizing influence on Indians throughout the West," *ibid.*, 187.

¹³BG Davis to Mayor of Sitka, 6 December 1867, U.S. Army, Department of Alaska, Letters Sent, RG 393, Pt. 1, entry 137.

¹⁴Davis to AAJ, Department of the Pacific, 25 October 1869, *ibid.*

¹⁵Charles W. Raymond, "Report of a Reconnaissance of the Yukon River, July to September 1869," 42d Cong., 1st Sess., *Sen. Ex. Doc*, 12 (1870); Goetzmann, 399-401.

¹⁶Koeninger, 39-40, asserts that the Army's record in Alaska military government "is singularly unimpressive.", citing poor soldier behavior towards the aborigines and bootlegging, and concludes that the civil population was better off when the Army left. His own evidence, one source, is also unimpressive, and is contradictory when he notes that the citizens of Sitka put themselves under British naval protection two years after the troops had left.

¹⁷Stubbs, 15. Greely asserts that after the Army exited "A pandemonium of drunkenness, disorder, property destruction and personal violence obtained at Sitka....", 43.

¹⁸William H. Goetzmann, *Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West* (New York and London: 1978), 391. Note that Professor Goetzmann speaks of "military aid" for economic enterprise, not military protection from Indians.

¹⁹Utley, ix.

²⁰Ibid., 393; 401-409. *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1867*, 53-54.

²¹See Goetzmann, 355-389, 388.

²²Northern Boundary Survey Commission, Letters Sent, 1873-1876, RG 393, pt. 1, entry 1337.

²³Copy letterbook, Northern Pacific Railroad Escort, 1880, RG 393, pt. 1, entry 1344, 2 vols.

²⁴Goetzmann, 416-418.

²⁵Ibid., 467-488.

²⁶Jack D. Foner, "The Socializing Role of the Military," in *The American Military on the Frontier*, The Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium (United States Air Force Academy, Office of Air Force History and United States Air Force Academy (Washington: 1978), 86.

²⁷Ibid., 87.

²⁸Forms, for "Citizens of ____, State of Nebraska, Rendered Destitute by the Ravages of Grasshoppers during the Summer of 1874....", RG 393, pt. 1, entries 3763, 3764. It is indicative of the "quality" of these people, that of the 6,000 or so signing for these rations, only about ten had to sign with their mark.

²⁹Utley *Frontier Regulars*, 59-65, 188-189; Donald J. D'Elia, "The Argument over Civilian or Military Indian Control, 1865-1880," *The Historian* (February 1962), 213.

³⁰*Army and Navy Journal* (8 September 1877).

³¹Jack D. Foner, *The United States Soldier Between Two Wars: Army Life and Reforms, 1865-1898* (New York: 1970), 74.

³²Ibid., 6-7.

³³Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 236-266.

³⁴Secretary of War, *Annual Report* (1880), 4; General Sherman repeated these sentiments in almost identical words in his report for 1883, 45-46.

³⁵"Papers Accompanying the Report of the General-in-Chief," in *Report of the Secretary of War, 1868*, 333. A most significant exception to the general Army attitude of relative impartiality was that held by General of the Army LTG P. H. Sheridan. For Sheridan, it

was intolerable that "while it [the federal government] found it necessary to enact the most stringent laws for the government of civilized whites, it was attempting to govern a wild, brutal, and savage people without any laws at all.... The Indian is a lazy, idle, vagabond; he never labors, and has no profession except that of arms, to which he is raised from a child," "Report of Lieutenant General Sheridan," in *Report of the Secretary of War*, 1869, 37-38.

³⁶ Birtle, 59.

³⁷ *House Report No. 354*, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44.

³⁸ Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 51-52. These were consistent opinions. See Miles, "The Indian Problem," *North American Review* (March 1890); "Our Military Past and Future," *Atlantic Monthly* (November 1879) and Howard, *My Life Among Our Hostile Indians* (Hartford: 1907). Even at the Wounded Knee "massacre," Utley claims, the Army "took extraordinary efforts to avoid harming [women and children]."

³⁹ James T. King, "Commentary," in *The American Military on the Frontier*, paper presented at Seventh Military History Symposium, 162.

⁴⁰ D'Elia, *passim*.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 223-224.

⁴² The Army also displayed a commendable interest in Indian culture, with General Sheridan, for example, sponsoring the publication of the book *The Indian Sign Language*, which also dealt with other aspects of Indian culture., Birtle, 65.

⁴³ MG Winfield Scott Hancock, for example, informed a congressional committee in 1876 that the Army's Indian Wars "entitled no weight" in determining the current state of the U.S. Army., quoted in Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 45.

⁴⁴ To be fair, the U.S. Army did carry over from the Indian Wars, in the words of one authority, "a deep appreciation for the value of mobility; a rich heritage of small-unit leadership that stressed self-reliance; aggressive, independent action and open order tactics; a near-obsession with individual marksmanship that at times approached the status of a cult; and a force structure unusually strong in cavalry.", Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, U.S. Army Center of Military History (1998), 87.

VI

IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE

"[W]e have got to infuse new life, new principles, and new methods of doing things."
(BG Leonard Wood to President McKinley)

-Spanish-American War-

During the Spanish-American War of 1898 U.S. troops found themselves on foreign soil for the first time since the Mexican War and overseas for the first time in U.S. history. Also for the first time in U.S. military history, those soldiers had some prior guidance for their relations with the civilian population; the Civil War Lieber Code was re-issued without change. In the meantime, of course, the Lieber Code had been supplemented (but not supplanted) by the Second Hague Convention. While the former had emphasized the occupier's rights (and attempted to limit them), the latter stressed his duty to preserve the *status quo*, so much as was possible. The United States had signed these conventions and their injunctions were spelled out in various Army manuals of the time¹

From a Civil Affairs and Military Government viewpoint, the war itself is significant primarily in its aftermath, that is, in the increased Caribbean interventions and in the military occupations and governments of the territories that the United States acquired from Spain. The conflict itself was brief and, except for the engagement before Santiago, Cuba, the important battles were naval, with the U.S. Navy using Spanish fleets for target practice.

"Latin Military Colony": Military Government in Cuba

The aftermath of the Spanish-American War presented the United States with a nearly unprecedented situation: for the first time (with the exception of Alaska) the nation would be acquiring, in some cases permanently, territories not contiguous to the continental United States. Thus the steps to statehood spelled out in the Northwest Ordinance, and followed, more or less, even in the Mexican Cession might now not be applicable. Secretary of War Elihu Root wrote accurately enough that in this matter, "We have had no precedents, save the simple and meager proceedings under the occupation of California and New Mexico, more than half a century ago." Root was forced to rely on his own interpretation of the Constitution:

We have embarked upon a system of government based upon certain definite principles and fundamental rights of man. When we came to govern colonies, we didn't find anything in the exact words of the Constitution as to what we can do in a colony, and a grammatical construction of the Constitution shows that the limitations apply to States

and not the Federal Government, yet there are general principles that apply to all mankind, and we had to govern according to them.²

Cuban military government differed from that established in Puerto Rico and the Philippines in that in Cuba the United States intended to turn over control to an indigenous government; (although retaining something of a protectorate over the island) Puerto Rico and the Philippines were to remain American possessions for the foreseeable future. However, almost a year after the start of the American military occupation President McKinley had to admit that "Up to this time we have had no policy in regard to Cuba or our relations therewith, for the simple reason that we have had no time to formulate a policy." General Brooke was forced to conduct his government, as he quaintly put it "by induction."³

In Cuba itself, the first Civil Affairs concern was that of refugees and the sanitation problems they caused. The Army commander in Cuba, MG William R. Shafter, cooperated cordially with the local U.S. Red Cross representative, George Kennan, in diverting Army wagons to transport food to the refugee camps. For some reason, General Shafter did not employ Cuban labor for this task, diverting hundreds of soldiers for such work, while able-bodied Cuban males encamped in indolent and diseased squalor.⁴ Yet civilian employment in exchange for food was already Army policy, as noted by the Secretary of War:

To supply food for the destitute, especially in Cuba, is a question which must tax this government greatly, for a time at least. It is a question of humanity to which we cannot turn a deaf ear. Employment is essential to contentment: idleness breeds indolence. The effort should be made to aid these people by giving them work so they may feel they are earning their own bread instead of living upon charity.⁵

Tending to the needs of the destitute was not purely a matter of humanitarianism. Disease knew no nationality; within 34 days after the landings in Cuba more than one-fourth of all Americans there were on sick call. The typhoid fever epidemic that incapacitated so many Americans was spread in large measure through the contamination of the San Juan River by non-combatants who had fled from Santiago to El Caney --where U.S. troops were concentrated.⁶

On the first day of 1899 Cuba officially fell under U.S. military government, with MG John R. Brooke commanding the new Military District of Cuba. Brooke's first proclamation let stand "The civil and criminal code which prevailed prior to the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty," with such modifications as might become necessary "in the interests of good government."⁷ Three years of war, in Brooke's words, had brought "desolation, starvation, and anarchy...almost everywhere."⁸ As usual, of course, aside from various proclamations, the Army had not planned for the administration of the island, bankrupt and devastated by years of revolt against Spanish control. For the immediate future, Brooke's staff assumed control of the various Cuban administrative departments.

The first job of the Americans was to clean up Havana --here they would be headquartered. Under the efficient and energetic COL Tasker Bliss, the American concept of the civilian volunteer was imported, and soon the Citizens' Relief Committee was distributing Army rations to the inhabitants. Customs revenues funded the cleaning and disinfecting of the streets. Soon the Army Signal Corps was operating the telegraph and telephone system, while the postal service was taken over by the U.S. Postmaster General. General Brooke appointed COL William Ludlow, formerly director of the Philadelphia Water Works, as Military Governor of Havana. COL Ludlow boastfully, but not inaccurately, reported that "For the first time, probably in its history, Havana had an honest and efficient government, clean of bribery and speculation, with revenues honestly collected and faithfully and intelligently expended."⁹

For the island as a whole, the Military District of Cuba was divided into four Departments, each headed by a Cuban Secretary with an Advisory Body. A "Cuban Cabinet" was responsible for the routine administration of the island, but the regulations from these indigenous administrators, however, had to go through the headquarters of the Division of Cuba over General Brooke's name.¹⁰

MG Brooke first showed his insensitivity when he forbade the Cubans their victory parade (Cubans had been fighting the Spaniard overlords, off and on, for much of the 19th century.) Again, due to a misunderstanding, Cuban forces who were to have escorted the funeral cortege of the great guerrilla General Calixto Garcia, (who, after all, was a Cuban), were shouldered aside by U.S. contingents. MG Brooke believed that the passions of the moment had not subsided sufficiently for such a display.¹¹ Brooke had not finished with his blunders, however. One of his earliest significant enactments showed a lack of common sense as well as of planning: the remission of all unpaid taxes. This understandably popular measure debilitated what remained of Cuba's financial structure and threw the entire burden of revenue upon the customs service, which became almost entirely Americanized.

In contrast to this rash act, General Brooke refused to authorize the feeding of the multitudes of destitute, on the grounds that they would flock to Army feeding kitchens and disrupt further the nearly-prostrate Cuban economy, until he had received specific authorization from the Secretary of War. Not until the middle of January 1899 did the Army Adjutant General approve the issuing of Army rations for relief of the destitute. (Brooke's subordinate military governor, BG Leonard Wood in Santiago province had been doing just that for the previous five months, with no discernible problems.)¹² Brooke also refused the calls for assistance by planters and farmers for cattle, farming implements and funds to restore their domiciles on the grounds that such aid would smack of paternalism. This was probably simply an excuse, in that Brooke's government at its best was openly paternalistic.¹³

No such hesitation, or such rashness, characterized the early administration of the province of Santiago by BG Leonard Wood. Wood, commander of the Rough Riders and a former Army surgeon, quickly set up a public health system as well as feeding kitchens, weeding out the indolent by a rough inspection system. Wood coaxed the local police out of hiding, provided for their personal and professional needs, and

only called in U.S. troops as a last resort. Appalled by the dead natives and animals scattered about the city and even in the reservoirs, he organized cleanup squads that dug their way through decades of accumulated filth and put his Army engineers to work rehabilitating and modernizing the city's antiquated water system. General Wood was not one to spend a great deal of time in arguing with people, particularly when it came to public health. President McKinley's special commissioner for Cuba reported that

The doors of houses had to be smashed in; people making sewers of the thoroughfares were publicly horsewhipped in the streets of Santiago[!]; eminently respectable citizens were forcibly brought before the commanding general and sentenced to aid in cleaning the streets they were in the habit of defiling.¹⁴

By the end of August "the city fairly gleamed and the air smelled of disinfectant rather than of decomposed filth." Wood then got down to what he termed "modern dirt" which, "while not attractive, is of a less offensive character than [that] of 1520." He was full of plans to transform the city into a modern "Progressive" metropolis with up-to-date sewer and water systems, wide thoroughfares, good schools, etc. Wood's commander then indulged in a six days' drinking spree in which he attacked the Santiago Chief of Police and virtually demolished the barroom scene of his revels. MG Henry W. Lawton was quietly relieved and Wood assumed his place as military governor of Santiago Province.¹⁵

Generals Brook and Wood, however, clashed over a basic question: who should administer military government, Cubans or Americans? Each of General Brooke's four civil administration units were headed by Cubans, but many U.S. however, felt that they were being ordered around by the old and discredited "coffee and rum drinking" pettifogging Creole bureaucracy. Further, Brooke, a slow and cautious bureaucrat, delegated authority to his Provincial Military Governors, but still closely supervised their administration, thus presumably combining the worst of both worlds.¹⁶

In his report to the Secretary of War, Brooke confined his recommendations to such matters as sanitation, sewage and new construction. Declining to speculate on political matters he simply concluded that "The kind of government to be established, and when, is not a subject which the military governor believes to be a subject which can be discussed in this report, if at all."¹⁷

General Wood carefully kept the War Department informed of Brooke's unimaginative administration of the island and worked with his fellow generals to have his chief sacked. In Washington, the dynamic Vice-President, Theodore Roosevelt, was urging that his old Rough Rider commander replace Brooke. Roosevelt accurately summarized Wood's and his own "progressive" imperialist-annexationist philosophy.

Wood believes that we should not promise or give the Cubans independence; that we should govern them justly and equitably, giving

them all possible opportunities for civic and military advancement, and that in two or three years they will insist upon being a part of us.¹⁸

Never one to hide his opinions, Wood informed a *New York Times* correspondent

The Cuban problem can be easily solved. With the right sort of administration everything could be straightened out in six months. Just now there is too much "tommyrot." What is needed is a firm and stable military government in the hands of men who would not hesitate to use severe measures should the occasion arise.¹⁹

Booke's reaction to such public insubordination can be imagined. The mere rumor that the Americans were considering a transfer to a civil government of Cuba was enough to produce a surprisingly widespread protest movement, with telegrams pouring into the military government headquarters, and popular demonstrations being staged in provincial capitals, presumably out of a fear that this change would postpone independence.²⁰

After one day less than a year in office, insensitive, bluff, honest, General Brooke was transferred out, the victim of machinations he could hardly follow, and General Wood took his place. Brooke did have his friends; the entire Cuban Cabinet resigned out of respect for their old governor and in the knowledge that the new military governor favored permanent American control of the island.

Wood enthused, "we have got to infuse new life, new principles, and new methods of doing things."²¹ He immediately reorganized the island's government, establishing four military districts for every province, each headed by a U.S. Army general officer. The new Governor did not remove all native Cuban administrators, but retained those who proved loyal and efficient, reserving Army officers solely for overall supervision but giving those officers almost complete responsibility.²² Wood remained convinced, however, that Cuban affairs should remain under the tutelage of American military government. A few months after assuming office as Military Governor of Cuba, Wood wrote privately to President McKinley, "The Cuban people, as a whole, realize very fully that they are not ready for self-government and the only people who are howling for it are those whose antecedents and actions demonstrate the impossibility of self-government just at present." After all, Wood wrote later, "we are dealing with a race that has steadily been going down for a hundred years." Later he lamented that they were "such stupid, downtrodden people", but he nonetheless "hope[d] to bring them into shape before long." Secretary Root argued along similar lines that "We are trying to give the Cuban people just as fair and favorable a start in governing themselves as possible....To succeed in their experiment the Cubans must necessarily acquire some new ideas and new methods."

The question remained: if not self-government now, when? Wood confided to Root that military government should remain for "years, several of them at least," to foreshorten that government "would be to betray the cause of civilization."²³ "Teddy" Roosevelt had no doubt that Wood was the man for the job of dealing with the

Spaniards and Cubans: "They like him, trust him, and down in their hearts are afraid of him."²⁴

Wood also gave enthusiastic support to the Walter Reed Commission, which centered its attention on the theories of the Cuban physician, Dr. Carlos Finlay, that yellow fever's organisms were transmitted by a type of mosquito common to the area, rather than somehow by "miasmatic vapors." As a result, "yellow jack" was practically eradicated from Cuba and large areas of the world. (Yet amid the mutual congratulations, it was seldom remarked that this disease rarely afflicted the Cubans themselves. The boon was mainly to the Americans and the rest of the world.)²⁵ Certainly the US Army itself benefited from General Wood's public health programs; the Army's Chief Surgeon reported for the year 1900 that an American soldier was three times more likely to die of a disease in the United States than in Cuba!²⁶

General Wood was a man of almost omnivorous interests, ordering, for example, the codification of Spanish and Cuban criminal and civil law. He further rehabilitated the island's devastated economy, establishing broadly-based, moderate and fair property taxes that were sufficient to keep the local governments working and also to pay the cost of the occupying army. He later instituted an extensive public works system as funds permitted, building roads and railroads and stringing telegraph wires into the interior, paving streets, installing sewers, and in general bringing to Cuba the bustle of "progress" and "improvements" that so characterized early 20th century America itself. Wood even ordered the Army to build mills to process the island's sugar, 50 percent of which was grown by Cubans or Spaniards rather than American corporations as late as 1920.²⁷

In the field, junior officers were able to carry on Wood's work in detail. For example, the 2d lieutenant who commanded the sub-district of Baracoa in the district of Guantamo, Department of Santiago, from 1899 to 1902:

1) Commanded a detachment of the 10th (all-black) U.S. Cavalry and was the tactical commander of a detachment of Cuban rural police. With these forces small gangs of bandits were cleaned out.

2) Served as military commandant of the city (which included Baracoa itself and many square miles about.)

3) Fulfilled the duties of Collector of customs with a clerical and inspecting force of some 20 Cubans,

4) In his spare time, he was also Captain of the Port, American Consul, Inspector of Schools, lighthouse inspector, engineer officer, seeing that streets and wharves were built and kept in repair, and swamps drained; and chief sanitary officer, chiefly involved in fighting mosquitoes and yellow fever.²⁸

Nonetheless, for Progressives, education was the surest way to progress, for "Anglo-Saxons" and "lesser breeds" alike. The foundations of a vastly-improved school system had actually been established during the tenure of General Brooke, when

Secretary Root had sent renowned American geographer, Alexis E. Frye, to the island. Root told Fry that the only purpose of public education was to "train citizens." These were to be good citizens of Cuba; Root made it quite clear that there would be no going back on America's promise of an independent Cuba (more or less). The Cuban school system had almost disintegrated during the rebellion against Spain, and even in peaceful times the pupils were taught in the homes of the teachers, many appointed on political grounds, who eked out their meager salaries by charging fees. Learning was by rote and the principal textbook the Roman Catholic Catechism. This "system" accommodated barely one-tenth of the school-age children of the island. General Wood continued his strong military government support for reformed Cuban education, but he also agreed with Frye that all teaching in Cuba should be conducted by Cubans, and in Spanish. Considering the times in which he lived, Wood was remarkably sensitive to Cuban fears that his government intended to "Americanize" Cuba. Frye, with the general's enthusiastic support, arranged to send 1200 Cuban teachers to Harvard for the summer term of 1900 and Secretary Root assigned five Army transports for this service.²⁹ (Harvard's president raised \$70,000 for the project.) The teacher-trainees also visited other American education centers, conferred with leading educators and themselves became something of an attraction for the social season. They returned full of enthusiasm and soon Cuban public school enrollment reached a record high. In a sense, MG Wood had the best of both worlds; the teachers were Cubans, but they returned from their U.S. tour for the most part favorably disposed to the "American Colossus."

Soon after, however, Wood and Frye had a bitter falling out; Frye's ideas often seemed to outrun the available resources, to Wood disgust. Wood felt even more strongly about the educator's "spreading the most intense radicalism as to the future relations between Cuba and the United States."³⁰ Frye departed in January 1901, to be succeeded by an officer on Wood's staff, LT Matthew E. Hanna. Wood replaced Brooke's school organization with one drawn up by LT Hanna, based on that of the school law of Hanna's home state of Ohio. New textbooks were simply translated from American English into Spanish, with no attempt to make them relevant to Cuban experience. Whatever the cultural insensitivities of the system, by the end of 1901 most Cuban children were receiving free public education and the moribund University of Havana had been revitalized. Of all the works of American military government in Cuba, education was the most popular among the Cuban people.³¹ At least as far as schooling was concerned, General Woods' doubts about Cuban self-government seemed justified. With the end of American military government, education took a lower priority for the Havana government and the Cuban schools entered a gradual decline not halted until the 1960s.³²

Proclaiming that "the law is excellent, the procedure alone is bad," Wood set to reforming the judiciary.³³ One authority describes the Cuban legal system of the day as

a luxuriant bureaucracy and a dizzying intricacy of procedure which made difficult, if not impossible, the efficient dispensing of justice. At

each of the endless steps which constituted a legal case, the payment of a fee was necessary, and lawsuits tended to become financial endurance contests in which the wealthiest litigant simply outlasted his opponent.³⁴

Governor Wood first ordered a literal clean-up of the shocking conditions found in Cuban prisons and established police courts to clear out the back-log clogging the old courts by giving summary judgments in minor cases. Corrupt and incompetent judges were removed and the pernicious fee system replaced by salaries. Wood saw to the detail that the courts be supplied with "typewriting machines." So far, so good. But Wood, writing to Theodore Roosevelt in 1899, asserted that "Nothing more idiotic can be imagined than the attempt to establish a liberal government under Spanish laws."³⁵ Acting on this sentiment, the Military Governor then tried to engraft such Anglo-Saxon legal concepts as the jury system and *habeas corpus* onto the Roman law concepts of Cuba, to much confusion. Wood's Cuban Secretary of Justice then drafted an *habeas corpus* decree that was merely an appeal process, subject to proceedings and their attendant delay, while the subject remained incarcerated: not that much different from the old Spanish law. American legal authorities finally had to draft a legal instrument that more forthrightly conformed to the Anglo-Saxon principle.³⁶ These last two reforms created resentment within much of the Cuban bar, who regarded the Spanish system as part of their heritage.³⁷ Cuban jurors "declared frankly that they were not going to act as judges to convict their friends."³⁸ This reform probably strengthened long-term anti-American feelings among the Cuban intelligentsia, dominated by the bar.

The Military Governor proved more successful with agricultural interests, offering them bank loans, then sent a deputation to Mexico which brought back \$100,000 worth of cattle and allowed easy terms for their purchase. Wood directed the same arrangements for agricultural implements and horses.³⁹

Some culturally-sensitive Cubans might claim that if the military government was not overtly attempting to "Americanize" the island, it did seem to be trying to "Protestantize" Cuba, with arbitrary regulations against the ringing of church bells, gambling and Sabbath enforcement, matters which seemed to go well beyond any legitimate military government concern. More seriously, many American officers mindlessly brought the "color line" to a land that was considerably more easy-going in racial matters.⁴⁰ As was to be expected, with the best units shipped off to fight the Philippine Insurrection, troop misbehavior and public drunkenness and the sheer presence of no less than 10,000 soldiers became a problem that threatened to undo much of the goodwill generated by General Wood's progressive policies.

As far as most Americans were concerned, their nation had entered the Spanish-American War to liberate Cuba. Thus General Wood ordered elections held for the future leaders of the Cuban Republic and for the Cuban Constitutional Convention.⁴¹ Wood believed that the "better" elements of Cuban society, primarily the planter class, were favorable to American interests. He therefore saw to it that the franchise was limited to the literate and propertied (a goal many Progressives would have liked to

have attained in the United States itself), and to the veterans of the Cuban guerrilla army.⁴²

Nonetheless, Governor Wood had his troubles with the newly-elected Cuban civil officials, many of whom were inexperienced, sometimes unfit, and who often pandered to their constituents by the wholesale creation of government jobs, clerkships, police positions, etc. Military government had to suspend some *alcaldes* (municipal councils) while others were charged with serious offenses. Wood's basic problem here was that he was attempting to devolve authority to the local level in distinct contrast to the prevailing Spanish system of centralized authority with Havana at the apex. Wood privately wrote Secretary Root that he considered the Cuban politicians who had just won office as "in a certain sense doctors without patients, lawyers without practice and demagogues living on the subscriptions of the people and their friends."⁴³ By the time government was turned over to the Cubans, however, Wood could take some pride in the fact that the island's municipalities had been overhauled and were self-supporting. He remained dubious about the quality of the officials, however, for it was difficult to interest "the property-holding element in the conduct of the island's political affairs."⁴⁴

In many ways General Wood personified the ideal "Progressive" American reformer of the time. He was a well-educated, non-partisan, (preferably non-elected) executive from a "good [i.e., Northern European] background" administering public affairs also through non-elected experts, all for the public's good. Even in dealing with the Cuban railways Wood was looking well beyond the island. Thoroughly aware of the great demand for reform of the railroads' supposed monopolistic power in the United States, Wood appointed a Railroad Commission to regulate rates and basically replicate the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. When the Cuban railroads balked at such regulation, the Secretary of the United States Interstate Commerce Commission encouraged Wood in words that could have been taken as the rationale for every such commission either in existence or soon to assume power in the United States itself:

I'm convinced that the railroad commission, composed of men of high character, is determined to follow the reasonable and correct course, dealing fairly with all, and while having the interest of the State and welfare of the people fully in view, do no act of injustice to the railroads."⁴⁵

Wood's honest, efficient military government was held up in the U.S. as an off-shore example of Progressive ideas and policies at work. One of the founding fathers of Progressivism, Herbert Croly, claimed that American military occupation and its reforms "far from hindering the process of domestic amelioration, availed, from the sheer force of national aspirations it aroused, to give a tremendous impulse to the work of national reform."⁴⁶ Although never actually nominated, General Wood was a serious contender for the Presidency as a Progressive Republican.

The sentiments of Secretary Root and Governor Wood and those of their fellow Progressive imperialists must be seen in the light of the "reforming" zeal of their times, as well as in the context of the military necessities of that age of imperialism. As

paternalistic, even racist as these sentiments might now seem, they were well in advance of the other contemporary imperialist powers, who had no intention of granting independence for their possessions, and for whom the extending of even local self-government was a laborious and lengthy process.

There is some evidence that the imposition of American military government almost reignited the Cuban revolt. With the Spaniards gone, however, the *insurrectos* were now disunited. Some continued to yearn for independence, others actually desired annexation and still others became resigned to some limited American tutelage.⁴⁷ Whatever its condescending or paternalistic aspects, however, it cannot be seriously denied that U.S. military government left Cuba a far cleaner, safer and more prosperous place when it turned over authority to a new indigenous civilian administration on 20 May 1902. A year after relinquishing office, General Wood summarized his government of Cuba as "the establishment, in a little over three years, in a Latin military colony, in one of the most unhealthy countries of the world, a republic modeled closely upon the lines of our own great Anglo-Saxon republic."⁴⁸

Army of Cuban Pacification/Provisional Government

Cuba had not seen the last of U.S. Military Government. In 1906, with the island again approaching chaos, the Cuban President appealed to the United States for assistance. In early September Marine and Army forces (the latter numbering some 6,000 under the command of MG J. Franklin Bell) landed in the island and soon restored order. Secretary of War William Howard Taft immediately after the first landings proclaimed a provisional government with himself as chief executive. Two weeks later, Taft appointed the former civil governor of the Canal Zone, Charles E. Magoon, as his replacement. Magoon's government consisted of the Departments of State, Justice, Government, Treasury, Public Works, Public Instruction, Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, Sanitary Department, Rural Guard and Board of State Aid to Municipalities.⁴⁹ It was, in the words of one authority:

distinctly American-conservative. It was not a businessmen's government in the sense that the requirements of the large sugar and tobacco planters and the banking and commercial institutions received highest priority. Rather it was a government of lawyers, judges, bureaucrats, and soldiers ruling, largely, by balancing what they conceived to be in the national interest of Cuba with the demands of American foreign policy.⁵⁰

The government was composed of American Army officers and Cuban civilians. (*politicos*). Over the months the power and influence of those American officers grew and became increasingly important both in the national government and in the countryside. This was in large measure due to the greater confidence Governor

Magoon had for the officers. He considered them energetic, incorruptible, well-trained and loyal.⁵¹

The Provisional Government worked assiduously to improve Cuban living conditions; for humanitarian reasons as well as to forestall further Cuban revolts and unrest. It labored to make the island economically viable for Cubans and Americans and, in a sense, to pick up where General Wood had left off just a few years previous.

One of the first missions of the U.S. troops in this renewed occupation was the construction of the first accurate topographical map of Cuba.⁵² Army Engineers embarked on an ambitious road-building program which doubled the mileage of Cuba's paved roads (which originally had been fewer than those on Jamaica, a considerably smaller island), and in the areas affected halved the costs of transporting sugar and tobacco.⁵³

It was typical of Army military government out in the provinces that a Captain of the 28th Infantry was put in charge of a correctional school for wayward boys and apparently gave complete satisfaction. However, it was a possible indication that the earlier Wood reforms had not set deep roots that the Army of Cuban pacification had once again to clean up the island's prisons.⁵⁴

In the field of public health, much remained to be done from the Wood administration. The Cubans, relatively immune to yellow fever, paid for their good fortune by being ravaged with typhoid, malaria, cholera and tuberculosis. Considering sanitary conditions on the island, this was not surprising.⁵⁵ Governor Magoon placed Army officers on each municipal board of health, and then nationalized the entire Cuban public health system, although it did remain heavily politicized.⁵⁶

U.S. Army officers also attempted to reform the Cuban Army, to mold it into the form of the apolitical U.S. Army. The only result of American reform here was the growth of the Cuban Army to the point where it could quell insurrections, as it demonstrated adequately enough in the "Race War" of 1912. It remained as fiscally corrupt and as politicized as before, particularly after the departure of the Americans. The American-reformed Cuban Army was, from its beginning, an instrument for the *politicos* to retain their power.⁵⁷

The American military administrators were in an almost unresolvable quandary. They knew that they would soon have to leave the island again. They also sincerely wished to leave Cuba as a well-administered, prosperous and democratic land. Good administration and prosperity seemed to require, in the absence of qualified Cubans, American administrators. However, democracy would probably open the way to power for those Cuban *politicos* who had so far evinced little enough interest in good government. All the Americans could hope for was to leave in place so well-established a system of laws and so efficient an administration that even the *politicos* would be under some public pressure to maintain them.

This was, of course, all high policy. Despite the best efforts of Army officers, U.S. troops and locals clashed in the cities. For example, on the night of 13 February 1908, shooting erupted at Lajas, Santa Clara, over the presence of some of those troops in "a house of ill repute." A Military Intelligence officer blamed "four or five degenerates who spend all their time and but little money in these places.", and who

drove out local customers --certainly inflammatory behavior. U.S. military malefactors, however, did not have to fear the punishment of any Cuban court. A decree of the military government stipulated that even offenses by Americans against Cuban law would be tried in provisional courts convened by the provisional governor.⁵⁸

Military Intelligence kept a detailed, near daily record of political developments. Of particular concern was "the negroes [who] continue to work for the recognition of their race. The feeling of uneasiness and agitation seems to grow from day to day among them." A few months later an MI officer forwarded a report from the intelligence officer at Cardenas noting that "The most inflammatory speech heard was made by a negro Liberal orator in the Plazon Colon last week, in which he exhorted the "Blacks" to get together and rule - that they must dominate or the Conservatives will pluck all the plums from the pie."⁵⁹ The Americans were not to interfere in any way with Cuban political factions, only to prevent disorder, but they acted quickly in reaction to a conspiracy by one Masso Parra to raise revolution and "kill Americans." On "R-Day" (27 September 1907) Senor Parro was arrested, but given only a three years sentence. A more serious threat may have been posed by Urbano Guerra (a "chronic revolutionist"), whose band of eight desperados with the "avowed purpose of raising a revolution", turned instead to cattle and horse rustling. Military government sentences on his quickly-captured group ranged from 10 years to life, although it is unclear whether these stiffer legal impositions were for plotting revolution or for larceny.⁶⁰ The Provisional Government also had to face a wave of strikes and labor unrest, some accompanied by violence, which "paralyzed" the island's principal industries, particularly the railroads. Governor Magoon would have been pardoned for believing that even nature was conspiring against him, as Cuba endured floods and a major cyclone in 1906 and droughts in 1907.⁶¹

In the end, the American Army of Cuban Pacification did little more than temporarily pacify Cuba without alienating most Cubans. As the primary authority on this episode in Progressive Imperialism wrote in conclusion:

Colonel Crowder did not get the reformed legal codes; Lieutenant Colonel Bullard did not get the chance to rebuild the educational system; Lieutenant Colonel Black did not get the better roads and waterworks he wanted to construct; Lieutenant Colonel Greble did not have enough time to purge the incompetents from the Department of Government; Major Kean had to leave the epidemic disease problem relatively untouched; Major Slocum did not get the Rural Guard thoroughly professionalized.⁶²

In fact, in many ways, most of the "reforms" and "improvements" carried out by the Army of Cuban Pacification simply made it that much easier for the *politicos* and the Cuban Army to consolidate their power and to oppress their people.⁶³

The troops of the Army of Cuban Pacification had for the most part cleared Havana when Governor Magoon ceremonially transferred the Cuban government to Jose Miguel Gomez. After receiving a warm *abrasso* from the latter, Magoon was

taken by a launch to the new battleship *Maine* for passage to the United States. Cheering thousands lined the Havana rooftops, every head uncovered, as a Cuban military band played, at Magoon's request, the Cuban National Anthem. The last U.S. troops turned over their barracks to the Cuban Army on 31 March 1907 and their officers were toasted at a banquet in their honor that night, given by grateful Cuban officers. Once again, the island was ripe for the plucking by its own.

Puerto Rico

The United States military needed little fighting to seize control of Puerto Rico. In fact, there was already some sentiment among certain indigenous intellectuals for annexation to the United States, although with a high degree of autonomy.⁶⁴ The first U.S. Army military governor, MG Nelson Miles, the old Indian fighter, perfervedly proclaimed that the United States military had come to "give this beautiful Island the greatest degree of liberty compatible with military occupation..." and to bestow "upon you the guarantees and the blessings of the liberal institutions of our Government."⁶⁵ More tangibly, Miles kept almost all existing courts, municipal laws, police forces in effect, so long as they were submissive to U.S. military authority. As in Cuba, U.S. military personnel were not subject to the native criminal courts.

His successor, MG Brooke, proved less amenable to native sensibilities. Early in his administration, which commenced in October 1898, General Brooke ordered that the *Gaceta Oficial* be printed in English, and arbitrarily anglicized the very name of the island to "Porto Rico." Brooke was careful to continue Miles' policy of local non-interference with persons and property, however. He also established an Insular Council for governing the island, appointed members of a nascent supreme court, and re-opened the schools. (One source states that on the entire island there was not one building that was actually being used as a schoolhouse.) With banditry and worse in the countryside as a result of the chaos in the immediate post-war period, Brooke set up a special military commission to try such hard cases.

U.S. military government in Puerto Rico was basically one in which the usual staff officers of any military headquarters also performed civil duties, although line officers could be similarly engaged. Brooke did establish the Office of Civil Secretary as the immediate head of Civil Affairs on the island, as well as an Advisory Board, composed entirely of island natives, and a Judicial Board comprising three natives and a law judge of the U.S. Provisional Court, and an Army Judge Advocate. Lesser boards of health, education, charities, etc. were also composed of a mixture of mainland Americans and Puerto Ricans.⁶⁶

Something like euphoria reigned, at least among the urban population, in these early months, a feeling that the United States was about to solve most of the island's problems, and at the same time allow its inhabitants to go about their own affairs unmolested. As early as November of 1898, however, the native literate classes were beginning to worry about the imposition of Army-supported Yankee culture. One Don Edwardo Newman, mounting the platform to take exception to the preaching and singing of one of the more fervent of American Protestant missionaries in the capital

plaza, was hauled off to an Army camp by two American troopers. A crowd assembled outside the camp and the nationalistic "profane orator" was soon released.⁶⁷ As a result of drunken brawls by some troops and sailors and a general cultural insensitivity displayed by the military government, both literate and general public opinion began to cool towards that government. General Brooke wearily recorded sentiments that seemingly every combat commander finding himself in an unanticipated and unwelcome military government situation would heartily affirm:

military men are not experienced in affairs of civil government and there are many perplexing questions which we find ourselves unprepared for. Here, for instance, is a remonstrance against the free importation of Porto Rican [sic] coffee into Cuba. An intelligent decision requires hours of study in tariffs, crop reports, markets, etc....⁶⁸

General Brooke's successor, BG Guy V. Henry, knew little and cared less about the island's ways. In one of his first letters to the Army Adjutant General he unburdened himself of the opinion that the people "notwithstanding their gentle and peaceful nature, have acquired very liberally the Spanish habit of lying and cannot be trusted." General Henry did concede that this unhappy characteristic "may have resulted from dishonest administration."⁶⁹

Like MG Brooke, however, General Henry was a "reformer," whose agenda included improved sanitation (even forbidding the stacking of bones in the corners of cemeteries), electoral reform, an American-style police force, a vastly-extended education system --in English-- with female American teachers brought onto the island, and under the control of an Army General. Henry taxed land on the basis of its value and success of cultivation, with the heaviest imposts on absentee landlords' holdings. He forbade imposts on bread and fresh meat in the interests of the poor, and, also in their interests, imposed a heavy impost on alcohol and tobacco, hoping that this measure would close numbers of saloons. Not so benignly, Henry tightened press censorship, to which at least one disgusted island journal responded pointedly with references to American traditions of freedom of the press. Furthermore, apparently having learned nothing from his economic experience in Cuba, Henry suspended the law of real estate foreclosure, making it impossible to raise money for improvements, with devastating effects on the island's business.⁷⁰

Early in 1899 General Henry dissolved the Insular Cabinet, which had been established in 1897 (that is, during the last year of Spanish rule), on the unarguable grounds that it was "not compatible with American methods and progress." A new civil government was established which lost even the autonomy granted in 1897 and was an instrument of General Henry. The general obviously had in mind government for the people of Puerto Rico, with little provision for government by those people, a common criticism of Progressive reformers of the time.

To be fair, General Henry iterated to the civil authorities that "There is no authority for officers or soldiers to interfere with the proceedings of the town councils, or even to enter therein.", and took immediate action against one such offending

officer. He himself, however, did not hesitate to interfere with local councils' workings if he suspected corruption or disorder, proclaiming flatly that "Alcaldes and councilmen are reminded that orders are issued to be obeyed."⁷¹

General Henry' successor, BG George W. Davis, in the summer of 1899, actually referred to current codification of the island's laws as "to suit the change that may soon come and which all desire, that is, complete territorial autonomy.", a rather advanced notion in that age of imperialism.⁷² Yet in October of that year even he found it necessary "to advert in strong terms to the general unfitness of the great mass of the people for self-government.", and proceeded to outline his not-uncommon universal racial prejudices by arguing that:

If the disenfranchisement of the negro illiterates of the Union can be justified, the same in Porto Rico can be defended on equally good grounds....The vast majority of the people are no more fit to take part in self-government than are our reservation Indians, from whom the suffrage is withheld unless they pay taxes. They are certainly far inferior in the social, intellectual, and industrial scale to the Chinese, who for very good reasons are forbidden to own land on our shores.⁷³

The military governor was here actually justifying withholding some basic democratic concepts by referring to the situation in the United States! As for the island's legal system, the solution was "to adapt their old laws and methods to the new conditions, for it is useless, and indeed impossible, to wipe out the existing statues and secure intelligent observance of an exotic code of justice and procedure." General Davis further pointed out that although the prevailing precedent was for U.S. Army military governments to leave the laws of an occupied territory basically in effect to the extent that they did not interfere with the functioning of those governments, the United States and its Army in this case was attempting to change those laws.⁷⁴

General Davis also had to concern himself with electoral and municipal reforms, aid to the formerly-established church, with the codification of marriage and divorce laws and with public health and education regulations. Some truly "Americanizing" educational provisions authorized coeducation, limited the school year to nine months and eliminated religion from the classrooms.⁷⁵ General Davis, however, still basically failed in his attempts to bring order to the island's chaotic school system.⁷⁶

In the midst of this reforming and codification, the law officer of the Division of Customs and Insular Affairs, in response to an inquiry by the Secretary of War about General Davis' codification of civil marriage and divorce, issued a ruling that, at least in theory, would have simply ended American military government of any of the nation's new-found possessions in time of peace. Judge Charles E. Magoon argued that:

When the war ended, the civilians were relegated to the civil code. The commanding general in time of peace cannot exercise the right and powers of a commander of a belligerent force....The President is the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United States. He has called upon Congress to legislate for Porto Rico....Therefore, the General in command...is now prevented from exercising such authority by the action of his superior officer, the President United States.⁷⁷

Obviously, Judge Magoon's ruling was not followed, and it drops from the record. Even if the U.S. Congress were to legislate for Puerto Rico, how and by whom would its enactments be carried out? What body would be responsible for the daily operation of the civil government of the island? Presumably, the judge himself realized that his was an exercise in pure theory. General Davis seemed to recognize his anomalous legal position, for he took some pains to point out that "the course adopted [by his military government] is understood to have been, tacitly at least approved by Congress, for with two slight exceptions....every order promulgated by the military governors has been confirmed by Congressional enactment."⁷⁸

Governor Davis repeated General Brooke's mistake in ordering a moratorium on farm mortgages. He had even less success in ordering that all wages and salaries be paid in U.S. currency and in enforcing his elaborate wages and hours codes. As for his attempts to provide for the writ of *habeas corpus* and to set up a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, these ideas were almost totally alien to the island's ways.⁷⁹

One authority on the American role in Puerto Rico summarized U.S. military governors on the island as making "a serious and honest effort to better conditions of the people of Puerto Rico. Their greatest failings were in the lack of understanding of a people with different traditions and in the rather blunt expression of chauvinism."⁸⁰

It could be argued, however, that in light of the continued impoverishment of the island, lack of significant economic improvement was the most severe failing of U.S. military government. Although American administration did bring a new measure of peace to the countryside, and eventually greatly improved the school system, little else of U.S. military government could touch the majority population of rural, subsistence *peones*. General Davis' chief officer responsible for welfare recorded that in 1899:

The population numbered 960,000, or about 260 to the square mile, and nearly 800,000 could neither read nor write. Most of these lived in bark huts, and were in effect the personal property of the landed proprietors. When work was obtained, they received 35 cents for a day's labor, which they would invest in sugar, tobacco, coffee, rum, lard, salt, and occasionally clothing; when not, they continued to live on plantains, bananas, potatoes, and other so-called *fruta minora* of the country. They were poor beyond the possibility of our understanding, and if they were so fortunate as to have enough for the current hour they were content.⁸¹

General Davis himself stoically concluded that "A vast number of the inhabitants will probably remain submerged in poverty and ignorance."⁸² It must have been with no

little relief that General Davis, as the last Military Governor of Porto Rico/Puerto Rico turned over his government to a civil governor on 1 May 1900.

The Philippines and Insurrection

The Philippine Islands represented a far more serious challenge than Cuba or Puerto Rico, for here, for the first and only time, large numbers of indigenous inhabitants raised extended rebellion against U.S. Army military government. Previous resistance or uprisings, such as in New Mexico, had proved small-scale and short-lived.

A little more than one month after U.S. Commodore George Dewey's victory over the Spanish Pacific fleet in Manila Bay on 1 May 1898, Philippine insurgents (against Spain) controlled most of the main island of Luzon outside the capital, Manila, and declared the independence of the Philippines. The United States, however, had made no promises to the Philippine insurgent commander, General Emilio Aguinaldo, regarding Philippine independence, and on 19 May 1898, the archipelago was placed under American military government.⁸³ To make matters worse, in a repetition of the Havana imbroglio, the American command denied combined occupation of Manila after that city had fallen to a combined Filipino-American assault. The Treaty of Paris, signed on 10 December 1898, ended the war but bitterly disappointed the insurgents. The Philippines had been ceded to the United States. President McKinley soon after instructed the commander of U.S. forces in Manila, MG Elwell S. Otis, to extend with all possible haste American control over all the islands of the archipelago. He was also to prove that the mission of the United States was "one of benevolent assimilation," although the "strong arm of authority" was to be exerted "to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of good and stable government." Nonetheless, assimilation by a foreign power, however "benevolent," held few if any charms for the insurgent leaders, who, with their own forces, had liberated the heartland of the Philippines. Echoing military governors Wood in Cuba and Davis in Puerto Rico, General Otis claimed that although his proclamation of 1 January 1899 had been received "by the better classes of natives with satisfaction," the people in general were "incapable of self-government."⁸⁴

This was the America's and Europe's "Age of Empire" and many American business and political leaders feared that if the United States did not do its "duty," other powers, such as Germany or Great Britain, would eventually seize or control the islands, to the detriment of the Philippines as well as of the United States. Then again, many Americans opposed any foreign adventures in imperialism and could number in their ranks such literary figures as Mark Twain and William Dean Howells.⁸⁵ The insurgents indeed were hoping that the national elections of 1900 would produce an anti-imperialist majority that would liquidate America's Philippine empire.⁸⁶

President McKinley did not lightly make his decision to hold on to the Philippines, and publicly confessed that on his knees he had besought divine guidance in the matter. Seizing upon the suggestion of Admiral Dewey the President organized a committee of wise men, military and civilian, under the chairmanship of Dr. Jacob G. Schurman, President of Cornell University, to visit the islands and determine American policy. But matters were already moving beyond McKinley's control. On the night of 4 February, 1899, one month before the arrival of the Schurman Commission, fighting broke out between U.S. and Filipino forces outside Manila. This was the beginning of

one of America's nastiest, most unrewarding military episodes, one in which more than 70,000 American troops would be eventually deployed. Both sides committed atrocities and the conflict, as is almost always the case in such insurgencies, proved particularly hard upon civilians.

American military government of the Philippines began auspiciously enough with the cleaning up of Manila, a metropolis that had been running down for months and where open sewage ran into the streets of a city that faced anarchy as well as epidemic. The Spanish administrators were less than helpful, mulishly refusing either to cooperate with the Americans or to give them any particular information on the city's governance.

Unabashed, the U.S. military commander, MG Wesley Merritt (General Otis' successor), triumphantly proclaimed that his troops came, "not as despoilers and oppressors but simply [as] the instruments of a strong, free government whose purposes are beneficent." Merritt ordered his Provost Marshal to take over the policing of the city, although, and in accordance with U.S. Army military government traditions, the existing laws and regulations were to continue so long as they did not interfere with that military government. The Provost Marshal did "interfere," however, in Manila's abominable prisons. Troops released some 2,000 unsentenced, unrecorded prisoners, striking off heavy iron chains from inmates and putting them to compensated labor building bamboo cots for the Army. A Filipino-American Army Board of Health examined dwellings, markets, slaughterhouses and any establishment that could affect the city's health; vaccinated the entire city for small pox, gave other vaccinations, ran a leper hospital, registered prostitutes and established a hospital for diseased members of the profession and worked with Army engineers to purify the city's water.

The Roman Catholic chaplain of the 1st California Volunteers was given the task of re-opening and secularizing the city's schools. Soon most schools had an English language teacher, usually a literate American soldier.⁸⁷ The American Expeditionary Force was particularly fortunate in that something like 75 percent of its troops were volunteers recently removed from their civilian occupations. In the words of a British observer:

lawyers, merchants, postal clerks, tradesmen, office hands of all descriptions university men; and, indeed, it would be difficult to say what trade or calling is not represented. From among these men it was possible to draw fairly proficient officials.⁸⁸

Here again, as in Cuba and Puerto Rico, the American Progressive dream of non-partisan, reforming, government by disinterested, well-trained e'lites was put into effect overseas.⁸⁹ Such municipal beneficence, however, had little effect through the countryside where the insurrectionists gathered their strength. As General Otis reported:

A column of 3,000 [American troops] could march through and successfully control with any force which the insurgents could place in

its route, but they would close in behind it and prey upon the inhabitants, persecuting without mercy those who manifested any friendly feeling toward the American troops."⁹⁰

General Otis showed less perception when he claimed that he had stifled the insurrection by conventional operations, clearing the insurgents from most towns in Luzon and capturing their political and military strongpoints. The conflict was simply entering a new and more intractable stage, that of guerrilla insurgency. Americans themselves had carried out such warfare in the Southern Department during the Revolutionary War and had won. They had also carried out a more or less continuous series of counter-insurgency campaigns against the Indians of the trans-Mississippi West and, of course, had won. As noted, however, none of this invaluable experience had been called upon by the Army; conventional, European-type warfare against a conventional opponent was the almost completely prevailing doctrine. Nonetheless, even General Otis managed to reopen almost 1500 public schools in the countryside and to provide them with textbooks (expending more than \$41,000 for stationery supplies alone) and teachers.⁹¹ He rehabilitated the courts and local police forces, and abolished "useless offices inherited from the Spanish." Less positively, he fined a Filipino newspaper \$250 for what he termed "abuse and calumny", reporting that the penalty "has had beneficial effects." The high-handed Otis proved surprisingly lenient, on the other hand, with the southern islands. Reporting their native rule as "perfect despotism," and the masses of peasants held in serfdom, Otis nevertheless concluded that "The United States must accept these people as they are." There is no indication that the general saw this move as a means of weaning the population from the insurrectos. At the close of his first year as Military Governor, Otis wearily noted that his Civil Affairs-Military Government responsibilities consumed more of his resources than did the actual fighting:

The experience of the past year has conclusively demonstrated that the labor demanded to organize, supply, command, and exchange an army actively engaged in hostilities are small in comparison to those which are required to supervise the business, social and political interests and the individual rights of several millions of people.⁹²

The Schurman Commission in the meanwhile had issued its report, asserting that Filipino suspicion of whites, the selfish ambitions of Tagalog leaders and the persistent misrepresentation of American motives and goals were the major reasons for the continuation of the insurgency. It concluded that civil authority should be extended immediately to General Otis's supposedly pacified areas as an inducement to those still in revolt to cease their resistance.⁹³

President McKinley, pleased that the Schurman Commission's conclusions paralleled his own, tried to induce the members to return for a second tour of the islands. When all but one refused, the President established a second commission to study the Philippines problem, this time under the chairmanship of U.S. Circuit Court

Judge (and future President and Supreme Court Chief Justice) William Howard Taft.⁹⁴ Unlike the Schurman Commission, this later commission was to be far more than merely a fact-finding body; it was specifically instructed to see to the transfer of all legislative authority from the military governor to itself by 1 September 1900, as well as to establish municipal and provincial authorities and to prepare the central government for a transfer from military to civilian administrators. Further, Filipinos were to receive preference in the filling of the higher governmental posts, quite "advanced" conclusions compared to those of the other colonializing powers.

The military government completely revised the Spanish legal system to such an extent that the Army had to appoint special aides to assist Filipino judges and lawyers through the new framework.⁹⁵ General Otis also reformed and centralized an iniquitous tax system in which a licensed local entrepreneur would forward to the capital the stipulated sum from his district. The means and the amounts he extorted were entirely his business. As General Otis noted dryly, "The position [of tax collector] was generally sought, as it conferred authority, individual distinction, and personal pecuniary gain when conscience did not intervene." Perhaps less happily, General Otis, like General Scott in Mexico, revived a royal Spanish stamp decree, a type of enactment that had helped to alienate his own colonial forefathers from the British Empire.⁹⁶

American forces thus found themselves involved in remaking the political, economic, judicial and even social life of the archipelago, well beyond Manila. Early in 1900, following the conclusions of the second Philippine Commission, General Otis had ordered the establishment of municipal governments in Luzon's towns, consisting of a local *presidente* (mayor), town council and police force

Local garrisons were also mandated to institute sanitary reforms, build or improve roads and foster local schools.⁹⁷ For example, the civil governor of La Union province, COL Wessels, 3d Cavalry, routinely reported in March of 1900 that one MAJ E. M. Johnson, 29th Infantry, had supervised elections in all pueblos, consisting of 104 barrios, which resulted in the installation of local *presidentes* and had already established schools and police systems. However, another officer-administrator had to report that his *presidente* had been accused of aiding the insurgents, and when ordered to appear before the officer had fled into the bush.⁹⁸ Certainly, loyal local government officials in the contested areas often lived in fear, knowing that the insurgents would kill them for collaborating with the Americans. The Commander of the 1st Military District reported back to Manila that the local police were "a nerveless lot, with insufficient food and pay.", who "seem to do well enough in protecting the towns from *ladrones* [bandits], but in most of the towns where they are not in sympathy with the insurgents, they are very much afraid of them and dare not go to the far barrios."⁹⁹ The commander of the Philippine Constabulary later remembered, "A few barefoot peasants clad in the rags of uniforms, loafing around the *Casa Popular* to be more often used as servants for the officials than in legitimate police work."¹⁰⁰ It was understandable if the local police had proved "a nerveless lot." Most were but lightly armed, with shotguns or small arms, if at all.

The commanding general of the Southern Luzon military district objected to the arming of any native police or constabulary unit, concluding that, "The services of an armed civil police could well be utilized, but they should not be armed with weapons which could be used against us in case they prove treacherous."¹⁰¹ The commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines was himself dubious about the arming of native police.¹⁰² These officers probably contributed little to the ending of the insurgency but they did their part in ensuring order in the *barrios*.

The Commanding General of the 3d Military District attempted to go beyond "bandits" in accounting for the widespread nature of the insurrection, at least in his area:

The section of the country between Gabugao and Batac teems with Insurgents and their sympathizers. They [the sympathizers] are poor and needy, and having nothing, join insurgents where by robbery and forced assessments they obtain something to eat. If work can be provided for them they will be able to provide food in a legitimate manner, and their greatest inducement to join the insurgents will be removed.

Half of these people could not find work, he continued, "Due to the small acreage planted the last two years, the largely increased consumption for the past year, the death of three-fourths of the working animals, necessitating the planting of a greatly reduced acreage this year." BG Young called for the expenditure of 20,000 pesos and \$16,000 to repair local harbor-to-town roads, "an excellent thing from a political, economical, and charitable standpoint," as well as benefiting the local military supply situation.¹⁰³

The Army sometimes seemed to show little sympathy. "[T]he excuse" of the *presidente* at Nagfartiau, in the same military district and in the same month, that his people were too poor to pay a tax of one peso on each horse brought the curt response from the military district chief assistant that local government "must be required to levy taxes to pay the current expenses."¹⁰⁴ (In a pathetic footnote to such poverty, a report on one unnamed town showed its revenue as amounting to the grand total of "40 cents Mexican, during the month. The schools had to be closed.")

Even the earlier, more informal reports reveal an amazing variety and detail of concerns and responsibilities. These included the receipt of school supplies, the establishment of vaccination points and the arranging of elections. However, the funding by the town of San Nicholas for a "music leader" and no less than 42 musicians was disallowed.¹⁰⁵


American units in the field, in what would later be termed "Civic Action," often took it upon themselves to improve local conditions and thus convince Filipinos of the good results of American tutelage. For example, two companies of U.S. soldiers in the town of Lagonoy, built roads, constructed and repaired bridges, fed the locals during a brief famine and established a local government and police force "to gain the peoples' confidence." On the island of Leyte, troops of the 43d Volunteers, following Manila's lead, cleaned up the town of Tacloban and tried to keep it clean

through new sanitary measures. They further established an equitable system of taxation, located buildings for public schools, repaired bridges and roads and established a municipal government and local police force.¹⁰⁶

By order of 29 September 1900, commanders of each civil sub-district of the 1st Military District, Northern Luzon, were to submit "Monthly Civil Reports" that covered police, including a careful accounting of their arms (which in some cases consisted solely of bolo knives); schools, finances, vaccinations, municipal officers and employees. An apparently fairly typical rural municipality from that densely-populated area, which had also been prime insurrectionist territory, held a population of 8156, and consisted of 19 barrios. Vintas was administered by a *presidente*, *vice presidente*, treasurer, Secretary and three clerks, in addition to two public vaccinators. It was policed by 30 law officers armed with three unspecified weapons and boasted one school each for 177 boys and 129 girls, taught by one female and one male teacher (monthly salaries \$10 and \$12 respectively). During May this government expended \$198, received \$285 and boasted no indebtedness. All of this was presided over by one 1LT of the 20th Infantry.¹⁰⁷

In a major break with Spanish colonial government tradition, U.S. military government also brought with it the American Constitutional doctrine of the separation of church and state, and not just in the school system as noted above. BG William Bell, military governor of Southern Luzon, protested with some asperity a petition apparently addressed to him by residents of his district denouncing the local church officials. MG Bell, noted that "I have carefully avoided any interference with church matters in this district.", and concluded that "many prominent men of this neighborhood have spoken to me of their deep seated hatred of the friars and I have invariably told although them that all communications on church matters should be addressed to the Arch Bishop in Manila."¹⁰⁸ At the local level and in response to a complaint brought by the *presidente* of Santa Clara concerning alleged acts and abuses of the parish priest, the 1st District Commander informed the commanding officer at Vigan that "the military authorities will not regulate the conduct of the interior economy, and affairs of the churches nor interfere in the relations between the parish priest and his religious adherents, as long as there is no interference with the public morals, the laws and good government."¹⁰⁹ This policy was certainly in distinct contrast to the insurgents' anti-clericalism. An unsigned draft proclamation from an unidentified guerrilla commander exhorted: "Down with the churches and convents! May their ruins serve for the roads, is what common sense requires."¹¹⁰ In view of such rebel sentiments, and the US Army's "hands-off" policy," it was not surprising that for the most part the Filipino clergy, originally one of the most revolutionary groups in the islands, was won over to U.S. rule.¹¹¹

Military government reforming zeal could degenerate, however, into mere busy-bodiness. For example, one J. Valentine Karelson (who may have been a foreign-born resident) was informed that "you are regarded as a troublesome citizen whose presence in Vigan is not desirable," and was directed to wind up his business and depart on the first boat out.¹¹² In this "Progressive Era" of reform it was not surprising that some Army civil administrators ordered their Filipino counterparts to outlaw, at least in any



U.S. Army Engineer-constructed bridge, Philippines, 1900. Signal Corps, National Archives

public place, "gambling, cock-fighting, opium smoking, or kindred vices." MG Wheaton of the Military Government staff in Manila conceded that:

It is not expected by this order to change the sentiment of the mass of the people, nor to change their moral natures so that they will be in accord with the ideas of modern civilization,...for this, dependence must be placed on the good example, practices and teachings of the enlightened, refined and educated people of this district.¹¹³

For all this pettifoggery, the U.S. Army was succeeding overall in pacification. For example, by 1900 the Army had opened no fewer than 1,000 schools.¹¹⁴ By March of 1901, BG Bell could report to Manila that in his command most of the municipalities were prosperous and that in none was there any "organized opposition to the constituted authorities." He also let slip that at Magarao Province "a local native militia has kept up a constant and active search for insurgents. "Notwithstanding, "many miles of roads have been repaired, the sanitary regulations strictly enforced, and the patients at the leper hospital at Palistina looked after and kept isolated." He went on to report that "In the Camarines alone, more than fifty schools have been reopened and reorganized on as nearly American lines as possible... The instruction has been through native teachers, with capable soldiers detailed to assist them in the teaching of English."

Few details escaped the administration of BG Bell. He personally ordered the compilation of an English language grammar textbook. The energetic general had also established a department of information and statistics, which had already collected, translated and prepared for printing material on the "history, fauna, flora, trade, mineral resources, waters, geography, topography, hydrography, ethnology and philology of the District, including material never before printed or published." The department and attached Army Engineers were also drawing up two "very accurate" maps of North and South Camarines. The Provincial Archives, going back to 1839, were being collated and classified, and the provincial land books, seized by the insurgents with intent to destroy, had been "recovered, repaired, sorted and now are in daily use for the benefit of the people." Trade was prospering, although General Bell did concede that the area held "a number of merchants who lived under the protection of our flag, but whose sympathies were with their friends in the mountains. However, they have seen the error of their ways, and business, while subject to severe restrictions and regulations, is very good...."¹¹⁵ In another example, although the population of Albay had been split over acceptance of American rule, between 1900 and 1903 most *albayones* had become reconciled to the American regime because of the participation of their fellows in local government and the military government's local improvements, education initiatives and encouragement of the hemp trade.¹¹⁶

General Otis did not see matters in quite so positive a light, and requested his relief no later than May 1900. He was replaced by MG Arthur MacArthur (father of Douglas MacArthur), a Civil War Medal of Honor recipient who had been commanding a division of volunteers against the insurrectionists. General MacArthur's

reaction to the Taft Commission was hardly an improvement on that of his predecessor, and the commissioners received a markedly cool reception from the new commander.

Nonetheless, military government could boast considerable non-military successes, at least on the economic level. Tax collections had become so efficient after 1900 that, even in the midst of a guerrilla war, far more was collected from the customs alone than the Spaniards had taken in from all sources in time of peace. Until September of 1900 most of these revenues were absorbed by military expenses. After the arrival of the Taft Commission, however, these funds began to filter out into the countryside, for farm-to-market roads, bridges, wells and school construction, causing a further weakening of popular support for the *insurrectos*. U.S. Army officers, more or less on their own in the countryside, could develop counterinsurgency and Civil Affairs operations tailored to their particular locality and relatively free from Manila's meddling.¹¹⁷ Each province was different, but the local experience absorbed by the more perceptive officers eventually proved effective in weaning the populace from the *insurrectos*. In fact, in almost every province, the Army was able to enlist and employ significant numbers of Filipinos against the guerrillas, or at least in support of the Americans.

This was still wartime, however, and the *presidentes* in that district were instructed on 1 November 1900 to see that the chief of each subordinate barrio forward the names of all males over 18 years of age, his occupation, how long he had lived in that barrio and place of birth. Ominously, the telegram concluded that "Any Presidente or chief of a *barrio* who fails to furnish a list as required or furnishes an improper list, and you believe he has done so willfully, he will be arrested and confined as a suspect." unless the *presidente* could prove otherwise. The following day, the commander of the 5th Infantry was directed "to use the most severe measures known to the laws of war," although in accordance with Army General Order 100 of 1863, to accomplish the killing or capturing of all bandits or guerrillas in the area.¹¹⁸

As much as possible, however, actual local administration was increasingly turned over to the *presidentes*. These civic worthies had their hands full, particularly in such regions as the Visayas, where the insurrection, or lawlessness, lingered.¹¹⁹ Appointed or elected, the *presidentes*, understandably, were considered "traitors" by the guerrillas. The *presidente* and *vice presidente* of the town of Bay, according to a circular letter from the commander of the insurgent "1st Column:

boldly raised the American flag above the town hall. The upright and patriotic citizens of the above mentioned town, at the sight of such outrageous insolence, invaded the town hall and killed [the two officials] and some policemen.

The insurgent commander in chief of the Ilococos region ordered the "summary judgment and penalty of death" for any *Presidente* failing to report American troop movements in his jurisdiction.¹²⁰

Generally speaking this was not entirely a "people's war." In fact, in some towns virtual civil war raged against the *insurrectos*. As early as August of 1898 a

guerrilla leader had to report to Aguinaldo "many complaints regarding the behavior of the soldiers." In December of that year an officer admitted to the "Secretary of War" his inability to control widespread robbery of the people. In March of 1899 the Temporary President of the Visayas wrote Aguinaldo of "almost a reign of terror here," under a rival rebel leader. The following month, another rebel official reported from Antipolo of instances of rape, concluded that "All the province complains to me of the abuses and thieving which goes on, but I am unable to do anything." and offered to resign.¹²¹ The enforced Philippine National Loans caused particular hardship and, presumably, resentment. One relatively prosperous laborer of Pangasinan remonstrated to the guerrilla chief of that province that he would have most gladly paid his loan requisition had not all of his property been "destroyed by the revolutionary forces when they entered this townMy family and I were able only to escape with our lives."¹²² The wealthy citizens of San Miguel de Mayumo, Bulacan Province, claimed that, what with feeding the insurgent troops quartered on them and troops passing through, they were at the end of their resources and could henceforth do no more than support themselves.¹²³

A significant weapon against the *insurrectos* was the native Philippine Constabulary, created in March of 1901. The first Commandant was Henry T. Allen (whom we shall meet later) and some of the officers were Filipinos. Their mission was basically one of law and order, but this included what would now be termed "civic action." Their most formidable opponents were the Moro warriors of the Sulu area, although the term "Moro warrior" may well be redundant when describing any young, able-bodied, adult male Moro. Even these formidable foes were finally brought to heel by these fast-moving, ambushing units that dared stealthily to penetrate enemy territory. At least on the enemy's side, this was a war without quarter against "traitors"; the picked-clean bones of several captured Constabulary intelligence agents were found after the rebels had tied them down over ant hills.

With the Moros subdued and the U.S. Volunteers and Regulars leaving, the Constabulary became the major force for pacification, some 7,000 officers and men for a countryside roughly the size of Italy. Its troopers also turned to more mundane police duties, reducing animal rustling drastically, training municipal police forces and arresting corrupt officials, suppressing high-stakes gambling and smuggling, clearing disease cordons, providing disaster relief, building roads and even serving as firemen. The piracy, graft, slaving and smuggling that the Spanish had fought feebly for three centuries was at least temporarily subdued. The key to the Constabulary's success, like that of the Philippine Scouts, was that it was an indigenous force well paid by Philippine standards but also possessed of a sense of personal honor that made breaking an oath of allegiance nearly unthinkable.¹²⁴ The Constabulary's good works also helped to win over the populace, and without such considerable Filipino support for the Americans this insurrection could have stretched out interminably.¹²⁵ As in practically all civil insurrections, unfortunately, it was the civil population that suffered the most, both from the insurrectionists and from the efforts of the Army to suppress the insurrection.

The capture of Aguinaldo in March of 1901, cut the heart out of the revolt and other rebel commanders began to call on their forces to lay down their arms. For the most part, the insurrection was over, although scattered resistance, often indistinguishable from mere banditry, persisted, particularly in the Moro provinces. In fact, military government continued in the Moro provinces of Mindanao island until 1912 under General Wood and later CPT John J. Pershing. These military governors sometimes had to use demonstrations of military force to compel the warlike local chiefs to abandon such time-honored Moro customs as raiding Christian villages and enslaving their captives in favor of the more conventional outsider practices of farming and trading (but not in human beings) for a living.¹²⁶ Wood went on to become Civil governor-general of the Philippines in 1905. He was the only American Military Governor to be translated into a civil governor of the same territory until LTG Lucius Clay, Military Governor of the American Zone of Germany, became the High Commissioner for Germany in 1949.

In retrospect, American military government of the Philippines showed American Progressivism at its best. For all its condescension, like its counterpart in Cuba it undoubtedly gave Filipinos a better life than anything the insurrectos or another colonial power could offer. One contemporary American observer reported in 1902 "that the civil administration work done by the army in these islands will never be thoroughly appreciated, but it is safe to say that never again will the pueblo affairs be administered throughout with the same integrity, same economy and thoroughness, as when under the supervision of the United States Army."¹²⁷ The U.S. Army was able to defeat a "pre-Maoist rural insurgency" by throwing the burden of pacification on those who had to deal with it in the field: the garrison and provincial Army officers, who were thrown upon their own personal resources. These officers administered the countryside, and were retained in the same district, often in the same town, during the bulk of their service in the islands. They thus established strong contacts among the Filipinos and certainly got to know their areas of operation.¹²⁸ In the words of one authority, "it was the local garrison commander's force of character that won or lost the day."¹²⁹ In this counterinsurgency campaign, there were no one-year tours of combat duty.

The proof of American benign intentions could be seen in the fulfillment of the explicit guarantees of Commonwealth status in 1935 and finally of independence in 1946. In response, Filipinos were the only Asian colonial peoples to offer serious resistance to Japanese invasion and occupation in World War II. Many fought valiantly alongside American guerrillas before and after the surrender at Bataan and cooperated with the Americans upon General MacArthur's return to the islands.

Yet, the fact that a significant number of Filipinos had violently resisted those benign U.S. plans for them sat ill with many Americans, who noted that this uniquely large-scale opposition to American military government came not from former enemies but from a people the United States honestly believed it had come to liberate and "improve." These Americans recalled their own resistance to colonialism and agitated and petitioned against American involvement in the Philippines. Opposition to a far-away war did not start with Vietnam.

Finally, despite the democracy and self-government and economic development, the deep-seated problems of Philippine economic inequality, land hunger and corruption were never systematically addressed by American governors, military or civilian. Consequently, anti-government guerrilla warfare has persisted over the decades. The models for development and even democracy have more recently proved to be the prosperous "Asian Tigers" of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Singapore, not America's onetime "showcase of the Pacific."

-Caribbean Interventions-

The arrest in April of 1914 of several U.S. Navy seamen by officers of the Mexican insurgent, Victoriano Huerta, in disputed Tampico led, most improbably, to a brief U.S. Army military occupation and government of the Mexican port city of Vera Cruz. Although the sailors in question were promptly released and an apology officially tendered, the U.S. Naval commander for the area, wildly overacting, demanded that the Mexican port authorities tender a formal apology, salute the U.S. flag and promise to punish the offending officer. This was international bullying at its ugliest, and the local Mexican authorities understandably rejected these humiliating demands. President Woodrow Wilson inexplicably determined to support his blowhard admiral and obtained from Congress the authority to compel "from General Huerta the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States."¹³⁰ A naval-Marine landing, after confused but bitter street fighting in which hundreds of Mexicans and 19 bluejackets died, cleared the city of the Huertistas. In contrast to their rather measured reaction to the American invasions of 1847, the Vera Cruz journals in this invasion whipped themselves into a patriotic frenzy: "We May Die, But Let Us Kill!" (*El Imparcial*); "While Mexicans were massacring the gringo pigs, the church bells rang out their glory!" (*La Patria*); "pigs of *Yanquilandia*" (*El Imparcial* again), and simply Vengeance! Vengeance! Vengeance! (*La Patria* again).¹³¹

The U.S. Navy established an initial Civil/Military government for the city of 40,00 inhabitants under RADM F. F. Fletcher but this regime lasted less than a week before being replaced by the Military Government of Vera Cruz, under the authority of U.S. Army BG Frederick Funston, on 29 April 1914. The civil governor, one Robert J. Kerr, who had earlier opined that the Mexicans were fit only for a "beneficent despotism," was quickly removed, leaving the government of Vera Cruz strictly military.¹³² BG Funston was directed by Secretary of War Lindley Garrison that his exercise of authority should be based as much as possible on that in the Philippines of a decade or so earlier. The Mexicans should be made to realize that "the administration of military government at Vera Cruz would not be "pursuing a scheme of conquest.", but rather would hope to give the inhabitants "an object lesson of national good will."¹³³ Understandably dubious, General Funston confidentially insisted that he should not be held accountable if the whole episode should prove a disaster. Nonetheless, good soldier Funston commenced his MG duties, calling upon the Army administration of the Philippines as his example.¹³⁴

The first problem was that of finding local, willing and competent Mexican officials to serve with the Americans. The federal Mexican penal code, undoubtedly having in mind the American occupations of the Mexican War, provided for severe penalties for those who served in any capacity a foreign power occupying Mexican territory. Both warring Mexican factions joined in branding any such workers as "traitors." The leader of the anti-Huerta faction, however, later promised an amnesty, and workers began to return to their jobs. With their aid, the occupation transformed the chaotic and corrupt customs service into a money-spinner.

Most businesses had opened in Vera Cruz as early as the 28th, probably due to the Navy's imposition of martial law. The Navy had also relieved the Army occupation authorities of the responsibility for evacuating by way of Vera Cruz large numbers of refugees trapped in Mexico City. Eventually there were more Mexicans entering the city than leaving it.¹³⁵

Military Government quickly established provost courts that dispensed a rough-and-ready justice that seemed to please the Vera Cruzadans with its absence of any hint of the old "mordida" ("bite"---bribe) and which covered everything from grand larceny to wife beating. Crimes of violence remained minimal; in fact, there were exactly two murders in Vera Cruz during its military occupation, a rate that would compare more than favorably with any equivalent U.S. city then or now.¹³⁶

The occupation of Vera Cruz, as that of Cuba or Puerto Rico, could be seen as a laboratory for Progressivism, now in its high noon. Disinterested officers (in the absence of the Progressives' favored experts) governed and administered the city without any tiresome politics, and all for the citizens' own good. Military Government provided not only clean justice and streets, it also prohibited cocaine and marijuana, along with public spitting or drunkenness, unclean business premises, lotteries and cock and bull fighting.

However, the military government did not essay that "Great Experiment" of Stateside Progressives, alcohol prohibition --even disinterested Army officer could go only so far. Rather more surprisingly, General Funston attempted to regulate, not abolish, the Vera Cruz bawdy houses, and Army medical officers did what they could to bring down the appallingly high rate of venereal disease among troops and civilians. Furthermore, separate red-light districts were set aside, one for the enlisted men and one for the officers (the latter brought protests from scandalized neighbors). General Funston even had trouble with American prostitutes, who flocked to Vera Cruz after the occupation was established. When Funston tried to remove these birds of passage they protested through the Brazilian minister in Mexico that the American general was acting, in the words of the "trust-busters" of the time, in "restraint of trade."¹³⁷ The problem of small pox was taken care of more simply by General Funston's decreeing that all inhabitants were to be vaccinated, and 46,000 were quickly inoculated.¹³⁸

Municipal finance was one of the most complicated and continuing of the problems faced by American Military Government in Vera Cruz. The city was now isolated from the rest of Mexico and funds had been very low to begin with, due to the civil war. Funston's finance office was meticulous in allotting to their proper use what state and federal funds it did find in the treasury, although it did have to "borrow" from state funds to meet municipal obligations. Hence, when the occupation ended Vera Cruz was more in debt to the state than it had been just before the occupation. The Federal Tax Office was vigorous in exacting its tax stamp revenue for a wide variety of licenses, mortgages, loans, business books, etc., as in the Army's Mexican occupation of 1846-1847. Financial matters were not helped by BG Funston's outlawing of lotteries and cock and bull fighting.

Because this occupation was to be as brief as possible, Secretary of War Garrison directed that legal civil business could wait until the Americans had gone

home. Consequently, the entire judicial machinery of the city was in the hands of military officers serving with the Legal Department under the Provost Marshal General, whose judicial decisions were, in turn, enforced by the Public Safety Department.

The Legal Department showed a commendable concern for the Mexicans it dealt with by keeping almost no record of the deeds of trusts, mortgages and other legal instruments that it serviced. Rather, they were filed in a notary's office, with nothing in the document to indicate that the military government had anything to do with the matter. Thus Mexican courts, upon their return, would be more likely to concede the validity of documents executed under Mexican law by Mexican officials. The collection of rents, however, proved a formidable problem, due to the long period of internal disorder and what one authority termed "easy-going Mexican ways." The Legal Department had to settle no less than 6,000 rent cases and something like 3,000 claims adjustments.¹³⁹ As an example of the fine legal points that could be raised in any military occupation of a sizable port city, MG legal officers had to determine what to do in the case of imported pianos on which duty had been paid in Vera Cruz and then assessed again in Mexico City. The MG lawyers meticulously refunded the Vera Cruz duty.¹⁴⁰

The Department of Public Safety was able to recruit a native police force despite fears of retribution when the Americans left. Their duties were considerably more varied than any similar municipal force in the United States. In addition to making arrests and incarcerating offenders, they apprehended deserters from the American forces, arranged public funerals, parades and recreational events and solved the problem of vagrants, criminals, etc. simply by exporting them to the Mexican hinterland.

The Director of Public Works must have left the most durable legacy of this brief American occupation. His office first engaged in a general clean-up of the city, repairing public buildings damaged in the fighting, including the vital ice plant, as well as the city markets. In addition he initiated regular garbage collection and a flushing of the market place, the construction of a 140-meter sewage main, a 1200 meter road and even sidewalks, as well as a much-needed repairing of existing water and sewage systems and roads. Many of the city's roads were ingeniously hardened with cinders hauled in from the Navy's coal-burning warships, while new roads were built, bridges repaired or also built new and the municipal lighting and water systems rehabilitated. When the city's sole ice factory persisted in favoring its best customers, that is the cantinas and houses of ill-fame, General Funston simply seized the offending enterprise and distributed its products to more wholesome locations through his Department of Public Works. The Military government also did not hesitate to construct a large office building for its use when it needed more space and facilities.¹⁴¹

Vera Cruz military government put more than 3,000 of its troops to work in an "heroic effort" to clear away the debris from decades of neglect of public health. "Every street, every yard, every plaza was swept out and the debris hauled to the public dump to be burned." Even the dump had been neglected by the Mexican authorities; its contents were simply piled high for the dogs and vultures, and the troops

had their work cut out in removing the accumulated detritus. In addition, each night the entire city area was flushed out with sea water from the Navy fireboat hoses.

The so-called New Market posed a particular public health problem. In the memorable words of one American contemporary:

The tiled floors had cracked, and maggots writhed in the offal-clogged crevices. The tiles themselves were barely visible beneath a festering meringue of dried blood, fish scales, chicken feathers, putrid produce, and excrement.

Within a week the New Market had been transformed into a model of cleanliness and efficiency. A sure sign of an altogether more healthy state of affairs was the noticeable absence of the city's once-ubiquitous vultures.¹⁴²

Conditions in the prison at San Juan de Ulua were reportedly worse than those prevailing at the New Market (if that could be imagined) and the clean-up of the latter pest-hole was perhaps the most gratifying operation, for Mexicans and Americans, of the entire Vera Cruz occupation. It took the burning of no less than 1,200 pounds of sulfur to exterminate all the vermin in the cells.¹⁴³

A vigorous malaria eradication program saw some 61 miles of ditches dug and 69,000 gallons of crude oil poured over stagnant ponds. These public health efforts was not purely disinterested Progressive humanitarianism. The rainy-mosquito season was fast approaching, and there were military men on the scene who advocated a march on Mexico City just to get out of the unhealthy lowlands. As a result, the death rate for the American troops remained the same as if they were back in the States, while the civilian death rate dropped more than 25 percent from the previous months, and at the height of the rainy, hot season at that.¹⁴⁴

It should also be noted that the American troops who were in an unhealthy, humid and uncomfortable environment with little in the way of wholesome recreational facilities, were fairly well behaved. There was but one reported case of rape and none of murder, but 53 offenses did result in dishonorable discharges. The most disgraceful breach of military discipline could not be attributed to the Army at all. During the landings groups of sailors and Marines looted the customs house and nearby warehouses, smashing and emptying the contents of every drawer and desk they came upon. Although the looters and vandals were driven out by a squad of bluejackets from cruiser *San Francisco*, no one was arrested and the unsavory incident was not reported to Admiral Fletcher.¹⁴⁵

In sum, this six-month occupation, as in so many similar U.S. Army occupations, provided a paternalistic, fair and efficient administration which delivered better services than the civil population had ever enjoyed in recent memory. As the radical novelist Jack London (who was there) exulted "Never, in the long history of Vera Cruz, has the city been so decent, so orderly, so safe, so clean."¹⁴⁶

Nonetheless, this was a foreign occupation, one which also brought along some less savory attitudes in its baggage. American attitudes of racial or moral superiority

were never better summarized than by the famous war correspondent Richard Harding Davis, when he dispatched this purple prose back to his editors in Washington, DC:

Vera Cruz felt that the foeman's boot was on her shore when six thousand hobnailed brogans struck the asphalt with the regularity of pile drivers. Except in bronze on their monuments the natives had never seen such supermen [U.S. troops] of such heroic aspect....¹⁴⁷

By the end of the occupation, in the words of one historian of the episode, "Though the first concern of the American commanders was always the well-being of their own men, as a result of their labors, Vera Cruz was the cleanest, most efficient, most honestly and most justly governed city in all of Mexican history." But, he concluded, "The American forces had no right to be in Mexico."¹⁴⁸

The American evacuation was delayed interminably by efforts and negotiations with the Mexicans to guarantee that those Vera Cruzadans who had worked with the American occupiers would not be victimized, that customs duties would not be charged a second time and that refugees would be protected. Few, if any of the promises made to the Americans were kept. In the end some 600 Mexicans, many of them former employees of the Military Government, had to be evacuated with the Americans.¹⁴⁹

Left behind was a legacy, at least among the literate class, of bitter resentment that was even greater than that felt toward the *yanquis* for the Mexican War that had stripped the nation of so much of its patrimony. At least in 1846 the Americans were straightforward about their invasion; they wanted Mexican land and they took it. Wilson, on the other hand, had pledged one year before his own invasion to "cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America." It was this "nauseating hypocrisy," this "insufferable air of superiority" that stuck in their craws, and would do future U.S.-Mexican relations no good.¹⁵⁰ As for Vera Cruz itself, "within a few weeks [after the American evacuation] it was difficult to tell that the Americans had ever occupied the city."¹⁵¹ But the "rights and dignity of the United States" had been upheld.

¹Kyre, "Army Civil Affairs Policy," 67; Kyres, *Military Occupation and National Security* (Washington: 1968), 87-88.

²Root, *Secretary of War Annual Report for 1901*, vol., p. 5; Root to Philip C. Jessup, quoted in Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (New York: 1938), vol. 1, p. 345.

³Gillette, 413.

⁴George Kennan, *Campaigning in Cuba* (New York: 1899), 5, 10. See also *Report of Secretary of War for FY 30 June 1898*, 105; Daugherty and Andrews, 126-127; and MAJ Hamilton V. Bail, "The Military Government of Cuba 1898-1902," study prepared in the Historical Section, U.S. Army War College (June 1943), 4-11 for early period of U.S. Army MG in Cuba.

⁵*Report of the Secretary of War for 1898*, 9-10.

⁶*Ibid.*, 832.

⁷"Civil Report of Maj. Gen John R. Brooke, " Military Governor of Cuba," in *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1899* (Washington: 1900), 7.

⁸"Civil Report of Major-General John R. Brooke, Military Governor of Cuba," *War Department Report for 1899* (Washington: 1900), vol. 1, page 7.

⁹*House Docs*, vol. 5, No. 2, 56th Cong., 2d Sess (Serial 4073), 10.

¹⁰C. M. Dowell, *Military Aid to the Civil Power, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy* (Madison: 1963) 94; J. V. Morgan, Jr., "Military Government," typescript, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University [1942], 111, 112; Healy, 53.

¹¹Brooke, 7; Harry A. Smith, *Military Government*. General Service Schools, the General Staff School, 1919-1920. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1920), 93; C. M. Dowell, *Military Aid to the Civil Power, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy* (Madison: 1963), 70-71 To be fair, it should be noted that when the Cuban army leader did arrive in Havana he and his staff were treated as honored guests of the government, occupying the summer residence complex of the governor-general., *ibid.* See also Bail, 11-12.

¹²Morgan, 112. Even then, Brooke warned his officers to issue the rations with care, because, he noted, black domestics were leaving their employ in the belief that the Army would feed them for nothing., *ibid.*

¹³"Civil Report of Major-General John Brooke," 1 October 1899, *House Docs.*, vol. 7, No. 2, 56th Cong., 1st Sess (Serial 3904), 11; Morgan, 11; General Service Schools, 96-97; Dowell, 97.

¹⁴Robert P. Porter, *Industrial Cuba* (New York: 1899), 63; Bail, 22-23.

¹⁵Jack C. Lane, *Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood* (San Rafael, California and London: 1978), 59-64.

¹⁶Morgan, 115; Lane, 72-85.

¹⁷*Civil Report of Major General Brooke, Military Governor, Island of Cuba* (Washington: 1900), 15. (Emphasis added). Wood, on the other hand, publicly advocated the annexation of Cuba., Lane, 78.

¹⁸Healy, 102.

¹⁹*New York Times*, 24 January 1899, quoted in Gillette, 413. An old friend of Wood published an article, "American Mismanagement in Cuba," in the *North American Review*, violently criticizing the Brooke regime. The author disingenuously swore that the article's publication had proved "an entire surprise" to him. Wood was reprimanded by the unconvinced Secretary of the Army, who demanded an end to the "tendency to turn the Army into a newspaper debating society.", Lane 89.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 118-119.

²¹Wood to McKinley, 12 April 1900, Leonard Wood papers, Library of Congress., Healy 179; Lane, 86-87. Theodore Roosevelt even wrote a laudatory article on Wood, "General Wood: A Model American Administrator," *The Outlook* (7 January 1899).

²²*General Service Schools*, 98-101.

²³Wood to McKinley, 6 February 1900; *ibid.*, Wood to Root, 16 February, quoted in Healy, 131; *ibid.*, 209. "Stupid" quotation in Lane, 99. See also Erwin H. Epstein, "Social Structure, Race Relations and Political Stability in Cuba under U.S. Administration," *Review InterAmericana*, vol. 8, No. 2 (1978). Root quotation, Ralph Henry Gabriel, "American Experience with Military Government," *American Historical Review* (July 1944), 641.

²⁴Roosevelt to Secretary of State John Hay, 1 July 1899, quoted in Gillette, 414.

²⁵Healy, 185-186; Civil Report of General Leonard Wood for 1901, vol. 1, Part 1; *ibid.* for 1902, Part 1, pp. 160-163; Hagedorn, vol. 1, pp. 324-328. Dr. Finlay's theory had been published as early as 1881, but nothing was done about this major medical advance until the coming of General Wood's no-nonsense military government swept away the mental and physical barriers to its implementation., N. Stephan, "The Interplay between Socio-Economic Factors and Medical Science: Yellow Fever Research, Cuba and the United States," *Social Studies of Science*, vol. 8, No. 4 (1978). It is perhaps indicative of Wood's thinking that he always considered the eradication of yellow fever as American military government's greatest accomplishment in Cuba., Lane 99.

²⁶Quoted in Wood, "Military Government of Cuba," 20.

²⁷James H. Hitchman, "Unfinished Business: Public Works in Cuba, 1898-1902," *America*, vol. 31, No. 3 (1975); *ibid.*, "U.S. Control over Cuban Sugar Production, 1898-1902," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, vol. 12, No. 1 (1970); Lane, 96-97. For graphic evidence of U.S. activities, military and civil, in Cuba at this time see William De Costa, "The U.S. Occupation of Cuba, Through the Lens of an Artist," *Mankind*, vol. 5, no. 6 (1976).

²⁸Bail, 17-18.

²⁹For Wood's administration of Cuba, see *Civil Report of General Wood...1900*, and for 1901-1902; also *Report of Secretary of War, 1900*, all *passim*, which contain reports from Superintendent Fry, among many others. Frye, who frequently extolled the beauty of Cuban women, certainly increased his popularity by marrying one of those fair Cubans., Fitchen, 146. Healy, 180-182.

³⁰Lane, 92-93. Wood to Root, 8 January 1901.

³¹"Report of the Secretary of Public Education for the 6 Months Ending June 30, 1901., in Leonard Wood, *Cuba Military Governor, Civil Report 1901* (Havana?: 1901), reprinted in "Report of First Lt. Matthew E. Hanna, Commissioner of Public Schools," 26 February 1901, *House Docs.*, vol. 12, Pt. 4, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. (Serial 4083), 98-100. Wood could not have been unaware that Hanna was related to Marcus A. Hanna, the political "boss" of Ohio, the man most responsible for the elevation of William McKinley to the Presidency. See also Healy, 180-183; Wood, "Military Government of Cuba," 10-15.

³²Fitchen, 148.

³³*Civil Report of General Leonard Wood for 1900*, 1, Part 1, p. 65.

³⁴Healy, 182; Lane, 92.

³⁵Wood, "The Military Government of Cuba," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March 1903); 157-160. Wood to Roosevelt, 12 July 1899, quoted in Healy, 183; Bail, 27-28.

³⁶MAJ E. S. Dudley, "Report of the Judge-Advocate of the Department, Calendar Year 1900," *Civil Report of General Leonard Wood for 1900*, vol. 6, Pt. 1, pp. 9-10.

³⁷"Civil Report of Major General Leonard Wood, Military Governor of Cuba, 1900." *House Docs.*, No. 2, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 65; Healy, 183.

³⁸Herman Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood* (New York), vol. 1, p. 319; Lane, 92.

³⁹Morgan, 117; Army Service Schools, 101-102. Again, this was something that General Brooke had only just begun., *ibid.*

⁴⁰Healy, 184. General Wood's subordinate, BG James H Wilson, Military Governor of Matanzas Province sought to reassure Americans by declaring that white domination was as secure in Cuba as in the southern United States. Wilson, *An Address on Our Trade Relations with the Tropics* (Boston: 1901), 18; Erwin H. Epstein, "Social Structure, Race Relations and Political Stability in Cuba under U.S. Administration," *Review InterAmericana*, vol. 8, No. 2 (1978); Epstein, *passim*. General Wilson had a quite different perspective on Cuban improvement: "I do not consider the future of Cuba depends chiefly upon schools, road-making, improved sanitation or judiciary reform." For Wilson, agriculture was the key to Cuban well-being. quoted in Gillette, 421.

⁴¹Dowell, 102-104.

⁴²Wood, *Civil Report*, 1, part 1, p. 36.

⁴³Wood to Root, 26 September 1900, Wood Papers, quoted in Gillette, 413.

⁴⁴Leo S. Rowe, "The Reorganization of Local Government in Cuba," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 25 (1905); Healy, 184; Army Service Schools, 102; Lane, 95.

⁴⁵E. H. Mosely to Wood, January 1902, *Military Records*, file No. 118, quoted in Gillette, 417. In his belief that "men of high character," could find "the reasonable and correct course," and thus "deal... fairly with all," Mosely demonstrated the touching belief of the Progressives that they could painlessly square the circle. One also cannot escape the conclusion that the Progressives' personal ideal was themselves.

⁴⁶Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York: 1909), 169, quoted in Howard Gillette, Jr., "The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1899-1902: Workshop for American Progressivism," *American Quarterly*, vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1973), 410. Croly's work was a virtual bible for the Progressive movement. See also, William Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 39, (1952).

⁴⁷Louis A. Perez, Jr., "Cuba between Empires, 1892-1899," *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 48, No. 4 (1979).

⁴⁸Wood, "The Military Government in Cuba," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 21 (1903), 30. Wood also wrote in his diary, while he was on board the cruiser returning him to the United States, that "The general feeling among Cubans was one of intense regret at the termination of American government.", that is, "The better class of people, the people representing the churches, business, education, the learned professions," Lane, 112.

⁴⁹Charles Magoon, *Republic of Cuba: Report of Provisional Administration From December 1st, 1907 to December 1st 1908* (Havana: 1909).

⁵⁰Allen Reed Millett, *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909* (Columbus, Ohio: 1968), 190.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 190-191.

⁵²Magoon, 1908, p. 74.

⁵³Charles E. Magoon, *Republic of Cuba, Report of the Provisional Administration, October 13, 1906 - December 1, 1907* (Havana: 1908), 22-25; Irene Wright, "The Cart-Roads of Mister Magoon," *The World Today* (June 1909), 641-648. Magoon, in fact, claimed that his administration had laid down more improved roads in his two years' administration than had been constructed in the previous two centuries., Magoon, 93.

⁵⁴*Republic of Cuba: Report of Provisional Administration From October 13, 1906 to December 1, 1907*, 97, 105.

⁵⁵Quoted in Millett, 209, by Charles Magoon (Havana: 1908), 97.

⁵⁶Magoon, 46-47; Millett, 211-212.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 238.

⁵⁸*Annual Report of Charles E. Magoon, Provisional Governor of Cuba* (Washington: 1908), 66, 88-89.

⁵⁹CPT J. O. Furlong, memorandum for Chief of Staff, Army of Cuban Pacification, 17 February 1908, RG 395, entry 1013, Reports from the Military Information Division, 1907-1907; *ibid.*, memorandums of 26 May and 11 November 1908. CPT Furlong spoke more presciently than he knew: In 1912 a black Cuban "little" revolt erupted into a full-fledged race war in which 3,000 blacks were killed before the Cuban Army could restore order.; Millett, 183.

⁶⁰Magoon, vol. 2, 89-92, 107.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 14-16.

⁶²Millett, 263.

⁶³*Ibid.*, 215.

⁶⁴See, for example, Juan B. Nieves, *La Anexion de Puerto Rico a los Estados Unidos* (Ponce: 1898).

⁶⁵*Annual Reports of the War Department for 1898*, vol. 1, part 1, p. 7.

⁶⁶General Staff Schools, 86-88; Taylor and Braibanti, 303-305.

⁶⁷Edward J. Berbusse, S. J., *The United States in Puerto Rico, 1898-1900* (Chapel Hill: 1966), 77-85.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 87.

⁶⁹General Henry to Army Adjutant General, 8 December 1898, NARA, Bureau of Insular Affairs, 81.

⁷⁰Berbusse, 89-90; General Service Schools, 82-83.

⁷¹Berbusse, 95. General Henry's more significant enactments are in Davis Report, 50-56.

⁷²Berbusse, *The United States in Puerto Rico*, 101. (Davis to AAJ, 13 /10/99, NARA, BIA, 295-96.)

⁷³Davis Report, 115-116.

⁷⁴Davis Report, 36, 63..

⁷⁵RMGD 125-129, 41-45.

⁷⁶Dowell, 81

⁷⁷Berbusse, 108 (Interior 7 Dec 1899, 834-5.

⁷⁸Davis report, 45.

⁷⁹Dowell, 81-82.

⁸⁰Berbusse, 109. Birtle continues in the same vein that with its "top-down management" "all the Army had really done was to impose a thin veneer of American-style institutions," 106-107.

⁸¹MAJ John Van R. Hof, Chief Surgeon, Department of Porto Rico, former President of the Board of Charities of Porto Rico, in Davis Report, 669.

⁸²Davis Report, 64. A U.S. Army Major, Collector of Customs at Ponce, shrewdly observed that "the absence of a middle class is the great drawback to reform and change." MAJ F. W. Masefield to AAG 15 September 1899, BIA 295-21. Berbusse, 105-106. For contemporary views of the island's economy, see Davis Report, 649-782; Henry K. Carroll, *Report on the Island of Porto Rico: Its Population, Civil Government, Commerce, Industries, Productions, Roads, Tariff, and Currency, With Recommendations*. (Washington: 1899), *passim*.

⁸³Philip H. Taylor and Ralph Braibanti, *Administration of Occupied Areas* (Syracuse: 1948), 281-286.

⁸⁴*Report of Major-General E. S. Otis U.S. Volunteers on Military Operations and Civil Affairs in the Philippine Islands* (Washington: 1899), 69.

⁸⁵See letters from the Secretary of the "Anti-Expansion Club" of St. Louis, 20 January 1900 to Aguinaldo; and letter of 8 March 1899 from the Single Tax League of Ohio to the Philippine Junta, NARA Micro 719, Taylor file, reel No. 1, frames 338-344.

⁸⁶See, for example, orders transmitted by Aguinaldo, that in view of "the approaching presidential election in the United States of America, which takes place in the early part of the coming month of September [?] the insurgents should deliver "such hard knocks to the Americans that they will resound to our favor and set in motion the fall of the imperialist party, which is trying to enslave us.", Aguinaldo, letter to T. Sandico and distributees, 27 June 1900, translated copy, Taylor project, NARA 719, reel No. 3, frame 585; Brian M. Linn, "The War in Luzon: U.S. Army Regional Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1900-1902," Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1985, Birtle, 112.

⁸⁷John Morgan Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, Connecticut: 1973), 56. An early and detailed work dealing with the U.S. Army in the Philippines is James A. LeRoy, *Americans in the Philippines*, 2 vols. (Boston: 1915). See also Stuart Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation": *The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven: 1983); R. Roth, *Muddy Glory: America's "Indian Wars" in the Philippines* (West Hanover, Massachusetts: 1981); William T. Sexton, *Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism* (Harrisburg: 1939); Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippines at the Century's Turn* (Garden City, New York: 1961); John M. Gates, "The Pacification of the Philippines," *Proceedings of the 9th Military History Symposium*, U.S. Air Force Academy. Washington:); Brian Linn, "Pacification in Northwestern Luzon: An American Regiment in the Philippine-American War, 1899-1901," *Philippines*, No. 3, 1982; "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District,

Department of Northern Luzon," *Military Affairs* (April 1987); "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1901," *Pacific Historical Review*. (November 1982); [anon.] "The Soldier Teacher in the Philippines," *Harpers Weekly* (18 January 1901).

⁸⁸G. J. Yonghusband, *The Philippines and Round About* (New York: 1899), 111.

⁸⁹In fact, Herbert Croly that the Spanish-American War had given "a tremendous impulse to the work of national reform.", *Promise of American Life*, 169.

⁹⁰Otis, 164.

⁹¹*Report of the United States Philippine Commission: 1900*, 132-134. For schools, see also House Document No. 2, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 5, p. 257; Senate Document No. 129, *Education in the Philippine Islands*, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 1901, pp. 3, 44.

⁹²Otis, *Report of Major-General E. S. Otis U.S. Volunteers on Military Operations and Civil Affairs in the Philippine Islands* (Washington: 1899), 157. See also Thomas F. Burdett, "A New Evaluation of General Otis' Leadership in the Philippines," *Military Review* (January 1975).

⁹³U.S. Senate, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc 138, pp. 82-84.

⁹⁴Ralph Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government in the Philippines," *Ohio History*, vol. 70 No. 4 (1961).

⁹⁵Gates, 130.

⁹⁶Otis, *Report*, 352-353.

⁹⁷Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* Chapel Hill, North Carolina. (1989), 41; *Report of Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, United States Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines, Military Governor, September 1, 1899, to May 5, 1900* (Washington: 1900), 279 (quotation).

⁹⁸COL Wessells to Headquarters, 1st District, Department of Northern Luzon, 9 March, 1900; MAJ March *ibid.*, 5 March 1900. See numerous other military reports of pueblo elections and juridical appointments at this time in RG 395, entry 2170, box No. 1. Election materials are also found in *ibid.*, entry 2412, 2d Military District, Southern Luzon, Correspondence and Reports Re District, October 1900-April 1901, box No. 1.

⁹⁹MG S. B. Young to Adjutant General, Department of Northern Luzon, 13 October 1900, RG 395, entry 2167, vol. 2.

¹⁰⁰John R. White, *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands* (New York, London: 1928), 133.

¹⁰¹See reports on police from 2d District, Department of Southern Luzon, which detail arms and pay. Most reporters called for increased pay for native policemen, but their impoverished districts could not raise the revenue., RG 395, entry 2412, Department of Southern Luzon, Correspondence and Reports, October 1900-April 1901, box No. 1; MG J. G. Bates, endorsement to proposal for a "Guarde Civile," 15 June 1900, *ibid.* See similar reports on municipal police from 3d Separate Brigade, *ibid.*, Department of Northern Philippines, Reports Received, entry 2380, 1901-1902, box No. 1. As late as September 1901, the commanding officer of the municipality of Santa Cruz, Laguna, reported that although his force was attired "in gray linen, They have no weapons except a

few clubs." COL [illegible signature], 8th Infantry, to Adjutant General, 1st District, *ibid.*, 2 September 1901., *ibid.*

¹⁰²Linn, 169 is somewhat more positive on the use of native scouts, volunteers, etc. See also a contemporary view, John A. Ward, "The Use of Native Troops in Our New Possessions," *Journal of the Military Service Institution* (November 1902).

¹⁰³Copy of telegram, BG Young, to Adjutant General, Department of Northern Luzon, copy dated 20 August 1900, RG 395, entry 2167, vol. 2, Letters Sent, Military Governor, 1st District, 7 August 1900-7 December 1900.

¹⁰⁴CPT John Green Ballance to Commanding Officer, Civil Sub-District, Laoag, 28 August 1900, RG 395, entry 2167, Letters Sent, vol. 2; *ibid.*, to Adjutant General, Department of Northern Luzon, 24 November 1900, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁵RG 395, entry 2167, Letters Sent, 1st Military District, vol. 2, entries for 14 November, 27 August, 3 October, 1900 and *passim*; elections also *passim*.

¹⁰⁶Gates, 134; "Official Reports of the 43d Infantry, U.S. Volunteers," I, March 28, Henry T. Allen Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁰⁷Headquarters, 1st Military District, Circular Letter No. 17, 29 September 1900, RG 395, entry 2167, Letters Sent, vol. 2. Monthly Civil Report for town of Vintas, for May 1901, submitted by 1st LT J. Guthrie, Headquarters, 1st District, Department of Northern Luzon, Letters Received (Civil), 1901, *ibid.*, entry 2170, box No. 3. See also copy of similar report for Dingras reproduced here, and numerous other such reports from Northern Luzon., *ibid.* Detailed critiques by the 1st Military District's Chief Assistant for civil affairs officer of earlier, more informal monthly reports may be found in *ibid.* See also reports on schools from 2d District, Southern Luzon, for 1900-1901., *ibid.*, entry 2412, 2d District, Department of Southern Luzon, Correspondence and Reports Re District, October 1900-April 1901.

¹⁰⁸Bell to Headquarters, Philippine Military Government, 26 December 1900, RG 395, entry 2440, Letters Sent, Military Governor, 3d District, Southern Luzon, 9 April 1900 to 25 June 1901.

¹⁰⁹Chief Assistant, 1st Military District to Commanding Officer, Vigan, 15 September 1900, RG 395, entry 2167, vol. 2.

¹¹⁰Taylor project, reel no. 7, frame 1210; Proclamation of Jose Cavestany, 15 May 1900. *Ibid.*, frame 1270.

¹¹¹Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 168.

¹¹²Chief Assistant, 1st Military District, to J. Valentine Karelson, through Commanding Officer, Baguio, 12 November 1900.

¹¹³Headquarters, 1st District, Department of Northern Luzon, Office of Chief Assistant, Circular Letter No. 14, 14 August 1900, RG 395, Entry 2167. Letters Sent, vol. 2. BG Young, 1st Military District Commander, protested that if the circular banning the sport were to be rescinded, "it would be taking a step backward in our attempts to teach these people modern civilization....", BG Young to MG Wheaton, 4 September 1900; *ibid.* Rebel commanders also attempted to regulate, if not prohibit, vice, by requiring a tax on all gaming tables. See "Edict Against Gambling," issued by "Governor of Manila," 12 February 1900, NARA micro 719, Taylor file, reel No. 2, frame 638.

¹¹⁴Birtle, 121.

¹¹⁵Report of BG Bell, Military Governor, 3d District, Department of Southern Luzon, to Military Governor of Philippine Islands, 4 March, 1901, RG 395, entry 2440, Letters Sent, Military Governor, 3d District, Philippines. See also Edgar F. Raines, "Major General Franklin Bell, USA: The Education of a Soldier," *Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* (Autumn 1985).

¹¹⁶Norman G. Owen, "Winding Down the War in Albay, 1900-1903," *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 48, No. 4 (1979).

¹¹⁷A first-hand account of U.S. Army MG in the field during the Philippine Insurrection is found in Conrad R. Babcock autobiography, "From This Generation to the Next," copy in Hoover Institution Archives, box 1 (1942-1947).

¹¹⁸1st District, Department of Northern Luzon, to Commanding Officer Baged, 1 November 1900, RG 395, entry 2167, Letters Received, volume No. 2; *ibid.*, to COL Richard Comba, 5th U.S. Infantry, *ibid.*, 2 November 1900.

¹¹⁹See reports of *presidentes* on burning of town of Conception, of armed bands, requests of citizens to carry revolvers, etc., as well as fewer civil concerns, such as the closing of opium dens, prison sentences, or requests for employment; in Department of Visayas, Headquarters 3d District, Civil Letters Received (Spanish language), January-April 1901, *ibid.*, Entry 2620, box No. 2.

¹²⁰LTC Julio Herrera to "Presidentes Locales," 30 April 1900, Taylor project, reel No. 3, frame 425; *ibid.*, reel 4, frame 52.

¹²¹A. Mabini to Aguinaldo, NARA micro 719, Taylor file, reel No. 3, frame 449; Insay to Aguinaldo, 16 March 1899, *ibid.*, reel No. 2, frame 288; L. M. Lacandola to Aguinaldo, 18 April 1899, *ibid.*, frame 609; J. N. Leyba to "Secretary of War," December 1898, *ibid.*, frame 601; and anonymous letter showing abuses in Pangasinan Province, also in April of 1899, *ibid.*, reel No. 3, frame 857. These are all copies of captured and translated insurrectionist documents. Linn, 38.

¹²²Luis A. Callanda to Senior Chief of Province of Pangasinan, 27 April 1899, Taylor project, reel No. 3, frames 3-4. The complainants were not all civilians, either. A commanding officer in Aparri reported that his own men had committed numerous depredations, asserted that "the officers were the first ones to commit abuses", and proposed returning the lot to their homes. J. N. Leyba to "Secretary of War", 4 December 1898., *ibid.*, frames 254-257.

¹²³Taylor draft, micro 719, reel no. 9, "4 HS.":; Linn, 168.

¹²⁴Harold H. Elarth (ed.), *The Story of the Philippine Constabulary* (Los Angeles: 1949); Richard W. Smith, "Philippine constabulary," *Military Review* (May 1968); John R. White, *Bullets and Bolos* (New York and London: 1928); Vic Hurley, *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary* (New York: 1938); Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary, *Manual for the Philippine Constabulary* (Manila: 1915).

¹²⁵Linn, 353-360. George Y. Coats, "The Philippine Constabulary: 1901-1917," Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University. 1968. The first commander of the Philippine Constabulary later boasted that in place of the "mud holes" that passed for roads at the turn of the century

"by 1913 there were thousands of miles of perfectly kept macadam highways that linked provincial capitals with outlying pueblos and with Manila." White, 135.

¹²⁶See agreement between the Sultan of Jolo and other Moro chiefs permitting slaves to purchase their freedom but delicately reserving the final disposition of the institution "as a matter for future conference, determination and agreement." Agreement with MG J. C. Bates, 4 April 1900, Taylor project, reel No. 7, frame 412; Hagedorn, vol. 2, 16-45, 375; Lane, 122-123.

¹²⁷D. H Broughton, "How Soldiers Have Ruled in the Philippines," *International Quarterly*, 6 (1902), 225.

¹²⁸Linn, 169-170. See also Gerald H. Early, "The United States Army in the Philippine Insurrection, 1899-1902," thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (June 1975).

¹²⁹Birtle, 122.

¹³⁰Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Vera Cruz* (Lexington, Kentucky: 1962), 107.

¹³¹*Ibid.*; Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washington: 1998), 192-199.

¹³²*Ibid.*, 106.

¹³³"War Diary - U.S. Expeditionary Forces, Vera Cruz, 1914," RG 94, roll 2054 Record Service (Washington: 1962), 1.

¹³⁴Funston to Garrison, 4 May 1914, RG 94, 2155673-H; Birtle, 196. Back in Washington, high Army officers were actually pressing President Wilson for a full-scale invasion and conquest of all of Mexico, before that unfortunate nation could mobilize its forces against the U.S., *ibid.*, 193.

¹³⁵Rear Admiral F. F. Fletcher, "Seizure and Occupation of Vera Cruz, April 21st - April 30th, 1914," RG 45, Naval Records Collection, Subject File, 1911-1927, box 776, folder No. 7, *passim*, quote, 45.

¹³⁶Quirk, 139-140; Birtle, 196.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, 137-138. The American prostitutes solved their problem themselves, by ingeniously marrying indigent Mexicans for a few pesos, thus acquiring Mexican citizenship., *ibid.*

¹³⁸Quirk, 81, 138; Charles Jenkinson, "Vera Cruz, What American Occupation Has Meant to a Mexican Community," *Survey* (7 November 1914).

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, 7; Quirk, 147-148. See also "Vera Cruz: A Crusade for Decency," *Outlook* (4 July 1914). (President Wilson would have approved of the words of this title.)

¹⁴⁰General Funston memo, 15 September, 1914, RG 94, 2209050.

¹⁴¹Quirk, 133-134.

¹⁴²Jenkinson; Jack Sweetman, *The Landing at Vera Cruz: 1914* (Annapolis: 1968), 156. In reality, the albatrosses/vultures had served the city well as garbage-eaters., Quirk, 81-82, 132. A U.S. soldier wrote home that "The buzzards have all moved on to the next joint. We cancelled their meal tickets." "Bill" (NLNG), in [anon.], *American Occupation of Vera Cruz* (Vera Cruz: 1914), 18.

¹⁴³Ibid., 136.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 129, 138.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., 144, 149-150.

¹⁴⁶London, "Lawgivers," *Colliers Magazine* (20 June 1914), quotation, 29. See also his "With Funston's Men." Ibid. (23 May 1914).

¹⁴⁷*Washington Post*, (1 May 1914), quoted in Quirk, 127. In the over-excited dispatches of Davis, the U.S. occupying force was "an army of white wings," the "apostles of peace." Mexican men, by contrast were "spiggoty," their women "squaws.", *ibid.*, 128.

¹⁴⁸Quirk, 154.

¹⁴⁹Ibid., 3., Sweetman, 160-161; Quirk, 156-171.

¹⁵⁰Quirk, vi. Such bitterness is seen throughout Justino M. Palomares, *La Invasion Yanqui* (Mexico City: 1940).

¹⁵¹Quirk, 171. See also Marlin Forster. "U.S. Intervention in Mexico: The 1914 Occupation of Veracruz." *Military Review*. (August 1977).

VII

POST-WORLD WAR I OCCUPATIONS

US Military Intervention in Siberia

("Walking on Eggs Loaded With Dynamite")

American military forces found themselves in one of the world's more improbable trouble spots when they intervened in the chaotic affairs of Russia towards the end of World War I and in the immediate post-war years. The missions of this unlikely force were: 1)To help the Czechoslovakian forces making their way across Siberia through the chaos of revolutionary Russia to Vladivostok there to proceed on to fight the Central Powers in Europe, 2)To guard from Bolshevik depredations the vast stores shipped to Russia to fight the Germans, and 3)To aid the Russian people. A smaller, more brief U.S. intervention in North Russia had generally the same mission.

The American commander, MG William Graves, and the Wilson administration which dispatched him were determined to confine this mission to these objectives and not to become entangled in domestic Russian affairs. In the ominous words with which Secretary of War, Newton Baker, sent General Graves off to Siberia from a Kansas City railroad station, "Watch your step; you will be walking on eggs loaded with dynamite. God bless you and good-bye."¹

The same restraint was obviously not enjoined on the Siberian missions dispatched by America's Allies, most of whom seemed more concerned with their geopolitical aims, which may have included the dismemberment of that part of Russia, then with actions directed to victory over the Germans.² General Graves was completely out of sympathy with such amoral national goals and a decade later claimed that "It has always been difficult for me...to understand why the United States ever acceded to the desires of England, France and Japan to send United States troops to Siberia."³

The advanced detachments of Graves' force landed at Vladivostok in August 1918 and took up duties as railroad guards. At peak strength, American Expeditionary Forces, Siberia, numbered 338 officers, 8050 enlisted men.

General Graves soon found himself embroiled with the machinations of the Japanese, who had the most blatant designs on Siberia. Fighting almost broke out between the Americans and the Japanese troops along their sections of the local rail line. In one incident, the Japanese allies began methodically to dig a mass grave, then, as US troops looked on in horror, slashed and beheaded local Russians, and pushed them into the pit. General Graves furiously protested to the Japanese commander, who finally roused himself to reply blandly that such practices were alien to his army.⁴ Hardly more bearable was the supercilious attitude of the first local British commander.

General Graves, a veteran of the Philippine Insurrection, was determined to win popular support or at least acquiescence for his mission, and insisted that his troops behave themselves and pay for all that they needed from the local economy. He detailed Army doctors to treat local civilians, while the troops themselves organized local entertainments and even brought in Christmas trees.⁵

Graves had his work cut out, however, in trying to deal with the complex mixtures of pro and anti-Bolshevik, conservative, agrarian, separatist political-military groups. Each of these groupings firmly believed that the Americans were in duty-bound to come to their aid and each found American neutrality incomprehensible. After all, the other Allied missions had their own "pet" Russian groups.

Graves found that the State Department representation in Siberia was probably under instructions from Washington to accord some sort of recognition to the White Russian Kolchak regime, a policy the general adamantly blocked. American civilian representatives of non-governmental agencies, particularly the American Red Cross (but not the YMCA, Knights of Columbus or the Salvation Army) also tended to meddle in Russian affairs, usually supporting the Kolchak regime.⁶ Graves complained that US Consul General Harris was "opposed to my views of 'non-interference' in the internal affairs of Russia.", and supported the Kolchak White administration when he could.⁷ When some 3,500 Jews were murdered by White forces in Ekaterinburg, Consul Harris refused to pass on a detailed report on the slaughter, and General Graves sent out the story through Army communication facilities.⁸ As Graves disgustedly put it, "The State Department is running this, not the War Department." But he stoutly added that "The State Department is not running me." In fact, General Graves so dominated the US presence in Siberia that the civilian officials were relegated to frustrated obscurity.⁹

The only group toward which General Graves was not neutral was the long-suffering civilian population. These were the only people to display gratitude for American assistance. General Graves' policy toward the civil population was exemplary. He ordered that local government remain unmolested as far as possible, and that no citizen be disturbed for his political opinions. According to Graves, the British Commander had the impertinence and snobbery to come to the American commander and inform him that "I was getting the reputation of being a friend of the poor and didn't I know they were only swine." For his part, Graves later wrote that "I had the greatest sympathy for these people and found them generous, kindly, and very hospitable.", and claimed to have studied "their habits, their customs, their desires, and their aspirations." Graves further perceptively noted that the British forces carried "two or three times as many officers in Siberia as did the United States, but few soldiers", probably due to the political and military designs of London on the area.¹⁰ In a telegram he iterated:

Troops must take no part in arresting people because of their political affiliations. No authority to arrest and confine citizens unless they commit

some illegal act. I cannot hold in confinement a Russian citizen because he has taken part in some Meeting.¹¹

Relations with the local citizenry were complicated by the colorful "admixture of races, émigrés, refugees, adventurers of all sorts, both masculine and feminine," Company E of the 27th Infantry even found itself administering a prisoner of war camp, and "reorganize[d] it for the welfare of some 2,000 Austro-Hungarian prisoners."¹² This "admixture" was complicated further by the defection of more than 30 troops of the Ussuri Cossack headman, Kalmikoff, a villain know for personally killing many of his victims. These troops went over to the Americans for protection. The Japanese, who had been supporting this brutal legion, demanded the return of the defectors, but Graves refused and the men were quietly released when matters had calmed as much as they ever would then in Siberia.¹³

Whatever General Graves' good faith efforts to keep out of the Russian Civil War, that war tended to come to him. In November of 1919 the Czech commander raised a "social revolutionist" revolt against pro-Kolchak forces in Vladivostok. The rebels, however, got the worst of it and the survivors were executed, except for a handful who made it to AEF headquarters. ("The bodies hadn't been removed and there were quite a number of them as the [railroad] station was made a place of execution by the Kolchaks.")¹⁴ Graves' troopers were quick enough to respond to violent provocations, as when a Semenoff Cossack armored train fired on a platoon of Co. M, 27th Infantry without warning. The platoon leader was ready for trouble, his men returned fire, and then charged the train and captured it at a cost of two Americans killed.¹⁵

Any American troop indiscipline tended to be emblazoned in the local newspapers, which continued to publish, for the most part, "virulent" criticism of the Americans, despite what must have been extremely tolerant censorship: "American troops --well-fed lads who know how to make themselves comfortable in other people's houses. They converse with Russians by way of gesticulations --a punch in the jaw or neck."¹⁶

Only essays in subversion or the inciting of outright revolt seemed to bring down any American censorship. According to the AEF's intelligence reading, local opinion between October 1918 and April 1919 was overwhelmingly favorable to the Americans, the chief holdouts being intellectuals and reactionary military officers. (The last category were usually pro-Japanese, as if the humiliation of the lost Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 had never occurred.) This good opinion was the more impressive in that it was current for the most part after the Armistice ending the war, when the troops presumably were restless to return home and questioning why they were in Siberia at all.¹⁷

It can be argued that the only positive results of this US/Allied intervention in Siberia was that the United States prevented Japan from absorbing, or at least dominating, Eastern Siberia and the Chinese Eastern Railway, and that things might



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MG William Graves, no-nonsense commander of U.S. forces in Vladivostok, had far more trouble from his White Russian, Japanese and British allies than from the Bolsheviks. C. 1920. Signal Corps, National Archives

have gone much worse for the local population absent the Allied troops, except for the Japanese. Whatever the State Department's bias toward the Kolchak regime, Graves' policies did help to prevent the Allies' from becoming involved in war with the Bolsheviks.

If anything, General Graves drew an even more negative conclusion, bitterly claiming that

I doubt if history will record, in the past century, a more flagrant case of flouting the well-known and approved practice of States in their international relations, and using instead of the accepted principles of international law, the principle of Might makes right."¹⁸

The American Siberian Expedition's good deeds did not go unpunished; in clashes with local partisans of undetermined political hue, the Americans lost 36 troops killed in action. The Soviet government never displayed the slightest gratitude for the U.S. military preservation of their vast eastern territory.¹⁹

On 31 December 1919, the forces received the welcome orders to withdraw and the outlying units began concentrating in Vladivostok. A Bolshevik armored train arrived on 30 January with envoys from Lenin to negotiate the surrender of Vladivostok, by which time practically all Russian troops in the area, except for officers, had turned ostensibly Bolshevik and now proved far more friendly to the Americans than in their previous anti-Bolshevik incarnation. The last U.S. troops gratefully embarked on 1 April for Manila's balmy environment.²⁰ Probably the best epitaph for the whole misbegotten episode was pronounced by CPT Barrett of the 27th.

It is a good thing that Americans and other allies are withdrawing from Siberia. Foreign intervention has only served to solidify the reds, giving the communists a rallying slogan to hold the power. Not since the days of the first revolution has Russia been so solidified.²¹

America's Watch on the Rhine

"[T]he German government appreciates highly the spirit in which you have administered the authority vested in you." (Wilhelm Cuno, Chancellor of Germany, to U.S. Army Military Governor of the Rhineland)

In one sense, there was no US Army Civil Affairs or Military Government as those terms were understood at the time, during World War I. During and immediately after that conflict the term "Civil Affairs" was synonymous with Military Government, and the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France engaged in no recorded Military Government before the signing of the Armistice. The battle lines had been

relatively fixed for most of the war and most civilians evacuated from the areas of actual combat. American tactical troops came into contact with French civilians in significant numbers only when they were moving forward in the final Allied offensives of the war. Thus the American Expeditionary Force's (AEF) interactions with civilians and French civil authorities during the war were limited to such routine matters of the procurement of labor and supplies, the requisition of billets and land for camps or training areas, usually on an *ad hoc* basis, and many of those at any rate were handled by the French military.²²

The AEF's real Civil Affairs and Military Government commitment commenced after the Armistice of 11 November 1918. That cease-fire mandated the German armies to evacuate territory on the left bank of the Rhine River, the area to be then administered by local authorities under Allied and United States military control for up to fifteen years.²³

Originally the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, had contemplated mixed occupation commands. However, the AEF commander, General John J. Pershing, successfully held out for well-defined territory for each national commander to administer. (During the war General Pershing had also successfully insisted upon keeping American troops under an American chain of command.)

From beginning to end the occupations of Luxembourg and the Rhineland would be almost entirely military; neither Generalissimo Foch nor General Pershing received any extensive direction from their political superiors as to policy or details. In actuality, General Pershing provided his own guidance: he was opposed to any American occupation of Germany. Many Americans were also suspicious of this new adventure in overseas military government. Governing "primitive" Filipinos or Cubans was one thing, but to become involved in the ancient broils of sophisticated Europe was something else entirely. The lack of political guidance is the more surprising in the case of President Woodrow Wilson, who believed in the imposition (or at least the "teaching") of democracy, as in the case of his military interventions in Latin America. However, the President seemed content that the Germans, in accordance with his Fourteen Points, had overthrown "autocracy" and "militarism" and had established a democratic, if tenuous, government at Weimar. There would be no attempts actually to "teach the Germans democracy," as had been the case with the unfortunate Mexicans or the Haitians. At any rate, Allied occupation was basically to ensure that Germany would pay its reparations, to shield France from any renewed German aggression and to provide some earnest of America's concern for the peace of Europe.

This is not to say that the War Department or the Army had made any particular preparation for a military occupation of a portion of Germany. Although it is difficult to credit, there is no record of anyone considering or drawing up plans, publications or doctrine for the occupation of Germany before the Armistice, even when the German armies were in full retreat across the battlefields. If any such planning was carried out, the documentation is conspicuously lacking.²⁴

In any event, this was the first American occupation of an industrialized, economically developed area. Further, this occupation, in distinction to that of the Mexican Cession, the former Confederate states, Puerto Rico, Cuba or the Philippines, was not a consequence of any determination to retain, annex or even exercise any long-term influence over the occupied territory. Also, like Reconstruction, this was to be a "punitive" Military Government; the Germans, like the South, were held responsible for the war and they were going to be made to pay for their aggression. American Military Government of its Rhineland zone would remain until Germany fulfilled her Allied-imposed obligations and would be terminated as she was determined fit to return to the family of completely-sovereign nations. This was a policy shared with the British, although the French had their own territorial designs. Finally, this was the US Army's first combined occupation, for it included her wartime partners, Great Britain, France and Belgium.

On 17 November, the AEF's Third Army, MG Joseph T. Dickman commanding, began advancing to its designated occupation area. However, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which had been occupied by Germany, lay in its route of march. When the AEF arrived in Luxembourg on the 20th General Pershing set the tone of this brief US MG by proclaiming that his forces came as liberators and that any necessary requisitions would be paid for in full. The Luxembourgese cordially cooperated with the Americans, but had their reservations about the French. In fact, Pershing's only difficulties involved Generalissimo Foch's attempt to place a French general in control of certain aspects of the occupation and to impose the most minute of restrictions on the local inhabitants (again successfully resisted by General Pershing). An aborted coup in mid-January, probably at least French-encouraged, led to a confrontation between Pershing and Foch, the withdrawal of the French and the safeguarding of the Grand Duchy's independence. Some American troops remained on duty in Luxembourg as late as the summer of 1919, possibly because of French designs on the Duchy²⁵

By early December, the Third Army was entering its sector of the German Rhineland.²⁶ The first instructions for American commanders entering their zone is instructive of the early attitudes of these combat veterans towards the Germans: "In staging in a town where a halt for the night or a longer period has been ordered, the commanding officer will send for the burgomaster [*sic*], chief of police or other prominent official." The conquerors were not to go calling on the conquered.²⁷

Mutual suspicion and resentment seemed to fester more and longer between the two allies than anything directed against the mutual enemy. General Pershing had to advise General Dickman to caution his men against anti-French sentiments. Obviously, this occupation was not going to prove to be an arena of Allied solidarity, at least as far as the Americans and the French were concerned.²⁸ The French were even suspicious personally of General Dickman, not the least because of his surname, which in actuality, as General Pershing took some pains to discover, was Dutch, not German. Dickman, who apparently had given no cause for dissatisfaction to his American

commander, was nonetheless replaced in May of 1919 by MG Hunter Liggett, who despite his impeccably non-Germanic surname, soon enough also became *persona non grata* with his French allies.²⁹

Allied cooperation was secured, at least on paper, through the Permanent Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, charged with the general supervision of the Armistice's provisions and with communication with the German government. Its sub-commission, the Inter-Allied Commission for the Rhineland, had, in turn, 14 subordinate commissions, dealing with the economy, transport, postal affairs, shipping, food, etc. Each of these commissions, of course, included American military representatives.³⁰

The American occupation zone consisted of approximately 2,500 square miles, relatively sparsely inhabited and predominantly agrarian. The zone contained only two real cities, Coblenz and Trier, both without heavy industry.³¹

War Department and Army preparations, all post-Armistice, for the Rhineland occupation consisted primarily of the publication and distribution within the Army of the AEF G-2 pamphlet *Notes on German Local Government*, the appointment of BG H. A. Smith as Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory and of COL I. L. Hunt as General Smith's assistant. COL Hunt was soon after appointed Third Army's Advance GHQ Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs (OCCA). The AEF's work on a series of *Anordnungen* (ordinances) for the guidance of Rhineland civilians had not been completed, however, before the Third Army entered Germany. Finally, General Pershing had issued a proclamation declaring that the impending American Military Government would be conducted in accord with international law. Pershing's proclamation was fully within American MG precedent, which stressed working within local law and administration and avoiding unnecessary harshness. While warning the Germans that any breach of military law would "be severely punished," General Pershing went on to assure Germans and Americans alike that "It is the duty of the population to regain their normal mode of life and to reestablish the schools, churches, hospitals and charitable institutions, and to continue in their regular local activities. Therein they will not be disturbed, but rather assisted and protected." He concluded that:

In so far as their scope and bearing permit, the courts, city departments, and civil establishments will be continued under the supervision of the American Army. The existing laws and regulations, in so far as they do not interfere with the duty and security of the American troops, shall remain in force.³²

Early in his command, Third Army Commanding General, MG Henry Allen, realized that he could leave most German government to the Germans, confiding to his diary that "my idea relative to affairs in the American area is to leave the Germans as free a hand as is compatible with order and their compliance with the provisions of the Treaty."³³ These were certainly humane sentiments from an enemy commander to a defeated people, coming at a time when the Allied command considered it entirely

possible that the Germans, none of whose armies had surrendered in the field, might renounce the Armistice and renew the fighting.³⁴

It was this apprehension, as well as ignorance of German local government and of the ease to which the US military occupation could be adapted to that government, which caused Third Army to make a serious mistake at the beginning of its occupation. BG Smith determined that the tactical formations of Third Army would be used as the units of Military Government a situation that prevailed until the following June.³⁵

Cutting across local German political boundaries, each subordinate Corps and division carried its own OCCA, in addition to Third Army Advance GHQ's OCCA (BG Smith).³⁶ Third Army HQ, on the other hand, scattered its Civil Affairs and Military Government duties throughout its staff sections, creating further confusion. Administrative logic did prevail in the segmenting of Third Army Advance HQ OCCA into five major departments: public works and utilities, fiscal affairs, sanitation and public health, schools and charitable institutions and legal affairs. Overall, American Military Government in this initial stage of the occupation was not very administratively efficient.³⁷

The fact that such government worked at all was undoubtedly due to the obvious and immediate docility of the Germans. There is no case recorded where a German official refused to carry out his duties under the Americans. In fact, no less than 90 percent of the detailed government work in the Rhineland remained in the hands of German civil servants. It is difficult to see how the American Zone could have functioned without this help, given the almost total lack of American preparation for Military Government.³⁸

The attitude of the general civil population, was well summarized by the *Trierische Zeitung*, which could hardly have been more enthusiastic (and more perceptive) about the new occupiers:

The American soldiers are distinguished from one another, apart from the almost invisible insignia of rank, only by their facial expression and general appearance. All are clean-shaven and their uniforms are alike. The horses of the higher officers are no more gorgeously harnessed than those of ordinary troopers. The rations are also the same, save the officers are served a little better. Recently, as we have been informed, soup, beefsteak, and trimmings and pudding were served for dinner. We should like to add that when the American soldier is not provided with rations, he draws an allowance of six marks daily. This proves that he lives fairly well. Our musketeers would have been overjoyed at such an allowance. But we must take into consideration that the United States is the richest country in the world and that \$1.00, or four marks, must be expended there for articles that can be obtained for one mark here. What is most conspicuous in the Americans is the assurance and the peaceful manner in which they perform their duties. We hear no strident

sounds or insolence; we see no dissatisfaction, much less a haughty mien, but always a friendly smile when intercourse with civilians is necessary. There are no disagreeable relations between the soldier and his superior. We should draw a lesson for the citizens of our new republic from this. We cannot afford the pay of the American soldiers, but we can give our people the same position which they take in life. The great differences between the lower officers and the men do not exist with them; nevertheless everything runs smoothly and this is a particular advantage which we take to heart.³⁹

One month later, the renowned American journalist, William Allen White, found the Army's occupation characterized by "a policy of kindness toward the German people in their humiliation and distress." On a local level the *Landrat* of Mayen Kreis wrote, not untypically, to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for Mayen, "In connection with the proceedings of to-day, I honor myself to inform your High and Wellborn self that."⁴⁰ These were all rather remarkable attitudes considering that Germany and the United States were still in a state of war.⁴¹ Douglas MacArthur, looking back over the decades, nostalgically remembered that:

We had often boasted of 'watering our horses in the Rhine,' but now we were there and the exhilaration seemed to have disappeared. In its place came a realization of the inherent dignity and stature of the great German nation.⁴²

In fact, at the time some military personnel actually imagined at first that this attitude masked some "insidious form of propaganda."⁴³ A common sentiment among the American doughboys was "We wouldn't act this way if the enemy had come to our country!"⁴⁴ These soldiers simply did not know their Germans. The Americans were now the legal authority by right of conquest, a principle which the Germans themselves had put into practice in other peoples' countries in the recent past and would soon enough do so again. It must be remembered also this was early in the occupation, and before the harsh terms of the Treaty [*diktat*] of Versailles became known. American troops reflected the glory of President Wilson and his Fourteen Points for a better world, a world in which the Germans naively expected to share, with a minimum of difficulty about the recent, and most regrettable, unpleasantness. Further, as unoccupied Germany seemed to slide into chaos in the wake of military defeat and the abdication of the Kaiser, many German officials in the American Zone welcomed the American troops as a barrier against the Bolshevik-tinged "Workers' and Soldiers' Councils" springing up everywhere else in the Fatherland.⁴⁵

American Military Government came to be regarded, with some wry amusement by the Germans, as carried out with appreciably less rigidity and consistency, certainly in its later phases, than their own well-disciplined, long-serving, professional,

officialdom. (In fact, the German civil service of the time has been described as an "army in civilian clothes.")

At the start of the occupation, however, the German civil service itself could have taken lessons from the blizzard of American Military Government ordinances, and most of these orders and prohibitions would have cheered the pedantic heart of any Prussian civil servant. First in importance (and actually the doing of Marshal Foch) was the requirement that all Germans in the American zone above the age of 12 carry on their persons at all times (of course) an *ausweis* personal identification card, and that each householder had to post on the inside of his front door the names, ages, sex, age and occupation of all inhabitants.

The pass system was probably the most useless and unnecessarily irritating regulation of the entire American occupation. Germans had to stand in long lines in all kinds of weather to obtain permission for the most routine of journeys. Yet the passes were easily forged or borrowed. Pass violations were by far the most numerous of the cases tried by the American provost courts. However, the pass cases clogging the US Army courts primarily dealt with those honest enough to admit that they had lost their passes. Germans serious about evading the requirement almost always got away with it.⁴⁶ Furthermore, American military police had the authority to stop and search at will German civilians, a practice bound to breed resentment among law-abiding civilians: roughly 99 percent of German citizens of the time.⁴⁷ More positively, the Americans put the German love of uniforms to their own use, requiring that uniformed civil government employees, such as railroad personnel, render a "proper" salute to Allied troops, although civilians did not have to uncover (except for the U.S. national anthem), as was apparently the case in the British and French zones. Government employees were immediately thereafter observed punctiliously getting off snappy salutes to American troops of even the lowest ranks

Prohibitions included non-fraternization with the local civilian population, the carrying of arms (except for police officers), outdoor photography, the use of carrier pigeons, German Army recruiting, treatment by civilian doctors of American military personnel (particularly for venereal disease); drug sales to US troops and sales of German Army equipment to civilians. Further, no one could:

hang on a passing vehicle...., children must not play around an automobile park or on streets where traffic is continually passing....Drivers of animal drawn vehicles must at all times have their vehicles under control....Failure to comply strictly with this order will subject offenders to trial by military tribunal. In the case of violation by children, parents will be held responsible.⁴⁸

A distinctly American prohibition was that of sale of alcoholic beverages, except for light wine and beer. MG headquarters argued with a straight face that "The majority of American soldiers were not used to alcoholic stimulants," and (somewhat more

convincingly), that they were now in the heart of the German wine-making country. The underlying impetus was undoubtedly a reflection of the "Noble Experiment" of national alcoholic Prohibition now commencing in the United States but it was also true that the vast majority of assaults, whether by Americans on Germans, or vice-versa, were the results of drunken brawls.⁴⁹

In addition to prohibitions, the American military imposed censorship on mail, telegraph, and telephone messages, as well as on ordinances and orders dealing with currency exchange rates, the marking of road signs in English, curfew, price levels, public meetings, the setting of clocks, billeting, travel and travel permits and registration of travelers, water conservation, arming of "gendarmes," German Army military personnel on duty in the American Zone, German Army deserters (to be returned), use of German mails on official business (free of charge), quarantine of immigrants, auctions of surplus US Army stocks, claims of Germans against US military, private automobiles (new licenses permitted "only after careful investigation and examination of applications."), etc., etc. Some of these ordinances could be quite complicated:

(a) Where material, previously purchased from the German Army, or any regularly constituted government or municipal authority acting for or in behalf of the German Army, within the American Zone of the Occupied area, has been confiscated from any person or corporation, and where the American Army has also taken the money which was paid for the said material from the Kreis concerned, and where the property has not been returned or sold to the purchaser, the person or corporation from whom the property was confiscated may present a claim for the amount paid for the said material[.] The claims, together with proper receipts and certificates, must be presented to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in the Kreis concerned, within ten (10) days from the date of this notice.⁵⁰

To put such officious matters in the context of their times, it should be noted yet again that Germany had not yet signed a peace treaty, and it was not unreasonable to expect a resumption of hostilities from an army that many Germans firmly believed could not possibly have been defeated in the field, but must have been "stabbed in the back" by internal enemies. As late as March of 1920 AFG troops were conducting map exercises and maneuvers to repulse an imagined German invasion of their zone.⁵¹

Surely one of the least needed orders to the meticulously neat Germans was that from the Third Division OCCA, through the Burgomeister of Andernach-Stadt, requiring the householders to cleanse their sidewalks at 0800 and 1500 each day, violators to be punished at the hands of the Provost Court.⁵² Many of these orders applying specifically to German civilians were issued through the local *burgomeisters* and it is not always possible to determine which were the result of American orders and

which merely the exercise of meticulous Germanic municipal administration. Military governors also found it convenient to issue verbal orders through town criers and church pulpits.

On the other hand, American troops were prohibited from purchasing foods that were determined to be a part of the German ration, although they could buy not only apples, but also (and this must surely have been added tongue-in-cheek, considering the location), oranges, lemons or bananas. Individual soldiers and American civilian relief workers had also to pay full toll in most cases on German trams and trains.⁵³ Troops wishing to supplement their rations with local game were warned by Fourth Army Corps that they would be held liable for compensation. ("In Germany all game is private property.")⁵⁴

The German food situation was considerably eased by the humanitarian work of the American Hoover Commission, which issued rations to civilians in both occupied and unoccupied Germany. The Commission's larders were soon overwhelmed, however, and first the British, then the French and finally the Americans had to sell off portions of their reserve food stocks to prevent actual starvation. In the American zone, Hoover Commission food was distributed in churches and schools by US and American civilians. "Sale of Garbage" signs by sealed bids for the edible refuse from American river boats and messes were a grim reflection of those hungry months.⁵⁵ The French made it a point to have their soldiers serve the largesse to let the Germans know who was both their benefactors and their masters.⁵⁶

In this earlier phase of the occupation wartime memories lingered. The city of Coblenz, ordered to cut its electricity consumption by 50 percent, had quoted to it a similar German order in occupied Belgium.⁵⁷

The provost courts, which had jurisdiction for all cases involving civilian offenses against the US military and its regulations, were of course, a significant part of Rhineland Military Government. Provost court sentences were publicized but could not have done much to awe the civilian population: "stealing US rations," 20 days; "disrespect to an American officer, 30 days"; "US property in possession and stealing, 30 days"; another such case, 100 Marks; yet another 600 Marks; "insulting US flag"; 60 days; "drunk and no pass, 10 days"; "prostitution, 30 days," (standard sentence); "pandering, 60 days" (also standard); "false[ly] charging Americans, 600 Marks"; "drunk and insulting American women, 200 Marks"; "concealed weapons, 30 days"; "possessing fire arms, 300 Marks"; "threatening to shoot soldiers," 30 days [!]. (Certain of these offenses in areas occupied by the German Army earlier or later would have resulted in the death penalty.)⁵⁸ American military mildness soon extended well beyond the courts. During 1919 the French took disciplinary measures against twice as many German officials as did the Americans, and usually by the drastic measure of deportation. From 1920 through 1921, 16 German officials were suspended by French military authorities, compared to only four by the Americans. At the same time, the French prohibited 79 German publications, compared to American action against only one.⁵⁹ As one US officer reported, after noting "a deep feeling of hatred for the

French" and "fear" of the English, "The people and officials state openly that they are glad the Americans are here instead of the English or the French,"⁶⁰

Some time before the spring of 1921, the commander of U.S. forces in Germany decided to turn over to German courts serious cases involving German civilians. Accordingly, when two Germans murdered an American soldier soon after, they were handed over to German justice and a few months later both were guillotined in Cologne.⁶¹

Conversely, by 1 October, 1919, of the 250,000 American occupation troops, 256 were accused of felonies, a rate of two per thousand per year. General courts martial indictments of American troops on complaint of German authorities numbered 25 homicides (6 convicted), 34 sex crimes (10 convictions), 13 burglaries (8 convictions), 79 robberies (8 convictions), 53 larcenies (20 convictions) and 36 assaults with deadly weapons (23 convictions). In addition, two soldiers were convicted out of seven complaints of mistreatment of German prisoners. Two of the more despicable cases included a group of four or five newly-arrived American soldiers in the summer of 1919, full of the "hate propaganda" of the war, who went out and killed an inoffensive German peasant standing in front of his house. They were quickly convicted of murder. Another gang of green troops who serially-raped a nun also felt the full effect of military justice.⁶² Such indiscipline was undoubtedly exacerbated by a somewhat casual attitude toward fights between Germans and American troops. The Trier Post Commander, for example, brushed aside reports of brawls involving Germans and America troops early in the occupation:

The 'higher ups' were always afraid that our men would beat up the Boche; and it was quite true that soldiers did take a certain delight in doing so, and it was inadvisable to make too much of the matter while it did have the effect of making the Germans very careful how they acted in American occupied territory.⁶³

A distinctly un-Germanic policy of American Military Government was the prohibition of collective penalties on German communities, except by authority of the commander-in-chief. Individuals would be punished for individual offenses. This prohibition, so unlike prevailing German military procedures in their occupied territories, was questioned only once, when four American soldiers were assaulted by something like thirty Germans in the remote town of Niederlutzigen. A "conspiracy of silence" by the townspeople blocked investigative efforts, and the local Military Government officials recommended a collective fine for the town. The fine was disapproved by the AEF Judge Advocate General on the grounds that ill-feeling by the townspeople had been provoked by the misbehavior of other soldiers (not of the unlucky four.)⁶⁴ This disturbance is probably the only case of anything more than individual violence directed toward individual American occupation troops in the U.S. Rhineland Occupation.

One of the earliest duties of American Military Government in the Rhineland was the supervision in its zone of the German national and Prussian elections of January 1919. Military Government officers refrained from overt interference in the election process, although they gave short shrift to the Communist Spartacist "Workers and Soldiers Councils." In fact, the only American military interference with these elections seems to have come when one Army Captain, "whom we always regarded as our best Kreise officer," was somehow elected as a delegate from Mayen! This election, of course, was quashed; community involvement and goodwill could only be taken so far.⁶⁵

Tactical unit commanders were charged with the actual implementation of Civil Affairs in their towns and villages. In effect, the division commanders, through their OCCAs, became the agents of Army Civil Affairs in the Rhineland. The problem was that these obligations were incidental to their tactical military duties. At the regimental and battalion levels, Civil Affairs were passed on to staff officers as additional duty, the only common qualification being a knowledge of German (not so difficult a requirement in those days of recent heavy German immigration to the United States). Consequently the actual execution of Civil Affairs varied greatly, with improper findings, and unduly harsh punishments for minor infractions often inflicted on hapless citizens by Army officers either impatient to rotate home now that the war was over, or newly arrived and totally inexperienced in anything to do with civil governance.

This state of affairs began to change as the occupation army itself profoundly altered through demobilization of the great citizen army raised to fight the war. By August of 1919 the last combat division remaining in the Rhineland left for home and Rhineland Civil Affairs gradually changed from its military tactical-oriented administration to a "occupation type" organization. As combat officers left, the division, regimental and battalion OCCAs were replaced by a *Kreis* officer, directly responsible to the Third Army (now renamed Armed Forces in Germany (AFG) OCCA, and a small staff that included a superior provost court and medical and sanitation units. This administration based on political divisions was an entirely more sensible organization than its predecessor, and the only major problem now was a shortage of personnel as the US Army was severely reduced in post-war Congressional budget-cutting.

Further, with the Versailles peace accords coming into effect in January of 1920, the administrative nature of the occupation changed even more. Although the United States itself was not a signatory, the signing of the treaty brought an end to the relatively joint occupation of the Rhineland dating from the Armistice. The newly-created Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission administered what purported to be a civil occupation, although French, British and Belgian troops remained very much in evidence in their respective zones. The American commissioner, a strong Wilsonian, actually tried to have AFG come under Commission control. MG Allen fought this unrealistic proposal and gained the support even of the State Department as well as of the War Department.⁶⁶

Thus, in the absence of a peace treaty with Germany, the Americans, uniquely, maintained a military occupation, but the supreme authority in the American Zone was now vested exclusively in the Third Army commander, where it belonged.⁶⁷

By this time many of the more petty regulations, injunctions, prohibitions and restrictions thought up by officious administrators trying to cover any and all conceivable contingencies, could not be enforced in anything like their originally intended vigor. Rhinelanders no longer had to carry passports on their persons whenever they went out, censorship and curfews on inns and other public houses were relaxed, as were restrictions on firearms and public meetings. By this time also, the non-fraternization injunction had become a completely dead letter. American troops found it impossible. The "dignified aloofness" the order was supposed to foster might have been possible for officers, who had their own rooms and their coal supplied and could, in fact, remain somewhat autonomous, although at the cost of learning little first-hand about the country. No such course was possible for the enlisted men, thrown together with the German families in whose homes they were billeted. In fact, because of the shortage of coal, the kitchen was the only heated room in German homes at that time; Rhinelanders and Americans thus found themselves, cheek-by-jowl, sharing the same room and getting acquainted, no matter what Army regs stipulated. At least the enlisted troops got to know something of the Germans.

As the remaining troops were transferred to barracks they could no longer meet German women in wholesome surroundings. Those German women who would risk arrest to meet Americans tended to expect money for their company. Consequently, the venereal disease rate soared. Further, about 100 soldiers honestly reported to their commanders that they were engaged to German girls who were now pregnant and wished to do the "honorable thing" and marry their fiancées. The Army had little choice but to make exceptions in those cases only. However, this ruling simply seemed to have encouraged far more soldiers to get their girl friends pregnant so that they could marry. To general relief, the obnoxious order was withdrawn on 27 September 1919. (only to be resurrected, to similar lack of success, in the American occupation of Germany towards the end of World War II). In the end, something like one-tenth of the command had married local women.⁶⁸

General Henry T. Allen, a tall, imposing Kentucky mountaineer and West Point graduate (Class of 1882) was basically left to his own devices throughout the years of the U.S. Rhineland occupation. He recorded in his diary that "no one knows anything about it and it was considered best to give me a free hand to act as circumstances may demand." On the other hand, Allen was able to pick and choose his personnel from among thousands of officers and enlisted men.⁶⁹ By this time his command was down to around 50,000 troops. However, these men were, for the most part, replacements for the disciplined Third Army combat troops who had gone home. Venereal disease, court martial rates and general indiscipline problems remained high.

Allen imposed a tough training program to keep the men out of trouble and give them a military edge. Knowing how supercilious and patronizing America's allies

could be about the qualities of American troops and how much they were impressed by military pomp, General Allen also stressed military drill. He claimed, with perhaps some pardonable exaggeration, that a bullet fired down each rank of his men lined up at "present arms" could have taken off the nose of every man. Allen also organized a vigorous athletic program that was so successful and popular that the Americans won most of the inter-Allied competitions. Soon General Allen's command enjoyed the highest re-enlistment rate of the entire US Army.⁷⁰ Once General Allen had whipped his command into impressive condition, he could then concentrate on education and vocational training, raising some 500 illiterates, for example, out of their ignorance and making them all the better soldiers for it.⁷¹

General Allen found that his main "enemy" was never the German civil population, but rather French policy toward the Rhineland. General Pershing had presciently advised Allen in a personal letter to handle this ally most delicately.⁷² The most serious problem here was the attempt by America's ally to foster the Rhennish separatist movement, but it also included French attempts at direct interference with the running of the occupation, such as the dismantling of fortresses and the sending in of French communications units. General Allen also objected to the practice of French troops on leave going about town with their bayonets on their belts. He felt that this was a needless provocation to the Germans and he forbade it in his zone.⁷³ The French could point out, of course, that the "naive" Americans could afford such "enlightened" policies; things would presumably have proven considerably different if the United States bordered Germany and had been invaded, partially occupied twice and lost territory to such a neighbor, whatever the present docility of the Germans. General Allen was on firm ground, however, when he concluded to his diary that "It is not possible to make France so strong or German[y] so weak that the former will remain a permanent checkmate to the latter." Geopolitical-military considerations aside, Allen further confided that "I am more than ever impressed with the greater natural affinity existing between the Germans and ourselves."⁷⁴

With the fading of Wilsonianism, the main argument for keeping the US troops in the Rhineland now seemed to be that of ensuring the territorial integrity of France. The United States was still strongly opposed to any French designs on the Rhineland, however, and the Germans now wished for the American troops to remain to protect their nation's borders! General Allen obligingly settled the separatist question in his zone simply by having his OCCA arrest the separatist leader, who came to be regarded by the Rhinelanders, at least in the American Zone, as a figure of fun.⁷⁵

American Military Government was also concerned with threats from the left, with the Bolsheviks Spartacists and the "Red Republic of the Ruhr," which bordered on the US Zone. At least one veteran claimed that every agent the "Bolshiviki" used to attempt to subvert American troops was actually in the employ of US Military Government Intelligence.⁷⁶ Undoubtedly aware of the "Red threat" General Allen claimed that his command was deeply involved in resolving labor disputes. An OCCA officer would visit the workplace concerned to show his interest. Then an attempt




MG Henry T. Allen, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone of Occupation, the Rhineland, 1919-1923.,
Signal Corps, National Archives

would be made to bring the sides to an amicable settlement. Allen claimed that "one conference of this sort was generally sufficient."⁷⁷ Perhaps reflecting the growing conservative and anti-union attitude in the United States, Army authorities would summarily deport any striker who would not at least take another job.⁷⁸ Even here, General Allen had his *contretemps* with the French. A threatened railway strike in the winter of 1921-1922 impelled the French to propose a declaration of martial law and the seizure of the railroads to ensure logistical support and lines of communication for the Allied occupation armies. Allen feared that once the French had taken control of the lines they would never give them up. When the strike actually began, the American commander exercised his authority to draft essential workers to continue operating the lines. The French had no choice but to follow suit and the strike soon ended.⁷⁹

General Allen and his British counterpart kept aloof from the general strike called in protest against the rightist Berlin Kapp *putsch* of March 1920, both agreeing that the German army had every right to deploy troops and restore the legitimate German government. Again, the French had other ideas and tried to make political capital of the tumultuous situation.⁸⁰

None of these high-level concerns particularly affected the American doughboy. His was hardly hardship duty. Particularly with the rampaging German monetary inflation, he could live well indeed. As one soldier reported, "A shave costs us 1/2 cents in American money and everything else is in the same proportion." Another veteran of the occupation reported years later that he had purchased a "suit of good English material, made to measure by the best tailor in Coblenz" for less than \$10.00. By May of 1919, the *Amaroc News*, the unofficial U.S. MG newspaper, was reporting that troopers were remitting to the US daily nearly \$10,000. Not surprisingly, it was reported that between the spring and summer of 1921, as the Army was being reduced, not one enlisted man took his discharge! When the announcement came of the impending withdrawal of the troops, the *New York Times* reported that the US soldier had been "tumbled...off the top of the world."⁸¹ Nonetheless, this good life did not seem to have dulled the military edge of the troops; to the end, the American occupation force retained a reputation as something of a crack outfit.⁸²

Little of this seemed to concern Americans back home; the Rhinelanders remained docile, and the future of the AFG was not an issue in the national elections of 1920. One of the few times that the occupation made news was when the 1920 Republican candidate for the presidency, Senator Warren G. Harding, opined that "American troops had no business" in Germany, and would be brought home upon the signing of a "formal peace." Yet President Harding's administration then announced that the troops would stay for an indefinite period, although the new administration's War Department announced that the AFG would be reduced to 5,600 men. One Senator did advocate keeping the troops on as "a good business investment." More seriously, *The New York Times* argued for an American presence in grand Wilsonian



MG troopers in post-World War I German Rhineland padlock two shops for overcharging U.S. forces.
Signal Corps, National Archives

terms as the sole visible sign remaining of the once promising hope of "settling the war in the common interest of the world."⁸³

As early as 1920 the American occupation had begun its withdrawal. (Some wags noted that "America's Watch on the Rhine is running down.") The command began turning over some of its civil administration to the French, much to the chagrin of most Rhinelanders, who justifiably feared that the French would prove considerably less amiable than the Americans. A French General's perhaps sour comment rings true enough: "the Americans were more German than the Germans themselves."⁸⁴

By this time French troops were increasingly in evidence in Coblenz. General Allen, after having to discipline an insubordinate French colonel, grimly determined that "the maximum of French show in this city has been reached for the duration of my stewardship." By this time, the American forces were down to 1,200 troops. Had it not been for the Washington Disarmament Treaty of 1921 the AFG might have been repatriated in that year. However, Washington felt that complete withdrawal would render the French less willing to make concessions, given their concern for military security and fear of diplomatic isolation. Conversely, the presence of the AFG restrained the French from their more obtrusive ventures in the Rhineland and the Ruhr.⁸⁵

As France began to mobilize for her invasion of the Ruhr to exact war reparations, however, American political and public opinion was increasingly coming to the conclusion that the troops should get out of what Senator James Reed of Missouri termed the "hellpot they are brewing over there." By this time the only American political support for the occupation came from a weird admixture of what *The New York Times* termed "isolationists, Versailles irreconcilables, Lodge [League of Nations] reservationists, mild reservationists and out-and-out advocates of the Treaty and League Covenant."⁸⁶ In Washington any interest in the AFG was a simple concern for its safety in the face of the Franco-German crisis.⁸⁷ The Germans, on the other hand, were well-pleased that the AFG remained available as a counter to French "aggression." The *Berliner Borsenzeitung*, delighted that another rumor of American withdrawal had proven false (for the time), asserted that their new-found friends were helping limit the French "passion for military encroachments." In return, the French military command now found the Americans "unbearable."⁸⁸ This latest threatened American withdrawal prompted the German Foreign Minister to cable the American Secretary of State that:

Proposed withdrawal is causing great anxiety to population of Rhineland and the frontier. The American authorities of occupation have distinguished themselves by impartial use of the privileges allotted them.... This consideration causes German Government to request American Government not to withdraw completely from the occupation of the Rhineland in favor of occupation by another power."⁸⁹

The "other power," of course was France.

The American Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, warned the French Ambassador that any occupation of the Ruhr would trigger the withdrawal of the AFG. On 10 January 1923, the French, claiming the Germans in default on their deliveries of reparations coal, moved their troops into the Ruhr to take over its mines. The same day, the White House issued a statement that, true to Secretary Hughes' word, the AFG was coming home.⁹⁰ Wasting no time, the AFG lowered Old Glory for the last time from the Ehrenbreitstein.⁹¹ The German foreign minister, twisting the anti-French knife, informed the American ambassador that although the AFG would be missed there would be a "certain consolation" for Germany if such a withdrawal could were viewed as the result of French aggression.⁹² None of this, of course, stopped the Americans, in the end, from turning their occupation zone over to the French.

The last days of the AFG Headquarters resembled "a domestic relations court," as German women hurried to marry their American sweethearts and ship to the States, and as claimants for illegitimate children, for work, for charity, for settlement of overdue bills, all crowded in to make their cases before the Americans left forever.⁹³ The Chancellor of Germany, Wilhelm Cuno, sent his farewell blessing: "the German government appreciates highly the spirit in which you have administered the authority vested in you." The *Reichskommissar* for the American zone and General Allen's chief liaison with the German government told the Military Governor personally that the Americans "had arrived as enemies and were leaving as friends -- a rare occurrence in history."⁹⁴ The Mayor of Coblenz was positively effusive, as was the German press - and, to a lesser extent, even the official French press in Mainz.⁹⁵

In the immediate post-evacuation years German journals continued their praise of the Allen regime, long after they could have reaped any benefit by so doing. The *Sddeutsche Monatshefte* said the general had "insisted upon a policy based on honesty, decency and justice", high praise indeed from an ultra-nationalist journal. *Die Gesellschaft*, a socialist and labor leader said that Allen was "guided by his unbribable capacity to analyze the world conflicts from a sober businesslike point of view."⁹⁶ Rather astonishingly, General Allen replied by claiming that that the "American [troops] had less discord with the citizens of Coblenz and had been more gentlemanly...than even the peacetime German garrison."⁹⁷

There may have been a certain golden haze of memory in all this. Despite General Allen's best efforts while back in the States most Americans had lost interest in any Wilsonian setting of the world to rights. Nonetheless, from the viewpoint of efficiently maintaining tranquillity and security over prolonged period of time, it can hardly be denied that here was one of history's most successful Military Governments.

¹William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920* (New York: 1931), 4. President Wilson's *Aide Memoir* spelling out the mission of the Siberian force is in *ibid.*, 5-10.

²See the final report of MG W. S. Graves, 1 July 1919, to 31 March 1920, NARA, micro 917, reel No. 10, file 21-336, Office of Chief of Staff, "American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia," where MG Graves reveals his extreme bitterness toward British and Japanese machinations in Siberia and the viciousness of the "Whites" toward the inoffensive civilian population. For an analysis of Allied territorial designs on Russia, see L. I. Strakhovski, "The Franco-British Plot to Dismember Russia," *Current History* (March 1931), 8. See also the Kyres, 122-123; V. C. Westall, "AEF Siberia -- The Forgotten Army," *Military Review* (March 1968); C. K. Melton, "Between War and Peace: Woodrow Wilson and the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918-1920.", Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1991. A useful summary of the American Expeditionary Forces, Siberia, can be found in U.S. Army Historical Section, Army War College, *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces*. General Headquarters, Armies, Army Corps, Services of Supply, and Separate Forces (Washington: 1937), 385-389.

³Graves, 32.

⁴*Ibid.*, 253-254. Graves in this work sarcastically refers to the "modern methods being used by our ally, Japan, in destroying Bolshevism," *ibid.* Sylvian G. Kindall, a veteran officer of the 27th Infantry in Siberia, confirms the beheading story and other cases of Japanese cruelty to the Siberians., *American Soldiers in Siberia* (New York: 1945), 152 and *passim*. See Bugbee Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.

⁵Birtle, 220-221.

⁶Graves, 205-206, 267-268, 330; Birtle, 219; Faith Bugbee, "The American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia," 14 August 1934, copy in Hoover Institution Archives, *passim*, copy in Bugbee Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.

⁷*Ibid.*, 118. Kolchak forces, to show their gratitude for State's partiality, spread the word that most of the American troops were "Jews from New York." For what it was worth, most were actually from the West Coast, whatever their religious persuasion. *ibid.*, 111.

⁸Bugbee, 19-20.

⁹Zink, 8; Kyre, 122-123. Local State Department and non-governmental involvement in anti-Bolshevik activities is described throughout Graves, *passim*. See also Betty Miller Unterberger, *America's Siberian Expedition 1918-1920: A Study of National Policy* (Durham: 1956), 233. Unterberger concludes that the U.S. government only withdrew to avoid an armed clash with the Bolsheviks. Rather more pertinent was the fact that, the American public had overwhelmingly repudiated Wilsonian "crusades" in the elections of 1918 and 1920.

¹⁰Graves, 87, 144. Graves, rather mildly, characterized the obnoxious British General Knox as "a natural aristocrat." Graves, 18-19. Privately, General Knox returned the favor by informing an American newspaper correspondent that "all America meant by her program of economic relief was to sell more harvester machines, shows and films to the Russians.", Unterberger, 123. The British officer, John Ward, seemed to believe that the American forces were almost working hand-in-glove with the Bolsheviks. Ward, *With the "Die-Hards" in Siberia* (London, New York, etc.: 1920), 250-251.

¹¹Quoted in Office of the Chief of Staff, American Expeditionary Forces, Siberia, "The American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia," micro 917, reel No. 10, file 21-336, p. 79.

¹²Army War College, *Order of Battle*, 387; Kyre, 122-123.

¹³CPT William S. Barrett, "America in Russia or the Diary of a Russian Wolfhound," typescript in Hoover Institution Archives. Bugbee, gives a less likely figure of 300 deserters, 11. Birtle notes that Graves' was "appalled" by the atrocities inflicted by this unseemly force upon the inoffensive civilians of the area, and that this reaction was the primary cause of his anti-White attitude. 220.

¹⁴COL Bugbee to Mrs. Bugbee, 19 November 1919, Bugbee Papers. Barrett puts the total death toll at 1,000, with several hundred being shot out of hand after they had surrendered., 23-24.

¹⁵Barrett, 27.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 8. Birtle asserts that the Kolchak forces "orchestrated an anti-American propaganda campaign designed to turn the population against the United States and force the Americans to withdraw, giving Japan a freer hand in Siberian affairs.", 220.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 87-90; U.S. Army A.E.F., XX 546- 9.13, boxes Nos.1, 2, "News Summary" folders (1919-1920), Hoover Institution Archives.

¹⁸Graves, 348. (punctuation in original) And yet Secretary of War Baker contributed this book's introduction, only mildly disagreeing with Graves' conclusion.

¹⁹Unterberger, 234.

²⁰*War Department, Annual Report for 1920*, vol. 1, p. 242. See also Birtle, 218-226.

²¹Barrett, 31. Army Chief of Staff Peyton March, at the time, forthrightly termed the Russian interventions "a military crime," quoted in Birtle, 226. The entire topic of Wilsonian interventions is covered in Frederick Calhoun, "The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago (1983).

²²See Earl F. Ziemke, "Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty," *Military Affairs* (December 1972), 131.

²³Terminologically, the United States was not one of the "Allied" powers. In deference to American isolationist sentiments, the United States was officially an "Associated Power."

²⁴The Army's General Staff School's authoritative publication, *Military Aid to the Civil Power*, 116, wrote that the "unexpected suddenness of the close of the war left little time for the study of problems which would confront the Military Government, or for the formulation of policies or the completion of an organization to carry on the civil administration.", which is true enough. The Allies had planned a gigantic offensive for 1919 into Germany itself. One company commander wrote much later that "I had never up to that time heard the word 'Civil Affairs', I [sic] had never considered taking a town that was not resisting.", Thomas H. Barber, "Experiences in Military Government," lecture delivered before School of Military Government, 11 October 1942, 1.

²⁵*Military Aid to the Civil Power*, 18.

²⁶Final Report, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, 2 July 1919, *U.S. Army in the World War, 1917-1919*, vol. 14; Joseph W. Morgan, Jr., "Military Government," School of International and Public Affairs, Princeton University. [1942], 135; *Military Aid*, 18; Nelson, 32-33.

²⁷*Military Aid*, 9 (Italics added).

²⁸Nelson, 42-43.

²⁹Twitchell, 239; P. Noyes, *While Europe Waits for Peace* (New York: 1921), 51-57; Hunter Liggett, *Commanding an American Army: Recollections of the World War* (Boston: 1925), 142-144.

³⁰Allen, *Rhineland Occupation*, 299-305.

³¹Keith L. Nelson. *Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923* (Berkeley: 1975), 29-30.

³²Advanced GHQ, AEF, Orders 1, 13 December 1918, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920*, "Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany," "Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany," 4 March 1920, *U.S. Army in the World War*, vol. 2, passim. The text of General Pershing's proclamation can be found in "Report from Commanding Officer, U.S. Troops, Coblenz, Germany on Civil Administration, 22 June 1919, "Administrative Matters," n.p., RG 120, Records of the American Expeditionary Forces - World War I, entry 1368, Reports on American Military Government...in Occupied Germany, 1919-1920 from to Commanding General, Third Army, 22.

³³Entry for 30 August 1919, Allen diary, in Allen papers, Library of Congress.

³⁴*Military Aid*, 19.

³⁵Nelson, 38-39. The authoritative *Military Aid* terms this period one of a "combination of improvisation and political expediency, with the authority of the military being gradually replaced by that of [German] civilian agencies.", a governmental situation made possible only by the obedience of those "civilian agencies.", 17; Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, "U.S.

Army in the World War, vol. 11, p. 158; *Military Aid*, 19. "Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army," *U.S. Army in the World War*, vol. 11, p. 158; *Military Aid*, 19.

³⁶The changing boundaries of the American Zone can be found in RG 120, Records of the American Expeditionary Force, World War I, entry 1368, Reports on American Military Government and the Administration of Civil Affairs, 1920-1921, box No. 12.

³⁷[Hunt], 11; Allen, *Occupation*, 53-54. A considerably more positive account of the early phase of American Military Government Civil Affairs can be found in Maude Radford Warren, "American Rule in the Rhineland," *Saturday Evening Post* (5 May 1919), passim.

³⁸H. S. Grier, *Report to Commanding General American Forces in Germany* [Coblentz?], 16-17; *Military Aid to the Civil Power*, 121; Morgan, 144.

³⁹Issue for 12 December 1918, quoted in [H. L. Hunt], "American Military Government of Occupied Germany," Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany," typescript, vol. 1 [Coblentz: 1920], RG 120, entry 1368, box 5, p. 42.

⁴⁰Landrat of Mayen to O.C.C.A. for the Kreis of Mayen, copy, n.d., "Report, Military Government Third Division, RG 120, entry 1368, vol. 2, folder No. 59.

⁴¹White, *The Autobiography of William Allen White* (New York: 1946), 568, 575. See also Alexander R. Stoesen, "The End of the American Watch on the Rhine," *The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* (1966).

⁴²MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: 1964), 81.

⁴³General Service Schools, 107.

⁴⁴[Hunt] 20-23, 40-44.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 207; *Military Aid*, 121. For Allied MG relations with unoccupied Germany, see "Summaries of the Final Reports of the Inter-Allied Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions in Germany," collection of typescript reports of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, May 1944. RG 331, entry 54, SHAEF G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, Numeric-Subject Operations File, Box No. 196, folder 25-32. See also Archibald King, "Military Government," typescript of lecture before Judge Advocate General's School, 17 February 1942, 19-37. Excellent contemporary reports of the situation in the U.S. occupation zone are found in U.S. Army, American Expeditionary Force, G-2 reports, 1919-1923, boxes 1-7, Hoover Institution Archives. These reports consistently emphasize the economic rehabilitation and political tranquillity in the zone.

⁴⁶Germans were accustomed to saluting at least the higher ranks of their uniformed civil service, so saluting American officers was no real imposition. Allen, *Occupation*, 74. Nonetheless, German official who failed to salute a Colonel from the Civil Affairs department found himself facing a 1,000 mark fine and three months imprisonment,

with the latter remitted on promise of future good behavior., *The Amaroc News*, 30 April.

⁴⁷Orders of General Pershing, MG J. T. Dickman, various dates or undated, between December 1918 and spring 1919, in RG 120, Records of the American Expeditionary Force, World War I, entry 1368, Reports on American Military Government and the Administration of Civil Affairs in Occupied Germany, 1920-1921, boxes No. 1-12, Records of the American Expeditionary Force, [Hunt], 210, 214, 215; *Military Aid*, 124.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, and Keith Nelson,. "The First American Military Occupation of Germany, 1918-1923." Ph. D. diss., University of California, Berkeley. 1965.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰Civil Affairs Memorandum No. 46, 11 June 1919, "To: The Landrat, Kreis Cochem," in "Report on Administration of Civil Affairs in the Kreis of Cochem, Germany, from 17 May 1919 to 22 July 1919, dated 22 July 1919, to Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, American Forces in Germany, *ibid.*, box 2, folder 25; *Military Aid*, 124. Referring to the censorship, German editors understandably protested "How can we thus become democratic?", *ibid.*

⁵¹Civil Affairs Memorandum, No. 24, 11 April 1919; Headquarters Fourth Army Corps, in "Report on Administration of Civil Affairs in the Kreis of Cochem, Germany, from 17 May 1919 to 23 July 1919," *ibid.*, box 2, folder No. 25. Copies of Third Army/American Forces in Germany occupation regulations, orders, etc., are for the most part contained in "American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920," vols. 3 and 4, *ibid.*, box 11.

⁵²CPT R. C. M. Page to Burgomaster [*sic*], Andernach-Stadt, copy, n.d., *ibid.*, entry 967, box No. 2064, "Miscellaneous Correspondence to Civilians, Dec. 1919 - Aug 10, 1919, 3rd Division Occupation, volume 1" folder.

⁵³These regulations for American personnel are found throughout *ibid.*, reports of Civil Affairs officers for Third Army and its divisions as well as instructions to German civil officials and their proclamations and orders to the civil population, boxes 1-12. The considerate American Forces Germany (AFG) did not requisition food although it did collect fodder from the Germans., *Military Aid*, 122.

⁵⁴Fourth Army Corps Chief of Staff, Memorandum No. 7, copy, n.d. *Ibid.*, box 3, folder No. 62.

⁵⁵Civil Affairs Memorandum, No. 24, 11 April 1919; Headquarters Fourth Army Corps, in "Report on Administration of Civil Affairs in the Kreis of Cochem, Germany, from 17 May 1919 to 23 July 1919," *ibid.*, box 2, folder No. 25. Copies of Third Army/American Forces in Germany occupation regulations, orders, etc., are for the most part contained in "American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920," vols. 3 and 4, *ibid.*, box 11.

⁵⁶[Hunt], vol. 1, 56-57; Nelson, 48-49; Allen, *Journal*, F. M. Surface and Raymond L. Bland, *American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period* (Stanford: 1931), 193, 200; Twitchell, 241-242.

⁵⁷Warren, 143.

⁵⁸Ibid.; See also "Collection of All Publications Issued by the Burgomeister of the City of Coblenz during the Occupation and by Order of the American Authorities," American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920, vol. 4, box 10, folder 16; "Collection of Important Publications Issued Within the City of Coblenz during the Period of Occupation, *ibid.*, folder 17; "List of Persons Sentenced by Provost Courts at Coblenz, Germany," March-May 1919 (two lists), "Report on Civil Administration," *ibid.*, n.p.; J. Ireton, "The Rhineland Commission at Work," *American Journal of International Law* . No. 460 (1923). An impressionistic account of American military courts in operation, as well as other areas of Military Government is found in Warren, *passim*.

⁵⁹Hunt, 214-215, 279, 282-288; Nelson, 212. It should be noted, however, that the civil population in the French zone was more than four times that of the American., *ibid.*, 351.

⁶⁰"German Psychology," in "Officer [in] Charge of Civil Affairs, KREIS BERNCASTLE, to O.C.C.A., American Forces in Germany," Subject, Report on Administration of Civil Affairs, KREIS BERNCASTLE, 4th, September 1919," n.p., *ibid.*, folder No. 21. See also [anon.] "Experiences in Occupied Rhineland, 1919-1925," SHAEF G-5, information paper, c. November 1944., RG 331, entry 54, SHAEF G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, box No. 196, folder 25.32. See also Babcock, 658-715.

⁶¹Bagby, 1920-21, vol. 1, p. 87. In fact, the American occupation itself never imposed any death sentences., Morrisette, 5, 9.

⁶²Barbere, 8.

⁶³Babcock, 722.

⁶⁴"Report on Military Government, Third Division," vol. 2, n.p., *ibid.*, box No. 5, folder No. 66.

⁶⁵*Military Aid*, 29-33; quotation from Barber, 6.

⁶⁶J. P. Girard, "American Diplomacy and the Ruhr Crisis of 1920," *Military Affairs* (April 1975), 59-60.

⁶⁷Morrisette, 9. General Allen noted that there were actual disturbances in the American zone when the terms of the treaty became known. Allen, *Rhineland Occupation*, 72-74, 110-115.

⁶⁸Hunt, 206-210; Nelson, Keith, 212; General Allen noted accurately enough that "Apparently the Germans and soldiers are much pleased that I should have revoked the orders yesterday, which prevented fraternization.", Allen diary, entry for 28 September 1919. General Pershing was particularly concerned with "loathsome diseases,"

exhorting commanders to "Let us send home our Army of fighters clean physically and clean morally.", Pershing telegram to Third Army, 18 January 1919, *ibid.*, box 4, folder No. 62. For a general view of U.S. occupation troops in this period, see "The Doughboys Occupying Germany are Perfectly Calm but Homesick," *Literary Digest* (21 June 1919).

⁶⁹Allen, *My Rhineland Journal*, 362; Morrisette, 2. Among those chosen was a Captain Ferdinand Eberstadt, detailed to the Third Army's OCCA and in the 1950s to distinguish himself as one of the pioneer Pentagon reformers., Barber, 2.

⁷⁰Twitchell, 226-227.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, [Hunt], *passim.*"

⁷²Pershing to Allen, 18 May 1919, *ibid.*

⁷³Twitchell, 241.

⁷⁴Allen diary, entries for 30 September and 18 May, 1919, Allen Papers.

⁷⁵Twitchell, 235. On the other hand, Allen made specific efforts to counter the "black horror" campaign waged against French colonial troops by German propagandists. See K. L. Nelson, "The 'Black Horror on the Rhine': Race as a Factor in Post World War I Diplomacy," *The Journal of Modern History* (December 1970). Allen's exculpatory report is contained in his *Rhineland Occupation*, 319-322.

⁷⁶Barber, 7.

⁷⁷Allen, *Rhineland Occupation*, 106-107

⁷⁸Fraenkel, 27-28, 71, 106.

⁷⁹Allen, *Rhineland Journal*, 297-300

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, *Rhineland Occupation*, 159-170.

⁸¹Prices and discharge material in *Congressional Record*, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 6356-6357. James E. Morrisette, "The Administration of Military Law by the American Forces During the Occupation of the Rhineland Provinces from December 1, 1918 to January 24, 1923," 2, typescript of lecture given before the School of Military Government, June 1924. COL Morrisette had been Staff Judge Advocate of VII Army Corps during the Rhineland occupation. Remittances from *Amaroc News* issue of 5 May 1919. See also "Happy Days for the American Troops on the Rhine," *Literary Digest* (1 October 1921). *The Outlook's* correspondent reported in September 1922 a similar situation.

⁸²Alfred E. Cornebise, "Der Rhine Entlang: The American Occupation Force in Germany, 1918-1923," *Military Affairs* (December 1982), 51. Frances Rogers, "Verdun and Coblenz," *The Outlook* (13 September 1922), 57.

⁸³Stoesen, 22-23; Nelson, 174-201; Twitchell, 244.

⁸⁴Twitchell, 248.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

⁸⁶quoted in Stoesen, 23.

⁸⁷Girard, 60-61.

- ⁸⁸ Cited in Nelson: 238; quoted in Stoesen, 23.
- ⁸⁹ Friederich, "Institutions of the Occupying Power," 109.
- ⁹⁰ Twitchell, 249-250; Allen, *Rhineland Occupation*, 290.
- ⁹¹ Nelson, 248-249.
- ⁹² American Forces in Germany, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, "American Representation in Occupied Germany, 1922-1923", 226.
- ⁹³ "American Representation," 226.
- ⁹⁴ Allen, *Rhineland Journal*, 561.
- ⁹⁵ Quoted in Friederich, "Institutions of the Occupying powers," 109.
- ⁹⁶ Oral interview, Craig with Morgan, "Military Government," 142.
- ⁹⁷ *American Representation*, 235. In all fairness, it should be noted that the British occupation zone seemed to function about as effectively as the American, with the same absence of overt German resistance and resentment. The stated preferences of the Germans in the U.S. Zone for American overlordship was probably more due to the greater amount of money at the disposal of the doughboys than to the Rhinelander's love for things American. Less favorable views of the U.S. Army occupation of the Rhineland came from some German journals in unoccupied Germany: "Rhenanus [pseud.]", "In Rhenish Dollarika," *Der Tag* (14 June 1920), complained that Coblenz was being "Americanized," with "mammoth automobiles" tearing about and the trains crowded with "foreign deformities." However, even this sour author remarked, albeit patronizingly, on the "good humor of the great babies" (American troops), quoted in *Living Age* (7 August 1920).

VIII

WORLD WAR II

("They didn't teach us that at Charlottesville!")¹

More Americans by far were involved in Civil Affairs and Military Government in World War II than in any previous American conflict. Further, the U.S. War Department and the Army actually began to plan for dealing with civilians, enemy or allied, before that Army entered combat. In this war the Rhineland MG experience would by no means be wasted.

Soon after the close of World War I, General Pershing's Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in the Rhineland gave a series of lectures at the Command and General Staff School which were quickly published.² The Army, now aware from its Rhineland MG experience that there was a need for Civil Affairs sections in its war plans, made such planning a part of the War Plans Course.³

The CA/MG place in the U.S. Army was formalized for the first time when, following the 1921 reorganization of the War Department, Civil Affairs and Military Government were placed in the War Plans Division's G-1 section. Nonetheless, the continuing uncertainty about the subject is evident in the absence of any mention of CA/MG in the *Army Regulations* published in the 1920s and 1930s, although paragraphs on their employment were later inserted.⁴ The Army Command and General Staff School published an impressive manual, *Military Aid to the Civil Power* in 1925, which drew heavily upon Army experience in past Military Governments and which would serve as a textbook for several decades. The manual, understandably, drew extensively on the recently-closed Rhineland occupation and thus emphasized Military Government after the ending of combat. Overall, in far as it went, this manual was an effective preparation for the far more extensive U.S. Army MG/CA responsibilities of World War II:

International law recognizes that, having overthrown the pre-existing government and deprived the people of the protection that government afforded, it becomes not only the right, but the duty of the invader to give the vanquished people a new government adequate to the protection of their personal and property rights.... It is decidedly to the military advantage of the invader to establish a strong and just government, such as will preserve order and, as far as possible, pacify the inhabitants.⁵

Beginning with the 1919-1920 term and continuing to the entrance of the United States into World War II the Army War College made Civil Affairs an important part of its G-1 and War Plans Division course. In 1925 the Army War College incorporated

Civil Affairs into all G-1 principles and policies. Unpublished War College G-1 works dealing with Civil Affairs included the 1932 "G-1 Reference Data," which contained significant material on Civil Affairs and the 1934-1935 drafts, "Basic Manual for Military Government by United States Forces." The 1938-1939 "War Department Basic Manual Military Government" and part 4 of the "War Department basic Field Manual, volume 3, "Military Law," part 4, "Administration of Civil Affairs in Occupied Alien Territory" also achieved widespread unofficial circulation at the Army War College. Students at the War College studied German, British, French and U. S. military occupations. However, no thought was given to the occupation of a friendly nation, even though the Luxembourg example would have been fresh.

In 1939, the Army Judge Advocate's Office published FM 27-10, *The Rules of Land Warfare*, which carried a substantial section on Military Government, some of it using experience from the Rhineland occupation.⁶ Then, in July of 1940, nearly eighteen months before Pearl Harbor, the War Department Judge Advocate General published the first edition of its *Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs* (FM 27-5), more specifically based on lessons learned from the Rhineland German military occupation as well as on the Lieber Code and the Hague Conventions of 1907. This manual preferred the term "Military Government," but also noted, as though anticipating the opposition of the President in the near future, that the term might grate on civilian ears. As one authority notes, "'Military Government' raised visions of empires and proconsuls, of Anthony and Cleopatra, and even of Attila the Hun."⁷ On the other hand, "Civil Affairs" seemed too bland a term to use in conquered enemy territory.⁸ Following the Lieber Code, 27-5 termed military necessity the principal guideline for Military Government. But the humanitarianism of Francis Lieber was not slighted:

Military Governments should be just, humane, and as mild as practicable, and the welfare of the people governed should always be the aim of every person engaged therein. As Military Government is executed by force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity - virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men for the very reason that he possesses the power of arms against the unarmed.... The object of the United States in waging any war is to obtain a favorable and enduring peace. A military occupation marked by harshness, injustice or oppression leaves lasting resentment against the occupying power in the hearts of the people of the occupied territory and sows the seeds of future war by them against the occupying power... whereas just, considerate and mild treatment of the governed by the occupying power will convert enemies into friends.⁹

An obvious lesson from the Rhineland occupation's use of "additional duty" personnel for Military Government was the manual's injunction that specific personnel for

Military Government should be provided for the duration of hostilities and that personnel of combat units should be assigned to Military Government duties only when "the probability of a resumption of hostilities is extremely remote." This manual also established a requirement for MG training, but ignored the question of who was to give it. G-1, assigned staff supervision, was strictly a staff agency with no capacity, facilities or interest in training, and none of the other elements of the Army General Staff was interested in diverting personnel, effort and resources to prepare for what at the time seemed a post-war mission, that is, a very long way off.¹⁰

These were relatively minor advances. As late as four days before Pearl Harbor, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 of the War Department suggested that the Provost Marshal might draw up plans for a course of instruction in Military Government, and specifically charged the latter officer for such training. Thus, at the time the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor catapulted the United States into war, the only trained CA or MG officers available were the very small number of Army staff officers who were veterans of the Rhineland occupation. An equally minute number of official observers had noted successful British operations in Africa.¹¹ By then, however, one major "lesson learned" from the Rhineland occupation was deliberately discarded. As the horrors of Nazism and the widespread complicity in Nazi crimes of all levels of German society became increasingly evident, there remained little, if any, sentiment for a "mild" occupation like that of General Allen's in the Rhineland.¹²

Although British forces had been expelled from the European continent, in 1941 the British Army imperturbably commenced an eight-weeks course in political-military subjects at St. John's College, Cambridge University that would be useful for CA/MG when His Majesty's forces returned to northwest Europe. The course was organized in the wake of the only real Allied land success at that time, the liberation of Ethiopia, Italian Somaliland and Cyrenaica. Two American officers were invited by the British Army Director of Military Intelligence to attend. These two officers, LT Charles A. H. Thomson, Inf., and MAJ Henry H. Cummings (the latter the U.S. Military Attaché in London) were thus distinguished as the first American officers ever to receive formal instruction in CA/MG. The classes were confined to the ideological, theoretical and political aspects of CA/MG, with no practical instruction on such matters as Army organization, supply or combat, matters it was felt would best come later. The two officers reported on their so-called "Politico-Military" Cambridge course, and recommended that the U.S. Army establish something similar. Their report circulated about the U.S. War Department, provoking little interest, until Army G-1, MG John H. Hilldring, forwarded it to the Provost Marshal, MG Albert W. Gullion, who was interested.

In June 1942, with the war situation little improved except that the United States was now in it, the British Army Council Secretariat had created the secret committee on Administration of Territories (Europe) to plan for the civil administration of liberated European territories and to maintain liaison with the various Allied governments. A representative from the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

(ETOUSA), General Eisenhower commanding, attended most of the committee's sessions as an observer. Oddly enough, at first the duties of these observers and their liaison officer successors were to work with the British on civil defense and to keep Regional Commanders informed on the disposition of U.S. troops in their regions and generally keep smooth military relations between the two allies. That summer General Eisenhower also appointed an ETOUSA Civil Affairs Officer. With the arrival of additional officers from the first classes of the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, the one-man CA office expanded into Civil Affairs Center OTIS and could now plan more for future operations and get out of the liaison business.¹³

In the meantime, and in part as a result of the reports of LT Thomson and MAJ Cummings, the Army Provost Marshal had established a small Military Government division. About the only significant achievement of this obscure office, however, was its creation of the School of Military Government, BG Cornelius Wickersham, Commandant.¹⁴ This facility, activated on 2 April 1942 at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, was away from crowded wartime Washington --but not too far away. Civil Affairs was now an accepted military specialty but one whose future in the Army's scheme of things would remain uncertain, particularly after the war. Some newspapers derisively dubbed the facility a "school for gauleiters," without, of course, actually visiting the institution or even looking into its curriculum. The first student body, numbering some 50 senior officers, studied in a program that combined the current Army War College "committee syndicate" working on assigned problems, the Command and General Staff School method of specific answers to specific problems set by the faculty, and the university system of lectures, conferences and seminars. The students intensively studied the Army's historical experience in Military Government in Mexico, Cuba, etc. The School's 48-week course of training sketchily included the practical (sewage disposal and the interior organization of the Nazi Party) along with the more theoretical (rules of land warfare), and lasted, on average, three months, with each class averaging 175 to 200 students. U.S. and Allied officers from every branch of their nations' armed forces attended various courses at the School. This School may have attracted, as did its British counterpart, its share of the superannuated, the misfits dispatched by exasperated commanders, the failures trying something new, even, in the opinion of some Army officers, enlisted refugees from mental wards. On the other hand, the school and its related institutions in 1943 accepted but two out of 25 in-service officer nominees and one in 50 civilian applicants for direct commissions, and the Provost Martial General claimed that less than 60 percent of those selected for the school were actually commissioned.

Over the months the average student age declined, although it was still 43 years by D-Day. The proportion of students commissioned directly from civilian life increased during the war but, presumably for lack of time and resources, comparatively little was done at Charlottesville to indoctrinate them into Army ways, aside from some rudimentary close-order drill and small arms instruction that was not nearly enough to

prepare them for the battlefield. Earlier courses also relied too heavily on lectures. Not until about V-E Day were junior CA/MG officers sent to the Provost Marshal's School at Fort Custer, Michigan for a month's basic training, along with courses in various beginning phases of Military Government. Upon completion of this course the graduates then supplemented their training in Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATs) at selected universities where they received also intensive training in a modern language.

By the end of the war in Europe CA/MG instruction was given at no less than thirteen centers: The School of Military Government, Charlottesville; CAT schools at six major U.S. universities, as well as at the Provost Marshal's School, the Civil Affairs School Center at Shrivenham, England; the Manchester (England) CA Training Center, and European Civil Affairs Division Schools at Rochefort, Troyes, Romilly-sur-Seine and the First U.S. Army Civil Affairs School and Ninth U.S. Army Civil Affairs Schools. The major subjects taught in these centers included public health, public safety, legal affairs, finance, economics, civil defense, transportation, public relations, communications, public utilities, language, army organization and field training, plus many of their sub-divisions. As operations on the continent of Europe loomed closer, more practical subjects, such as motor maintenance, field cooking, small arms firing and first aid received increasing emphasis. The handbooks on CA activities in Allied countries were prepared at Shrivenham. Probably the best instructional material were the reports from the field by CA/MG officers. Language training remained probably the most serious deficiency in the Charlottesville program, a major problem in polyglot Europe. The CATs did place heavy emphasis upon the study of the language of the area to which an officer expected to be assigned, but as one scholar who was there noted "the great majority of the officers never acquired enough of any foreign language to be able to use it with any degree of facility."¹⁵ In the end, the doctrine developed in this CA/MG training program proved applicable only to Germany and to a lesser extent, Austria.

In its first months, despite the war, continuation of the school was not assured. Secretary of War Henry Stimson confided to his diary:

news of a new tempest in a teapot raised by the jealous New Dealers [Stimson was a Republican] around the throne, this time in respect to General Gullion. Gullion has started a school for the education of Army officers in their fiscal and economic duties in occupied territories, and this seems to have raised a storm among people who were anticipating such activities as an opportunity for themselves.... Apparently they have been to the President about it so this brings the matter to me.¹⁶

Later, President Franklin Roosevelt addressed a sharply-worded inquiry to Secretary Stimson, contending that the War Department should never have established such an unprecedented project as a school for Military Government without even his personal knowledge, let alone consent. For the President, in the words of two

authorities, "Military Government was... a repulsive nation, associated with imperialism, dollar diplomacy, and other aspects of our behavior [that] we have abandoned."¹⁷ At an October Cabinet meeting Roosevelt asserted that Military Government and Civil Affairs were civilian matters and should be under the aegis of the Department of State. FDR even advanced the most unhelpful suggestion of installing civilian administrators responsible to the State Department in all occupied areas. For the Army this would have been disastrous, roughly akin to the debilitating Communist Party commissars inflicted on Red Army units, and like the commissars, resulting in two commanders in the area of operations. Stimson found unexpected allies in Mrs. Roosevelt and in Secretary of State Cordell Hull and such support helped to keep at least the School for Military Government alive. Stimson tried to point out that no one could tell how long hostilities or any post-hostilities period of unrest might continue and that it would take soldiers to deal with these conditions over the long run. At any rate, most CA soldiers would actually be civilians mobilized only for the duration and would bring with them the American values of civil supremacy over the military. The school itself may have helped matters by its atmosphere of a university under the tuition of civilians.¹⁸ These disagreements soon broke into public view and probably caused further delay in settling the issue.¹⁹

By this time, reorganization of the Army General Staff had put Civil Affairs under the "Miscellaneous Branch" of G-1, which did nothing to increase its power or influence in the Army or in the War Department.²⁰ On the other hand, because Civil Affairs had been made a command responsibility, all services were now responsible for their parts. The Quartermaster was responsible for requisitioning, receiving, storing and issuing imported civilian supplies, the Transportation Corps for movements and the Engineers for rehabilitation, etc.²¹

In the meantime, of course, there was a war to be won, and the issue of Civil Affairs and Military Government of occupied territories came sharply into focus when the Allies invaded French North Africa in November 1942. Understandably, in light of the lack of guidance from the Roosevelt administration, the War Department had made little advance MG/CA planning before the invasion. The President appointed a State Department official, Robert D. Murphy, as Civil Affairs advisor for North Africa only after a request by the commander of U.S. invasion forces, LTG Dwight Eisenhower. Mr. Murphy was in a most confusing situation, being able, as the President's personal representative, to by-pass General Eisenhower and report directly to the President, while also being responsible to Eisenhower and the State Department. In effect the President had indeed put the State Department in charge of Civil Affairs for North Africa.

Despite State Department "pre-eminence" in North Africa, it was Eisenhower and his staff that drew up the infamous agreement confirming in power the notorious Vichy collaborationist and Anglophobe, Admiral Francois Darlan, and his government in power in French North Africa, along with, incredibly, Vichy anti-Jewish and other discriminatory legislation. All of this was in exchange for French troops laying down

their arms. As should have been foreseen, the "Darlan Deal" provoked a wave of protest throughout the Allied world. Were the Allies fighting simply to keep the old, discredited collaborators in their comfortable offices? Darlan was conveniently assassinated the following month and an untainted (but not very effective) French General, Henri Giraud, appointed in his place. However, considerable intangible damage had been done to the Allied cause and the European Axis used the episode to proclaim that the "tired, plutocratic so-called democracies" were just another bunch of politicians playing rotation-in-office games. Had there been an extensive Allied Military Government apparatus in place ready to take over the civil governance of French North Africa, the whole Darlan Deal might not have been necessary.

That apparatus was still not in place, although the State Department, along with other Washington agencies, such as Treasury, Agriculture, Office of Lend-Lease, or the Board of Economic Warfare, toyed with getting into the business. It was as though Washington were desperately casting about for any alternative to the one department best fitted by its organization, resources, personnel and history for the job --the U.S. Army.²²

Actually, the War Department itself was only slightly less confused regarding Civil Affairs as was wartime civilian Washington. The Assistant Chief of Staff (G1), the Provost Marshal General and the Director of the International Division of the Services of Supply all had at least paper Civil Affairs responsibilities, but none of them had their duties clearly spelled out. For example, the Provost Marshal General was authorized to establish within his office a Military Government Division for planning purposes. Nonetheless, FM 27-5 had specified the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 for such plans and policies.²³

Although the President's reluctance to use the Army for Civil Affairs/Military Government is often attributed to his shying away from military control over civilians, certainly a part of the American political heritage, Eisenhower after the war saw matters differently:

I find that the President, in his consideration of current African problems, did not always distinguish clearly between the military occupation of enemy territory and the situation in which we found ourselves in North Africa. He constantly referred to plans and proposals affecting the local population, the French Army, and governmental officials in terms of orders, instructions and compulsion. It was necessary to remind him that from the outset we had operated under policies requiring U.S. to gain and use an ally - that far from governing a conquered country, we were attempting only to force a gradual widening of the base of government, with the final objective of turning all internal affairs over to popular control. He of course agreed...but he nevertheless continued, perhaps subconsciously, to discuss local problems from the viewpoint of a conqueror.²⁴

Stimson at the time concurred with Eisenhower, noting in his diary the President's typically breezy approach to Civil Affairs: "He wants to do it all himself.... The fault is Rooseveltian and deeply ingrained." Stimson also felt that the military was not yet handling CA satisfactorily. Confiding to his diary a few days later, Stimson wrote of another discussion with the President, in which he noted that "poor Eisenhower's first attempts to do the work with his "Civil Affairs Section" of his General Staff,... were not successful."²⁵

President Roosevelt finally informed Stimson that the Army would have to assume "the initial burden" of CA/MG, but added, significantly, "until civilian agencies [were] ready to carry out the long range program."²⁶ Eisenhower at the same time iterated to Army Chief of Staff General Marshall the urgent requirement for a single, centralized military authority over Civil Affairs/Military Government operations. Presumably in response, Stimson in March of 1943 then ordered the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) in the War Department Chief of Staff office, as a Division of the WD Special Staff, with MG John Hilldring as Director.²⁷ In notifying General Hilldring of his appointment, General Marshall grandly informed him that CA and MG were no less than "the sacred trust of the American people."²⁸

MG Hilldring was 45 years old at the time, born in New Rochelle, New York. He had received his Army commission through Columbia University ROTC, but was awarded a Regular commission soon after. He saw combat in World War I as an infantry officer and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. After that war, Hilldring served in the Rhineland occupation. He served in a variety of U.S. Army posts in the continental U.S. and the Philippines, attended the Command and General Staff School, and commanded several Civilian Conservation Corps districts. In 1939 he began a series of War Department headquarters tours, becoming Assistant Chief of Staff and a BG. Between July 1942 and April 1943, Hilldring, now a Major General, commanded the 84th Infantry Division. In that April he became chief of the newly-established CAD.

CAD's mission was considerably less portentous than its title or its benediction by General Marshall might indicate. Its main duty seemed to be that of supervision of the Charlottesville school. It exercised little, if any, control, either in Washington or in the field. Its primary accomplishment seems to be that it acted as a "buffer" between State and Treasury Departments and lower Army commanders, and General Marshall, in the words of one authority "a message center with a presumptuous title."²⁹ For a while, U.S. Army CA/MG affairs were primarily unilateral. However, with the formation of the combined Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command (COSSAC) in June 1943 the Americans and British began to plan in common for the administration of European territories, and a combined Civil Affairs staff was established in COSSAC. COSSAC would speak with final authority on all Civil Affairs matters. CA ETOUSA would be abolished on 17 December 1943 and its responsibilities transferred to First

U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) FUSAG was then responsible for operational planning and preparation for the future direction of field operations. CA ETOUSA's training activities were transferred to the American School Center.³⁰ Overall, it is apparent that the near-failure of "joint" Allied MG in North Africa was the impetus for the formation of the CAD and the COSSAC CA staff.³¹ The new concept was soon to be tested in Italy, the next Allied campaign. Allied MG for Sicily/Italy would prove one of the bright spots in that relatively discouraging campaign.

Military Government of Italy

Italy was the scene of the first Allied World War II Military Government of an enemy population. This government was also unique in that here was the first and only Military Government that was completely combined. UK and U.S. forces were to be integrated as much as possible on a 50-50 basis in these operations, from the smallest teams to the highest policy-making bodies. There were to be no American or British MG zones in Italy (even though the Allied armies in the field were themselves organizationally and geographically separated). Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT) was established on 1 May 1943, under of 15th Army Group, commanded by the British General Harold Alexander. However, Alexander was under General Eisenhower. The AMGOT chief was MG Lord Rennell of the British Army, but his deputy was the American BG F. J. McSherry.³² However, through no fault of the officers involved and despite its success, AMGOT-style combined Military Government was never repeated.

Even the training of AMGOT officers in North Africa was combined. Beds were arranged in the barracks by alternate nationality and the troops were mixed in the mess tables. Few American AMGOT officers were likely to forget the 4th of July, 1943 when they were marched by a circuitous route to a clearing in the Algerian mountains above their training station. There they found their British counterparts drawn up and ready to salute the "Star-Spangled Banner" with hand and voice and all the unpleasantness of 1776 and 1812 dismissed over liquid refreshment.³³

With the fall of Mussolini's regime and the signing of the Italian armistice, an Allied Control Commission (later, Allied Commission) was established to work with the new Italian government. The Allied MG chain of command came down from Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) to the Allied Control Commission, to Military Government Regional Headquarters, to Provincial Military Government teams, to municipal teams. In the field, MG personnel with overall responsibilities (termed Civil Affairs officers) were assigned to communes (towns) or groups of communes and worked under the supervision of a provincial headquarters. Within this joint organization British officers always seemed to have the higher rank for any given position than their U.S. counterparts. British policy was to grant their officers rank commensurate with the positions they held regardless of their permanent rank. With the Americans rank was rank.

Geographically, Italian MG was based upon the provinces. Each province was placed under a Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAO) who would direct and supervise Civil Affairs Officers responsible for the general supervision of the various municipalities and specialist officers of the six AMGOT divisions: Legal, Financial, Civilian Supply, Public Health, Public Safety and Enemy Property. It was probably at the provincial level that Allied MG in Italy did its best work in its daily contact with local Italian officials and citizens. Italy had declared war on Great Britain and the

United States, but her people were to be treated by the Allies as having been "misled" by their Fascist rulers, although the Italians would not be entirely absolved of responsibility for Italian aggression.³⁴ Allied MG was nonetheless designed to be indirect as much as possible, relying heavily upon the Italian *Carabinieri*, who performed very well under their new governors, in the maintaining of order behind the lines. Soon towns were being patrolled by truly combined units consisting of British or American MPs and *Carabinieri*. The major goal of Allied Civil Affairs was to maintain order with a minimum diversion of military personnel and resources from the fighting fronts and services of supply. This indirect rule did not extend to Italian Fascism's legal bases and organizations, which were to be dismantled and replaced by "free and democratic" institutions.

None of these successes seemed to impress the higher Allied military commanders, who regarded AMGOT's presence, if they were even aware of it, as, in Lord Rennell's words, "nothing but an unmitigated nuisance.", with the Americans being the more ignorant as to MG.³⁵ In fact, both Allied armies in Italy (the British Eighth and the U.S. Fifth) carried their own MG organization as a special staff activity. Their duties covered the initial MG in newly-conquered territories and they commissioned the first Italian communal and provincial officials and issued the first Military Government decrees.³⁶

The first actual Allied administration of enemy territory during World War II began on 11 June 1943 on four small Italian islands off Sicily. There MG personnel found the natives almost excessively friendly. One month later, with the invasion of Sicily, AMGOT personnel went ashore under fire on D-Day, 10 July. They established Military Government in three small towns and in Syracuse, the first enemy municipality to be placed under combined Allied MG. Approaching its first town and under intense enemy fire, this first MG team of one Lieutenant-Colonel and three junior officers, after dropping off a dead and a wounded U.S. soldier at an aid station, continued on into the town. With their prior knowledge of the area these MG officers were able to instruct mortar men as where to lay their fire to rout out or kill snipers, but fighting still continued in the area for another two days. On the third day a mob of civilians turned to looting a German food warehouse. The (unnamed) local MG commanding officer, alone at the time, and realizing that he, single-handedly, could not stop the looting, ingeniously decided to turn it into "an official looting party." He had the ever-helpful *Carabinieri* line the people up (calming the fears of those who feared that they were about to be shot) and issued one helmetful of flour per person, thus saving the bulk of the stores and restoring the respect of the people for Allied MG. Running out of medical supplies, the officer had the company chaplain go out and retrieve the first aid kits of dead U.S. soldiers. This resourceful MG officer had established close relations with combat officers on the troop ship coming over. Consequently, during the drive on to Messina the troop commanding general would radio the MG detachment commander, tell him what town this troops were about to take; and the LTC would pack himself and his officers into a jeep and move up, often

going into one end of a town while enemy troops were being driven out of the other. Thus no time was wasted in establishing an MG presence amidst a terrified, volatile population.

Another CA LTC later also landed under fire at Salerno and was busy at first supplying a company of U.S. Army Rangers with six cases of bully beef and 200 gallons of water scrounged from a nearby British outfit and also issuing rations and water to American tankers. One such support activity might have proven disastrous, when a U.S. Army Air Force Colonel requested liquor for his exhausted fliers. The LTC requisitioned a liquor store and distributed the stock in the interest of cordial relations with a sister service. Rather than getting drunk and tearing the place apart, the grateful airmen the next day sent up a special mission that knocked out enemy mortar batteries shelling the town and MG headquarters.³⁷ Nonetheless, there remained a strong opinion that higher headquarters did not quite grasp the mission of MG/CA in Italy:

When a man is working 12 to 18 hours a day, eating C-Rations, sleeping with bedbugs, sitting on the lid of an explosive force of 80,000 hungry, disturbed, restless and sometimes scheming people [,] he is irritated to get a request from headquarters for immediate estimates of the next cherry crop, the number of indoor toilets in the area, and the whereabouts and health and welfare of the cousin of a prominent Italian in Chicago.

The population was overwhelmingly friendly and Allied bombardments did not seem to have alienated the Sicilians. This enthusiasm was no mere initial greeting. Later, at the liberation of Rome, a MG Major reported that "I have nearly a jeep load of flowers thrown to U.S. by the people of Frascati and Rome."³⁸ The major problems were simply those of getting the Italian civil life back in operation, or in the words of the Catania SCAO, "to bury the dead and feed the living." Burying the dead was delayed, in the heat of a Sicilian summer, by a gravediggers' strike. The living could hardly be fed on the 125 to 200 grams of the individual bread ration and, at any rate, the rationing system had broken down. In addition, the harvest had been poor, farmers were holding back their grain and transport had been commandeered or destroyed by troops of both sides. Starvation was barely averted by the abundance of fruit, nuts and vegetables and by the fact that the larger proportion of the population had fled to the countryside, there to be fed, more or less, by friends and relatives. In all, the Allies were very fortunate that their invasion of Sicily and Italy had taken place in the summer.

One of the very few veterans of the Army's Rhineland occupation assumed control of the port and naval base of Augusta, 80 percent destroyed by Allied bombing. He also found himself and his unit under German "precision bombing." Throwing away

his CA rule book as useless in such a situation, he was able to call upon British Army bulldozers to clear the streets and colonial Baluchi transport troops and Royal Engineers to haul food and work up rudimentary water, sewer and electric power systems and supply food at 100 grams daily, free of charge at first. He carefully noted a "lesson learned" about food. Hoarders would not remain a problem if the authorities made it known that all uncovered caches would be freely distributed. Also, although emergency food rations were distributed free of charge, MG officers realized from the start that civilians should pay for their more regular food distribution to avoid any undermining of self-respect. Due to the minuscule number of MG officers, such activities had to take place through the (purged) local authorities, with Military Government assuming only a supervisory role. Civilians were kept off the roads by a system of travel permits, sparingly issued. Augusta was still a devastated city after 11 days of initial MG control but at least Allied MG had provided "A good 'first aid' job." for the city.³⁹ The hasty "Notes from memory of the Sicilian Campaign" give the flavor (somewhat jaundiced) of the work from one who went ashore with the second wave of CA officers. His orders were to "drive to Bula and run the town."

July 23. Bula. The fawning servility 40,000 people. What a place, what a stink! Open sewers, a thousand gaping kids. Now what? At the Municipio I summon the Mayor, police chief, principal priest, bank director and a few more. A little speech about the necessity of cooperating and carrying on as usual. The fawning servility of these birds is both nauseating and suspicious. Don't trust any of them.

July 29. Some 500 ragged peasants and workers stormed the Municipio, tore up the ration cards and started to settle some personal scores with the municipal employees. At Fort Custer they always taught U.S. to keep cool in a riot. I tried to. Got the Carabinieri to clear the building. When the mob returned, I had the Corporal fire a clip from his Thompson sub at their feet. Nobody hurt and the trouble stopped. Arrested the ring-leaders, three men and four women. They said now that their American liberators had come, they were going to put a stop to the hated Fascist rationing system. They looked sincere -- and hungry. Hated to put them in the filthy clink, but have to make an example to save more trouble.

August 10. Next a seven year old blows himself to death on the stairs of his tenement, playing with hand grenades. Nobody would touch him, though he started to decompose -- afraid of more explosives in his pocket. I tied a rope around his leg and dragged him to the ground. Then an American soldier is shot by a civilian in a drunken brawl.

August 15. Third time the large ration dump has been looted. Laid an ambush last night. Private Cortese killed two with his Tommy gun.[!] Big court session - 25

cases. Should have given more severe sentences - and will after I get that stinking hold of a jail cleaned out.

August 26. I may be conceited, but I feel these people need me. There is so damn much to be done here. Appointed a new mayor and police chief and have organized a field police of 30 men to catch Black Market traffic. Opened the schools, ahead of schedule, just to keep the kids off my jeep.

September 1. Allowed a fairly large amount to clean up a jail and hospital. Also a grant to the orphanage. The nuns who run the place are the finest people in town. They live on charity and yet their home is the only clean spot in town. Hope I can justify the expenditure -- if not I'll be working for Uncle Sam for the next 10 years.

September 5. "To C.O. ---th Engineers. "A civilian is lying in a meadow, injured by an anti-personnel mine. He is alive, but apparently dying. As there may be other explosives near the body, it is impossible to find anyone to remove him. Can you send a squad over at once to remove the civilian to the hospital or the body to the morgue?"

September 7. A real stroke of luck. Found 5,000 Italian Army shirts in a forgotten storeroom. A real chance to observe the law of marginal value. If you have 10 shirts, one more means little. If you have none, one shirt means a present from heaven. Had them distributed and glad to see a lot of happy faces in town.

October 10. I am beginning to smell trouble around here, before it starts. We had orders to reduce the bread ration. I don't see what kick these Sicilians have coming.... They are getting more bread than under Musso, even with the new ration. My friend Antonio tells me they are planning to mob the flour mills and the Municipio tomorrow morning. Asked Colonel A for 15 soldiers for two days.

October 11. Had the soldiers patrol the mills and the Municipio with fixed bayonets. Everything nice and quiet.

October 18. Someone took a shot at me through the bedroom window. Saw Captain B_____'s car. He has the district next to mine. Fifteen bullet holes in it. His civilian driver killed. They caught two of the Maffia [sic.] gang and I hope the C.G. will confirm the death sentence.

November 1. Made a list of work for this month. Things have become quiet enough to get life back to a resemblance of normality. Open movies, start newspaper, replant public garden, Municipal band, repair main street and sewers, repair bomb damage to Cathedral, make another effort to get refugees from Africa back home, substitute....[Sentence ends here.]⁴⁰

Much less threatening problems faced MAJ Frank Toscani, MG of the small port town of Licata. Here it was merely a question of replacing the town's bell, taken away by the Fascist authorities to be melted down for armaments. Few Licatans, a poor people, owned watches, and they had regulated their daily lives by the now-missing town bell. Could President Roosevelt perhaps be approached on the matter? After all, most of the inhabitants were also anxious that Sicily become the 49th state of the USA. Over drinks a few days later, MAJ Toscani casually brought up the matter with several U.S. Navy officers. A Commander replied that if Toscani were serious about the matter he could supply a reserve bell from his destroyer, *USS. Corelli* (felicitously named after a prominent Italian-American). The bell was duly hung, amid great civic rejoicing. MAJ Toscani and U.S. Army MG had provided *A Bell for Adano*.⁴¹

In Messina, MG officers found that some 220,000 daily rations were being issued to a population estimated at no more than 169,000. Investigation soon showed that bakers and sellers were buying counterfeit ration cards, drawing their supplies against these bogus cards and selling the falsely-gained surplus on the black market at high prices. MG gave the bakers and sellers one week in which to list all customers by name, address, number in family, etc., and conducted spot checks on the validity of these registers. Daily ration issuances dropped quickly to 168,000, at a saving of five tons of flour daily, with no adverse reaction from the long-suffering people of Messina. The Messina MG unit also uncovered large quantities of German Army gasoline, looted by civilians and then buried. Informants and *Carabinieri* reported on the general location of the buried fuel, and with a "borrowed" mine detector and a few enlisted personnel, the drums were dug up and their contents put to better use than the black market.⁴²

A British Major, with more experience (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tripolitania) than any American MG officer at the time most aptly summarized the demands and the value of CA/MG for any time:

The chief problem of military government operations is the selection of personnel and the chief criterion for their selection is their adaptability to the extraordinary range of circumstances with which civil affairs officers are confronted. As examples of this essential adaptability he cited the case of one of his officers, an American, a former New York City policeman who, while knowing nothing of civil or electrical engineering, has nevertheless done an excellent job as public utilities officer. He has done so by searching out skilled men among the Sicilians and driving them by cajolery and threats when necessary to find materials, make repairs, and get things going. Thus by using native electricians and much ingenuity he got operating the Enna city electric light plant which had been in disuse for seven years. He completed by mid-November



Civil Affairs Division troopers encounter Italian displaced persons, c. 1944. USASOC History Archives

nine of eleven bridges that had been blown up or washed out in the province. Another case was that of a young American lieutenant, a former employee of the National City Bank, who --despite his youth, low rank and inexperience --has dealt with the procurement of tons of wheat, coal, sugar, and olive oil and with millions of Allied military lire; has worked out and got running the distribution,.... Also there was the case of the former London constable, who, with one enlisted man, has bossed the Carabinieri for the whole province, restored much of the telephone communications system, organized the motor pool including the setting up of a repair garage and the employment of mechanics, and taken charge of the fishing fleet along the south coast. There was the case of the mild-mannered, gentle, faithful American captain, a lawyer in civilian life, who in the early phase directed the burial of the dead, took care of the wounded soldiers of four nations, and the wounded and sick civilians; who found a U.S. soldier holding up a group of Carabinieri and robbing them of their watches at the point of a tommy-gun and took the gun away from him and put him under arrest. Now he [the mild-mannered CPT] does a good job as chief judge of the military court.⁴³

With the invasion of the Italian mainland U.S. Military Government again went ashore with the assault troops and soon came under heavy enemy fire. Once ashore and now being fired at only intermittently they found that, as on Sicily, the main civilian problem was food. A small schooner was dispatched to load grain at Salerno -- and immediately impounded in that city, due to a naval prohibition of any civilian use of the still-embattled port. The ranking MG officer had to make a hurried trip to Naples to identify and arrange for the release of the offending crew. Large-scale looting of imported foodstuffs would remain a problem, however, until Allied MG turned over the food to Italian agencies, making them financially responsible. In the words of one MG veteran, "Military Government was not a very successful wholesale grocer." Here was a good example of the benefits of "indirect rule" by MG. The local Army Quartermaster was more forthcoming, providing a limited supply of condensed milk for infants and the ill. Posters were posted, jails checked for political prisoners and funds advanced for the immediate operations of local governments.

The *podesti* (mayors) gave receipts for those funds which were charged against each commune. Aside from the distribution of emergency food, there would be few "giveaways" under Allied Military Government for Italy. Furthermore, civil administration, as much as possible, was to be through the existing governmental structure; MG personnel were basically to observe, counsel and supervise. They also did not usually rely on their schoolbook Italian, but kept on hand an Italian interpreter, who could also advise on local customs and characteristics.⁴⁴

A number of civilian evacuations had to be ordered by Allied commanders. Yet evacuations were more likely a mission for combat troops or the military police, at least when carried out under close combat conditions. With the numbers of MG personal in any one unit rarely numbering more than five or six (probably too small for the job), the lack of qualified manpower alone made large-scale civilian relocation beyond the capabilities of Allied MG.⁴⁵ Certainly those combat conditions made life at least tense for MG troops. Because of the retreating Germans' penchant for leaving behind all sorts of fiendish passive weapons to maim and kill, "In newly-captured areas it was never safe to open a closed door, close a partially-open one, sit on a good chair or open a desk drawer without a careful investigation."⁴⁶

Allied MG did not ignore purely humanitarian assistance. The badly malnourished children in an orphanage at St. Agata were fed through the efforts of an enterprising local MG officer who dispatched an Army truck to a U.S. Army Salvage Ration dump. There he found large quantities of canned food whose only "defects" were dents or missing paper wrapping. Sufficient amounts of the discarded food, plus meat, fruit, powdered eggs and milk, a 30-days' supply, were delivered to the orphanage, as were electric light bulbs and urgently-needed medical supplies for a local hospital.⁴⁷ The children could also be pests, however; one MG officer recalled that abandoned German shells in Messina "were being broken open by kids who whacked the shell noses on stones until they broke open and then burned the cordite for fireworks."⁴⁸ AMGOT even supplied Rome with food for several weeks in July of 1944. Even after the railroad to Rome had been re-opened, it was some time before the U.S. Army would allow anything but military supplies through by train. The city flour stocks were down to a three days supply and AMGOT stepped into the breach, supplying the Eternal City by schooner from Anzio, another embattled port city.⁴⁹

A vexing problem was the purging of Fascists from all positions of trust or authority. Such extreme "epuration" (a term which for obvious reasons soon replaced "deFascistization") soon proved impracticable, and a distinction had to be drawn between "harmless" or "nominal" Fascists, and the more dangerous, active variety. Although each Allied MG officer carried a "black list," drawn up before the invasion and containing egregious Fascists and their last known locations, the instrument for separating the wolves from the sheep consisted in the main of a questionnaire, termed the *Scheda Personale*, which all officials and teachers were required to complete. As with food hoarders, local civilians were not behindhand in reporting offenders. (One Fascist was so hated by the locals that he was shot out of hand before he could be taken into custody.) AMGOT personnel worked closely in this process with the Counter-Intelligence Corps, but there were certainly cases of harmless "Fascists" being dismissed their offices with a resultant loss of administrative efficiency, and, on the other hand, of a few dangerous Fascists remaining in office, mocking Allied attempts at "democracy." Those on the "black list" were to be removed and arrested immediately, at least in theory. Epuration was often accomplished by flight, as Fascist officials fled the Allied armies north to German-controlled territory. As the Allied armies closed in

on northern Italy, the Italian partisans took care of epuration "by quick and effective methods," as they demonstrated later in their drumhead trial and execution of Mussolini and his entourage in 1945.

The removal of many officials and police personnel weakened law and order, and the following months showed an increase in crime and an enormous growth in the black market. Black marketers often displayed impressive ingenuity; a baker sold truckloads of bread made from U. S. flour at 20 times the official price while a Sicilian-American interpreter rented out MG trucks for illegal uses and forged driver and other circulation permits.⁵⁰ MG Legal and Police Officers remained extremely busy, although most crimes were relatively trivial. Certainly there were few recorded cases of overt opposition to AMGOT. Even certain instances of the cutting of military signal wire turned out to have been motivated by the prospect of loot rather than by anything political or military. Offenders were tried before military courts, which in many cases, handed down sentences that even Italians thought too lenient. The Italian courts themselves were soon put into operation to deal with offenses against the civilian polity, a creditable achievement indeed, considering the disruption of a war that was still very much going on, with the dispersal of witnesses, the tenuous communications, the shortages of paper, etc. The black market in the Naples area was effectively reduced, according to local MG officers, by the establishment of Military Government road-blocks, manned by Military Police and *Carabinieri*, with heavy fines and jail sentences imposed on those netted. Prostitute control was also not the least of MG concerns in this land of licensed brothels.⁵¹

MG troops also for the first time began to work with what a later CA generation would term Non-Governmental Organizations. The most prominent, the American Red Cross, supplied clothing, blankets and medical supplies to needy civilians, and worked with Allied II Corps MG troops.⁵²

As the Allied armies entered northern Italy U. S. Military Government for the first time in its history encountered friendly guerrillas, or partisans. These groups were tricky to handle; they often pointed out that they had been fighting the Fascists or the Germans well before the Allies had landed in their country. Many did not appreciate being ordered to hand over their arms to these latecomers to the war against Fascism. It required considerable tact to convince these partisans that civilian life had greater claims on their talents than the more exciting fields of battle. As one U. S. MG officer noted, "The attitude of our officers and their conduct toward the Patriots determined whether the latter cooperated, surrendered their arms and became an asset, or became disgruntled and a liability."⁵³ The same officer provided a model example in dealing with the first partisans his unit encountered. A band of no less than 700 came out of the mountains some 15 miles northeast of the town of Scarperia in the Bologna area. MG officers arranged for their transportation, temporary quarters and good feeding. Partisan officers were given clothing and shoes, as well as cigarettes and other "necessities." Their leaders were carefully informed of MG's plans for their disarmament and reintegration into civil life. The troops were publicly thanked for

their services against the Germans and a letter of commendation was given to the unit -- which was then disbanded. Those who still had a taste for military life were permitted to enlist in the reconstituted "Co-Belligerent" Italian military.⁵⁴

Allied MG in northern Italy also found that the Germans had used the area to store their vast loot and stolen Italian art: "all the gold from the Bank of Italy, valuable works of art from the Italian galleries, the King's art collection and most of the personal jewelry of the Italian people." For the immovable monuments of Italy, Allied Military Government had published a *Guide Michelin*-type of booklet, giving the locations of historical monuments in each region of Italy and ranking them according to their historical importance: four stars for the most important, down to one star for the least important but still valuable. Allied MG supplied all combat officers with these booklets.⁵⁵ More than one CA trooper accurately described the Italian campaign as "being fought in a museum."⁵⁶

Unhappily, the heritage of Italy had to be protected seemingly as much from the depredations of civilians and Allied troops as from the enemy. For example, the treasures of a restored castle at Mignano had been carefully crated by the castle curator. The crates survived the destruction of the castle by German shell fire, only to be thoroughly looted by Allied troops. The MG officer reporting on the Mignano incident claimed that "many Sicilians say that our forces were in this regard as bad or worse than the Fascist or German." The Royal Palace in Naples was heavily damaged by Allied bombing as well as by troop and civilian depredations and by indiscriminate quartering. The Allied Subcommittee for Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives at least took comfort in claiming that the Royal Palace experience was not repeated in the rest of the Italian campaign and that "The experience was worth the price." Sadly, the same report also detailed the obliteration of the Mantegna Chapel in Padua.⁵⁷

It was the latter destruction that impelled the Director of the Subcommittee to establish personal liaison with the chief of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force and later the Tactical Air Force. The Subcommittee could not hope to induce the Allied air forces to avoid legitimate military targets that might have cultural structures in their vicinity, but "The clear task of the [Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives -MFA&A] Subcommittee was to ensure that at least no part of this destruction should be wrought through ignorance of the existence and importance of individual monuments." Apparently the main concern of the Director was not so much the limitation of damage to cultural sites, but rather to determine the real extent of such aerial bombardment and thus to counter German propaganda which by 1944 was weeping crocodile tears over the destruction of "Europe's Cultural Heritage" at the hands of the Anglo/American "air gangsters."⁵⁸

To bring home to Allied troops the historic and cultural heritage of the land over which they were fighting, MFA&A arranged exhibitions of the artistic heritage of Italy. The first opened in Rome only three months after the liberation of the Eternal City and in six months received some 150,000 visitors, military and civilian; it made a

profit of 1,000,000 lire, which was applied to the repair of war-damaged monuments. Exhibitions were later opened in Siena, Perugia, Urbino and Venice.⁵⁹

For all of the uncertainty over how to treat Italy, it could not be argued that Allied MG "coddled" the Italians. Their daily food ration never exceeded 1,000 calories (although this basic ration was supplemented by fruits and vegetables, which were never rationed) and clothing distribution was also minimal. Allied MG also tended to ignore the heavy cost to the Italians of rampant inflation as Allied troops, particularly the free-spending Americans, did more than their part to inflate the Italian economy. Elaborate wage scales published by MG were widely ignored, with Army units deliberately raising their workers' compensation substantially above prevailing rates on the naive theory that the Italian standard of living was thus being improved. An underworld society soon emerged that began to rival anything endured in the worst days of Prohibition-era Chicago. Allied MG and the Allied armies themselves were basically uninterested in such matters.

On the other hand, Allied MG did fine work in restoring the Italian infrastructure. The fisheries industry brought in some 30,000 tons in 1945, considerably easing the food situation. The railroad system was restored with the help of Army Engineers and its services made available for civilian milling, lighting and other essential purposes. In Sicily, within one year after the Allied landings all railroad bridges, important highways and other public works had been restored. In fact, Italy was the only nation in which Allied Military Government or Civil Affairs stayed long enough for a restored industry to make a significant contribution to the war effort. For example, the Italian hemp industry became a mainstay of the Royal Navy. All this came about in spite of Allied MG initially paying little attention to the rehabilitation of Italian industry, presumably because such work was not deemed relevant to "military necessity." Without exports, however, Italy could never begin to pay for its vital imports, such as coal for its industries, which exports would then pay for coal imports, which could then manufacture or process goods for export. AMG's negative attitude toward Italian industry began to change after the Italian surrender eased animosities. One constant, however, was the enormous requisitions upon the Italian economy by the Allied armies. Up to August of 1944, for example, those armies had consumed 150,000 tons of fresh foods and 110,000 sheep, all purchased in Italy. On the one hand, those purchases injected hard currency into the Italian economy. On the other, those supplies were withdrawn from civilian consumption and had to be made up in part by imports or drawing on Allied armies stocks or by simply by civilians tightening their already constricted belts. On occasion, of course, Allied armies simply took what they needed. AMGOT reported that 180 tons of soap "in cases plainly marked 'AMGOT' were carried off in military vehicles; no trace of this soap was ever found."

Throughout the period of Allied Military Government, the Italian working class saw its standard of living decline, though probably not as much as that of the middle classes on fixed incomes. Nonetheless, this was wartime, and the Italians were one of

the very few peoples who had enthusiastically welcomed this war, and had committed unprovoked aggression in Ethiopia, France, and Greece.

Overall, Allied Military Government in Italy can be termed a qualified success. The Italian economy recovered very slowly under its control, inflation raged seemingly out of control and a large number of citizens were turned into lawbreakers by a ubiquitous black market necessary for their survival. On the other hand, Italian democracy revived and flourished in the post-war years, as did, eventually, the Italian economy. Considering the nature of this war, things could have gone much worse for the Italians.⁶⁰

MG in the ETO

As planning accelerated for the invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe, Civil Affairs and Military Government for the continent moved increasingly from the realm of theory to that of practical planning. With the establishment of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), a Civil Affairs G-5 General Staff Separate Section at Headquarters SHAEF eventually emerged. In May of 1944, SHAEF authorized general staff status for CA/MG staffs in Europe and established, for the first time, the offices of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 in the headquarters of armies and corps. The determination as to whether a G-5 section would be established at division level was left to the discretion of the field army commander. In many cases armies and corps were operational before their G-5 section could be manned.

The actual providing of Civil Affairs Teams and Detachments, almost 300 in all, for field operations rested with the European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD) of SHAEF G-5, which drew most of its personnel from the Civil Affairs Group at the American School Center. The ECAD numbered some 2,500 officers and 5,000 enlisted men, and was composed of a conventional division headquarters, three Regiments and 28 Companies. Its regiments were broken down into battalions and the battalions into eight to ten companies; the latter units were comprised of about 12 teams of varying numbers of officers and enlisted men, known as detachments, the basic unit for CA/MG operations in the ETO. The enlisted men proved invaluable in imparting their knowledge of military channels, courtesy, communications, etc., to the officers, who were a collection of bank presidents, small-town mayors, heads of college chemistry departments, lawyers, city public works managers. Their hasty specialist training at Charlottesville and other CA schools favored their particular duties in the field over the nuts-and-bolts realities of military life. The largest field units were known as "A" detachments, consisting of 15-25 personnel. The other detachments were B, C, and D, in descending order of personnel strength. (On the eve of MG for Germany, these detachments, for some reason, were retitled E., F, G, and I, respectively.) Each Army Group had detachments at its disposal, which were attached by Group to Armies, which, in turn detached the detachments needed for an operation to the divisions. Divisions' G-5 usually controlled the placing of the detachment in its

controlled cities and towns. Until the eve of entry into Germany the teams were combined units, the nationality of the commanding officer of each detachment matching that of the Army operating in the area. It was those detachments that went into the cities and towns with the combat troops or closely on their heels.⁶¹ Administrative control of those detachments left behind was assumed by the next regiment to appear in the area.

Although FM 27-5 (1940) had mandated that "Except where military necessity makes it impossible, historical and cultural monuments, works of art and religious shrines will be preserved," the British had taken a slight lead in planning for the protection and restoration of the artistic heritage of Europe from battle damage, Nazi "collecting" and Allied military activity.⁶² In the spring of 1943, British Eighth Army had made arrangements for the protection of historic monuments in North Africa, and AMGOT, as noted above, was actively protecting Italy's cultural heritage.

In August of 1943, the U.S. federal government established The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas. It was informally termed the "Roberts Commission" after its chairman, Associate U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Owen J. Roberts. The MFA&A and the "Roberts Commission," established a close two-way cooperation and liaison and worked with the American Institute of Architects, the American Association of Museums, The National Archives, The Library of Congress, the American Library Association and with leaders in these respective fields of cultural endeavor.

In November of the same year, SHAEF established its own Civil Affairs Section of Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives. (MFA&A). MFA&A's Director was a British officer, his Deputy an American and combined personnel served down the table of organization. The MFA&A was to record and assess war damage suffered by historic monuments prior to occupation by Allied troops, to take or advise on the measures to prevent further destruction or deterioration, estimate costs of repairs, prevent damage by troops, post notices, close or guard buildings, check billeting conditions, inform Allied troops of their responsibilities toward historical-cultural sites and articles and investigate and report on cases of wanton damages brought against Allied troops. In fact, one authority argued that the greatest contribution of the Roberts Commission was the impetus it gave to the creation of MFA&A. The Roberts Commission would forward maps, lists of monuments and technical manuals to the MFA&A, while the ECAD'S Official Lists of Protected Monuments went back to the Roberts Commission. The result of this cooperation was that precise and reliable lists of protected monuments could be issued to the troops in the field, and, for the most part, unnecessary damage was minimized. The bulk of the damage to Europe's historical-cultural treasures came as the result of Allied air bombardment, although even here Allied air forces were somewhat restrained by MFA&A's target advisories.

Utilizing lessons learned in Italy, MFA&A officers were assigned to the German and French Country Units before the invasion of the Continent. The MFA&A tried to obtain specialists from other military service branches but always remained

quite short of such personnel. In Italy the MFA&A numbered 34 officers and enlisted personnel, although all of the British were officers. In the ETO they numbered some 165 enlisted and officers, again, all of the British personnel were officers, although the numbers in both theaters fluctuated. In the field, ETO MFA&A personnel averaged no more than 10 in number, distributed among Headquarters Communications Zone, and with one each with the First, Third, Seventh, Ninth and Fifteenth U.S. Armies, Second British Army and First Canadian Army.⁶³

The combined British and U.S. Civil Affairs Center and School, Shrivenham, England was activated on 7 February 1944, along with the Civil Affairs Division (U.S. Contingent) SHAEF. Twenty-five hundred Army officers, some of whom had received basic training and been schooled in CA/MG at Fort Custer and the CATS in the United States, were detailed to the new school, there to receive further instruction prior to the invasion of Europe. It is an indication of the shortage of CA/MG experience that most of the instructors for this school were drawn from the student officers themselves. However, this was also a recognition that, as in the Stateside schools, these students were mostly older men with university degrees and long experience in their professional fields --basically why they had been selected in the first place. Although there were ample grounds for friction between these "instant officers" in CA, and the Regulars they would be working with and for, such difficulties seem to have been kept to a minimum.

The training itself fell into three categories: 1) Training of officers fresh from civilian life in military ways., 2) Training of all students in the theory and practice of CA/MG. and 3) Training of selected students as members of teams designated for specific regions of a particular country. The basic manual of instruction remained FM 27-5 (*Manual for Military Government*) and the curriculum basically followed that used at the British Civil Affairs Staff School at Wimbledon. By early January 1944, the number of Shrivenham students reached 108, about half of whom had German and French backgrounds, while the remainder were Charlottesville graduates sent to the UK school because of their specialist backgrounds. Graduates were to be assigned to the G-5 division of army groups, armies and divisions, while some selected U.S. officers would serve with British CA/MG detachments. Faculty and students were also responsible for the preparation of the *Basic Handbook for Military Government of Germany*.

The First U.S. Army Group made the initial call on Shrivenham's graduates, calling for 70 CA detachments for France and 273 for Germany --a total of 1,529 officers. 1st AG even had specific German towns and cities designated where these detachments were to serve, six months before D-Day. First U.S. Army later established its own supplemental training center at Verviers, Belgium for its MG detachments awaiting assignment in the field. This school's emphasis was placed upon language training and instruction in 1st Army policies, and with the front only a few miles away, the instruction tended to be practical and realistic.

Shortly before D-Day, General Eisenhower went to Shrivenham and addressed its officer-students. The Supreme Allied Commander informed his audience that they "were as modern as radar and just as important to the command.", and exhorted them to remember that "you are not politicians or anything else but soldiers." Although their missions might prove humanitarian in their results, their task, nonetheless was "to help us win the war."⁶⁴

Unfortunately, this was also a time of fairly intense rivalry between the German Country Unit of SHAEF, the U.S. element of SHAEF G-5, the ECAD and for a time 12th Army Group. As one CA/MG veteran noted, "All at one time or another engaged in internal maneuvers for power and control, duplicated planning, hoarded and raided personal, monopolized documents, sabotaged their rivals' efforts, and maintained veritable espionage systems against one another." Almost as reprehensible, the functioning SHAEF combined US/UK organization was taken apart to allay suspicions of the Soviets that the Western Allies were organizing something of a united front against them.⁶⁵

Although a SHAEF French Unit was established in June of 1942, there was no formal agreement between SHEAF G-5 and Charles De Gaulle's French Mission Militaire right up to D-Day. Thus, immediately after the Normandy landings, Civil Affairs/Military Government cooperation with the French had to be improvised until a definitive agreement was signed with the Gaullist authorities on 25 August. As in Italy, military operations remained paramount, although SHAEF G-5 "would meet French wishes in every way we could."⁶⁶ In the words of the commanding general of Third U.S. Army in April 1944:

The sole mission of Civil Affairs Administration is to further military objectives. The exercise of Civil Affairs is a command responsibility. The object of Civil Affairs is to assist in military operations.⁶⁷

The day before the invasion of Europe the ECAD was confirmed in its status as a major command.

Maintaining a balance between sensitivity to French authority and military necessity would not prove easy. SHAEF G-5 reported three days before D-Day that the Free French Committee had proved "very touchy on its position in Government and we might easily get into trouble if we were firm in the wrong place." CA officers certainly seemed to make the good-faith effort. When, for example, the Chief of the Resistance at Bayeaux requested guidance as to the disposition of the local *sous-prefet*, an alleged Vichyite and collaborationist, area CA officers remained impartial.⁶⁸


In CA's first airborne operation, three officers of the Civil Affairs Section of First U.S. Army (including future Democrat/Dixiecrat/Republican Senator Strom Thurmond), approached Normandy on D-Day by glider and found themselves under heavy German fire even before their "controlled crash" landings. CA problems in the Normandy area were relatively minor. Available supplies of civilian goods, some from

captured *Wehrmacht* stocks, exceeded Army requirements; electrical power and water supply problems were met, postal service was soon restored, civilians had either been evacuated or stayed out of the way and accepted the Gaullist authorities, who quickly took control of or supervised local government. Refugees were conspicuous by their absence and the weather good. Immediate civilian needs were limited to medical supplies, fuel for physicians' automobiles, soap and shoes, all of which were provided by Civil Affairs authorities. But this was a relatively small area and the true CA tests would come later.⁶⁹ Already, however, Allied MG's attempts to eliminate the black market aroused some resentment among the French, who remembered the wide-open German policies which reflected a German desire to wreck the French economy as well as to keep its troops happy.⁷⁰

12th U.S. Army G-5 later outlined the duties of its CA Detachments in France, which could serve as a template for CA operations in a friendly-liberated country:

- 1) Maintain supervision over local officials and agencies.
- 2) Maintain provost courts, when appointed, for the trial of civilians for offenses against proclamations, ordinances and local laws, when authorized.
- 4) Plan and control civilian travel to prevent interference with military supply routes and to secure the lines of communication.
- 4) Aid in the restoration and supervision of the administration of public health, including sanitation and medical care.
- 5) Re-establish of normal financial services and assisting in the restoration of civilian activities and economy.
- 6) Assist in the receipt and forwarding of claims.
- 7) Provide for the safeguarding of local government records, public monuments and works of art.
- 8) Make special recommendations regarding Civil Affairs control and operations in the area to which assigned, including requests for specialists for investigations and surveys.⁷¹

By 1 August 1944 Allied advances into Brittany had uprooted 40,000 refugees in La Manche alone, and elsewhere the numbers were increasing. Local dispersal and billeting took care of most of the wanderers, but as earlier refugees became restless stringent orders had to be issued to keep them off the roads. Food remained less of a problem, in large measure because of the season and the distribution of captured German stocks, which were "surprisingly diverse" and included invaluable field kitchens, cookers, 30 motor vehicles and two busses. Such abandoned enemy property could also cause some friction between the rights of the Allied armies under international law to seize whatever they needed for military operations and civilian needs. Relations could sometimes be tense between Americans and [Free] French Forces of the Interior (FFI), as the latter, like many Italian partisans, were reluctant to give up their arms and go back to civil life's routines. They often carried on their



General Eisenhower visits the CA Center a few days before D-Day. ("As modern as radar"), Signal Corps, National Archives

personal vendettas and sometimes caused confusion among U.S. troops, who sometimes mistook them for enemy snipers out of uniform. Some 8,000 former resistance men were recruited under the supervision of CA officers into special police forces to reinforce the *Gardes Champêtres* and gendarmes in Normandy and Brittany. Representatives of the Provisional National [Gaullist] Government, sometimes reinforced with French Forces of the Interior (FFI) resistance soldiers, accompanied combat troops and CA Detachments and helped in the screening of officials. Unfortunately, sometimes this screening was little more than a cloak for vendettas and political purging. In addition, many of the supposed Resistance fighters were in reality "overnight" patriots. The commander of Det. G-32, perceptively noted that "In the first place, real exponents of Resistance did not linger behind advancing troops but went forward with them."

Then there was the question of collaborationist clergy. When asked by a CA officer why the Rennes cathedral had not pealed out its bells on the jubilee day of liberation, the Archbishop essayed the feeble excuse that there was no electricity and that attempts to ring the bells by rope had not been successful. This cleric was fortunate not to have shared the fate of the alleged collaborators of Brest, of whom Third Army G-5 casually reported, "All but 600 collaborators were expelled from BREST."⁷² Later, in the wake of the Southern France invasion, some 5,000 French civilians were arrested "for security reasons" in Nice alone. In November of 1944, an armed band attacked and overcame prison guards and carried off and killed a former prefect and police superintendent who were awaiting trial as collaborators.⁷³

Detachment D5B2 in the town of Dreux, Department of the Loire, found that in August of 1944 the location, recording and burial of Allied dead, particularly airmen, was a major task. However, the local population was most helpful, carefully pointing out recent, unburied remains, or temporary graves that they had lovingly maintained themselves. Large stores of German Army food was uncovered and these were sold to the *marie* of Dreux for distribution among the inhabitants. The detachment reported that on the whole, its relationship with the public was "largely a function of the pass desk." Most pass applicants were railroad and agricultural workers, essential transporters of food, doctors, dentists and legal and tax workers. The public needs that these people served had to be balanced against the need to keep civilians as much as possible out of the way of military logistics and operations. The FFI were strong in the area and furnished the detachment with information on German supplies and lists of collaborators. The detachment, for its part, turned over several presumed collaborators to the tender mercies of the local FFI along with supplies they requested for their own operations.

Nonetheless, some civilians found their lives made more difficult by the acts of U.S. troops, and appealed to Det. D5B2 for help. A young girl (busily "chewing gum") called at the detachment office to report that her mother's potato patch near Saizerais had been stripped by an American artillery outfit encamped nearby. Winter was coming and mother and daughter had no food. The girl could not identify the

offending unit but she was fortunate enough to have a piece of paper signed by the mayor and countersigned by an American officer testifying to her loss, and a report was submitted through channels. A woman of 60 appeared in tears. Evacuated from her home, she found upon her return that American troops had taken her entire supply of firewood. "Arrangements were made to replace her wood." A few days later a Frenchman stumbled excitedly into the office. He owned several boats near Liverdun which American troops had borrowed and failed to return. He remonstrated with the troops and finally one struck him with his rifle butt, knocking him unconscious. Sightless in one eye, he now feared that he would go blind in the other. "He was soothed and a report was filed." Another Frenchman understandably objected to the use of his furniture for firewood in his stove, both used without his permission. On 27 October, the detachment's public safety officer was called to a local cafe, where five men of a combat engineer unit were in an advanced state of intoxication and shooting up the place. With the aid of an MP they were disarmed and conducted to their commanding officer. The offending soldiers claimed that:

It was the first time in France that they had been billeted in a town, the first time they had been in a cafe, they first time they had been able to talk to a girl. There were two "girls" in the cafe who were amenable to the advances, accompanied by cigarettes and candy....Mirabelle (the local liquor) is a powerful drink.⁷⁴

The first way in which the detachment was able to get the community functioning normally was through its securing of adequate stocks of fuel oil to run its water works full time. A trip to a U.S. Army POL dump near Le Mans produced the necessary fuel, which was then sold to the mayor and the water works were turned on. CAD troopers also had to confront the continuing question of prostitute control. Generally speaking, they kept in effect the existing French laws for their regulation, had C.I.C. (Combat Intelligence Corps) vet their records, and established medical prophylactic stations. All of this was done to control disease among civilians. Prostitutes were officially "strictly off limits," for the U.S. troops, undoubtedly to the bemusement of the worldly-wise French.⁷⁵

Overall, then, the first American CA operations in liberated France were going well. General Eisenhower did warn in a cable to the War Department, however, that although there was "General approval by population of conduct of our troops.", "potential friction lies in tendency toward looting or molestation of women, also in the black market.": a situation that would worsen.⁷⁶

As for cultural protection, Eisenhower reported that two "special observers, with photographic equipment [were] working in liberated [French] areas", recording French structures of architectural significance.⁷⁷ A typical Fine Arts and Archives report, the result of a personal reconnaissance by a Seventh Army Fine Arts officer in September of 1944, of the Arles-Avignon vicinity, showed 17 churches and religious

facilities, six ancient Roman structures, three museums and various chateaux mostly in fairly good condition, despite some German vandalism and considerable Allied bombing. The report indicated that the suspicious French were still somewhat reluctant to reveal the sites of their richer treasures, possibly as result of German propaganda that the British and Americans were preparing to loot liberated areas. The report concluded that little action was necessary by the local American CA/MG detachment, as the French themselves were doing a fine job in cleaning up and with emergency repairs.⁷⁸

CA specialists surveying the Royal palace at Fontainebleau in August 1944 located in a room that had been occupied by German General von Brauchitz a more contemporary cultural artifact: a huge map where plans had been drawn up for the invasion of Great Britain. Proposed movements on the map called for the occupation of London by Christmas 1940 and a peace conference in that city for May of 1941.⁷⁹

The assault waves of Seventh Army were still making their way off the invasion beaches of Southern France when the first Civil Affairs officer assigned to Operation DRAGOON crash-landed in a glider ten miles inland at 0500, 15 August 1944. Within a few hours most of the CA officers attached to the three spearhead American divisions were at work. They found surprisingly little to do, for the local FFI were well-organized and cooperative, the civilian population enthusiastically welcomed their liberation, war damage was slight and the weather was fine. Perhaps ominously, CA HQ reported on 18 August that "No problems of replacements of public officials arose which were not handled by the FFI." What this actually meant was that anyone tainted by charges of "collaboration" could find himself before a FFI summary "Cours Martial," put up against a wall and shot, all within a matter of hours. Even these tiresome legal niceties could be ignored on occasion. Later reports told of ten persons taken at random from the jail at Antibes and shot in retaliation for the shooting of one FFI member. Another account told of several executed Marseilles policemen found floating in the river. The local CA commander protested to his French liaison, who passed the complaint on to General De Gaulle, who managed to stem the more gross abuses of due process.

The French handled other Civil Affairs, however, to the complete satisfaction of the Americans, who made a point of avoiding any impression of officiousness. By August it had been firmly established that all liaison between French officials and the Army would be effected through CA. Nonetheless, the American CA troops came to realize soon enough that the French, understandably, were increasingly more concerned with restoring their own nation than in the joint war effort. An important means of easing the resultant friction between the French and their military liberators were the traveling "claims teams," which assisted local Civil Affairs officers in handling a multitude of civil claims and grievances against the U.S. Army or individual personnel.⁸⁰

For the Americans, the needs of the Allied forces came first and an early demand was for laborers to unload cargo off the beaches. CA officers drove from

town to town along the coast, appealing for impromptu stevedores, but to little avail given the low wages offered and the hard work involved. Many local men found it far more exciting to join with the partisans and race wildly through the streets of Marseilles in cars whose doors had been removed, permitting them to shoot down the detested Vichy collaborators more conveniently. Some Americans caught a distinct whiff of revolution in the air of the volatile city.⁸¹

In addition to the expected concerns of public safety, supply, agriculture, public utilities, etc., MG Detachment O 1525 and O 0560 brought no less than five tons of chocolate from Cherbourg to Nantes, early in January 1945, for distribution to children. At about the same time, O 0560 discovered that some 10 percent of 8 million British truck and passenger auto tires were usable, with minor repairs, and could be requisitioned for civilian use.⁸²

Another major mission for CA troopers in France was refugee control. By 6 August 1944 some 7,000 of them crowded onto the roads to get back to their homes behind the American lines, and finally were routed over secondary roads. Six days later the main refugee routes were forwarded to all CA detachments in the liberated area and their commanders became responsible for routing all nonmilitary traffic onto nonmilitary routes. Thanks to close CA cooperation with French authorities, the *Secours National* and the French Red Cross, the estimated 500,000 French refugees in the U.S. Army's area of operation in August did not suffer unduly, all things considered.⁸³

Alien civilians posed something of a problem as well. In the Cherbourg area there were numerous German civilians and those of other nationalities, enemy or otherwise, who had to be accounted for. In Cherbourg Det. A1A1 took all such civilians to a "pound" where they were screened by Combat Intelligence Corps personnel in conjunction with the rather less sympathetic French military security police.

A more intractable problem was posed by Cherbourg's brothels. They were immediately placed "Off Limits to Allied Troops." However, this injunction put three of the main establishments out of business, "with the unsurprising result that small brothels of a very undesirable type sprang up all over the town." "Respectable citizens" were repeatedly disturbed by troops knocking at their doors in search of the clandestine brothels. Nonetheless, Det. A1A1 could thankfully report that "Fortunately, to date no cases of rape have occurred in the city itself," due to good policing. Det. A1A1 also reported that as they packed up to redeploy "genuine regret and even concern was expressed by all leading civilian and military authorities. They all felt they had lost a friend."⁸⁴

A typical legal case involved a Combat Intelligence Corps investigation, assisted by a CA officer, in October 1944. A cafe owner in the town of Bayonville was found in possession of one U.S. Army carbine with loaded clip, five cans of U.S. gasoline, four German magnetos and one U.S. Army field jacket. The restrauteur claimed that previous 95th Division combat troops had traded this equipment with him for cognac.

As the civil courts were now functioning, he was turned over to the local mayor, who assured the investigators that the culprit would receive a severe sentence.⁸⁵

To weaken the black market and avoid large-scale dependence on Allied largesse, CA organizations at army and army group levels distributed a limited amount of civilian necessities to the French population. Even these restricted quantities were impressive. Between September of 1944 and V-J Day, SHAEF G-5 forwarded to Paris 1,277,061 tons of food, which, while not enough to afford a full caloric diet, was adequate for some 5,000,000 people. Much of this record delivery was made possible by SHAEF G-5's making available fuel, oils and gasoline, coal and other equipment and supplies, such as binder twine, threshing machines, grain drills, seeds, etc. to the French food industry. Millions of tons of food were thereby made available from indigenous resources, French civilians were put back to work and the transport that would have been required to import this food remained available for military use.⁸⁶

In December of 1944 alone some 126,000 pounds of food, 27,600 pounds of soap, 10.5 tons of clothing and 15.3 tons of blankets were handed out. These figures did not include the vast stocks of enemy material also distributed. The biggest single cache in this category was found in 25 miles of storage tunnels, crammed with German food and liquor rations. Civilians and U.S. soldiers, as well as Resistance troops were busily helping themselves before a CA detachment came upon the scene, put an end to the looting and properly distributed the war booty through official French channels. During the harvest in October 1944, CA located more than 9,000 gallons of abandoned German Army motor fuel that it distributed for use on farms in the Nancy region. More negatively, CA troops had to adhere strictly to their major mission of keeping civilians off the roads as much as possible. In January 1945 "drastic action" had to be taken in Northern France. A 48-hour operation by CA motor patrols and CIC detachments in late January 1945 netted and heavily fined no less than 300 civilians who were out and about without passes. Finally, CA troops were instrumental in restoring French transport and communications, although it was a tedious and lengthy process. Not until December 1944 was mail service restored throughout France. Electrical power and telephone service took about as long to restore to any semblance to pre-war standards.⁸⁷ The transport of supplies, civilian and military was enormously assisted with the establishment of the French Truck Group (Provisional). The Group consisted of 50 companies and numbered 390 officers and 6,950 men and on average employed some 2,000 trucks in its missions, which put nearly seven loaded ton miles on those trucks between 1 September and 31 November of 1944. Again, not only did the supplies get through, but thousands of Frenchmen found work.⁸⁸

In all, CA in France successfully walked a fine line between respect for the sensibilities and authority of the newly restored French national government, and military necessity. Even when it did directly intervene in the control or relief of the civil population, it mostly did so with the cooperation of the French authorities. As a result the CA mission, as outlined by the commanding general of Third U.S. Army,



CA PVT Nicholas, in the role of St. Nicholas, distributes Army field rations to children of the French Village of St. Nicholas, 1944. Signal Corps, National Archives



Soviet former slave laborers returned to the Motherland by Army MG. (Snow on roofs of coaches indicates complete lack of heat.) Signal Corps, National Archives

was basically fulfilled. "Military objectives," including the expulsion of the Germans from France, were accomplished with a minimum of civilian interference.

Allied CA/MG planning had proceeded under the assumption that the German armies would surrender in the field when they realized that the war was lost, as they had in World War I. However, this was a different, National Socialist, Germany. Now the planning had to be for fighting all the way into Germany in the face of fanatical resistance. In addition, vast areas which it had thought would be captured by the Red Army were actually seized by the Western Allies, bringing with them far more CA/MG demands. As the Western Allies' armies fought across Germany from the west and south, combat and service troops, including chemical warfare, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft and Reserve units, were commandeered and diverted to MG duty, and personnel holding centers and pools combed for suitable troops. These impromptu military governors were given anything from three weeks to no instruction in Military Government. Experience and ingenuity substituted for training, although most troops received some lectures and demonstrations in basic MG operations, policy and organization, and received MG kits.

As one response to the increased need for MG officers, ECAD, on 5 March, opened a school in which tactical officers could be trained for MG assignments in a two-weeks course at Romilly-sur-Seine. The first class consisted of 92 Army Air Forces and Airborne officers. The school also trained directly-commissioned officers. The AAF and Airborne officers were given a choice at the end of their brief course as to whether they wished to join ECAD.

Regular Army CA/MG officers remained something of a problem to the end of the war and into the post-war occupation period. They generally seemed to lack whatever it was that put their fellow officers onto the wartime fast track and resented being thrown into a field about which they knew little and being instructed in its mysteries by some recently-commissioned civilian specialist temporarily-in-uniform. In the words of the authority on the German occupation, and himself a specialist MG officer:

Most of them [Regular officers assigned to Military Government] had little or no respect for this new-fangled military activity: prestige to them meant assignment to a tactical unit. To them the running of a Military Government headquarters in Germany was substantially the same as operating a truck driver's school or an airfield in the United States...they obviously constituted a fairly heavy liability, especially when they concentrated their attention on jockeying for personal power, knocking the efforts of specialist Military Government officers down, and making themselves generally "difficult."⁸⁹

All of which argued the need for a Military Government officer career path, something that would have to wait for years after the end of the war. Personnel "churning" also

did not help matters: the Germany unit in its first two years was to have nine different superior officers, all of whom were innocent of any Civil Affairs training, as "reorganization followed reorganization."⁹⁰

Further, many Army officers unfairly held the opinion that "Military Government officers were culls and misfits and the enlisted men were mostly alumni of the mental wards." An MG veteran wrote of "the old Army game of unloading undesirable officers on a newly organized outfit."⁹¹ Yet in 1943, Charlottesville and the training schools had accepted only two out of twenty-five in-service officer nominees and one in fifty civilian applicants for commissions. The average age of the officers and commissioned civilians was 40, well above that of the Army as a whole, but most brought pertinent civilian skills that proved invaluable in the field. Sixty-eight percent of the enlisted men were in the Army General Classification Test categories I and II, compared to the Army average of 41 percent. Like their officers, many had had some training in law, teaching, engineering, law enforcement or social work and about one-third had come from the Army Specialist Training Program, where they had received nine months of post-secondary instruction in foreign languages (an area in which, as noted, in Military Government officers' training had been weak.) The Army established additional MG training centers after the Normandy landings, at Troyes, Rochefort and Romelley sur Seine, while the individual armies sometimes established training programs. Some of these schools gave specialist training, such as police or supply, while others were refresher institutions to take advantage of experience gained and to train combat officers for MG work.⁹²

One of the more intriguing MG training centers was the German police school, established by 1st U.S. Army in October 1944 at Verviers, Belgium. The students were members of several German Police Companies captured near Aachen in early October 1944. This experimental school (which may have violated several Geneva Convention proscriptions regarding the employment of POWs in their captor's war effort) was designed to prepare German police to serve under American Military Government in Germany. The senior *meister* was made responsible for the discipline of and duty performance by the group. The American staff numbered only six. Classes included English language, Military Government proclamations, laws, etc., and such miscellaneous subjects as U.S. Army military courtesy and discipline, insignia, ranks, the American Way of Life and democracy by one Tech Lobl, who was thoroughly bilingual. Supplies were thriftily drawn from captured German material, although rations remained a problem in that the official status of these men was unclear. Were they still POWs or civilian employees of the U.S. Army? Their uniforms also had to be drastically altered to remove them as far as possible from German Army pattern. The endemic Nazi salute, accompanied by much heel-clicking, (along with many "jahwohls!") also had to be vigorously discouraged. Most American officers would return a proper U.S.- style salute. The school moved to Aachen in December 1944 and formal instruction was now supplemented by the transformed police now daily performing their duties in the city.⁹³

Population control, evacuation and movement became an even more important activity of CA/MG teams in the wake of the German Ardennes offensive in December of 1944. In order to spot German paratroopers and to keep civilians off the roads, no civilian without a special pass was permitted east of a line Aachen-Kynatten-Eupen-Malmedy-St. Vith, Germany/Belgium. The priority task of MG was to keep panic-stricken civilians off the roads used by Allied military convoys. Curfews were imposed in the same general area with civilian check points manned around the clock by rearmed Belgian gendarmarie. Bombardments by enemy "aerial projectiles" (presumably V-1s pilotless flying bombs and V-2 rockets), added to the general civilian unrest before the Germans were stopped and then turned back in January 1945.⁹⁴ Most significantly, the Aachen Military Government appointees and even the POW-police, all "sure candidates for the firing squads and concentration camps" if the area were ever recaptured by the *Wehrmacht*, resolutely stayed at their posts.⁹⁵ On the northern shoulder of the German offensive, Detachment I4G2, with jurisdiction over Landkreis Monschau, faced the decision whether to evacuate or stay in place. They decided to stay when the local tactical military detachment asked them to remain in order to maintain civilian morale. (Those civilians had already witnessed the hasty departure of a group and two battalion headquarters from the town.) The detachment also realized that it would be that much harder to reestablish its authority after having departed and left the population, particularly those who had cooperated with the Americans in good faith, to the tender mercies of the Germans and their collaborators. The town suffered severely from shelling but was not retaken by the enemy. The population remained calm and in fact, local civilians turned in some 25 German paratroopers! Some civilian evacuations, of course, were necessary. Military Government staffs of 82d Airborne and 7th Armored Divisions meticulously-planned and executed a major civilian evacuation that lasted three days, and which even included follow-up visits by welfare-trained personnel and the establishment of road blocks to prevent unauthorized returns.

At Bastogne the Germans rendered the question of evacuation moot as they besieged the city. About 2,000 of the town's 5,000 citizens had already fled, but the remnant faced constant shelling; 20 were killed and many more injured. A new mayor and 17 auxiliary police were appointed and provided refugee billets, burying the dead, supervising civil food distribution and procuring supplies needed by the military. Because the food supply was adequate, local MG personnel spent most of their time in "impounding" wandering local civilians and returning them, under escort, to what remained of their homes.⁹⁶

Eleven CA troops of the 1st and 2d Companies, 1st Regiment, French Provisional Truck Unit, early in the Ardennes offensive held off a German infantry counter-attack at Sarreguimines, killing eight Germans and capturing 15. This team established a refugee concentration point in the town and seized every vehicle they could get their hands on to bring in supplies, often under enemy air attack and shell fire. After the Germans retreated, the team remained in the town for about three months, restoring water and electricity and rescued no less than 2800 civilians found

living in a cave. The team leader was later transferred to a combat unit and killed in action. MAJ Robert H. Bennett, however, was not forgotten. After the war, one of Sarreguimines town's main squares was renamed in his honor.⁹⁷

Another CA detachment of the 95th Division found approximately 1,000 German civilians who had been hiding in a bunker in Saarlautern, Alsach, for a week in December 1944. The team leader arranged for the bunker to be thoroughly cleaned and latrines dug at either end, organized a community kitchen and planned daily foraging parties to locate food and water. During all of this, the area was under constant enemy artillery bombardment, and two of the pumps the team had located were destroyed. Understandably, "the people [were] all highly nervous and hysterical"; three had been killed by the bombardment and several wounded. The team leader himself soon after was himself wounded.⁹⁸

A somewhat more typical day was reported by the Military Government section of the 99th Infantry Division for the division's forward echelon along the Belgian sector of the front, for 15 February 1945:

0745 Made arrangements for a civilian to buy necessary stone to rebuild his house.

0945 Made arrangements for QM truck to get wood from MONTENAU for use in the bakery; also to secure yeast and salt.

1000 Conferred with Burgermeister regarding names of all refugees from other towns and where they are located here.

1030 Civilian called re his wife's miscarriage in hospital in VERVIERS.... Told him perhaps our Rear office could check on her condition.

1000 Contacted 324th Med Bn for ambulance for 3 sick people to take them to hospital in BUTGENBACH.

1200 Conferred with 1st Lt Tirsoul, Bel[gian] Liaison Officer and representative of governor of Liege re food and coal for people here. They assured us that Bel. gov't would look out for the people in this area. Also discussed cattle situation and the same applies. Cleared up [matter] of people selling their cattle on Dec 7 44, for which they were never paid.

1530 Discussed dead soldiers in town w/S-5.

1600 Talked with 99th Inf Div CIC [Counter-Intelligence Corps] screening of civilians. Referred them to Capt Young.

1830 S-5 Reported civilians were hauling dead Germans away in a cart. Will investigate tomorrow...⁹⁹


It was fortunate that such activities took place in cool weather: Third U.S. Army G-5 reported that it had to burn, bury or dynamite some 1200 head of dead Belgian cattle, using civilian labor and captured German dynamite for the job.¹⁰⁰

Even routine moves could prove dangerous. A special trainload of more than 1300 Russian DPs was strafed on 2 January by two errant USAAF P-47. Only one civilian, a train crewman was killed, as the refugees had been instructed to run for the snow banks under line side trees if attacked (presumably by enemy aircraft). Fortunately, the train also carried a French medical team and a five-member CA unit, who rendered assistance and calmed the passengers, but this incident could have been a major civilian tragedy of the war.¹⁰¹

CA/MG teams could exercise admirable field ingenuity. In early 1945 Detachment I7A2 at Virton, Belgium located a small mill nearby that could supply up to 135 tons of flour per week --if the proper lubricants could be found. Said lubricants not being readily available, the detachment made arrangements with the local Army motor pools to collect their oil crankcase drainings, and the mill was soon producing more than sufficient flour for the region.¹⁰²

Such detachments could also work closely with the new civil governments in liberated areas. On a typical operation in February 1945, CA/MG units delivered 20 tons of military meat from Army depots to the towns of St. Hubert, Hoffalize and Bastogne and used 12 Army trucks from a local motor pool to haul 50 tons of potatoes from Poppel to Eupen. They also used their own trucks to deliver three tons of food and clothing voluntarily collected by the citizens of Huy for the relief of their less fortunate fellows of Vielsalm.¹⁰³ D1G1 went even further in the clothing area, establishing a sewing center in the arrondissement of Verviers, Belgium, collecting sewing machines from private homes, materials from abandoned factories and putting DPs to work repairing and making clothing, underwear and fatigue clothing that had been abandoned by the German Army. Later, U.S. troops were allowed to have minor repairs made to their uniforms for a small fee. Detachment D1G1 also established a shoe repair facility with equipment salvaged from an abandoned repair shop in an abandoned town with the result that all DPs in the area had shoes¹⁰⁴

U.S. Army CA soldiers also at this time ministered to the newly-liberated Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, as they had just after World War I. In February 1945 alone, some 6 1/2 tons of foodstuffs and 18 cases of soap were issued to the single detachment at Trois Vierges. Assembly points were established in five cities and towns for the collection of fodder in an attempt to save the cattle of the Grand Duchy and Army Ordnance was persuaded to turn over 75 bicycles to Luxembourg civil authorities.¹⁰⁵ On a somewhat larger scale, CA officials saw to it that some 30 tons of overhead cable was brought up for the Antwerp tramways; if the port workers could



Belgian *Burgomeister* meets with Army MG officers, 1944. Signal Corps, National Archives

not get to the docks, the Allied ships, laden with military equipment, could obviously not be unloaded.¹⁰⁶

On 15 September 1944 Detachment D8B1 established itself in the small town of Roetgen, on the Belgian border due west of Aachen. This was the first U.S. military occupation of German territory in World War II and can also be considered the beginning of the occupation of that nation.¹⁰⁷ The city had been fanatically defended, and MG troops found "a fantastic, stinking heap of ruins" wherein the inhabitants subsisted on cabbage soup and potatoes (about the fare of most Europeans at the time.)¹⁰⁸

The "bible" of this occupation was the SHAEF *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, which had been completed only weeks before the U.S. penetrations into the Third Reich.¹⁰⁹ As in Italy, American MG would be indirect, working through what German local officials could be found untainted by a Nazi past. For the enormous task of governing U.S.-occupied German territory the U.S. Army had allotted all of 2,700 officers, 130 warrant officers, and 5,424 enlisted personnel.¹¹⁰

By December of 1944 MG officers were being given explicit instructions "to maintain a strict attitude towards the German population and to avoid any activity which might be considered "coddling." Furthermore, the Germans were to set up their own rationing system that would see to it that this conquered people ate no better than the populations in liberated territories.¹¹¹ Germans were to be made to feel that rehabilitation "was a practical duty which they owed to themselves and to their conquerors."¹¹²

As they moved into Germany, CA/MG teams found that their most persistent task was finding suitable German administrative personnel. To remain in office, such officials had to be anti- (or at least non) Nazi as well as competent. It was difficult to find officials from the pre-Nazi era. As one inspection report of 12th Army CA for the Aachen area for November 1944 put it, "Pre-Nazi officials are in practice generally either dead, or too old or not able to be traced."¹¹³ Aachen was also the site of a surprisingly long-range and non-punitive effort to rehabilitate Germany. In April 1945 some 70 surviving pre-Nazi era trade union leaders met, with the blessing of the local MG detachment and organized the "Free German Trade Union," planned as the germ-cell for future democratic trade-union organizations in Germany.¹¹⁴ It was at about this time that General Eisenhower made his often-quoted, and not untypical remark that:

The sooner I get rid of these questions that are outside of the military in scope, the happier I will be; sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.¹¹⁵

The fighting was far from over when U.S. Army MG entered these German border towns. At Saarlautern some 6,500 enemy shells fell on the town during the first 24 hours of occupation and intermittent shelling continued for days, as did heavy

fighting in the general area. Nonetheless, within two days a bakery had been set up, pharmaceutical supplies gathered from the ruins, refugees rounded up and a general survey made of the town's condition. The Saarlauten area MG unit soon saw to it that each of the neighboring inhabited towns (many had been evacuated) had a mayor, a few auxiliary police, a volunteer fire brigade and a fire control pump and that a camp had been established. Several months later the detachment had embarked on more long-range MG operations. Its personnel distributed the notorious *Fragebogen* questionnaires to all officials to determine their degree of individual Nazi culpability. In addition, they posted proclamations and issued arm bands for civilian police, confiscated small arms, binoculars and cameras as well as Nationalist Socialist property. Each community was surveyed for population estimates, name, birth date and appointing authority of all mayors, police and other available officials, names of doctors, the number, capacity and equipment of hospitals, prisons and fire stations, number and type of refugees and the food and health situation. The mayors themselves were to register private radios, vehicles, citizens, refugees and livestock; collect and register radio transmitters, shotguns, rifles, military equipment, government and remaining Nazi Party property, close banks and schools and be prepared to draw up reports on health, food and the refugee situation. Through it all they were to maintain routine administration but purged, of course, of National Socialist influence. For the most part this was still MG by indirection, with the newly-appointed or confirmed burgermeisters accounting for some 90 percent of the towns' business.

All seemed to go well so long as the team was relatively autonomous, and until 15th U.S. Army indulged itself in the U.S. Army's favorite indoor pastime, reorganization. Afterwards, the team leader reported, "Our requisitions for urgently needed food supplies, or crude oil were returned because a comma, or one of eight signatures, or some other insignificant paper item had been omitted." No less than four food reports were demanded by different layers of 15th Army and SHAEF authority but there was no particular evidence to indicate that any of the reports had any effect or had even been read. The job did have its satisfactions, however, as when the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) member of the team, a Miss Dingle, inspected the children's school on its first day and the moppets "so cute behind their little desks," sang out "Viva Churchill, Viva Roosevelt, Viva Stalin." Miss Dingle, who had already provided the scholars' desks, now requested a piano for their politically-correct recitations and, somewhat improbably, a truckload of flowers for their May Day decorations.¹¹⁶

The situation in Stolberg, among the first German towns to fall to the Allies was instructive of the denazification problem. The newly-installed burgomeister had been a convinced Republican-Democrat in pre-Nazi years and a devout Roman Catholic. He was demoted by the Nazis from primary school principal to teacher, and somehow managed to give a form of religious instruction to his pupils. However, there was some question as to his administrative ability in his new office. The just-replaced Burgomeister, a pre-Nazi-era Social Democrat, on the other hand, had achieved his

office at the behest of a prominent Nazi and had himself then joined the Party. On the other hand, he had been frequently at loggerheads with the Nazi kreisleiter of Stolberg, and numerous local civilians had attested to his reluctance to apply Nazi principles with any full vigor. This ex-official was efficient in his job. However, SHAEF directives had called for the purge of all "active" and "ardent" Nazi Party members and sympathizers. Did the latter example come under this proscription? On the principle of preferring "political character to administrative efficiency," the former official remained in office.¹¹⁷ Germans who tried to hide an unsavory past could face harsh reckoning. A former Aachen policeman discovered destroying files was tried before an Intermediate Military Government Court and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Three months later a coal mine official in the Aachen area, in applying for a travel pass, neglected to mention that he had been an SA Stormtrooper and found himself facing the same penalty, plus a 10,000 Mark fine. A similar but less culpable offender received one year's imprisonment. The Germans must have realized that the Americans were serious when each regiment of the 95th Infantry Division erected a stockade in its area for offenders against Military Government regulations. MG officials were also seeing to the repair of leaks in the Aachen cathedral and forwarding antibiotics and specialists to control an outbreak of diphtheria in Monschasu and Mutzenich.¹¹⁸

By this time a series of SHAEF proclamations had suspended the operation of the courts in occupied Germany, permanently abrogated Nazi laws, and had established in their place MG courts to deal with civilians under Allied control. Army Group commanders could delegate the power to set up such courts to subordinate and Military Government commanders. There were to be three such types of MG courts: general, intermediate and summary. They were to have jurisdiction over all persons in occupied territory, except those serving under SHAEF or UN commands. All three were empowered to try all offenses under the laws and usages of war or against any proclamation, law, ordinance, etc. issued by MG or the Allied forces and all offenses under the [non-Nazi] laws of the occupied territory. The general court could impose any lawful sentence, including death, the intermediate any sentence except death or imprisonment exceeding ten years or fine in excess of \$10,000; and the summary court any penalty except death, imprisonment exceeding one year or fine in excess of \$1,000. MG judges were not required to have legal training, although this was encouraged for at least one judge on each panel. The three courts usually consisted of three officers, although the summary court consisted of one legally-qualified officer. Although not mandated, it was common practice for these courts to provide a U. S. Army officer, if the accused were not otherwise represented, and to furnish such an officer who was a lawyer in civilian life to assist the defense in serious cases. The rights of the accused were spelled out in some detail and included the presumption of innocence, the right to legal counsel, to have a copy of the charges, to call witnesses, to apply for an adjournment to prepare his defense, to have the proceedings translated and to appeal his sentence.

There were some variations from U.S. court procedures, probably due to the wartime situation. The refusal of the accused to testify could be held against him, charges could be amended at any time during the trial and the accused could be subjected to a preliminary interrogation by the court. Sentences tended to be severe and there was no appeal, except for review by higher authority. Some 99 percent of the trials were held in the summary courts and of those trials approximately 70 percent dealt with curfew and circulation charges, relatively minor offenses that hardly brought down the wrath of the conquerors on the conquered. The most common serious offense through January 1945 was the unlawful possession of firearms, but even here the courts usually determined that that the arms were for the most part used to protect their holders from marauding DPs or for hunting. MG courts in their earliest months, at least, tended to be "rough and tumble affairs," often being held in barns, inns, or hotels. The Germans did appreciate their basic fairness, and, of course, following on the heels of the Nazi-era German courts, they must have looked good to any fair-minded German civilian.¹¹⁹

MG units began to take on their first "nuts-and-bolts" MG activities: For example, MG officials made some nice distinctions in restoring electric power to Aachen: A diesel generator was restored to provide power for MG offices and a steam-driven generator found in a brewery did the same for the St. Marien hospital. The rest of the city, however, would have to await repairs to the Gobbelgasse plant; the contents of about 50 railroad cars of coal found in the Aachen yards would be enough to start up at least one unit of the plant.¹²⁰ MG Det. I1H2 actually ran a coal mine in Palembang. The main problem was that the mine's lower level had been flooded by natural seepage which could not be pumped out without electric power. Although the MG unit was able to get three of the mine power plant's eleven boilers into operation, this was not enough to pump out the water. The detachment requested Army Engineer aid, which was forthcoming and mine employees went back to work, now under MG supervision. Once the mine was back in operation, French mining engineers were brought in and attached to I1H2 to run the facility for the benefit of the Allied cause. At least the local miners were back at work and no longer a charge on the local MG.¹²¹

As for the general run of the German population, the report of 3d U.S. Army in early December of 1944 seems apt: "German nationals in forward areas recently liberated appear apathetic, docile and very war-weary."¹²² Keeping destitute Germans fed, even at the level of Allied liberated peoples, proved a major task but one as much related to transportation as to production. For example, MG Detachment Q 1783 at Niedeldorf had to ship "750 loaves of German bread, 1 ton flour, meat and fat, 2 1/2 tons foodstuffs and 13 loads of wood" from nearby towns to Niedeldorf in early January of 1945. Nine agricultural specialists were expected shortly to survey agricultural needs for spring planting and to survey existing stocks.¹²³

Although by this time the U.S. Army had imposed a rigorous non-fraternization policy, the troops were freely giving their impressions of the Germans, and they were for the most part quite positive:

These Germans aren't bad people. We get along with them O.K. All you've got to do is treat them good and you have no trouble.... These people aren't really Germans - they're Catholic [?!]. This part of Germany is all Catholic. They're good people and don't have any of this Nazi feeling toward us....Hell, these people are cleaner and a damned sight friendlier than the Frogs. They're our kind of people.

These were just some of the reactions to a poll conducted by a *Stars and Stripes* reporter.¹²⁴

Another contemporary source recorded GI opinion as generally one of favoring the "nice, clean countryside and well-built homes, with their decent bathrooms." After all, for the first time since leaving the States, the American soldier was encountering some good domestic plumbing.¹²⁵

Such kindly sentiments could not deter the Army's hard-core looters, however: "Radios, food, bicycles, crucifixes, doors, cooking utensils, and cattle." were all seized by U.S. troops, whose attitude was that they had fought for it and so it was legitimate booty, and that at any rate, the Germans had stolen plenty from the rest of Europe in the first place. Such "liberation" did not make the work of ECAD any easier, particularly with winter coming on. Matters were not helped by a rather blasé attitude at the top. LTG Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, remarked that such activity should be considered as less despicable in enemy territory, but should still be discouraged "to impress on the inhabitants the fact that their conquerors are superior to them not only in military prowess but in their moral standards."¹²⁶ Despite such trials, the widespread German civilian docility, just as that of their fathers after World War I, was making the work of ECAD personnel that much easier. In fact, during the Battle of the Bulge, when it appeared that the town of Monschau might fall, German officials stoutly proclaimed their readiness to stay at their posts, and did.¹²⁷

On 20 March 1945, just behind U.S. assault troops, Detachment F3G2 moved into Coblenz. It is not recorded whether any MG troops there noted that this city had been the headquarters of the American Rhineland occupation after World War I. Apparently the Americans this time were given, if anything, a more enthusiastic welcome than in 1918. One MG detachment even reported from the Aachen area some renewed interest in the separatist movement that had given General Allen so much trouble. Det. F1G2 reported that such activity was "being investigated."

This time, of course, a war was still on, and F3G2 led a much more active life than had any of General Allen's occupation troops. The fortified Ehrenbreitstein heights, upon which that general had planted Old Glory, in 1945 held German artillery and its observers. Anything in the city that moved during daylight could draw sniper or artillery fire. At night, the detachment could view a seemingly permanent fireworks display as U.S. artillery duelled with the enemy guns on the Ehrenbreitstein. On 25

March a German unit raided downtown Coblenz, sending civilians and a small U. S. patrol scurrying into the town hall for safety.¹²⁸

Even without *Wehrmacht* counterattacks, the last weeks of the Third Reich could prove challenging for many MG troopers. Det. F2A3 in Bamberg found that the security battalion of XV corps had provided no security. Consequently, by 18 April, looting by DPs and German civilians was in full swing, with food warehouses sacked and railroad cars set afire. A large explosion killed 16 civilians and injured many more and ignited munitions on an adjacent train. All the while, military traffic was backed-up through the main Bamberg thoroughfare. The looting, fires, explosions and military congestion continued until the 19th when troops from the 319th Infantry Regiment finally restored order. It was none too soon; a large quantity of mustard gas was found stored in the vicinity of the railroad depot.¹²⁹

The MG detachment that uncovered the Belsen concentration camp on 15 April 1945 found thousands of dead in various stages of decomposition as well as evidences of cannibalism. The unit was overwhelmed and had to call in all Corps services for help. By 18 April the camp survivors were receiving two adequate meals per day (soup; the detachment realized that people in such condition could hardly stand full-scale meals immediately.) The rescue efforts were considerably aided by the "excellent bakery" in the camp guard barracks. The repellent guards, approximately 35 men and women, "under strict guard, are in process of cleansing this Augean stable", a satisfying outcome to most.¹³⁰

By this time, CAD personnel were beginning to encounter growing numbers of Soviet civilians and soldiers. Detailed instructions were drawn up in April by ECAD and signed by General Eisenhower, directing in some detail their treatment. These citizens were to receive generous allotments of rations, clothing, medical care and were to be immediately segregated from the general POW population in special "camps or points of concentration" as the directive gingerly put it, with Soviet repatriation representatives to have control of internal administration.¹³¹ Later, it became evident that many such Soviet citizens were ready forcefully to resist any return to the socialist motherland, but these repatriation decisions rested in the high political realm of inter-Allied national relations.

Military Government units had also acquired responsibility for DPs. UNRRA was to have cared for these unfortunates who were considered victims of the Nazis and thus entitled to good treatment. UNRRA, however, lacked the resources and personnel for the task, which then became in large measure by default the responsibility of MG.¹³² Some 4,200,000 DPs of 47 nationalities were located at the time, mostly in Germany, and 2,700,000 were repatriated by the end of the war. (Temporarily homeless refugees were not counted.) Probably a large measure of credit for this gratifying situation was the early planning by SHAEF; as early as 4 June 1944 (that is, two days before D-Day), General Eisenhower's organization issued a detailed memorandum on the care and treatment of non-German refugees.¹³³ Unfortunately,

these uprooted people were often demoralized and believed that they had the right to wreak vengeance on the Germans who had enslaved them.

In Trier, for example, "a shifting horde of from 5,000 to 12,000 displaced persons was reported by the detachment commander in March 1945 as "daily looting in town, setting fires and causing general fear among civilians."¹³⁴ In fact, despite all talk of "Werewolves" and "fanatical, last-ditch Nazis," by far the greatest threat to order came from the DPs.¹³⁵ Unfortunately, these added responsibilities came at a time when CAD had run out of manpower. By April, the Army was calling upon antiaircraft artillery, field artillery and signal personnel to fill MG personnel requirements.¹³⁶

Not surprisingly, American troops encountered frequent examples of the Nazis' mass-production killing operations. First Army G-5 reported a typical example when it uncovered a small concentration camp outside Leipzig whose 300 inmates had been burned alive when their barracks were doused in gasoline and set alight by retreating guards. In accordance with standing instructions from General Eisenhower, the Germans were forced to bury their victims in the most prominent spot in the nearest town. Leipzig also had to supply a wreath for each victim and all prominent available citizens were required to attend the funeral, which was presided over by U.S. Army chaplains of the three major faiths, including the Jewish.¹³⁷

In all fairness, it should be noted that there were some German resisters and MG troops worked with them, at least in Munich, where a unique but failed anti-Nazi uprising had been mounted two days before the arrival of U.S. troops. MG officers found that, if anything, anti-Nazi Germans were more difficult to work with than the ordinary run of German officials; the former believed that they had some claim to be treated differently from their more compromised fellows.¹³⁸ Another CA detachment was shown a network of tunnels under a string of row houses that had been used to hide Jews, some of whom were still there.¹³⁹ Not many Germans could offer such tenable anti-Nazi credentials. Resisters were few enough to begin with and many, perhaps a majority, had been liquidated in the wake of the failed 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler.

These early occupation troopers, for the most part, had been trained in mock "Germantowns" at the Schools of Military Government and, in the words of the leader of detachment F-213 upon entering Munich in late April 1945, "We knew Munich better than we did our home towns." The detachment found a few apprehensive, deferential officials waiting on the *rathaus* steps. They had already been selected from the "white list" and notified to be there. LTC Keller had never, of course, met any of these worthies but he knew them from their dossiers. He selected one as temporary mayor and told him to assemble the heads of the municipal departments for an early conference. The detachment's job was complicated by the large number of POWs dumped in the *rathaus* for someone else to look after, and by the sniping that went on sporadically in this former citadel of Nazism for a week, that is, up to the very moment of Germany's national surrender.¹⁴⁰

Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives branch of SHAEF G-5 moved into Germany along with the combat troops in November of 1944. Their field operations

turned out to be significantly different from those in liberated territory. In France or Belgium local curators and staff were usually still on the job or nearby. In Germany, however, they found that collections and staff had often been widely dispersed to prevent war damage. To the end of 1944 not one significant historical or artistic collection, either German or looted, had been uncovered in occupied Germany. MFA&A did establish a central depository to which art objects and archival material could be brought for safekeeping, cataloguing and study, as well as to establish rightful ownership. Finally, in December, a shell burst opened a walled enclosure in Geilenkirchen, revealing numerous paintings and sculptures in excellent condition. Combat troops dutifully informed the local Military Government of the find, which was removed to the Aachen cultural collection point.¹⁴¹ An even more spectacular, macabre, find was uncovered in a salt mine at Bernterode, where curious and energetic enlisted men from a U.S. Army service unit, noticing a freshly-constructed wall, tore it down and broke open a locked door. Inside they found a large collection of art works, including the Prussian crown jewels and military mementoes. Further inspection revealed that the collection also included the caskets containing the remains of Field Marshal and Frau von Hindenburg, Kaiser Wilhelm I, and Kaiser Frederick the Great. The eminent iconic remains were afforded proper burial and the valuables were sent to the Reichsbank in Frankfurt am Main.¹⁴²

More often than not, however, MFA&A troops found that the architectural heritage of Central Europe and artifacts associated with it had sustained grievous and irreplaceable loss. In the ancient city of Trier, for example, the only historic structures left standing were the Roman ruins. The cathedral, the oldest Romanesque church in Germany, had taken a direct bomb hit and the bell had fallen through the tower. A church dating from the early Gothic period had also been badly damaged. About all that could be done with such buildings was to try to make them more or less watertight to prevent further damage. In structures so old anything inside was valuable and worth preserving. A particularly sad case was the old city of Muenster. Ninth Army MF&A's officer pronounced its epitaph:

it is little better than rubble with the towers of the medieval churches alone standing to mark what the city once was. All the fine fourteenth to eighteenth century buildings are gone.¹⁴³

MFA&A troops could be forgiven if they had an attitude something akin to despair when they surveyed their responsibilities in so much of Germany.

What had escaped the fighting was still not safe. Allied troops were often careless enough with Allied property and were not given to any undue solicitude for the possessions of the "krauts." Souvenir hunters and plain looters, and the understandable haste and carelessness of troops whose primary concern was to win the war as quickly as possible and go home, all caused severe damage, although, of course, nothing like

that wrought by bombing and shelling. In Aachen U.S. soldiers unceremoniously pulled out valuable carvings from the city hall and dumped them outside to deteriorate in the wet winter weather. American troops at Rimberg Castle scattered arts work and furniture about, throwing some of the more inconvenient objects into the moat and broke into locked rooms and rifled their contents. Castles were especially hard-hit. Because they were rarely bombed the Germans had filled them with valuables from the cities and towns for safekeeping. They made very attractive command posts and billets for officers and their rumored fabulous wine cellars encouraged even more troop interest. Artillerymen often could not resist throwing a few rounds at such prominent structures (which might, in truth, harbor an enemy observer in a crenellation). All of this, of course, was against Army regulations and the Rules of War; even tactical troops were to inventory historical artifacts and artwork and keep them under lock and key. The battle situation was fast-moving, however, and the soldiers had far more pressing concerns. SHAEF attempted to point out that much of what was dismissed as German was in reality looted Allied property which the Allies were pledged to restore, but one can wonder how many troops, particularly those at the hard edge of combat, ever got the message.¹⁴⁴ 3d Armored Division troopers favored "bull roasting" as their form of looting. A CA officer who remonstrated with the Assistant Division Commander on such an occasion --"But sir, I have a SHAEF directive....", was then told by the ADC "You can take that SHAEF directive and shove it up your----." In the end, Corps G-5 moved the offending division out of the area, but looting would grow even worse in the immediate post-war years.¹⁴⁵ Further, Furthermore, not a few Germans themselves were not above looting their own patrimony.¹⁴⁶

For all these vicissitudes, with their numbers never exceeding 9,000, ECAD during World War II in Europe controlled at one time or another no fewer than 80 million persons, nearly half of whom were enemy nationals, in seven countries. Yet resistance or "incidents" were almost completely absent amongst those eighty million, most of whom had been bombed, shelled, or dislocated, and who were hungry, cold or terrified as the iron harrow of modern war passed over them. Tens of thousands owed their lives to U.S. Army and Allied CA/MG troops.¹⁴⁷ No other military organization, at any time or in any place, can make a remotely similar claim.

The Pacific

The first large-scale use of Army Civil Affairs in the Pacific during World War II took place in the Philippine Islands. However, not until two weeks after his forces had come ashore did General MacArthur receive his first directive on the subject. The delay was a result of Washington bickering reminiscent of what had gone on earlier over the question of Military Government in Europe. The War and State Departments battled over who should administer Civil Affairs on the islands, but this time President Roosevelt finally came down early in favor of the War Department.

In the meantime the imperious South West Pacific Area (SWPA) commander devised his own policy. He was determined that planning for Philippine Civil Affairs included providing freedom and a standard of living at least comparable to that enjoyed in the islands under their Commonwealth Government before the Japanese occupation. It called for no elaborate G-5 general staff section, and Pacific Civil Affairs did not seem to suffer from it. Instead, MacArthur ordered that a Civil Affairs directorate be established in his headquarters and that such matters be assumed by Sixth Army during the combat phase of operations. That army's commander, General Walter Krueger, in turn, delegated Civil Affairs and Military Government to his two corps commanders. In addition SWPA GHQ attached eight Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAU) to Krueger's command.¹⁴⁸ Each PCAU consisted of 10 officers and 39 enlisted men. Some of the officers and nearly all of the enlisted men were Filipino and each included medical, police, legal, labor, engineer, supply and transport officers.¹⁴⁹

After landing, the PCAUs found that, unlike the situation in much of Europe, food was not a major problem. There seemed to be a fair supply of fruits and vegetables, coupled with the generosity of the average G.I. in sharing with the Filipinos his food and clothing. This benign situation, however, made it difficult to recruit Philippine civilian CA workers. Further, an absence of consumer goods meant that even if workers were recruited they would have little on which to spend their money. To deal with this problem the Army established something like general stores, offering such practical items as clothing, rice, biscuits, salmon and candles. Later relief supplies included some 19,900 tons of subsistence rations, 17 tons of engineer equipment, not to mention 21 tons of bicycles! It also set up a system of price controls and rationing.

PCAU No. 7's experiences were typical enough. The unit landed on Leyte under fire on 22 October 1944. It found that the main town it was initially to administer, Dulag, no longer existed; it had been leveled by naval bombardment and the ruins taken over by the U.S. Army as a base. Thus the first problem faced by the unit was the rehousing of the town's former inhabitants. A site was selected in Mayorga barrio and food and clothing stores enabled the unit to keep relief requirements to a minimum. Its personnel also set up a large sewing project to make clothing for the men, women and children hospitalized. By the time the unit was

ordered to redeploy to accompany the 77th Division on the Ormoc operation the inhabitants of what had been Dulag had at least a minimum of shelter, food, clothing and medical care.¹⁵⁰ When the combat phase had passed, PCAU teams appointed temporary local officials, after screening for collaborators. Once these local governments were established, Army Civil Affairs rarely interfered with their operations, unless required to do so by the military situation.¹⁵¹ There could be no doubt of the joy with which the civilian population welcomed the Americans and that welcome, plus the large numbers of Filipinos who could speak English, considerably eased the work of the PCAUs.

The refugee problem was one that did resemble the situation in Europe. By late October 1944, Sixth Army was caring for approximately 45,000 uprooted civilians, most of the population of 56 communities that had been in the path of the fighting. Unlike European refugees, however, almost all Filipinos could be returned to their homes immediately after the fighting had ended; there were no masses of people who could not or would not return home. Actually, the greatest civilian suffering was caused by the drawn-out fighting to take the capital city, Manila, fighting that left that metropolis the most battered in Asia with tens of thousands of trapped civilians dead and injured. Finally, the reinstated Philippine Government was determined to account and pay for all relief supplies provided by the United States Army or government. In July 1945, that is even before the Japanese surrender, relief supply was transferred from the army to the civil Foreign Economic Administration¹⁵²

Okinawa

Planning for the occupation of Okinawa revealed that the War Department lacked sufficient manpower to conduct Civil Affairs and Military Government by itself. Consequently a joint occupation was devised whereby the Army was to provide 183 officers, including one general officer, while the remaining necessary officers and all enlisted men would be supplied by the Navy, which was also to retain over-all control.

The Okinawa campaign was the only U.S. military operation of World War II in the Pacific which involved large numbers of possibly hostile civilians. The advanced Army MG contingent went ashore at Okinawa on the first day of the landings, 2 April 1945. Sixth Army had learned well the lessons of previous campaigns in various theaters and had carefully assembled specialized teams for the island. Six "A" teams accompanied the assault divisions to conduct preliminary reconnaissance and eight "B" teams were to be distributed one to each assault division and corps to organize MG behind the fighting fronts as civilians were uncovered. The 13 "C" teams were to organize refugee camps and the six "D" teams were to administer the six Military Government districts into which the island was to be divided when the fighting had ceased. In addition, MG headquarters was to have attached one military police battalion, one quartermaster truck company, twenty Navy G-10 medical dispensaries



Stunned, wounded Okinawan civilians, brought to an Army collecting station, await help, June 1945.
Signal Corps, National Archives

and six Navy G-6 hospitals.¹⁵³ No one could say that the Army had not prepared to deal with the civilian population of Okinawa.¹⁵⁴

The civilian backgrounds of Team B-10 members, assigned to the 27th Division, would certainly indicate that CA/MG troopers were anything but "culls". They were termed by their critics. The senior MG officer was a LTCDR graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, who had been a businessman in civil life. The Public Safety Officer had been a sales executive with a Washington, DC business, and the Industry and Economics Officer was a civilian specialist in the field of labor-management relations. The Legal and Supply Officer was a Kentucky lawyer with experience as a supply officer in the Army Service Forces. The Engineering Officer had served as a county engineer in Georgia and had an extensive background in construction, sewage and water purification. The Public Health Officer was a pediatrics specialist on leave from the New York City Public Health Department. His assistant was an engineer with extensive civil experience in road construction and mining engineering, and like the Engineering Officer, was skilled in sewage systems and water works operations. The Assistant Public Safety Officer was a biochemist in civilian life but had had military police experience in the Panama Canal Zone. All 15 enlisted men were noncommissioned officers in the Navy Reserve, while most of the enlisted men were either yeoman, hospital corpsmen or supply clerks. It would be difficult, even in theory, to imagine a more qualified unit.¹⁵⁵

MG headquarters did lack a sufficient number of interpreters, something it realized well before the invasion. Because of a War Department directive giving higher priority to the assignment of Americans of Japanese ancestry (*Nisei*) to G-2 language teams and as combat infantrymen, very few could be provided and of those the Navy supplied, some were found to be "virtually illiterate in two languages." Only a direct appeal to Washington produced 75 qualified interpreters, but only a few of these had an extensive knowledge of written Japanese.¹⁵⁶

As the teams entered the field they soon realized that there were few demands for the services of the legal, fiscal or public safety specialists or even of those in public health or civilian supply. Most of the work of the MG teams in the combat phase was more like disaster relief, as the island passed through a "typhoon of steel". The preparatory naval gunfire and aerial bombardment had inflicted very heavy casualties on the Okinawan civilians. Even food seemed in adequate supply, although much had been destroyed in the south as U.S. troops rounded up livestock for their own use or mindlessly jabbed rice sacks with their bayonets. MG teams organized special work crews to harvest the growing crops and round up remaining livestock. However, because the Japanese forces had drafted most Okinawan younger men as laborers, civilian workers were not easy to find.

Once the island had been secured, U.S. MG, in the absence of any Okinawan local government to deal with, found itself more involved in the direct administration of a territory than at any time so far in the war. Little, if anything, remained of Okinawan governmental, economic or commercial life. Even the MG-appointed native

honchos served more as foremen passing on MG directives and instructions, than as any form of local government.

No Pacific people suffered more at the hand of war than did the innocent Okinawans. Tens of thousands had died, killed in cross-fire, blasted to oblivion by bombing or artillery strikes or even shot down by the Japanese military while attempting to flee the battle zone. Practically everything above ground had been leveled. The capital city, Naha, no longer existed, something that could not be said even of Warsaw or Manila. The situation was so catastrophic that after the battle about 3,000 Okinawans were shipped off to Hawaii. Even after the island was militarily secured the misery of the Okinawans did not end, except for the fact that they were no longer being killed. Okinawa immediately afterward became the major base for the projected invasion of the Japanese home islands. For example, the small village of Sobe had survived the battle somewhat intact, but one month later it was gone, obliterated by a large U.S. Army gravel pit surrounded by a network of roads and crushed rock.¹⁵⁷ Under these circumstances the Okinawans had to remain in their camps for months, directly supported by U.S. Military Government.

For the only time in World War II, U.S. MG faced armed opposition. Remnants of the Japanese Army conducted organized guerrilla operations in northern Okinawa. Night assaults on U.S. Army headquarters and bivouacs and roadside ambushes killed or wounded an undetermined number of MG personnel. In response, all able-bodied Okinawans had to be confined in stockades for several months to prevent their being used by the guerrillas. Any Okinawan cooperating with MG was liable to a kangaroo court trial, torture and beheading as a "traitor" at the hands of the Japanese guerrillas. Further, MG personnel in the field, who were more likely than not to be the only U.S. troops in the area with the withdrawal of tactical forces, had to turn their headquarters into defensive positions, with barbed wire and trip-flares, and to arm themselves with automatic weapons and grenades, and thus could do much less to help the Okinawans.¹⁵⁸

The Japanese guerrillas were gradually exterminated or became discouraged and melted into the island's civilian population, and the island's survivors were able to return to their fields and what remained of their villages after the Japanese surrender. However, the island remained under direct Military Government. That Military Government was aided by an Okinawan Advisory Council of 15 men selected by the U.S. Deputy Commander on the recommendation of a nominating body of more than 1,000 prominent Okinawans. In 1946, the responsibility for such government passed back from the U.S. Navy to the Army and Okinawa was governed by a resident Major General and staff under the Commander in Chief U.S. Forces Far East (CINCFE), for the next five years.

As the Okinawan civil economy began to approach something akin to normality American Military Government established an indigenous government with limited authority under the jurisdiction of the military governor. In 1946 civilian courts were established and elections were held for mayors and councilmen two years later. For the

island's overall governance a nominating convention composed of village heads, members of the Advisory Council and a representative group of Okinawan leaders, named a three-man panel, from which a Okinawan Governor was selected by the Deputy Commander. U.S. Military Government made some amends for its destruction of Okinawan farmland when it plowed some 3,000 acres of land by late 1946 and imported 100 head of livestock monthly. The Military Government did restore the fishing industry to better than pre-war levels by the lease or donation of converted military craft. In fact, converted or adapted surplus military equipment probably did more to aid in Okinawan economic recovery than any aid program. Still, military demands, even after the surrender of Japan, severely cut into valuable agricultural land. In the best farming land, that in southern Okinawa, some one-third of the land remained alienated for military use.

Military Government, well aware of the threat of disease among the smashed infrastructure in the mild climate, embarked on a major health campaign, digging no less than 10,000 latrines and establishing 210 medical dispensaries. As early as July 1946, elementary school enrollment reached the pre-war level and an island-wide newspaper was established. In May of that year Military Government had re-established a money economy, although that government had to continue to pour in foodstuffs and materials and to impose a controlled economy in order to keep Okinawan commerce functioning even at a barter level.¹⁵⁹

In 1950 Military Government operational activities were assumed by the newly-established U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), which still reported to CINCFE, who continued as military governor of the islands. The Ryukyus achieved almost complete local self-government with the establishment in 1952 of a one-house legislative assembly elected through universal suffrage. Still, a vestige of military control remained, with the military governor retaining a veto over any Okinawan assembly law. Finally, in 1957, the Office of High Commissioner replaced the Office of the Military Governor, and the longest-lasting American military and civil government of any territory captured by U.S. military forces in World War II came to an end.

World-wide, the Allies, at great cost, had been triumphant against evil forces. Nonetheless, the question remained as to the disposition of the aggressor nations and their allies. The bitter legacy of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany after World War I and of Germany's terrifying rebirth in Nazi blood and fire less than two decades later, as well as Japan's aggressive rampage in the later 1930s and early 1940s were not encouraging precedents.

¹Marshall to Hilldring, 1 March 1943, quoted in Paul W. Gulgowski, *The American Military Government of United States Occupied Zones of Post World War II Germany in Relation to Policies Expressed by its Civilian Government Authorities at Home, During the Course of 1944/45 Through 1949*. (Frankfurt a.m.: 1983), 81.

²Harry A. Smith, *Military Government* (Fort Leavenworth: 1920).

³Office of the Chief of Military History, "An Introduction to American Military Government-Civil Affairs in World War II," compiled by Edgar Erickson (n.p., n.d.), 124a. This massive, well-documented, unedited work remains a basic source for the organization and administration of CA/MG in World War II. Copies in USASOC History Archives and the U.S. Army Center of Military History Archives.

⁴*Ibid.*, 125.

⁵*Military Aid*, 57.

⁶Edwin J. Hayward, Harry Coles, *et al*, "History of the Civil Affairs Division War Department Special Staff World War II to March 1946," typescript, vol. 1, n.d., pp. 1-24.

⁷Earl F. Ziemke, "Military Government: Two Approaches, Russian and American," in Russell F. Weigley, ed., *New Dimensions in Military History* (San Rafael, California: 1975), 291.

⁸*Ibid.*, "Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty," *Military Affairs* (December 1972), 132; Boyd Dastrup, *Crusade in Nuremberg: Military Occupation, 1945-1949* (Westport, etc.: 1985), 7.

⁹*Military Government and Civil Affairs* (30 July 1940, revised 22 December 1943), quotation, 5.

¹⁰The "Hunt Report" on the American Army's Military Government in the Rhineland immediately after the end of World War I apparently was used as a guide by Army planners before and during the early months of World War II. COL F. Van Wyck Mason, "The Education and Training of Allied Officers for Duty With Civil Affairs, Military Government, European Theatre of Operations, September 1941-July 1945," SHAEF G-5, RG 331, entry 54, Information Branch, Historical Section, box no. 214, folder no. 60.

¹¹U.S. Army General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, G-5 Section, "Civil Affairs and Military Government Organizations and Operations." [1945?], 11.

¹²This obvious point was not brought out until the "Conference of Scholars on the Administration of Occupied Areas - 1943-1955," Harry S Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs (Independence: 1970), 8.

¹³Mason, 4-10; MAJ J. Counsell, "The Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee," 1, typescript, SHAEF G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, RG 331, entry 54, box 211, folder 6; LT Connos (? , semi-illegible signature), "Historical Record, Civil Affairs Section, ETOUSA," typescript, *ibid.*, 1 See also "The Military

Government Training Program., September 1945. typescript. Library of Congress, no pagination.

¹⁴For documentation of the creation of this school, see *ibid.* See also Statement of COL Jesse I. Miller, Director of the Military Government Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, 21 January 1944, *Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs House of Representatives*, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., part 2 (Washington: 1944).

¹⁵The MG curriculums for Charlottesville and the CATs are found in Provost Marshal General, "History of Military Government Training." See *ibid.*, "Evaluation of the Product," for evaluation of CA officers' quality. The Charlottesville school's curriculum is extensively documented in USASOC History Archives and in Provost Marshal General's Bureau, "History of Military Government Training."

¹⁶Stimson diary entry for 27 August 1942, in Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: 1948), 553.

¹⁷H. C. Mansfield, H. Stein, in W. Miller (ed.), *Arms and the State* (New York: 1958), 124.

¹⁸Ziemke, "Military Government: Two Approaches," 294. General Eisenhower believed that the controversy was more over the fear that once the Army had established MG in Europe it would prove reluctant to let go. Remarks of Eisenhower before European Civil Affairs Division and SHAEF personnel, 9 May 1944, quoted in Paul W. Gulgowski, *The American Military Government of United States Occupied Zones of Post World War II Germany in Relation to Policies Expressed by its Civilian Government Authorities at Home, During the Course of 1944/45 Through 1949.* (Frankfurt a.m.: 1983), 61-62, 95. For FDR's attitude on the matter see Dan Charles Allen, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Development of an American Occupation Policy in Europe," Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1976.

¹⁹See, for example, Hiram Motherwell, "Military Occupation and Then What...?" *Harpers Magazine* (October 1943).

²⁰Ziemke, "Improvising Stability, 132.

²¹BG C. P. Stearns, "Civil Affairs Activities of ETOUSA," typescript copy in USASOC History Archives.

²²Ziemke, 132; Daugherty and Andrews, 209-211. There is some evidence that because the initial negotiations with Darlan were in the hands of a State Department representative (Mr. Robert Murphy), the argument for civil control of MG was appreciably weakened. But, to be fair, it should also be noted that Admiral Darlan did fulfill his end of the bargain., Gulgowski, 68-71.

²³*Ibid.*, 79-80; Daugherty and Andrews, 212.

²⁴Dwight Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: 1948), 137.

²⁵Stimson and Bundy, 555, 558-559.

²⁶Ziemke, "Military Government: Two Approaches," 295.

²⁷MG Hilldring, while an infantry division commander, had just suffered a heart attack, and was thus in line for a job in Washington. He had no particular qualifications in CA or MG., Gulgowski, 81; William R. Swarm, "Impact of the Proconsular Experience on Civil Affairs Organization and Doctrine," in Wolfe, ed., 400; LT Connos [semi-legible signature], "Civil Affairs Section, "European Theater of Operations, United States Army," n.d. (preliminary draft, 1 November 1944), SHAEF Information Branch, Historical Section, RG 331, entry 54, box 211, folder 60; Counsell, n.p.

²⁸Marshall to Hilldring, 1 March 1943, quoted in Gulgowski, 81. Hilldring's second-in-command BG Ernest Gross, asserted that his chief had contributed little to policy decisions, leaving field commanders to their own devices. General Hilldring himself informed LTG Patch (7th Army commander) that nothing was farther from his mind "than to cause trouble or irritation, no matter how slight, to anyone," *ibid.*, 84-85. The real "strong man" of the CAD may well have been the President's son-in-law, John Boettinger. *Ibid.*, 86.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 84-85.

³⁰*Ibid.*, n.p; PFC George N. Wosk, Historic Section, Past Affairs, ETOUSA, "G-5, Civil Affairs, ETOUSA" (July 1944), 1-2.

³¹Provost Marshal General's Bureau, "History of Military Government Training," "Evaluation of Product," 6.

³²C. R. S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945*. HMSO (London: 1957), 26. The popular jibe at the time was that the initials stood for "Aged Military Gentlemen on Tour."

³³*Ibid.*, 25-26; War Department Civil Affairs Division, "Allied Military Government in Sicily," *Military Review* (April 1951).

³⁴George C. Benson and Maurice Neufeld, "American Military Government in Italy," in Holborn, ed., 115. The authoritative Malcolm MacLean, a MG commander, is considerably more negative on the qualities of the *Carabinieri*, "Adventures in Occupied Areas," typescript (July 1975), Hoover Institution Archives, box No. 1, page 50 and passim; Harris, 14-16; passim; Henry M. Adams, "Allied Military Government in Sicily, 1943," *Military Affairs* (Fall 1951), (quotation, 158).

³⁵*Ibid.*, 27-28.

³⁶Benson and Neufeld, 117-118.

³⁷Field Report No. 13, LTCMDR M. S. MacLean, "Subject: Functions, Duties and activities of Military Government and Civil Affairs officers during the initial attack phase of invasion and occupation" (n.d.), USASOC History Archives; School of Military Government (?), *Case Studies on Field Operations of Military Government Units in World War II* (Fort Gordon (?): n.d.), 231-246; and *ibid.*, *Military Government With Combat Troops*, Special Text ST 41-177 (Fort Gordon: December 1967 rev.), .

³⁸Situation Report, Major Francis M. Wray, 5 June 1944, to SACO, AMG HQ 5 Army (Field), Subject: "Situation Report," in *Military Government With Combat Troops*, 93. (5 June was also the day Rome fell to the Allies.)

³⁹*Military Government With Combat Troops*, 15-23, quotation p. 23. Just before the invasion of the Italian mainland the term AMGOT was dropped in favor of "Allied Military Government" when it was realized that the former term in Turkish "did not have a genteel meaning." Nonetheless, the previous term persisted, *ibid.*, 24; Benson and Howe, 65.

⁴⁰"Lieutenant X, "Notes from Memory on the Sicilian Campaign," n.d., USASOC History Archives, n.d. Lieutenant X was identified as born in China to a Polish father and English mother, educated in Germany, who spoke German, Spanish and French., *ibid.*

⁴¹Toscani Memoirs, typescript (December 1983), 19-21. (Copy in USASOC History Archives). The writer, John Hersey, wrote up the incident in his Pulitzer-Prize winning, best selling novel, Broadway play and film, *A Bell for Adamo*.

⁴²MacLean, 48.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 55.

⁴⁴"Military Government With Combat Troops," 49.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 53, 55. This conclusion did not stint the creativity of this particular MG officer. At the beginning of another civilian evacuation, he stopped all empty military trucks returning to the rear for supplies, and loaded them with refugees, with directions to unload them at the nearest designated refugee relocation areas., *ibid.*, 87.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 54.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 54, 81; Benson and Neufeld (food quotation), 137.

⁴⁸MacLean, 46.

⁴⁹Report of the Economic Section, ACC, Chapter IV, Food," September 1944, in "Cases and Materials on Military Government" (n.p., n.d.), USASOC History Archives.

⁵⁰MacLean, 50.

⁵¹For example, see *ibid.*, 53. The subject is hardly touched upon in official accounts. For Italian MG courts, see Campbell, "Some Legal Problems Arising Out of the Establishment of Allied Military government Courts in Italy, *International Law Quarterly*, No. 191, 1947.

⁵²Benson and Neufeld, 124-125 (quotation); *Military Government With Combat Troops*, 73, 79, 80, 99-100.

⁵³*Military Government With Combat Troops*, 96, 121-122. (quotation). For this aspect of MG in Northern Italy, see Toscani memoirs and Army Service Forces Manual draft[?] "Military Government in Italy," n.d., n.p.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 97-98. MAJ Wray praised partisan officers' "fine control of the men", their "splendid attitude and understanding of the situation....", *ibid.*, 121.

^{55c} "Military Government With Combat Troops," 138. See also AMGOT, *Notes on the History, Art, and Monuments of Sicily* (Palermo: 1 November 1943).

⁵⁶ Bowman Papers, passim. It could be argued that, aside from its people's native genius, architecture is Italy's only significant resource.

⁵⁷ Headquarters Allied Commission Subcommittee for Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives, "Final Report" (n.p.: 1 January 1946), 7. For some of the results of the attempts of MFA&A to limit damage to Italian monuments and art, see HQ AAI, "Preservation of Property of Historical or Educational Importance in Italy," 30 March 1944. USASOC History Archives. See also letter from Deputy Chief of Civil Affairs, BG Frank McSherry to LTG Walter B. Smith 28 May 1944, detailing an enormous amount of looting by Allied troops., McSherry Papers, "Col Newton" folder. Quotation in MacLean, 96.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁹ AFHQ, MFA&A, *Report*, 33.

⁶⁰ Benson and Neufeld, 140-147; ACC, Report of the Economic Section, Allied Control Commission, Chapter IV, Food, September 1944, in "Cases and Materials on Military Government" (n.p., n.d.), USASOC History Archives.

⁶¹ Slover, "History of Military Government," 5-6; George C. Benson and Mark DeWolf Howe, "Military Government Organizational Relationships, in Holborn, 61; Oravetz and Nobleman, oral interview, 10-11; BG C. P. Stearns, [Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, SHAEF] "Civil Affairs Activities of ETOUSA," typescript copy in USASOC History Archives.

⁶² FM 27-5, 15.

⁶³ Leslie I. Poste, "The Development of U.S. Protection of Libraries and Archives in Europe during World War II," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1958, Chapt. x, p. 3.

⁶⁴ SHAEF G-5, Public Relations Branch, "Remarks Made by General Eisenhower Before CAD and SHAEF officers Personnel 9 May 1944 at Civil Affairs Center, APO 645," copy in McSherry Papers, box 16, "General Eisenhower Visit to Shrivenham" folder; Wosk, 1-2, 6-7; James E. Mrazek, "The Fifth Staff Officer," *Military Review* (March 1957), 48; quotation from Forrest C. Pogue, *The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command*, Office of the Chief of Military History (Washington: 1954), 84; Slover, "History of Military Government in ETO," 2, 4.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 219.

⁶⁶ SHAEF G-5, memo for the record, subject: "Negotiations with the French," December 1944, RG 331, entry 54, SHAEF G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, monographs, box No. 214, "monographs and sketches" folder.

⁶⁷ Hughes, 167.

⁶⁸ Wosk, 19-20; J. Strom Thurmond, "Military Government with the Airborne Command, *Military Government Journal* (August 1948).

⁶⁹Wosk, 19-21; Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, "Allied Civil Affairs Administration in Liberated France," report No. 2375, 21 July 1944, passim. See also ECAD G-5, "Lessons Learnt [stet.], 15 August - 15 October 1944, n.d., RG 332, Adm. File ETO entry, box 119, folder 494B; General Board, E.T.O., Report No. 33, "Civil Affairs and Military Government Procedures - Indigenous Civil Administration" (Washington: n.d.), 38; Hon. Strom Thurmond, oral interview with Dr. D. Hogan, 11 August, pt. 1, page 4. "CA Soldier-Statesman Recalls D-Day Duty with 82d Airborne", *Civil Affairs Journal and Newsletter* (May-June 1994).

⁷⁰Report, MAJ F. Simpich and BG Frank McSherry, to SHAEF G-5, 20 June 1944, McSherry Papers, "Lessons Learned" folder.

⁷¹*First United States Army Report of Operations, 20 October 1943 1 August 1944*, Annex No. 7, G-5 Section. (n.d., n.p.), 152.

⁷²Third U.S. Army, G-5 Historian, "Historical Records," 1 August - 15 August 1944. RG 332, Admin. File, ETO, box 119, folder 494b. "Diverse" German stocks and Brest collaborators in *ibid.*, and Merritt Y. Hughes, "Civil Affairs in France," in Holborn, 150; Resistance recruitment, *ibid.*, 149; report for 16-31 August 1944; kitchens, etc., in cable from Eisenhower to AGWAR, Summary of CA Field Operations for Period Ending 1200 - 5 Aug '44, *ibid.*, 2. Seized *Wehrmacht* horses were also being loaned to French farmers., *ibid.*, cable of 30 June 1944; quotation from General Board, E.T.O., Report No. 33, "Civil Affairs and Military Government Procedures- Indigenous Civil Administration." Washington?, n.d., 54. See *ibid.*, for captured German equipment and supplies, 114-116.

⁷³SHAEF G-5, "Civil Affairs Summary for Week ending 25 November 1945," McSherry Papers, box 81, "SHAEF Weekly Report" folder.

⁷⁴Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Division, "Field Operations of Military Government Units," (Washington: January 1949), 3-13. (Why the Public Safety Officer was called instead of MPs is unclear from the record.)

⁷⁵CA Detachment D1G1, memo, "Health and Sanitation Report," 26 August 1944, RG 332, ECAD, box 2, folder "Press releases."; "Field Operations," 50.

⁷⁶Cable S-56925 from SHAEF to AGWAR, "Summary of CA field operations for period ending 1200 - 5 Aug '44, 1, RG 332, Adm File ETO entry, box 119, folder 494B.

⁷⁷Eisenhower, cable S-56925 from SHAEF to AGWAR, Summary of CA field operations for period ending 1200 - 5 Aug '44, RG 332, "Admin File ETO" entry, box 119, 449B folder.

⁷⁸"Report on Fine Arts and Archives, Arles, Avignon and Vicinity," 18 September 1944," RG 407, entry 427, box 2673, 107-5 folder.

⁷⁹Third U.S. Army G-5, "Report of the Historian Third United States Army, G-5, 16 - 31 August 1944, 2, RG 332, "Administrative File ETO" entry, box 119, folder 494B.

⁸⁰ MAJ D. Robinson, SHAEF G-5, memo, subject: "History of Civil Affairs in Southern France under AFHQ Control.", n. d., RG 331, entry 54, SHAEF, G-5, passim.

⁸¹On FFI excesses and "star-chamber" executions, see conference between MG Robert Frederick, commander of the 1st Airborne Task Force, and M. Escande, Prefect of Department of Alpes Maritimes, 2 September 1944, in which General Frederick warned that "he did not wish to be forced to call in the military to keep order", "History of Civil Affairs Operations in Southern France under AFHQ Control," typescript, 2 September 1944, SHAEF G-5, RG 331, entry 54, Information Branch, Historical Section, box 213, folder 60; "Civil Affairs and Military Government Procedures," 45.

⁸²SHAEF G-5, "Weekly Civil Affairs Summary for" week ending 6 January 1945, ETO Historical Division, Administrative File, RG 332, Administrative File, box 14, p. 5. See also Slover, "History of MG," 7-10.

⁸³Hughes, 155-156. See also Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Division, "Field Operations of Military Government Units" (Washington: January 1949), 17-23.

⁸⁴"Field Operations," 52.

⁸⁵95th ID G-5, Report for October 1944, RG 407, entry 427, box 13310, folder 395-5.2. Stiffer sentences by French courts also helped to end the sale of Army rations and petrol on the black market., Hughes, 151.

⁸⁶C. P. Stearns, "Report of Civil Affairs Activities in ETOUSA (From D-Day to 30 June 1945), Hq., Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations (n. p., n. d.), 26, RG 94, Entry 368, box 1658, "Report of CA in ETOUSA" folder.

⁸⁷Hughes, 161-165; HQ, 12th U.S. Army, G-5 Narrative Summary for the Month of February 1945, (8 March 1945) RG 407, entry 427, box 1780, folder 99-12.5.06.

⁸⁸Stearns, "Report of Civil Affairs," 23-24. No less than 3,516 vehicles were turned over to the French, exclusive of captured German Army vehicles and U.S. Army trucks., *ibid.*, 24.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 28-29.

⁹⁰Marshall Knappen, *And Call it Peace* (Chicago: 1947), 61-62.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 15.

⁹²Golgowski, 64-65 (for Charlottesville); Earl F. Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," in Wolfe, 87.

⁹³Mason, "Training," 80-93.

⁹⁴SHAEF G-5, *Weekly Civil Affairs Summary* for week ending 30 December 1944, ETO Historical Division, RG 332, Administrative File, box 14. See also Hughes, 157; "Civil Affairs and Military Government Procedures," 60-61.

⁹⁵Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 56; "Field Operations," 64-66.

⁹⁶Robert H. Slover, "Military Government in a Defensive Operation," *Armored Cavalry Journal* (May-June 1950); *ibid.*, "History of MG," 17-18; *Case Studies on Field Operations of Military Government Units in World War II*, Camp Gordon (?). n. d.

⁹⁷*The New York Times*, 6 December 1981.

⁹⁸95th ID G-5 Journal, December 1944, RG 407, entry 427, box 13910, folder 395-5.2.

⁹⁹HQ 99th Infantry Division, Military Government Section, *Journal*, FROM: 0001 Hrs 16 February 45, TO: 2400 Hrs 16 Feb 45" (Text of report begins with "Report of Yesterday."), RG 407, entry 427, box 14162, folder 399-12.

¹⁰⁰12th Army Group G-5, Narrative Summary for February 1945, *ibid.*, box 1780, folder 99-12. 5.06.

¹⁰¹"HQ Third U.S. Army, Historical Report for January 1945, n. p., RG 331, entry 54, SHAEF G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, Box 281, folder 204.

¹⁰²HQ Third U.S. Army Historical Report for January 1945," n. p., SHAEF G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, RG 331, entry 54, box 281, folder 204. For Belgian CA see "Civil Affairs and Military Government Procedures, 54-60.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, for period ending 3 March 1945, 7; J. MAJ H. Palfrey, Public Safety Officer, Det A1A1, 14 August 1944, in "Cases & Materials on Military Government.", training material, n. p., n. d., USASOC History Archives.

¹⁰⁴"Field Reports," 62.

¹⁰⁵12th U.S. Army Group, G-5, "Narrative Summary for month February 1945," *Ibid.*, box 1780, folder 99-12.5.06.

¹⁰⁶SHAEF G-5 "Civil Affairs Summary for Week Ending 25 November 1945," McSherry Papers, box No. 81, "Weekly Reports" folder.

¹⁰⁷E. F. Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," in Wolfe, 52-53.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁰⁹SHAEF. *Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender* (London?: December 1944, rev. ed. April 1945). Martin, 195-196. The *Handbook's* tardy arrival was likely due to SHAEF and War Department disagreements between a "soft" occupation and the application of the rigors of the Morgenthau Plan., *ibid.*, 197.

¹¹⁰Gulgowski, 122. For pre-surrender Military Government of Germany, see "Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare," No. 23, pt. 1, "German Home Front," 3 March 1945, McSherry Papers, box 18, "policy" folder.

¹¹¹BG Frank J. McSherry, Analysis Sheet 30 December 1944, subject "Supply," RG 331, entry 54, SHAEF G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, box No. 196, folder 25.

¹¹²Slover, "History of MG," 11.

¹¹³"Notes on Visit to First U.S. Army," filed in folder "204 Twelfth U.S. Army Group -- Field Reports," n.d., SHAEF G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, RG 331, entry 54, box 281, folder 204. See also 12th Army Group, "Civil Affairs and Military Government Summary No. 262, 23 February 1945, 12 AG-G5, RG 407, Entry 427, box 1780, folder 99-12.5.06. For a detailed account of MG in the Aachen area, see Journal of Det H7H2, December 1944- January 1945, RG 332, ECAD, 1944-1945, box 54, "Detachment H7H2" folder. See also "Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare," No. 23, pt. 1, German Home Front, 3 March 1945, McSherry Papers, box 18, "policy" folder.

¹¹⁴SHAEF G-5, "Civil Affairs/Military Government Weekly Field Report for Week Ending 21 April 1945," (n.p., 21 April 1945, 11.

¹¹⁵Quoted in Galgowski, 59, among others.

¹¹⁶Henry M. Adams, "Operations of an American Military Government Detachment in the Saar, 1944-45," *Military Affairs* (fall, 1955), 132; "Field Operations," 70-71. A detailed account of an MG unit in a typical, albeit fictitiously-named, German city is in CPT N. Vinson, "Official History of the Second Military Government Regiment," typescript, (n.p., n.d.), 17-32. For early U.S. Army MG in Germany, see Gulgowski, 134-135; and BG (Ret.) T. Metaxas, oral interview with author, 14 March 1997.

¹¹⁷HQ 12th Army Group, memo, "Government Affairs in Area Stolberg, Kornelimunster, Breinig, 2 October 1944." SHAEF G-5, Information Branch, Historical Section, RG 331, entry 54, folder 204; 12th Army Group, "Civil Affairs and Military Government Summary No. 262, 23 February 1945, 12 AG-G-5, RG 407, entry 427, box 1780, folder 99-12.5-06. A post-war survey concluded that most former MG officers felt that the wartime purge of former Nazi officials was confused, and although there was little overt opposition from Germans, there was considerable of the passive variety as well as a "lack of understanding." They also felt that the "big shots" more often than not escaped with trifling punishment. In the eyes of many Germans, the purge was merely punitive, the "ins" vs. the "outs." But in the long-run these officers believed that the purge brought to the fore new and constructive leadership, even though economic recovery was delayed as competent managers and entrepreneurs were removed from key positions. George Fitzpatrick, et al *A Survey of the Experience and Opinions of U.S. Military Government Officers in World War II* (Baltimore: September 1956), passim. An account of early denazification, with numerous examples, is found in "Civil Affairs and Military Government Procedures," 68-89.

¹¹⁸SHAEF G-5, *Weekly Civil Affairs Summary*, for week ending 30 December 1944, ETO Historical Division, Administrative File, RG 332, box 14, p. 21; 95 ID G-5 report for March 1945, RG 94, entry 427, box 13910, folder 395.5; SHAEF G-5 *Civil Affairs Summary* for week ending 5 March 1945, 13, 15, *ibid*.

¹¹⁹For the official outline of U.S. Army Military Courts see Eli Nobleman, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, *American Military Government Courts in Germany*, June 1950,

41-10-52. George S. Wilson, "The World War II Military Government Court in Germany," Master of Laws diss., Indiana University (1955), passim; "rough and tumble" quotation from J. Simpich, "Americans Help Liberated Europe Live Again," *National Geographic* (January-June 1945); C. Clark and B. Goodman, "American Justice in Occupied Germany: U.S. Military Government Courts," *American Bar Association Journal* (June 1950); C. Fahy, "The Lawyer in Military Government (Germany)," *Proceedings of the American Bar Association* No. 29; J. Slover, "Military Government -- Where Do We Stand Today?," *Annals* (January 1950); C. Wickersham, "Address," *American Bar Association Journal* (October 1943); J. Kraus, "Law and Administration in Military Occupation," *Michigan Law Review* (February 1945).

¹²⁰94th ID report, in 12th Army Group G-5 report for December 1944, RG 407, entry 427, box 1780, folder 99/12-5.6. Another MG detachment displayed similar inventiveness when they discovered that the local butcher shop in the town of Ahn was also the local gathering place. A German-speaking CA trooper, hanging about the establishment, soon picked up valuable intelligence, including the fact that a local civilian was spreading tacks on the roads to puncture the tires of U.S. military vehicles., Oravetz and Nobleman, oral interview, 26.

¹²¹"Field Operations," 72-73.

¹²²12th U.S. Army Group, G-5 report, number 180 for December 1944, RG 407, entry, 427, box 1780, p. 1, folder 99/12-5.6.

¹²³SHAEF, G-5, *Weekly Civil Affairs Summary*, for week ending 13 January 1945, RG 332, adm. file ETO, box 14, p. 25. These not at all untypical examples make nonsense of the contention of one authority on the occupation that "the Army assumed no direct responsibility for their [i.e., the Germans'] welfare.", Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 57.

¹²⁴Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washington: 1975), 142; Robert Engler, "The Individual Soldier and the Occupation," *Annals* (January 1950); Joseph R. Starr, *Fraternization With the Germans in World War II*, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command (Frankfurt: 1947).

¹²⁵Julian Bach, *America's Germany* (New York: 1946), 263.

¹²⁶Zink, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 200. The Germans, of course, tended to argue just the opposite of General Smith's quotation. See also Adams, "Operations of American Military Government Detachment," 132.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, 147, 156.

¹²⁸*U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 192-193; 12th Army Group, Civil Affairs and Military Government Summary No. 265, 26 February 1945, 12 AG-G5, RG 407, Entry 427, box 1780, folder 99-12.5.06. If the Army MG in the field had no recollection of the Rhineland occupation, the same was not true at least of a group of

German farm laborers near Trier. In April 1945 they reportedly refused to work, stating that "there is no need to work since Americans will feed them as they did following the 1918 surrender!", SHAEF G-5, *Civil Affairs/Military Government Weekly Field Report, for week ending 28 April 1945* (n.p., 28 April 1945), 4.

¹²⁹Report of Det F1B9, NARA RG 338, ECAD, box 54.

¹³⁰SHAEF G-5 Weekly Report for week ending 5 May 1945, 23.

¹³¹HQ, ETO, memo, "Liberated Citizens of the Soviet Union," 8 April 1945, RG 332, ECAD records, box 48, "detachment 20" folder. Ziemke remarks that the Polish and Soviet governments were "not prepared to receive them [their citizens] but more than ready, particularly in the part of the Soviet Union, to complain about shortcomings in their treatment," Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 57. Actually, the problem was that although the Soviet authorities were more than willing to receive their POWs, former slave laborers, etc., many of them did not wish to be received.

¹³²Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 57; Gulgowski, 127-128.

¹³³SHAEF, memo, "Refugees and Displaced Persons," 4 June 1944, Germany (Territory under Allied occupation, 1945-1955; General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, *Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Recovered Allied Military Personnel*, Study No. 35 (Washington? n.d.); U.S. Zone, Office for the Military Government of Bavaria), Kreis Traunstein. Records, 1945-1948, box No. 1, "Displaced Persons" folder, Hoover Institution Archives. (ibid. for actual Allied Expeditionary Force) "DP Index Card" and "DP Registration Record."

¹³⁴Slover, "History of MG," 13.

¹³⁵See SHAEF G-5 Weekly Reports for April-May 1945.

¹³⁶Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 59.

¹³⁷Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 245. See also ibid., 252-253, for liberation of Dachau, and SHAEF G-5, "Report on Inspection of German Concentration Camp at Buckenwald [sic], 25 April 1945, McSherry papers, box No. 17, "Lessons Learned" folder..

¹³⁸Ziemke, *U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany*, 254.

¹³⁹Oravetz and Nobleman, oral interview, 37.

¹⁴⁰"Field Operations," 75. For an contemporary account of early MG German operations in the pseudonymous town of "Bergstadt" see Second Military Government Regiment, *Official History of the Second Military Government Regiment* (n.p., n.d.).

¹⁴¹Joseph R. Starr, *U.S. Military Government in Germany: Operations During the Rhineland Campaign*, Historical Division, European Command (Karlsruhe: 1950, reprinted as Training Packet No. 56, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia, n.d.), 122-123. See also Gulgowski, 129-131.

¹⁴²"Operations from Late March to Mid-July 1945," 74.

¹⁴³Zink, 197-198.

¹⁴⁴Ziemke, 198-200. The MFA&A officer of First U.S. Army reported that treasures were the least safe in "country houses and public buildings....those in castles seem to be the least secure," quoted in "Operations from Late March to Mid-July 1945," 71. In the category of looted art from Allied countries was the Siegen collection, which was found upon closer examination to contain treasures from the Cathedral of Metz, France., *ibid.*, 72. The Army Board, United States Forces, European Theater, spoke of "much looting by troops in forward areas," as well as admitting to "a spiral increase of crimes of rape by occupying troops," Judge Advocate Section, Study No. 86, "War Crimes and Punishment of War Criminals" (n.d.), 6.

¹⁴⁵Oravetz and Nobleman, oral interview, 35-36.

¹⁴⁶In fact, Germans on occasion actually intervened to prevent resistance to U.S. MG. An attempt to blow up the Hermann Goring Werke "was prevented by anti-Nazi mine employees.", SHAEF G-5 Weekly Report for week ending 5 May 1945, 8. The loyalty of German police has already been noted above.

¹⁴⁷12th U.S. Army, *G-5 Section, 12th Army Group, Report of Operations (Final After Action Report)*, vol. 7, (n.p.), 7. Of those 80 million, some 4.2 million were actually serviced by U.S. Army CA and MG. James E. Mrazek, "The Fifth Staff Officer," *Military Review* (March 1957), 47.

¹⁴⁸M. Hamlin Cannon, *The War in the Pacific: Leyte, the Return to the Philippines*, Office of the Chief of Military History (Washington: 1954), 198-199; "History of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, World War II to March 1946," 3-4; X Corps. "History of Civil Affairs Section - Leyte-Samar Campaign." transcript (1945); General Headquarters United States Army Forces, Pacific, Civil Affairs Section. "Philippine Civil Affairs." (Manila ?). 25 August 1945. Center of Military History. It is undoubtedly significant that the official U.S. Army Forces, Pacific "Report of Philippine Civil Affairs," by the Chief of USAFP CA Section, the sycophantic BG Courtney Whitney opens paragraph No. 2 with "Your policy in Civil Affairs,....", Philippines U5 A7 F697P, Hoover Institution Archives.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 31; Walter Krueger, *From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army* (Washington: 1953), 153. The number of enlisted men per officers in PCAU units was more than twice that in other wartime theaters. This was due to the undeveloped nature of much of the Philippine archipelago, the need to provide more labor in transporting relief supplies and the necessity to be self-sustaining and to provide their own protection, "History of the Civil Affairs Division," 9.

¹⁵⁰"Report on Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 7 From September 1944 to January 1945," in "Field Operations," 207.

¹⁵¹Cannon, 200; "History of the Civil Affairs Division," 19; "The Philippine Civil Affairs Program," in "The Philippine Campaign, 1944-1945," typescript, U.S. Army Center of Military History, GEO V, Philippines, *passim*.

¹⁵²“History of the Civil Affairs Division,” 19. See also DA, Civil Affairs Division, *Field Operations of Military Government Units* (January 1949), 198-217.

¹⁵³Daugherty and Andrews, 374-375.

¹⁵⁴The commander of the MG detachment on Okinawa obviously did not get along with the commander of U.S. Army forces on Okinawa, LTG Simon Bolivar Buckner. He claimed that General Buckner had no use of MG, and, in fact, while being briefed on the subject, “All the while he sneered or kept his mouth shut.” Bitterly, and quite erroneously, this MG officer asserted that Buckner “Killed himself later on Okinawa.” (For the record, Buckner was killed by Japanese shell fire.), MacLean, 104-105.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 377.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 375-376.

¹⁵⁷David D. Karasaki, “Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction,” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* (May 1948); “Field Operations,” 167-194.

¹⁵⁸“Operations of Military Government in the Ryukyus,” in Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Division, *Field Operations of Military Government Units* (January, 1949).

¹⁵⁹Karasaki, *passim*.

IX

POST-WORLD WAR II OCCUPATIONS

Germany

"What Germans don't know would fill a book. What Germans think they know would fill another."

On V-E Day, the "carpet" of U.S. Army MG units stretched across the Rhineland and the Ruhr into central Germany, into Czechoslovakia and south into Austria. The question now was how to convert these mobile units into a system of U.S. Military Government that would compel a truncated Germany to keep the peace. The aftermath of World War I had been very much in the minds of the Allies well before the end of World War II. The Western Allies and the Soviets alike initially shared a determination that the aggressor nations should be punished, their war-making power irrevocably destroyed, their lands occupied, their leaders and their war criminals punished and their economies worked to provide reparations. As a result, the central German government was to be dissolved. This was unprecedented: all previous U.S. occupations and those to come relied heavily on local, indigenous, government officials and administrators, with only the worst types being removed. Such "indirect rule" has always been considered the most efficient method of MG, but the Nazis had proved so loathsome that there was little debate over their removal, imprisonment, even execution. Further, the Allied occupations were to see to it that Germany no longer would pose a threat to world peace.¹

The primary means of achieving these goals was to be the military occupation and governing of the aggressor nations. The Germans and the Japanese (and to a lesser extent, the Austrians and the Koreans) were not only to be pacified, but their schools, their media and their economy, their very social relations, were to be "democratized," whether they wanted to be or not. (Even the Soviets agreed, at least in principle, to this stipulation.) For the Germans, this was "Year Zero": all things were to begin anew.

One veteran authority has claimed that the simultaneous occupations of Germany, Japan and Austria, as well as of Korea and several Pacific islands was the largest and most important administrative task in US. history.² Precedent for such long-term, breathtaking, vision could only be found in the Military Government of the Reconstruction South, hardly an encouraging analogy. The U.S. Army's German Rhineland occupation sought merely obedience and good order, as did General Scott's in Mexico. Even the military occupations of the Philippine Islands and Puerto Rico, while making economic and educational improvements, specifically refrained, more or less, for better or for worse, from interfering with existing social relations. However, by 1947 another authority could claim that Military Government, in addition to restoring law, order and basic services, "as it rebuilds government, it must redesign it

in the general pattern of democracy and prepare it for extended Allied civilian supervision during and after the deliberation of the peace-makers."³ Fifteen years later another scholar argued that "Army Civil Affairs authorities can start the occupied people on the path to democracy through the establishment of democratic institutions."⁴

Nonetheless, for all that, the immediate primary mission of Civil Affairs/Military Government, that is, the support of American and Allied military forces, was retained.

Another consideration, and a cautionary example, had been the record of Axis occupations, a documented saga of exploitation, brutality, mass murder and violent resistance. Even high-ranking German military leaders were freely admitting after the 1945 surrenders that their own occupation policies and their execution had been perhaps their greatest failure in their conquered lands. (Almost all, of course, tried to distance themselves from those policies and activities and put the blame on civilian "fanatics" - e.g. "Nazi scum.")⁵

The Provost Marshal's School and other training centers were closed down, but early in 1946 the Army established the School for the Government of Occupied Areas, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to train replacements for Military Government officers demobilizing with the end of the war⁶. Prior to the German surrender, however, policy planners, at least in Washington, had presumed that Allied occupation of Germany and Japan would prove relatively brief and that a civil administration would be established under State Department control. In line with his earlier opposition to Military Government for non-enemy nations, President Roosevelt had repeatedly warned that US troops could not remain in Europe for more than a year or two.⁷ General Eisenhower had recommended the termination of military occupation as soon as possible, arguing that the U.S. military was not an appropriate organization for dealing with the political, social and economic problems of Germany, except on an emergency basis.⁸ Now the positions were exactly reversed, with State (Secretary of State James Byrnes) arguing that only the Army could handle CA/MG, and the Army (Eisenhower and MG Joseph McNarney, Acting Mediterranean Theater commander) contending that State should take up the burden! Again, the Army got the job.⁹

Eisenhower, even as Commander in Chief of U.S. Occupation Forces in Germany and the U.S. Zone's first Military Governor, seemed to have little interest in his civil responsibilities, concerning himself primarily with the first of his official titles.¹⁰ In fact, as early as four days after the German surrender, the Supreme Allied Commander was reminding his army group commanders that because his forces could not provide the manpower to govern, the object of U.S. Military Government would be simply one of controlling the German government, not governing the land. It was an indication of the general confusion over the aims and duration of U.S. Military Government for post-surrender Germany that for several months after V-E Day Military Government remained with Army tactical units, a serious blunder in that the mission of military security had ended with the surrender of the German armies and had been replaced with that of the governing and control of Germany. Furthermore, existing Military Government personnel were given little or no training in dealing with



the problems of post-war occupations of defeated enemy nations. Many recruited for this work were given assurances that this new duty would not prejudice their eligibility for discharge, hardly an introduction to complex and challenging work over the long term.¹¹ Eisenhower's successor, General McNarney, was, if anything, even less interested in MG than had been his predecessor. The MG command vacuum at the top would be filled admirably by the Deputy Military Governor, LTG Lucius D. Clay, who would himself become Military Governor of the U.S. Zone in March of 1947. LTG Clay would reverse his priorities for the U.S. Zone from those of his predecessors.¹²

The occupations of Germany, Austria and Japan were to have been Allied enterprises, but nowhere did this prove to be the case for long. By the end of 1946, the (European) Allied Control Council was paralyzed, at first, interestingly enough, by French resistance and veto of plans to treat Germany as a whole, despite the Allied occupation zones, and then by U.S. and British differences with the Soviets.¹³ U.S. occupation policy for Germany was to follow JCS 1067, an essentially negative document emphasizing the mere avoidance of disease and unrest, a "let-them-stew-in-their-own juice" approach to economic matters and the imposition of the "three ds": denazification, demilitarization and decentralization. The *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* of December 1944 emphasized that:


No relief supplies are to be imported or distributed for the German population or for displaced enemy or ex-enemy nationals beyond the minimum necessary to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations.... Germany will always be treated as a defeated country and not as a liberated country. (p. 5).

(Emphasis added. The title *Military Government in Germany* may also be significant.)¹⁴ One disciple of the "hard peace" school proclaimed that "The best way to kill rats is to burn down the whole house," while another official claimed that, "When we go into Germany this will be our policy: Germany will be in flames. We will be the fire department and we won't turn on the water!"

However, a SHAEF G-5 survey conducted in March of 1945 predicted that such vague and negative policies "could have calamitous results in the not too distant future," a conclusion with which Generals Clay and Hilldring both agreed. As has been noted, U.S. troops themselves more often than not found the Germans a congenial, docile people. Here was a paradox: those who had fought the Germans had fought without hating and those who hated the Germans had rarely fought them. At any rate, the reality of immediate post-war Germany made it very obvious that the Germans, hungry, apathetic and concerned merely with survival, presented no threat to world peace for the foreseeable future. They had been completely defeated and this time even they knew it.¹⁵

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (OMGUS)

AS OF MARCH, 1946



Prepared by OMGUS

Zink, The United States in Germany



Ground Zero, Year Zero. German city center, 1945. USASOC History Archives

The U.S. Army did, barely, avoid making the same mistake in Military Government that had caused so much difficulty in the early months of the Rhineland occupation. General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, LTG Walter B. Smith, held the view that U.S. MG should be administered through field commanders. General Clay, however, argued that a major mission for U.S. Military Government was the resuscitation of German democratic government, something he doubted could be accomplished by any one Army staff division or theater headquarters. Rather, it would require an organization with staff members. The Army would have plenty to do in post-war Germany and Clay proposed a Military Government structure organized separately from the Army command, with Military Government placed under a deputy reporting directly to the theater commander. General Clay went so far as to say that Military Government was "not a job for soldiers": and President Truman, following the late President Roosevelt's reasoning, claimed that the American tradition was "that the military should not have governmental responsibilities beyond the requirements of military operations," a statement ignoring the historical record of U.S. Military Government and the more surprising coming from one who claimed to read history for pleasure.

General Clay had powerful supporters of his own, including Secretary of War Stimson and Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy (a future High Commissioner for Germany) and his design prevailed. The resulting organization, the Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany (OMGUS), remained the U.S. MG command for the U.S. Zone of occupation until it was supplanted four years later by the office of the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) when Germany again achieved partial sovereignty. The World War II system of CA/MG was at an end. To the end OMGUS remained a U.S. Army organization, commanded by a professional soldier, General Clay; its administrative and control staff largely composed of military personnel, although civilians increasingly took over from the military after the spring of 1946 and predominated by the time it was dissolved in 1949. Those civilians holding high posts in OMGUS had to forward their work ordinarily through the military channels controlled by military regulations and staffed by military officers.¹⁶ For the most part, these civilian employees were not career U.S. Government civil servants; they were only in Germany and the other occupied areas on a temporary basis. Thus, when their contracts had expired they had to return to the States to compete for new jobs. The situation did improve gradually by 1947, but the system did not attract the best personnel. Because most of the MG military personnel did not speak German, and the most experienced had rotated back to the USA, at the lower levels MG in Germany was mostly in the hands of the interpreters. General Eisenhower passed on to General Clay the allegations that "Among other things they say that many of these people have been citizens of the United States for only two or three years and are using their present positions either to communize Germany or to indulge in vengeance."¹⁷

OMGUS divided its zone of occupation into five MG establishments: *Land* Bavaria, *Land* Hesse, *Land* Wurttemberg-Baden, the Bremen Enclave and the U. S. Sector of Berlin.¹⁸ U. S. Army MG units were not exactly thick on the ground. An urban county of some 50,000 in 1946 would likely be administered by an MG team of no more than three officers and six enlisted men. The ratio of governed to governors could fall even lower in the wake of massive and rapid personnel redeployment to the States.¹⁹

Remaining MG officers had their problems, particularly in their relations with tactical commanders. The local MG commander, holding Captain's rank, was usually outranked by the area tactical commander and the latter tended to look upon the area as his conquered fiefdom and was likely to be ignorant or even hostile to Military Government. ("My MPs can handle any problems.") German civil administrators, appointed by the MG commander, often found themselves caught between that MG officer, who had no real power to protect him but wanted him to do his job, and the tactical commander, who might wish to arrest him for being a Nazi.²⁰


One of U. S. MG's earliest activities was their organization and operation of Military Government courts. Here there was little precedent with the Rhineland occupation, for in the former the German courts remained open to handle the strictly civilian cases. As early as the fall of 1944, U. S. military courts were established, once again, in the Rhineland. These courts, in the absence of the German judiciary, handled local civilian criminal matters and functioned with a combination of U. S. Army courts martial, the German legal establishment and Anglo-American jurisprudence, a unique arrangement. The sentences of these courts could be heavy indeed, oddly enough in comparison to the MG court sentences during the war. A regimental commander, now transmogrified into court officer, summed up his attitude, "Well, the hell with them - we were supposed to kill every German from the Rhine all the way east --so obviously he's guilty, he's German."²¹ Two German spies from the last weeks of the war were executed under sentence of Ninth Army MG court, although they were mere youths of 16 and 17 years. Happily more common were curfew violations, which in Third U. S. Army MG courts resulted in confinement of from two to six weeks or a fine adjudged equivalent. Court officers were not required to have any legal background.

There was no appeals process as such, but any case involving in which the sentence imposed was imprisonment in excess of one year or fine or forfeiture of property exceeding 10,000 *reichmarks*. The reviewing authority served as the appeals process and managed to reverse some of the more egregious miscarriages of justice, although *habeas corpus* proceedings were not authorized until January 1948. No death sentences could be carried out before it was confirmed by the Theater Commander. The courts had been the most thoroughly nazified of all German institutions of that era, and the American courts, for all their rough-and-ready faults proved an instructive contrast for the Germans. Here was also the only places where large numbers of Germans could see Americans at work. Long lines of local citizens could be seen drawn up outside any court long before it went into session. (The fact that the


courtrooms were heated may also had something to do with their popularity with the Germans.) For the most part, the Germans were pleasantly surprised by the proceedings and the procedural and legal safeguards that these conqueror's courts provided. Germans were particularly amazed that defendants were afforded the opportunity to be heard and to say what they wished and to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf and, most astonishing, that American judges were not necessarily servants of the state. Still, it took some time for the values of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence to make their way down to rank-and-file Germans. Particularly in rural areas the failure to, say, mount a light on a bicycle, would elicit in answer to the court's "How do you plead?" the automatic reaction *Ich war nie bei der Partei* ("I was never in the [Nazi] Party.") These courts were large-scale undertakings: between September 1944 and August 1948 when the military courts were basically turned back to the Germans, they had tried almost 400,000 cases.²²

German courts were reestablished as their personnel and the laws were denazified, and German civilians were soon being tried before their own tribunals for offenses that did not violate MG law. To considerable ceremony, the first German courts, three *Laenderichte* and 15 *Amtgerichte* in Mannheim were reopened on 15 June, 1945, and the *Laendgericht* and *Amtgerichte* of the Bremen Enclave on 27 June. However, even non-Nazi German law could produce some confusion. In one case a woman applying for the position as head of a German school district answered "no" to the *Fragebogen* question, "Are you or have you ever been related to a member of the leadership corps of the Nazi Party?" It turned out that she was married to a very senior Nazi, and a case was soon in preparation against her. However, the senior German legal advisor informed the military court that under German law a husband is not a relative of his wife, which made the court reconsider.²³ One Legal Officer, in the absence of precedent, displayed some Solomonic wisdom in dealing with the case of an indignant *Wehrmacht* veteran who had tried to cut off the hair of a German woman consorting with a GI. The offender received nine months --about the time it would take for the victim's hair to regrow.²⁴

OMGUS numbered some 12,000, and as noted, an increasing number of U. S. and German civilians. Its mission was carried out by four types of MG detachments at the local level, but with the establishment of *land* offices of MG by the end of 1945 there seemed little need for the detachments and they were merged into those offices. The *land* offices became the channel through which OMGUS transmitted directives to the German *land* governments, which, in turn, sent them down the line to the lower echelons of districts, counties and cities. Each *land* MG office, of course, varied in numbers of personnel and in their specializations (usually including public safety, public works, public utilities, religious affairs, transportation, posts, telegraphs and telephones and public welfare) to take into account the populations and characteristics of their respective jurisdictions. One of the largest such offices, that for Bavaria, was responsible for some eight million persons; the smallest was Bremen, with its one-half million inhabitants gathered within one city.²⁵



MG headquarters, occupied Germany, c. 1945. USASOC History Archives



Early MG court, occupied Germany. Eli E. Nobleman Collection

Early, on the-ground, MG activities in Munich, gave some indication of the wisdom required of troops whose official mission was often described, quite erroneously, as "debris clearance." When a merchant's vegetable truck broke down he presented himself before MG headquarters requesting the loan of an Army truck before his cargo spoiled. (The request was granted because the vegetables were essential.) A distinguished English-speaking woman was worried that her medieval sword violated occupation weapons ordinances. (It did, and the sword was confiscated.) A dispute between a landlord and his tenant was presented before a mess sergeant for adjudication. Then there were "tips" on who was a Nazi, complaints about "dirty" Poles or Russians causing disturbances, inquiries about school opening or an increase in food rations or visas to the United States. To retain the respect and obedience of the Munichers an answer had to be given on the spot, often any answer. In another typical example Military Government Detachment Traunstein was requested to release former German Army tobacco stocks to one Hans Brand Trostberg ("was for a long time in the Concentration Camp Dachau") a cigar maker, to make up into cheroots, presumably to maintain civilian morale.²⁶

As during the last months of the war, the Germans, military and civilian, were notable for their docility. Aside from the assassination of the Burgomeister of Aachen and a few shots in the night before V-E Day, Germans settled down to obey their new masters. Of course, such attitudes could vary; Germans who had been bombed out, or whose towns had been fought over, or who had lost menfolk on the Western Front, managed to hold in check excessive cordiality toward the Americans.

A quick reading of the well-documented Rhineland occupation would have given some indication of what U.S. forces could expect in Germany, and that record (the "Hunt Report") had been studied. There were no German guerrillas in the Rhineland and there would be none in post-1945 Germany. It is significant that only one MG officer, the head of Public Health (MG M. C. Stayer) was known to have had any experience in the post-World War I occupation of the Rhineland.²⁷ The only significant act of overt resistance to American Military Government in Europe occurred on 1 February 1947 when a bomb was thrown into a shop on the ground floor of a building in which the former German Foreign Minister, Franz von Papen, was being tried. The building was partially destroyed, although there were no injuries.²⁸ In the event, the often enthusiastic welcome given to the Americans by the Germans meant that the former had to take some pains to make clear to the latter, sometimes to their hurt bewilderment, that they had come, not as liberators or friends, but as conquerors.

Unlike the prescriptions of the Rhineland occupation, MG in Germany mandated that civilians could not salute officers of the United Nations, although they would render respect to UN flags, anthems, etc. Germans still in some uniformed military capacity would salute only when receiving orders, which would be returned. The Nazi salute and "Heil Hitler," of course, were *verboten*. Even U.S. Military Government gave up on any attempt to stop the ubiquitous German heel-clicking. By



A German whose troubles are just beginning. Former SS Major *and* Nazi Party member, brought in by MPs, is arraigned by MG legal authorities after release from British custody. c. 1946. Signal Corps, National Archives

May of 1946 the whole idea of enforcing any particular overt signs of respect from the Germans was dropped.²⁹

This time the Germans needed only to look about them to become painfully aware that they had lost this war, unlike World War I, when, as Nazi and Nationalist legend would have it, their "undefeated" armies were "stabbed in the back." At any rate, the generation that had endured a recent past of hyper-inflation, depression, the Nazis, the slaughter of its young men on the battlefields of Europe, mass bombing of its cities and invasion by vengeful enemy armies, was, understandably, willing at least to contemplate the concept that Germany might need to attempt something different for the future.

The occupation may have lost, at least in its beginnings, a valuable source of German leadership and assistance with OMGUS's refusal, in line with the non-fraternization policy, to deal with Germans and a number of veteran anti-Nazi groups that had come forward, offering to assist in the reconstruction of their country. Although some of these volunteers may have had their own agendas, the majority nonetheless possessed the skills and experience to have been of great assistance. The Army's occasionally rude refusals did nothing to strengthen their devotion to democracy and may have actually driven a few in the early months into the Communists' camp.³⁰ Some of these groups did prove extremely helpful to Army Counter-Intelligence, pointing out former Nazis in hiding or their records.³¹

U.S. Military Government after the German surrender found itself in an economy that had basically shut down, with practically no electric power, no postal service, no banking and no public transport. If any of these services were available, they were on a strictly local basis from local resources. An eyewitness who became a scholar of the occupation later concluded that "I encountered a society reduced closer to a state of nature than any the natural law political theorists had ever known."³²

The first problem facing MG units in the field was that of food. The Germans might just survive the coming winter if the hordes of Displaced Persons could be fed from other sources. Germans would still go quite hungry on their typical daily ration, set by the German authorities, of 1,000-1500 calories, if even that were available. (About 2000 calories is generally considered the minimum for persons not engaged in manual labor.) Ironically, 1,000 calories was about what was allotted concentration camp prisoners. The tempting option of simply letting the Germans more or less starve was never viable. In the blunt words of the ETOUSA G-5, "While we can say they brought it on themselves and to hell with them, the fact remains that the Supreme Commander, who will be the Military Governor of Germany, will be forced by public opinion at home to take at least minimum steps to prevent starvation."

Steps also had to be taken to suppress widespread disorder. In Essen several Germans and DPs were killed in food riots and all the warehouses looted, while large-scale pillaging occurred in Doernberg at about the same time.³³ All of Europe faced food shortages, but nonetheless SHAEF began to import food into Germany and to distribute seed, mostly transported in Army trucks. Local MG detachments spent much

of their time in the first months of the occupation driving about the countryside, looking for hidden food stores, no easy task given the difficulty of MG units in obtaining any vehicles from tactical units.³⁴ Early in the occupation the burgomeister of Oberlahnstein decreed that all males between the ages of 18 and 65 had to register for employment as a prerequisite to obtaining food ration cards. Fifteenth Army took up the idea and it began to spread through the U.S. Zone.³⁵ The Germans did not actually starve, but the 1946 death rate in Berlin, for example, was about twice normal, although many deaths could be attributed to disease.

Unlike the Rhineland situation, U.S. Army MG only reluctantly allowed private relief organizations to minister to Germans in the U.S. Zone, when the food situation began to approach a catastrophe. The excuse was offered that most MG officers had been trained in the public welfare agency field and had little understanding of or use for private organizations, even such as the International Red Cross, not to mention the Mennonite Central Committee, Friends World Service Committee, etc. British MG rightly saw private welfare organizations as a most valuable addition to their own work. US MG, on the other hand, at first actually forbade individual Americans from sending food packages to their relatives in Germany, a mindless, mean-spirited prohibition that showed officious MG at its worst.³⁶ One contemporary observer wrote with understandable asperity of "well-fed Military Government officers holding long conferences with half-starved Germans on the problems of reconstructing German universities or church life," a situation hardly assuaged by the occasional handout of chocolate bars. Undoubtedly hardest to bear was the sight of U.S. Army personnel cheerfully burning or burying perfectly good left-over food. Even throwing the food away was preferable.³⁷

Coal production presented no better a picture, operating at about 3 percent of prewar levels. Coal was necessary for practically the entire German economy, for heating, electricity, water works, food processing and transportation, including that of the coal itself. In the month of V-E Day, a British-American coal commission reported that the mines of Germany were operating on something of a closed cycle; producing just a little more coal than enough to keep their own machinery going.³⁸

Then there was the rubble and ruins left by years of bombing and months of combat. Some "experts" calculated mathematically that it would take 60 years just to remove all of Berlin's debris. In most ways, the Germans, particularly those in the cities, were appreciably worse off than during the war, with the major exception that they were no longer being killed in large numbers. The Nazi authorities had kept German wartime living standards fairly high by means of a distribution of the loot from the countries they had conquered. The wartime jibe, "Enjoy the war, the peace will be terrible!" --a jest encouraged by the Nazis in their last months --came terribly true for the Germans for the next three years. For example, the Nazis had decreed 2,000 calories as an adult civilian average during the war years, and upheld that figure until about 1944. Early in the occupation, German food rations for "normal adult consumers" could range from actual starvation 995 calories (Koblenz) to a high of 1380 calories in agrarian Schleswig-Holstein. Later in Munich rations, at 1,200 calories

soon after the city was taken, were raised to 1,500 and stayed at that famine level through 1946. Throughout the U.S. Zone during the typical post-war month of February 1947, actual German rations were down to 1555 calories.³⁹ By way of comparison, the contemporary American caloric intake was 3,000 calories; even during the war Britons never received less than 2,800 calories.⁴⁰ How could Germans physically survive on such famine rations? The answer lay in the ubiquitous "scrounging" that seemed to occupy the bulk of the citizens' time, thoughts and efforts. Basically, it involved the exchange of possessions, obtained through barter or theft, or exchange of services for food. If there were any medium of exchange, it was the ubiquitous American cigarette. The near-worthless German Mark was used strictly for official transactions. However, Germans soon learned how to survive in this "economy":

For the manufacturer, the farmer, and the businessman it meant to sell as little as possible at official prices and to barter the rest. For blue and white collar workers it meant to exert oneself as little as possible in order not to burn up irreplaceable calories. It was wise to work two or three days in order to earn the small sum of money needed to buy rationed goods at official prices. The rest of the time was used to go out to the farmers in an effort to barter some wares for essential food items.⁴¹

It can be argued that in reality the relentless inflation of the first three years hindered German recovery more than the war's physical destruction. Yet, one authority has pointed out convincingly that it was not the destruction of the German infrastructure that accounted for three years of economic paralysis, but rather the "suppressed inflation, Western inability to cope with it, and German reactions thereto". After all, the USAAF's *Strategic Bombing Survey* had concluded that something like 85 percent of Germany's industrial capacity remained intact at war's end.⁴²

The more fortunate civilians obtained employment with the Americans. The pay was low but applicants lined up for the "Extra food, indoor work in a heated house, the chance to eat Army bread or butter on the sly, and sometimes the men give them a cigarette."⁴³ The Germans had been turned into a nation of mendicants, menials and scroungers, a situation which the occupation Allies, in all truth, thought was rather mild recompense for the sins of the Nazis.⁴⁴ This dispiriting situation would not change basically until the currency reform of 1948.

In its early months OMGUS seemed more concerned with rooting out Nazis from all offices of trust or responsibility than with food, fuel or reconstruction.⁴⁵ Toward the end of 1945, no less than 100,000 "dangerous Nazis" languished in US custody, for the first months incommunicado.⁴⁶ To deal with denazification, OMGUS

established Special Branches (SpBr), which began by distributing questionnaires to German administrators, teachers and other civil servants. The very question of "Who was a Nazi?" admitted no easy answers. It was not simply a matter of membership. Many seemingly innocuous organizations, such as sport motor and flying clubs, were actually Nazi-sponsored. Were officials of such organizations truly Nazis? On the other hand, was membership in the Nazi party itself an offense? Were not many Germans not at all in sympathy with the Party, nonetheless required to join to save their livelihoods and to protect their families?⁴⁷ The year that the Nazis came to power, 1933, initially served as a convenient date to smoke out the true believer. Soon after, the cut-off date was moved ahead to 1937; after that year, all public employees who wished to keep their jobs had been required to join the Party. Anyone with Party membership before those dates could consider himself fortunate if he were merely barred from all offices and found himself at the tail of the line for food rations and lodgings and put to manual labor. (On the other hand, the 82,000 interned Nazi party officials subsisted quite well on the 2,400 calorie daily ration allotted to them by the Americans.)

U.S. MG authorities arrested two types of putative Nazis: those who fell within certain prescribed arrest categories and were thus liable to seizure by the simple fact that they had occupied certain positions in the Nazi hierarchy or the German government; and those specifically named in the ominously entitled *Allied Arrest Blackbook* --Adolf Hitler, of course, heading the list. All of this, of course, was nothing less than "guilt by association," a legal concept employed wholesale by the Nazis and the communists, not the best lesson in democracy for the Germans, but perhaps understandable under the circumstances. For those not so obviously at risk, U.S. MG drew up the *Fragebogen*, a multi-page, questionnaire requiring the respondent to list his or her membership in political and military organizations, salary, associations, publications and public speaking from 1923 on ("except those of a strictly technical or artistic and non-political character, giving title, date and circulation") and employment back to the pre-Hitler period. This information could then be checked against public and Party documents. The Nazi Party had kept careful records; its entire registry of 12 million cards with photographs, had been retrieved from a pile of waste paper about to be pulped, undoubtedly to the disgust of those former Nazi officials now attempting to pose as "good Germans."⁴⁸ The *Fragebogen* was drawn up in German and English, and, as in a peace treaty imposed on a conquered nation, the conqueror's language would prevail in case of any discrepancies. Processing the millions of *Fragebogen* and comparing these instruments with Nazi and other German records must have gone far to reduce the unemployment rate in the U.S. Zone. The document could not be avoided; a completed *Fragebogen* was necessary to obtain a ration card. Of the 1,103,000 Germans investigated about 260,000 were adjudged to have been active Nazis and were removed. Unfortunately, some 15 percent of that lot were from the public service and for the most part they would be missed, from the point of view of

their services. Some 100,000 suspected Nazis, however, went underground, only to resurface after an amnesty in 1948.⁴⁹

Of all the memories that that generation of Germans retain, none can match the bitterness and controversy generated by denazification in general and by the egregious *Fragebogen* in particular. Some 12 million of these documents were distributed by OMGUS during the occupation period.⁵⁰ Most Germans viewed it as an intrusion into personal lives on an overwhelming scale by incompetents or busybodies. The war was over, there was no argument that Germany had lost, so what was the point of raking over the dead ashes of the past?⁵¹ Later, Germans became more bold in denouncing such Allied "atrocities" as the bombing of Dresden. (In Munich, citizens began to make known their informed opinion that the intensity of debris clearance was likely some form of public penance the Americans were imposing on themselves for their devastating bombing raids!)⁵² Some of the more legalistic applications of the denazification program did not impress the Germans, either. In one case a judge who had condemned a man to death for conducting sabotage for the Allies near the end of the war was retained in office because the jurist was not an active party member. The man that he had condemned to death had somehow survived the war, but he was purged because he had, in fact, been a party member!⁵³

The theory of denazification in the U. S. Zone was aptly summarized in 1947 by the MG of Bavaria:

Every German in Bavaria desiring a position with Military Government or industry had to fill out a questionnaire [*Fragebogen*].... They were checked by our people. We discovered all the cards of the '[Bavarian?] Nazi Party in an old stable near Munich and sent them to Berlin where they had a special identification records office. They were rechecked there. If a man falsified his *Fragebogen* he was tried by Military Government Court. To give you an idea of the American side of it, Military Government investigated up to March 1946 about 3/4 of a million Bavarians and uncovered almost 200,000 [formerly] active Nazis. They were responsible for the prosecution of almost 1500 Germans for falsification of *Fragebogens*.⁵⁴

The problem was that Nazis did not usually show themselves as the arrogant, bull-necked, monocled fanatics of Hollywood's wartime fantasies, and often proved affable and willing enough to cooperate with MG. Conversely, impeccably anti-or non-Nazis could prove difficult to work with, even though, as perhaps Royalists or Nationalists, they had looked down upon the Nazis as low-class scum. For example, there was Dr. Otto Gessler, Minister of War for a time under the Weimar Republic. No Nazi he, but he had indeed connived in Germany's secret pre-Hitler rearmament in complete violation of the Versailles Treaty.⁵⁵ Those persecuted by the Nazis might not have much use for democracy and could be lacking in ability or even in honesty. Of

many undoubted Nazis, on the other hand, it had to be said that they knew their jobs and were industrious. Further, if MG made a clean sweep of all those with Nazi affiliations, the Americans might have to run their zone with old men for a generation. Then there were the sheer numbers involved, as those 12 million party cards demonstrated. Finally, MG officers were rated on the way they did their jobs, not on the past political affiliations or beliefs of the Germans who worked for them. The tendency was thus strong to choose civilian administrators from those Germans who were the most cooperative, the most efficient and those with the best command of English, not necessarily from those untainted by Nazism.

One inexperienced MG officer in a small German town hit on a most ingenious means of both "purging" a tainted official and yet getting on with his business. He simply permitted the purged municipal official to work quietly on his files and correspondence at home. The official's wife was transferred to the new office as a clerk and courier, and the American officer frequently called on his German counterpart on municipal affairs.⁵⁶ Another MG unit located a long-retired police chief and a retired fire chief and utilizing their years of experience, established police and fire training schools. The unit also located large numbers of young German NCOs who had recently been released from POW camps. To utilize their skills and to keep them out of trouble the unit created police and fire departments and sent the former POWs to the new schools.⁵⁷

Another MG officer well summarized the attitude of his fellows:

Both these men and their Regular Army colleagues were frank respecters of efficiency, of bigness, of power. They could appreciate like-minded persons who also wanted to get things running again. The fact that the Germans they first contacted were generally unrepentant Nazis, confident industrialists, "indispensable" experts, long-time militarists, and right-wing clerics was unfortunate, but no man who liked to see his country in order and business running smoothly could really be as dangerous as some idealistic Military Government people claimed.⁵⁸

Or in the words of a contemporary:

The orders were: De-Nazification comes first. But their [commanders] view was: Get this trolley line operating first, get the milk supply flowing again, get roofing materials turned out again, and then de-Nazify.⁵⁹

Matters were certainly not smoothed by General George Patton's several notorious statements before reporters, including one that MG "would get better results if it employed former members of the Nazi party in administrative jobs and as skilled workmen." For these sentiments he was sacked as commander of

Third U.S. Army by General Eisenhower and given a paper command.⁶⁰ More problematically, the Army also included in its purges all "avowed believers" in Nazism or even militarism, something that smacked of thought control and which was hardly a lesson in democracy. Also, the punishments were for violations of laws that did not, of course, even exist prior to the occupation, a clear-cut case of *ex post facto* enactments, a violation of the legal code of every democratic nation in the world.

All of this was the first phase of denazification, that is, a program carried out under direct MG control.⁶¹ This phase was considered important to avoid the taint of "victors' justice" and perhaps the creation of another "stab in the back" legend. The later program could be, and was at the time and since, termed a "whitewash," with camp guards receiving long sentences (although often remitted in a few years) and former Nazi big-shots getting derisory sentences. In March 1946, the Germans were informed that henceforth denazification was their business, Military Government from then on would only supervise. Under denazification, Phase II:

They [suspects] were divided up into five classes: first, the major offenders...; class two, activists, militarists and profiteers; class three, probationary offenders; class four, followers and class five, exonerated persons. As of November 1947 about 6 1/2 million of these questionnaires had been processed and disposed of and about 1/2 a million remained on hand to be processed. You read a great deal in the paper about Nazis here and Nazis there, but any system that you get where you have people tried by their own country, you are bound to have a lot of distrustfulness.⁶²

The German authorities, operating on the basis of their own legislation and their own legal and administrative staffs, carried on denazification through local quasi-judicial boards, composed of local citizens, something after the order of the American draft boards. However, it soon became apparent that neighbor was unlikely to judge neighbor, and the *Spruchkammern* were generally judged failures.⁶³

Overall, in the words of one authority (and an O.S.S. and State Department veteran): "Thus a process that had begun with wholesale incriminations turned in the direction of wholesale exemptions and then ended in wholesale exonerations." By March of 1949 the influential American diplomat, George Kennan was recording the plea of a Hamburg editor, half-Jewish himself, for an amnesty to replace denazification. Otherwise, officials would continue to bungle, with the innocent harmed about as much as the guilty because of the subjective nature of the whole question of who was a Nazi, when, why and how strongly.⁶⁴ The table below gives some indication of the magnitude of MG's task. Not surprisingly, one authority termed German denazification as "the most extensive legal procedure the world had ever witnessed."⁶⁵ Another scholar on U.S. Army MG and a veteran of that service

Status of Denazification Proceedings (continued)

<i>Status of Denazification Proceedings</i>			Type	Percentage	Thousands
	End of May 1949 United States Zone				
Type	Percentage	Thousands			
Total registrants	100.0	13,180.3	Cases completed by denazification		
Not chargeable cases	73.8	9,738.5	Tribunals which are finally and		
Total chargeable cases	26.2	3,441.8	legally valid		924.7
Chargeable cases completed	26.1	3,432.5	Sanctions imposed		
Amnestied without trial	18.9	2,487.3	Sentenced to labor camps		9.6
Trials completed	7.2	945.2	Fined		569.0
Chargeable cases to be			Ineligible to hold public office		23.0
Completed	0.1	9.3	Restricted in employment		124.2
Findings: Cases completed by			Sentenced to special labor but not		
Denazification tribunals		945.2	imprisoned		30.4
Found as major offenders		1.6	Subject to confiscation of property		25.8
Found as offenders		21.9	Internees, number of		0.4
Found as lesser offenders		106.1	Internees serving sentences		
Found as followers		482.7	Imposed by tribunals		0.4
Found as exonerated		18.3	Internees awaiting trial		0.05
Found as amnestied or					
Proceedings quashed		314.6			
Appeals received		90.5			
Appeals not accepted for decision					
or withdrawn		12.4			
Appeals adjudicated		70.2			
Appeals pending		7.9			

himself, concluded that "if one were to select the single item which received the most attention from Military Government officers of the United States in Germany, stirred up the widest controversies, occasioned the greatest perplexity among British, Russian and French allies, and gave rise to the most widespread publicity in the United States, it would without much question be the denazification program."⁶⁶

Yet throughout the post-war years Western Germany presented little evidence of any revival of Nazism, militarism or extreme nationalism on any large scale. At least the Americans did not put former jailers, murders, and torturers back into uniform, as was sometimes the case in the Soviet Zone.⁶⁷ Even the undoubted presence of former Nazis in Western Germany, some in positions of responsibility or trust, did not seem to have significantly affected the peace, political processes or liberties of the state.⁶⁸ For this happy outcome the U.S. Army's occupation must be given the most credit.

OMGUS also embarked on a purge of German industrialists involved with the Nazis. Although this program was also subjected to bitter criticism for its supposed leniency, the record is fairly clear that Nazi party activists were indeed removed from the higher positions. Such activists had usually been appointed to their positions in the first place because of their party connections. With the party officially dead, they were of no further use and could be jettisoned by their former comrades. Nominal Nazis, those who had paid their dues, but had concentrated on their jobs, were quietly retained, as were even, in many cases, "true believers" who had supported Hitler from a genuine belief in his policies, but who, again, had not allowed such beliefs to warp their managerial efficiency.⁶⁹

With the shift of American Military Government emphasis from purge and punishment to the rebuilding of its Zone, removed Nazis, even some of the more active variety, made something of a startling comeback to positions of authority. In 1948 Bavaria reported that 40 percent of its civil servants were former Nazi party members, three-fourths of whom had earlier been removed by denazification action. Another *land* reported in mid-1949 that 46.2 percent of its judiciary personnel had been Nazi followers. The Bizonal postal administration reported more former Nazi party members occupying leading positions than during the Nazi regime itself!⁷⁰

OMGUS may have been attempting the near-impossible in a chaotic situation (as the more "realistic" British and French maintained), but it should be given credit for the attempt, a more thoroughgoing program than anything devised by the French or the Soviets. In the long run, it can hardly be disputed that, whatever happened to the Nazis, a reunited Germany needs no further imposed democracy lessons.

American MG was willing to adopt a more positive policy toward the Germans when it came to education. The MG education officers (all nine of them) determined that they would need to work through the Germans rather than dictate to them if democracy through education were to take hold in Germany.⁷¹ The new times called for new texts. Even in mathematics a Nazi-era text could pose this problem:

The moneylender charged the farmer's widow 12 percent interest per year on a loan of six hundred marks for four years. Out of how much money did the Jewish swindler cheat the widow?⁷²

MG education policies could not simply call for a resurrection of pre-Nazi era texts. Those of the Kaiser's era breathed Germanic racial and cultural superiority, and even the Weimar Republic's tended toward resentment of the Versailles *diktat* and a general "poor Germany" moaning. Entirely new textbooks were required. As early as April of 1945 Detachment F1G2 had plates made up for new purged German-language textbooks for the Aachen schools. Grades one to four, with 1,000 students, then reopened, the first in U.S. Zone postwar Germany. In the fall of 1945, after only 75 days' labor, in a masterpiece of improvisation, 5,450,000 elementary school texts had been printed and bound, the plates made in the U.K., paper mache' mats run off from them and then flown to Munich where castings from the mats were made the following day. The project received top priority for paper, paper mills, presses, transportation and distribution. The entire school system in the American Zone could thus reopen on 1 October 1945.⁷³ The OMGUS Education Branch insisted that

In the field of education no textbook has been forced upon the Germans...It is the policy of Education Branch to assist the German school people in working out their own education program."⁷⁴

OMGUS reformers, particularly the Zook commission of prominent American educationists, did attempt to impose the "American Way" of education in their zone, with the abolition of tuition and textbook fees, an emphasis on social studies, the merging of small country schools into larger facilities, the "controlling" of quality in private schools and the discouraging of parochial schools --a liberal, egalitarian model. Needless to say, these "reforms" were resented, for the most part successfully opposed by German elites and conservatives, and were delayed until the social turmoils of the 1960s.⁷⁵

Then there was the question of the teachers. The Nazi Minister for Education had defined the teacher as one who "together with the German officer marches ahead of the people." Many teachers in what later became the U.S. Zone must have followed that definition, for some 70 percent had been purged soon after the German surrender. By 1946 at least one new teacher training school had been opened in the U.S. Zone.⁷⁶

Still, these were imposed reforms. The problem was well put by an eminent American historian, who wrote in 1945 (with some dramatic license), "To discuss life values effectively with a defeated people is difficult for a lecturer who, when he puts his notes on the desk, lays down beside them an automatic pistol."⁷⁷ American Military Government nonetheless attempted to eradicate centuries of authoritarian education with more open methods of instruction, courses on civics and an emphasis on democratic methods of solving problems, including the introduction of elected student councils.

The model for this program was "The American Way," but even well-disposed Germans were reluctant to concede that their high schools were inferior, at least academically, to those in the States. Most managed to muted their enthusiasm for the "American Way" of education until the USA, for all its "democratic" high schools, had produced a few Beethovens, Goethes or Schillers.⁷⁸

In the early months of the occupation, AMG published its own newspapers, which, lacking any competition, had reached a circulation of more than 3.7 million in the U.S. Zone by August 1945. Of these Army journalistic efforts only *Die Neue Zeitung* ("The New Newspaper"), survived as German competition opened up. All journals of the time enjoyed remarkably high readership, however, among a public eager to read anything more or less telling the truth after twelve years of the lies of Dr. Goebbels. Their work was cut out for them. One study early in the occupation revealed Germans as believing that penicillin was a "monetary unit," Truman "a novelist," De Gaulle "an American general," and that German-Americans comprised about one-half of the total U.S. population. Rumors abounded: the atom bomb was the product of German scientists and would soon be used --against Russia, of course; America would soon annex the U.S. Zone; the Russians will not turn on Berlin's gas because 90 percent of the women would then commit suicide, etc. In the wise words of a contemporary, "What Germans don't know would fill a book. What Germans think they know would fill another."⁷⁹

American Army newspapers reflecting the lack of competition, often coupled poorly-written factual news stories with sensationalism, dwelling on such matters as Hitler's marriage to his mistress or the mystery as to whether the Nazi dictator was dead or alive. Fortune tellers filled in the gap left by an absence of thoughtful information programming.

However, the Army was not in the German journalism business and began to reduce the number of its papers as it changed policy to one of a "German press run by Germans," under a licensing program, administered by the ominously-titled Information Control Division (ICD).⁸⁰ Of course, the problems faced by these German pioneering journalistic enterprises were enormous. The presses were often buried in rubble, electricity supply was erratic, newsprint scarce, and any journalists who had worked during the Nazi period barred from the premises. Editors acceptable to Military Government were in even scarcer supply; they had to prove themselves anti-Nazi, not just non-Nazi. Their journals were basically self-censoring. Every newspaper they ran off was sold, and they were not about to lose their valuable licenses by running afoul of Military Government "guidance." However, these journals were actually encouraged to report moderately bad news from the USA simply to demonstrate to the Germans that this was relatively uncensored news, good and bad. American newspapers and journals, however, were originally banned from the American Zone, undoubtedly because those publications often carried news or editorial comments sharply critical of some aspect of U.S. Military Government in Germany.

Yet German newsmen were expected to use American publications as an example of the free journalism of a free people!⁸¹

The first more-or-less purely German newspaper in the U. S. Zone was the semiweekly *Frankfurter Rundschau*, licensed as early as 31 July 1945, with an initial circulation of 415,000. During September, October and November of that year, 19 more German newspapers were licensed by Military Government authorities, providing at least every large city in the zone with its own German paper. By the end of 1945 the number had increased to 23, with a combined circulation of 1,300,000. In a break with Germany's past, OMGUS, very much aware of the "prostitution" of so many pre-war German journals, forbade partisan party newspapers, with the apparent exception of the Communist Party journals; they must be either non-party or have the input of different party writers and editors on the same paper.

These journals certainly did not lack for supervision. SHAEF had laid down general rules for German journals that were, if anything, more exacting than anything imposed during the war. Editors were forbidden to publish any "advocacy of racism, or directly or indirectly question the principle of the equality of man." Remembering the German "*stab in the back*" legend, SHAEF also ruled that no German writer could even "suggest or imply that Germany was not completely militarily defeated in this war or in the last." (emphasis added). Severe punishment awaited any German who might "ridicule or fail to respect the way of life, political systems, institutions, ideals, decisions, and interests of any of the peoples of the United Nations."⁸² Despite these regulations, those German editors and owners who persisted had a market all to themselves, and in the words of one authority, "the owners of fifty-nine new newspapers were provided an opportunity to become very wealthy men."⁸³ For the enforcement of these rules, in addition to the control exercised from headquarters and field office/*Land* level, American MG maintained special press officers in every two or three *Kreise* for more direct supervision and "assistance."

American MG established a truly bizarre facility to screen potential German media licensees at Bad Orb in the fall of 1945. The staff of the screening center was composed equally of psychiatrists and political experts. Candidates had to endure two days of tests which included such essays as "My feelings and state of mind during the Hitler regime," and another ordeal, composed of 40 items, to reveal political attitudes. The last examination was a Rorschach "inkblot" test, taken while a psychiatrist probed the candidate's personal life. On the basis of all this, the staff believed that they had uncovered the pattern (termed "deviation data") of the typical anti-Nazi: strong maternal influence, absence of an authoritarian father, being the favored or only child and leaving one's church. (the last presumably an indication of personal independence.)⁸⁴

The Americans established on the ruins of the old journalistic order a licensed press of a comparatively few but strong medium sized and independent regional newspapers, which all enjoyed large press runs. A major break with the discredited past was the careful separation of reporting from opinion. The early journalistic efforts

reflected a punishment theme, which most Germans seemed to accept, if for no other reason than that there was not much else to read. By 1948, however, the reaction was "we've heard enough of that."⁸⁵


Three American magazines also made their appearance in the fall of 1945: *Heute* ("Today"), originally a photo monthly similar to *Life* or *Look*, then a weekly; *Amerikanische Rundschau* ("American Review"), a more cerebral journal appearing every two months, and *Neue Auslese* ("New Selections"), a joint British-American digest. These journals were published to foster a positive approach to the United States, to its foreign policy, and to the occupation. By the end of licensing in 1949, 59 such magazines were being published.⁸⁶ OMGUS also established a German news service, *Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichten* (DANA, later DENA), which was turned over in 1946 to the publishers of the 41 licensed newspapers in the U.S. Zone.

German journals were strictly controlled from May 1946 to July 1949, during the period of direct military occupation. The main weapon of control was the supply of newsprint, which was issued quarterly to publishers for specific projects. Those German editors who failed to cooperate simply found themselves without paper. OMGUS had the honesty to admit, amid a generally self-congratulatory report, that the press in the US Zone of Occupation was only "nearly free" as a result of such controls.⁸⁷

Licensed publications were severely distorted by the deranged economics of the time. High monetary inflation and employment levels, coupled with very few consumer goods, meant that no matter how poorly-printed, or uninteresting, newspaper editions were invariably sold out, and then used for wrapping fish, for school notebooks or whatever. It was thus almost impossible to judge the true readership of any journal.

The Nazis had done such a thorough job in controlling the book industry that when OMGUS had cleared out the unacceptable volumes, there was little left. Aware of the appalling precedent of Nazi thugs burning books, and responding to a shocked American Library Association protest, ICD drew back from its original proposal to incinerate offending works and so hit upon the ingenious solution of pulping them instead, to be recycled into paper for approved books and newspapers, and retaining sample copies for research libraries. On the other hand, copies of even *Mein Kampf* and other Nazi books were permitted in private libraries, which Germans pointed out, tended to favor the wealthy.⁸⁸ Of course, book publishing also required licenses. All potential licensees were investigated thoroughly and licenses were granted more on the basis of anti-Nazi credentials than on journalistic or business abilities. In the early years even a few Communists were licensed to publish material that was about as one-sided, although not as vile, as anything from the Nazi era. All of this, of course, was conducted amid the ruins of many printing houses, a badly-damaged transportation system and shortages of everything from newsprint, to ink to electric power.⁸⁹

Military Government did not require licensing for civil radio broadcasting stations in the American Zone because these installations were already operating, first



U.S. Army MG officers and French ally view MG-supervised Radio Stuttgart, U.S. Zone of Occupation, c. 1948. Signal Corps, National Archives

under direct U. S. Army control and later under OMGUS supervision. The Western occupation powers were determined that these stations operate under the principle of independence from the state and of a pluralistic structure. These theoretical concepts were difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with Military Government, although the Information Control Division of OMGUS to some extent conscientiously made the effort. The OMGUS at first favored a U. S.-type radio system of independent stations and networks, but in the end it adopted, with the encouragement of the German bureaucracy and political leaders, a semi-public "BBC" model. At first the stations, one for each *land* and as well as one in Bremen and in the American Sector of Berlin, were basically run by Americans. In 1945, for example, 40 Americans and 30 Germans operated Radio Munich. By 1946 the ratio was 7 Americans to approximately 400 Germans, and in 1949 only 4 to 700. As late as 1955, probably reflecting some remaining nervous memories of Goebbelsian ethereal propaganda exercises, the Americans retained some German radio control, although only post-broadcast.⁹⁰

As for the broadcasts themselves, after the first few months, the stations backed away from their initial "Now hear this!" fare, and began to feature children's programs, music, church services, and even a "Top Ten" American popular music feature, the votes being mailed in by German listeners.⁹¹ The didactic voice did not die out completely. Radio Munich continued to broadcast such propaganda as "Documents and Facts in the War Crime Trials in Nuremberg," "The Judgment Chamber in Session," "No More War," "Resistance, Victims, Incitement" and interviews with former concentration camp victims. Most of these programs were the brainchild of an American commentator who apparently became "one of the most hated journalists in Bavaria." Early in the occupation Germans responded that they preferred the Soviet broadcasts, which made a distinction between Nazi and non-Nazi Germans, in contrast to the "dour and grim" "dishwater" broadcasts of Radio Luxembourg and SHAEF press and radio output. Of course, few of these malcontents, though, expressed any desire to live under Soviet occupation. An even more jaundiced view of U. S. Zone radio broadcasting argued that:

All the talk on the radio programs was of German atrocities and war guilt, while the Russians were promising everything. Not even the good classical music, which the Bavarians had come to consider as necessary as food, was being provided. The jazz on the Army programs, primarily for our own boys, was a poor substitute. By 1948 such overt propagandistic ventures were being replaced by anti-Soviet material, which inspired considerably less resentment, but not much greater listenership.⁹²

Far more popular were the school programs of Radios Stuttgart and Frankfurt ("Culture and Life," "We and the World," "Basic Economics," German History, Geography, etc.) which began quite early in the occupation, with OMGUS blessing, in order to supplement the lack of textbooks and trained (and un-Nazi) teachers.⁹³

OMGUS did establish one new broadcasting station of its own, Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor (RIAS), when it became obvious that the Soviets would not relinquish their unilateral control of Radio Berlin. Going on the air in September 1946, RIAS soon developed into the single most popular radio in the American Zone - and quite possibly in the Soviet as well, despite the penalties imposed there upon listeners. Gradually, American sector radio improved in the post-war years and garnered solid civilian listenership in all Allied occupation sectors. Further, currency reform and its attendant economic stimulus brought greatly increased production of radio receivers.⁹⁴

The German motion picture industry, like German radio broadcasting, had been taken over completely by the Nazis. Dr. Goebbels had fancied himself a sophisticated film connoisseur and, strictly from a technical standpoint, numerous Nazi-era films are still viewable. OMGUS carefully supervised film-making in the American Zone. Oddly, it was discovered that Germans preferred their own films, and found some Hollywood features, such as the *Maltese Falcon*, with its glorification of the underworld and denigration of the police (hardly the values that ICD was attempting to inculcate in their charges anyway), incomprehensible. There could be little question that the German pre-1933 films were superior, often even technically, to some of what was exhibited to the Germans after the war by Hollywood. The point was driven home when a mediocre German film, *Operette*, outdrew *Falcon* by 60 percent. The Humphrey Bogart war film, *Action in the North Atlantic*, provoked an even stronger German reaction. Ex-German sailors stormed out and attempted to force out other spectators, following a scene depicting a German U-boat crew machine-gunning survivors. When a German U-boat appeared in the midst of another super-patriotic U.S. wartime film, the German audience applauded vigorously.⁹⁵ ICD then hit upon the solution of requiring German exhibitors to show American films for two weeks before and after each run of any German film. Further, a joint British-U.S. newsreel, *Die Welt im Film*, had to be shown with all features, and all cinemas in the American Zone had to run for one consecutive week the concentration camp atrocity film "The Mills of Death." It was probably the Nazi-era ideological baggage as well as the dispersion of much of the industry to the Soviet Zone (where it was welcomed) that limited German-made full-length films completed in the American Zone between 1945 and 1949 to a mere eight features.⁹⁶

Even classical music posed traps. ICD had to see to it that musicians who had enjoyed favor under the Nazis, such as Wilhelm Furtwaengler (conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic), were blacklisted. Probably the most thoroughly damned of all German musicians was Norbert Schulze, composer of the repulsive "Bombs Over England." (But then Schulze should have been able to redeem himself as the author of "Lili Marlene," a soldiers' song as popular with British Eighth Army as with Afrika Corps). ICD went beyond personalities and words, however, looking into the music itself and undoubtedly imagining considerably more therein than the composer himself had intended in the first place. "Inflammatory" music was *verboten*, so out went Wagner's funeral march from *Goetterdammerung* and Beethoven's *Third* and *Seventh*

symphonies. ICD busybodies remained on the alert for "musical sabotage," such as the playing of Beethoven's *Eroica* symphony or Strauss' *Ein Heldenleben* ("A Hero's Life") on Hitler's birthday. Even Sibelius' *Finlandia* and Chopin's *Revolutionary Etude* were banned because they might "encourage dangerous tendencies."⁹⁷

Most MG detachments, of course, were not involved in the realms of high or popular culture. Quite at the other end of the scale there was the problem of pumping out the Jena DP camp cesspool, complicated by the fact that one pumper truck burned charcoal, and the other was idled for lack of gasoline.⁹⁸ Other equally mundane tasks of MG troops early in the occupation would include a detailed report on a kindergarten, the restoration of the Munich streetcar system to limited operation, albeit at first with the trams drawn by horses, or dispatching the first fishing trawlers out of Bremen, with coal dust for fuel, giving them a speed two knots slower than the average fish. MG personnel in the winter of 1945-1946 were able to round up an Army sergeant with some rabbinical training to perform the first synagogue service anywhere in the U.S. Zone of Germany. Because it was unlikely that Jewish refugees would find much in the way of Kosher food in the German military and civil food stocks, the Army established several Kosher slaughterhouses both for the Jews and for a group of Turkish Islamic DPs.⁹⁹ As one veteran and historian of U.S. MG perceptively noted, "Military Government always was going to be mostly a matter of trivialities that could not be quite harmonized with the grand sweep of policy."¹⁰⁰ On a larger scale, General Clay saw to it that within two months of the end of hostilities three-fourths of the railroad tracks in the U.S. Zone had been rebuilt, 25,000 railroad cars brought over to Germany by the U.S. Army during the war were turned over to the German railroad administration, and some 10,000 Army trucks put up for sale in the U.S. Zone on a deferred payment basis.¹⁰¹ General Hilldring was probably on to something when he wrote LTG Clay that Military Government policies would have to "bubble up from the facts."¹⁰²

Some of these facts "bubbling up" could have proved extremely embarrassing to OMGUS. Incredibly, an insane asylum-"murder camp" was discovered in full operation in July, a full two months after the Nazi surrender, and within "an M-1 rifle shot" of an obviously inattentive MG detachment. Another detachment (FIF3) sent two enlisted men to investigate information given by a local German doctor and found a scene of horror. The Kaufeuren, Swabian facility's uncooled morgue contained the stinking bodies of men and women who had died only 12 hours to three days earlier.

Bodies which had been living beings less than 12 hours before investigators came, weighing 27 kgs (60 pounds approx.) were found in the morgue. A more-or-less alive boy weighed 10 kilos.

The head nurse confessed to having killed by intra-muscular injection "at least 211 minors." For this latter duty she drew a bonus of 35 RM. Another sister of mercy, "with a stony grin on her face" admitted to having poisoned "at least 30 to 40

persons." Yet another, in response to a bewildered question as to if she were a Christian, responded arrogantly that she was Lutheran, but that it was none of the interrogator's business. The victims were usually exterminated by three methods that would not have been out of place at Belsen: administration of chemicals (the lucky ones) or by slow or fast starvation. "Fast starvation" finished off an inmate in three months; "slow starvation" was interminable. These "scientific" procedures were embarked upon supposedly "for the improvement of the race." The total number of victims of this mini-Auschwitz could not be determined because the records had been burned. (There was, of course, a crematorium). The detachment's report emphasized that the staff were not Nazis, who had made themselves scarce by this time, but "good German" doctors and nurses. As for the general population of Kaufbeuren, "in this idyllic Swabian town...virtually every inhabitant was fully aware of the fact that human beings were both used as guinea pigs and were systematically butchered." A 12-year-old "urchin, selected at random" replied casually "das ist wo sie's umbringen - "Oh, that's where they kill them."

The entire close-by MG detachment which had overlooked this horror was relieved, although higher MG officials made unworthy attempts (in their own words) "not to emphasize the (obvious) implication: that U.S. military authorities had been grossly negligent in allowing these conditions to exist during two months of occupation."¹⁰³

Another, somewhat less horrific, example of Nazi efforts "for the improvement of the race" was discovered at about the same time when Detachment E361 came upon an SS *Lebensborn* barracks in *Landkreis* Ebersberg, southeast of Munich. There they found 100 women, "all attractive, perfect specimens," carefully blood-typed in approved "racial hygiene" fashion, brood mares (in the eyes of the Nazis) awaiting impregnation by "Aryan" SS troopers. Many already had been; the detachment found 300 babies, all less than three months old, at the facility. In accordance with SS *Reichsfuehrer* Heinrich Himmler's mad fantasy, these "pure" offspring were to become the seed corn of the restocked "New German Race," destined to dominate the world. Now these innocents were simply one more burden on the exhausted, impoverished German economy.¹⁰⁴ Understandably, "Charlottesville" had not instructed U.S. MG troops in how to deal with death camps and human breeding stations.

A far more formidable burden was that of Displaced Persons. Some 2.5 million were estimated to be in SHAEF-held territory just after V-E Day. This figure did not include the millions of German expellees from the East, an emphatically different category. Hardly an MG Detachment was without a DP camp in its area of operation. DPs were to be taken care of without consideration of the effect on the German economy. In fact, they were to be fed at least 2,000 calories per day. They subsisted on a combination of captured German Army, German civil and U.S. Army food stocks. The DPs also had priority in housing. In Munich alone 10,000 Germans were forced out of their homes to make room for DPs. Also in Munich at roughly the same time no less than 5,000 men's suits and 5,000 pairs of shoes were requisitioned from

city shops for survivors of the nearby Mauthausen concentration camp. Large numbers of DPs were also screened for work with the military. The American Zone experienced a particularly heavy influx of DPs, many of them Jewish, in the first year or so of the occupation due to the word getting out that the American rations were considerably above those proffered by the British or French. Any flow to the Soviet Zone, despite its better agricultural base, was minimal.¹⁰⁵

Allied attitudes toward the DPs changed rather quickly from one of great sympathy to exasperation. Newly-freed DPs roamed the countryside, unemployed, often reluctant to return to homes and employment in the East, and many soon often fell into criminal ways. With perhaps unconscious irony, the best authority on the subject, and himself a former MG officer, noted: "But when displaced persons broke out of their camps night after night and pillaged the country for miles around, driving off a hundred head of cattle or more in a single night and killing the German farmers who sought to protect their property, Military Government officials began to worry." Local Germans were careful to attribute the worst to these "outsiders."¹⁰⁶

It is possible that American MG troopers may have been less than fair in their evaluation of DPs at the time. Mostly they were shabbily dressed, had no jobs and lived in overcrowded barracks. Few MG soldiers spoke Polish, Russian or Serbo-Croatian and could thus not get the DPs point of view. DPs thus suffered in comparison to the Germans, many of whom spoke good English and who were usually not above drawing American attention to the contrast.¹⁰⁷ The magnitude of the problem can be seen in the fact that as late as the spring of 1947, some two million DPs were crowded into Bavaria alone.¹⁰⁸ Until the establishment of the U.S. Army Constabulary later in 1946, there was little the Army or the semi-armed and reconstituted German police could do. The obvious answer was to return these people as soon as possible to their own countries. A separate branch of SHAEF and its successors, working closely with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), successfully repatriated most of these wanderers. In one of the great unreported horror tales of post-war Europe, the western Allies assisted in the forcible repatriation of many of the more than 2,000,000 Soviet citizens found in the West. ("And you'd find a box [car] full of people without clothes so they wouldn't strangle themselves with their own clothes."¹⁰⁹)

By the fall of 1945 something like 97 percent of those who wished to be repatriated (and most who did not) had been fed, sheltered, deloused, and entrained home at U.S. expense. About 225,000 DPs, mostly Polish, were regarded as unrepatriable. Although feeding the DPs was soon on a satisfactory basis, their housing remained a major problem to the end of the occupation. On the other hand, MG authorities often found that better-educated, English-speaking individual DPs could be employed as excellent translators, counter-intelligence agents and office workers.¹¹⁰

In addition to the DPs, victims of German aggression, there were the German expellees from Eastern territories of the Reich, particularly from the German Sudetenland of pre-1938 Czechoslovakia, tens of thousands of whom died on their

forced migration. (Another less-told post-war horror story). They aroused little Allied sympathy. The majority of these Germans, who numbered no less than some 920,000 by June of 1946, were women, children and elderly or incapacitated males who represented yet another burden on what was left of the German civil economy.¹¹¹

Although the Kaufbeuren death asylum was undoubtedly an aberration, the persistence of some degree of German anti-Semitism apparently was not. As the German people emerged from the stunned apathy prevailing in the immediate post-war months, residual anti-Jewish feelings became more apparent, although always on a small scale. For example, displaced persons billets were smashed early in 1948 and some threatening letters warned the Jews to get out of Germany or be hanged like the notorious Jew-baiter, Julius Streicher. At the same time, the mayor of nearby Bamberg expressed an attitude not uncommon among Germans of the time: "You know, I have been receiving many complaints against Jews. They carry on a lot of black market activity, which makes it clear why anti-Semitism is growing here."

In despair and with perhaps some exaggeration, the Military Government's Advisor on Jewish Affairs (a rather ominous title) wrote in March 1948 that:

the German people would willingly readopt Hitler[']s policy of slaughtering the Jews if the American Army were not here to stop them. The American gun and the American bayonet are the only security for the Jews of American-occupied Germany.

The official U.S. Military Government report for the period concluded that "Responsible Germans and Austrians, as well as the occupation authorities, conceded that there was no future for Jewish displaced persons in Germany and Austria....", and saw resettlement elsewhere, presumably Palestine, as the only answer.¹¹²

Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives personnel continued to uncover many new finds after the German surrender and to protect them from GI souvenir hunters and outright thieves. In underground vaults below Nuremberg MFA&A troops uncovered the Neptune Fountain, looted by the *Wehrmacht* from Leningrad's Imperial Palace, as well as the great 15th century Viet Stoss altar from St. Mary's Church, Cracow. The Heilbronn salt mines yielded the stained glass windows of Strasbourg Cathedral. MFA&A troops did not simply stumble over these treasures. It took two months of detective work and the persistent interrogation of two lying Nuremberg city officials to bring to light the orb, scepter and the two swords of the Holy Roman Empire. The prevaricating officials justly received sentences of 25,000 mark fines and five-year prison terms. Probably the greatest find --thousands of paintings, 3,000 cases of books, and hundreds of artifacts, was uncovered in two salt mines near Salzburg, Austria. This loot was to stock the museum to be constructed in Linz, Austria, in honor of the artistic Adolph Hitler.

Much of the MFA&A work came in response to inquiries from all over the globe as to the whereabouts and welfare of libraries, collections, castles as well as

individual items, including a unique specimen of an Indian shark preserved in a Stuttgart museum. All foreign-owned items were carefully packed and forwarded to their rightful owners, whether in the Soviet Union, Poland, the Netherlands, France, etc. Those that were unarguably of German ownership, such as the Stuppach Madonna by Matthias Gruenwald (a small work but valued at \$2 million), were also returned, in this case to a village parish church in Bavaria.¹¹³

German military monuments or memorials posed a special problem. Did they glorify militarism? Were they from the Nazi era? MG Personnel were to use their common sense. They could also make "alterations," e. g. chiseling out swastikas from otherwise inoffensive monuments or memorials. Whether by alteration or removal, nothing should be done to "offend accepted good taste" or to "occasion unnecessary bitterness or lasting resentment among the broad masses of the citizenry."¹¹⁴ Such general guidelines tested MFA&A troops almost daily in the performance of their duties.

By no means was all of the looted art of Germany or other nations returned to its rightful owners. The stealing by GIs, enlisted and officers, could be said to have reached something like epidemic proportions in the post-war months. Between 1945 and 1962, 3,978 stolen art objects were recovered in the United States and returned to Europe, and undoubtedly many more escaped detection. Even so, not one museum or individual had U.S. criminal charges filed against them, although in some cases the victimized countries did so.¹¹⁵

The corruption, most unfortunately, was severe in the Monuments, Fine Art and Archives section. The head of the Berlin section, a former professor of anthropology, was a blatant thief, but when finally brought to trial in 1947 was simply dismissed from the service. Although the Army officer culprits in the greatest gem theft in modern history, the stealing of the Hesse Crown jewels, were court-martialed and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, wholesale art looting, or at least the commandeering for personal use by senior officers went almost entirely unpunished, in what was one of the worst marks against the U.S. occupation of Germany and Austria.¹¹⁶

Conscientious MFA&A soldiers were able to thwart some more official "looting" of German treasures. The officer in charge of the Central Collecting Point for German-owned works of art in Wiesbaden, CPT Walter Farmer, issued a strongly-worded objection to his orders, issued at the behest of the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D. C., that 202 of the most prized paintings in the collection be forthwith shipped to the United States. Thirty-three officers signed the "Wiesbaden Manifesto" actually publicly protesting their orders. The recalcitrant MFA&A officers pointed out that Germans were at that moment being prosecuted for taking into "protective custody" other nations' cultural treasures. If that shipment went to the U.S., for whatever purpose, "we are thus put before any candid eyes as no less culpable than those whose prosecution we affect to sanction." Nonetheless, the 202 paintings were crated up and shipped to Washington. The "Wiesbaden Manifesto" had caught the public eye, however, and there would be no further such shipments. After going on

exhibition in Washington and on a national tour, the paintings were returned to Germany and their rightful owners.¹¹⁷

Yet for all of Germany's other post-war problems, the black market was probably what dominated the minds and probably even the activities of most Germans and Americans. In the absence of a currency of any value every American, from commanding officers to the lowliest private had plenty of the "true coin" of the MG realm: cigarettes, coffee, chocolate, nylons, as well as the gasoline, medicines and drugs that could be obtained by soldiers of pliable integrity. The situation was greatly exacerbated by the wartime action of the U.S. Treasury Department of handing over to their Soviet allies the plates for the printing of Allied military marks. The Soviets paid their soldiers only in those marks, which they printed in the billions. They did not permit those troops to send any money home and the marks were not convertible into rubles. They could only be spent in Germany and, legally, could only be used for purchases from the financially buoyant Americans. The Soviets favored American watches, particularly of the "Mickey Mouse" variety. For many US soldiers, the temptations, German and Soviet, proved irresistible. A spot check at Frankfurt at about this time showed that more than one-half of the marks sent home by GIs were of Soviet origin.¹¹⁸

The more enterprising U.S. troops established themselves as major black-market operators, without a twinge of conscience, reasoning that they were merely providing a service much in demand. Whatever the interested justifications, the black market certainly contributed to the general sense of cynicism and lack of respect for the law by both Germans and Americans. In August of 1946, for example, Dr. E. Y. Hartshorne, the Harvard authority on German higher education, was brazenly and fatally gunned down by "Germans in American uniforms," presumably blackmarketeers, on the Nuremberg-Munich autobahn.¹¹⁹ The Dusseldorf Chamber of Commerce estimated that about one-half of all transactions in 1947 in that city took place outside regular channels. American Military Government even opened official "barter rings" where legal (and taxable) exchanges could take place among civilians only. The situation was exemplified by the quite typical Ruhr miner who earned 60 RM per week and who owned a hen which laid five eggs per week. The miner would eat one egg and barter the remaining four for 25 cigarettes. Each cigarette would bring 8RM on the black market, for a total of 160 RM. Thus the miner's hen earned nearly three times as much on the black market as the miner earned for a full six days' toil in the mine!

This was but small beer compared to what the American GI could make on the illegal market. The temptation to provide people with what they really want, when their government doesn't want them to want it, and to make a lot of money at it often proved irresistible for general officers and privates alike. It would be difficult to imagine a more lethal threat to military discipline. In the words of one admittedly jaundiced former MG officer:

Food is scarce and rationing strict, but get close to the right American and you'll be O.K. That's the way to get gasoline, too, if you need it. There's a law making punishable "illegal possession, control or disposition of property of the Allied forces or any member thereof." But where did the food, the cigarettes, the GI blankets and clothing come from? The Germans know - the Americans.¹²⁰

In return, the Germans could provide services, most often sex and liquor, but also heirlooms, ranging from delicate Meissen china to super-charged Mercedes-Benz roadsters formerly owned by Nazi big-wigs. Literally millions of U.S. dollars as well as jewelry, artifacts and antiques, flowed Stateside from the U.S. Zones of Germany and Austria.¹²¹ A pack of American cigarettes (PX cost ten packs for \$.50) brought \$10-\$20, a five-cent candy bar \$5, a cake of soap \$3, a bottle of spirits \$75-\$100 (most GI could legally pick up four per month at the PX), an Army watch \$200 (the "Mickey Mouse" variety, beloved of the Red Army, cost the GI \$3.). All such transactions were illegal and all were ubiquitous. Diligent troopers could anticipate annual incomes of more than \$31,000.¹²² It was the Rhineland all over again, but worse. In the words of one contemporary, "Johnny doesn't have to 'make the best of it,' because Johnny already has the best of it."¹²³ On the other hand, it should be noted that although practically all U.S. occupation troops and their dependents utilized the black market, the overwhelming majority were mainly interested in satisfying limited personal desires and were hardly "big-time operators."¹²⁴

In fact, the operations of OMGUS in the fall and winter of 1945 took place against a background of one of the worst morale and discipline problems perhaps ever faced by the U.S. Army. After V-J Day a seeming epidemic of looting, murder, rape, and generally drunken behavior broke out among U.S. troops in Germany. "High point men," veteran troops soon to be discharged, often felt that they had a right to one last fling while the liquor and women were still cheap, and most offenses involved one or the other or both. Wartime's "SNAFU" was replaced by "FYIGMO," the last part of which read "I got my orders" (to go home). "Low point men," resentful, inexperienced and retained in the Army long after they could see any need for their services, tended to take out their frustration on the near-helpless Germans. "Welcome to Germany" lectures and literature emphasizing the horrors of that nation's invasion and occupation of its unoffending neighbors, did not, of course, inculcate any feelings of respect or restraint toward the "Krauts." "We're treating them one hell of a lot better than they treated the people they took over," was a common enough GI reaction to any criticism of troop behavior toward civilians. One of General McNarney's exhortations to the troops ended with "The ragged German trudging along the street with a load of firewood may not look vicious, but he has a lot in common with a trapped rat."¹²⁵

Less punitive soldier contact with the Germans resulted in a venereal disease rate of 30 percent, an all-time high for the U.S. Army. In June 1947 the European

Command had the highest VD rate in the entire Army. Some units, unbelievably, scored a rate of over 1,000 cases per 1,000 troops per annum. One unit, confined to quarters over Christmas day 1946 suffered from a rate that averaged 3.66 cases of infection per soldier. The motor vehicle accident rate also soared; from June to November 1945 there were 7,800 motor vehicle accidents, at a time when the military were virtually the only motor drivers on the road. The situation only got worse. Through 1946 13,320 such accidents claimed 1,000 lives and cost the Army some \$10,000,000. Wartime Provost Marshal courts martial cases document the concern of reviewing authorities that many of those condemned to death for rape or murder were of near-retarded mental capacity and should not have been inducted in the first place. Or as one MG veteran put it later, "The Army required few references."¹²⁶ The U.S. Selective Service System certainly had not been particularly selective towards the end of the war, inducting thugs and the mentally-deficient along with concert pianists and brain surgeons. Now the troops were demanding to go home immediately, often vociferously and in demonstrations watched by astonished Germans. When their repatriation did not come quickly enough, many turned their frustration onto the people responsible for bringing them over in the first place --the Germans. Unfortunately, those who did get to go home early were the trained and experienced MG officers.¹²⁷

Yet it was at this same time that the U.S. Forces European Theater's Civil Censorship Division reported that its Berlin mail showed that approximately 75 percent of opinions revealed in more than 16,000 letters were favorable to the Americans. A full 80 percent of the remarks on the Soviet occupation forces were unfavorable. Obviously, the Germans were publicly saying one thing and privately writing quite another.¹²⁸ Nonetheless, the situation would not truly improve until the majority of "low point men" had been sent home and until the establishment of the U.S. Army Constabulary. Even after, the U.S. soldier on occupation duty faced almost irresistible temptation until the currency reform of June 1948 put the Germans back on a cash economy.¹²⁹

In reaction to fears that morale and discipline might collapse entirely, the U.S. Army Constabulary was activated on 15 February 1946 at Bamberg, in northern Bavaria, under MG Ernest Harmon, wartime commander of the 1st and 2d Armored Division and of XXII Corps. When it became operational the Constabulary numbered some 3,000 personnel. From the start the Constabulary was to be an elite unit, cleared of all short-timers and given first priority on officers and high priority for enlisted personnel. Officers and NCOs were given special training at the Constabulary School in Sonthofen, southern Bavaria. The Constabulary was organized into three brigades of three regiments each, in addition to special troops, which included a school squadron and intelligence and counter-intelligence personnel. Each of the three regiments included three squadrons, a light tank company of 17 M-24 tanks, nine liaison-type light aircraft and a horse platoon of 30 mounted men for operations over difficult terrain.

The Constabulary's daily work was primarily concerned with anti-black market investigations and operations. Constabulary armor would also stage shows of force, usually in those German areas where there had been a large number of security violations and serious incidents.¹³⁰

The U. S. Constabulary proved to be an excellent unit searching for a mission. It was to assume from Army tactical commanders the responsibility for area security throughout the U. S. Zone of Occupation. However, by the time the Constabulary had been activated, that mission was being accomplished with increasing effectiveness by German authorities under U. S. MG supervision. The Constabulary then turned its main attention to keeping order in the DP camps, a responsibility that also proved temporary as the camps increasingly relied their own, newly-trained, police. With the establishment of military posts and the transfer to post commanders of responsibility for general area security, about the only major mission for the Constabulary was that of border security. Even that mission was reduced as general border security was turned over to armed German border guards in the middle of 1947 and as the major flows of refugees sharply diminished. Nonetheless, the Constabulary certainly served as a much-needed deterrent to disorderly and criminal elements in the U. S. Zone and provided an example of at least one U. S. Army unit whose discipline, *esprit* and spit-and-polish even the more supercilious Germans could admire. ("Almost like the Wehrmacht")¹³¹

The vexed question of fraternization with the Germans was finally settled by July of 1945 with what soon enough became a policy of complete fraternization. For some reason the myth has persisted that the first chink in this U. S. Army *apartheid* was the GIs' fondness for children. The record is quite clear that, on the contrary, it was the American soldier's fondness for German women that brought down the wall. Well before that barrier had fallen, non-fraternization (perhaps more accurately termed "non-fertilization" by the troops) was easily "the most widespread violation of [America's] own law since Prohibition." Some soldiers were even kept behind barbed wire, as at the SHAEF compound in Frankfurt, leading to the German gibe that the America was the only nation that built concentration camps for its own people.¹³² The situation was intolerable for GIs, who noticed that higher-ranking officers seemed to experience no difficulty in squiring around WACs, nurses or Allied and Red Cross women, while the enlisted men sulked in ice cream parlors or other makeshift substitutes for feminine company. One possible legitimate outlet was female DPs, but how to tell such a female from the forbidden German variety? The 12th Army Group came up with the bright idea of "an armband four inches wide, made of materials in the colors of their respective nations [which] will be worn on the left arm by Allied DPs as a symbol of recognition." Another unit helpfully suggested special buttons for such identification. Armbands or buttons, there were simply far too few available young female DPs to make much difference. Perhaps the height of denial was reached when SHAEF, from behind its barbed wire, blandly announced, to general amusement, that "Contraction of

venereal disease or the facts concerning prophylactic treatment will not be used directly or indirectly as evidence of fraternization."

Finally, the misbegotten policy simply collapsed. On 14 July 1945 General Eisenhower, who had adamantly proclaimed only a month earlier that there could be no fraternization until the last Nazi criminals had been punished, now primly announced, to joyous acclaim, that personnel in his command would be permitted "to engage in conversation with adult Germans on the streets and in public places." (GIs could already hold brief conversations with German children.)¹³³ By way of contrast, the tough-minded French and Soviets in their respective occupation zones had no objection to the closest relations with individual Germans who might prove useful, and seemed to have little concern with their Nazi antecedents, but rather treated their zones as something to be exploited. The British tended to be stern but fair. Whatever the individual faults of the U.S. soldier, Germans after each of their 20th century wars overwhelmingly preferred to be ruled by Americans. (But then, Americans had not seen their country invaded, conquered or bombed by the Germans twice in a little more than 25 years.) OMGUS, however, did retain restrictions on Americans entering a number of German establishments, such as nightclubs, for another four years, although permitting attendance at German churches.

The occupation settled down as the infamous "low point" troops returned to the U.S. and the Constabulary restored order. The arrival of the first women and children American military dependents also brought a more wholesome cast to the occupation. In fact, the American military actually came in time to have fewer contacts with the Germans, as more civil government functions were turned over to German agencies and as more American soldiers began to live in compounds with their families and their children attended special Army schools. Overall policy also changed from a punitive occupation to rehabilitating the U.S. Zone and, with the Berlin airlift, to the defense of Western Europe from the Soviet threat.¹³⁴

In contrast to earlier agonized debates as to whether U.S. soldiers could fraternize with German children, OMGUS in late July 1946, with the legacy of the Hitler Youth very much in mind, and also simply to get the kids off the streets, created a German Youth Activities (GYA) Section. Although many U.S. Army units were already involved in their own German youth activities, in October 1946 each subordinate unit of any Army major command, down to company level, was required to assign an officer to the sole duty of implementing the GYA program. The GYA mission was to provide German youth with wholesome recreation by sponsoring informal events, such as picnics, film exhibitions or outings. The idea behind the GYA was that German youth, who had known nothing but the Nazi poison from their schools and the Hitler Youth, must be weaned from that hateful ideology if democracy were to take root and survive in the next German generation.

Membership, of course, was entirely voluntary, in contrast to the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* of the Soviet Zone, which nonetheless had a smaller membership than GYA. Except for liquor, women and black market goods, nothing came easily for the



German Youth Administration leader distributes Army shoes, c. 1947. Signal Corps, National Archives

U.S. occupation in those years, and GYA was no exception. It proved difficult to find Army personnel with a knowledge of German who could also handle active youths on the playing field as well as conduct meaningful discussions about the meaning of democracy with them around a table. It proved no easier to recruit qualified, "clean" adult German leaders because so many with any interest and experience in youth activities had been tainted by association with the Hitler Jugend.

So long as GYA remained an anti-juvenile delinquency program, its success proved minimal. However, reports of anti-democratic or semi-militaristic clandestine German youth gangs galvanized MG to greater efforts and by the summer of 1946 something like 25 percent of German youth were enrolled in the organization. In the end, Nazi indoctrination of the youth of Germany must have been either much less effective than alarmists had calculated, or the GYA did its job very well, for there were very few proven instances of German youngsters committing any Nazi-inspired acts, although German youth got into their share of trouble in those difficult post-war years.¹³⁵

An indication of the growing estrangement between the Western Allies and the Soviets, and in what could be considered the first step in German unification, was the near-merging of the British and U.S. zones of occupation ("Bizonia") in 1947.¹³⁶ By that year, the chief of MG for Bavaria would assert:

The American Military Government was not interested in the efficiency of the Bavarian Government, except where lack of efficiency interfered with the execution of approved U.S. policy, became a threat to our security or the general welfare of our occupying forces. The main mission of Military Government in 1947 was that of observation, inspection, advising, supervising to ensure that the actions of the Bavarian Government conformed to occupational policy. In addition, Military Government did everything possible to assist the Bavarian government to economic recovery.¹³⁷

Even though there had been considerable restoration of the German infrastructure, the economies of the Western Allied zones had basically stagnated since 1945. However, on 20 June 1948 the Western occupying powers (the French were the last to agree) instituted a sweeping currency reform that literally at one stroke ended the debilitating German inflation and rapidly created the conditions for the "German miracle" that within a decade would make West Germany the dominant economic power on the European continent. In a series of laws promulgated by the Western military governors each German received 40 new marks. The old marks were no longer valid but could be deposited and converted at a later date, which avoided currency manipulation and speculation. A moratorium was declared on all debts, wages and other contractual obligations, which were written down by the same 90 percent liquidation rate that applied to the new currency. The entire internal German

debt (estimated at RM400 billion) was invalidated, although provision was made for liquid assets and new public securities to keep institutions solvent which held large quantities of government fiscal obligations. The Germans were understandably cheered by the 33 1/3 percent reduction in taxes that accompanied the currency reform -- and there was a statutory requirement that German governments balance their budgets. The German economy, that is in the Western Allied zones, experienced a quick and lasting revival. The shops filled with consumer goods supposedly unobtainable a few days before. In the words of one authority, "Previously everyone had money, but there was little to buy. Now, no one had very much money and there was almost everything to buy."¹³⁸ Only once before in modern times had so drastic and successful a monetary conversion been instituted, and that nation, again, had been Germany, after World War I. Apparently, it takes the shock of a lost war and dismal post-war conditions to prepare a nation for such fiscal surgery. The only criticism of this daring stroke of monetary genius is that it should, and could, have come about two years earlier.

The magnitude of this transformation is seen in the responses of Germans surveyed in Munich in March 1948, the month of the Czech communist coup and just one month before the currency reform. The respondents then were unanimous in their conviction that the communists would soon roll over the western occupation zones and that the Military Governments would have only themselves to blame, primarily because of the "hunger democracy" they had imposed on Germany.¹³⁹

The Soviets responded to the currency reform with a blockade of all surface routes into Berlin, to which the Western allies responded by successfully supplying the city, occupiers and Germans alike, through the legendary Berlin Airlift. Now the Germans were considered to be on something like the front line of the East-West confrontation, and the earlier punitive attitudes faded. One year later, Germany achieved limited sovereignty with the establishment of the German Federal Republic and OMGUS was replaced by the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany and civilian high commissioners replaced the military governors throughout the U. S. Zone. Any reservations the Germans might have entertained about the just-ended U. S. MG (and the British and French versions, for that matter) were easily attenuated by a glance over to the Soviet Zone.¹⁴⁰ However, it should also be pointed out that the occupation costs of the U. S. Zone, billed directly to the German taxpayer, exceeded the amount drained out of the Soviet Zone by reparations.¹⁴¹ A battered, truncated land in 1945-1948, Western Germany, its cities moonscapes, packed with refugees and expellees, its political legacy the most murderous philosophy ever devised, its complex industrial infrastructure a ruin, its most worthwhile currency cigarette butts, subservient to a conqueror's Military Government, had been transformed by those conquerors, of all people, into a functioning, economically-flourishing, democratic powerhouse in a mere four or five years by the one of the most successful military occupations in history.¹⁴²

Austria

The U.S. Military Government of Austria differed in many ways from that of Germany. There were also strong similarities. As in Germany, there was an American Zone, along with zones for the three other Allies, and the capital, Vienna, was, like Berlin, deep inside the Soviet Zone, but also divided into four Allied zones. Like Germany, Austria had suffered severely from aerial bombardment, although it had not been fought over so severely. Its people were, if anything, more hungry than the Germans, and their country, as a whole, had also basically ceased to function by the time of V-E Day.


As in the early months of the German occupation, Army tactical units were kept in control of affairs for months after the termination of hostilities to control a conquered (or was it a liberated?) nation.¹⁴³ The 3d Division in Salzburg, for example, kept a township MG unit away from the capital of its township, and mindless tactical unit orders even kept milk away from Austrian dairies. Understandably lacking much knowledge of civilian needs, the units imposed prohibitions on the exportation of foodstuffs and on any civilian travel, although such activities were often necessary to revive the economy. Again in Salzburg, American military courts were still trying Austrians for illegal parking, were directing traffic and American military officers were mis-using their time in directing snow removal, street cleaning, etc. One can only conclude that the 3d Division command was looking about for something with which to keep its troops busy after the fighting had ended.

There had been strong debate among the Allies and within the American political leadership as to how completely the Austrians should be held fully accountable for the war in Europe. Austria had been annexed to Germany in 1938 (the *Anschluss*) by threat of force and Nazi thugs had earlier assassinated one of her chancellors. Because of its status as a semi-victim of Nazi aggression, Austria was not required to sign a surrender instrument. On the other hand, when Hitler had motored into Vienna, he, an Austrian, had been rapturously welcomed, and the Austrians did not seem to have been particularly discontented while within the Third Reich.¹⁴⁴

The Austrians' claim to be more the victims of Nazism than accomplices was not harmed by the fact that an anti-Nazi city government had been set up in Salzburg before the entry of the Americans and the formation of a land government merely awaited Allied approval.¹⁴⁵ The issue was rather quickly resolved, at least for the Americans, in favor of treating the Austrians as liberated people. The *Report of the United States High Commissioner: Military Government Austria* in each of its monthly reports, 1945-1949, gave as its benign mission "To reestablish a free, independent and democratic Austria, with a sound economy, capable of insuring an adequate standard of living."¹⁴⁶

President Roosevelt had had his doubts as to whether there should even be a U.S. Zone of occupation for Austria and hoped to keep American participation in the

OCCUPATION AREAS OF AUSTRIA



From: American Military Occupation of Germany



Innsbruck, Austria. MG officer hears complaints through interpreter (in scarf), 1945. Signal Corps, National Archives

affairs of Austria to a minimum. In the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, the three major Allies declared their policy that Austria was indeed to be treated as a liberated victim rather than an accomplice of Germany. Still, at the least there would have to be an untangling of Austrian laws and finances from the German/Nazi enactments, as the two nations were once again to be separated, and so some Allied military presence would be necessary for a limited time. The Soviets, however, who had no intention of sharing their governance of Austria with their wartime partners, successfully insisted on the division of Austria into Allied military zones.¹⁴⁷

Nonetheless, Austria was able to secure a national government years before anything similar emerged in Germany. The Soviets, on entering Vienna, had been greeted by the provisional Austrian government, and the Allies in September 1945 approved that government. Austria could hold national elections in November of that year, and in January 1946 the Allies recognized the resultant popularly-elected government.¹⁴⁸

The first tangible move toward U.S. military occupation of Austria came with the opening of a school for military government at Portici, Italy in February 1945. Of the 121 U.S. Army officers it trained for Austrian Military Government duties, 71 had prior MG experience and the rest were on detached service from tactical units.¹⁴⁹ U.S. Army MG units, under the command of the 36th Division's Military Government Section, moved into Austria in May of 1945. As in Germany, MG units were greeted by chaos, as civil administration had collapsed. As in Germany, their first duties were the posting of proclamations, the dislodging of Nazi-tainted burgermeister, the establishment of curfews and regulations for civilians and the requisitioning of food and shelter for refugees and DPs. The latter, again as in Germany, posed a serious problem, and MG officers had to work with the 36th Division to establish a camp for some 4000 DPs and 1700 German refugees awaiting repatriation. In less than a month, 6,000 DPs crowded into the camp and more had to be turned away to wander the countryside.¹⁵⁰ Because of such DP privileges as an extra 800 daily calorie ration, exemption for compulsory work mandates, extensive issuances of American clothing and, most importantly, cigarettes, their camps became major black market centers. In Salzburg, some 30,000 DPs committed as much black market offenses as the 300,000 Austrians in the area. These activities did subside later in 1946 when the army began to police the camps and to conduct moderately successful "shakedowns."¹⁵¹

In June 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted to the U.S. Commander in Austria their directives for Austrian MG. They did not differ that much from those that would govern Germany. These including the elimination of German and Nazi domination, reparations, the apprehension of war criminals, the reconstruction of the Austrian economy and the rebirth of Austria as a free, democratic state. A less-positive provision was that Austria, like Germany, must undergo "approved programs of reparation and restitution."¹⁵²

The Austrians seemed to reciprocate this ambivalence. In 1947 one survey showed that half of those questioned blamed the Allies for the lack of a return to

normal conditions, while 23 percent thought that the Allies had genuinely assisted their nation's rehabilitation, and the remainder had no real opinion. These Austrians also ranked the Americans as their favorite occupiers (if there had to be an occupation), followed by the British, and, at a great distance, by the French (sometimes called "washed" or "perfumed" Russians for their leftist or even communist proclivities), with the Soviets almost off the bottom end of the scale.¹⁵³

The Military Government of the U.S. Zone of Austria, of course, early became involved in denazification. The Austrian denazification was somewhat different from that in Germany, in that the Austrian government was involved from the start. Three days before the German surrender, the Austrian Provisional Government, composed of prominent political figures who had suffered at the hands of the Nazis, outlawed the National Socialist Party, ordered all former party members to register, and promptly disenfranchised the lot.¹⁵⁴

As in Germany, there was something of a cut-off date for determining the taint of Nazism. Those who had held party membership before the *Anschluss* of 1938, a particularly brutal lot, could hold no responsible position, period. Those who had joined after were somewhat better off. They were barred only from government office or high business positions. Austrian de-nazification for the first two years of the occupation was pursued with an even more heavy hand than in Germany. Between August 1945 and February 1946 some 11,000 Austrians were arrested in the American Zone, including all men who had served as mayors of towns after 1938. These mass arrests debilitated the revival of Austrian civil government. Nazism was as deeply embedded in popular sentiment in Austria as anywhere in Germany.¹⁵⁵

Under a new law of that year, the program officially became an Austrian responsibility. Austrian ex-Nazis were divided into 42,000 strongly implicated (*belastete*) and 482,000 weakly implicated (*minderbelastete*) party members. These numbers alone should give an idea of the strength of Nazism in Austria. Punishments were hardly draconian. *Minderbelasteten* had merely to pay substantial fines, while *Belasteten* simply remained disenfranchised and could be removed from sensitive government jobs, such as teaching, and might lose their homes. As in other post-war occupations, the year 1948 saw a reorientation from punishment (such as it was) to rehabilitation and in April of that year all *minderbelasteten* were amnestied, well in time for the 1949 elections.¹⁵⁶

The resumption of education in the American Zone was delayed until December of 1945 by the need to investigate almost all teachers, who had been compelled to join the Party to hold their jobs. A lack of textbooks also delayed school opening. As early as February 1946 American Military Government officials felt enough progress had been made to turn the process over to the Austrian authorities. Rather predictably, the program was no longer pursued with such thoroughness.

Camp Marcus Orr held 8,500 interned persons suspected of Nazi affiliations, but hardened SS veterans were now billeted with more harmless lower-level party functionaries. The camp seemed to do more to strengthen already-held attitudes, than

bring home to its inmates any sense of responsibility for their previous actions. Outside the camp, a former Nazi *gauleiter*, supported by the U.S. *land* military governor, got off with a trifling fine, while lesser-known officials without U.S. protection could find themselves facing ten-year jail terms. The Austrian authorities began to concentrate more on Nazi criminal actions rather than on mere party membership. Understandably, throughout Austria the feeling was that "they catch the little ones and let the big ones run."¹⁵⁷ The American diplomat, Hugh Gibson, exclaimed in disgust that:

Our bungling denazification procedure...is playing right into the hands of the Russians, as any former Nazi, no matter how obnoxious, can obtain absolution by walking into the Russian zone and applying for registration as a communist...no questions.

But a U.S. civilian official, himself Austrian born, riposted that such "absolution" did require going over to the Soviet Zone, not a palatable prospect for Austrians of whatever political persuasion.

The Austrians were also bothered, at least through 1947, by an over-abundance of MG jurisdictions for so small a country; seemingly one every ten kilometers, and each with its own rules and regulations and with different interpretation of basic U.S. MG directives. Again, as in Germany, the Army boundaries did not follow political boundaries. About as provoking was the automatic imposition of a non-fraternization rule for relations between American military personnel and Austrian civilians.¹⁵⁸

The Information Services Branch (ISB) of American Military Government published the *Wiener Kurier*, which enjoyed the largest circulation of any journal in Austria and operated the red-white-red three-station radio network, sponsored or published five magazines, reopened the Salzburg Mozart festival as early as 1945, licensed eight newspapers and distributed the German MG newsreel *Welt im Film*. These efforts were well-received by the civil population. Between the discredited, lying Nazi propaganda of the recent past, and current material that at least made the effort to be truthful as well as interesting and entertaining, there could be little contest. However, ISB failed to produce almost any books or magazines for the Austrian public.

ISB bookstores in February 1946 featured only of a translation of *Reader's Digest*, a translation of Robert Sherwood's *Tarawa* and a book of photographs of concentration camps, a pathetic showing to attract a people as literate as the Austrians. In the early months of the occupation, there was not much competition.¹⁵⁹

Austria's U.S. Zone also the endured the same troop indiscipline and criminal activities that were disfiguring the German occupation. One officer wrote to a friend in the States that:

The Army is no good now here, Earl. The 18 yr. old replacements are a bunch who get insanely drunk on one drink, try to beat up civilians and

raise hell. One of them stabbed another in the club last month so our club closed after nine months.... One guy got 15 days for failing to salute a Colonel. It's worse than basic but these new characters need it badly. The poor old re-enlistees are all sorry they signed up again.

Such reprehensible behavior still did not seem to shake the basic popularity of the Americans. The same author noted a little later that the Commander of U.S. Forces in Austria and High Commissioner for Austria, General Mark Clark, was cheered by Austrian civilians along his automobile route in Salzburg.¹⁶⁰

The basic tangible problems remained of a divided Austria that could not feed itself and lacked the production base to pay for imports of food. There were shortages of practically all of the necessities of life, particularly of food, fuel, transport and housing. Although the Austrians, in theory, received a somewhat higher food ration (1550 calories) than the Germans, the Army had to import some 240,000 tons of food to maintain that ration. During the occupation's early years the food ration could drift down to 1300 or even 700 calories daily.¹⁶¹ Vienna seemed a ghost city, with the only activity one American observer noted that of Soviet soldiers shoveling a pile of telephones into a truck, loading park benches into railroad cars, or cutting large swatches of leather from padded chairs.¹⁶² In fact, from 1 April 1946 to the end of the year the Allies turned over feeding of the Austrians (in each zone of occupation) to UNRRA. The situation only gradually improved the following year, as the U.S. Zone of Austria, uniquely, joined the Marshall Plan for European recovery.¹⁶³ A few of the rigors of life in the American Zone were alleviated somewhat by a generous transfer of captured enemy equipment, although more than one *ex-Wehrmacht* staff car was "released" unofficially for a bottle of schnapps. The U.S. Army could also prove generous. Some \$3.5 million worth of Army blankets were released to the Austrian economy free of charge in the early months of the occupation.¹⁶⁴

The Austrian occupation was also complicated by the clash between the Soviets and the Western occupying Allies. Although in 1947 the U.S. began to pay all of its own occupation costs, the only occupying power in Austria to do so, the Soviets insisted on the Austrians paying for the privilege of being occupied by a foreign army, as well as on continuing reparations and were not at all helpful in sharing any of their zone's oil, or even more important, food production.

Another vexed problem was that of the restitution to their rightful owners of property looted by the Nazis and deposited in Austria. When the commandant of the French Zone expressed his discontent over the pace of restitution to his country, General Clark's deputy, emphatically pointed out that as of June 1946 his forces had shipped back to France \$3,793,812 worth of oil refining equipment (thirty rail car loads), cranes and artwork. The following year \$1,489,450 worth of machine tools and \$1,598,850 worth of railroad rolling stock and artwork went back to France, with machine tools appraised at \$1,625,000 being prepared for transfer. General Balmer conceded that "these restitutions will have a catastrophic effect upon the Austrian

economy." Often the determination of ownership could prove quite tricky. For example, the Soviets claimed 50 boxes containing eight Swiss-made electric rectifiers and four transformers found in the U. S. Zone. They neglected to mention that, although the Soviet Union had placed a similar order with a Swiss firm before the war, it had never paid for the goods nor accepted delivery, and, in fact, there was no evidence that any of it had ever made its way east.

The Austrians themselves could on occasion prove about as difficult in such matters. Desperately short of transport vehicles that did not burn petroleum, Austrian authorities reluctantly returned Milan's electric trolley busses, which the Germans had hijacked off that Italian city's streets during the war, and paid the resulting transportation costs only after constant American prodding. In 1948 officials simply refused to admit French and U.S. representatives to the German-owned United Iron and Steel Works at Linz, wherein were eight looted French Magdeburg lathes.¹⁶⁵

Displaced Persons and forced repatriation were also major problems in the U.S. Zone of Austria. After some initial forced repatriation to the east the American position firmed against such unsavory work. Yet as late as February 1948, Soviet officers were entering DP camps in the U.S. Zone without American escorts, a violation of agreements reached by both occupying powers. By this date those Soviet citizens left in the camps were literally violently anti-Soviet and MPs had to be called on several occasions to restore order, occasionally with light tanks.¹⁶⁶

As for the black market, there was no significant difference between that flourishing in Austria or in Germany. Money was practically worthless and the Americans had more than enough cigarettes, chocolate, coffee, nylons, canned goods, etc. The rot began at the top. Dr. Eleanor Dulles, of the U.S. Economic Division in Vienna, claimed that only two colleagues and herself were not deeply involved in black market activities.¹⁶⁷

A reviving Austrian economy mirrored that of West Germany and western Europe by the early 1950s. However, the ending of the Military Government of Austria was considerably quicker and cleaner than that in Germany. Fortunately for Austria, the nation had not been politically divided. In 1955 the foreign ministers of the occupying powers met in Vienna and negotiated a peace treaty with Austria (One with Germany still awaits more than half a century after the German surrender.) which provided for Austria's neutralization and confirmed that nation's 1937 boundaries. Soon after, the last occupying forces departed.

The Austrians seemed genuinely distressed to see General Clark leave and similar regrets were expressed at the departure of the U.S. Deputy High Commissioner in 1949. Significantly these sentiments were reciprocated by those American MG personnel who have left records. General Clark, for example, recorded his high esteem for Austrian Chancellor Leopold Figl. In fact, one U.S. official characterized the Austrian leadership, of those days, presumably with some exaggeration, as "working day and night, literally to their graves."¹⁶⁸

The great immediate failure of the Austrian occupation was that of denazification.¹⁶⁹ Yet Military Government veterans can take comfort in the fact that, in the longer run, both nations, as strong democracies, seem to have cast out the Hitler virus, or at least to have channeled it into the more respectable environs of simply extreme nationalism.

In fact, considering that Austria, unlike Germany or Korea, was not divided as a result of military occupation, that the country was freed of military occupation almost a quarter of a century before Germany, and that, unlike Korea (or the Rhineland occupation for that matter), no war ensued after military occupation ended, that the Americans left with the general plaudits of the population, and with the near-absence of the strikes and riots of the early years of the Japanese occupation, the now almost-forgotten U.S. occupation of Austria could be characterized as America's most successful essay to date in Military Government.

Japan

“Military Occupation Can't Succeed.” *Harper's*, November 1945.

With the sudden capitulation of Japan a major nation surrendered, for the first time in modern history, without its territory having been invaded.¹⁷⁰ Consequently, for the first time since the Rhineland MG, U.S. armed forces assumed control of a government that was in place and functioning, from the capital on down to the local towns and villages. (It should also be remembered that the Japanese Army was in place, intact and fully equipped.) However battered Japan had been by aerial bombardment in the last year of the conflict and whatever her enormous losses throughout the Pacific War, her government had retained absolute control of the nation. When that government, in the person of the divine Emperor Hirohito, ordered its people to cease resistance, the entire nation, civilian and military, immediately and completely, did so. When that government at the same time mandated that its subjects cooperate with the Allied conquerors, again there was nearly complete compliance. (The sole apparent exception was the actions of a group of “renegade” Japanese officers who killed some U.S. POWs and resisted surrender for a brief period.) It could even be argued that “Military Government” might not be a strictly accurate description of the American Occupation of Japan, in that the American military in August of 1945 simply assumed the overall control of the still-functioning Japanese government from the Emperor on down. In the words of the official history of the Occupation of Japan:

Military Government, while supervising the economic, political, social, and cultural structure of Japan, was to intervene as little as possible in Japanese governmental matters. The governmental reins remained in the hands of Japanese officials, and intervention was limited to cases of

inadvertent or deliberate abuse of this privilege. The Japanese were constantly being prompted to take the initiative in bringing about prescribed reforms.¹⁷¹

More specifically, the Japanese government mandated, in the form of an Imperial Ordinance, that all acts prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation and all violations of that occupation's directives were now crimes under Japanese law, and could be tried in either MG or Japanese courts.¹⁷²

The seven-year occupation of Japan by the United States was arguably the most thoroughgoing --and successful --effort by one nation to change another's very way of life in modern history. Basically, Japan was to be reconstructed into something like an Oriental version of the United States. For all the horrors of Nazism, Germany was a nation in the Western tradition, like the United States and even had something of a democratic tradition, strong labor unions and a vigorous parliamentary life, at least under the immediate pre-Hitler Weimar constitution. Educated Americans were familiar with Luther, Beethoven, Goethe or Schiller. Japan, on the other hand, its history, culture and government, was almost totally *terra incognita*, even to American university graduates. What the vast majority of Americans did think they knew about Japan they had imbibed from the "We-have-ways-to-make-you-talk," or "You-forget-I-graduate-from-UCRA" type of wartime films. However, as one veteran authority on the occupation wrote much later, with historical perspective, "In retrospect this deficiency in knowledge and competence appears fortuitous for it prevented us from making too many serious mistakes."¹⁷³ This ignorance of Japan extended to the State Department, conspicuously laggard in its planning for the Japanese occupation. In fact, it was not impelled to any such action until 26 months into the war when it began to respond to a series of 23 questions relating to Japanese Military Government forwarded by MG Hilldring.¹⁷⁴ Like Germany, Japan was to be recreated as a demilitarized and democratized nation, and with an economic free market, but in the case of Japan, with a land-owning peasantry as well. The United States would not impose "upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people," but rather [would work?] through the "encouragement of desires for individual liberties and democratic processes." Still, the United States would have the final word in the event of any difference of opinion with the Japanese authorities.¹⁷⁵

Unlike MG in Germany, however, whose chiefs few Americans could ever name, the Japanese occupation would be dominated throughout almost its entire term by one officer, the fabulous General Douglas MacArthur, designated the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers (SCAP). Even the Emperor Hirohito, retained on his throne as a revered figurehead monarch, proved no competition. MacArthur seemed to have no difficulty in assuming the role of an aloof, benign overlord of the Japanese in place of the Emperor. In fact, the general was sometimes referred to by the Japanese as "Mikasa Shogun," ("MacArthur Ruler") and one Japanese newspaper shocked Japanese by daring to suggest that the "divine occupier," although the greatest of



Democracy in Action: Communist Party rally in Tokyo, 1946. USASOC History Archives (Hans Menglesdorf, artist)

mortals, was not truly divine.¹⁷⁶ MacArthur also retained his post as theater Commander in Chief of United States Forces in the Far East (USFFE).

Surprisingly for those who view MacArthur as an uncompromising conservative, the prevailing tenor of the early years of the occupation of Japan was of a New Deal, even "liberal," cast.¹⁷⁷ A contemporary observer perceptively noted that:

a program which would have appalled Americans if proposed for application to the United States is inaugurating democracy in Japan. One must assume that the master of ceremonies, General MacArthur, and not the program, has caught American attention.¹⁷⁸

In contrast to the selection process for MG officers destined for the European Theater, very few officers had been commissioned directly from civilian life for such duty in the Pacific, although many had seen combat in one or both of the World Wars. Their training had also been extensive. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Civil Affairs Holding and Staging Area (CASA --the "H" was somehow dropped.), Monterey, California jointly produced 18 CA handbooks covering such subjects as Japanese transportation, agriculture, industry, finance, etc., as well as 48 prefectural manuals outlining the specifics of each Japanese prefecture. The OSS had also drawn up finely-detailed maps, covering every major phase of Japanese activity. Alas, almost none of this excellent material would ever reach Japan itself; most was sidelined by poor planning at CASA and by a "bodies not books" dictum of Armed Forces Pacific Areas Command (AFPAC), although it was put to some use in training.

As were those destined for liberated Europe and for Germany or Austria, U.S. Military Government officers for Japan were trained at the School of Military Government and the Civil Affairs Training schools, as well as at CASA. Much of this instruction, which anticipated an invasion of Japan and the newly-trained officers administering conquered areas immediately in the wake of combat forces, proved irrelevant with the sudden surrender of Japan.¹⁷⁹

In fact, U.S. Army MG for Japan got off to a very bad start, certainly from a personnel point of view. Although War Department policy very explicitly stated that MG officers were to be released six months after the termination of the war like everyone else, it then reversed itself and stated that such officers would be held in the "scarce" category, that is, indefinitely. An uproar ensued when the CASA Regimental Commander declared before 2,000 seething CA officers that anyone protesting these orders should be awarded the "Order of the White Diaper"! The Post Commandant then made matters worse by advising officers "not to complain to their Congressmen under risk of violating Army Regulations", in itself a clear violation of Constitutional rights. Of course, protests were indeed sent, to the President, to Congress, to the Inspector General, to the newspapers, etc. This discontent was in addition to a general feeling that MG training was too much "Regular Army." As late as September of 1945, that is after the Japanese surrender, CASA officer students were undergoing

instruction in fox hole digging, gas mask drill and field sanitation. This regimen was justified by the Plans and Training Officer, who displayed his ignorance of things Japanese before his charges (who knew better) by stating that he expected further violence and military operations in Japan after V-J Day. Obviously, the undoubted successes of Japanese MG had little to do with the late 1945 training at CASA.¹⁸⁰

Entering Military Government officers also could not count on making contact with any "resistance" groups or individuals in post-surrender Japan. The same national unity and obedience which had also seen to it that any Japanese who had misgivings about the war followed loyally their nation's militaristic leadership to disaster. There would be no Japanese leaders brought back from exile or retirement or released from concentration camps to provide civil leadership under military supervision, as was the case to some extent in Germany and Austria.¹⁸¹

The structure of American Military Government of Japan was extremely complex, with three administrative layers between SCAP and MG teams at the prefectural level, and none had a Japanese counterpart. Just below SCAP was U. S. Eighth Army, with its appendage of a Military Government Section to its headquarters. Below Eighth Army came the two Army corps, I and IX, both of which had a Military Government staff section. Between the corps and prefectural teams themselves were eight MG regional headquarters, each of which supervised a group of prefectural teams. At the prefectural level, Military Government was exercised by a total of six groups, twenty-four companies and twenty-eight detachments. ("Team" replaced "Detachment" soon after.)¹⁸² According to Eighth Army "Outside of Tokyo, Yokohama and a few other cities, the Military Government team is the occupation to the vast majority of the Japanese people and their public officials, and occupational policies stand or fall according to the measure of effectiveness achieved in the team efforts."¹⁸³

The functional experts, trained at Charlottesville and at various Civil Affairs Training Schools left Japan by the summer of 1946. They were replaced by Regular Army officers transferred from troop duty, their only training a hastily organized course at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Other officers, transferred directly from Japanese troop duty, did not have even that scanty training.¹⁸⁴ Overall, U. S. Army MG forces at full strength numbered some 500 officers (from all arms and services), an equal number of civilians from the Civil Service and Department of the Army and 2,300 enlisted men, plus a variable number of Japanese civilians. An average MG team consisted of 10 officers, 10 civilians, 45 enlisted men and 120 to 200 Japanese civilians (the latter serving as interpreters, janitors, drivers, mechanics, clerks, kitchen personnel, etc.)¹⁸⁵ In the words of one impressed reporter after a tour of occupied Japan, "All Japan is being Policed by Less than 2,500 Yanks."¹⁸⁶

In fact, in the absence of any Japanese resistance whatsoever, as distinguished from labor unrest and riots which did occur, and with the prompt compliance to SCAP's initial directives, the Military Government Section of GHQ, Armed Forces Pacific was dissolved. It was soon obvious that the main concern of the occupation

would be with the nonmilitary aspects of Japanese life. Therefore, in the absence of the Military Government Section or a G-5, the same general staff officers (G-1 through G-4) who exercised the general staff functions for AFPAC now also would exercise control over the newly developed SCAP special staff sections. Eighth Army carried three principal agencies concerned with Military Government: the Military Government Section, a special staff section of Eighth Army; a field organization based on two corps headquarters and special Military Government units, as well as 53 MG teams, one team for each of the 46 prefectures and one for each of the seven administrative regions. With the exception of the three largest metropolitan teams, which reported to Eighth Army Commander, the regional and prefectural teams within each corps area were attached to the corps and operated under the direct supervision of the corps commander. The occupation troops functioned in the usual command channels.

By 1 January 1946 Eighth Army had fielded six groups, 24 companies and 28 detachments. The Eighth Army Military Government [Special] Staff Section itself comprised seven divisions: Legal and Public Safety, Welfare, Economics, Finance, Medical, Supply and Procurement, and Repatriation. These groups and companies were to be used as integral teams and not on any other duties than military government. Soon after, the units were redesignated "teams" and were identified with the prefecture to which they were assigned. These prefecture teams carried experts in commerce and industry, legal and government matters, information and education, civil property, public health and public welfare. They were to work in daily contact with the agencies of the central Japanese government, of the prefectural governments and local governing and voluntary bodies, executing "on the spot" supervision and oversight of the execution of SCAP directives and ferreting out violations and non-compliance. However, punitive or disciplinary action was not delegated to the MG units. Rather, it was the duty of MG to report violations of or failure to comply with SCAP directives to Tokyo for action. There would be no "military governors" as such in Japan, rather there would be Military Government officers, who after 1949 were termed Civil Affairs officers. In theory, at least, the occupation forces were in Japan simply to act as an agency for the observing, investigating and reporting of Japanese compliance with the instruction of the Supreme Commander to the Japanese government. In fact, one MG officer was actually transferred out of Japan after his wife, writing a society column in an American newspaper, committed the gaffe of referring to her spouse as a "military governor."¹⁸⁷

The teams varied in size from six officers and 25 enlisted men for minor prefectural teams to 67 officers and 150 enlisted men assigned to the Tokyo-Kanagawa MG District Team. Japan-wide, MG personnel continued to drop, reaching a mere 1,772 in August 1948. With such small numbers of troops, Eighth Army had to recruit Civil Service personnel for a wide variety of positions, such as economics, sociology and government. Even here personnel shortages persisted despite good salaries and living perquisites. Professor Ralph Braibanti, an authority on the subject, noted the

"overwhelmingly civilian nature of the occupation objectives." Special missions, such as the destruction of Japanese military materiel and the repatriation program were still to be supervised by Eighth Army combat units. Peaceful as it was, the occupation of Japan would remain a military concern.¹⁸⁸

Some more "progressive" MG officers in the early months of the Japanese occupation opposed this method of "indirect" Military Government. "Young Turk" MG officers feared that SCAP's dread of communism had driven it to support what was basically the old regime, with some surface purging. One disgruntled "Young Turk" wrote that MacArthur was surrounded by two influences:

bidding for favor from His [note "divine" upper-case] throne. One group, spearheaded by G-2 and most of the regulars, favors abandoning the purposes of the Occupation --which they never did support --and building Japan as a bastion against the Red tide. This means restoring Japan to the old boys. The other element, led by the [SCAP] Government Section, is plugging away for the fundamental reforms envisaged in the early directives....As the good civilian-minded people go home and the military hacks stay on, the reactionary attitude naturally increases in influence.¹⁸⁹

A *New York Times* correspondent reported that "Americans, by working through the Yoshida Government, actually turned over Japan to the same reactionaries who ruled before and during the war." By May of 1946, another journalist claimed, "most of the men who had championed [reform] [had] gone --or had been ordered --home. The men [left] in key positions [were]concerned primarily with the maintenance of an orderly, stable and conservative government." The conservative "military" element in SCAP opposed a more thoroughgoing purge of militarists, what one colonel termed "the brains of the country," because of a general belief that "there might be a time when we shall want a strong Japan."

The first post-surrender duty given by SCAP to the Japanese was the repatriation of all Japanese troops from their ill-gotten overseas territories, particularly Korea and Formosa (as it was then termed), as well of all Koreans and Formosans in Japan who wished repatriation back to their homelands. Some 1,250,000 persons were thus repatriated with remarkable efficiency, considering the state of Japan at the time.¹⁹⁰ Here was a forecast of the thorough cooperation that all levels of Japanese government would afford the American occupiers.

The demilitarization of the nation came simultaneously with repatriation and was fully as successful. In a sense, demilitarization had been accomplished at about the time that the Japanese representatives signed the surrender terms. The one significant blot on the occupation's demilitarization record and on that of MacArthur personally, were the executions of Japanese generals Yamashita and Homma, who probably would not have been convicted of war crimes in any impartial court of law, but who had been


unlucky enough to have badly defeated MacArthur and other Allied commanders in the early months of the war. This was "victors' justice" at its worst, far more so than at Nuremberg, and no example of an independent judiciary that the Japanese would wish to emulate. Even so, the Japanese people were heartily weary of war and of the warlords who had brought so much death and destruction to the nation. Most Japanese seemed to blame their own discredited warlords rather than the Americans for their current misery.¹⁹¹

That misery was as much spiritual as physical. MacArthur termed it "a collapse of faith" which left "a complete vacuum, morally, mentally, and physically."¹⁹² There had been very little opposition to the war policies of the Japanese leadership; the Japanese people entered the war united and enthusiastic. Now their "spiritually invincible" nation had surrendered to the "barbarians," the Japanese had expected a repetition of their own brutal occupations of other countries.

Because of the unexpectedly swift Japanese capitulation, and also probably because of America's "Europe First" strategy, there had been considerably less pre-surrender planning for Japan than for post-surrender Germany. Although such planning called for an Allied occupation through the Allied Council for Japan, General MacArthur imperiously ignored Soviet attempts to secure a significant share in the occupation, while the British and French, lacking manpower and resources, were also reduced to what portions of his empire the SCAP chose to dole out.¹⁹³ MacArthur reasoned that the United States, along with the sterling Australians, had borne the brunt of the fighting against the Japanese, so this seemed a fairly logical arrangement. (Nonetheless, someone on the council might have reminded MacArthur that his title and his office was Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces.) Furthermore, and to the inestimable benefit of the Japanese, the basically unilateral U.S. occupation meant that Japan was never territorially divided into zones of Allied occupation. Commerce, government, the movement of peoples, might be hindered by the difficult conditions within Japan during the early months of the occupation, but not by any artificial political barriers. The surrender was hard enough for this people; dismemberment of their land might have proven insupportable.

SCAP could govern Japan free from the tiresome interference of Allies. Hence, all occupation forces in Japan, whatever their nationality, would come under MacArthur's command. In case of disagreement in the Allied Council the SCAP's point of view would prevail.¹⁹⁴ For example, MacArthur, in the spring of 1949, unilaterally abrogated any further Japanese reparations, to the fury of the Council. His logic was impeccable: For him, it made no sense to strip impoverished Japan, into which the United States was reluctantly pouring millions of dollars, if the main source of that nation's economic recovery were to be shipped away. (The victims of Japanese aggression did not take so "balanced" a view.)¹⁹⁵

Understandably, in light of SCAP's grand vision of purging Japan of nothing less than several millennia of militarism and feudalism, censorship would play a large part in the occupation of Japan. Initially, everything from radio, press, news agencies,



MG trooper supervises Japanese crating of machinery slated for repairs. Signal Corps, National Archives

concert halls and libraries to geisha houses and picnic grounds were to be controlled, although freedom of speech, press, religion "and (eventually) freedom of assembly" were to be permitted "as soon as practicable," subject to the exigencies of security and law and order. Taboo were ultramilitaristic, ultranationalistic and feudalistic themes. Thus even Kabuki and No theatrical productions were in trouble in the early days of the occupation. Films were also carefully scrutinized for offending material. Out went "Symphony of Revenge," "Swords Flash in Cherry Blossom Time," and "Human Bullet Volunteer Corps," of course. Less obvious were atomic bomb accounts and lamentations for the war dead, all banned at least temporarily. Graphic film footage taken by Japanese cameramen soon after the nuclear bombings was impounded by SCAP and not returned to Japanese officials until 1967. In the optimistic words of one SCAP report, censorship was to serve as "a police force against anti-democratic propaganda."¹⁹⁶ The official history of SCAP blandly asserted that the "Press Code for Japan and Radio Code for Japan" were based "on ethical practices in the United States", which would surely have been news to American media executives. Further, this censorship was admittedly used as much to keep abreast of "violence, strikes, communist activities or any other developments which were of a subversive or possibly subversive nature."¹⁹⁷

SCAP's Information Dissemination Section (IDS) conducted propaganda and information programs with the goal, in the words of one IDS policy-maker, of "the re-education of Japan." The major SCAP propaganda effort in the early occupation years was the radio program "Now it Can Be Told," which one Japanese critic conceded was "necessary and edifying for the Japanese," but also conceded it as "the most unpopular radio program of the day"; the Japanese did not wish to hear any more about lost battles. An American account also denounced "Now it Can Be Told"'s "March of Time" brassy style. Fortunately, in the ensuing years the programs became considerably more sophisticated and popular.¹⁹⁸

The SCAP censorship office followed the mold of totalitarian regimes by prohibiting any public reference to its own activities.¹⁹⁹ It was all part of the dilemma of how one could encourage freedom while restricting freedom of expression, something that, admittedly, bothered MG censors in both Germany and Japan. However, over the immediate post-war years, the censorship gradually eased, with a trend from pre to post-censorship, and as SCAP's official history dryly noted, "The possibility of being returned to pre-censorship status was sufficient incentive to keep most post-censored publishers in line with the Press Code."²⁰⁰

SCAP had its own, excellent source of information about Japanese attitudes with its Allied Translation and Information Service (ATIS) an intelligence organization dating back to World War II in the Pacific. The "Allied" part of the title was by now archaic; ATIS was entirely a SCAP creature that put its wartime experience to use in translating Japanese newspapers, unobtrusively attending political meetings and cultural events, as well as surveying factories, mines, etc. Although MacArthur was personally

aloof from the Japanese people, through ATIS he was quite well-informed as to their activities and opinions.²⁰¹

SCAP had embarked upon an ambitious, even grandiose, program for the transformation of Japan. Its publication *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948*, officially spelled out the project's scope: nothing less than the "Elimination of the Old Order."²⁰² Later, the SCAP-drafted new Japanese Constitution proclaimed that "The feudal system of Japan will cease." This "reorientation" mandated the disestablishment of the Shinto religion (fortunately, no one tried the term "deshintoization"), the Emperor's own renunciation of "the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world", the removal of restrictions of political, civil and religious liberties; dissolution of holding companies, rural land reform and reform of the civil service and education. In the rather breathless prose of Eighth Army Historical Section:

Here Military Government stands for freedom of thought, freedom of religion, for freedom of the press, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, for the new democratic school system, for the screening of teachers and school officials, for parent-teacher associations and adult education groups, for free libraries, educational and informational movies and radio programs, for wholesome sports and recreation, for boy scouts and girl scouts, for public health controls and facilities, sanitary inspection and medical preventives, for DDT, vaccination, inoculations and quarantines, for public welfare provisions, public assistance, relief in kind, for improved hospitals, venereal disease control measures, for more efficient relief plans, for child welfare centers, for the repatriation program and the return of relatives and friends from overseas.²⁰³

Putting all of this into practice, the MG team in the small Mie prefecture (whose main city was Osaka) in June of 1947, for example, supervised mining, finance, communications, enemy property installations, transportation, roads, public works, reparations, industry (which consisted entirely of team surveillance), fishing, shipbuilding, inspections of Japanese merchant vessels, labor, (again, surveillance, with 16 unions dissolved in that one month), adult and child welfare-relief, repatriation, public health, judiciary, law enforcement, banking and currency, food and agriculture. In each area, Japanese officials and employees performed the actual work and supervision, under the surveillance of the Americans. It was no simple task: Mie prefecture contained seven cities, four of which had been heavily bombed. "The mayors of Yokkaichi and Ujiamada assert that their cities are in a desperate financial condition."²⁰⁴ Eight months later, the Chiba MG Team could report the same basically supervisory activities, although it did report that a surprise inspection of the Chiba City

slaughterhouse, "revealed it to be in a filthy state," but, again, restorative action itself was taken by the local authorities.²⁰⁵ The total control of the police over the everyday life of the Japanese people was weakened by an ambitious decentralization program. Of course, the infamous civil "Thought Police" were disbanded.²⁰⁶

The so-called "purge program" was based on a Joint Chief of Staff Directive dated 3 November 1945, which stated that "you will assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.", a blatant violation of Anglo-U.S. legal principles. The purge at lower levels, however, was to be handled by local Japanese boards. It fell most heavily on the "militarists," who were removed from any positions of power and neither they nor any spiritual descendants have disturbed the peace over the last half century.²⁰⁷

The civilian ultra-nationalists, in some ways fully as blood-thirsty as their military counterparts, were also purged from positions of authority. Nonetheless, while no longer assassinating politicians who stood in their way, they maintained a shadowy existence as an ultra-rightist force, gained new strength with the Korean War, and re-established former ties with organized crime.²⁰⁸

The bureaucrats and the financial and industrial elite survived for the most part, and were not reduced to manual labor or penury, as was more often the case in U.S.-occupied Germany.²⁰⁹ Some of these purges seemed to go "by the numbers." When one local board was excoriated by higher MG authorities for "incompetence" and "inefficiency," it obediently raised the percentages of "purgees" at once from 0.4 to 1.3 percent. Even when non-military elites were purged, they were usually replaced by men with similar training and attitudes.²¹⁰

More lasting good came from the SCAP-inspired "Daily Life Security Law," Japan's first comprehensive welfare legislation. In that the law placed the burden of responsibility for public welfare on local government, MG teams were required to see that the prefectural and municipal officials understood the enactment and complied with its numerous provisions. All too often at the time these officials proved lethargic and their work was handicapped by the lack of trained social workers.²¹¹ In time, however, the law basically brought Japan up to the social security standards of other industrialized western nations.

Judicial reform encompassed a new structure of basic law, new civil and criminal codes and a new system of court procedures, and the Supreme Court was given the American power to declare laws unconstitutional. However, the Japanese did not adopt the American habit of litigiousness, actually to the regret of some early U.S. legal reformers and theorists.²¹²

SCAP saw to it that nation-wide elections were held in 1946. A succession of ministries resulted, which would indicate a certain political freedom, until the election of the long-lasting Yoshida regime, which set Japan on its path of global economic power.

The most publicized achievement of the U.S. Military Government of Japan was the inauguration of a new constitution. The official myth is that Japanese officials and politicians, aware of the Allies' dissatisfaction with the existing constitution, themselves drew up this new instrument of state, in, of course, close consultation with SCAP officials. In reality, General MacArthur's headquarters rejected a first draft that was indeed drawn up by the Japanese Cabinet. Then, and in the closest secrecy, MacArthur's Government Section Chief, BG Courtney Whitney, drew up a revised draft, presumably in English, presented it before a distraught Japanese Cabinet and forced it through a reluctant Japanese Diet, allowing only the most minimal of changes. (A Japanese news magazine impertinently published the story of a citizen, who when asked what he thought of the new constitution, replied, "Oh, has it been translated into Japanese already?") The document was full of American idioms and political theories that were at first almost unintelligible to Japanese readers. MacArthur blandly praised the Japanese people for having produced so exemplary a document, and the new "Japanese" constitution, whatever its alien provenance, went into effect on 3 May 1947. It has endured to this day.²¹³

Economic recovery was another urgent SCAP priority. Japanese industrial production was then at about one-tenth of prewar levels, and even this meager effort was mainly in the line of such makeshifts as turning army helmets into pots and pans or wood pulp into an ersatz cloth that soon reverted to its previous state in the rain. As in contemporary Germany the ubiquitous black market could be seen as another, and extremely significant, "industry." On the other hand, despite heavy U.S. bombing in the closing months of the war, Japanese industry was damaged, not destroyed, despite the claims of the advocates of "Victory through Airpower."

The main problems of the Japanese post-war economy lay in a lack of raw materials and transportation, and the departure of the near-slave labor Chinese and Korean workers. The American occupation had initially, and naively, believed that it could leave the Japanese economic situation and its reform to the Japanese themselves. The problems were too great, however, the industrial plant too damaged, transport too chaotic and the Japanese people too close to starvation.²¹⁴ Also as in Germany, coal seemed at the root of most economic and industrial problems. Coal production was slowed by lack of equipment and food; increased food production depended upon fertilizer, and the production of fertilizer depended upon the production of more coal. Initial emergency aid soon was replaced by longer-range economic reform although the fruits of the American economic policies were not particularly evident until the boom induced by the coming of the Korean War in 1950.²¹⁵

SCAP realized that production could not begin to improve until the Japanese worker could be fed better. Official rations had dropped to the 1,050 calories per person per day - about one-fifth that consumed by an average occupation American soldier. Even at that, as in Germany and Austria, the rations were often late and when they came were filled out with such unpalatable substitutes as acorn meal or the residue from the extraction of soybean meal. Guided by identification charts printed in

newspapers, housewives foraged through the countryside for edible weeds. In reality, no one was expected actually to live on the official rations. There may have been few, if any, actual deaths from starvation, but civilians weakened by malnutrition were easy prey to disease and certainly could not work at their best. Furthermore, the day-to-day struggle for food consumed time that could have been otherwise spent at the factory, office or mine. As in the European occupations, the only answer was the importation of food, a course of action resisted by those mindful of the destruction and starvation inflicted on millions of innocents by the vanquished aggressor nations. General MacArthur, acting on the premise that "you cannot teach democracy to a hungry people," directed the emergency importation of foodstuffs and medicines into Japan on the grounds that the health and security of the U.S. occupation forces there would be in danger if the situation were to continue. The Supreme Commander grandiloquently wired a hesitating State Department, "Give me bread or give me bullets."²¹⁶ Food imports were not always wisely handled. For example, occupation officials imported large quantities of cornmeal, explaining to the citizenry that corn bread and corn muffins were considered delicacies in the United States. All it took was the addition of some shortening and wheat flour, eggs, milk and butter, salt...²¹⁷

Sanitary conditions initially threatened an outbreak of disease on a large-scale. The Japanese personally were extremely clean, but retained a paradoxically casual attitude toward public health, a situation made so much the worse by the war. MG sanitation personnel had their educational work cut out, but usually prevailed by emphasizing to this disciplined and conforming people that it was all "for the good of everybody," particularly the children.²¹⁸ The SCAP medical section also initiated successful mass inoculations in 1946 against a serious smallpox threat and the localization of cholera brought back to the Home Islands by repatriates. Less pressing but hardly less important were the MG health campaigns against venereal and gastrointestinal diseases and tuberculosis.²¹⁹

To hold down inflation the occupation embarked upon a price-control program, which had little effect and which only fueled the black market all the more. The Japanese did little more than mark time until about 1950-1951, several years after the beginning of the German economic "miracle."

One of the more successful economic programs of SCAP, on the other hand, was the breaking-up of the giant *zaibatsu* financier families, or "money clique." A Japanese Holding Company Liquidation Commission, closely supervised by SCAP, saw to it that the stocks of the *zaibatsu* were sold off eventually. In the meantime the money trusts were deprived of the control of those stocks. Attempts to break up other Japanese monopolies enjoyed considerably less success. The policy was incomprehensible to the Japanese, who felt that economic consolidation was the way the world was going anyway, and that only a nation as wealthy as America could afford to be so wasteful as to ignore the economies of scale and mobilization of capital and enterprise that monopolies supposedly afforded. MacArthur carried his economic purge well beyond the minuscule political removals. The SCAP asserted that he was

not opposed to encouraging a capitalist economy in Japan, but if the purge of tainted top managers would delay or disrupt Japanese recovery, so be it.²²⁰

The occupation can also be credited with "setting the workers free" with its labor union policies. The Socialists believed firmly that SCAP did not go nearly far enough. Even so, by early 1948 Japanese workers enjoyed a system of workers' compensation, insurance legislation, regulated workplace standards, hours of work and vacations with pay, that was enforced on a uniform basis by labor standards administrative offices in each prefecture which was comparable to the world's most advanced nations at the time. Typically, this reform, although certainly at the behest of SCAP, was carried through by the Japanese government.

Perhaps as a result, and in contrast with the German occupation, Japan was racked with strikes and labor disorders in the first few years of the U. S. occupation. In March 1948 leftist-controlled unions of government workers brought the nation to the verge of a crippling strike that SCAP had to prohibit. MacArthur responded with a purge of communist leaders in June of 1948. In the spring of 1949 a Korean mob occupied the Kobe prefectural office and had to be removed by Eighth Army troops. In June of that year, communists seized a police station in the town of Taira and held it for the better part of the day. In 1949 Government and private employers, with active SCAP encouragement, struck back, firing some 20,000 workers considered communists or fellow travelers. (Just previous, in December of 1948, public sector workers had their right to strike taken from them.)²²¹

Throughout its reform program SCAP seems to have been sensitive to Japanese cultural norms and to have avoided overt "pushing" of the Japanese into reforms and transformations that the Americans favored. One of the best, and most successful, examples of SCAP's deference to Japanese mores did nothing less than transform rural Japan from a collection of landless peasants to one of land-owning proprietors. As early as 1947 the Japanese government purchased more than 2,000,000 acres of land for redistribution. In October 1948, the Japanese Diet, acting on the behest of SCAP, passed the Farm Land Reform Law, which simply prohibited absentee landownership. Some 13,000 locally-elected local land commissions, each consisting of five tenant farmers, two owner-cultivators and three landlords, were established. They in turn chose prefectural land commissions while national supervision was provided by a Central Land Commission. (And, of course, indirectly, SCAP.) With commendable speed and efficiency some 75 percent of tenant farmers became small landowners. MG officers made routine visits to the most remote villages to symbolize SCAP's commitment and to see that the job was getting done. This was land reform unprecedented (except in the Philippines in the 1950s and in South Vietnam in the 1970s, also under U.S. prodding). The Soviet representative on the Allied Council was unimpressed, and unsuccessfully demanded the immediate uncompensated confiscation of all land and its redistribution to the peasants. Japanese land reform was successful primarily because SCAP could call upon a broad range of knowledge of Japan in the U. S. Government and in American academe. (This bank of American knowledge of

Japan had not been called upon in the first months of the occupation.) It also helped considerably that Japan was by far the most Western of any Asian nation at the time.²²²

SCAP also concerned itself with the removal of "objectionable" courses, practices and textbooks, and ordered the Japanese government to reform its centralized school system forthwith. The first SCAP-directed education reforms were negative and unarguable: the prohibition of any teaching of ultra-nationalism and militarism, racial superiority, the subordination of the individual to the state, even of rote learning, as well as of texts and teachers who propagated these ideas. By April of 1947 some 22 percent of the nation's school officials had resigned or had been removed by Japanese screening committees. In all, approximately 700,000 individuals were investigated, of whom only 3,000 were adjudged unfit to continue in the field of education. SCAP education enthusiasts even attempted to import American-style Parent-Teacher Associations, without much success, as teachers remained dominant figures even in post-war Japan.

The Japanese could be forgiven their doubts about the reforming of Japanese schooling along American lines. Early in the occupation an American education commission was brought over to Japan by SACP to, in the words of one commission member, "supplant nationalism, militarism, and mental slavery by democracy and freedom of thought", which the educator did admit was something of "a large order." These evils were to be replaced by emphasis on "the dignity and worth of the individual, on independent thought and initiative and on developing a spirit of inquiry." More dubiously, the Americans had dreams of something like 200 universities to replace the mere six pre-war imperial institutions of higher education, another educational "reform" (such as that mandating boards of trustees on the American model) quietly throttled by the Japanese.²²³ Bothered by Japanese education control from the top, the SCAP Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E), did see to it that popularly elected school boards were eventually constituted in each prefecture and in most municipalities. Most of these CI&E officers were already school administrators and professional educationists, however, and local Military Government education officers were of even more limited academic background. In the only gesture ever made by SCAP toward the reinstatement of those who had lost positions because of their opposition to the old regime, such teachers were given preference in hiring.

The new social studies textbook was completed by the fall of 1946. Prepared by Japanese scholars, the text was indeed purged of the traditional glorifications of militarism, ultranationalism and Shintoism. Nonetheless, the "evidence shows ... [its] values sprang not from American but Japanese sources."²²⁴ Education reform was not singular in this regard. One authority on the occupation of Japan perceptively concluded, "For almost every proposed reform there was found a Japanese who long before the occupation had developed a commitment to the concept involved."²²⁵ Furthermore, "Japanese educators and particularly the university professors were

conscious only of their own wider experience or greater erudition and tended to be supercilious toward these American educational officers and their ideas."²²⁶

By the end of 1948, SCAP Election Management Commission recognized four major political parties, plus some 1,250 other registered political groups, all officially working for democracy. As the former head of SCAP Government Section noted:

The 1,250 parties seem bewilderingly numerous, yet no one but the American is in the least confused....An Oriental will form a group, dignified by a high title, at the drop of a hat.²²⁷

Almost as significant as these numerous political "groups" were the *oyabun-kobun* (literally "father-like -- child-like") a network of near-feudalistic patron-protégé organizations, which permeated Japan and which, in the words of the assistant chief of the SCAP Government Section, extended "from the smallest rural village to the highest echelons of the national government." This SCAP officer logically argued, that "this clannish and clandestine combination of bosses, hoodlums, and racketeers is the greatest threat to American democratic aims in Japan." These groups did bring up frightening parallels with the secret societies that had assassinated democratic-leaning politicians and military officers and which did as much as anything to place Japan on its path of conquest in the 1930s. It cannot be denied that the *oyagun* flourished all the more in the difficult years of occupation immediately following the surrender.²²⁸

Far more significant than any post-war secret groupings, a new Japanese political elite and bureaucracy arose. The pre-war Japanese political elite had been almost entirely removed, far more so than in Germany. A new political elite found its home for the most part in the Liberal Democratic Party, which governed and dominated Japan uninterruptedly for more than three decades after its organization in 1955.²²⁹

Nineteen forty-eight saw the transition from something of a punitive occupation to one more concerned with economic rehabilitation. Japan was now looked upon as a potential bulwark against communist expansion in the Pacific, her well being a matter of American national interest. The indirect Japanese occupation was to become even more indirect. Surprisingly, many Japanese authorities were alarmed by SCAP's rather unexpectedly turning over to them so much more of the management of their responsibility, fearing shame and loss of "face" if they failed in their new responsibilities and pleading in many cases for the retention of uniformed U.S. Army troops for moral support. In January of that year, the Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall called for a reassessment of U.S. policies in Japan, in particular the December 1946 "Law Relating to the Prohibition of Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power" and the Anti-Monopoly Law of April 1947. Royal noted "an area of conflict between the original concept of broad demilitarization and the new purpose of building a self-supporting nation" and concluded that the *zaibatsu* were "the ablest and most successful leaders of that country, and their services would in many instances

contribute to the economic recovery of Japan."²³⁰ By then the *zaibatsu* had mostly been removed but younger executives were already taking their places. Even then purges were not prohibited from moving into new lines of work. The chairman of the Mitsui Bank, for example, simply moved over to the chairmanship of Sony, "where his distinguished talents were put to splendid use", in the words of the SCAP official who helped to plan the *zaibatsu* purge! A contemporary American author noted "the peculiar cross-industry structure of industrial control under which certain Japanese firms have manufactured everything from parasols to locomotives", well before U.S. businessmen made their supposedly unique discovery of the benefits of the conglomerate.²³¹ As early as the beginning of 1948, prefectural Military Government officials were doing no more than merely referring cases of non-compliance to the prefectural government and suggesting remedies. Increasingly, SCAP was governing Japan by "remote control" through Japanese authorities.²³²

Although Japan lacked a land border with any other nation and was spared a Soviet zone of occupation, SCAP did worry about communist unrest or Soviet pressure. The Korean War, of course, intensified these fears; but by then Japan was well on the road to self-government, and the Japanese Treaty of Peace and the end of the occupation was only a year away.

As in Germany and Austria, 1948 also saw the first lasting economic improvement since the end of the war. In March the Draper Mission, headed by the Undersecretary of the Army and composed of prominent American businessmen, concluded that Japan was to become the workshop of Asia. Rather than reparations out of Japan, investment would now flow into Japan from America. In 1949, Mr. Joseph Dodge, who had presided over the successful reform of the German currency, became SCAP's financial advisor. In that year also the Japanese Diet submitted its first balanced budget.²³³ In the next year the Korean War solidified and accelerated Japan's economic recovery and left the nation poised for global economic eminence. In sum, and looking back, it can be confirmed that Japan under U.S. occupation and Military Government "followed the great tradition of adaptation, importation, and consolidation, which the Japanese have followed on other occasions in their history."²³⁴

By 1949, it had become obvious that U.S. Military Government of Germany, Austria and Japan had more than achieved their initial goals, despite some lingering carping. In November of that year, Secretary of State Dean Acheson summarized the newly-emerging U.S. attitude toward the two former enemy nations:

To me one conclusion seemed plain beyond doubt. Western Europe and the United States could not contain the Soviet Union and suppress Germany and Japan at the same time, Our best hope was to make these former enemies willing and strong supporters of a free-world spectrum.²³⁵

Two years later, the World War II Allies, with the conspicuous exception of the Soviet Union, signed a peace treaty with Japan that officially stripped her of her imperial possessions, but which was otherwise a non-punitive instrument that allowed the Japanese people to retain their national dignity.

By any reckoning, the U.S. Military Governments of Germany and Japan must be accounted as the most successful such endeavors in modern history. This accomplishment is the more impressive in that these post-war occupations were unprecedented in their longevity. Neither Germany nor Japan, both strong democracies more than a half an century after destruction and defeat, have threatened the peace of their neighbors, nor do they seem likely to in the foreseeable future. If for no other reason, their peaceful record alone, aside from their great economic development, should be sufficient to justify and commend the U.S. occupations of those two former enemy nations. In fact, the United States spent considerable effort in more recent years in trying to moderate some of the rather intense Japanese anti-militaristic sentiment, as well as to persuade Germany to shoulder more of the military defense of Western Europe. In fact, in terms of civil control of the military, in commitment to the political process, in voter turnout, knowledge and participation in elections, not to mention individual freedoms, the once-occupied nations could now perhaps be seen to give their occupiers some lessons.

An Asian authority summarized the verdict of history on America's Japanese occupation, equally applicable to the German, paraphrasing the Japanese Minister of Education, as early as 1947:

We Japanese found it difficult to be a model conquered people, seeing that for two thousand years of our national life we had never been conquered. You Americans, on the other hand, were in a position only a little less embarrassing, for you found it difficult to be conquerors, seeing that in your one hundred and fifty years of national life you never formed the habit of conquering other peoples. Both of our intentions, however, were honorable. We were utterly inexperienced, needed coaching. You often made the same mistake we made, in the heyday of conquest, trying to thrust bodily upon the conquered our way of life. There we could teach you. All in all, through mutual aid and many mistakes we did not do too badly giving the world a pattern of conduct for those mutually embarrassed.²³⁶

The accomplishments of U.S. Army Military Government are all the more impressive when viewed against the truly discouraging condition of each of the vanquished aggressor nations in 1945, their mutual "Year Zero." It probably helped that there were no Nazi or *Bushido* "martyrs." Former Nazi and Japanese leaders seemed mainly concerned with explaining away the late unpleasantness or with trying to mount an anti-Bolshevik crusade with their new-found Western Allies. Even the war

crimes trials and executions were considered a bore and an irrelevancy by the Germans and the Japanese. Matters were undoubtedly helped by the fact that American Military Governments, inadvertently or not, did not uproot the bureaucracies in any of their World War II occupations. Here was a foundation that had much to do with providing some continuity with the past and an orderly transition to a democratic, market-oriented future. Whether the cost of a lack of interest in pursuing the near-criminal conspirators and their collaborators in business, government and the professions who had brought their nations so much grief was worth this continuity is another matter.

Admittedly, positive historical interpretations of the post World War II U.S. occupations have become commonplace. Contemporary journalistic accounts of the first two or three years of the occupations often painted a rather different picture, focusing on the hunger, the chaos, the failings of denazification, demilitarization and democratization of the occupied lands, and the blunders and insensitivity of individual American soldiers.²³⁷ The Americans were also criticized, particularly by Europeans, for their "naiveté" in believing that conquered peoples could be "forced to be free." Yet it did work. The new "Japanese" Constitution declared that "The feudal system of Japan will cease." It did. With the hindsight of more than half a century, we can discern that the former evaluation is by far the more accurate. The innate kindness of the individual U.S. soldier, particularly towards children, should not be omitted in any positive accounting of the post-war occupations. In Japan, for example, American troops often risked their lives to save Japanese lives in the earthquakes and fires to which Japan is so vulnerable.

Both of the former enemy nations, as well as Austria and South Korea, continue to look to their futures, rather than to brood upon past supposed wrongs. The Germans and the Japanese could, for example, have made considerably more of the bombings of Dresden or Hiroshima or the misbehavior of too many occupying Allied troops. Certainly the generally positive verdict of history, the best evaluation we have, on these simultaneous post-World War II U.S. military occupations has been clear for decades.²³⁸ The British MG record was also good, as was that of the French for all their intrigue and national pride. On the other hand, the Soviet-spawned dwarf prison-state, the German Democratic Republic, finally collapsed of the "internal contradictions" that Marxists so often attributed to the democratic West. With a due sense of the paradox involved, it can be said that democracies do make the best conquerors.

¹Eli E. Nobleman, "The Recruitment of Personnel for Occupied Areas," *Personnel Administration* (March 1947), 9; Benson and Howe, 65. See also the overall directive for the U.S. occupation of Germany, Headquarters United States Forces European Theater, Directive of Commanding Generals Military Districts, "Administration of Military Government in the U.S. Zone in Germany," July 1945, in Germany, U.S. Zone, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, Kreis Traunstein, Records, 1945-1948, box No. 3, "Tactical Troops" folder, Hoover Institution Archives.

²Nobleman, "The Recruitment of Personnel, 9; Benson and Howe, 65. See also the overall directive for the U.S. occupation of Germany, Headquarters United States Forces European Theater, Directive of Commanding Generals Military Districts, "Administration of Military Government in the U.S. Zone in Germany," July 1945, in Germany, U.S. Zone., Office of Military Government for Bavaria, Kreis Traunstein, Records, 1945-1948, box No. 3, "Tactical Troops" folder, Hoover Institution Archives.

³Malcolm S. MacLean, "Military Government - Fact and Fancy," *Public Administration Review* (Autumn, 1947), 275. For pre-surrender planning of U.S. MG of Germany, see *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command (Frankfurt am Main: 1947).

⁴Martin T. Kyre, "United States Army Civil Affairs Policy: An Attempt to Discover its Predictable Ingredients," Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1962, 28.

⁵Robert H. Slover, "Military Government - Where Do We Stand Today?", *Annals* (January 1950) makes this point.

⁶Robert H. Slover, "Military Government—Where do We Stand?", *ibid.*, 195 and *passim*.

⁷Warren F. Kimball, *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War* (New York: 1997), 252.

⁸Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany* (U.S. Army Center of Military History: 1975), 269; John Gimbel, "Governing the American Zone of Germany," in Wolfe, ed., 93-96.

⁹Gulgowski, 150-151. Gulgowski points out Eisenhower's near-hatred of the Germans after his visit to several concentration camps., *ibid.* As late as the publication of his war-time memoirs, Eisenhower favorably noted that "we were prepared to turn over the Military Government to the State Department.", *Crusade in Europe* (New York: 1948), 435.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 147-148. Gulgowski uncharitably ascribes Eisenhower reluctance to get involved in German civil matters to concerns for his future career., 150. Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944-1945* (Princeton, etc.: 1957), 43-44; Ziemke, 272; Benson and Howe, 64.

¹¹Irving Wolfson, "The AMG Mess in Germany," *New Republic* (4 March 1946).

¹²Gulgowski, 157-158 169.

¹³M. Fichter, "Non-State Organizations and the Problems of Redemocratization," in J. H. Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy* (Westport and London: 1982) 62. The French jibe was that "They liked Germany so much that they wanted two of them.", quoted in Charles W. Sydnor, Jr., "Some Architects of U.S. Occupation Policy Respond: Summary of a Roundtable," in Hans A. Schmitt, ed., "U.S. Occupation in Europe After World War II: Papers and Reminiscences from the April 23-24, 1976 Conference Held at the George C. Marshall Research Foundation, Lexington, Virginia (Lawrence, Kansas: 1978), ed., 135. As in the post-World War I era, the French were believed on good authority to have their designs on the Rhineland and the Ruhr as well as on the Saar industrial region.; Friedrich, "Organizational Evolution in Germany, 1945-1947," in Friedrich, ed., 200; and in Adams, "Operations of an American Military Government Detachment," 134-136.

¹⁴SHAEF, Office of the Chief of Staff. *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* (London? December 1944), ii. (emphasis added). See also U.S. Office of Military Government for Germany. *Military Government Gazette. Germany: United States Area of Control*. (Frankfurt? 16 June 1949), for the more significant ordinances, proclamations, laws, regulations, etc. of U.S. MG in Germany.

¹⁵Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," 59; Dale Clark, "Conflicts over Planning at Staff Headquarters," 232, in Friedrich, ed. By early 1948 MG Hilldring was writing that "It is not our purpose, and it never has been, to destroy or pauperize or otherwise degrade Germany..... The heart and soul of our policy in Germany is to turn the country over to the German people," Hilldring, "What is Our Purpose in Germany?," *Annals* (January 1948), 79. The controversy between the advocates of a "hard" versus a "soft" peace is outlined in Gulgowski, 175-180.

¹⁶Lucius Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York: 1950), 7-8, 51; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 30-31; Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 401; "Governing the American Zone of Germany," in Wolfe, ed., 94. Truman also claimed, against all the historical evidence, that civil government was "no job for soldiers," quoted in Ziemke, "Military Government: Two Approaches," *Essays in Some Dimensions of Military History*, vol. 3 (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania" n.d.), 295. McCloy, a veteran of the Rhineland occupation, "had experienced the bitterness of that occupation.", and consciously wished to have no repetition "of the reparations issue, and the reoccupation of the Ruhr, and the harassments, and the agitation, and the irritations on which Hitler so greatly capitalized later...." Most of these ills, of course, were not directly caused by the U.S. Rhineland occupation., McCloy, "American Occupation Policies in Germany", *American Academy of Political Sciences Proceedings* (January 1946). There is strong evidence that the Rhineland occupation was indeed studied by U.S. Army MG planners; Dale Clark, "Conflicts Over Planning at Staff Headquarters," in Friedrich, ed., 211. "From Military Government to Self-Government," in Wolfe, ed., 117. The procurement of civilian personnel for OMGUS was no easy matter. With the patriotic allure of the war ended, many high-grade, qualified personnel were anxious to return to their Stateside careers,

despite the relatively high pay and allowances offered., Eli E. Nobleman, "The Recruitment of Personnel for Occupied Areas," *Personnel Administration* (March 1947), 9.

¹⁷Gulgowski, 261-264; ltr, Eisenhower to Clay, 5 March 1947, *ibid.*, 263; B. U. Ratchford and W. D. Ross, *Berlin Reparations Assignment* (Chapel Hill: 1947), 23.

¹⁸Friedrich, "Organizational Evolution in Germany," 203.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 250; information supplied by Eli E. Nobleman to author, 17 February 1998.

²⁰Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany* (U.S. Army Center of Military History: 1975), 311; information supplied by Eli E. Nobleman to author, 17 February 1998.

²¹Nobleman, "Military Courts in Germany," 184.

²²An excellent official historical analysis of US MG courts in Germany is in Eli E. Nobleman, Provost Marshal General's School, Military Government Department, Training Packet No. 52, *Military Government Courts in Germany* (Fort Gordon, Georgia: June 1950); based upon *ibid.*, "American Military Government Courts in Germany with Special Reference to Historic Practice and their role in the Democratization of the German People." JSD diss., New York University. 1950; *ibid.*, Nobleman, "American Military Government Courts in Germany," *Annals* (January 1950), *passim*; Historical Division, European Command, "United States Military Government in Germany, Operations from Late March to Mid-June 1945" (Karlsruhe: n.d.), 115. , George S. Wilson "The World War II Military Government Court in Germany," Master of Laws diss., Indiana University, 1955, despite the title, deals also with post-war MG courts. See also Clark and Goodman, "American Justice in Occupied Germany"; J. Lowenstein, "Reconstruction of the Administration of Justice in American Occupied Germany," *Harvard Law Review*, 419 (1948); P. Weiden, "The Impact of Occupation on German Law," *Wisconsin Law Review* (1947); J. Clark and J. Goodman, "American Justice in Occupied Germany: U.S. Military Government Courts," *American Bar Association Journal* (June 1950); J. Green, "The Military Commission," *American Journal of International Law*, No. 832 (1948).

²³Nobleman, "United States Military Courts in Germany: Setting an Example and Learning Lessons," in Wolfe, ed., 183-184; "Operations From Late March to Mid-July 1945," 120-121.

²⁴Bach, 82-83, 135-149.

²⁵Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 36.

²⁶Engler, 83; "Office in charged [*sic.*] of Conzentration Camp Personnel," Trostberg, "Request for Purchase of Tobacco," 7 August 1945, Germany, (Territory Under Allied Occupation, 1945-1955: U.S. Zone) Office of Military Government for Bavaria. Kreis Traunstein. Records, 1945-1948, box No. 2, "Letters Incoming" folder, Hoover Institution Archives.

²⁷Knappen, 174. The official, four-volume record of the Rhineland occupation, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920* was prepared in an original and

four copies. After considerable searching early in the war, one copy was found and forwarded to the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, and another set was later found in the possession of COL Hunt's widow., George S. Wilson "The World War II Military Government Court in Germany," Master of Laws diss., Indiana University, 1955, chapt. 1, page 2. The present author located another complete set in the National Archives. Even more elusive are the two typescript volumes of the later years of the Rhineland occupation, "American Representation in Occupied Germany," 2 vols., by Philip H. Bagley (vol. 1, 1920-1921) and Henry Hossfield (vol. 2, 1922-1923). The present author located one set in the National Archives, in addition to another in the USASOC History Archives, inherited from the School of Military Government, Fort Carson, Colorado.

²⁸James M. Snyder, *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary, 3 October 1945-30 June 1947*, Historical Sub-Section G-3, United States Constabulary (n.p.: 1947), 183. A "bomb ring" was uncovered by Army agents in Frankfurt in late 1946 before the members could do any havoc., *New York Times* (11 November 1946). The early years of the Allied occupation of Venezia-Giulia (Italy) saw several serious shooting and ambush incidents against Allied personnel and their vehicles. But whether these had any political significance or were simply cases of civil lawlessness was undetermined., *The Blue Devil* (journal of U.S. forces in Venezia Giulia, 13 June 1947), Alfred Bowman papers, box No. 1, folder 66015.

²⁹SHAEF memo, TO: All Concerned, Subject: "Rules Governing Military Courtesy to be Observed by Germans in Occupied Germany," 13 May 1945. RG 332, ECAD, 1944-1945, box 54, "Det. I4C9 Correspondence" folder.

³⁰Zink, *American Military Government in Germany* (New York: 1947), 242. Zink, who was there, claimed that some U.S. "top brass" had the idea that Americans could never understand "the German mentality," but nonetheless contended that a cold aloofness was required to impress on the conquered that this time they had truly lost the war., *ibid.* See also J. H. Herz, "Denazification and Related Policies," in Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism* (Westport, London: 1982), 25.

³¹Friedrich, "Field Operations," 246-247.

³²Robert Wolfe, "A Minor Keynote," in Robert Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, Proceedings of symposium "Americans as Proconsuls," National Museum of History and Technology, Smithsonian Institution, May 1977 (Carbondale, c. 1984.), xv.

³³"Operations from Late March to Mid-July 1945," 144.

³⁴Zink, *American Military Government in Germany*, 112; Bach, 87-103; John H. Backer, *Priming the German Economy: American Occupational Policies 1945-1948* (Durham, North Carolina: 1971), 34; N. Balabkins, *Germany Under Direct Control* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 1964), 100-102. It was all reminiscent of failed Soviet attempts to save the harvest by sending in the army. Actually, General Clay had resorted to this

expedient to demonstrate to the US government that the German cupboard was truly bare., Gulgowski, 298.

^{35c} "Operations from Late March to Mid-June 1945," 59.

³⁶ Knappen, 121.

³⁷ Gulgowski, 296.

³⁸ Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 274-276; *ibid.*, "Improvising," 59. U.S. MG here seemed considerably less liberal than on the food problem. A coal commission said that if the Europe-wide coal famine caused unrest anywhere, it might as well be in Germany, "Should it become necessary to preserve order by shooting, it would surely be better for this to occur in Germany than elsewhere.", *ibid.* Not surprisingly in light of such idiocy, German coal production as late as 1947-1948 was still only 80-85 percent of its pre-war tonnage., OMGUS, *Chronologies* (Frankfurt: 23 February 1947).

³⁹ Martin, 54; "Field Operations," 81. But miners in the vital coal industry enjoyed no less than 4,000 calories daily.; MG Walter J. Muller, speech at dedication of Veterans Memorial Building, Redwood City, California, 27 May 1956, Muller papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box No. 16, p. 21. Muller was MG of Bavaria, 1945-1947. For food rations in the early days of Germany's occupation, see "Civil Affairs and Military Government Procedures," 127-128, 143-144.

⁴⁰ Gulgowski, 293.

⁴¹ Backer, 160. (Similar observations could be made about the economically illiterate Leninist command economies of the Soviet Union and its satellites.)

⁴² John H. Backer, "From Morgenthau to Marshall Plan," in Wolfe, ed., 161. The Office of Military Government for Germany *Economic Data on Potsdam* [i.e. postwar] *Germany: Special Report of the Military Governor* (n.p.: September 1947) reported that as late as August 1947, "there was little prospect of the prompt achievement of a self-sustaining economy for the [British-U.S.] Bizonal Area," 39.

⁴³ Julian Bach, *America's Germany* (New York: 1946), 35.

⁴⁴ Surveying this unpromising situation, a German communist quipped "Where shall we start? Shall we lead our prostituted women on the road to virtue or shall we rehabilitate our proletarian bums?" , *ibid.*, 234.

⁴⁵ See, for example, records of Detachment 82, Ringolstadt, RG 332, ECAD, box No. 51 for spring-summer of 1945. See also the quite extensive "List of the NSDAP Party, the Formations thereof and Affiliated Organizations in the Township of Rudolstadt and Members Who Held Offices" drawn up by Det. 82. A distinction was made in this document for "voluntary" and "necessity" [sic.] Party membership., *ibid.*, "List of Nazi Party Members" folder. A memo from the MG Public Safety Officer termed the area "a Nazi hot-bed," and asserted "that 90% of its government employees were Nazis." 2LT Angelo C. Capponi, "Estimate of the Situation, Rudolstadt," 29 June 1945, *ibid.*

⁴⁶ Gulgowski, 343.

⁴⁷ Herz, "Denazification," 21.

⁴⁸Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 380; "Improvising Stability," 63. Actually the U.S. Army office of Military Government had seized not only the NSDP Master File, but membership applications, personnel files of SS officers, as well as SA and Supreme Party Court, etc., OMGUS, 7771 Document Center, *Who Was a Nazi?* (Berlin: June 1947), 7-9 and passim.

⁴⁹Herz, "Denazification," 26-29, 35. If the *Fragebogen* were detailed, the *German Denazification Law and All Implementation and American Directives* was positively voluminous, running to several hundred pages.; Office of Military Government for Bavaria, Cecil Wood and Curtis Shelly, eds., 2d ed. (Munich? 1 April 1947); Friedrich, "Denazification," 262.

⁵⁰Gulgowski, 350.

⁵¹Montgomery, 128-150. A satirical analysis from a German viewpoint can be found in *Fragebogen* (English translation, New York: 1955).

⁵²Robert Engler, "The Individual Soldier and the Occupation," *Annals* (January 1950).

⁵³Friedrick, "Denazification," 263; Office of Military Government Bavaria, Special Branch, *German Denazification Law with Implementations and American Directives Included* (Munich?: 15 June 1946), gives a good *German* official analysis of U.S. denazification policy in the earlier MG period. See also *ibid.*, *Denazification Law and All Implementations and American Directives* (Munich?: 1 April 1947).

⁵⁴Muller speech, passim.

⁵⁵Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 385; Gulgowski, gives several cases of actual criminals who, apparently for no other reason than that they were anti (or un)-Nazi, presided over-denazification courts., 348-349.

⁵⁶John Gimble, "American Denazification and German Politics, 1945-1949," *American Political Science Review* (March 1960), 88-89; William Griffith, "The Denazification Program in the U.S. Zone of Germany," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1950.

⁵⁷Nobleman, "After the Battle, It Was Military Government," *Civil Affairs Journal and Newsletter* (May-June 1994).

⁵⁸Engler, 79.

⁵⁹Bach 172-173.

⁶⁰Knappen, 129; Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 380-381, 386; Bach, 178-179; Gulgowski, 223-224. Patton's response has rarely been publicized: "I was trying to bring out... that in Germany practically all, or at least a very large percentage of tradespeople, small businessmen and even professional men, ... were beholden to the party in power for the patronage... and that, therefore, many of them gave lip service only.", *ibid.*, 179. Patton's version is also in his *War as I Knew It* (Boston: 1947), 389-90.

⁶¹For early assessments of the U.S. MG denazification program, see OMGUS, memo for Deputy Military Governor, Subject: "Report of Denazification Policy Board," 15 January 1946, RG 407, box 1004, "Denazification (U.S. Zone)" folder; OMGUS, "Denazification in the Four Zones," November 1947, *ibid.*

⁶²Muller speech, 22.

⁶³Department of State, "The Present Status of Denazification in Western Germany and Berlin," Division of Research for Europe, Office of Intelligence Research (15 April 1948), OIR Report No. 4626.

⁶⁴"German Views on Denazification," Opinion Survey Branch, Information Service Division, "OMGUS (Bad Neuheim: 11 July 1947); George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: 1967), 434-435. See also *Elimination of German Resources for War*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs (25 February 1946). See also the almost entirely negative views of denazification by a former MG officer, Wolfson, *passim*; Plischke, 215. One authority in 1947 claimed that the denazification process had "gone to destructive extremes.", Lewis H. Brown, "Denazification," *Social Research* (March 1947), 72. For other critical contemporary views see Max Rheinstein, "Renazifying Germany," *University of Chicago Magazine* (April 1947) and "The Ghost of the Morgenthau Plan," *Christian Century* (2 April 1947); Department of State, Division of Research for Europe, "The Present State of Denazification in Western Germany and Berlin, RG 94, entry 368, box 1004, "Denazification in (U.S. Zone)" folder.

⁶⁵Plischke, 223; Zink, *United States in Germany*, 165-67; W. Friedman, *The Allied Military Government of Germany* (London: 1947), 332

⁶⁶Zink, *United States in Germany*, 130.

⁶⁷Herz, "Denazification," *passim*. For the Soviet Zone see N. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1995).

⁶⁸Plischke, 235.

⁶⁹

⁷⁰See Richard L. Merritt, "American Influences in the Occupation of Germany," *Annals* (November, 1976). Surveying Western Germany's enduring post-war democracy, one authority noted that "Few would have believed this possible in 1945. For all its faults and follies, denazification may have helped to achieve this admirable end." However, he added wisely, "But in history there is no end.", Constantine Fitzgibbon, *Denazification* (London: 1969), 177.

⁷¹Knappen, 44-45. An education officer from the U.S. South remarked in confidence that perhaps the more direct approach might work; after all, the Southern school system, such as it was, implanted by the hated Yankee Reconstruction military government during Reconstruction, had endured past the end of that military government., *ibid*.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 63-64. Knappen shrewdly pointed out that simply excising or covering offending material would simply attract juvenile interest in the forbidden original passages., *ibid.*, 64.

⁷³Knappen, 39-40; Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 277. For schools in Munich and throughout the U.S. Zone, see report of MG Detachment F-213, in "Field Operations," 87, 158-160.

⁷⁴OMGUS, Education and Religious Affairs Branch, "Textbooks in Germany: American Zone" (August 1946), 24, RG 94, Entry 368, box 1015. Even pre-Hitler textbooks could be obnoxiously nationalistic. An absurd, but not unique example is found in a 1926 shorthand manual: "No people on earth has taken the perfection of its shorthand so seriously as have the Germans. Only in Germany...only here...and in no other nation of the world...that finally the same stenographic flag waves over all Germany.", B. Gaster, *Methodik des kurzschriftlichen Unterrichts* (1926), quoted in OMGUS, Education and Religious Affairs Branch, "Textbooks in Germany: American Zone" (n.p., August 1946), 17.

⁷⁵Hurwitz, *passim*.

⁷⁶Bach, 150-168.

⁷⁷Ralph Henry Gabriel, "Military Government and the Will of the Victors," *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Summer 1945), 339. Professor Gabriel at this stage termed the Germans "a hostile and fanatical people.", *ibid*. See also letters and material dealing with local schools in Kreis Traunstein MG in Germany (Territory Under Allied Occupation, 1945-1955), *passim*.

⁷⁸OMGUS, "Special Report of the Military Government: Educational and Cultural Relations," September 1948, RG 407, box 1015, "Education Germany" folder; OMGUS, Education and Cultural Relations Division - Educational Reconstruction in Germany - Berchtesgaden Conference, 7-12 October 1948," *ibid*; Richard L. Merritt, "American Influences in the Occupation of Germany," *Annals* (November 1976).

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 247; Dunner, 288. At least one copy of *Die Neue Zeitung* has survived, in the MG Muller Papers.

⁸⁰Edward Breitenkamp, *The U.S. Information Control Division 1945-1949* (Grand Forks, North Dakota: 1953).

⁸¹Bach, 220-221.

⁸²Office of the Chief of Staff, SHAEF, "Directive for Psychological Warfare and Control of German Information Systems," n.d. (penciled 16 April, presumably 1945), and "Control of Information and Propaganda Service in Germany," RG 331, decimal file, 1943-July 1945, box 42; SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division, "Directive No. 1 for Propaganda Policy of Overt Information Services," and "Guidance on Propaganda Treatment of Individual German Responsibilities," May 1945, RG 331, SHAEF Special Staff, PWD, box 10, folder 091.42. One of the earliest accounts of the occupation to point to the anomaly of a racially segregated army teaching democracy was in Engler, 43.

⁸³Hurwitz, 324.

⁸⁴Joseph Dunner, "Information Controls in the American Zone of Germany, 1945-1946," 281-282; Historical Division, European Command, Office of the Chief of Military History, "United States Military Government in Germany: Press Reorientation" (Karlsruhe: n.d.).

⁸⁵Lange-Quassowski, 89.

⁸⁶See Christmas 1946 multi-color issue. By contrast, in 1944, in the midst of war and heavy bombardment, something like 1,500 newspapers were still being published in Germany., "The German Press in the U.S. Occupied Area, 1945-1948), *Special Report of the Military Governor* (November 1948), 1; Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 367-374. An example of a licensed Communist newspaper was *Badische Volsecho*, published in Mannheim, which carried the following helpful headlines in its 15 May 1947 issue: "Hunger in All Streets," "The Saboteurs of the Food Amnesty in the West," "Abolish the Bureaucratic Food Administration," and "Growing Indignation of the Worker"; Snyder, 203.

⁸⁷OMGUS, Special Report of the Military Governor, *The German Press in the US Occupied Area 1945-1948* (Stuttgart? November 1948), 1. The pertinent press ordinances for the US Zone are also in this report. At the same time, German students were taking classroom notes in the margins of old newspapers. (Personal observations of author in Munich at that time.)

⁸⁸Bach, 225; Knappen, 165-168; Dunner, "Information Control," *passim*

⁸⁹Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 374; H. Hurwitz, *Die Stunde Null der deutschen Presse, Die Amerikanische Presspolitik in Deutschland, 1945-1949* (Cologne: 1972), 166-172.

⁹⁰Jutta-B. Lange-Quassowski, "Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past: Schools, Media, and the Formation of Opinion," in Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 84; Wolfgang Schutte, "Der deutsche Nachkriegs Rundfunk und die Grundung der Rundfunkanstalten," Eine Chronik, in Wilfried B. Lerg and Rolf Steininger, eds., "Rundfunk und Politic, 1923-1973," *Rundfunkforschung*, 3, (Berlin: 1973), 217-241, 226-232; Wolfgang Kapust, "Entwicklung des Rundfunks nach 1945," in *Fernsehen und Horfunk fur die Demokratie, Ein Handbuch uber den Rundfunk in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Opladen: 1979), 34-52; Harold Hurwitz, "Comparing American Reform Efforts in Germany: Mass Media and the School System," in Wolfe, ed., 327 and *passim*.

⁹¹Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 378. Early in the occupation, Germans responded that they preferred the Soviet broadcasts, which made a distinction between Nazi and non-Nazi Germans, in contrast to the "dour and grim" "dishwater" broadcasts of Radio Luxembourg and SHAEF press and radio output, *ibid.*, 281-282, 96.

⁹²Lange-Quassowski, 86.

⁹³OMGUS, *Special Report of the Military Governor: Education & Cultural Relations*. Stuttgart? September 1948, 8-10.

⁹⁴For a report on the greatly improved radio broadcasting in the American occupation sector, background of early post-war broadcasting and a listing of programs, see OMGUS, *Special Report*, "United States Military Government in Germany: Radio Reorientation (Karlsruhe: n. d.).

⁹⁵Bach, 230-231; Knappen, 159. See also Dunner, "Information Control," 287, 289.

⁹⁶"Information Control," *Military Government Report No. 1* (20 August 1945); Pilgert, Henry P, with Helga Dobbert, *Press, Radio and Film in West Germany, 1945-1953*. Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany. n.p., 14-30; "Radio in the U.S. Zone of Germany," U.S. Department of State *Bulletin*, 21, No. 525 (July 1949). For the various U.S. Military Government laws and regulations of post-war German media, see *Germany, 1947-1948: The Story in Documents*, Department of State Publication 3555 (1950), 594-607. See also *Reports of the Military Governor*, sections dealing with "Information Control," 13, 24, 36, 48 (1946-1949); "The German Press in the U.S. Occupied Area; and HICOG (final), *Report on Germany* (21 September 1949 - 31 July 1952), 61-82); Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 376-377.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 378-379

⁹⁸Detachment 39, memo "Report about the Kindergarten in Priorau," Dessau, 20 May 1945, RG 332, ETO/USAFET CAD, box No. 50, "Displaced Persons, Detachment 39 folder; Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 397; DP "Screening Reports" for 9-10 June 1945 by CA DP Detachment 47, RG 332, ETO/USFET CAD, box No. 50, "Displaced Persons Detachment 47" folder.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, speech, 24.

¹⁰⁰Ziemke, "Improvising Stability in Postwar Germany," 55; Knappen, 108.

¹⁰¹John H. Backer, "From Morgenthau Plan to Marshall Plan," Wolfe, ed., 157; Martin, 101.

¹⁰²Ziemke, "Improvising," 58.

¹⁰³[Det. F1F3], "Special Statement of Fact, July 2 (sic)," ("*Not released to press" in red pencil on bottom of page 1.); *ibid.*, memo to SMGO {senior military government officer}, Det. F1H2, Subject: "Asylum at Kaufbeuren, Swabia," 5 July 1945 (contains "not to emphasize" quotation); memo, Regional Military Governor, Headquarters, Regional Military Government Bavaria, Subject: "Report on Kaufbeuren (Murder Camp)", 7 July 1945, RG 332, ECAD, 1944-1945, box 54, "Detachment F1F3" folder.

¹⁰⁴Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 279.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, 285. The provision for Mauthausen camp survivors is in CPT C. Joad (DP8, 2d ECA Regiment), unpub. ms., James Robertson Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute Archives. "DPs vs. German Authorities" (n.d.); Muller speech. See *ibid.*, for food rations, etc. for DPs, 24-25.

¹⁰⁶Zink, *American Military Government*, 106; Friedrich, "The Three Phases of Field Operations in Germany, 1945-1946, 242, in Friedrich, ed.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 95. Identical sentiments were voiced by the official *Review of Military Government*. DPs in the U.S. Zone of Austria were "responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime, unrest and Black Market activity.", 188. See also Joad, *passim*.

¹⁰⁸Muller Papers, box No. 16.

¹⁰⁹Oravetz and Nobleman, oral interview, 80-81.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 106; Oliver J. Frederickson, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953*, Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe (Darmstadt? 1953), 73-80.

¹¹¹Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 435.

¹¹²Historical Division, European Command, "Displaced Persons, 1 July 1947- 30 June 1948" (Karlsruhe: 1950), 130-131.

¹¹³Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 397-398. See also *General List of Archives in Western Germany*, n.p., n.d., an Army pamphlet listing German depositories that might prove useful for Arts and Monuments personnel, to be distributed down to battalion level. Photocopy in RG 331, box 20, reel 291; Bach, 197-211; "Operations from Late March to Mid-July 1945," 161-163. More than one M&FAA must have speculated on the paradox of the Nazis' collecting of the fine art of peoples officially labeled "degenerate" or "subhuman." See also MAJ E. E. Adams, "Looted Art Treasures Go Back to France," *Quartermaster Review* (September-October 1946).

¹¹⁴Office of Military Government for Bavaria, Economics Division, memo, sub: "Liquidation of German Military and Nazi Memorials and Museums," 15 August 1946., copy in Muller Papers, box No. 16. It is a pity that this commonsensical guidance was not employed by ICD in its control of German music.

¹¹⁵Kenneth D. Alford, *The Spoils of World War II: The American Military's Role in the Stealing of Europe's Treasures* (New York: 1994), 278; Robert Engler, "The Individual Soldier and the Occupation," *Annals* (January 1950).

¹¹⁶Alford, *passim*. This work is somewhat overwrought, practically claiming that all U.S. soldiers, in combat or as occupiers, were pillagers. But Alford does give numerous examples in his own work of incorruptible soldiers who brought villains to some sort of justice.

¹¹⁷Walter I. Farmer, "Custody and Controversy at the Wiesbaden Collecting Point," in "The Spoils of War: World War II and its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance, & Recovery of Cultural Property, A Symposium presented by the Bard Graduate Center for Studies in the Decorative Arts" (New York: 19-12 January 1995). (November 1945); Charles Kuhn, "German Paintings in the National Gallery: A Protest," *College Art Journal* (January 1946); Thomas Carr Howe, *Salt Mines and Castles* (1946), 304-311; Lynn Nicholas, *The Rape of Europe* (1994), 401-405.

¹¹⁸Gulgowski, 220-221, 245. See also "Genet," "The Beautiful Spoils," *The New Yorker*, 17 November 1945.

¹¹⁹Martin, 99; Frank Howley, *Berlin Command* (New York: 1950), 89. BG Howley was U.S. Army Berlin Commandant.

¹²⁰Wolfson, 312; Historical Division, EUCOM, "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-1949," chapt. 4. The "chits" that were used in the legal exchange marts were paid the sincere tribute of being counterfeited., E. Hartrich, "Scrip Backed by U.S.

Cigarettes Best Money in Frankfurt Today," *New York Herald Tribune* (9 March 1947). Also personal observations of author in Munich, 1947.

¹²¹ Alford, *passim*.

¹²² Gulgowski, 246-247; Engler, concedes in his valuable article that the U.S. soldier lived like a king in occupied Germany. See also Bach, 51-52, 57, 274-275; Howley, 91; Frederick Kuh, "Allied Berlin Officials Living in Luxury, Each Meal a Tribal Festival," *Chicago Sun* (24 November 1947).

¹²³ Bach, 31.

¹²⁴ This point was made by the Historical Division, EUCOM, "Relations of Occupation Forces Personnel with the Civil Population, 1946-1948," *Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1946-48* (n.p., n.d.)

¹²⁵ Gulgowski, 228-229.

¹²⁶ Historical Division, European Command, "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-49" and "Relations of Occupation Forces Personnel with the Civil Population, 1946-1948," *Occupation Forces in Europe Series, (n.p., n.d.)*, *passim*; Engeler, 82. Engeler, inexplicably, blames some of the indiscipline on "poor living conditions." Knappen, 180-185; Bach, *passim*. "Morale and Discipline" more plausibly points out that some of the increase might have been due to a "new willingness of Germans actually to report to authorities offenses by U.S. personnel against their persons or property," 3.; "Record Venereal Rate Revealed in GI Complaints," *Washington Post* (14 January 1946). The *Post* also felt compelled to identify the troops as "white."

¹²⁷ Gulgowski, 249-250, 257. In January 1946, some 3,000 disorderly soldiers gathered in front on General McNarney's residence, chanting "I want to go home!", again before a bemused German audience., *ibid.* Engler, 77-86. Gulgowski points out that the Army did little beyond complaining about the quality of the new inductees., *ibid.*, 252.

¹²⁸ "Relations of Occupation Forces Personnel with the Civil Population," 11-12.

¹²⁹ Snyder, 187-189. Yet for all this criminal activity, the civilian crime rate in the U.S. Zone showed a steady decline, to where the Berlin MG could boast that it was well below that in most U.S. urban areas., Office of Military Government U.S. Sector, Berlin, *A Four Year Report, July 1, 1945 - September 1, 1949* (Berlin: n.d.), 63-70.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, *passim*; "Mobility, Vigilance, Justice, A Saga of the Constabulary," *Military Review* (April 1947); Franklin M. Davis, Jr., *Come as a Conqueror* (New York: 1967), 166-171.

¹³¹ Fredericksen, 63-69.

¹³² Joseph Starr, *Fraternization With the Germans in World War II*, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command (Frankfurt: 1947), 29.

¹³³ Ziemke, *U.S. Army in Occupation*, 321-325; Engeler, 82-83; Bach, 73-76; Clark, "Conflicts," 232. The changing Army policy toward German civilians in the early occupation years is best outlined in "Relations of Occupation Forces Personnel with the

Civil Population.” One local commander in the early days of the U.S. occupation, who also had fenced in his men, found that they had dug a tunnel out of the compound!, Metaxas oral interview. An entire, unpublished, Army study dealt with the vexatious subject: Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans*

¹³⁴Fredericksen, 138-139.

¹³⁵Historical Division, European Command, "Relations of Occupation Forces Personnel with the Civil Population, 1946-1948," Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1946-48, n.p., n.d., 46-57. Charles E. Campbell, "German Youth Activities of the United States Army," Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command (Frankfurt Am Main: 1947); Fredericksen, 135-136; Knappen, 47-48, 138-142; OMGUS, Education and Cultural Relations Division, "Educational Reconstruction in Germany," Berchtesgaden Conference, 12-17 October 1948, RG 94, box 1015.

¹³⁶OMGUS Civil Affairs Division, *Germany (Territory Under U.S. Occupation: The Evolution of Bizonal Organization* (n.p: March 1948).

¹³⁷Muller speech, 12.

¹³⁸Howard Palfrey Jones, "Currency, Banking, Domestic and Foreign Debt," in Edward H. Litchfield, ed., *Governing Post War Germany* (Ithaca: 1953), 423-425; Martin, 182-183. Edward A. Tennenbaum, "Military Government and Monetary Reform," unpublished typescript, n. d., Truman Library; Jack Bennett, "The German Currency Reform." *Annals* (January 1950). But for an early, largely agnostic, account of the currency reform in the western zones, see Franz Blucher, "Financial Situation and Currency Reform in Germany," *Annals* (November 1948).

¹³⁹Office of Military Government for Bavaria, Intelligence Division, *Trend: A Monthly Report of Intelligence Analysis and Public Opinion* (Munich? March 1948), 2-5., Muller Papers, Box No. 19.

¹⁴⁰Ziemke, "The formulation and Initial Implementation of U.S. Occupation Policy in Germany," in Schmitt, ed., *U.S. Occupation in Europe After World War II*. Lawrence, Kansas. 1978.

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¹⁴¹Institute fur Besatzungsfragen, *Occupation Costs: Are They a Defense Contribution?* (Tuebingen: 1951), 1.

¹⁴²See Richard L. Merritt, *Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949* (New Haven and London: 1996).

¹⁴³Benson, "Austria," 187-188. For early MG activities in Austria, see "Handbook for Unit Commanders - AUSTRIA, draft (n.d., n.p.), USASOC History Archives..

¹⁴⁴As some indication of the differences between the two occupations, this writer remembers that Austrians would wave at U.S. troop trains, while Germans did not.

¹⁴⁵See also Benson and Howe, 67; F. C. Englemann, "How Austria had Coped with Two Dictatorial Legacies," in Herz, *From Dictatorship*; G. C. S. Benson, "American Military Government in Austria May 1945-February 1946," in Holborn, 169; Office of the Chief of

Military History, "History of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, World War II to March 1946," typescript, n.p., n.d., copies in USASOC Historical Archives and U.S. Army Center of Military History Archives.

¹⁴⁶Copies in USASOC Historical Archives and U.S. Army Center of Military History. Note how titles of these reports progress from *Military Government* (1945-1947) to *Civil Affairs* (1948-1949), to *Report of the United States High Commissioner* (1949).

¹⁴⁷Edgar L. Erickson, "The Zoning of Austria," *Annals* (January 1950); Donald R. Whitnah and Edgar L. Erickson, *The American Occupation of Austria: Planning and Early Years* (Westport, Connecticut and London: 1985); Benson, "Austria," 170; US Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, "A Civil Affairs Guide Program for Austria and the Applicability of the German Guides" (n.p.: 16 January 1945) seeks to unravel the German from the Austrian MG. (copy in Hoover Institution Archives).

¹⁴⁸Benson, "Austria," passim.

¹⁴⁹Robert Komer, "Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater," Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington: n.d., n.p.), 28. The results of the school's first, two-week, course are outlined in a report from the school's commandant, on 18 February 1945. The curriculum consisted of general U.S. Army material (record-keeping, staff duties, etc.), Austrian history and government, "psychology of Nazism," economics and supply, police, legal/military government principles, finance, public health, displaced persons and monuments/fine arts., RG 331, box 20, reel 292A.

¹⁵⁰Daugherty and Andrews, 352-353.

¹⁵¹Benson, "Austria," 176, 182.

¹⁵²Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government: Its Organization and Policy* (Washington: 1947), 177-194. A draft of the U.S. military government's responsibilities is in "Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Austria," from Armed Forces Headquarters, 11 April 1945, and "Plans for Military Government, Austria," RG 331, box 20, reel 291A.

¹⁵³Whitnah and Erickson, 218.

¹⁵⁴F. C. Englemann, "How Austria Has Coped; Herz, *From Dictatorship*, 144; "Austrian Denazification," 31 May 1945, memo from AFHQ, G-2, RG 331, box 20, reel 291A.

¹⁵⁵Benson, "Austria, 178; Milton Colvin, "Principal Issues in the U.S. Occupation of Austria, 1945-1948," in Schmitt, ed.

¹⁵⁶Englemann, 144; A. Scharf, *Osterreichs Erneuerung, 1945-1955* (Vienna: 1955); D. Stiefel, *Entnazifizierung in Osterreich* (Vienna, Munich: 1981); US Forces in Austria, *Review of Military Government*, 27-28.

¹⁵⁷Whitnahs, 127; Whitnah and Erickson, 221.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 184-185.

¹⁵⁹Benson, 185-186.

- ¹⁶⁰Colvin, 113; Donald R. and Florentine E. Whitnah, *Salzburg Under Siege: U.S. Occupation, 1945-1955* (New York, Westport, etc.: 1991), 110-11.
- ¹⁶¹Whitnahs, *Salzburg Under Siege*, 129; Benson, "Austria," 193; United States Forces in Austria, *A Review of Military Government* (Vienna? 1 April 1947), 83-87.
- ¹⁶²Whitnah and Erickson, 235.
- ¹⁶³Colvin, 118-119; Fred L. Hansel, "Epilogue: Reflections of the U.S. Commanders in Austria and Germany," in Schmitt, ed., 147. For UNRRA in Austria, see *Review of Military Government*, 86-89.
- ¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 165.
- ¹⁶⁵Whitnah and Erickson, 223-225; *Review of Military Government*, 108-113.
- ¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 226-228. For DPs see Reports of U.S. High Commissioner, 1945-1949, and *Review of Military Government*, 184-189.
- ¹⁶⁷Whitnah and Erickson, 249.
- ¹⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 254-257. Less positive evaluations come from Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State under President Franklin Roosevelt *Where are We Heading?* (New York: 1946), 168; and Professor Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy During the Second World War* (New York: 1965), 174-175. Welles was writing too soon after events and neither he nor Smith seemed to understand the nature of a military occupation. For the Austrian black market, see *Review of Military Government*, 57.
- ¹⁶⁹Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation*, 444-449; Whitnah and Erickson, 219.
- ¹⁷⁰Planning for the occupation of Japan is found in Office of the Chief of Military History, "History of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, World War II to March 1946,"
- ¹⁷¹SCAP staff, *Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase*, volume 1 Supplement (Tokyo 1950), 194. (Note the repeated use of the name of the SCAP commander, and the reverential ascription, "By His General Staff.")
- ¹⁷²H. I. Hille, Jr., "The Eighth Army's Role in the Military Government of Japan," *Military Review* (January 1948), 11.
- ¹⁷³SCAP staff, *Reports of General MacArthur. MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase*, vol. 1 Supplement; Ralph Braibanti, "The MacArthur Shogunate in Allied Guise," in Wolfe, ed., 82. A veteran of the 76th Military Government Company and of the Japanese occupation in its first year termed Japan at the time as "virtually intact" but "inert.", John D. Montgomery, "Administration of Occupied Japan: First Year," *Human Organization* (Summer 1949), 4.
- ¹⁷⁴Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation As New Deal* (New York: 1987), 14-31. It should be remembered that, with the exception of Korea, no major nation on earth is so united in culture and language as Japan, a fact which obviously considerably eased the U.S. occupation's burdens. Grant Doty sees a definite "line of succession" between General Hilldring's questions and the State Department's *U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* (Washington: 1945), Doty, "MacArthur's Japanese

Experiments," draft paper, n.d. (copy in USASOC Historical Archives). [Eighth U.S. Army] 10th Information and Historical Service, "Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan," n.p., (c. 1948), (Copy in USASOC Historical Archives).

¹⁷⁵Doty, 8; Robert Scalapino, "The American Occupation of Japan - Perspective after Three Decades," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (November 1976).

¹⁷⁶See *Reports of General MacArthur, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase*; Comments by Ralph Braibanti, in Wolfe, ed., 132. It is quite significant that the official history of the U.S. occupation of Japan is entitled *MacArthur in Japan*. One cannot envisage a companion volume with the title *Clay in Germany*. For "divine occupier" see Arthur D. Bourtest, Philip H. Taylor and Arthur A. Maass, "Military Government Organization and Experience in the Pacific," in Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government*.

¹⁷⁷Scalapino, 106. Paul Linebarger goes so far as to term the U.S. Occupation "the high-water mark of the New Deal in world affairs." Paul A. M. Linebarger, Djang Chu, Ardath W. Burks, *Far Eastern Governments and Politics, China and Japan* (Princeton, etc: 1956); R. J. Donaldson, "Japan is Paradise for Government Planners," *Cleveland Plain Dealer* (11 March 1947).

¹⁷⁸"Democracy Occupies Japan," *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Autumn, 1947), 521. An early occupation radio program was entitled "Liberal Thinkers," and cast Japan's most popular stage and film actors in tales about pre-war Japanese liberals., Mayo, 316.

¹⁷⁹Robert E. Ward and Frank J. Shulman, *The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952* (Chicago: 1974), 232. See also Department of State, *Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress*, Publication 267, Far Eastern Series 17 (n.d.); A D. Bouterse, P. H. Taylor and Arthur A. Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan," in; Friederich, ed., 318-328.

¹⁸⁰John D. Montgomery, "Administration of Occupied Japan: The first Year," *Human Organization* (Summer 1949).

¹⁸¹Friedrich, "American Military Government in the Far East," in Friederich et al, 91. Edwin M. Martin, wrote that "The sharpness of the split between Nazi and anti-Nazi elements in Germany, dulled though it became in the course of war, was never equaled in Japan." *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (reprint, Westport: 1972), 53. Actually, it never came close. A basic source for U.S. MG of Japan and Korea is SCAP monthly, *Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea* (Tokyo?).

¹⁸²"Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan," passim; Reports of General MacArthur, 199; Switzer, passim; Hille, passim; GHQ SCAP, "History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, W. Hutchison, ed., 7.

¹⁸³"Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan," 11.

¹⁸⁴Ralph Braibanti, "Occupation Controls in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* (22 September 1948). Braibanti served 16 months as military government officer in Yamanashi prefecture

and three months as coordinator for military government teams of eight prefectures in the Kanto region., *ibid.*

¹⁸⁵J. S. Switzer, "Military Government in Japan," *Military Review* (April 1954), 26. (COL Switzer was commanding officer, Hokkaido Civil Affairs Region, Japan.)

¹⁸⁶Ralph J. Donaldson, "All Japan Being Policed by Less than 2,500 Yanks," *Cleveland Plain Dealer* (7 March 1947); *Reports of General MacArthur*, 201, note 18.

¹⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 230 and *passim*; Braibanti, "The MacArthur Shogunate in Allied Guise," in Wolfe ed., 81-82; Bourtest, et al, "American Military Government in Japan," 343-344. By 1946-1947 the SCAP chief of intelligence chief, MG Charles A. Willoughby, had begun an internal purge with his report to MacArthur., Edward J. Boone, Jr., "The Leftist Infiltration of SCAP," "The Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952," *Army History* (Spring 1997), 20.

¹⁸⁸"Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan," 4; Philip H. Taylor, "The Administration of Occupied Japan," *Annals* (January 1950). Taylor, who was extremely caustic about the quality of SCAP military chiefs, advanced the preposterous prognostication that MacArthur might soon be replaced by a Britisher or an Australian!, *ibid.*, 150; Hille, 14; *Military Review* (February 1948).

¹⁸⁹"Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan," 6-7. Quotation from Braibanti, "The Role of Administration in the Occupation of Japan," *Annals* (January 1950), 159; Hille, 14; Switzer, 27-28.

¹⁹⁰Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: 1960), 16-21; Hille, 16-17; "Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan, 25-26.

¹⁹¹Kawai, 21-23; A. E. Tiedemann, "Japan Sheds Dictatorship," in Herz, ed., 198.

¹⁹²MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: 1991), 310.

¹⁹³This policy was not always approved at the time. Richard Lauterbach, although conceding that the occupation was doing a better job than other MGs, denounced the unilateral nature of MacArthur's occupation: "We have treated Japan as a colony and we have accepted Japan's problems as our own, forgetting that the whole world must be considered in any settlement of the Japanese problem." ("The whole world"?) *Danger From the East* (New York: 1947), 189. Philip H. Taylor was also upset by MacArthur's unilateral policies., "Administration of Occupied Japan." Lawrence Rosinger's "United States Accepts Allied Control of Japan," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* (4 January 1946), was thus decidedly premature. See also R. Singh, *Post-War Occupation Forces: Japan and South-East Asia*, (Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War), Historical Section, India and Pakistan (n.p. 1958); and "British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute of India* (July 1949); S. S. Stratton, "The Far Eastern Commission," *Far Eastern Survey* (25 August 1948), presents a more positive view, as does J. M. Walsh, "British Participation in the Occupation of Japan," *Army Quarterly* (October 1948); "American Military Government in the Far East," Friederich and Associates, 94.

¹⁹⁴Having carried out so little post-surrender planning for Japan of their own, America's Pacific allies, in a way, had only themselves to blame if they were unable to participate significantly in the Japanese occupation., Gordon Daniels, "The American Occupation of Japan, 1945-52," in R. A. Prete and A. Hamish Ion, eds., *Armies of Occupation*, Ninth Annual Military History Symposium, Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, 18-19 March 1982 (Waterloo, Ontario: 1984), 160. In late December 1945 the "Big Three" Foreign Ministers established an 11-nation Far Eastern Commission (FEC) to devise policy for the occupation of Japan. MacArthur, believing that FEC actually posed a threat to the democratization of Japan, likewise basically ignored this international interloper., T. McNelly, "The Japanese Constitution: Child of the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* (June 1959); MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 291-293; K. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution* (Chicago: 1991).

¹⁹⁵Fearey, 143-145; Martin Kyre, "The Japanese Reparations Question: A Survey," MA thesis, University of Washington, Seattle, 1957); Philip H. Taylor, "The Administration of Occupied Japan," *Annals* (January 1950), 49-50; Werner Levi, "International Control of Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* (25 September 1945), both deplored MacArthur's unilateralism. At any rate, Japanese equipment reparations had only begun in January 1948. "Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan," 32-33..

¹⁹⁶Marlene J. Mayo, "Civil Censorship and Media Control in Early Occupied Japan," in Wolfe, ed., 285, 299, 311, 317, 510 (note #63); Paul Vincent Miller, "Censorship in Japan," *Commonwealth* (25 April 1947); Russell Brines, *MacArthur's Japan* (Philadelphia and New York: 1948), 247; Iwasaki Akira, "The Occupied Screen," *Japan Quarterly* (July September 1978), 304-305. See also Kawai, 214. (Brines was head of the AP News agency in Japan; Kawai was editor of *Nippon Times*.)

¹⁹⁷SCAP General Staff, *Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase* (n.p., [1950, 1966, 1994]), quotations on pages, 236, 241; William Coughlan, *Conquered Press: The MacArthur Era in Japanese Journalism* (Palo Alto: 1952); Lafe F. Allen, "Effect of Allied Occupation on the Press of Japan," *Journalism Quarterly* (December 1947).

¹⁹⁸Iwasaki, 312-313, Mayo, 307-308. The Japanese housewife was even introduced to the American-style soap opera by SCAP, and the programs, with their Japanese classical music background, became very popular., *ibid.*, 317. See also SCAP, *Missions and Accomplishments of the Occupation Civil Information and Education Fields* ([Tokyo]: 1 January 1950).

¹⁹⁹Mayo, 301.

²⁰⁰"MacArthur in Japan," 240.

²⁰¹Daniels, 169.

²⁰²*Political Reorientation of Japan*, Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (Tokyo? 1949?), vol. 2, p. 405. Kawai, 141.

^{203c} Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan, 12.

²⁰⁴ Chiba MG Team, Activities Report, June 1947, RG 260, box 19, folder No. 61.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, box 21, folder No. 6.

²⁰⁶ *MacArthur Reports: The Occupation, 249-251*; Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan: Second Phase. 1948-50*, 2d ed. (Westport: 1972), 54-55.

²⁰⁷ Hans H. Baerwald, "The Purge in Occupation Japan," Wolfe, 189 and passim; *MacArthur Reports: The Occupation, 220-222*. See also Charles A. Willoughby, *Shirarezaru Nhon Senryo Uirobii Kaikoroku* ("Unknown History of the Japanese Occupation: Willoughby's Memoirs"), Tokyo. 1973. This posthumous work by MacArthur's Intelligence Chief has never been translated from the original Japanese.

²⁰⁸ Fearey, 26.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 13, 45. Daniel C. Holtom, "New Status of Shinto," *Far Eastern Survey* (30 January 1946); Montgomery, *The Purge in Occupied Japan: A Study in the Use of Civilian Agencies Under Military Government*, Operations Research Office (Chevy Chase: 1954), passim; Montgomery, *Forced to be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan* (Chicago: 1957), 28; Tiedemann, 200-202.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 28; "Behind the Japanese Purge - American Military Priorities," *Newsweek* (27 January 1947).

^{211c} Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan," 21.

²¹² Fearey, 48-49.

²¹³ K. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution* (Chicago: 1991); Kawai, 52-53. The official "line" is in SCAP, Government Section, *The Political Reorientation of Japan*, 2 vols. (Washington: 1950). See also Robert E. Ward, "The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution," *American Political Science Review* (December 1950); Kawai, "Sovereignty and Democracy in the Japanese Constitution," *ibid.* (September 1955); R. E. Ward, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned Political Change in Japan," in Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton: 1968), 994. Ward, "The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution," *American Political Science Review* December 1956); State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. 8 (Washington: 1971), 123-127; A. E. Tiedemann, "Japan Sheds Dictatorship," in Herz, 194; Montgomery, 15; Boone, 17.

²¹⁴ Scalapino, 110; Martin, 97-100.

²¹⁵ For the Japanese occupation economic and industrial policy, see SCAP, *Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan* monthly reports, "Economic Activities" section, and *Reports of General MacArthur*, vol. 1 Supplement, "Economic Division."

²¹⁶ William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964* (Boston: 1978), 465. The 1947 Constitution has never been amended. (Interestingly for an instrument basically drawn up by Americans, the new constitution adopted most of the parliamentary system, with the supremacy of the legislature and a prime minister.)

²¹⁷ Kawai, 137-138.

²¹⁸Hille, 15; "Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan", 19.

²¹⁹Ibid., 16-17.

²²⁰*Political Reorientation in Japan, September 1945-September 1948*, 549. Martin, 73-81; SCAP Monograph No. 24, *Elimination of the Zaibatsu Cartel, 1945-1950* (Tokyo: n.d.). What removals did take place, probably simply opened the way for younger managers with newer ideas, and thus actually speeded German and Japanese economic recovery.

²²¹Eleanor M. Hadley, "Trust Busting in Japan," *Harvard Business Review* (4 July 1948). Ms Hadley was a SCAP official.; Kawai, 143-156, 170; T. A. Bisson, *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan* (Berkeley: 1954); R. J. D. Braibanti, "The Role of Administration in Japan," *Annals* (January 1950), 160; Martin, 81-87; Tiedemann, 196; Fearey, 56, 76, 79, 82; Daniels, 175. According to Daniels, MacArthur, certainly a dyed-in-the-wool anti communist, nonetheless believed the Japanese Communist Party to be "pathetically weak.", *ibid.*

²²²Kawai, 173-173; Martin, 87-92; Fearey, 87-98; Tiedemann, 195-196. R. P. Done, *Land Reform in Japan* (London: 1959), 130-132; A. F. Raper, *The Japanese Village in Transition*, SCAP Natural Resources Section Report No. 136 (Tokyo: 1950), 175; SCAP Monograph No. 27, *The Rural Land Reform* (Tokyo: n.d.). There was also a political agenda to Japan land reform: significant gerrymandering saw to it that one rural vote could be worth up to four urban votes and cemented the lengthy dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party., G. McCormack and Y. Sugimoto, eds., *Democracy in Japan* (Armonk, New York: 1986), 3; G. R. Doty, "MacArthur's Japanese Experiments," draft, USASOC History Archives; "Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan," 29.

²²³Kermit Eby, "Re-Education of Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* (3 July 1946). The Commission also recommended the compulsory teaching of "Romanji," the simplified system of writing Japanese in Roman characters, a reform that seems to have gotten nowhere., *MacArthur Reports*, 206. Fearey, 35.

²²⁴J. Caiger, "Ienga Saburo and the First Postwar Japanese History Textbook," *Modern Asian Studies* (January 1969), 15; Fearey, 36-37; "Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan", 13-15; Mayo, "Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of Defeated Japan, 1943-1945," in T. W. Burkman, ed., *The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform* (Norfolk, Virginia, MacArthur Library: 1982).

²²⁵Tiedemann, 194

²²⁶Kawai, 188-193. Edward Boone, Jr., dryly remarks that "The Japanese had the good sense to re-reform some of the educational reforms as soon as feasible., 19.

²²⁷Harry Emerson Wilder, "Post-War Politics in Japan, II," *American Political Science Review* (December 1948); Kawai, 229-231. Linebarger gives a figure of more than 1,000 registered political parties at the time., 509.

²²⁸Wilder, 123.

²²⁹Scalapino, 108; Montgomery, 57; Tiedemann, 203. This point about the staying power of the Japanese bureaucracy (as opposed to the political elite) was made as early as April 1947. See John M. Maki, "Japan: Political Reconstruction," *Far Eastern Survey* (9 April 1947). Also Kawai, 116-120, 124-25; and Linebarger, 505-506. The eminent sociologist, Max Weber, should have the last word here. "even in case of revolution by force or of occupation by an enemy, the bureaucratic machinery will normally continue to function just as it has for the previous legal government.", quoted in Montgomery, 89. Considering that the post-war military occupations were "legal" by any definition of the Laws of War, one can understand the resilience of both bureaucracies.

²³⁰Switzer, 34; Philip H. Taylor, "The Administration of Occupied Japan," *Annals* (January 1950), 149; Fearey, 60-65; Tiedemann, 197-198; Hadley, "From Deconstruction to Reverse Course in Japan," Wolfe, ed., 146. This battle echoed in the United States, where liberal opinion supported such "trust-busting" in Japan while conservatives usually took the opposite position. Both positions were based on philosophical grounds, in that few, if any, in the U.S. could foresee the emergence of Japan's mighty industrial and economic power in the coming years., *ibid.*, *passim*.

²³¹Eleanor Hadley, "From Deconcentration to Reverse Course in Japan," in Wolfe, ed., 144; Fearey, 66.

²³²Braibanti, "Role of Administration.", *ibid.*, "Occupation Controls in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, 22 September 1948.

²³³Taylor, 149-150.

²³⁴Linebarger, et al, 487. More tangibly, the chief of SCAP Information and Information Section in 1951 exulted, even with the Korean War raging, that the United States could drastically draw down its troops on occupation duty with no fear of any Japanese moves against the U.S. MG. In fact, the Japanese were donating blood and school children were mailing Christmas cards for U.S. troops in Korea. Only the still "legal" Communist Party was fulminating against "U.S. aggression" in Korea., D. R. Nugent, "A Report on the Occupation of Japan," in H. E. Snyder and G. E. Beauchamp, eds. *Responsibilities of Voluntary Agencies in Occupied Areas*. "A Report on the Second National Conference on the Occupied Countries held under the Auspices of Commission on the Occupied Areas of the American Council of Education in Co-Operation with the Department of State and Department of the Army, Washington, November 30 - December 1 1950" (Washington: February 1951), 57.

²³⁵Ziemke, in Schmitt, 42.

²³⁶Linebarger, 521.

²³⁷One Harry Emerson Wildes, for example, claimed that contrary to any of MacArthur's claims, the American occupation of Japan produced no revolution, but rather a renaissance of the old order., *Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath* (New York: 1954); see also Paul Hutchinson, "Is MacArthur Attempting the Impossible?" *Christian Century* (15 January 1947), or Harry F. Kern, "Trouble in Japan: How the Struggle to

Win the Peace Now Threatens the Success of the American Occupation," *Newsweek* (23 June 1947) and many others. Inevitably, the further from the occupation the work was written, the more favorable, although as late as 1950 Engler (who should have known better) wrote of "the discouraging patterns of so much of present-Germany", "Individual Soldier," 85. Eli Nobleman in the same year wondered what effect of the occupation on "a nation which had little or no experience with democratic principles and traditions", *Military Government Courts in Germany*, 191.

²³⁸It is indeed startling to read that "Economic rehabilitation lags sadly behind that of the Soviet zone [of Germany].... Compared to conditions in the East, those in the Western zones present a sorry picture." A. Dorpallen, "The Split Occupation of Germany," *Virginia Quarterly*, Autumn 1946, 587. Critical accounts of the American military occupation of Germany continued through the 1950s. See, for example, J. D. Montgomery's *Forced to be Free* (Chicago: 1957), an indicative title.

KOREA: OCCUPATION AND WAR

"Military rule in a liberated country is an anomaly at best," (Roger Baldwin)

Soon after World War II the War Department CAMG G-5 vanished, with some of its functions absorbed by other agencies. On the other hand, the Army did activate the first permanent MG units, presumably for post-war occupation duty. These were the 95th and 96th MG Groups, both activated 26 August 1945 at the Presidio of Monterey, California. The 95th was inactivated in Japan in June 1946 but activated again on 29 October 1948 at Fort Bragg, then inactivated on 28 October 1951 at Pusan Korea. The 96th was inactivated on 25 January 1949 in Korea. Some twenty-four 400 series CA battalions, later redesignated companies, were also activated in the post-war years.¹

With the winding down or elimination of post-World War U.S. Army Military Government occupations in 1949-51, the Army began to lose interest in the subject. It did, however, approve Table of Organization 41-500 (June 1948) for the Military Government service organizations. This cellular-type TO&E permitted the formation of MG groups, companies and platoons of any size or composition; MG staff sections were also being included, at least in theory, in the post-war TO&Es for Army Groups, Armies, Corps and Division headquarters. TO&E 41-500 also served as the basis for the organization of MG units in the organized Reserve Corps. In the 40 series of Reserve unit and individual training every branch of the Army now included a common subcourse on Military Government, while the Command and General Staff College began to include MG problems in its 50 and 60 Series courses.²

Nonetheless, the Civil Affairs Division was dissolved in 1949 and its functions widely distributed among several Army agencies: Plans and Operations Division of the Army General Staff, Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office, Historical Division, Army Special Staff; the Adjutant General's Office and the Assistant Secretary of the Army's Office for Occupied Areas.³ This dissolving of the CAD and the dispersal of its functions was an indication of the considerably reduced interest in the subject throughout the Army. In the short-fuse, "push-button" nuclear war foreseen by military and civilian pundits, it was difficult to imagine any need for the occupation and administration of other lands.

On the other hand, by 1949 the Army had created the first peacetime Reserve Component (RC) Civil Affairs/Military Government units. These 70 units consisted of 14 groups and 56 companies, but they were soon supplemented by the activation of RC special units, consisting of several CA/MG headquarters and school units. Further, the 95th CA Group was reactivated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 29 October 1948. For the first time in history the Army could immediately deploy CA/MG units to a trouble spot. Whether it would do so was an entirely different matter.

Occupation

One of American military history's lesser-known episodes is the U.S. Army's occupation and direct government of South Korea for three years, 1945-1948. In many ways the troops who landed at Inchon (not for the first time) can be compared to those bemused U.S. Army troops who had stepped down the gangplank in Vladivostok, Russia almost three decades earlier. Why were they here? What kind of a country were they getting into?

They were there at first simply to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea. Japan had brutally governed its "protectorate" of Korea since 1910. They had developed the country industrially, although the Koreans themselves had precious little share in the fruits of this development. The Cairo Declaration of December 1943 had asserted that it was the policy of the Allies that Korea would become "free and independent in due course" (emphasis added). That latter phrase, of course, perplexed Korean nationalists, who pointed out that they had been among the first victims of Japanese aggression. If, for example, France were to regain its sovereignty immediately with the expulsion of the enemy, why not Korea? Korea, however, did not bulk large in the councils of the mighty. When the Japanese surrender had been confirmed, State Department officials divided Korea roughly and temporarily in half (horizontally) for the acceptance of that surrender and to disarm and repatriate the Japanese. Quite possibly another motive was to establish an American presence facing the Soviets forces, then rounding up Japanese troops in Manchuria and northern Korea. Thus, almost casually, was established the only place in Asia where the U.S. would directly confront the Soviet Union; four decades and a major war later, (even with the Soviets long gone), the Americans would still be there.

Unlike the occupations of Germany, Austria or Japan, the American military occupation of Korea was almost completely (and inexplicably) unplanned. Therein lay the cause of most of the U.S. occupation Army's troubles in the months to come.⁴ (In the words of one War Department civilian hired for duty in Korea, "When I was hired in Washington...the only books available in the Pentagon War Department library [on Korea] were about six volumes of travel literature..., published by the Japanese in the early years of the century to entice visitors to Korea...[and] the pseudo-scholarly publications of the missionary-staffed Royal Asiatic Society."⁵) The troops themselves were told little more than that they were entering a land in which "some of the populace is Japanese, some Chinese, the people may be hostile to newcomers; you can expect all kinds of weather and the women are strange." (To which one perceptive GI replied "Hell, it could be California!")⁶ The U.S. Far East Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, was primarily concerned with Japan and its problems and obviously gave little thought to the appointment of a military governor for the liberated nation. Generals Joseph Stilwell and Albert Wedemeyer, both experienced Asian experts, had been proposed, but for some reason rejected for the position. In the words of one later authority, the military governor who was chosen, LTG John Hodge, XXIV Corps Commander, was a poor choice, lacking any military government or Asian civil

experience. His appointment was "made at the last minute by the sheerest expediency.... General Hodge was very possibly the first man in history selected to wield executive powers over a nation of nearly twenty million on the basis of shipping time." Hodge appeared to be a "small-bore MacArthur", with his own corn-cob pipe, sunglasses and a militantly Middle-America approach to his new charge.⁷ MacArthur's confused and casual guidance to Hodge boded ill for the occupation: he was informed that the Koreans were Japanese subjects and that they "may be treated by you as enemy nationals" --but they were not to be treated as Japanese *per se*.⁸

A small detachment of MG personnel, trained by the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit for duty in Japan, was finally dispatched to Korea in mid-October, but, of course, had to be re-oriented for the actual mission in Korea. In the meantime, General Hodge's tactical units, in their ignorance, made occupation policy.⁹ Many Korean political activists had already organized throughout the peninsula a provisional "government," termed the Korean People's Republic.¹⁰ This organization, under its leader, Kim Ku (later assassinated), was by no means entirely communist, although at first it was backed by the Soviets in the North. In impeccable Hangeul it referred to itself as the "gook/"guk", or "going government."¹¹ It performed sterling duty in the days between the Japanese surrender and the Americans' arrival in keeping order in the South, a most difficult task, as the area was in chaos. A delegation from the KPR unsuccessfully attempted to visit LTG Hodge on board his headquarters ship in Inchon harbor. However, Hodge's sole directive from the State Department was to organize and accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea not to deal with any political groupings or parties. (Perhaps the "leftist" title of the KPR also put him off.)¹² Yet the KPR was probably the political grouping with the strongest following throughout the South.¹³

Worse was to come. Japanese police squelched Korean welcoming demonstrations, killing several. When the Americans did land the Koreans at first were forced to remain mute. When the Japanese surrender was finally signed, however, Koreans, three-deep in the cities and towns, waved hastily drawn-up Korean and U.S. flags and welcome signs (including "Americans - Koreans - Friends in Christ" from Korea's large Christian population) and shouted *mansei en masse*. Probably no foreign army entering Korea has ever been so rapturously welcomed.¹⁴ When Japanese forces continued to suppress Korean demonstrations, who at least had the quality of straightforwardness, informed the Japanese liaison officer that having been a "combat commander in four large battles in the Pacific, he could take care of anything that arises." He also presumably gave the Japanese senior army commander the double message that he could take on either the Japanese or the Koreans and that he did not need any further Japanese "assistance" in restoring order. He noted that, at any rate, the Koreans were "just repeating what the Japanese had done to them," although adding that civilians would be punished for any breaches of order.¹⁵

Right at the beginning of his administration General Hodge received a strong indication of the feeling of Koreans across the political spectrum about the military occupation of their country. In his first meeting with representatives of registered Korean political parties, on 12 September, the general received loud applause when he

proclaimed an end to the Japanese rule and America's good wishes. However, as the official report of MG for the first nine months was honest enough to note that there was a "noticeable lack of applause" when he went on to repeat the Cairo Declaration that Korea would receive its independence "in due course."¹⁶

As in Japan, American forces found a functioning indigenous civil service in Seoul (the capital then for the entire nation) and throughout the countryside when they landed. The problem was that it was almost entirely Japanese or collaborationist and all but the lowest categories had been reserved for Japanese. Once again American military government faced the wearying problem of deciding between governmental efficiency and ideological purity. Much to the rage and disgust of Koreans of every political stripe, the Americans at first kept the Japanese overlords in place, not only in the civil service, but also in industry, law enforcement, education, etc. A Japanese officer on horseback even made his way to the head of the American entry into Seoul and the Americans, to the watching Koreans' confusion and consternation, allowed him to remain, heading up a parade celebrating victory over Japan!¹⁷

Whatever its confusion, tactical military government immediately took to cleaning up southern Korea's capital after months of wartime neglect by the Japanese. MG Team No. 3, discovered that no government functions were being performed when it took over Seoul on 11 September. In this case, at least, Japanese officials were immediately removed. The unit made temporary appointments of ranking Koreans to the various municipal offices. The city was littered with dead bodies from the previous days' riots, not to mention general debris and accumulated human waste. In the words of the official Korea MG report for 1945-1946:

Hospitals were not functioning, accumulations of "night soil" and debris were everywhere; the streets were filled with throngs of milling people; essential food establishments were boarded up; the water supply was inadequate and intermittent; the streets were dotted with human bodies with human bodies in various states of decomposition. Thousands of refugees crowded the streets. Hundreds slept on the ground in front of Seoul Station. Fecal matter had accumulated in the gutter until it was level with the curb.¹⁸

Within a week, thanks to the mobilization of Engineer units with their dump trucks and the employment of local labor, the city was about as clean and as functioning as it had ever been.¹⁹

Matters were at first no better at the southern end of the Korean peninsula, as reported by the MG team for Kyongsand-Namdo and Pusan, South Korea's major port.

All banks, stores, and schools were closed throughout the province. Trade was at a standstill. Looting was commonplace, and a good share of Japanese policemen had left their posts. Korean refugees to the number of 6,000 to 10,000 a day were entering, and Japanese nationals at the rate of 3,000 to 4,000 were leaving at the Port of Pusan. A majority

of Japanese officials remained at their posts in the Provincial government even though the government was virtually at a standstill. In many of the guns [subdivisions] of the provinces Japanese [officials] and police chiefs had either fled or been forcibly removed from office by action of the People's Party....All of these gun guerrillas were deposed by US Military Government troops and duly appointed Korean officials installed.²⁰

Hodge soon was being bitterly denounced, however, in Korea and abroad for supposedly winking at this final Japanese brutality, and then for retaining the Japanese administration in place from Governor General Nobuyuki Abe on down to the town level.²¹ General Hodge pointed out that his command:

Will have great difficulty operating with any sweeping removal of Japanese unless willing to accept chaos. All utilities, communications, etc., are Japanese operated and government controlled. My military government setup is entirely inadequate to cope with the situation. Request material assistance in way of military government personnel with experience and capabilities in civil government.²²

Hodge continued his string of blunders by publicly informing reporters that "As a matter of fact, the Japanese are my most reliable sources of information."²³ Most likely, General Hodge was simply following U.S. occupation policy for Japan, where most Japanese officials were indeed retained in their offices, at least until "purged" However, following directions from the War and State Departments and from General MacArthur, Hodge did remove Governor Abe and his remaining bureau heads, and by the end of January 1946 only 60 Japanese remained of the 70,000 in government positions at the time of the surrender.²⁴ However, much damage had been inflicted on American-Korean relations.

Even this move did not always bring acceptance. When U.S. military government in those early days of the occupation did replace Japanese with Koreans, the latter were often derisively called "shoe shine boys," by their more nationalist fellows.²⁵ It is undoubtedly true that U.S. Army Military Government relied heavily on the wealthier Koreans and those who could speak English. In fact, American Military Government was often termed by Koreans as an "interpreters' government." (There were Americans in Korean Military Government who were indeed language trained, but that language was Japanese.²⁶) It is difficult, however, to see how Military Government could avoid such reliance; English-speaking Koreans tended to come from the more educated class, if not the more wealthy, and the number of Hangul (Korean)-speaking Americans was minuscule, being mostly aging missionaries.²⁷

If the Americans were admittedly ignorant of things Korean, the Koreans themselves could hardly boast of any superior understanding of the Americans. Their views were a weird amalgam of anti-American propaganda picked up in the Japanese-administered schools and Hollywood gangster and romance films (with Japanese subtitles!). Koreans soon found out that the American liberators did not even speak

English, at least not the English that they had studied from classic 19th century British novels and the writings of Washington Irving (the latter their sole exposure to American literature).²⁸ Fortunately, about one-half of MG officers in Korea did eventually have some MG background, although very few of the enlisted personnel could boast of such a qualification.²⁹

On 14 October the Military Government announced the appointment of "a 'Unification Committee for Political Party Activities,' composed of a communist, a Nationalist and a Radical, to lay the groundwork for unification." Later, however, SCAP had to announce that this undoubtedly naive political exercise "has met with little success as 33 of the member parties have left the organization. The Democratic Party refused to attend any meetings, claiming the presence of the People's Republic...made it impossible."³⁰ Politically, things would not get any better.

The Americans had decided on a full-scale, direct military government of Korea primarily because of the absence of any political grouping that seemed to have the support of a majority of Koreans and which could lead the way to a democratic, united nation. Even worse, perhaps, was the lack of any technical or white collar class, as a result of the Japanese reservation of the best education and jobs for themselves.³¹ The U.S. State Department, on the other hand, continued for more than a year to hope that an accommodation could be worked out with the Soviets for a trusteeship agreement for the eventual unification of Korea. This State Department policy inhibited the American Military Government's establishing policy for Korean political representation in its zone of responsibility. Into the resultant near-vacuum rightists and leftists fought without inhibition.³² Only the absence of significant progress after two years of negotiations with the Soviets ended the American hopes for a temporary military government.³³

The first U.S. Military Governor for Korea, Major General A. V. Arnold, the Commanding General of the 7th Division, was appointed on 12 September and set up his office, U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK). His command had to work with no less than 144 central government agencies, which were involved with almost every phase of Korean life. The Military Governor also commanded all MG personnel not attached to tactical units. In the field, MG Teams were assigned to tactical units and, at least in the first months of the occupation, were under the command of those units. All communications from the USAFIK in Seoul had to go through tortuous Army channels. Fortunately, MG teams gained release from the tactical units with the establishment on 4 January 1946 of U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). Koreans could take some solace in that the title at least was not Military Government of Korea.³⁴ Relations were none too cordial between USAMGIK and USAFIK. Each exercised a "tacit disinterest in the problems of each other, except on repatriation and cholera."³⁵ One observer cleverly termed the arrangement as one of "two kings in half a realm." With the incredible number of 50 general officers, mostly working at cross-purposes, USAMGIK/USAFIK understandably got the reputation as a "general's graveyard." Oddly, the practical administration of MG personnel resided in the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, AA Artillery, whose officers, one can be sure, had not the slightest knowledge of, or particular interest in, Military Government

or Civil Affairs. USAFIK showed its contempt for USAMGIK in a very practical manner by requiring most MG officers to serve six months longer in grade than other officers to be eligible for promotion.³⁶

These divided troops faced a divided land with seemingly no middle ground. Leftists, excoriated by the right for their subservience to the Soviets and for their following the "party line" in agreeing to a trusteeship for Korea, nonetheless had some popular strength because of their revolutionary agrarian and industrial programs. Rightists, of course, were damned by the left for their truckling to the Americans and indifference to Korea's problems. Even the Boy Scouts were politicized, often seen as a "strong arm squad" for rightists.³⁷ No less than 33 political parties were registered, but most were so obscure or confused in their aims that, in the words of one Korean historian, "it is almost impossible to make an authoritative analysis of Korean politics during the early period of military government." Or, according to one USAMGIK adviser, "Every shade of political theory from anarchy to despotism flourished in the land of the Morning Calm." Their number actually increased as the occupation continued. By January more than 344 were known to exist.³⁸ General Arnold's successor, Major General Archer Lerch, showed his exasperation when he issued an ill-advised proclamation in the wake of several small riots in early 1946: "I warn the people of Korea again that unless they very quickly develop a dignified and statesmanlike attitude toward their obligations to Korea they are imperiling the independence of Korea." He thus managed to insult the politically active of right and left. (Politically aware Koreans might have wondered just how "dignified and statesmanlike" was the political life of, say, liberated Italy or France, yet no one questioned those nations' fitness for independence.³⁹)

If U.S. military government could not persuade or cajole left and right to subsume their differences in the new political system, it could at least establish order by force. Thus the MG Provost Marshal established a national police constabulary to be trained by the Americans, on 31 October 1945. Although this fledgling force was to have been the basis for a Korean defense establishment, authorities in Washington vetoed this plan at first for fear of a misunderstanding by the Soviets. This force would do very well in reducing the endemic violence throughout the South, but at the cost of a particularly odious reputation for violence and intimidation of its own.⁴⁰ Soon General Hodge was evaluating Korean political parties and politicians on the basis primarily of opposition to communism. Even an official history of U.S. military government in Korea concedes that "aversion to communism per se....became almost an obsession with him." It was just as well that any Koreans not of the most rightist stamp did not overhear Hodge's comments on them:

All the moderates and supposedly middle-of-the-road Koreans now could be proved to be radicals or communists. They were all handsomely paid to work to discredit the US. These had been their orders from 15 August [1945] on. They'd been working at it ever since. It was all clear now. All the pieces fitted together perfectly.⁴¹

One of the more important of U.S. USAMGIK activities was the establishment and operation of "Military Occupation Courts," which exercised jurisdiction over all Koreans, although civil courts dealt with violations of civil laws and military Provost courts with offenses against the military government.⁴² U.S. MG churned out reams of ordinances and regulations, or on the other hand, simply imprisoned Koreans without any paperwork niceties. In one province more than 100 Koreans, some little more than children, had been imprisoned by the local MG officer without any charges proffered and the officer had then departed for the U.S. Ordinance No. 120 (3 November 1946) stated that:

All existing law and regulations which fixed or imposed monetary fines for such violations are amended to increase each fine 50 times. Punishment for first offenses ranges from a Y1,000 fine and one month imprisonment to unlimited fines, depending on the amount involved in the transaction, and 3 years imprisonment. Punishment for second offenses will be tripled and for third and subsequent offenses will be 10 times the punishment for first offenses.

It should be noted that the first offense could lead to "unlimited fines." Thus an offender now could be fined to infinity. And these draconian measures were for price violations!⁴³ Almost as bad were the prohibitions against Americans being entertained in Korean homes and eating Korean food or Korean MG employees from eating in mess halls or entering American billets even as guests, without a special pass. The blanket injunction against social intercourse between Americans and Koreans was simply insulting for both. They could not even sit together in trains, even if on joint official business, nor attend sports events together.⁴⁴ Koreans might be forgiven if they wondered that if this were the way the Americans treated the victims of their mutual enemy's aggression, how they would treat their enemies? Koreans' confusion would have been confounded had they known that such injunctions were in fact being done away with in Germany and Japan even while the United States was still formally in a state of war with those occupied countries.

Closely allied to legal reform was the reconstitution of the Korean police. This was no easy task. The Japanese-trained police had earned a justified loathing for brutality and corruption which even the purged cadres did little to dissipate. Although the police were forbidden to beat prisoners any more, the fire fighters, recently separated from the police, did it for them. The establishment of a police academy did aid in the professionalizing of the force. However, to compound the list of U.S. MG blunders, the families of American MG officers were moved into the vacated houses of the departed Japanese overlords, a logical move on the surface, but one filled with unpleasant psychological meaning for observing Koreans.⁴⁵

The Soviets from the start of their occupation were far better informed as to conditions and attitudes on the peninsula; they shared a land border with Korea and were host to many Korean expatriates. Not surprisingly, the Red Army's XXVth Army brought in its train a "Committee of Liberation" and an embryonic Korean

"army" composed of Soviet-trained (and one may presume, Soviet-indoctrinated) Koreans.⁴⁶ Two weeks after their landings, the Soviet authorities ordered the "Executive Committee of the Korean People" to take over the administrative powers of the old Japanese government. The Soviets then went through the usual farce of "People's Committees," "Democratic Fronts" and virtually unanimous elector turnout and validation of proposed legislation: tactics that were becoming so familiar in Eastern Europe. The Soviets had no need to impose a military government; their "advisers" completely controlled the subservient "civil government."⁴⁷

Thus prepared, the Soviets handled the question of the Japanese in Korea with thoroughness and dispatch; the former overlords were turned off their land and out of their positions, occasionally shot, sent to labor camps or repatriated, their property divided among landless Korean peasants. These policies, understandably, proved generally popular, and were often favorable compared, even by non-communist Koreans, to those in the South. Nonetheless, Korean good will towards the Red Army was quickly dissipated by the heavy hand of Soviet military government, the Red Army's tradition of "living off the land" and individual troop indiscipline. One not unsympathetic account claimed that two or three Soviet soldiers were killed nightly by Koreans armed with little more than rocks.⁴⁸ By the end of the first year of the occupation more than 800,000 Koreans and Japanese had fled South. American MG reported at the end of its mission (1948) that no less than 1,250,000 northern Koreans had headed south of the Parallel.⁴⁹ Movement northward was so minuscule as to be unreportable. Further, the Soviet administration had virtually cut off trade and population movements across the artificial 38th parallel border; the embargo of electricity supply from the giant Japanese-constructed hydro-electric plants along the Yalu (the largest in Asia) was a particularly severe blow to the economic restoration of South Korea. None of this Soviet behavior improved General Hodge's attitudes toward communism or left-wing elements in his jurisdiction.⁵⁰

In the South, USAMGIK's most successful operation was the repatriation of the Japanese in Korea to Japan and of Koreans in Japan to Korea. The movement of the first was mandatory, of the latter voluntary. Either way it was a major undertaking involving some 2,600,000 people moving through the single port of Pusan, hindered by political chaos and poor transportation and communications. The Army worked closely with the Japanese Relief Society and Korean relief agencies in this project. The Soviets proved less than helpful here. Although they had agreed to perform the same duty in their zone they were more likely simply push to unwanted Japanese and Koreans over the 38th Parallel for the Americans to dispose of. As in Japan, the mission was effectively and successfully completed, no thanks to the Soviets, by 1 December 1945, just three months after the Americans had landed.⁵¹

In the meantime, tactical U.S. troops, in the absence of military government specialists, were spread thinly across the South. In this way, lieutenants could become governors of thousands. The troops' initial mission was to create a local police force or augment any existing one, maintain order, report agitators, and to order civilians to remain at their normal peacetime pursuits. As for the vexed question of local government heads, Japanese were to be only temporarily retained as advisors or put on

the road to Pusan. If the chief were a Korean but incompetent he would be retained until a more suitable native replacement could be found. In the chaos, some of the local indigenous heads had been overthrown by political factions. If this were the case, the incumbent was to be arrested. Tactical commanders were to do their best, of course, to alleviate suffering, prevent the spread of disease and encourage economic production, while discouraging the black market.

These were all laudable objectives but most Koreans would have agreed with Roger Baldwin, the director of the American Civil Liberties Union, who after a tour of southern Korea, concluded that "Military rule in a liberated country is an anomaly at best." Baldwin proceeded with a stinging attack on U.S. military government in the South, contending that the United States had created a "puppet" government "by fiat and we gave it office without power" in a "police state, bitterly resented by all but extreme rightists." He further claimed that the jails were filled with thousands of Koreans whose only offense was to be middle-of-the-road or mildly leftist, but rarely subversive or violent. Koreans were also incarcerated by provost courts for such "offenses against the occupation" as uttering words or singing a song hostile to the United States." Baldwin concluded that an "embryonic" civil war was already going on in the South. No communist sympathizer, Baldwin also reported that some 2,000 North Koreans daily flocked across the border to the South. He put his finger, perhaps unwittingly, on the American military government's dilemma when he admitted that "Law and order is an American responsibility until the Koreans possess a firmly established government which can maintain it." Yet, how could such order be established and maintained and the rights of the people protected in the midst of an "embryonic civil war?"⁵²

Hodge turned to the creation of an Advisory Council, an all-Korea advisory body, to be composed of all substantial factions, including the feared communists. The latter, along with other leftists, refused to participate. This left the Council in the hands of the rightists and increased the power base of Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, although the Council had more-or-less faded away by the end of the year.⁵³ About the only tangible accomplishment of the Council was to recommend that all traffic drive on the right side of the road. In disgust Hodge wrote MacArthur:

The Korean people are the most difficult of all peoples I have ever encountered. They have only one common idea - independence. Independence means that all should be freed from any form of work and from any and all restraints on actions or words. With few exceptions, they are highly contentious among themselves, can cooperate to the extent that each individual can have his own way, have small conception of patriotism on a national basis, are highly volatile and unpredictable, can easily be bought, have low individual integrity, have low capacity for citizenship, are pro-self and anti-almost anything else. Although they know we are trying to help them, they are suspicious of any controls and blame all their national ills on anyone handy who is not Korean....⁵⁴

So much for a people who had governed themselves and preserved some form of independence and their unique language and culture for more than a thousand years. A little later, and not surprisingly in view of these sentiments, Hodge urged that the Korean people be left to their own devices, doubted that they could "achieve a good government as judged by our mental standards," and concluded that they would "develop faster and come nearer to a competent government if left to their own devices with advisors than they will ever do under a dual occupation by two nations whose ideology and aims are widely divergent." Yet Hodge took strong exception to any efforts, as from the State Department, to ease out Rhee; "Rhee remains the most prominent individual in Korea and has provided a much needed leadership for patriotic forces." despite "his fixation against Russians and communists and intolerance of political opposition."⁵⁵ As if in response to General Hodge, President Truman stated that "Our commitments for the establishment of an Independent Korea requires that we stay in Korea long enough to see the job through".⁵⁶ Yet Truman himself may have been unaware that US MG policy, in the words of an MG brief of early 1946, was that "Since the primary objective of the US is to prevent Russian domination of Korea, and since Korean independence is a secondary objective, it is not believed to be in the US interest to form a Korean government which could be granted complete independence within the next few years." (emphasis added). It was well that Korean nationalists of whatever political stripe also were not privy to this document, although many must have had some idea of its sentiments.⁵⁷

Hodge nonetheless established in, February 1946 a consultative group, the Representative Democratic Council to replace the Unification Committee, and which was to include a reasonable representative cross-section of Korean opinion. Again, rightists, in the persons of Rhee and Kim Ku, came to dominate this body, and according to one authority, it actually emerged as "an engine of rightist opposition to the Military Government itself."⁵⁸

General Hodge's suspension in the fall of 1946 of two leading leftist newspapers and his attempted arrest of three leading communists in the South provoked strikes and riots. The situation then escalated beyond mere rioting as highway bridges were blown up, telephone lines cut, the Seoul-Pusan cable severed. Civil officials were particularly singled out; the Waegwan chief of police of Waegwan had his eyes and tongue cut out before being mercifully killed and other officials were buried alive. Order was only restored when U.S. tactical troops intervened in what some MG officials were convinced was a "communist uprising."⁵⁹

A Coalition Committee, successor to the short-lived Representative Democratic Council, did enjoy some success in damping down such dissent, which was probably not as yet directed from the North, but was provoked by genuine southern grievances. Yet the general U.S. military attitude toward the Koreans was well illustrated when a member of one of the Committee inquired of the head of the American delegation to the U.S.-U.S.S.R Joint Committee why he had not consulted with the Committee. The American's response was a terse "We haven't got time to talk with Korean politicians."⁶⁰

American Military Government was finding that it indeed had to "talk with Korean politicians," and increasingly those politicians were Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku. By September of 1946, at the request of General Hodge, General Lerch began to turn over the various government departments to Koreans, leaving American USAMGIK officers, at least in theory, in an exclusively advisory capacity. Early in 1947 the Capitol Building itself was handed over entirely to Koreans and USAMGIK moved out. In February a Korean Civil Administrator was sworn in.⁶¹

Furthermore, at the initiative of MG Lerch, elections were scheduled for a (South) Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (KILA). Half of its members were to be appointed by USAMGIK, which was fully aware that conditions in the countryside would militate against free balloting, and thus hoped to redress the balance. USAMGIK, to its credit, believed that Koreans should determine their own election laws, through legislation by the forthcoming half-elected assembly.⁶² The left stupidly boycotted the elections for the KILA on the grounds that this assembly would perpetuate the division of the country and the rightists, who were far better organized and not averse to violence, swept the board and would henceforth thwart much needed economic reforms. Even this triumph was not enough for the more extreme rightists, who boycotted the Assembly in protest against the appointment of liberal and even left-wing members by the General Hodge, who was fair-minded in these matters. Those liberal appointees were among the very few Assembly members who showed some ability to cooperate with their political opponents. At any rate, US. Military Government still held ultimate power in South Korea, retaining the power to dissolve the assembly, approve new members, and schedule new elections.⁶³ In fact both the Korean Civil Administrator and the Chief Justice (both appointed by the Military Government) affirmed that legally the Military Governor was still the supreme authority.

The KILA's legislative record was not impressive, a total of 12 enactments, mostly peripheral, compared to 217 ordinances issued by the Military Governor over the same three-year occupation period. (But those ordinances were now prefaced by "Pending action by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly.")⁶⁴ General Lerch claimed that the senior Korean government department heads and the KILA were now charged with most of the functions of government and that he did not intend to interfere "except in those extraordinary cases in which the direct interests of the U.S. government are involved."⁶⁵ These moves, however, were truly more of an administrative nature and not much progress on the way to democracy.⁶⁶ In March of 1947, a discouraged John Hilldring, now Assistant Secretary of State, declared that "Many Koreans feel that they are worse off than they were under the Japanese."⁶⁷

Complicating matters was an economy in shambles, a result of the war and decades of Japanese extraction policies. This agrarian nation was now totally bereft of all fertilizer plants as well as oil refining capacity.⁶⁸ A USMGIK report of 1946 had predicted disaster if American aid were not increased and pointed out that Korea, not an enemy country, received less such aid than any former World War II enemy nation. The problem was made even worse by the lack of trained Koreans. The employment of Koreans who had held minor positions under the Japanese (basically all that could be

found) had led to "maladministration, misuse of funds, waste of materials, and a general decline in production." One reporter noted that South Korea produced approximately one yard of cloth per capita in 1946 in a country that possessed a sizable textile industry.⁶⁹

USAMGIK did attempt some social and economic reforms, with considerably less blowing of the trumpet than that of the northern regime. The USAMGIK-controlled New Korea Company, with one officer in Seoul and one in each southern province, took over the management of all formerly Japanese-owned lands to parcel out these tracts to Korean tenant farmers. Surprisingly, Korean public opinion seemed somewhat against such an idea, wishing to see land reform carried out by a future Korean government, which was indeed the case two years later.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, progress was slow and very uneven. Food prices skyrocketed more than 1,000 percent in two years(!) Farmers hated the military government because it kept consumer goods off the market while insisting on grain deliveries.⁷¹ In the meantime the country was racked by an inflation exacerbated by the MG covering South Korea's budget deficits with an ever-increasing issuance of paper money. Harvests were scant due to lack of fertilizers, a necessity given South Korea's worn-out soil. In obvious desperation the U.S. military governor proclaimed that "the people of Korea must be fed and... the people of Korea will be fed," but later insisted that "Koreans must tighten their belts, they must eat less, they must eat substitutes". In December of 1946, the chairman of the Japan-Korea Secretariat of the U.S. State Department had to assert that "What evidence we have seems to indicate that the Russians are doing a better job of feeding the Koreans in their zone than we are in ours." In fact, conservative General Hodge was compelled as early as February 1946 to resort to a compulsory system of food collection and rationing and price controls, the first two detested measures of the Japanese overlords. One year later, the economic situation, not to mention the political, was so little improved that General Hodge flew to Washington to brief President Truman.⁷²

U.S. military government was more immediately successful in reforming the education system, dismissing some 17,000 Japanese teachers, encouraging Korean language instruction, using radio for the first time in the classrooms, and bringing in such new and somewhat esoteric subjects of instruction as domestic science and democracy.⁷³ In fact, MG's opening up and expansion of secondary and higher education (again an American panacea, although one that did conform to the traditional Korean reverence for the scholar), could be termed one of the few undoubted successes of the regime. Secondary school enrollment jumped from 62,000 in 1945 to 277,000 by the end of 1947. In 1945 all of Korea had just one national university. By November 1947, there was still but one national university for the South, but also four national colleges, three provincial colleges and (another American touch) 21 private institutions of higher education. Enrollment had climbed from 6,000 in 1945 to 30,000 in late 1947.⁷⁴ U.S. MG also, as in Japan, gave the vote to women, but steadfastly refused to place any women in positions of authority, either in the Korean administration, although four were appointed to the Interim Legislature or in MG itself.⁷⁵

These efforts were almost nullified by the lack of any domestic political discourse. In March, 1947, for example, leftists demonstrated, mostly peacefully, in a "flash-strike" and no fewer than 2,718 demonstrators were arrested. General Lerch claimed that all were "leftists." However, when rightist "storm troopers" actively fomented opposition to the American decision to reconvene the Joint Commission, they were virtually unhindered.⁷⁶

Nonetheless, General Lerch could privately report progress and hope. He pointed out that all Americans were now advisors only and "were out of the Capitol Building." He further reported that all communications, except those from USAMGIK had to be in Korean and routed through Koreans, although he concluded that "It is like pulling teeth to get Americans to let go."⁷⁷

By August of 1947 the United States, now convinced that it could never come to agreement with the communist North on the question of unification, turned the matter over to the United Nations. The UN agreed with the U.S. plan to establish an international commission to supervise elections for a Korean provisional government. However, because the Soviets would not allow such a commission into the North the prospects for Korean unification, after two years of negotiations, seemed more remote than ever.⁷⁸

Perhaps the one possible opportunity of the entire occupation to secure a united Korea had been lost at its beginning, when the Korean people had maintained a measure of order and demonstrated some ability to govern themselves in a most chaotic period. In hindsight, a persuasive case can be made that the U.S. Army and its Military Government should have and could have worked with the abortive Republic, despite its communist-sounding name (It should be remembered that in the summer of 1945 "People's Democracies" or "Republics" had not yet become a part of the communist global landscape.) One American USAMGIK officer noted, on the very eve of the Korean War. "It would appear that the United States lost not only a major part of Korean friendship, but also the respect of some who once held us in high regard. This was one of the most serious failures of the operation."⁷⁹ In fact, the Acting Military Governor (just after the sudden death of MG Lerch), BG Charles G. Helmick, frankly said that the Korean government in the U.S. Zone was considered by Korean patriots to be pro-Japanese, and further asserted that the only Koreans capable of assuming responsibility were those who worked with the Japanese before and during the war, a startling admission, indeed.⁸⁰

For all that, the American government was no longer prepared to hold the line in South Korea. In the fall of 1947 both the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the 45,000 American troops and their bases contributed little of strategic value and might actually prove a liability. The Chiefs particularly worried that "violent disorders" in the South could force the Americans to make a humiliating withdrawal. Espionage and sabotage directed from the North was increasing. General Hodge, as early as 1946, ruefully maintained that the communists had his command well "cased."⁸¹

Both State and Pentagon wished to evacuate the South under the best conditions, leaving the problem for the United Nations. The Chiefs, in February 1948 concluded

that "eventual domination of Korea by the U.S.S.R. will have to be accepted as a probability if U.S. troops are withdrawn", but still planned for that withdrawal "at the earliest practicable date." American financial and military aid would continue.

UN-sponsored elections in the South (boycotted, of course, by the communists North and South) resulted in the formation of a National Assembly, which, in July of 1948 drafted a constitution for a Republic of Korea (ROK, which in theory included the North, just as the Democratic Republic of Korea included the South) Elections under supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) that were more-or-less free for the first time in Korean history, put Syngman Rhee in office as the first ROK President.

UNTCOK and U.S. MG were at constant loggerheads, with the former accusing the latter of selling-out to the most extreme right-wing Korean elements and pressuring American MG to extend increasingly broad civil rights to the South Korean population. USAMGIK responded that UNTCOK was being naive about the menace of communist subversion supported by the North. American MG also had to deal with domestic political violence unprecedented even for South Korea at the time. During one three-day strike six policemen were killed and 24 wounded, 33 police substations and boxes attacked, five government officials and "rightists" killed or wounded, 28 rioters killed and 1,486 arrested, and 45 locomotives sabotaged. Worse followed, as 2,000 well-armed communist or pro-communist rioters on Cheju Island attacked election officials, policemen and their families, burning many to death in their homes, dismembering bodies of candidates and even poisoning water-wells. American MG was compelled to resort to vigilante groups as well as the Korean Constabulary and riot police, all ordered to shoot to kill during any disturbance. It is difficult to imagine that such violence occurred only coincidentally on the eve of South Korea's national elections. Although barred from interfering in the elections, Army headquarters publicly made it known that it would alert "the American troops and send them on intensive patrols to help thwart communist attacks." (emphasis added).⁸²

In hopes of pacifying the Korean populace during such troubled times, U.S. MG issued its *Proclamation on the Rights of the Korean People* one month before the South's general elections. This document followed closely the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. However, the American authorities added the qualification that such freedoms were subject to such "minimum controls and censorship as may be necessary for military security."⁸³ The elections in the South saw a 75 percent voter turnout (95 percent of those registered actually voted), although some 323 Koreans were killed during the ten days leading up to the elections. American military government cooperated in the election process. It guaranteed equal access to radio time and the available newsprint and even air-dropped some 4.7 million leaflets, pamphlets, newsletters, etc., distributing radio receivers and public address systems, and disseminating a film (*The People Vote*) seen by some eight million civilians. Wrongheaded to the end, General Hodge had claimed that the election would bring out only a small vote, that those elected would be representative of a very small minority of the total population and that the elections would soon be followed by a civil war.⁸⁴ Not surprisingly, one authority claimed that "The natives had little good to say about him in

the course of his three years in Korea."⁸⁵ Putting its best face on matters, the USAFIK final report spoke of America's multi-million dollar economic:

aid program [which] had lifted South Korea from disorganization bordering on chaos in September 1945, to a nation considerably more prepared to embark on self-rule in September 1948,.....an extensive agrarian rehabilitation program....Eighty-five per cent of the farmland held by the Japanese also had been sold to Korean farmers when the US Military Government went out of existence.⁸⁶

Rhee and the Republic of Korea itself were inaugurated on 15 August 1948, three years almost to the day after Japan had surrendered. General MacArthur was the principal speaker at the ceremony (his first visit to Korea), quite overshadowing Rhee, and in true form belliciously declaring that the "artificial barrier" of the 38th Parallel "must and will be torn down." The new National Assembly passed numerous reforming legislative enactments that mandated citizens' rights, social welfare, economic planning, and even the redistribution of the land formerly held by the Japanese imperialists. The high officials of the regime enjoyed good nationalist credentials, but at the lower military and police levels, former employees under the Japanese occupation predominated. The chief of staff for the ROK armed forces, for example, was a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy and had served during World War II with the Imperial Japanese Army, rising to the rank of Major. Another prominent officer, who had led a special detachment of Koreans in the Japanese Army to suppress Kim Il Sung's guerrillas in Manchuria, soon after the elections bizarrely led 2,500 of Korean veterans goose-stepping through the streets of Seoul! This after three years of a supposed purge by U.S. MG of collaborators with the Japanese. "Youth" groups were actually more politico-gangsters and extortionists, terrorizing city and country alike. The "Racial Youth Corps", later disbanded by presidential order, had a distinctly Nazi odor. A new National Traitor Law passed in September 1948 drew the rueful comment at a XXIV U.S. Army Corps staff conference that were this law fully enforced, "South Korea will have to have many, many more prisons."⁸⁷

On the same day as the inauguration of the Republic of Korea American military government came to an end although its non-governmental functions were assumed by the Civil Affairs Section of Army Headquarters.⁸⁸ The legacy of American MG in large measure was, in the words of one authority who was there,

Every cavern in the hills is sheltering a hoard of hungry, sick, and tragically unhappy people...Factories are idle for lack of equipment and stores are empty for want of anything to sell. In the cities bands of homeless children depend for subsistence on being able to loot G.I. mess hall garbage cans....Korean currency has no value....lean faces and drawn belts...of men and women on the country roads.⁸⁹

Another authority, and one actually more positive toward American MG's efforts, at the same time also wrote that:

industry in Korea is dormant....Trade is in no better condition. Except for goods imported from the United States, which turn in shady ways, and a few second-hand Korean articles offered for cash by hard-pressed people, the shops are practically bare...crowds of the unemployed wander about the streets; ill-clad laborers squat helplessly on the sidewalks. The writer visited several refugee camps near Seoul which were crowded with poorly-clad, ill-fed, and spiritless people, most of whom had come from the northern zone in the expectation that anywhere else would be better. They were rudely disillusioned.⁹⁰

(Considering the enormous influx of refugees from the North, conditions there must have been truly hellish.) In 1949 a former M.G. civilian employee reported that "When pressed for a frank answer, Koreans will often admit to American friends that "things were surely better than under the Japanese.", bitter concessions indeed, considering that the Japanese had been alien invaders and the Americans cordially welcomed as liberators.⁹¹ Decades later a historian of the peninsula concluded that "When the Americans ended their occupation, South Korea was politically unstable, socially chaotic, and an economically bankrupt country."⁹² What had been arguably the U.S. Army's worst military occupation had ended and most Koreans seemed happy enough to see the Americans leave.

Even the leaving of American troops, however, would not be easy. Embarrassingly for the Americans and Rhee, the Soviets withdrew their troops first, by the end of 1948, while residual U.S. forces stayed on until June of 1949. A reporter for the *Chicago Daily News* wrote that "An atmosphere of defeatism and frustration grips Americans in this dreary, dusty capital as they prepare to withdraw after three years that many of them feel have been wasted."⁹³ Considering that the standard of living for most Koreans was actually lower than it had been in 1945 after 30 years of Japanese exploitation and four years of war, the feeling was understandable.⁹⁴

In the end, the major contributions of U.S. Military Government over the years 1945 to 1948 were the peaceful repatriation of the Japanese occupiers, the providing of one source of some stability in the difficult transition from 35 years of repressive Japanese control to self-government and development; the prevention of starvation, public health and welfare, education; the maintenance of a modicum of public order after a very disorganized start; the laying the foundation for land reform; serving as a source for previously unknown democratic thought and procedure in the land and, perhaps most importantly, preventing the North from absorbing the South.(It should also be commended for, finally, bequeathing to its Korean successor government a balanced budget.) At best, U.S. Army MG in South Korea left a debatable heritage, but it could do little to forward Korean unity, implant democracy or foster prosperity, the missions given to that occupation in the first place.⁹⁵

War

James Baldwin had ridiculed General Hodge (a "small, frightened man in a job too big for him") for worriedly demanding "Do you know how many planes we could get into the air if the Russians attacked tomorrow?"⁹⁶ In time that attack did come, if not by the Russians themselves, then by the Soviet-trained and equipped Korean People's Army, and if not "tomorrow" then on 25 June 1950. There were no American planes in Korea to "get into the air." The result was that the ROK, basically a creature of U.S. Army Military Government, was almost lost to aggression and that the United States stumbled into its third most bloody war.

From June to December of 1950, the hectic months of rapid military moves up and down almost the entire length of the Korean peninsula when the issue was seriously in doubt, Civil Affairs received scant attention. When it did, almost all of the vast experience on the battlefields and behind the lines of World War II was ignored.⁹⁷ Obviously, not all of that experience was pertinent to Korea. U.S. Army Civil Affairs found itself, for the first time, operating in a nation alongside a functioning, internationally recognized civil government. That government, for all its undoubted faults, would remain punctiliously concerned that its sovereignty be recognized and respected. A Department of the Army directive of 6 July 1950 (one day after the rout of U.S. Task Force Smith in the initial American ground clash with the North Korean invaders) to General MacArthur mandated that "Auth of Govt of Republic of Korea will be respected and civil affairs matters will be conducted through it to max extent which mil necessity permits." Moreover, as the defense of the Republic of Korea was fought under the banner of the United Nations (to the inestimable propaganda benefit of those defenders), a UN Security Council resolution of 31 July 1950 specifically called on the UN Command in Korea to "exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea".⁹⁸ The World War II Civil Affairs Division had been abolished in 1949, as noted, and its duties distributed throughout various Department of the Army Headquarters staff sections and technical services. The CA executive agency of the unified command was the UN Command, Tokyo (UNC), whose commander was General MacArthur. The Public Health and Welfare Section of the UN Command was established on 2 September 1950 as a Special Staff Section, GHQ, UNC, under the command of a U.S. Army general officer (BG Crawford T. Sams, MC).

General Walton Walker, Eighth Army Commander, appeared averse even to the term "Civil Affairs." It is possible that he remembered that it had been used interchangeably with "Military Government" in the unhappy U.S. occupation of South Korea just a few years earlier. At any rate, Eighth Army did establish a special staff section to plan and supervise the implementation of CA, entitling it "Civil Assistance Command."⁹⁹

The earliest civil relief teams dispatched to Korea consisted of three UN civilian employees each, with the first such team landing at Pusan on 29 September (although individuals from SCAP Public Health and Welfare had arrived in country earlier that month) and setting up their offices in Pusan with the unwieldy title of the Public Health

and Welfare Field Organization National Level Team. The team consisted initially of welfare, health and a sanitation officers. All Korean aid activities were coordinated with the government and maximum self-help was encouraged. The ROK government, sensitive to the term "military government" as it remembered the unhappy Japanese and American governance of their land, made known its opposition to any such organization on its territory. At the suggestion of President Rhee the Korean Cabinet passed a resolution making PH&W team members of the existing ROK Central Relief Committee. Although the Rhee government seemed anxious to utilize this pioneer team, an early CA report notes that "Just how these teams were to be used, and supported by the military authorities was not clearly outlined."¹⁰⁰ Thus, from the first days of the Korean War, Civil Affairs was something of a combined responsibility, but with considerable uncertainty as to just where that responsibility lay. In fact, from September to December 1950 the only strictly U.S. military civil affairs units operating in Korea were the PH&W teams, operating directly under the Public Health Officer of SCAP Headquarters, Tokyo. Throughout 1950 the general U.S. Army opinion was that the war would end, one way or another, within the year. Anything beyond immediate relief of civilian suffering would prove a waste of time.

Refugee control and relief posed, however, an immediate and continuing problem regardless of the course of the war. Immediate surveys of the areas within the Pusan Perimeter made while there was still doubt if perimeter would hold showed no less than 300,000 needy refugees. Hardly had Eighth Army requisitioned supplies for relief of these unfortunates than the Inchon landings and subsequent liberation of Seoul provoked a fundamental desire of the refugees to return to their newly-freed villages and towns. By early October 1950, Eighth Army estimated some 1,800,000 refugees were wandering about the countryside or still in camps. An additional 900,000 North Koreans required relief assistance as the battle moved north of the 38th Parallel. The situation would worsen with the retreat of the UN forces from the North in deteriorating weather; an estimated 200,000 North Koreans flocked into South Korea in the December of 1950 alone. Most refugees were diverted to the lightly-populated and relatively undamaged Cholla Provinces in Southwest Korea¹⁰¹

Further, in the early months of the war, with the battle lines shifting and with serious problems with enemy guerrillas and North Korean troops disguised as civilians, Korean civilians were as much objects of suspicion as of concern by the UN military.¹⁰² Thus Civil Affairs operations were confined in the first year of the war primarily to emergency relief measures for the disrupted population.¹⁰³ Longer-term care for civilians and the Korean economy would come under the heading of civil assistance.¹⁰⁴

Staff supervision of U.S. Army Civil Affairs in the Korean War passed through a confusing number of organizations and their reorganization, with their attendant acronyms. The UNC G-4 was given such supervision on 1 October 1950 and a Civil Affairs Officer assigned.¹⁰⁵ Thus a system and staff already in existence could be called upon to deal with the disaster relief-type of mission carried out by the UN Command at that stage of the war. In addition, certain vital aspects of Civil Affairs were delegated to Eight U.S. Army under its Civil Assistance Section (CAS) and to the Japan Logistical Command.


To supervise the mission, Eighth U.S. Army Korea established as a major command its United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK). This was a combined organization consisting basically of a national headquarters to parallel the ROK national government, and provincial, city or port teams in the field, and to parallel ROK provincial and local governments. UNCACK was at its outset allotted \$50 million for the "prevention of disease, starvation, and unrest." Below the command level were two major divisions: Administration and Planning. Ten civil assistance field teams, composed of five military and five civilian personnel, worked as far forward as the Eighth Army corps rear boundaries. Forward of those boundaries Eighth Army administered its programs through its own Civil Affairs and Military Government channels. These UNCACK field teams implemented the policies for the government of each of the liberated provinces and Seoul. In the North MG (briefly administered its own programs.¹⁰⁶ By August of 1951 UNCACK consisted of 95 U.S. Army officers, 197 enlisted men and 150 civilians (102 Department of the Army and 48 UN). The number of non-U.S. personnel never seems to have been specified, but they represented at that time 12 nations and were all specialists in the fields of health, welfare or sanitation. Throughout the war the recruitment of qualified civilians to assist the ROK in CA work remained difficult, although apparently not so difficult as that with military personnel, and UNCAKC was authorized to substitute civilian for military personnel. During the autumn of 1950, X Corps, specifically organized for the Inchon landings and the invasion of North Korea, established its own "Civil Affairs" special staff section.

Field Civil Affairs missions were carried out by Corps and Division Civil Assistance Teams, with the same personnel composition as that of UNCACK. As Eighth Army and X Corps moved northward after the Inchon landings UNCACK furnished each of the provinces as well as Seoul with civil assistance teams as they were liberated. UNCACK teams deployed into North Korea in the wake of UNC forces and followed them back out of the North when the Chinese communists intervened in the war. By August of 1951, UNCACK had Civil Assistance Teams in all but one South Korean province plus one attached to each of the three U.S. Army corps and to the U.S. First Marine Division. Soon each U.S. Army division also carried a CA team.

None of these personnel, except possibly for some World War II veterans, had received any CA or MG training. In fact, in March of 1951, presumably after all hope of liberating and governing North Korea had been given up, a MG headquarters company and two MG companies in Japan were broken up and their personnel and equipment merged with UNCACK.¹⁰⁷ A collection of responses by CA personal on their training for the job in Korea revealed agreement that specific orientation for Korean service was practically non-existent:

I asked Camp Gordon for general background material on Korea before leaving the States. They had nothing except material on European occupation experiences on (this after extensive MG and CA in Japan and Korea itself since 1945)... I had little idea of the civil affairs function in

**ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
AID TO KOREA**



_____ Command
 - - - - - Coordination
 Policy

From General Headquarters, United Nations Command, Civilian Relief and Economic Aid - Korea, 7 July 1950-30 September 1951 (n.d., n.p.), USASOC History Archives

Korea except for a sketchy Pentagon briefing and 3 or 4 days in Pusan....Team commander predecessors are in a hurry to get home and not interested in indoctrination....The real orientation begins in the field.

Further, there was full agreement that rotation of personnel undermined CA effectiveness, with the length of stay of a team commander averaging some 4 1/2 months.¹⁰⁸ Obviously, few, if any, of the lessons of World War II (or World War I, for that matter) on the necessity for the timely introduction of professionally-trained Civil Affairs personnel had been learned. October of 1950 was rather late in the day to be organizing for Civil Affairs in a war that had been going on for four months and which had been significantly complicated by the ubiquitous and large-scale movements of civilians across the battlefields. Further, the authority for Civil Affairs in Korea was widely diffused. As MG Hilldring, the former commander of the Department of the Army's World War II Civil Affairs Division, wrote privately, "After six years we are in no better shape to handle military government than we were in 1941."¹⁰⁹

However, counting UN and U.S. civil and military agencies, literally dozens of agencies shared the CA mission and the responsibility. UNCACK received policy guidance or had to maintain close liaison with: Department of the Army, Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP), General Headquarters, Tokyo (GHQ); Eighth Army, Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), UN Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), the U.S. Embassy, and, of course, the Government of the Republic of Korea.¹¹⁰ One report of 1951 described the situation:

An examination of UN and US agencies concerned with civil affairs revealed that four separate agencies with independent channels of communication were in direct contact with the ROK Government in September 1951 - UNCURK, UNKRA the Department of State and the US Army. This has handicapped the development of an integrated policy, caused confusion among ROK officials regarding the real locus of responsibility, and has encouraged ROK attempts to play off one organization against the other.¹¹¹

Eighth Army alone deployed seven different units with varying degrees of direct relationships with ROK authorities, a situation which enabled ROK attempts to by-pass the main operating agency, UNCACK, and one that provoked frequent jurisdictional disputes.

No standard Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) CA/MG units were ever employed in Korea. Two or three MG units were dispatched to the Far East soon after the outbreak of hostilities but did not get past Japan, where they were quickly broken up and their personnel and equipment transferred to UNCACK. Thus, to the end of the war, the UNC remained seemingly oblivious to the wider mission of Civil Affairs, basically confining that mission to civilian relief. Exacerbating matters, Civil Affairs in the Korean Conflict endured numerous organizational changes through the

war years, probably at least in part a reflection of the Army's lack of policy on the subject.¹¹²

As if such organizational problems were not sufficient, an authoritative Army study (already cited) indicated that CA personnel, generally, military and civilian were of below-average ability. A comparison between Infantry and Civil Affairs officers showed the latter several points below the former on the Army Over-all Efficiency Index, a disparity that increased with grade. Educational levels of CA officers were also significantly below that of Army officers in general, a disturbing finding considering the range and complexity of the formers' work and the liaison with civil government officials involved. Comments of high ROK officials could be highly disparaging. One ROK minister, who had spent 30 years in the USA, termed CA personnel "cookie pushers." Recurring ROK officials' complaints at the national and provincial level included a lack of understanding of Korean conditions, too low levels of education (in a nation that put the scholar at the pinnacle of prestige), too great a dependence on interpreters (UNCACK did not possess one Korean-speaking American!), arrogance and impatience, and a lack of experience.

A survey of 31 percent of Civil Affairs personnel in UNCACK and CAS revealed that 87 percent believed that CA/MG had always been used, and not just in Korea, as a "shunting off" assignment for the "misfits, surplus, and undesirables." With such attitudes within the CA ranks themselves, it is not surprising that non U.S. non-CA troops would hold similar sentiments. When UNCACK was organized it was filled by drafts from other units; only five percent actually requested transfer to Civil Affairs, even though the assignment was considered as quite safe compared to the line. Within the CA ranks themselves the mixed civilian-military personnel worked well enough together, although there were mutual resentments of the civilians' high salaries and 40-hour work weeks and of the military's low levels of education and interest. Some 27 percent of CA civilian employees had requested their transfer to CA, compared to a mere three percent of Army officers.¹¹³

For all these serious problems, it does appear that CA personnel in Korea made substantial contributions to the war effort and to the relief of civilian suffering. Their most impressive accomplishment, as noted, was that of refugee evacuation. CA also was commendably early in taking up once again, in 1951, the land reform program initiated by USAMGIK and the ROK Government before the war. Even this program, however, could not compensate for UNC's lack of any reconstruction policy.¹¹⁴

One of the first CA field missions took place after the Inchon landings in September 1950, when some 2,000 tons of rice from the port of Inchon was carried on the backs of hundreds of Korean civilians, ferried across the Han River in small boats and hand-distributed throughout Seoul free of charge.¹¹⁵

Although it could not compare with the planning for the post-war occupations of Germany or Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did draw up a directive for General MacArthur detailing policy guidance for Civil Affairs (still not termed Military Government) in North Korea. This guidance provided that:

The occupation forces will not impose on the North Korean people a complete administration of Government. However, it will be necessary to establish a temporary substitute for the Central North Korean Govt and also to establish and maintain supervision and controls over North Korean De Facto Provincial and Local Govts.

General MacArthur was:

to change as little as possible the fundamental structure [sic.] which you find when you enter North Korea....Any change should be made by the Korean people themselves after the unification has been accomplished.

On the other hand, the JCS straightforwardly directed MacArthur to "dissolve the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea."¹¹⁶ General MacArthur himself apparently had shied away from the term "Military Government" for North Korea, perhaps bearing in mind the sour legacy of the U.S. occupation of South Korea.¹¹⁷ When UN forces entered North Korea in October of 1950, the UN Command forwarded city and provincial Military Government teams. There CA personnel discovered health and welfare concerns, but the primary need was for the re-establishment of civil law enforcement and industrial rehabilitation. They also found that the ROK military, presumably acting under the direct orders of President Rhee, was well into the process of establishing its own MG of the North as a preliminary to unification --under the control of Seoul.¹¹⁸

The occupation was to be in three phases. The first would continue until internal security had been established, the second would last until national elections had been held and, "the United Republic of Korea has assumed responsibility.", and the third phase would begin when all non-Korean UN forces were withdrawn. As much as possible, MacArthur was enjoined that "Your participation in the local and Provincial govts of North Korea will be limited to the minimum necessary to assume law and order and tranquillity."¹¹⁹

Following such guidance, Eighth Army decreed that North Korea's schools were to remain closed until UNCACK could be assured that they were "free from any taint of communism or ultra-nationalism". They would remain under close UNCACK supervision. Social studies textbooks were, understandably, to "be completely re-written." As for North Korea's newspapers and radio stations, the UNCACK team called for "a free flow of information, to see that no foreign power shall utilize the information media to further their own national interests." This was to be accomplished by a rather "Big Brother" process of "closing, screening, and licensing information media." On the other hand, "Civil activities...will be conducted through local civil authorities to the maximum extent which military necessity permits." Finally, political prisoners were to be released after investigation, and black-marketing, prostitution and "panderers" dealing with UN forces were to be controlled.¹²⁰

UNCACK field teams had hardly embarked on these programs when Chinese intervention late in the year drastically changed their mission once again to one of



ROK officer proclaims MG in North Korea, fall, 1950. National Archives

refugee evacuation and relief. In all, U.S. Army Military Government, as opposed to Civil Affairs, was confined briefly to liberated areas until ROK officials could be retrieved or recruited and to enemy territory in the Democratic Republic of [North] Korea, and that only for a period of a little more than a few months, from the crossing of the 38th Parallel in October of 1950 to the expulsion of UN forces by December of that year.¹²¹

The December 1950 UN X Corps disembarkation from the port of Hungnam, on the northeast coast of the peninsula, could be termed as nothing less than the most successful wartime civilian evacuation of this century. The Commanding General of X Corps, MG Edward Almond, gave his personal attention to the problem of the North Korean refugees pressing against his lines, now contracting in the face of Chinese advances. General Almond determined that all civil officials and their families and all other "loyal citizens" would be evacuated, shipping space permitting. This evacuation was immeasurably complicated by the fact that most North Korean government officials had left their posts. There was little doubt as to where the refugees wished to go --out of North Korea. Some 50,000 refugees from Hamhung alone tried to board the last train from Hamhung to the port city of Hungnam. Fortunately, there was already a CA team in Hungnam. They were ordered to move all refugees to the nearby village of Soho-Jin. There, along with X Corps Korean Military Police, KMAG troops and Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) agents they organized the refugees into parties of 11, with one member placed in charge. From Shoho-Jin they were moved again for screening, then evacuated on small fishing craft or ROK Navy vessels. Rice and barley requisitioned from a local mill and from stores in the port area were distributed or stocked in the refugee ships. On 19 December the Hungnam CA team was evacuated and the job fell to personnel of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, with a little assistance from X Corps Provost Marshal, certainly not an ideal means of dealing with masses of civilian refugees.

Nonetheless, some 98,1000 Korean refugees were evacuated from Hungnam port and the Soho-Jin docks. The number does not include babies carried on their mothers' backs, and many civilians must have scrambled aboard, undocumented, in the confusion. These refugees had been kept away from the main embarkation points at Hungnam and thus did not seriously impede the loading of UN forces for evacuation to Pusan to renew the conflict. Most refugees were taken directly to Koje Island off the east coast of South Korea. Not one soldier or civilian is known to have died of other than natural causes during the evacuation. Unfortunately an indeterminable number of refugees were left behind. The X Corps evacuation was only exceeded in numbers by the great forced migration of perhaps one million eastern Germans in 1945 from the advancing Red Army, but many of those refugees perished along the way.¹²²

Not all refugees followed the retreating UN forces by sea. Even more made the wearying winter trek overland, using back trails when ROK forces closed the main Pyongyang-Seoul road to them. UNCACK personnel stockpiled food and rice straw for fuel and shelter at river crossings and other places where these multitudes might have to pause. Each rest stop/check point was carefully situated to be no more than one day's march for the refugees. The refugees were also inoculated for typhus and

smallpox and liberally dusted with DDT powder. Between February and August 1951, 67 percent of the population under UN control were immunized against typhus, 87 percent against typhoid and 70 percent in the port cities against cholera. Although many of the refugees came from areas where these diseases were fairly common no serious epidemic followed in their wake. In the month of February 1953 alone some 532,874 "beggars, vagrants and refugees" were dusted. Perhaps as a result of this public health activity soon after the end of the war the Republic of Korea enjoyed a health and nutrition record better than that prevailing before the war and which was comparable to some developed western nations. This accomplishment was all the more impressive in that the population of the ROK increased from 16 to 20 million in the first year of the war, the increase accountable almost entirely to refugees. CA troops supervised 3.3 million smallpox inoculations and 4.1 million inoculations each for typhoid and typhus between 1950 and 1953. The dusting continued until the end of the war. Some refugees even moved by air; a large but undetermined number of orphaned or separated children were flown out of Seoul toward the end of December by 5th Air Force to Cheju Island, where they finally found refuge and where they could be ministered to by foreign welfare and missionary organizations.

As the Chinese onslaught, continued UNCACK had to face the probability of another evacuation of Seoul, which would entail major problems of food, shelter, medical services and sanitation as the great mass of refugees continued to surge southward. Civil Assistance Teams evacuated from the North were mobilized to assist in the work. It is a measure of their success that although this second evacuation was carried out under much harsher weather conditions than those prevailing during the first evacuation in late June 1950, civilian losses were minimal. By the end of the evacuation, every resident or refugee who wished to depart had been evacuated or had left on their own.

In Taegu alone 19 refugee camps were established, holding 15,000 persons, while another 70,000 were housed in private homes throughout the city. The task was daunting; as early as the summer of 1950 no less than 4,600,00 Koreans were counted as war sufferers or refugees. One year later, South Korea held some 487,500 refugees from North Korea, as well as 2,500,000 southern war sufferers.¹²³ At roughly this time the Japan Logistical Command forwarded six shipments of trucks to Korea loaded with a total of 119,100 blankets, 300,000 pairs of socks and other clothing needs.¹²⁴

The refugees were kept out of areas generally north of Taejon and prohibited from all but designated refugee trains. Residents were restricted to a radius of no more than ten miles from their homes. In an effort to reduce the swollen populations of Taegu and Pusan, refugees were transferred, often by force, from these cities to the Cholla Provinces (Cholla was also a hot bed of enemy guerrilla activity), and the islands of Koje and Cheju. When UN armies moved north again, many refugees embarked on yet another trek, in spite of the extensive efforts by U.S. Information Service (USIS) to persuade them that the again-liberated areas lacked heat, housing, food, water and electricity. Leaflets were even air-dropped over refugee columns and messages broadcast over loudspeakers mounted on Eighth Army psywar aircraft. However, the UNCACK teams, whose primary mission was to advise ROK officials,

were overwhelmed by the crush of displaced civilians, and often found themselves acting in an operational rather than advisory capacity. For example, prior to the re-entry of UN forces into Seoul, the Kyonggyi Province Civil Assistance Team (attached to I U.S. Corps), transferred rice from Inchon to the Yondong-po area nearer the capital, arranged with KMAG to have civilian returnees inoculated and dusted with DDT powder prior to entry into the city and readied a 40-bed hospital and its required medical supplies. However, the problem of displaced farmers slipping back to their fields for the spring planting remained almost insoluble.¹²⁵

In many ways these successes came in spite of ROK authorities. The most egregious failure in civilian relief was the National Defense Corps (NDC) scandal, which UNCACK Command and the Korean Public Health and Welfare Sections as well as the teams in the field had noted and reported upon as early as January of 1951. That the youths conscripted into the NDC were near-starvation and physically debilitated was hardly cause for surprise, considering that some 2.3 billion *won* had been "wasted" and that the NDC Vice-Commander had expended 317,630 *won* "for no useful purpose." This malfeasance "was carried on in the face of thousands of half-starved, rag clad and disease ridden youths who were cluttering the roads returning to their homes bitter and distrustful of the governmental authorities who were entrusted to guide the youths." UNCACK did what it could to provide bedding, medical care, clothing and food for the NDC unfortunates but, again, in dealing with the sovereign government of the ROK, there was little they could do for the long term other than to pressure governmental authorities and to publicize the situation.¹²⁶

Hardly better was the situation with the Second ROK "Army," a rag-tag outfit made up of young Koreans conscripted and moved South to keep them out of the hands of the invading Chinese. With that danger passed, like the NDC wretches, they were simply left by the side of the road, sick and indigent. UNCACK's Public Welfare staff cooperated with the ROK Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Health and Central Relief Committee to provide emergency care for these "rejectees," generally considered "the most needy and most undernourished group in Korea" (which would be saying something).¹²⁷

UNCACK was able to care immediately for wounded and sick refugees through the so-called Basic Medical Unit (BMU), which contained drugs and medical and surgical supplies for the normal medical support for a population of 100,000 persons for one month. The Basic Hospital Unit (BHU) carried the equipment and sustaining medical and surgical supplies needed for the establishment and operation of a 40-bed surgical hospital and basic supplies for another 500 patients. In addition, each Corps Civil Assistance Officer was given control of the operation of a mobile hospital unit capable of providing emergency care for sick and wounded prior to their evacuation to the rear. From 1 January to 30 September 1951, some 1,750,500 civilians received in-patient care and another 5,300,000 out-patient care. By 30 November 1951, 238 BMUs and 32 Hospital Units were in operation.¹²⁸

Other Civil Affairs operations included the procurement of local labor and supplies, supervision of public health and sanitation, restoration of public utilities and public transportation, establishment of liaison with local governments, establishment of



CA in the field, dealing with civilians in unauthorized area, Korean War (1953). Signal Corps, National Archives

policies to regulate wages and prices to combat inflation (a near-complete failure due to opposition from the ROK government) and the promotion of public safety. Even more than in World War II, Civil Affairs emphasized what would later be termed Civic Action. The Republic of Korea had been as battered by war as any European nation in World War II, with much of the ROK having endured enemy seizure, UN retaking, reseizure by the enemy and then a final retaking by UN forces. When Seoul was taken for the third time, that city had practically ceased to function.

With the stabilization of the battle lines, UNCACK could now concentrate on longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction, rather than on short-term civilian (particularly refugee relief.) Early in 1952 UNCACK worked closely with the ROK Ministry of Housing on the National Housing Plan, obtaining U.S. Army Engineer personnel and equipment support for the reconstruction of the nation's public utilities. (As just one example, the reconstruction of the Provincial Water Plant at Seoul could not proceed until the raw water intake had been repaired, but that had been delayed by a lack of pile driving and pipe handling equipment.) Civil transportation had become a major concern, with UNCACK, also early in 1952, concerning itself with provincial motorbus and trucking companies and noting that about 75 percent of the private trucks operating in Kyonggi Do were reported to be illegally converted military vehicles. The Seoul streetcar system by then already was up to 53 percent of its pre-war mileage, even with electrical converters at two sub-stations broken down and needing replacement. Other concerns in this battered, agrarian society included hog disease inoculations and the protection of remaining forests from wood-cutters, not to mention such local problems as clothing for civilian prisoners, and Seoul garbage collection and water supply and such national concerns as the futile fight against rampant national monetary inflation. (By April of 1952 the South Korean Won was worth only 1 percent of its 1945 value.)¹²⁹

In contrast to its late response to the need for Civil Affairs, Far East Command moved quickly to provide direct civil relief to South Korea, realizing that civil unrest could adversely affect military operations. FEC shipped food, clothing and medicine for refugees directly from its supply depots and purchased other supplies from Japanese sources. For example, 175,000 surplus WAC wool jackets were distributed during December of 1950, and 1,000 tons of charcoal shipped into Pusan during the same period was found adequate to supply only a fraction of current civilian requirements. All tungsten mined in Korea was handled, stored and shipped to the United States by the engineer depot in Pusan. Army personnel and heavy equipment actually operated a coal strip mine until an underground mine could be opened at Machari, and imported 400 coal cars, track, electrical machinery and other equipment for the mine. Eighth Army troops also built a 10-mile road complex at the Womder Pass, including 17 bridges; trucked coal 25 miles from the Songhok rail spur to the Yongwol powerplant, and built the Yongwol Bridge across the Han River.¹³⁰ An early, much-appreciated (and well-publicized) CA program was the plan finally to return farmers to their lands just south of the battlelines for spring planting. These farmers were allocated more than 7,000 tons of free seed so that they could begin anew their agrarian cycle free of debt. At about this time 150 1/2-ton Ford trucks were issued to the provincial teams

(four trucks per team) for the distribution of civil relief supplies and eventual turn-over to the ROK government.¹³¹

Even so, these good deeds had to take place in the context of the realities of life in South Korea. For example, it was discovered that the inhabitants of a particular village had been giving up their relief grain to the local police. The reason was simple; they had no money to pay the police for protection from the local guerrillas. The poorly-paid police were not necessarily venal; they simply needed the rice to live.¹³²

UNCACK's largesse could even be extended to the enemy. Sixty-eight captured "bandits" upon their arrival at Chongju Prison were found to be "in very poor" physical condition and 38 were hospitalized at once. UNCACK provided medical supplies and a team public health officer gave instructions for their use, presumably to the disgust of local ROK officials.¹³³ By the final year of the war, UNCACK was able to look even more to the long-term rehabilitation of South Korea and its people. A budget for the establishment of a comprehensive rehabilitation service for the physically handicapped was agreed on by UNCACK and the ROK government. One of the first actions of this service was the completion of a technical instruction manual for the fitting of artificial limbs. By this year also, voluntary, non-governmental organizations were increasing their humanitarian activities for Korea. In January of 1953 alone representatives or heads of the World YMCA, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Refugee Advisor of the World Council of Churches, the Church World Service the Federation of Women's Clubs in America and the Foster Parent Plan for War Children all arrived to offer their services or to seek information or orientation.¹³⁴ By early 1953, even with the war continuing, a UNCACK-ROK project, the "Hall of Progress," in Pusan was exhibiting the products of South Korean industries as a harbinger of the economic progress that could be expected post-war. In addition, of course, there were the enormous U.S. civil and governmental and UN relief operations. U.S. civil aid was funneled through the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) until April of 1951, when this mission was assumed by the UN Command. United Nations primarily came through the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA).¹³⁵ Even well after the Armistice no less than 52 different agencies and groups claiming to be engaged in some phase of civil assistance were registered with the UNC.¹³⁶

One great advantage enjoyed by the UN Command in this relief work was that the UN Commander had the final say on all of these civil and military projects and shipments. In the words of the last wartime CINCUNC, General Mark W. Clark, and echoing those of General Eisenhower a war and a decade earlier:

I couldn't afford to let a group of UN economists decide to rehabilitate textile factories, for instance, with money we sorely needed to dredge a harbor or a channel to make way for our supply ships....I had to have the authority to make decisions which would funnel relief and reconstruction aid money into projects that would be beneficial to the war effort at the same time that they aided the Korean economy. These

economic and financial affairs of South Korea were a continuing headache to me.¹³⁷

UNCACK's ramshackle structure made it easier for ROK officials to bypass the organization and go directly to Eighth Army Civil Assistance Section or to the Deputy Commander of Eighth Army with problems that would properly have fallen under the purview of CAC, and ROK officials were not discouraged from making such direct approaches. Liaison between KCAC and Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG), led to jurisdictional disputes and confusion among ROK officials over whom they should approach with their problems.

Whatever its failings, Civil Affairs/Civil Assistance programs did make it possible for the U.S. Army and the UNC, after the first months of the war, to conduct operations with minimal interference from the Korean civilian population. In some significant ways it left the Republic actually in better condition than it was before the war. As noted, large-scale major diseases had been practically eradicated. In addition, land under cultivation had exceeded the pre-war figure, crop yields were 105 percent of 1949 levels through a massive program of fertilizer importation and refugee resettlement and assimilation. The daily potable water production also exceeded the 1949 capacity. Electricity production was at its highest since 1948, when North Korea had cut off the power to South Korea.¹³⁸

Army Civil Affairs in Korea remained a distinctly hit-or-miss, come-as-you-are operation until the last months of the war. However, Civil Affairs did not share in the Army's general desire to put Korea behind it and go back to its preferred strategy, the defense of Central Europe against the Soviet hordes. The Army had produced no new Civil Affairs manual between 1947, well before the Korean War, and 1958, well after.¹³⁹ However, in the midst of the Korea War a report by Daniel Fahey, Jr., of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, had called for the establishment of a small permanent staff capable of providing impetus, advice, policy and coordination for CA/MG matters within DA. This recommendation was accepted by the Secretary of the Army, and on 13 April 1952, General Order No. 37 established the Office of the Chief, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Office of the Chief of Staff. At the same time the functions and personnel of the former Office for Occupied Areas were transferred to the new agency.¹⁴⁰ Already, the Provost Marshal's School, Fort Gordon, Georgia had established a Military Government Department to offer resident and non-resident training for the current 4,700 RC and AC Civil Affairs/Military Government officers.

New CA/MG manuals were also drawn up to replace obsolescent sections of 1947 FM 27-5: FMs 100-5, *Operations*; 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Procedures*, 41-15, *Civil Affairs Military Government Units* (all 1954); 41-10, *Civil Affairs Military Government Operations* (1957); 41-5 and *Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government* (1958). During World War II CA/MG officers knew their area of assignment and could be trained accordingly. In the post-war years, no one had much of an idea where they would be assigned. Thus such officers now had to be afforded techniques and doctrine that would enable them to function wherever deployed. Area

training was not neglected; each RC unit was designated a geographical area of specialization. Also, over the decades after 1951 CA/MG personnel or contractors undertook research studies for the Army for the first time for that service; previous research had been exclusively in the "hard" science areas. One of the more percipient early results was SGT Henry Kissinger and (civilian) Darwin Stolzenbach's study of Civil Affairs in the first year of the Korean War.¹⁴¹

Two years after the Korean War Armistice, Civil Affairs and Military Government was divorced from the Provost Marshal's Office (which probably heaved a sigh of relief), and the Civil Affairs and Military Government Branch, USAR was established. In addition, the Civil Affairs and Military Government School was upgraded from a Class II to a Class I activity and entered a period of continued expansion. On 17 August 1955 the Department of the Army established the U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs/Military Government (officer) Branch. Until then officers assigned to CAMG staffs and units were commissioned in a unrelated basic Army branch, such as Artillery, Armor, etc. If mobilized, these bank presidents, professors, public works supervisors and so forth would at some time have to withdraw from their CAMG units to serve with their basic branches, leaving their current skills and experience unused. Branch establishment was soon followed by the approval of the branch insignia ("On a globe 5/8 inch in diameter, a torch of liberty 1 inch in height surmounted by a scroll and sword crossed in saltire, all in gold color"). The School's motto: "Seal the Victory" became the unofficial motto of the Branch as a whole. On 2 October 1959, the Army redesignated the branch the Civil Affairs Branch, dropping the term "Military Government."¹⁴² At roughly the same time, the 95th Military Government Group was reactivated on 9 February 1955 at Camp Gordon, Georgia and redesignated on 27th May 1959 as the 95th Civil Affairs Group.¹⁴³ Paradoxically, this CA recognition and development came at a time when some high administration officials wondered if the Army would have any role in the age of nuclear warfare, as reflected in the post-Korean War Eisenhower administration's "New Look" at defense, which emphasized nuclear retaliation directly against the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁴

The Lebanon intervention of 1958 hardly diverted the Eisenhower administration from its fascination with nuclear Armageddon. At the time not one CA-qualified officer was to be found in a CA function in Europe. Non-CA-qualified officers were hurriedly seconded to the job by EUCOM and did good work in easing the impact of U.S. Marines on the fragile nation. The tactical troops, for example, would hack away at centuries-old olive trees that got in their way, oblivious to the fact that those trees represented the sole livelihood of scores of rural Lebanese. Their heavy military vehicles chewed up fragile farmlands. Thus one of CA's most important missions in Lebanon was claims adjudication. The US military attempted to make its own arrangements with the Lebanese authorities but found itself stymied by the prevailing Middle East deviousness, particularly in procurement matters. For all the good work of "Civil Affairs" in Lebanon, the official study of CA in that operation concluded that

It was well known that U.S. experience in CA as an organized branch of the military actually was sparse to nonexistent; that CA trained officers were not likely to be available, that existing doctrine did not cover the kind of operation called for in Lebanon, and that at command level there was doubt and skepticism about the value and need for CA.¹⁴⁵

That CA/MG survived was primarily the result of an active and influential Military Government Association and lobbying by high-level veterans of the Civil Affairs wars, including Governor/Senator Strom Thurmond, Generals Mark Clark and Lucius Clay, and Mr. John J. McCloy, certainly an impressive "Who's Who" on any post-war list of the civilian and military authorities most likely to know their way around Capitol Hill.¹⁴⁶ By the late 1950s the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs was on the General Staff level at Department of the Army under the direct supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, presumably in the light of World War II and Korean experience, now placed the Military Government mission under the concept of Civil Affairs, a break with the past which made Civil Affairs the all-inclusive term. Unit commanders, in addition to their traditional responsibilities toward the civil population were also now to look to Civil Affairs units to secure "necessary assistance, supplies, and facilities from indigenous sources," an early recognition that CA carried more than just the negative responsibility of keeping civilians from interfering with military operations, and could even benefit the commander. Perhaps even more importantly, for the first time the Army was providing peacetime CA/MG training.¹⁴⁷ U.S. Army Civil Affairs would find itself organizationally fairly well prepared for the next war. Unfortunately, the next war would be Vietnam.

¹Group histories in USASOC History Archives. Battalion/Company Lineage and Honors supplied by U.S. Army Center of Military History for USASOC History Archives.

²MAJ Robert H. Slover, "The Bridge of Military Government," typescript, n.d. USASOC. History Archives. Civil Affairs Association, *A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations*. (n.p.), (1976).

³Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, The Adjutant General's Office, *Guide to Civil Affairs and Military Government Records in the Adjutant General's Records Centers*, Part 1, *General Description of Records* (Washington: November 1951), 4-5.

⁴The first known planning for the U.S. military government of Korea goes back only to 13 August, just a few days before the Japanese surrender., C. Leonard Hoag, "American Military Government in Korea: War Policy and the First Year of Occupation, 1941-1946," Office of the Chief of Military History (Washington: 1970), 97. Korea was originally to be invaded and occupied. After Hiroshima, these plans were soon modified to provide for a peaceful occupation of Japan --and of Korea., General Staff of *MacArthur Report of General MacArthur*, vol. 1 (Washington, Department of the Army: 1965), 2. Korea was obviously seen then as little more than a mere extension of Japan., Han Mu Kang, "The United States Military Government in Korea, 1945-1948: An Analysis and Evaluation of its Policy," Ph.D. diss., University of Cincinnati, 1970. In the words of one contemporary authority, "When the XXIV Corps,...was designated the Occupation Force for Korea, it had no directives, no plans, no trained military government personnel, and less than a month to prepare for the accomplishment of its mission.", Philip H. Taylor, "Military Government Experience in Korea," Pt. 1, in Holborn, 356.

⁵Monika Keyhoe, "Report From Korea," *Common Ground* (Winter 1949), 15. Staff members of the short-lived Military Government Section of U.S. Armed Forces, Pacific, did refer to *FM 27-5* (1940), but this manual was of little use, containing mostly idealistic restatements of principles derived from the Hague Conventions., Carl Friederich, et al, *American Experiences*, 25. The OSS's study of Korea in the post-war era relied for its conclusions on the opinions of a mere six Koreans long resident in the United States., Kang, 30-31. Apparently the best account of the immediate Korean background came from Editorial Research Reports, *Freedom for Korea*, by F. M. Brewer (Washington: 5 November 1945) well after the commencement of the occupation, of course.

⁶Michael C. Sandusky, *America's Parallel* (Alexandria, Virginia: 1983), 22.

⁷*Ibid.*, 265.

⁸*Ibid.*, 21. The ever-resourceful State Department had classified Korean nationals (along with Austrians) as "technically neutrals.", PVTS M. R. Segal and Bert Werner, "Some Legal Problems of Military Government in the Present Conflict," (n.p.: 1943), 55.

⁹Hodge quotation in Kang, 28, 32-33. The Chief of the State Department's Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, stated that "nobody ever [had] thought of Korea

and we had to start from scratch.", discussion of Mayo paper, "Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan," Wolfe, ed., 68.

¹⁰Donald S. MacDonald, "The 1946 Elections and Legislative Assembly in South Korea: America's Bumbling Tutelage," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* (September 1982).

¹¹"Gook" apparently became a term of derision by Americans for Koreans only with the coming of the Korean War. Koreans in 1945 were terming Americans "migook." Within a few months after the American landings, the People's Republic was circulating a pamphlet, entitled *The Traitor and the Patriot* that condemned the American Military Government as collaborating with Korean traitors, setting the tone of political discourse for South Korea in the years to come., Kang, 61.

¹²Hoag, 132-133. Kim Ku's patriotic credentials were impeccable. He was married to the daughter of the assassin of Japanese Prince Ito, and in Shanghai in 1932 threw a bomb which killed Japanese General Shinegawa and also cost Foreign Minister Shigemitsu a leg and Admiral Nomura an eye. Rhee was more a victim of the Japanese, who had forced burning bamboo splinters under his fingernails. *Ibid.*

¹³History of USAFIK, Pt. 2, Chapter 1, p. 11; Bertram D. Sarafan, "Military Government: Korea," *Far Eastern Survey* (20 November 1947).

¹⁴Hoag, 143-144; Richard E. Lauterbach, "Hodge's Korea," *Virginia Quarterly* (Summer 1947); A. Wigfall Green, *The Epic of Korea* (Washington: 1950), 51; Kang, 42-43; G. Harry Huppert, "Korean Occupational Problems," *Military Review* (December 1949); Duncan Sinclair, "The Occupation of Korea - Operations and Accomplishments," *Military Review* (August 1947).

¹⁵Kang, 42.

¹⁶Report of USAMGIK for September 1945 to 30 June 1946, 203.

¹⁷Sandusky, 280.

¹⁸United States Military Government in Korea. *History of United States Army Military Government in Korea, Period of September 1945 - 30 June 1946*, 3 vols. (Seoul: October 1946), 13.

¹⁹Hoag, 152. See also Robert K. Sawyer and Walter G. Hermes, ed., *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War*, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington: 1962), 3-33.

²⁰USAMIK Report for September 1945 - June 1946, pt. 2, p. 118.

²¹*Ibid.*, 136-137, 153. For criticism of Hodge, see Pearl Buck, *The Living Reed* (New York: 1963), 161; *Christian Science Monitor* (11, 12, 14 September 1945). President Truman had to issue a statement that the retained Japanese officials were only those "deemed essential by reason of their technical qualifications.", "Statement by the President," Department of State *Bulletin*, 23 September 1945, 435. General Hodge will always be remembered for something that he never said: that Koreans and Japanese were "the same breed of cats." What he actually said was that the Japanese police and their Korean collaborationist fellows, in the eyes of the Koreans, were "the same breed of cats." But the "clarification," as usual, never caught up with the charge. Hoag, 187.

²²Ibid., 180. MacDonald states that "The Americans initially even intended to keep the Japanese administrators in place," and bases this assertion upon War and Navy Departments FM 27-5, *U.S. Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs* (Washington: 1945), 9-10. But this manual does not refer to Korea at all, and simply calls for the keeping in place of non-hostile indigenous civil servants, hardly the Japanese situation.

²³Sandusky, 296.

²⁴Hoag, 180-186; Sinclair, 55; Green, 52. In flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention of 1929, the personal property the repatriated Japanese had left behind was confiscated or looted by the U.S. military government., *ibid.*, 65.

²⁵Comments by Soon S. Cho, *at Conference of Scholars on the Administration of Occupied Areas, 1943-1956*, Harry S Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs (Independence: 1970), 48. Cho concluded that "Our people were fed up with this." Two other commentators added that "We had the government of interpreters and mistresses. (C. F. Loeh). "Sometimes the same person." (E. N. Peterson), *ibid.* An informative statistical analysis of the U.S. MG of South Korea is found in United States Army Forces, Pacific/Commander-in-Chief Far East, "Summation of United States Army Military Government Activities in Korea," monthly 1946-1948.

²⁶USAMGIK Report for September 1945 to 30 June 1946, pt. 1, p. 188; Green, 99. Many of these interpreters were not above assessing "fees" for allowing Koreans to speak with Americans or mistranslating to favor their own political or social interests., Taylor, 372.

²⁷McCune, "Post-War Government"; Edgar Snow, "We Meet the Russians in Korea," *Saturday Evening Post* (30 March 1946); Harold Sugg, "Watch Korea," *Harper's Magazine* (January 1947); Sarafan; Sandusky; 277.

²⁸Kehoe, 11-12.

²⁹Sarafan, "Korea," *Far Eastern Survey* (20 November 1946). Green is most bitter on the quality of U.S. MG officers in Korea., *passim*; USAMGIK Report for September 1945 to 30 June 1946, pt. 1, p. 8.

³⁰SCAP *Summation*, No. 1, 178; *Editorial Research Reports*, "Freedom For Korea," by F. M. Brewer (5 November 1945).

³¹Lauterbach, 83.

³²MacDonald, 63. Hoag, 473; Sinclair, 55-56.

³³McCune, "Post-War Government and Politics in Korea," *The Journal of Politics*, 9 (1947).

³⁴Hoag, 150. The original title was to have been U.S. Military Government of Korea, until someone discovered that this abbreviation would spell USMGOK - too close to "gook.", *ibid.*; Taylor, 361.

³⁵Ibid., 145.

³⁶Green, 54-58. Channing Liem, "United States Rule in Korea," *Far Eastern Survey*, (6 April 1949), claimed that USAMGK was considered the "duping ground for 'incompetents.'", 80.

- ³⁷Hoag, 235; McCune, "Post-War Government," 619; Green, 97; USAMIK Report for September 1945 to 30 June 1946, pt. 1, 183. The "Scouts" were abolished and reorganized, with membership limited to boys of 12-17 years of age., *ibid.*
- ³⁸Meade, 155. The USAMIK Bureau of Public Opinion's "A Brief Summary of Pertinent Information on Political Parties in South Korea" listed 354 political parties and social organizations registered with MG as of January 1948. (Seoul: 1948).
- ³⁹USAMGIK Report for September 1945 to 30 June 1946, pt. 1, p. 241.
- ⁴⁰Hoag, 239-242; Green, 61. McCune, "Post-War Government," 613. McCune reports that 53 police officers were killed in Taegu in October of 1946, by "enraged mobs," "largely due to police terrorism.", *Ibid.*, 613. A more positive view of the Korean police and Constabulary can be found in Sinclair, 55.
- ⁴¹Hoag, 299. A selection of the titles of these "parties" included "Forlorn Hope Society" or "Supportive Union for Old Korea Political Actors"; Lauterbach. A Soviet officer exclaimed in the first year of the occupation that Korea was "'the Poland of the East,' and the Koreans just as proud and difficult as the Poles.", *ibid.* The Report of USAMGIK for September 1945 to 30 June 1946 gingerly notes that "Opposition to Communism was not the purpose of this American occupation... although they naturally found other groups more congenial and cooperative," pt. 1, p. 1.
- ⁴²Hoag, 215-217.
- ⁴³*Summation of USAMG Activities in Korea*, No. 14 (November 1946). When "seditious" posters appeared on Seoul walls, SCAP Proclamation No. 2, providing for the death penalty for opposition to Military Government was reissued for Korea, with an indication that it could apply for such unauthorized postings. Thus, at least in theory, Koreans could be executed for expressing in writing outré political opinions, USAMGIK Report for September 1945 to 30 June 1946, pt. 2, page 196. Less draconian was USAMGIK's flat ruling that "Traffic in South Korea will drive on the right-hand side after 1 April [1946].", a measure designed undoubtedly more to underline the transition from Japanese government (and to clear the way for the many U.S. Army vehicles, all designed for right-hand drive), than to regulate the minute civilian motor vehicular flow in South Korea at that time., *ibid.*, No. 6, p. 1.
- ⁴⁴Keyhoe, 12.
- ⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 11; USAMGIK Report for September 1945 to 30 June 1946, pt. 2, "National Police" section. See also John Goette, "Red Yin, Blue Yang Party Line of North Korea," *China Monthly* (November 1946) for a generally laudatory account of U.S. Army MG in Korea, as is "Korea: The U.S. Gets to Work," *Fortune* (June 1947). MG chief MG Archer Lerch, in a public address, blamed the 38th parallel decision for most of the problems in his domain, "Expediency Decision to Divide Korea Created 90 Percent of Troubles," *Commonwealth* (18 August 1947). General Lerch died of natural causes less than one month later., *New York Times* 3 September 1947. Views less favorable to U.S. Army MG in southern Korea were not lacking: George M. McCune, the foremost authority on contemporary Korea, "Korea: The First Year of Liberation," *Pacific Affairs* (March 1947); *The Occupation of Korea*. Foreign Policy Reports, vol. 23, No. 15 (New

York: 15 October 1947); "Postwar Government and Politics of Korea," *Journal of Politics* (November 1947); Robert T. Oliver, "Tug of War in Korea," *Current History* (October 1947); Sarafan, *passim*.

⁴⁶Hoag, 132-133; E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York: 1951), 58-59.

⁴⁷G. M. McCune, "Post-War Government and Politics of Korea," *The Journal of Politics*, 9 (1947), 620; John N. Washburn, "Russia Looks at Northern Korea," *Pacific Affairs* (June 1947). Howard Noble, "North Korean Democracy: Russian Style," *The New Leader* (31 May 1947). The Soviet commander, Colonel General T. Shtikov, in the Soviet-American conference held in Seoul on 20 March 1946, stressed the need for what his interpreter publicly rendered as a "friendly" Korean regime. But according to an Army historian at the time, the original Soviet text actually used the word "loyal," but even the literal meaning of that Russian word was "faithful.", *History of USAFIK*, pt.2, Chapt. 4, p. 166. (General Shtikov later helped to plan the North Korean invasion of South Korea.)

⁴⁸Lauterbach, 431.

⁴⁹USAFIK, *South Korean Interim Government Activities*, prepared by the National Economic Board, Civil Affairs Division, July-August 1948, ([Seoul]: August 1948), 1.

⁵⁰83d Cong., 2d Sess., *House Report No. 2574*, "Relief and Rehabilitation in Korea," 23d Intermediate Report of the [House] Committee on Government Operations (Washington: 1954); Lauterbach, 433; USAFIK, "South Korean Interim Government Activities," No. 34, 1; Kang, 71-72.

⁵¹USAFIK, *Repatriation From 25 September 1945 to 31 December 1945*, prepared by W. J. Gane (Seoul: 1946.); USAFIK, *South Korean Interim Government Activities*, Prepared by National Economic Board, No. 34 (July - August 1948), 1; Kang, 47-48; Sinclair, 55; Hoag, 165-169..

⁵²Roger Baldwin, "Our Blunder in Korea," *The Nation* (2 August 1947). Baldwin also concluded that South Korea had been poorly prepared for its independence., *ibid*. A contemporary authority had earlier written in disgust that "The democratic process to which much lip-service was paid was often less understood by some of its advocates than by the Koreans themselves.", Sarafan, 18. See also Hugh Borton, "Occupation Policies in Japan and Korea," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (January 1948); J. P. Brinton, "Small Korea is a Big Test," *New Republic* (14 March 1949); "Our Record in Korea," *Amerasia* (November 1946).

⁵³MacDonald, 54; McCune, "Post-War Government," 616-617; Kang, 65. When Rhee had returned to Korea, General Hodge gave him a hero's welcome, thus indicating where American MG sympathies would lie in future political developments. *Ibid.*, 67. In response, Dr. Rhee informed the welcoming assembly of 50,000 of his countrymen that "the answer to the question of whether Korea was to remain divided would be easier if the Koreans cooperated" with U.S. MG., *ibid.*, 68.

⁵⁴Hoag, 400-403, 434.

⁵⁵Hoag, 435, 451. Perhaps in his later statement, Hodge was influenced by the opinions of a prominent U.S. educationist, who had lived many years in Korea: Dr. Horace Underwood stated that Koreans "are as capable of governing themselves on their level as we are. They had centers of education and sovereignty before the Japanese conquest -almost as long as China's and much older than Japan's," quoted in Lauterbach.

⁵⁶*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. 8 (Washington: 1946), 713-714.

⁵⁷"History of USAFIK, Pt. 2, Chapt. 4, p. 166.

⁵⁸MacDonald, 55; Kang, 63-64.

⁵⁹In "G-2 Summary of Kyongsong Communist Uprising" folder, Herron Papers, 1945-1953 box No. 15.

⁶⁰MacDonald, 56. The strikes and demonstrations, occasionally erupting in bloodshed, are detailed in Green, 80-81.

⁶¹McCune, "Post-War Government," 613.

⁶²Kang, 103-105; Sinclair, 59; McCune, "Post-War Government," 617. When a Korean journalist accurately enough claimed before the Military Governor that the new legislature was hardly represented the Korean people, General Lerch forthrightly answered "I agree with you in almost everything you said and for that reason I am insisting that a general election law be passed which will give every man and woman the right to say how his country should be run." *Ibid.*, 618.

⁶³McCune, "Post-War Government," 618. The serpentine nature of South Korean politics in this period is dealt with in some detail by Green, 70-77; George C. McCune, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1950), 76 and passim; and Kang, passim.

⁶⁴MacDonald, 58, 59. MacDonald confusingly records that "Fifteen members of election committees were killed. However, the elections reportedly proceeded smoothly and without disorder," *ibid.*, 57.

⁶⁵USAMIK *Summation* No. 13 (October 1946), 15.

⁶⁶MacDonald, 60. Another authority, perhaps with some exaggeration, claims that "The democratic process to which much lip-service was paid was often less understood by some of its advocates than by the Koreans themselves," McCune, "Post-War Government," 615.

⁶⁷Green, 95.

⁶⁸Tony Mitchell, "Control of the Economy During the Korean War: The 1952 Coordinating Agreement and its Consequences," in James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., *The Korean War in History* (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: 1989)

⁶⁹USAMIK, National Economic Board, James Shoemaker, "The Economic Weakness of South Korea," (Seoul?, n.d.), 11, James H. Shoemaker Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 11, folder 11-14. Shoemaker was Chairman of the National Economic Board, USAMIK.

⁷⁰McCune, *Korea Today*, 83-84; Lauterbach; Green 68-69; Kang, 135. Not surprisingly, the rightists in the National Assembly led the opposition to land reform., *ibid.*, 140-142.

⁷¹Channing Liem, "United States Rule in Korea," *Far Eastern Survey* (6 April 1949), 79.

⁷²Green, 95, 60; Kang, 112., 123-130, 146.

⁷³USAMGIK Report for September 1945 to 30 June 1946, pt. 2, "Bureau of Education" section. As early as November of 1945 MG had seen to it that a Korean language reader and a primer *First Steps* in Korean were published. *ibid.*; Lauterbach; Hoag, 258-259. Bruce Cummings' description of the U.S. occupation of Korea as a "peculiar combination of warm-spirited good will, benevolent naivete, and arrogant ethnocentrism," is basically accurate, despite Professor Cummings' inveterately supercilious tone toward any U.S. effort in Korea., Cummings, 48.

⁷⁴Andrew C. Nahim, *Korea: Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People* (Elizabeth, New Jersey: 1988), 365.

⁷⁵Keyhoe, 14.

⁷⁶McCune, "Post-War Government," 616. McCune did note one particularly violent rightist group, "Great Korean Democratic Young Men's Association" (Not to be confused with the YMCA.), was actually dissolved by USMGIK. *ibid.*

⁷⁷MG Archer L. Lerch, ltr to COL Emery J. Woodall, 10 March 1947, George Fox Mott Papers, box No. 3. "George Fox Mott and Emery J. Woodall" folder, Hoover Institution Archives.

⁷⁸G. M. McCune, "Post-War Government and Politics of Korea," *The Journal of Politics*, 9 (1947), 607-608.

⁷⁹Meade, 235.

⁸⁰New York *Herald Tribune*, 23 September 1947.

⁸¹Comments of General Hodge, RG 332, USAFIK, box 97, "Criticism of U.S. Military Government" folder.

⁸²Huppert Younghill Kang, "How it Feels to be a Korean in Korea," *United Nations World* (May 1948). *Stars and Stripes* (Pacific Edition), 10 February 1948. The National Strike Committee merely demanded, among other things, a 300 percent increase in wages, the confiscation of farm land and redistribution to the laboring classes (a program that had managed to turn Russia from an exporter to an importer of food) and the establishment of a "People's Republic." quotation, Kang, p. 237.

⁸³*Ibid.*, 209-218, 220.

⁸⁴Quoted by Economic Cooperation Administrator Paul Hoffman in *Periscope on Asia*, Korean Pacific Press, No. 66 (24 December 1948); Kang, 209-210. For an overall assessment of the U.S. military government of South Korea, see Reports and Analysis Branch of the Civil Affairs Division, "Liberated Korea: A Summary," n.p., n.d.), RG 94, Entry 368, box 2070, "Liberated Korea - Korea" folder, and .USASOC History Archives.

⁸⁵Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Division, Reports and Analysis Branch, *Liberated Korea: A Summary* (Washington: 1948?) presents a digest of the economic, political and social situation in South Korea as of 15 August 1948. See also Green, 53. Other reports on South Korea in the last year of U.S. Army MG can be found in Alfred Crofts, "Cross Currents in Korea," *Journeys Behind the News*, Social Science Foundation (University of Denver: 22 December 1948); Kang, 66.

⁸⁶USAFIK, *South Korean Interim Government Activities*, No. 34 (July-August 1948), 1; and *ibid.*; Civil Affairs Section, *Republic of Korea Economic Summation*, September-

October 1948," Summary." See also the positive evaluation ("in spite of the generally disparaging remarks which have appeared in the press to date....") of one ranking USMIK officer, Sinclair, 60.

⁸⁷XXIV Corps Staff Conference - 10 September 1948, RG 332, United States Army Forces in Korea, box 28, "Historical Journal of Korea" folder; G-5, Far East Command/UN Command, "*United Nations Civil Affairs Activities in Korea: June 1952* (n.p., n.d.), 6. The ignorance of MG officers persisted to the end. In March of 1948 a Hangul-speaking U.S. scholar noted "youth" groups demonstrating under banners denouncing everyone and everything, including the Americans and the communists. When he translated some of these banners to his MG conferees, they were "shocked," Liem, 79.

⁸⁸Green, 115.

⁸⁹Keyhoe, 13-14.

⁹⁰Liem, 79.

⁹¹Keyhoe, 12. These were apparently not isolated outbursts from malcontents. An American Military Government poll on the subject was never released, but unofficially it was stated in Seoul that the results favored the Japanese occupation., *ibid.*; *Periscope on Asia*, Korean Pacific Press, No. 66 (24 December 1948); Kang, 209-210. Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Division, *Liberated Korea: A Summary*; Green, 53. Other reports on South Korea in the last year of U.S. Army MG can be found in Alfred Crofts, "Cross Currents in Korea," *Journeys Behind the News*, Social Science Foundation (University of Denver: 22 December 1948). USAFIK, "South Korean Interim Government Activities," No. 34 (July-August 1948), 1. See also the positive evaluation ("in spite of the generally disparaging remarks which have appeared in the press to date....") of one ranking USMIK officer, Sinclair, 60.

⁹²Nahim, 365.

⁹³Quoted in RG 332, USAFIK, box 28, "Historical Journal of Korea" folder.

⁹⁴Kehoe, 10. General Hodge told General Mark Clark (later UN forces commander during the Korean War) that he would never have stayed in Korea for a million dollars a year, had he been a civilian., Kang, 33. A more positive evaluation is found in J. P. Brinton, "Small Korea is a Big Test," *New Republic* (14 March 1949). Brinton had been a civilian employee of U.S. Army Intelligence in Korea for nine months. See also Chull Baum Kim, "U.S. Withdrawal Decision from South Korea, 1945-1949." Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Buffalo. 1984.

⁹⁵U.S. MG in Korea could point out that it had set up shop in a country that had no democratic traditions, and thus should not be judged too harshly for its failures in this realm. However, Japanese democracy had hardly been flourishing plant in the land of the "Thought Police" when MacArthur's MG began to lead that nation to democracy.

⁹⁶Baldwin. Most of Baldwin's other points as to the failure of USAMIK's attempts to bring democracy to South Korea were more tenable. An authority on Korea claimed that "Some of his critics feel that he [Hodge] was in fear of the qualified officers about him, in fear of himself, and above all, in fear of the Russians," Green, 53.

⁹⁷U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, School of International Studies, "Case Study of Civil Affairs Operations: Mid-Intensity Conflict," ([Fort Bragg, North Carolina]: October 1981), 15.

⁹⁸DA Directive to CINCFE, 6 July 50, in C. Darwin Stolzenbach and Henry Kissinger, "Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51," Operations Research Office (Baltimore: 12 May 1951), 59; United Nations Security Council resolution on Korean Relief, 31 July 1950, *ibid.*

⁹⁹Eighth Army(?), "Korea 1950-1954" (n.p., n.d.), 9.

¹⁰⁰UNC, "History of Public Health Section UNCAACK," n.p., RG 407, Entry 368B, box No. 4995, "Command Report - UN Civil Assistance Command, 8201st Army Unit, Nov 1950 - Aug 1951," *ibid.*, folder; 46; UNC, *UN Command Civil Assistance and Economic Aid Korea, 1 October 1951-30 June 1952*, G-5, HQ, FEC; Thomas S. Teraji, "Civil Affairs/Civil Assistance Problems," *History of the Korean War*, vol. III, pt. 5, United Nations Command, Far East Command, General Headquarters, Military History Section, 3. James E. Mrazek, "Civil Assistance in Action," *Military Review* (October 1955), 30; GHQ, United Nations Command. *United Nations Command Civilian Relief and Economic Aid-Korea, 7 July 1950-30 September 1951* (Tokyo? n.d.), 2,9. See also P. H. Cullen, "Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Korea, Far East Command (Tokyo: n.d.), 1 and *passim*.

¹⁰¹Teraji, 16.

¹⁰²Martin and Joan Kyre, *Military Occupation and National Security* (Washington. 1968), 68-69; J. E. Mrazek, "Civil Assistance in Action," *Military Review* (October 1955), 30.

¹⁰³Memorandum for General Maxwell D. Taylor, from Chief of Military History, Sub: "Civil Affairs/Civil Assistance in Korea," n.d. (1970), 3.

¹⁰⁴J. E. Mrazek, "Civil Assistance in Action," *Military Review* (October 1955).

¹⁰⁵GHQ, UNC, Go No. 15, 19 October 1950; Teraji, 5.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 5; Daugherty and Andrews, 420; Far East Command, "Civil Affairs Organization of UNC and its Relations to UN Agencies in Korea." (Tokyo: n.d.), 1; Far East Command, "Civil Affairs Organization of UNC and its Relations to UN Agencies in Korea (Tokyo: n.d.), 1; 8201st report for November 1950 - August 1951, 1, 5; Mrazek, "Fifth Staff Officer," 48; *ibid.*, "Civil Assistance in Action," 31; Teraji, 6, 13; *UNC Civilian Relief and Economic Aid, 7 July 1950-30 September 1951*, 12-13; Thomas W. Herron Papers, 1952 box, *passim*.

¹⁰⁷"Public Health Items Bulletin" No. 2, 18 March 1951, 1, 8201^a report, November 1950 - 31 August 1951.

¹⁰⁸ORO, *Civil Affairs Relations in Korea* Operations Research Office (Chevy Chase, Maryland: 16 July 1954), 106.

¹⁰⁹Copy of ltr in USASOC History Archives. Also quoted in M. O. Edwards, "A Case Study in Military Government in Germany During and After World War II," Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1957, 76-77.

¹¹⁰UNCAACK report, November 1950 - August 1951, 6; Teraji, 8.

¹¹¹Stolzenbach and Kissinger, 40.

¹¹²Kyre, diss, 11; Daugherty and Andrews, 426. Virgil Ney claimed that "The United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea was based upon the United States Army's experience with civil affairs and military government in World War II," but there is little evidence that the Army's leadership paid serious attention to the previous war's wealth of experience and lessons., Ney, *The United States Soldier in a Non-Violent Role (An Historical Overview)*, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (Fort Belvoir, Virginia: July 1967), 76. Teraji cites two CA/MG companies (28th and 29th) but agrees on their fate., 13. See also Carlton Wood, Robert Kinney and Charles Henning, "Civil Affairs Relations in Korea" (Project LEGATE), ORO-t-264 (16 July 1954).

¹¹³Stoltzenbach and Kissinger, 45-49. On the other hand, most of the civilians had applied for CA work in Korea when they had been rendered redundant with the phasing out of SCAP in Japan, and they suffered from their own morale problems. *ibid.*, 48. See also *Civil Affairs Relations in Korea*, 82-83 for a somewhat more positive view of the caliber of CA military personnel in Korea.

¹¹⁴Mitchell, 43.

¹¹⁵Public Welfare Section, 8201st Army Unit, report for November 1950 to August 1951, 7.

¹¹⁶Msg, from Dept Army (JCS), to CINCFE (For MacArthur as CINCUNC), 29 October 1950, in Teraji, Appendix B.

¹¹⁷See itinerary and report on MG planning for North Korea by CA/MG veteran COL Alfred C. Bowman, MG Division, PMGO, 10-October - 4 November 1950, Bowman papers, box No. 1, 66015 folder.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, *passim*.

¹¹⁹Teraji, Appendix B. Similar principles are found in Draft, "Civil Information and Education Policy for North Korea," n.d., 8201st report, 15 October 1950 - 31 August 1951, 2, RG 470, entry 368, box 4995.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, 6; Headquarters EUSAK, Annex I (Civil Affairs) to Standing Operating Procedure, 25 October 1950, in Teraji, Appendix E.

¹²¹Far East Command, "Civil Affairs Organization," 1. All MG team personnel assigned to North Korea were successfully evacuated., 8201st report for November 1950 - August 1951, 23.

¹²²X Corps, *Command Report "Enclosure,"* (December 1950), 24. Teraji, 17-18; Richard W. Stewart, *Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, December 1950*, U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: April 1991), 45-47; Eighth Army?, "Korea 1950-1954," 3-5.

¹²³*UNC Civilian Relief and Economic Aid, 7 July 1950 -30 September 1951*, 20.

¹²⁴Daugherty and Andrews, 410; U.S. Army General Staff G-4, International Branch, Supply Division, "Civilian Aid in Korea, War Damage Report," 10 February 1951, copy in Center of Military History Archives; Maxwell Taylor memorandum, 7.

¹²⁵Teraji, 23.

¹²⁶Staff Section Reports, Public Welfare Section, Public Health Section, Sanitation Section, 5 September 1950- 31 August 1950, 8201* report, November 1950 - August 1951, 32; *ibid.* for February 1953, 2; Mrazek, "Civil Assistance," 32; Teraji, 24-25.

¹²⁷Public Welfare report, 8201* report for November 1950 - August 1951, 22 and *passim*; Teraji, 24. Teraji erroneously combines the Second Army and the National Defense Corps.

¹²⁸*Eighth Army Command Report* (December 1950), 32; 8201* report, November 1950-August 1951, 13-15, 30; Maxwell Taylor memorandum, 7; "Civil Assistance in Action."

¹²⁹Public Works Section, 8201* report for January 1952, RG 407, entry 368, box 4995, 3. Mitchell notes that prices overall by 1952 had climbed to some 300 percent of the 1950 level., 33. See also the monthly reports of UNC G-5, *United Nations Civil Affairs Activities in Korea*, which often gave surprisingly candid accounts of President Rhee's authoritarian government activities.

¹³⁰U.S. Army Chief of Military History, *Korea - 1951-1953* (Washington: 1956), 215; Eighth U.S. Army *War Diary*, Section I, "Summary," (1-30 November 1950), 4; 8201st report, November 1950 - August 1951, 14 - 20; "Relief and Rehabilitation in Korea," *Hearings before a Subcommittee on Government Operations, House of Representatives*, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 13, 14, 16 October 1953 (Washington: December 1954), 44; Mrazek, "Civil Assistance," 33.

¹³¹8201* report, November 1950-August 1951, 27, 29, -30. CA personnel negotiated successfully with Eighth Army for the use of the military Main Supply Route by these and other civilian trucks engaged in relief distribution., *ibid.*, 34.

¹³²ORO, *Civil Affairs Relations in Korea*, 106.

¹³³*United Nations Civil Affairs Activities in Korea*, October 1952, 19.

¹³⁴8201* Command Report for January 1953, RG 407, entry 368, box 5784.

¹³⁵UN Command/Far East Command, G-5. *Civil Assistance and Economic Aid Korea, 1 October 1951 - 30 June 1952* (Tokyo?, n.d.), 2-4.

¹³⁶United Nations Command, *Civil Assistance and Economic Affairs, 1 July 1954 - 30 June 1955*, Korean Civil Assistance Command (Seoul: 1955), 150. For all their good will and good works such civilian organizations could cause the Army some difficulties, with their occasional requests/demands for PX, commissary and other privileges, their use of Army personnel as "tour guides" and their cries of "militarism" all the way to Congress if these demands were not met promptly. On the other hand they could also on occasion render truthful reports outside the Army's chain of command., Kyles, 80-81.

¹³⁷Mark Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: 1954), 144-145.

¹³⁸Mrazek, "Civil Assistance," *passim*.

¹³⁹Kyles, 13.

¹⁴⁰Mrazek, 48; ORO, *Civil Affairs/Military Government Organization, Plans, and Training, 1953-1954* (Baltimore: 26 October 1954), 27 and *passim*. Strom Thurmond, "The Mission of the Civil Affairs Division G-5," *Army* (November 1959).

¹⁴¹Swarm, 403-404; Kissinger and Stolzenbach, *passim*.

¹⁴²Department of the army General Order No. 51 (17 August 1955); DA GO No. 36 (2 October 1959); Swarm, 404; CA heraldic material supplied by U.S. Army Institute of

Heraldry (March 1986), USASOC History Archives. See also Civil Affairs Association, *A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations* (Silver Spring, Maryland: c. 1976) for full-color reproductions of CA commands, groups and Branch and school insignias. (n.p.).

¹⁴³ 95th MG/CA material from Lineage and Honors sheet from Army Adjutant General

¹⁴⁴ Not that CA personnel felt that they might be excluded from the atomic battlefield. Strom Thurmond certainly saw no major problems "As we look ahead [!] to a possible nuclear warfare age...", Thurmond, "Comments and Recommendations on Civil Affairs/Military Government Organization and Operation," typescript, to Secretary of the Army, December 1953, copy in "CA" file, USASOC History Archives. (emphasis added). Thurmond was not alone. See Carlton Wood, "Role of CA/MG in a Period of Possible Nuclear Warfare," unpub., 14 June 1955; and William R. Swarm, "CMAG in the Atomic Age," Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government. (1 February 1956).

¹⁴⁵U.S. Army Office of Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government *Civil Affairs and the Lebanon Operation, 15 July-25 October 1958*, by M. Dyer and A. H. Hausrath, Operational Research Office, TP-23 (Chevy Chase, Maryland: February 1961).

¹⁴⁶Kyres, 141, 182. Heraldic material in USASOC History Archives, "CA Heraldry" file.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., "The Mission of the Civil Affairs Division G-5," *Army* (November 1959); JCS Pub. 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington: November 1959), Section 7; R. C. Barnes, "Civil Affairs: A LIC Priority" *Military Review* (September 1988), 44.

XI

VIETNAM ERA

“The [Montagnard CA] program was both praised and reviled by Americans and Vietnamese and was on the verge of being destroyed many times -- not by the Viet Cong, but by its creators, the American command,....”

Dominican Intervention

In 1965 the United States once again intervened in the Caribbean, this time in the Dominican Republic, and for basically the same reasons it had intervened in Cuba and Haiti and Mexico: to enforce the Monroe Doctrine's prohibition of foreign intervention in Latin America, as well as to restore order and to give self-government a chance. In April of 1965 the Lyndon Johnson administration feared that the rebel Constitutionalists forces were on the verge of becoming communist oriented or dominated.¹ U.S. Marines landed on 28 April, troops from the XVIII Airborne Corps followed two days later and within one week some 23,000 Americans were in the republic. This had been no mere palace coup: estimated casualties as early as 5 May were 2,000 dead, including 8 U.S. soldiers. As soon as U.S. Army troops and Marines had established their positions they began a program of Civil Affairs-Civic Action in and around Santo Domingo, a city with erratic electric power minimal water and medical services, filled with a despondent, war-weary population and decaying corpses. By 3 May a more organized program of distributing food and clothing replaced the earlier hit-or-miss distribution, but the combat troops of the 82d Airborne Division were unfamiliar with procedures. Mobs of hungry Santo Domingans stormed distribution points, with the strongest or most persistent often receiving more rations than the truly needy. Free medical clinics were also established and seemed to draw a better-behaved crowd.

The first contingent of CA soldiers from the 42d CA Company had arrived on the 2d and instituted more orderly procedures. With the 42d severely under-strength, individual RC filler/attached personnel were deployed with the company on the basis of their MOS or their civilian training (e.g., those with a B.S. in economics were sought out.) Valuable time was thus lost familiarizing these troops with team equipment, the CA mission, unit SOP, etc.² Eventually the entire company was deployed to the Republic and assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps, coming under the operational control of the Corps G-5, but basically operating independently. Other U.S. agencies for the most part refused to work with Army CA. In fact, the driver for the chief of USAID in the Republic supplied the 42d's commander with information as to what those other agencies were doing, although AID did later cooperate in a massive food distribution program.

CA troopers working in the city's main hospital found three patients to a bed, no medical supplies or food, operations in hallways by candlelight and an exhausted medical staff. Thus the most pressing problem was obvious. Through the Dominican Red Cross and the Peace Corps an emergency request for medical supplies was sent to the U.S., while the U.S. Army provided emergency medical supplies and water and provided medical facilities.

On 5 May approximately 20 tons of medical supplies were airlifted from the U.S. The Public Health Team worked under the XVIII Airborne Corps Surgeon, but responded only when help was specifically requested. Its special projects included establishing a potable ice source, translating and editing requests for medical items, coordination with the decontamination unit for vector disease control, carrying out studies of the water distribution system and setting up refuse disposal points.

In the meantime the Public Facilities Team and Army engineers worked to restore basic services to the city. Team personnel were able to obtain chemicals for the city power plants and chlorine for its water system. Santo Domingo city's electrical power plant had not been damaged, but repair linemen had to be provided with military escorts to ensure that they would not once more be shot off their poles by rebels with a grudge against the "capitalist" power company. The garbage situation was resolved more easily. The city's incinerator was not operating simply because of a lack of a few fuses; CA personnel simply bought the necessary fuses and put the incinerator back in operation. The 42d's Public Facilities Team went on to clean up the garbage backlog, using Army dump trucks and front loaders. (Army engineers earlier had balked -- "Clean up the streets, hell -- we came here to fight!") The city's citizens were encouraged to clean up their own areas, with the distribution of relief food as the incentive. The Civilian Supply Team's efforts concentrated on locating materials suitable for military and civilian use. For the Military Team, personnel tracked down trucks, 35mm cameras, folding chairs, commercial oil company maps of Santo Domingo, flags, etc. For the civilians they located rice, clothing and vitamins for an orphanage, and shovels and wheelbarrows for the Dominican Sanitation Department.

With food distribution totally closed down, the Public Welfare Team surveyed the situation and developed a distribution system, unloading U.S. supply ships and monitoring the five food distribution points. Simultaneously, the team worked toward the goal of returning food distribution as quickly possible to such civilian welfare agencies as CARE, Caritas, Church World Service, etc. (Even in normal times some 17 percent of the Republic's population had been fed by such civilian agencies.) On the other hand, the Public Education Team was unable to reopen Dominican schools. It didn't help matters that the chief of the school system and 250 teachers had defected to the rebels and that many of the high school students were believed to be communists or rebels. The elementary schools were reopened but lacking teachers and students they soon closed once again and remained so to the end of the U.S. intervention.

The U.S. command in the Republic did not officially assume local government functions, but with many Dominican government offices in rebel-held territory, State Department and AID officials had allowed the 42d temporarily to take over their functions. The Legal Team basically confined its activities to the giving of legal advice and the preparation of contracts for the employment of indigenous personnel.³ The Civil Information Team compiled a list of all radio frequencies, power output and the managers of all radio stations in Santo Domingo, as well as of radio repair shops, printing establishments, motion picture theaters, newspapers, radio and television stations. Team personnel wrote and disseminated public information announcements, cooperated with the



42d CA Company and J5 troopers distribute clothing to orphans, Dominican Republic, 1965. Signal Corps, National Archives

U. S. Information Agency in leaflet drops and produced television tapes to be disseminated throughout Latin America.

Overt American intervention in the Dominican Republic concluded in September of 1966, leaving behind a government more amenable to the United States. Stability had been restored but at the cost, once again, of strong resentment by local educated elites. The intervention demonstrated the need for greater training in such political-military operations, but that lesson would not be learned for two decades. Rather, the more-or-less successful intervention operation appeared to validate the elegant theories of limited conflict and war gaming propounded by high civilian policymakers in the Kennedy administration. They would try their hand on a far larger scale in Vietnam.⁴

Vietnam

As it was in Korea, so it was in Vietnam that for most Americans this was *terra incognita*. Vietnam had been a French colony since the late 19th century and although the United States had supported the French in their war against the communist-nationalist Viet Minh insurgency, few Americans had actually been to the country or knew much about it. That would soon change.

American anti-communist efforts in Vietnam went back to 1950 when President Harry Truman authorized the sending of U. S. military supplies to aid the French against the Viet Minh. This commitment continued and was considerably expanded after the expulsion of the French in 1954. Although the Viet Minh was a guerrilla force, American planners at first persisted in viewing the regular military of North Vietnam as the main threat. This perception was undoubtedly a result of the "lessons learned" from Korea, a war ignited by a conventional attack by conventional forces across an internationally-recognized border. U. S. non-combat support in Vietnam at this time concentrated on doing what the U. S. Army had done best in recent previous wars, refugee relief and road building. Recent specific examples of insurgency and counter-insurgency abounded --the Philippines, Algeria, Malaya and in Indochina itself --but were ignored by the U. S. Army and even by the U. S. Operations Mission, the executive arm of the U. S. Agency for International Development (AID) in Vietnam.⁵

In the meantime, the Viet Minh's successor, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) or Viet Cong (which was shorthand for "Vietnamese Communist") consisting of the People's Revolutionary Party, the National Liberation Front and its Liberation Army, was busily abolishing farm tenancy and distributing "land to the landless," winning "hearts and minds" --and controlling much of the countryside in the process.⁶

The first U. S. Army Civil Affairs involvement in the RVN came in 1960, when two (unnamed in the record) officers from the Civil Affairs and Military Government School at Fort Gordon arrived in July for a 90-day temporary tour of duty. The officers instructed officers of the U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and ARVN personnel in Civil Affairs and Civic Action and advised and assisted the Chief of MAAG. Little seems to have resulted from this effort due to the lack of Army of the Republic of Viet Nam interest and the absence of a CA officer at MAAG headquarters. A follow-up Civic Action Mobile Training Team (MTT) did formulate a comprehensive Civic Action

plan for the consideration of MAAG and the GVN, and recommended actions to improve economic, social and political conditions. High RVN officials also promised to use the plan as a basis for their own Civic Action program.⁷

Not until the advent of the John F. Kennedy administration in 1961 did the U.S. Army make any serious attempt to deal with the true threat in Vietnam. President Kennedy was possessed of an interest in counterinsurgency that had eluded his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower. JFK authorized an increase in Army advisors to the ARVN and a small increase in the size of U.S. Army Special Forces (SF), thus reversing their original mission of assisting, not resisting, insurgency. By 1961 the U.S. Military Assistance Program had begun formally to support civic action, and by 1965-1966 funding for military CA amounted to some \$2.5 annually.⁸ By the end of 1963, civic action was a mandatory subject in most U.S. Army service schools and training centers.⁹

The Army, in response to this White House initiative, stepped up its unconventional warfare training. By 1964 some officers assigned as advisers to South Vietnam were receiving such training during their regular one-year long course at the Command and General Staff College or at one of the war colleges. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg provided a four to six-weeks long Military Assistance Training Adviser (MATA) course for most officers and enlisted men assigned as advisers to the ARVN. Selected senior officers were superficially instructed during a one-week course also at the Special Warfare School. The MATA, which provided the greatest number of trained advisers, was established in early 1962, and gave training in physical conditioning, Vietnamese language and area study, weapons and radio procedure and counter-insurgency operations. It is also noteworthy that Special Forces had put together a very professional survey of the Montagnard peoples of the Vietnamese Central Highlands that rewards study to this day.¹⁰

President Kennedy dispatched no less than 400 U.S. Special Forces (SF) troops to train Vietnamese paramilitary teams and to assist in the defense of the latter's bases. Even then Kennedy felt it necessary to place those SF soldiers under the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because of the pervasive Army/MAAG conventional attitude toward "the other war" (i. e., the non-military aspects) a situation that prevailed until 1964.¹¹ At about the same time, MAAG dispatched 75 ARVN officers to the Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Georgia for special training. The Vietnamese military themselves felt that the American instruction still focused too much on large-scale military government. By this time also MAAG was organizing and overseeing the ARVN nascent Civil Affairs program and attempting to use the para-military territorial forces, later termed Popular Forces (PF) for the dual roles of village defense and Civic Action.

Civil Affairs MTTs continued to arrive in the RVN on temporary tours of duty (TDY) to provide advice and assistance to the ARVN. Four such teams arrived between late 1962 and early 1963 and each was assigned to an ARVN corps. Despite the work of these MTTs, the U.S. Army's main interest in Civil Affairs seems to have been more directed at American-directed Civic Action programs and projects. Then as now, the bulk of the Army's CA assets were in the Reserve Component.

The MACV commander proved reluctant to see U.S. troops become involved in what he termed "political cadres," and preferred to leave this work to the U.S. Operations

Mission, the executive arm of the U.S. Agency for International Development in Vietnam.¹² In February of 1962 the U.S. effort in Vietnam was placed under Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), a separate headquarters subordinate, oddly, to the U.S. Navy Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC). At roughly the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the position of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) to deal world-wide with communist "Wars of Liberation" as well as with the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. However, none of this should be interpreted as indicating that the Army had turned to any significant extent from its fixation on Central Europe.

Considerable intellectual confusion reigned throughout the Army at the time, a groping for definitions and doctrine to deal with the new challenge that, beginning at the top with the Kennedy administration, and with the new breed of civilian military theorists, had replaced the Eisenhower military's old "New Look." Soviet premier Nikita Krushchev had blessed the so-called "Wars of Liberation" in the underdeveloped world, and "Counterinsurgency," "pacification," "rural development," "internal development" or "the other war," not to mention Civic Action, Civil Action and Civil Affairs thus enjoyed something of a fashion for a few years among some in the higher ranks. Still, the Army remained in considerable confusion as to the exact definitions of all of these terms.

In 1963 the Army began to take over what came to be arguably the most successful of all its Civil Affairs/Civic Action programs, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). These groups were established among aboriginal tribes of the RVN Central Highlands and elsewhere who had been alienated from Saigon as well as Hanoi. The CIA had established the first of these groups in fortified camps for protection from the VC and to maintain reconnaissance along the Ho Chi Minh trail complex from North Vietnam. Each fighting CIDG camp came under the control of a 12-man U.S. Army Special Forces A Detachment and one Vietnamese detachment of roughly equal number. The SF troopers, usually language and area-qualified and cross-trained in medical, engineering, communications and weapons specialties were almost uniquely fitted for this work, immersing themselves in tribal lore and culture (and occasionally even being inducted into "their" tribe). They organized a wide range of resources to improve the lives of their allies, establishing medical clinics, as well as demonstrating and encouraging better animal husbandry and agriculture practices (The "green revolution" was first tested in CIDG areas.). All of these measures were designed to encourage the tribespeople to resist the blandishments of the VC as well as to recruit the able-bodies into regional military forces. These were no small-scale demonstrations; at its peak the CIDG program numbered more than 50,000 village militia, 10,000 strike force troopers and nearly 4,000 mountain scouts. The CIDGs were quite effective militarily, some were even airborne-trained, and the enemy made special efforts to overrun their camps. The American military command, however, remained uneasy with special operations forces while the GVN wondered what the Americans were doing among a disaffected people whom it regarded as "moi" -- "savages." In the words of a former 5th SF Group commander, the CIDG program was:

A story of teaching the Vietnamese how to shoot, build a farm, care for the sick, or run agent operations. It was working with the religious and ethnic

minorities of Vietnam: the Montagnards, the Cambodians, the Hoa Hoa and the Cao Dai [religious sects]. The program was both praised and reviled by Americans and Vietnamese and was on the verge of being destroyed many times -- not by the Viet Cong, but by its creators, the American command, and by early 1971 it had disappeared from the scene.¹³

Actually, the CIDG program lingered on under ARVN control, losing much of its effectiveness, until the final communist victory in 1975.

By 1964 the Civil Affairs Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations had defined Civic Action (sometimes termed "Military Civic Action") as the employment of primarily indigenous military forces on projects useful to the civil population which would also serve to further the positive image of the military with civilians. (That definition omitted specifying which "military": indigenous or U.S.) The same year, General William Westmoreland, MACV Commander, tried his hand at such definitions, noting that "the term Civic Action...embraces a variety of activities accomplished by both military and civilian agencies to include political as well as humanitarian endeavors." Early the following year, General Westmoreland added that Civil Affairs were subordinate to Civic Action. Westmoreland put this concept into tangible effect in October of 1965 when he wrote that the U.S. Agency for International Development now had "the primary US Civil Affairs responsibility in RVN," and that the involvement of the U.S. Army in CA was to be limited to tactical operations. In brief, Civil Affairs was to be part of the restoration process and Civic Action the developmental effort but, obviously, the two were going to overlap. In fact, the Army Staff officer responsible for Civil Affairs doctrine, citing the continuing confusion over the terms, reversed General Westmoreland's definition and termed Civic Action as just one portion of Civil Affairs!¹⁴ Yet, when the Army began to commit large numbers of troops to South Vietnam in 1965 it was still working on its advisor handbook and was far from having formulated any coherent counterinsurgency doctrine.¹⁵ Furthermore, it appears that many participants in the CA decision-making process at the time, military and civilian, tended to conflate or equate Civil Affairs with Military Government. When, for example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Special Operations, LTG Ray Peers, proposed the introduction of CA teams to assist in pacification at the province level, the U.S. Ambassador, Retired General Maxwell Taylor, successfully protested to the White House these "plans to impose U.S. military government", wanting to know why the civilian agency personnel would be replaced with the "Army civil affairs types operating on the pattern of military occupation?" According to General Peers later, here was lost a "golden opportunity" to cause "a critical review of the organization for pacification in South Vietnam."¹⁶

For both sides the key battleground in this subsistence agrarian society was the countryside. The embattled, centralized highly-bureaucratic government of the RVN at least recognized the problem from the first, but had little to show for its counterinsurgency programs. Its rural *agrovilles*, or "strategic hamlets," or *Chien Thang* ("Will to Victory," expansion of government-controlled areas like an "oil spot," an old French concept) or *Hop Tap* ("Victory", more "oil spot"), "Return to Village" or "New Life" did little more than uproot and alienate the peasants and generate reams of meaningless and misleading data



Civil Affairs/Civic Action Special Forces trooper helps to spread the "Rice Revolution" in the Central Highlands, Vietnam. USASOC History Archives

Hop Tap is notable only in that MACV under this program required U.S. Army advisors to report on security in their provincial responsibilities. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) often did not cooperate in these programs. If anything, many top ARVN commanders, from the traditional elite Mandarin class, often French-educated, were even more remote from the people than their civilian counterparts and lacked the latter's semi-revolutionary commitment to rural change.¹⁷ Although U.S. Army advisors through the MAAG had been assigned to ARVN combat units since the late 1950s and by the early 1960s were being assigned down to the battalion level, their activities were mainly concerned with arranging for U.S. artillery, air, heli-lift, medi-evacuation and logistic support rather than with pacification or Civil Affairs and were handicapped by a mere six-month average tour of duty.¹⁸

The introduction of American large combat units to the Republic of Vietnam in (RVN) 1965 came as that nation faced stark military defeat. The initial U.S. strategy was the defense of ports and airfields, or "enclave" strategy, "an inglorious, static use of U.S. forces in overpopulated areas." that gave the enemy the initiative. The deteriorating security situation soon dictated a more offensive U.S. role, the much more aggressive "Search-and-Destroy," "spoiling operations," and the infamous "body count" system superseded any holding or expansion of enclaves. Pacification was relegated to a secondary position for the next two years. "Civilians, once considered essential for mission success, became obstacles to combat operations, or worse, supporters of the enemy."¹⁹

Still, the summer of 1965 did see the first U.S. Army Civil Affairs units assigned to Vietnam on a regular tour of duty, as compared to the previous TDY tours. However, for political reasons no reserve units were mobilized for Vietnam.²⁰ Recognizing that the care of refugees displaced by U.S. firepower was fast becoming the number one civilian problem in the RVN, MACV requested and received 16 teams.

The first U.S. Army CA unit to serve in the RVN was the 41st CA Company, which, with its 16 accompanying six-man refugee teams, arrived at its base location at Nha Trang in late December of 1965. These teams were highly specialized and staffed by very well qualified personnel, including an O-3 team leader and CA specialist, a medical doctor and medical NCO, one construction officer, a counter-intelligence officer and an interpreter. Each team was placed under the operational control of tactical units and headquarters such as the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, the 3d Marine Amphibious Force, USMC corps-level headquarters and corps-level headquarters in the III Corps Tactical Zone.²¹ The companies consisted of from 50 officers and 90 enlisted men, and 70 officers and 120 enlisted men. They were deployed to provide CA support to a U.S. Army corps and to the III Marine Amphibious Force. Some 80 percent of a company were organized into generalist "platoons" composed of 2-4 officers and 4-6 enlisted men. Generally, these platoons were assigned to support the CORDS programs and each senior province advisor, as well as to each tactical division. Each CA company also maintained a limited number of functional teams to provide guidance and assistance in certain CA functional areas, including refugees, civic action, and CORDS. Their work was not eased by the fact that the companies remained at 15-20 percent understrength. One company reported that over a period of ten months it was actually at a constant average of only 18.5 percent of its authorized officer strength.²²

The 29th Civil Affairs Company arrived at Da Nang in June of 1966, in response to a request from the III Marine Amphibious Force for increased CA support, and remained under the "administrative supervision" of the III MAF G-5, although its six platoons were attached to the six Marine regiments in the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) for tactical CA support. The 29th remained almost totally committed to one mission throughout its tour of duty in Vietnam: refugee relief and rehabilitation. A third U.S. Army CA unit, the 2d CA Company, arrived in the RVN in December of 1966 and assumed control of three refugee teams from the 41st CA Company operating in III CTZ. The independent 51st CA Platoon arrived in October of 1967 and one year later three more similar units, the 52d, 53d and 54th, CA Platoons reached I CTZ. Finally, in December of that year, three more platoons from the 2d CA Company arrived in country. The authorized strength of each company varied between 50-70 officers and 90-120 enlisted persons. Some 80 percent of the companies' personnel were organized into generalist "platoons" composed of 2-4 officers and 4-6 enlisted personnel. A platoon was usually assigned to provide CA support to the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, founded as late as May 1967. The companies remained chronically understrength by 15-20 percent and often lacked qualified replacements. The 97th CA Group on Okinawa also sent personnel to Vietnam on TDY for various missions.²³

As noted, the U.S. Army CA effort operated primarily at the tactical level, presumably in consonance with U.S. government policy emphasizing that, at least in the long run, "this is their [i.e. RVN's] war." Indeed, General Westmoreland's 1966 proposal for increasing the U.S. Army's involvement in pacification was turned down by President Lyndon Johnson's advisers on the grounds that such increased involvement would encourage the GVN and ARVN to sit back and let the U.S. do the job, to the long-term detriment of national development.²⁴ Nonetheless, throughout the war, the initiative seemed to lie always with the Americans. They had the substantial staffs, with a wide variety of qualified specialists, and could concentrate on the civil problem at hand.²⁵

Thus, although the total U.S. pacification effort in Vietnam was enormous, surpassing in extent and in depth even Civil Affairs in Italy during World War II, the execution of the U.S. RVN CA mission was confined primarily to the field and was thus greatly overshadowed by the civilian programs of USAID/USOM, CORDS and the RVN's own programs. Further, the efforts of the specific CA were often obscured by the "extra-duty" Civic Action programs of U.S. Army tactical units. For example, U.S. Army Engineers embarked upon major programs of rebuilding or constructing dispensaries, schools, hospitals, orphanages, roads, water and electrical supply systems, etc. The rebuilding of roads specifically for the movement of heavy U.S. Army and Allied equipment, of course, aided the pacification program, easing civilian travel. U.S. Army medical personnel conducted a separate medical Civil Affairs program throughout the RVN, easily one of the most popular civilian programs of the war. G-5 officers of each U.S. tactical unit were specifically responsible for dealing with the civilian population.


The difficulties attendant to such efforts were well illustrated by a sawmill demonstration project of 1966. A Marine Gunnery Sergeant Civic Action team leader, living among the people of Kim Lien, near Da Nhang (population c. 1650), having already helped with the construction of a school, a clinic and a playground, would certainly seem to

have understood the needs of his area. (He was also apparently successful in "winning hearts and minds"; three local women had already proposed marriage.) Noting that some 60 percent of the local workers were engaged in logging, GYSGT Oakley requested a 29th team to erect a local sawmill. The villagers seemed favorable to the project, which was then worked up the chain of RVN authority to the hamlet chief, the village chief, the sub-sector advisor and the district chief. Then it was discovered that an official of the World Relief Organization had just the machine, which he wished to demonstrate in the Da Nhang area and which had already been operated by Special Forces troops when it had first been set up in country. Just prior to the first Kim Lien demonstration, it was discovered that a critical part was missing. The 7th Engineer Battalion was called in for a rush job and the part was machined from stock steel.

Now, with the sawmill up and running, the Americans discovered the true state of affairs in Kim Lien. Although many of its people indeed logged the forests they did not own the trees, which were in the possession of a Da Nhang lumbering syndicate which hired the people to do most of the cutting. Nonetheless, the project was still considered worthwhile simply to show the people the benefits of owning their own sawmill. Due to continuing mechanical difficulties, however, the sawmill demonstration had to be canceled.²⁶

Tangible progress could be recorded by the 29th CA Company, however, as a new brick factory came on line, a well and latrine at the Sa Huynh Maternity/Dispensary facility progressed and a school was reconstructed with the help of a Vietnamese youth group. The 29th's 6th AA Platoon at that time (mid-August 1968) had the following fairly typical projects in hand: a three classroom school (Khuong Nhon), two pig projects (Khuong My), a hamlet headquarters dispensary (An Tay), another dispensary /information office (Khuong Binh), a market place (Khuong Heip), a two classroom school (An Chau) and a school latrine (Dong Yen). A year later, the platoon found itself more involved in refugee relief and resettlement, working with the Quang Tin CORDS agricultural advisor, the 9th platoon Agricultural Coordinator and the Quang Tin Vietnamese Agriculture Service. It provided swine breeding programs, shipped food and lumber to Tam Ky for the Quang Tin Refugee Resettlement Program, surveyed three refugee camps (and briefed the Americal's G-5 and S-5 on the survey team mission and operations), conducted a MEDCAP in Ba To District, secured the names of three local amputees in the Duc Pho district to forward to the Quang Ngai City prosthetic center and distributed 4,000 health leaflets for the Vietnamese Information Service. The unit also encouraged education in the district by teaching English language classes, attending graduation ceremonies and buying pens to distribute at those ceremonies.²⁷

Also by this time, the MATA course devoted no less than one-fourth of its course hours to Civil Action instruction.²⁸ Still, the American Army's mission was that of combat and most officers considered even military advising of the ARVN a "sideshow" that would do nothing for their careers.²⁹ Thus the Army's propensity for large-scale operations like MANHATTAN, CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY, in which tactical units often seemed to do little more than temporarily clear an area, create thousands of refugees and then quit the location, leaving CA teams to pick up the pieces.³⁰



CA trooper oversees rebuilding of war-devastated housing, Vietnam, c. 1967. Signal Corps, National Archives

Furthermore, the actions of U.S. tactical troops on the move would so often negate "hearts and minds" CA efforts. The commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command recalled in 1993 patrolling with the Marines in the countryside and burning down villages where troops had been fired on or where an armored personnel carrier had hit a mine. "They would flail out in every direction at the civilian populace."³¹

By this time the tiny CA teams, when not policing up after main-force search-and-destroy operations, were moving from "restoration" projects into something closer to long-range "development" concerns. The new orientation emphasized construction of schools, hospitals, bridges, wells, etc., agricultural improvements and public health initiatives, more often than not on their own. For example, the 41st CA Company after the Tet offensive of 1968, shifted its emphasis from providing relief to refugees to establishing viable communities for them. In fact, LTG Peers, now Commanding General of I Field Force, actually declared to a meeting of CA personnel that the official mission of the 41st: "to supply [Free World Forces] in Civic Action/Civil Affairs activities... [and] to minimize the impact of the war upon the civilian population" was not "very appealing." Instead LTG Peers urged that CA take up the task of "building a society," specifying that this would include "administrative establishments, the economy, the sociology, the education and all of the things that really go into making up a living society." (A vision of what in the 1990s would be termed "nation building" --and a controversial undertaking.) 41st CA troopers found themselves distributing blacksmith kits, setting up looms in a village and, of all things, a crossbow industry at Song Mao, Binh Thuan Province. The villagers were having difficulty in meeting the American demand for crossbows.³²

In most cases, in accordance with prevailing doctrine, U.S. tactical units used their supporting CA teams or platoons to initiate Civic Action projects in coordination with the appropriate GVN administrators and their U.S. advisors as well as local leaders. In July of 1968, the 29th CA Company reported that it had transitioned from "a grass roots approach" in which the unit was "doing work," to that of "coordinator and catalyst," and in January 1969 noted a trend to "broader Civil Affairs functions and greater GVN participation."³³ The military units were not supposed to carry out this work themselves, but rather to facilitate it. Interestingly, this was also ARVN CA doctrine. Tactical commanders did tend to misuse their CA platoons, however. According to the 21st commander in 1970, many tactical commanders looked upon the CA platoons as what he termed "goody passers," and often lacked any overall scheme for their CA projects.³⁴

The 2d CA Company deployed ten platoons to support Allied cross-border operations into Cambodia in early 1970, attached to the brigade and divisional headquarters of the U.S. 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. They provided direct assistance to the large number of Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees displaced by these operations. Nonetheless, by the following year the company noted that it had ceased all Civic Action support and coordination with U.S. military units and was devoting its energies and resources entirely to GVN agencies and their advisors.³⁵ Even though Civil Affairs was a secondary priority in the first three years of the American buildup in Vietnam, the presence of U.S. combat forces did enable the GVN to devote more resources to pacification. The GVN increased its territorial forces, and in January of

1966 instituted a new program, the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RD), transforming youthful cadre into anti-communist revolutionaries for social change. RD cadres were specifically targeted by the VC and their casualties approached those of the ARVN. They were not exempt from the ARVN draft and many were misassigned away from their provinces of origin. Not surprisingly, the RD suffered heavy desertion rates.

The situation was hardly better within the territorial Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF), which throughout the conflict remained weak and under-gunned compared to their enemies. Once they became part of the ARVN the Americans saw to it that these units were strengthened and they finally represented about 50 percent of the military forces of the RVN, even receiving organic artillery and armored car support. The RFs were the provincial and district main force, while the PFs assumed that role at the village and hamlet levels. However, the RF/PFs remained plagued by "ghost" soldiers (killed or deserted but still carried on the rolls and their pay collected by someone), other forms of corruption as well as intimidation by local worthies, a shortage of trained NCOs and specialists and, like the RD cadres, were a prime target of the enemy. In many cases the regular forces of the ARVN had to be called upon to restore or even maintain local security.³⁶

At the provincial level, the U.S. Army advisors now provided advice and assistance over an enormous range of problems, including public works, administration of relief to refugees, public health and medical services, public administration, transport, training and equipping of police, clothing and housing for RF/PFs, schools and training of teachers, economic affairs and new industries and youth and women's programs. MACV-controlled sub-RF/PF sector teams carried out generally the same duties at below-provincial levels and evaluated the pacification program overall. One major, albeit intangible, problem that faced the U.S. pacification effort in Vietnam was the fact that few Americans at the time had a farm background, fewer still had any experience in working with peasants and almost none in getting shot at while doing so.³⁷

The U.S./GVN combined pacification effort can be said to have truly become a priority second only to the military effort after the Honolulu Conference of top-level U.S. and Vietnamese policy-makers in February of 1965. Unfortunately, agreement did not necessarily translate into action, and, in fact, many pacification officers seemed to feel that by various organization and reorganization schemes they had discharged their mission.

Lasting and tangible progress could not be noted until well after the early spring of 1967 when all the various civilian and military components of the American pacification effort were horizontally and vertically integrated under a single manager and office, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support --CORDS, a civilian and military organization with lines of control and communication extending from the American mission in Saigon down to the district level, the lowest echelon for the U.S. advisory program. As an indication of pacification's priority in the new scheme of things, the chief of CORDS, Mr. Robert Komer ("Blowtorch Bob"), a former Special Assistant to President Johnson, was given ambassadorial and three-star general status. Komer's mission was one of "supervising the formulation and execution of all plans, policies, and programs, military and civilian, which support the government's Revolutionary Development program and related programs." He served as deputy to Westmoreland. The Army now had a specified mission of pacification. CORDS, uniquely, integrated its civilians into the military chain of

command; civilians wrote the evaluations of the officers under them, while officers evaluated their Foreign Service subordinates. The GVN established a parallel structure by activating the Central Pacification and Development Council in Saigon, supported by similar councils in the provinces. Between 1962 and 1972, fully one-half of the rapidly-expanding armed forces of the RVN came to be composed of territorial forces, the mainstay of the GVN pacification program. Territorial forces reached a total of nearly 4 million by 1970.³⁸

The Americans by 1968 were committed to pacification, to the "other war." However, this was not the U.S. Army's first priority, however. Even during the years of General Westmoreland's successor, General Creighton Abrams and his "one war" strategy, U.S. artillery support alone was costing five times as much as the territorial forces. American forces continued large-scale search-and-destroy operations. Further:

To some commanders, pacification was merely a variant of Civic Action: digging wells, repairing damaged buildings, distributing rice, and the like. It was window dressing, and these commanders concentrated on using firepower to wear down enemy forces. At any rate, within two years after the establishment ofCORDS, even Civil Affairs personnel were thinking of disengagement.³⁹

The increasing American presence brought with it also a near-mania for statistics, for the quantification of pacification and Civil Affairs. Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara pressed for ever more detailed and quantified information, demanding a flood of graphs, statistics and indexes as well as lengthy reports. Officials in Washington became sated on statistics but still undernourished in their understanding of the meaning of this information.⁴⁰ With such a volume of material flowing back to the U.S., one can also wonder just how much of this material was read even superficially by its recipients.

The most lasting of all pacification/Civil Affairs programs in Vietnam was that of land reform, the success of which was marred only by the fact that it came so late. The VC had made "land to the tiller," co-equal with the ending of "imperialism" and "feudalism" as the foundation of their revolution, and had, indeed, carried out their own ad hoc land redistribution in the field wherever they had retained control and where the landlords had decamped. Under U.S. prodding, the Ngo Din Diem regime had embarked, very slowly, on a rent reduction, land reform and redistribution program in 1955. This initiative basically had gotten nowhere by 1968. Only after the failure of the Tet offensive had demonstrated how tenuous the hold of the VC really was on the countryside (in contradiction to what so many journalists were telling the world) that the U.S. and to some extent the GVN refocused on the importance of land reform. The result, the "Land to the Tiller" act of March 1970, would eventually end land tenancy for some one million RVN peasants. In a sense, this enactment simply legalized what the communists had done in the countryside over the years. It did "steal the thunder" of the enemy, however, and probably had much to do with the fact that the communist could never again rely on their revered "General Uprising" to conquer the South.⁴¹ In fact, by 1971, U.S. Army CA activities in the field had been turned over for the most part to civilian RVN agencies, changing the

mission of such tactical CA units as the 2d CA Company, "to providing Civil Affairs advice and assistance to military advisory teams and to GVN officials and organizations."⁴²

For all the good works of Army Civil Affairs, it has also to be noted that the very presence of the Americans had a negative effect on many areas of the fragile Vietnamese society and infrastructure. One of the most far-reaching and lasting impacts of the American presence was the inflation ignited by the free-spending habits of American soldiers, any one of whom could lay out twice as much on a bracelet for his girlfriend as the amount a refugee family was allotted to build a new house. Rentals around U.S. units skyrocketed, creating refugees of the Americans' own making. Gigantic Army semi-trailers, their drivers perched high and oblivious in their cabs, snarled into knots Saigon's already frenetic traffic. In the countryside, that key to the nation and the area benefiting the least from American cash infusions, U.S. troops would often bivouac in sacred graveyards, parking their vehicles over tombs, knocking about houses, chewing up fields, attracting "gin mills" and brothels and often, literally, shaking a land and a people about which they knew little and all too frequently cared even less.⁴³ The communist media and those ill-disposed to the American presence in Vietnam were all too glad to fix upon this unhappy impact as another stick with which to beat the "imperialist" Americans.

One of the more enduring paradoxes of the Vietnam War is the fact that just as the U.S. Army was becoming accustomed to think more in terms of "the other war," and to pay more than simply lip service to the idea of "winning hearts and minds", the enemy forsook his own doctrine ("Political activities are more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda.", General Vo Nguyen Giap⁴⁴) and swiftly conquered South Vietnam with a conventional, armored-tipped, *blitzkrieg* from the north, just as North Korea had invaded South Korea a quarter of a century before. The U.S. Army basically turned its back (probably gratefully) on such matters as Civil Affairs, insurgency and counterinsurgency and prepared again to meet the Warsaw Pact armored hordes on the plains of Central Europe.⁴⁵

From about 1961 on it would have been difficult to find any American military officer in South Vietnam who would not have paid at least lip-service to the necessity for more than military action to defeat the communists, and U.S. civilians recognized the need for military action. The long-lasting problem remained primarily one of coordination. In the words of an early CA fact-finding team:

And, one can talk to civilians at all levels in Vietnam who will quickly admit that "military requirements must be met." Similarly, military officers will say, "this situation demands a departure from some of our traditional tactics. I feel that the civilian aspects of every operation require my personal attention." But, in the current of day-to-day events, there is a great tendency to segregate responsibilities into neat piles - "that is a military job," and "this one over here is a USOM responsibility," or JUSPAO [Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office] handles that." Unhappily, there is even an amount of what might be called parochialism, almost a "don't you delve into my military affairs and I won't bother your civilian ones," and vice versa.⁴⁶

As for the primary problem of refugee relief, USAID carried the main responsibility; there was no comprehensive U.S. Army policy for dealing with displaced persons. Still, conventional Army G-5s and S-5s and sector and district advisors found themselves involved in general Civil Affairs responsibilities that certainly included refugee relief. Many CA teams at one time or another found themselves competing with district and provincial advisory teams.⁴⁷ This lack of coordination, of course, extended to America's GVN ally. The U.S. Army's small CA teams often found themselves caught between these conflicting mission assumptions and frequently under-employed.⁴⁸

The Americans had basically to "take over" the war in 1965-1966 to prevent a Government of [South] Viet Nam (GVN) defeat, thus postponing the necessary emphasis on pacification. The GVN came to rely excessively on the Americans for what it wanted, the syndrome of "The tyranny of the weak." ("Give us what we want or we will collapse.") This attitude was not necessarily a result of Vietnamese venality. In the words of one contemporary authority:

The officials of the host country are more often than not harassed, underpaid, and bewildered in the face of new problems. If they cannot avoid frequent confrontations with eager, demanding American counterparts, they tend to resort to supine acquiescence (which is rarely translated into action), stone walling, dissembling, or playing one American official against another. We have learned, or should have learned in Vietnam, the futility of trying to cajole local officials into pressing forward with American-sponsored programs that are not actively supported by their own government.

The same authority concluded that, as a result, "American aid became virtually unconditional."⁴⁹

Then, with some sterling exceptions, there was a general lackadaisicalness and lack of initiative up and down the ARVN chain of command. The 29th CA Company's summary of activities for 10 December 1966 spoke of having to "roust" the Assistant District Chief, in the absence of the District Chief, from District Headquarters "and prod him into action" when some 1600 refugees flocked into Thuong Duc as a result of U.S. Special Forces operations. This official offered no general guidance or direction to the refugees and had no medical personnel either on hand or on order. A Special Forces doctor was fortunately available to deal with the most seriously injured. The following day "was Sunday [and] most [officials] were still in bed when we arrived to discuss the matter at 0930." (!) The District Chief still had not arrived and his aforementioned assistant did "not appear to have activities organized and coordinated." The injured refugees (mostly burn cases, who must have suffered agonies) were still not medevaced although the local Public Health official claimed that he had requested this service. CA officers soon discovered that no such evacuation had been requested and went ahead and did it themselves.⁵⁰

Two years later, the situation was not markedly improved for the 54th Platoon of the 29th, which claimed that "Apparently, there is a high degree of administrative ignorance, incompetency, lackadaisicalness, or [un?]concern by GVN officials, and there [sic.] U.S. advisors" in Quang Tri.⁵¹ GVN officials and officers, primarily concerned with winning

the war, sometimes pointed out that many U.S. alternatives to the military struggle against the communist were all very well and good, but they first had a war to win. These same officials knew that they could (and in the end often did) find themselves in some "reeducation camp" for the next decade or so. The Americans, on the other hand, could simply go home if things fell apart, somewhat chagrined perhaps, but alive and well.

There was a brief moment in 1966 when most of the responsibility for the Vietnam pacification effort was indeed centered in one office, in the White House under Robert Komer. In that year only, the vast pacification effort could be controlled from one office headed by a most energetic and persuasive chief. When Komer went to Saigon the following year, however, he took that office, at least in theory, with him. Back in Washington, the pacification effort, minus "Blowtorch Bob," withered and remained divided between itself and Saigon.⁵²

The major internal problem faced by U.S. Army Civil Affairs units in Vietnam was one of personnel, even though the three CA companies only required 454 personnel, including 165 officers. The iniquitous one-year tour of duty, the absence of any reserve unit call-up and the demands of other units for skilled manpower made even these modest personnel requirements hard to fill with quality troops. Two of the companies had to inactivate their public health teams for up to two years. Replacements were hard enough to find and their qualifications were often weak when they arrived. The 2d reported that only two of its 19 platoon commanders had received Civil Affairs training and admitted candidly that, due to their lack of experience and training, a "few [of its officers] are relatively successful but most are inadequate."

The companies and platoons were also often mis-used, becoming involved as a result of command pressure (more often than not coming from CORDS) or in the absence of GVN initiative, in more elaborate Civic Action projects that were more in the provenance of GVN local government. And, as noted, some higher-ranking Army officers saw CA as a means to "build anew" the entire Republic of Vietnam. This in spite of a U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV) instructional letter of 17 November 1968 specifying that CA personnel were no longer to be GVN advisors and that their priority mission was not Civic Action but support of tactical units, for which they were designed in the first place. Civic Action should remain a secondary mission.⁵³

Although it can hardly be said that everything the United States did to pacify South Vietnam was too little, almost all of it was too late. If one were to assess blame for this lateness and for the resultant fall of the Republic of Vietnam in spite of America's enormous civil and military effort, one cannot blame too harshly the U.S. Army's concentration on search-and-destroy operations during the big buildup of the mid 1960s. The country looked as though it might collapse militarily even as U.S. advisors dug wells and built schools. As the U.S. and the GVN retrieved the military situation they did then come to emphasize more emphatically pacification/Civil Affairs/Civic Action. Looking at the case from an historical perspective, probably most blame should attach instead to the earliest U.S. military missions to South Vietnam, that "refought the last war" in the face of a very obvious insurgency. They ignored the contemporary examples of Malaya and the Philippines and their lessons of the necessity to bind the people to their government. Instead, they unimaginatively prepared the ARVN to repel a conventional strike from the

North while before their very eyes the GVN was internally bleeding to near-death from a thousand cuts. The fact that the GVN finally did collapse a decade or so later in the face of a blitzkrieg from the North hardly mitigates their culpability.

¹A relatively unbiased account of the U.S. Dominican intervention is found in the Center for Strategic Studies (Georgetown University), *Dominican Action – 1965: Intervention or Cooperation?* (Washington: July 1966).

²MAJ B. McCune, Commander, 95th CA Group, "Lessons Learned re: Preparation for CA Unit Deployment to USARPAC," 11 February 1966, USASOC History Archives.

³McCune, "Lessons Learned," 15-18, 22; U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, "Peace Keeping in the Dominican Republic (Fort Gordon, Georgia: November 1967), passim.

⁴Lesson plans "Case Study of Civil Affairs Operations: Low-Intensity Conflict" (Fort Bragg, NC: October 1981) and attached materials, USASOC History Archives; and Lawrence A. Yates, *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966* (Leavenworth Papers, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 1988), 133-136. Engineer quotation from *ibid.*, 133.

⁵Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: 1995) 13; Chester L. Cooper, et al, *The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam*, vol. 2, *Elements of Pacification*, Institute for Defense Analyses (Arlington, Virginia: March 1972), 36-37, 115.

⁶*Ibid.*, 15, 109-111; Tran Dinh Tho, *Pacification*, Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washington: 1984 reprint), 9. Wolf Ladejinski, "Agrarian Reform in Vietnam," in Wesley R. Fishel, ed., *Problems of Freedom: South Vietnam Since Independence* (New York: 1961). In the boilerplate of a roughly contemporary Vietnamese communist document: "The Vietnamese Revolution in the South marches forward toward the General Uprising... To seize power through the General Uprising means utilizing the strength of the people of South Vietnam as a principal medium to overthrow the imperialist and feudal ruling clique and set up the people's revolutionary government." Aside from expelling the "imperialist and feudal" Saigon regime, this means land reform. Douglas Pike, *War, Peace, and the Viet Cong* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1969), 11-13.

⁷Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs, "Summary of Major Events and Problems... 1 July 1960 - 30 June 1961," U.S. Army Center of Military History Archives (Washington: 1961), 8-9; Jeffrey Clarke, "A Survey History of Civil Affairs Units and Teams in South Vietnam, 1960-1971," U.S. Army Center of Military History [Washington 1974], 5. Early CA leadership interest in CA in the contemporary counterinsurgency climate can be seen in the article by the Commandant of the Army Civil Affairs School, COL William R. Swarm, "Mission and Capability of Civil Affairs in Counterinsurgency," *Current Civil Affairs Trends* (Fort Gordon, Georgia: May 1962). For an early account of CA in Vietnam, see Edwin Lansdale, "Civic Activities of the Military, Southeast Asia," in *Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program*. 1959.

⁸De Pauw, 37-38.

⁹J. W. De Pauw, "U.S. Military Civic Action and Civil Affairs in Vietnam, 1962-1966," paper read before 1988 Military History Exchange, 5-12 December, Tokyo, 23.

¹⁰James W. Dunn, "Province Advisers in Vietnam, 1952-1965," in Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts* (New York, Oxford, etc.: 1982), 13.

¹¹Cooper, et al., vol. 2, 281-282. One source plausibly claims that Special Forces "liberally borrowed... CA ideas and techniques" in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but adduces no documentation. (the Kyres, 145).

¹²Clarke, "Survey," 6-9.

¹³For the CIDG program see U.S. Joint Publications, Research Service, "Montagnard Tribes of South Vietnamese Highlands" (Saigon: September 1961, reissued July 1962); "The U.S. Special Forces CIDG Mission in Vietnam" (U), Special Operations Research Office, The American University (Washington: November 1964), SECRET (Info used is unclassified.); "U.S. Army Special Operations Under the Civil Irregular Defense Groups Program in Vietnam, 1961-64," Research Analysis Corporation Technical Memorandum RAC-T-477 (McLean, Virginia: 1966); R. A. Shakleton, *Village Defense: Initial Special Forces Operations in Vietnam* (New York: 1977); F. A. Stires, *The U.S. Special Forces CIDG Mission in Vietnam: A Preliminary Case Study in Counterpart and Civil-Military Relationships* Special Operations Research Office (Washington: 1964); Cao Van Vien, et. Al, *The U.S. Advisor*, Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washington: 1983); Clark, 69-74; Francis Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-71*, Vietnam Studies, Department of the Army (Washington: 1972); Shelby Stanton, *Green Berets at War* (New York: 1985); Stanton, *Special Forces at War: An Illustrated History, South East Asia, 1957-1975* (Charlottesville: 1990); C. S. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The Story of the U.S. Army Special Forces* (Novato, California: 1983). Quotation from R. Rheault, "The Special Forces and the CIDG Program," in Scott Thompson and D. D. Frizzel, *The Lessons of Vietnam*. (New York: 1983, 1984), 247. Simpson has nearly the identical quotation, 101-102. One authority argues that the very success of CIDG against the guerrillas impelled the North Vietnamese to forward their regular troops into South Vietnam., R. C. Barnes, "Civil Affairs a LIC Priority," *Military Review* (September 1988), 44.

¹⁴HQ, U.S. Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV) *Military Operations: Civil Affairs Handbook*, Pamphlet No. 524-5 ([Saigon]: 24 November 1970), 28.

¹⁵Hunt, 19-20.

¹⁶William R. Berkman, "Civil Affairs in Vietnam," U.S. Army War College thesis (28 December 1973), 4-7. (quotation on p. 7). See Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder: 1997); De Pauw, 41-42.

¹⁷Tho, 193-194; Dunn, 14-17; Hunt, 27-28; Cooper, et al., vol. 2, 39-41, vol. 3, 224-247. In the field, the ARVN situation was more positive; the average service experience of an ARVN officer was twelve years compared to that of his U.S. Army counterpart of about one-half that by 1970. *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁸Cooper, et al, vol. 2, 74. See commander's report in *The Twenty Niner* for 25 May 1969, noting that in the previous six months, 50 percent of the company had rotated out., USASOC History Archives.

¹⁹William Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968)*, USMACV (Washington: 1969), 100; *ibid.*, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: 1976), 130. Cooper, et al, vol. 2, 50-52, vol. 3, 249-250. It should be noted that the president's "inner circle": Dean Rusk, Robert MacNamara, the brilliant Bundy brothers had their doubts about

Westmoreland's offensive strategy, but were reluctant to override the general., Hunt, 35. Quotation from Barnes, 44.

²⁰Berkman, 4; De Pauw, 43. The "sophisticated/brilliant" U.S. Presidential advisers who managed this war in cold blood believed that they had learned a "lesson" from the Korean War: calling up Reserve units, with their often politically-involved personnel would prove disastrous at the polls. That there was no documentation for this belief did not weaken its hold.

²¹See records of HQ, 41st CA Company, "History of the 41st Civil Affairs Company, 1965," "A History of the 41st Civil Affairs Company, 1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966," "Deployment of CA Teams as of 19 May 1967," RG 472, box No. 9, "67-68" folder; 41 CA Company operational reports for July 1969, DTIC Technical Report, USASOC Historical Archives.

²²De Pauw, 45.

²³Thomas W. Scoville, *Reorganizing for Pacification Support*, U.S. Army Center of Military History Washington: 1982), 49, 53-54; Clarke, "Survey," 12, 22; John Urbanchuk, John, "Employment of the 29th Civil Affairs Company in the Republic of Vietnam - 1969," paper for Civil Affairs Advanced Course, Correspondence Option, 1976; De Pauw, 43. Records and reports of the 29th are available in the USASOC History Archives for 1966-1968; also some 1966-1968 records and reports from the 41st Berkman, 11.

²⁴Hunt, 61.

²⁵Tho, 85.

²⁶29th CA Company, 3d Platoon (CPT P. E. Dougherty, Commanding) "Special Report No. __, "Sawmill Demonstration at Kim Lien," n.d. [1966], RG 472, box No. 9, folder "3d Platoon." For a good overview of RVN's pacification organization in the later years of the war see trans. "SOP for the Pacification and Development Council of the Republic of Vietnam," n.d., and covering memo by William E. Colby, 8 July 1969, USASOC History Archives.

²⁷29th Civil Affairs Company, "Periodic Civil Affairs Report," 15 August 1968; 28 August 1969, USASOC Historical Archives. The 29th also drew up surveys of the labor supply and health conditions in I Corps: 29th CA Company, "Labor Study, I Corps, 1 May 1967" and "Public Health Study, I Corps, South Vietnam, 1 Dec 1966," copies in USASOC Archives. See also *The Twenty Niner* (newsletter of the company), selected issues, USASOC History Archives.

²⁸De Pauw, 24. Hugh Hanning's influential book, *The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces* also was published in 1967. (New York).

²⁹Hunt, 46-47, 59; Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam: 1964-1968, Ground Operations*, Appendix E, 239; Tho, 63-65. The Secretary of the Army made heroic attempts to change this situation and this perception, but to little lasting avail. The *Christian Science Monitor* concluded in 1970 that "Young officers of the sort one expects to have a great future...generally shun advisory duty.", quoted in Hunt, 270-271.

³⁰Clarke, "Survey," 15-16.

- ³¹Oral interview, BG Donald F. Campbell, with LTC McGrew, Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, 9 January, 1993, 52.
- ³²41st CA Company, "After Action Report," 4 October 1968, RG 472, box 9; also *ibid.* for period ending 31 October 1969, and for 4 November 1969, USASOC History Archives. The 41st received a Meritorious Unit Citation for 1968, GO No. 45 (16 July 1969).
- ³³Clarke, "Survey," 24.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*, 16-17, 25.
- ³⁵*Ibid.*, 27, 28; Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 2d CA Company, period ending 30 April 1971, USASOC History Archives.
- ³⁶Hunt, 39; Tho, 175-179; Cooper, et al., vol. 3, 250-256; Tho, 105.
- ³⁷H. R. Livingston, "Report on Civil Affairs Team Trip to Vietnam 2 Aug - 14 Oct 1965," Civil Affairs Directorate, DCSOPS (Washington: 1 December 1965). 19-23. See also U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, *An Investigation of the U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Program in Vietnam*, 42d Report, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (12 October 1966).
- ³⁸Cooper, et al, vol. 3, 259-262; Hunt, 86-90; Tho, 56-63, 167.
- ³⁹Hunt, 278.
- ⁴⁰Cooper, et al, vol. 1, p. 25, vol. 2, 191-235. MacNamara was not alone. One Vietnamese authority noted "the tendency of substituting statistical results for true achievements." in the GVN", and concluded that "The biggest shortcoming in pacification, aside from the shortage of forces, was the artificiality of its reporting." Tho, 162, 186.
- ⁴¹Ladejinsky; Roy L. Prosterman, "Land Reform in Vietnam," *Current History* (December 1969); J. Price Gittinger, J. D. Montgomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia* (New York: 1962); Jeffrey Race, "The Battle Over Land," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (20 August 1970); Montgomery, "Land Reform in Vietnam," *Orbis* (Spring 1968); William Bredo, "Agrarian Reform in Vietnam: Vietcong and Government of Vietnam Strategies in Conflict," *Asian Survey* (August 1970); F. Starnes, "Bowling to Revolution," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (2 July 1970); Roy L. Prosterman, "Land-to-the-Tiller" in South Vietnam," *Asian Survey* (August 1970); MacDonald Salter, "Land Reform in South Vietnam," *ibid.* (August 1970); U.S. Army Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, for Department of State, *Land Reform Vietnam: A Program to Speed Land Distribution* (Washington: March 1969); Tho, 140-144; Hunt, 263-265. Montgomery, "Land Reform and Political Development: Prospects in Vietnam," draft, USAID Office of Agriculture (August 1967); R. V. Russell, "Soldiers and the Land to the Tiller Program in Military Region 1 of Vietnam," Control Data Corporation (December 1971). For a critique of "Land-to-the-Tiller," see G. Kolko, *Anatomy of a War* (New York: 1994), 389-393, a prime example of the "America-Was-Always-Wrong-in-Vietnam and everywhere else" *claque*.
- ⁴²2d Civil Affairs Company, Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 18 May 1971, USASOC History Archives.
- ⁴³Livingston report, 80-85.
- ⁴⁴*People's War People's Army*. (New York: 1962), 55, 79.
- ⁴⁵The Kyres rightly date the reaction against CA (and Special Forces) to the later 1960s:

But when it became obvious that success in Vietnam would require a much wider commitment of conventional ground troops, the Green Beret lost much of its prestige and influence. The reaction in military circles seemed directed as much against the idea of elitism itself as it was against the individuals who had championed the Special Forces concept. As related to Civil Affairs the reaction meant that many officers and civilian officials who had been outspoken advocates of specialization and of their own separate branch became less vocal and in several cases actually reversed their positions. Martin and Joan Kyre, *Military Occupation and National Security* (Washington: 1968), 145.

⁴⁶Livingston report, 24.

⁴⁷Clarke, "Survey," 21.

⁴⁸Ibid, 11-12.

⁴⁹Cooper, et al, vol. 1, pp. 34-35, 32.

⁵⁰Memo, from Chief, DP Team, to Commanding Officer, 29th CA Company, Subject: "Thuong Duc Operation," 13 December 1966, RG 472, box No. 5, "Periodic Reports" folder.

⁵¹54th AA Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Company, Periodic Civil Affairs Report, 1-31 January 1969, RG 472, box No. 3, folder "Op Rpt, period ending 30 April 69."

⁵²Cooper, et al, vol. 1, 22.

⁵³Clarke, 29-31. For general histories of U.S. CA/Pacification in South Vietnam, including U.S. Army efforts, see Tran Dinh Tho, *Pacification*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Indochina Monographs (Washington: c. 1977, 1984), 56-74; R. A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder, Colorado: 1995) and Hunt, "Strategies at War: Pacification and Attrition in Vietnam," in Hunt and Richard H. Schult, Jr., *Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts* (New York, etc.: 1982).

XII

URGENT FURY AND JUST CAUSE

"So we busted the locks off the doors, got the medical supplies out, and distributed them down to the clinics." (96th CA Battalion trooper in Panama)

One positive and lasting development of the Vietnam years was the transfer of the Civil Affairs School from Fort Gordon, Georgia to Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 1972 as a part of the Institute for Military Assistance (later the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School). This move put Civil Affairs back again into the SOF mainstream, consolidating all Army agencies concerned with civil governments and local populations, and providing an officially-designated, centralized institution with which all CA personnel could identify.¹ Yet, there was seemingly little or no further use for the once-fashionable doctrines of "counterinsurgency" or "low-intensity conflict" that now reeked of Vietnam and thus were best forgotten. For the U.S. Army the focus was back on Central Europe.²

Europe was one potential battlefield that the Army realized would undoubtedly be "cluttered" with civilians who would need to be removed from the area of operations and their sufferings alleviated. Many CA units were now oriented to providing liaison and coordination for host nation support with NATO Europe. Further, the CA community itself was one of the few in the U.S. military during those years that continued to pay attention to low-intensity conflict. Nonetheless, support within the Army in general for CA was minor and armor or even transportation commanded a much higher priority. Gladly blotting out the Vietnam experience, military planners thought almost solely in terms of Military Government and reasoned that because the United States had no plans to occupy any other nation in the foreseeable future, there was really no need for any emphasis on Civil Affairs. If civilians happened to be in the field, well, military police could handle them. The reality of U.S. military operations in the next decade and a half would certainly destroy those assumptions.

Reserve Civil Affairs, which comprised some 96 percent of Army CA by the end of the 1980s, hardly played a role in those years.³ In fact, an Army-commissioned study even inquired, under the chapter heading "Pruning Non-essentials":

Should 7,000 reservists continue to be trained to govern occupied nations? Is there a need for those trained in the administration of art, archives, and monuments to preserve the culture of occupied territories?

The study concluded that some 99 percent of the total Army Civil Affairs assets "would be readily obtainable from the Civilian labor force after mobilization began." Just how and where was not explained nor how the Army would compensate for the lost training and experience of its CA Reservists if it relied on those "readily obtainable" civilians.⁴ Not surprisingly, a CA officer could plaintively write in *Army* magazine "Whatever Happened to Civil Affairs?"⁵

But with the 1980s came the Reagan military buildup and the revitalization of the U.S. Army, SOF in general and Civil Affairs.⁶ The beginnings can be dated to 1980. In the wake of the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt in April of that year it became obvious that the U.S. had to plan for a wider "spectrum of conflict" than that of a conventional or nuclear clash with the Soviet Union in Central Europe. With the support of Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer, a new SOF command and control headquarters, 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) was activated at Fort Bragg in 1982. 1st SOCOM eventually grew to control the SF groups, the 4th Psychological Operations Group, the Ranger Battalions and the 96th CA Battalion. The 96th had been reactivated in 1967 as the 96th CA Group and then redesignated on 26 November 1971 as the 96th CA Battalion at Fort Lee, Virginia. Two years later the 96th moved to Fort Bragg and was attached to the 95th CA Group. The 95th itself had been activated at Fort Gordon, Georgia in February 1955 as a CA group. In July 1971, the unit was transferred to Fort Bragg to become a component of the JFK Center for Military Assistance. The 95th CA Group was inactivated on 18 December 1974, leaving the 96th CA Battalion as the U.S. Army's sole AC CA unit.⁷

Also in 1982, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWC) was aligned along the lines of a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) School, beginning the integration of SOF into Army systems, training and operations. With "and School" added to its title in May 1986, the USAJFKSWCS became the proponent school for Army SOF.

URGENT FURY: The Grenada Intervention

The first mobilization, deployment, logistics and battle test for this renewed SOF came in the fall of 1983, when the Reagan administration launched the invasion of Grenada, a Caribbean island which had been hijacked by a sinister cabal of Marxist thugs.

Certainly for Civil Affairs, Operation URGENT FURY, was a "come as you are" operation. Probably as a consequence of the "close hold" nature of the approach to the operation, no CA plans had been drawn up prior to execution, and the 96th did not have a contingency plan for such an operation. In the words of one official report, "improvisation replaced planning."⁸ On the other hand, the "Vietnam Syndrome" seemed well and truly laid to rest as RC CA units and individuals contended for the privilege of being called up for active service on the island.⁹

The 96th sent representatives to the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) to coordinate the role the Battalion would have in the upcoming operation, but the contingent received no definitive response.¹⁰ Due to this lack of planning, no Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) was established until late in the operation. CA troopers were on their own in the field and relied, albeit effectively enough, on improvisation.

Nine RC CA officers forming functional teams for public works and utilities performed valuable work in restoring the island's run-down infrastructure; the only

significant combat damage was to two Grenadian telephone exchanges and the international cable and wireless system.¹¹ However, the CA troopers were not properly clothed or equipped for a wartime deployment, probably as a result of not being in on the planning phase of the operation.¹² Civic action by combat arms showed as well the "come as you are" nature of URGENT FURY. Engineers had to find local contractors by using telephone books and going around ringing doorbells.¹³

The RC 358th CA Brigade (Norristown, Pennsylvania) dispatched two three-man Public Welfare Public Works and Utilities teams to the island on 9 November. These teams conducted survey and damage assessments of the telephone, water, sewage and electrical power generation distribution systems. At first there was some lack of understanding between the 358th and the 96th and most of the activities relating to RC personnel logistics came as a surprise to the latter, but by late November the situation was corrected after the establishment of communications between elements of the 96th in Grenada and staff at 1st Special Operations Command and at the 96th, both at Fort Bragg.

On the other hand, cooperation and communication between the 358th and USAID was quick and cordial. USAID had the funding and the 358th the expertise. Personnel of the 358th also established a working relationship with the governor-general of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, whose attitude, in the words of a 358th report, "made them [358th personnel] want to work even harder to rehabilitate his nation." The Grenadian government particularly appreciated the fact that these were not only experts in their fields but also reliable and disciplined soldiers. For their part, CA personnel found that Grenadian officials and technical personnel were generally very able and hard-working, and the Americans were careful not to try to impose a "Stateside" solution to the island's problems. However, they were also aware of something of a "51st star" mentality among many of the people, and made it a point to emphasize that the CA mission was to assist the Grenadians to rehabilitate their island basically by their own efforts, with American assistance, guidance and financial aid. On occasion RC personnel had to step in personally for specific projects. For example, when records proved inaccurate for determining the new equipment and its proper sizing for the rehabilitation of the sewage system, a 358th officer completed the job himself with tape measure and surveyor's level.

Overall, the island had suffered little battle damage but its "socialized" infrastructure had deteriorated over a decade of authoritarian and Marxist governance; the island's physical assets belonged to "everyone" --and thus to no one. 358th personnel turned to supervising the rehabilitation of the school system, public utilities and public works, the Nationwide Road Repair Program and the water and sewage disposal systems, as well as restoring the slaughter house and market place in the capital, Georgetown. These volunteers, most of them Vietnam veterans, brought to the island engineering and public administration skills and experience from their Civilian occupations. One, from the City of Philadelphia Convention and Business Bureau, helped to restore the island's vital tourism trade. Grenada's East German telephone system posed a special challenge. Although relatively undamaged, this triumph of Socialist technology had yet to enter the digital era and spare parts were hard to find

outside a museum. An "imported" problem was that of the trash liberally distributed throughout the island by U.S. forces. The ecology-conscious island had permitted only returnable bottles, for example, but U.S. troops brought with them unlimited supplies of soft drinks in throw-away containers --and proceeded to throw them away. This trash, added to the new MRE and the old "C" rations' paper, metal and plastic detritus, soon overwhelmed the island's limited trash dumps, which began to breed a plague of rats, and CA troopers had to be called in.¹⁴

CA handling of Displaced Civilians (DCs) was an even more gratifying accomplishment. Upon arrival, the Displaced Persons, Refugees, Evacuees (DPRE) Team was confronted with some 5700 civilians temporarily displaced by military operations and all increasingly in need of food and water. A team 2LT established and operated two DPRE camps while another CA officer led several hundred civilians out of an area where U.S. Army Rangers were still fighting Cuban "construction workers."¹⁵

Many of the tasks assigned to or assumed by CA personnel were not standard CA missions. These unexpected operations included the return of personally operated vehicles to their owners, coordinating the establishment of the coastal patrol unit, providing security escorts for the U.S. President's representative for disaster assistance and members of the U.S. AID/U.S. Forces Caribbean Disaster Support Team, resupplying the Soviet Embassy with food and fuel prior to its closing out and distributing radios for the island's prison. CA troops also printed up a poster entitled "These Hoodlums are Already in Custody," displaying distinctly unfavorable photos of the unsavory leaders in the former Grenadian government and designed to encourage dislocated civilians to come down out of the hills and get on with their lives.

More expected tasks included procuring local labor, delivering Grenadian mail, as well as water to local agencies daily, providing water, mattresses and sheets and two generators to local hospitals and the mental asylum, conducting surveys of police stations, coordinating the pit latrine construction program, assessing civil damage, providing Grenadian flags for local authorities and repatriating Cuban "construction workers."¹⁶

Some weaknesses in U.S. CA operations were revealed as well. The separate military units, such as engineers, medical and MP units, which assumed CA projects were not coordinated by a single agency. U.S. civilian agencies were also not under any central control. Thus mission assignment was disjointed and unity of effort never completely achieved. Further, civilian labor procurement tended to favor those who had worked with the Cubans or those "in the know," a situation which reminded many unemployed Grenadians of the situation as it had been under the Cubans. Due to the improvised nature of their mission, CA troops would have encountered increasing difficulty had the mission continued much longer.¹⁷ However, URGENT FURY did display the renewed interest of the U.S. Army in SOF in general and in CA in particular. It was indicative of this interest that the commander of the 358th CA Brigade personally briefed the Secretary of the Army on the RC CA aspects of the Operation. Not only was the U.S. military going to react vigorously to Leninist military adventures and subversion in the developing world (as it had in Vietnam), but

it would be engaging in some military pressures and activities of its own, particularly utilizing SOF and CA. Once again an indigenous peoples were glad to see U.S. Army CA personnel come and sorry to see them go.

The Army's increasing emphasis on SOF and on CA continued after URGENT FURY. In 1985, it clearly subordinated Military Government to Civil Affairs, as illustrated in the change of manual title: from 1958's FM 41-5, *Civil Affairs and Military Government* to 1985's *Civil Affairs*.¹⁸ The Army also provided CA with a significant role, along with other SOF units, in what was increasingly coming to be known as Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). In 1986 the Army and Air Force activated the joint services Center for Low Intensity Conflict, and began publishing numerous influential documents on Special Operations and LIC. In the same year the Goldwater-Nichols Act (along with the Nunn-Cohen Amendment) authorized a four-star unified combatant command for special operations, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It activated at MacDill AFB, Florida in 1987 and consolidated the command, control, training, and funding for all U.S. SOF. Civil Affairs was given a high priority as one of the 10 special activities assigned to the new command. USSOCOM basically came into existence because of a Congressional perception that SOF was not receiving adequate support from their own Services.

Since at least 1979 there had been a movement, led by the Chief of Army Reserve, to include Civil Affairs in the Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) community. Even within CA units, however, not all agreed with this such inclusion. Some CA leaders feared that the CA role in support of conventional military operations might be lost and others believed that the "image" of the Reserve CA unit was hardly compatible with that of full-time "hard-charging" SOF. For many in the Army, CA troops were basically civilian experts who occasionally donned uniform. It was difficult to envision floppy-hat Reservists mingling with Green (or black) Berets. The Secretary of the Army ended such speculations by ruling in 1987 that Civil Affairs were indeed a part of Army SOF.¹⁹

The same Congressional enactment that had provided for the activation of USSOCOM also created the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASDSO/LIC) for basically the same reasons. The momentum continued through 1988 with the approval of the Civil Affairs and PSYOP enlisted career management fields. Then, on 1 December 1989 the Army component of USSOCOM, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), was activated at Fort Bragg. However, all CA and PSYOP units, Active and Reserve, did not come under USASOC until the activation of the subordinate U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Airborne (USACAPOC [A]), also headquartered at Fort Bragg in 1990. 1st SOCOM and USARSOC then disappeared and formal command and control of USAR CA moved to USACAPOC(A) in October 1992.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, a USAR organization assigned directly to a Major Army Command (USASOC), commands both AC and RC units, and is commanded by a drilling Reservist.²⁰ Also in 1989, the Reserve Civil Affairs Corps was placed under the Army regimental system (effective

16 June) and the Army Institute of Heraldry approved the CA (RC) corps, distinctive unit insignia and coat of arms as well as an official motto, "*Secure the Victory.*"²¹

Just Cause: Intervention in Panama

The U.S. intervention in Panama, OPERATION JUST CAUSE, was the first American military campaign in which Civil Affairs ranked as a main priority from the beginning. Uniquely, a government hostile to the United States, that of the unsavory dictator Manuel Noriega, was to be deposed and one more favorable was to be established almost simultaneously. Both missions were to be accomplished within a 24-hour period.

A joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) was established under the SOUTHCOM J-5, whose commander was under the effective control of the Charge d' Affaires at the U.S. Embassy. The CMOTF teams' missions were to provide direct S-5 support to U.S. combat units (75th Ranger Regiment, XVIII Airborne Corps, 82d Airborne Division, TF Semper Paratus and 7th Infantry Division), as well as to minimize interference of civilians with combat operations and to conduct nation building and Civil Military Operations within the Republic of Panama. Due to the initial weakness of the new Panamanian government, the commander of the CMOTF, BG B.W. Gann, had actually to assume the *de facto* government of Panama, with the concurrence of the Panamanian Government and the U.S. Embassy.²²

In the field, CMOTF teams evaluated the local political situation, the police force and generally identified continuing problems at the district level and below. The S-5 of the 3d Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A) organized its team around Medical, Intelligence and CA specialties (MICA). Medical troops conducted a health evaluation of the area and its inhabitants, MI soldiers searched for intelligence and CA personnel evaluated the local political situation and identified systemic problems. This was an on-the-ground operation and effective for gathering information as well as demonstrating a concrete U.S. concern for the local residents.²³ Food distribution efforts were hampered, however, by the kindly tendency of tactical unit troops to give away MRE rations to civilians long after any immediate need had passed. This frustrated Panamanian food distribution, did the economy no good and fostered an unhealthy dependence on the U.S. military. (As noted above, MREs are also a very expensive way to feed people.)²⁴ The missions of the JUST CAUSE CMOTF were five in number: 1) To support U.S. military forces in establishing the law and order infrastructure, 2) To provide CA support to the new Panamanian government, 3) To manage a refugee camp, 4) To establish CMO support for the cities of Panama and 5) To assist in nation building programs.

Civil Affairs had actually been involved in planning for such an operation as early as March of 1988, when two officers of the Civil Affairs Branch of the Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate of Southern Command J5 were tasked to review the approved phases of ELABORATE MAZE, the political-military effort to oust Noriega. To their surprise, they found that the plan was devoid of CA input. Perhaps unrealistically, they then determined on a World War II-style military government operation for a brief period of time after Noriega's ouster, followed by a pro-American, democratic indigenous government. However, the CA Branch of SCJ-5



CA troopers jumped with Rangers into Torrios-Tocumen Airport and soon had the facility up and operating. Operation JUST CAUSE. USASOC History Archives



The destroyed *Commandancia* and neighborhood, Panama City, December 1989. USASOC History Archives

consisted of only four full-time RC officers, and they had numerous other responsibilities. Consequently, SCJ-5 requested a team of RC CA officers, principally from SOUTHCOM's Capstone reserve unit, the 361st CA Brigade (Pensacola, Florida) to complete the whole CA plan, entitled BLIND LOGIC. The 361st had, in fact, established a CA staff section in SOUTHCOM and had been working in Panama since 1983, also under the auspices of the J-5. Despite an early realization that much of the anticipated CMO in Panama would impinge on State Department interests, no country team was established and SOUTHCOM, in the interests of security, at most "talked around" the CA plan in its dealing with the U.S. Embassy.²⁵

There can be little dispute that SOUTHCOM and XVIII Airborne Corps paid insufficient attention to the government and administration that would succeed the Noriega regime and that the restoration of Panama was generally of secondary importance throughout the planning process, even though it was in on that process from the first. USSOCOM was not included in the planning nor were civilian agencies. Most of the CA operations planning was carried out by a series of RC officers on temporary tours of active duty, who were delayed for orders and for security clearances. The Commander-in-Chief Southern Command (CINCSOUTH), General Maxwell R. Thurman, was not briefed on Civil-Military operations until after he had arrived in Panama. General Thurman, frankly noted later that "I did not even spend five minutes on BLIND LOGIC", and added of the post-conflict phase of military operations "we do not teach it in our school system, or include it in our doctrinal work." General Thurman's subordinate, XVIII Corps commander, LTG Carl W. Stiner, agreed that JUST CAUSE had a fine warfighting plan but ignored post-combat strategy. This lack of attention was the cause of basic erroneous assumptions about the post-combat situation, particularly that a functioning, democratic government and public order would quickly follow the U.S. invasion. Such assumptions would not have been made by anyone at all familiar with Panama's history of oligarchic or military rule.²⁶ Overall, it can be asserted that the hodgepodge CMOTF was simply not organized to deal with either the immediate problems of the breakdown of Panamanian law and order nor with the legacy of corruption, decay and "praetorianism" --personal rule-- of Noriega and his minions. As one authority noted, the CMOTF command "behaved as if they expected the new government to be functional, or nearly so, with [Panamanian] cabinet ministers reporting in on a daily basis."²⁷

For all of this conceptual failure at the top, at least CA assets were in on this operation from the beginning. (On 20 December, that is on D-Day itself, the BLIND LOGIC CA plan for Panama had been retitled PROMOTE LIBERTY.) In fact, JUST CAUSE was probably the fastest mobilization in U.S. military history.²⁸ Two contingents of the 96th jumped in with the Rangers in the assault on Torrijos-Tocumen airport at H-Hour, and as tracer fire filled the area, moved into the terminal building and calmed terrified airline passengers some of whom had been seized as hostages by PDF troops. CA and PSYOP troopers, using their knowledge of language and local culture talked the PDF into releasing its captives unharmed. ("Real soldiers don't hide behind women's' skirts!").²⁹ The bulk of the battalion was in the field within the next



Suppression of looting the in wake of JUST CAUSE, Panama City, December 1989

two days. They provided Direct Support Teams to Marine Corps TF Semper Fi and the 7th Infantry Division (L) and its TF Bayonet, the 82d Airborne Division in Panama City and the USAF at Tocumen Airport. A team deployed with a Ranger unit to Coiba Island to conduct an assessment of the requirements of the prison and penal colonies (well-filled by the Noriega regime).

Typical CA tasks handled by the S3 section of the CMO Task Force on a single day, 15 January, is indicative:

Request list of banks back in business and banks still closed.

Transfer of PDF horses seized by 82d Airborne troopers, who gave them to 7th ID, which wanted to get rid of them.

24 hour medevac requested for San Blas region

Colon Hospital sewage leak

Access list for Noriega-owned property in Panama City

Trash pickup for San Miquelito

7th ID requests four translators for combat sweep through slum area Hollywood

Airlift three tons of perishable food from David to Panama City.³⁰

One of the earliest and most successful CA operation was the handling of Displaced Civilians (DCs). Heavy fighting in the Comandancia/Chorrillo area had rendered large numbers of Panamanians homeless and they began to clog roads and hinder military operations. Some 300 milled about the international airport in the first days of the U.S. intervention. Many headed for the 96th Forward Battalion Aid Station, established at Balboa High School, which had also been designated already as a site for Displaced Civilians. On 21 December ten personnel from the 96th arrived as advisers for the newly-established DC camp. Five days later they were supplemented by two Reservists. These 96th troopers coordinated with the CMOTF, Corps of Engineers, USAID, Panamanian Red Cross and various representatives of the Panamanian government to get the facility operating. However, under State Department pressure to have the high school open for classes by the middle of January 1990, however, and on the recommendation of the Corps of Engineers, the 96th relocated the camp to a hanger at Albrook Air Force Base. At its peak, the camp cared for 1642 DC families. Some 11,000 Panamanian civilians were registered at the facility, although only approximately 4,000 actually took up residence there at one time or other.

There seemed to be no difficulty in getting the residents themselves to perform most of the work inside the camp. They erected their own tents (Army GP medium), collected the garbage, did all the cooking and made tables and benches for the dining facility under the supervision of two NCOs from the CMOTF who were both experienced in construction. All it took for a sufficient volunteer crew to show up for other tasks was an announcement over the camp public address system. These volunteers turned to work with a will at the new facility, erecting personal cubicles. Their progress was slow, due to their lack of tools, however. The USAF was then

called in to meet the deadline for movement of civilians into the new facility and a group of airmen with power tools completed the job.

A bizarre touch was added by the influx of a small number of Chinese into the camp. They had apparently bribed the Noriega administration for information on how to enter the United States. The dictator's thuggish minions had then informed them that the American soldiers at the camp would give them "green cards" for legal entry. Unfortunately for the Chinese, they were not only unlikely to get to the U.S.A. but, according to the camp's Panamanian mayor, would probably not survive their first night at the facility. The Chinese were removed from the camp and presumably still languish in Panama. On 19 January the CMOTF DC team officially turned the camp, Chinese and all, over to the Panamanian Red Cross.³¹

After the brief combat phase had resulted in complete U.S. victory, the Army turned to the task of rebuilding Panama, an economic basket-case. The very earliest such action was the coordination of the landing of the first humanitarian (Spanish) relief aircraft on D+ 2. The following day, sanitation trucks began making limited rounds and some electrical power was restored. Two days later saw trash removal in full operation and the painting over of anti-American graffiti. An unusual early 96th operation was the rescue of a group of multi-national scientific researchers who had been taken captive by Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) elements and then abandoned in the jungle.

Although their initial missions included working with the reconstituted Panamanian police force, running the DC camp and assisting the new government of Panama, CA troops in the field were given the new mission of supporting the tactical unit commanders, particularly in getting food and medicines out into the villages and thus keeping the civilians in those villages and away from any combat. In a touch of poetic justice, much of this food came from Christmas food packages originally designated for the vicious PDF. The once-privileged PDF also involuntarily provided medical supplies for Panamanian civilians. ("So we busted the locks off the doors, got the medical supplies out, and distributed them down to the clinics." - 96th officer). The 96th provided 100 new bicycles for needy Panamanian children. The unit also set up MEDCAPs, working with a PSYOP loudspeaker team mounted on a High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that drove through the neighborhood announcing times and places at a school or mission or just an open courtyard.³² In each town that the 96th entered, the local political leader was sought out and encouraged to appoint new police, fire and water officials. Although the 96th troopers successfully carried out their support for tactical units, they then withdrew. It soon became apparent that more CA personnel were needed than the 96th alone could supply. A naval officer reported:

Literally, thousands of [Civilian] personnel coming through your lines. There were no Civil Affairs units available to deal with them. That is going to jeopardize your operation. If you do not have anyone to handle that, the operation's success is in question. The resources were needed

from the very beginning.... All of these things could have been given to the theater commander.³³

Nonetheless, CA units were not called up but rather, in an improvised expedient, U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC) solicited individual volunteers. SOUTHCOM did request a small call-up of five RC CA units but by then the Secretary of Defense had ruled that "Volunteer CA personnel will be identified and deployed."³⁴ The volunteers were, almost by definition, enthusiastic, but were often lacking in knowledge of the area or the CA planning. They also found in some cases that legislation protecting RC civilian reemployment rights did not provide adequate protection for volunteers. In addition this ignoring of the Total Army concept weakened unit cohesion, caused poor command and control as well as equipment and readiness deficiencies.³⁵ As one authority on CA in JUST CAUSE noted soon after the operation:

The failure to utilize the Selected Reserve Call-up Authority cost SOUTHCOM needed expertise and its timely arrival. It further had the price of reducing the effectiveness of the Reserve personnel who did arrive because of the requirement to build a composite unit ad hoc. Moreover, the whole incident demonstrated that the Active Army leadership did not have a full understanding of what was available under the authority, what the Reserves were capable of, and what they were not.³⁶

Just one example of this ignoring of RC assets by the Active Army component was the giving to the law enforcement team of the Public Safety Section the task of developing a training authority for the Panamanian Port Authority Police. Yet in the RC there were several Provost Marshal Port Security Detachment companies that could have been mobilized for this mission, as any number of RC CA officers could have pointed out.³⁷

Individual CA reservists arrived in-country on D+ 6, with a CA support team joining them on D+ 12. The team consisted of five functional offices: Embassy Support Teams, Public Security, Public Works, Government and Humanitarian Assistance. Eventually totaling 152 troops, 57 of the personnel were 139-day and 75 were 31-day volunteers on Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD), while 6 were signal support on Active Duty and 14 came from "other" backgrounds. They were not always exactly welcomed with open arms. Several Reserve volunteers arrived at Fort Bragg -- only to be sent home. (There may have been some question of language proficiency, but many non-Spanish speakers were also deployed to Panama.) Reservists had a low transportation priority and unit equipment items such as vehicles had to be borrowed. Upon arrival, such items as field desks had to be improvised or acquired on the local economy, often at personal expense; lacking a unit identification code they could not be entered into the Army support system. Those detailed to work with Panamanian civil agencies were instructed to bring a minimum of personal baggage and

were then required to wear civilian clothes --more personal expense. A larger problem lay in the fact that the RC CA troops came from units oriented to strategic nation-building. However, they supported in the field by the AC 96th whose mission was only to re-establish government and then to move on with the tactical troops.

Matters were not simplified by the Army Reserve Civil Affairs Task Force having to work for and within five different command-and-control relationships for the first several weeks, even though their work was in full swing well after that date. Finally, those RC CA soldiers that arrived after 31 January 1990 were informed that they would not receive a campaign ribbon. Understandably, some returning volunteers expressed a reluctance to volunteer again, a reaction similar to that of members of the 358th CA Brigade mobilized in 1983 for Grenada.³⁸ On a more positive note, it should be recorded that some 600 CA Reservists volunteered for duty in Panama. The *Commanding General of U.S. Special Operations Command (General James J. Lindsay)* later noted that "we had far more volunteers than we needed when it came time to do it."³⁹

Much of the earliest and most important work of the CMOTF involved the assessment of problem areas for action by other government agencies. (The last updating of the Panama assessment had been made in 1986). The first assessment concentrated on the Chorillo district of Panama City, blasted by U.S. air and ground fire and also torched by retreating PDF soldiers. The damaged area was actually quite small, but because it was the focus of U.S. television network evening news coverage the American public thought that Panama City was devastated. Thus, there was considerable public pressure on JTF-South to rehabilitate the area. Task Force Chorillo, a team under the control of JTF-South, provided food and shelter for the destitute area residents, cleared the rubble and trash, brought utilities back on line and demolished the ruins of the PDF's Commandancia. After the completion of these missions the task force began the supervision of reconstruction of the district. Much of this work would be handled by USAID but, surprisingly, no one in the CMOTF had been appointed as liaison with that agency, so such contacts remained ad hoc until the end of January, when the CMOTF established its USAID Projects Team. USAID needed support from the CMOTF in order to prepare project profiles, conduct field inspections, monitor contract compliance, and to provide the host of other civil experience and skills that RC CA brought to the field.

The USSOCOM Commander-in-Chief, well aware of the deficiencies of the CMOTF, successfully urged the establishment of a Military Support Group (MSG) for the immediate post-hostilities period, which could absorb the CMOTF, including the law enforcement division, the Public Force Liaison Division --PFLD). The MSG was given the broad mission statement to "Conduct nation-building operations to ensure that democracy, international standards of justice and professional public services are established in Panama." The MSG became by default the country team, although it was not headed by the Ambassador as it probably should have been. These arrangements were often characterized by a considerable amount of uncertainty as to who was in overall charge of CA and what the mission was. The SOUTHCOM J-5,

USARSO J-5 and Brigade and Division S-5s were all conducting CMO, resulting in some duplication, particularly in assessment.

The MSG, of course, was to work closely with the Panamanian government. In fact, the MSG commander, COL James Steel, donned civilian clothes. The new organization was composed of Public Force Liaison, Civil Affairs, Military Police, PSYOP divisions and Special Forces. It was heavily dependent on reservists and thus faced constant turnover of personnel due to the volunteers' usual 31-days TTAD tour of duty. Overall, however, the system worked reasonably well. For example, CA Major David Bradshaw assessed the situation on the San Blas Islands and noted the inoperable electrical system. Bradshaw repaired the island's generator and then connected the existing electrical lines, giving the residents power for the first time in years.⁴⁰

The most immediate and obvious failure of CA in the Panama operation lay in the field of law enforcement, or rather its absence, in the well-publicized breakdown of civil order in Panama City and Colon, as looters, Noriega Dignity Battalions, vigilantes and criminals shot at each other and U.S. forces while looting downtown stores. This violent chaos was not unexpected and was in large measure due to the lack of CA initial planning. ("The kids, you see them with brand new [looted] Nikes on.") According to one source these looters did more damage to the economy than all the [U.S.] sanctions," and losses ranged from \$1 to \$2 billion. It was an indication of the extent of this avoidable breakdown that the Panamanian President and Vice-Presidents themselves were attacked by mobs outside the legislative assembly. The old, corrupt, oppressive PDF had scattered, with nothing to take its place. Law enforcement is one of the basic functions of Civil Affairs. CA specialists could have told SOUTHCOM and XVIII Airborne Corps that Latin American cities contain large numbers of disaffected civilians who would jump at the opportunity to pillage if the police forces scattered, and that unemployed security forces could not be counted on to remain quiescent in the face of such opportunities.⁴¹

The need was obviously for a public safety and an internal security force that would support any democratically-elected government and protect citizens, in place of Noriega's PDF, the paramilitary force that served as Noriega's Praetorian Guard and which had earned an abominable record of repression and lawlessness. In the quite accurate words of General Frederick Woerner, the PDF was simply "the most corrupt military institution in the hemisphere."⁴²

The RC CA Police Team oversaw the reconstitution of the immediately inactivated PDF. By providing on-the-job training programs staffed by hundreds of veteran U.S. law enforcement personnel, and working with Special Forces in the countryside and Military Police in the cities, the new Panamanian police force was civilianized and a beginning was made in inculcating professionalism and respect for human rights.⁴³ The Judicial Liaison Group (JLG) proved extremely capable in coordinating the opening of the night court system, as well as in reconstituting the remainder of the judicial system and in generally acting as liaison between Panamanian and U.S. forces on legal and judicial matters.⁴⁴ The U.S.-fostered alternative model was that of the Costa Rican forces, oriented to internal security and under strict civilian control.

The U.S. Public Force Liaison Group (USPFLG) of the MSG set out to advise, train and equip the police. The PDF was more-or-less purged of its more vicious elements and a new, civilianized, National Police Branch assumed its duties. The former PDF members, however, were not all purged. According to the MSG chief, the Government of Panama felt that it "could not afford to disenfranchise 10 or 15 thousand ex-PDF members, whose only skills consisted of beating up people and pulling triggers, because this group would have presented a direct threat to them." Fortunately, at least the image of the police could now be changed. U.S. forces had recently undergone a change of combat uniform and the Fort Clayton warehouse had some 50,000 old-model jungle fatigues available, enough to outfit each PNP member immediately with several sets.

Undoubtedly the most successful aspect of police training in Panama was the 20-hour course taught by RC CA personnel who were police officers in civilian life. These "RC Cops" taught the "quick fix" (20-hour) transition course to Panamanian National Police (PNP) trainers, who then passed on their knowledge to police in all the metropolitan precincts and rural zones. The entire PNP completed the course by 1 April 1990. However, the civilianized PNP came "on line" slowly. In the interim, Panama City was patrolled very effectively by four-man teams consisting of two Special Forces troopers and two RC police officers in each precinct, thus combining the technical proficiency of the latter with the Latin American experience and language capability of the former. The mere U.S. presence in these joint patrols had a calming and reassuring effect on Panamanians and gave an example of professional police conduct and a source of advice. By this time, however, MSG realized that it would be in violation of U.S. law if it continued to train any police force in a peacetime setting. Furthermore, MSG felt that a continued military training of a Panamanian security force would revive bad memories of the bygone paramilitary PDF. Consequently, a complicated arrangement was worked out whereby a civilian agency of the U.S. government, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) was assigned the responsibility for PNF training, while MSG/PFLD, through joint patrols, would monitor and report on the police's operational activities, with all of seven employees. Still, the effort to build a national police force from the remnants of an army was no easy task. There was considerable tension between MSG personnel, who had their doubts about ICITAP's rather "academic environment" and more theoretical approach, while ICITAP resented MSG's strong personal relationship with senior Government of Panama leaders.

Despite American efforts, the PNP continued to suffer from erratic and minimal funding and a lack of vehicle fuel and spare parts. It was also indicative of the general confusion and duplication of effort that hundreds of handcuffs confiscated from the PDF were quickly shipped to the United States. When someone made the astonishing discover that the new PNP would need its own cuffs these were purchased at considerable cost from federal government stocks, while the perfectly adequate old PDF models remained warehoused in Miami.⁴⁵ Even the ex-U.S. Army uniforms caused problems; they came, for some reason, in three different shades of khaki, after the Panamanian government had committed \$1.6 million of its own scarce funds for the

uniform purchase. Not surprisingly, all things considered, the PNP had to rely heavily on U.S. aid of various sorts in the ensuing years.⁴⁶

There were also the usual signs of ignorance of what even the AC CA could do for tactical units, as when one 96th advance element had to report to 1st Battalion of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment that they had as yet no communications equipment and no vehicle. That commander, still preoccupied with the tactical situation, irritably replied, "Captain, what the hell can you do for me, then." In fact, transportation seems to have been the greatest single support problem for CA troopers in Panama.⁴⁷ For example, the majority of the 96th's vehicles had to be left at Fort Bragg. Also, the battalion found that their vehicle-mounted FM radios lacked range and flexibility, and they were forced to rely upon the Panamanian commercial telephone system and on the supported units' communications equipment.⁴⁸

Despite often having to get about on foot, these troopers soon established a money-for-arms turn-in program. One 15-year old turned in an entire cache of weapons for which he was duly paid \$5,000, but another youth, arriving in an armored car with dreams of a big pay-off, only received the maximum payment for any one weapon, \$150⁴⁹.

The church in Panama proved of great assistance in food distribution. In the words of one 96th team leader:

The problem is who can you trust, because there's plenty of corruption there. And you turn the food over blindly to some organization, you don't know what they're doing with it. So we at least felt with the church leaders we had people we could trust and work with and they would get food into the hands of the people who needed it.... they also know far better than we do who were their people who needed it and who were the people not to give it to because they were going to turn around and sell it, for beer or whiskey or whatever.⁵⁰

The CMOTF had established a Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF) within the larger organization, composed of volunteer Reservists and organized into functional teams to assist the ministries of the new Government of Panama. These teams had to contend with initial State Department opposition, which hoped to keep such relationships only between civilians, and thus several weeks were wasted before these teams could get to work. Further, because the task force was an *ad hoc* organization, it had difficulty in obtaining its necessary support, lacking as it did, a Unit Identification Code (UIC) and DOD Activity Code (DODAC).⁵¹

The U.S. Embassy knew nothing about CA until a group of CA troopers arrived at the facility with the information that U.S. Army officers had been and would continue to deal with the new Government of Panama. The Embassy overcame its initial suspicions of the military when they saw the professionalism of the CA troops and their willingness to subordinate themselves to the Embassy, and who, unlike that Embassy, had a plan for dealing with the new government. At its peak in mid-January,

the ministry teams counted four soldiers assigned to the Presidency, two to Education, two to Agriculture, three to the single Ministry of Planning/Finance, Treasury, Commerce and Industry, three to Health, one to Housing, two to Public Works and four to Government and Justice.⁵² Newly-arriving U.S. Embassy personnel "sort of smirked" when they confronted the Army officers supporting Panamanian Civil ministries. However, as one of the former CA officer remarked soon after:

While we thought that some of this closeness to the Panamanian Civil government... was not appropriate, we also realized that an incredible number of things which needed to be done in the government weren't going to get done any other way. No one else was going to do them.⁵³

The ministry teams were able to make significant contributions to the rehabilitation of the nation. For example, the Deputy Director of Public Works for the city of San Antonio, Texas worked with the new Panamanian Minister of Public Works, helping to make that ministry's operations more effective and economical. The Public Works Team was able to arrange for U.S. National Guard Engineer units to use their Annual Training on projects in Panama, working with Panamanian military personnel.

Although USAID had the lead in infrastructure repairs and rehabilitation, there was not the "massive infusion" of economic aid necessary for such work. By default, this mission fell to the MSG, although the AID contribution would increase with time.⁵⁴

Several CMOTF officers (two physicians and a Ph.D. in civilian life) drew up a public health plan for the Panamanian government. Working with the Panamanian Lions and Kiwanis clubs, they were also able to control the heavy shipments of medical supplies flowing into the country and arranged with USAID to fund the leasing of vehicles to the Panamanian Social Security organization and for Army aircraft to deliver supplies and equipment to rural areas. The CMOTF Humanitarian Assistance Officer was also able to work through such Panamanian non-governmental organizations, as the Chamber of Commerce, civic clubs and the Roman Catholic Church. If a civilian needed food he or she would contact the local church or civic club, which would, in turn, forward the request to the CMOTF warehouse. The Humanitarian Assistance Officer would then validate the request and arrange for transportation, if needed, through the CMOTF J-4. In all the CMOTF arranged in Panama City alone for the distribution of more than two million dollars worth of food and medical items.⁵⁵

The Ministry of Education Team consisted of one officer (the highly competent but rather mis-named LTC D. F. Dull) whose mission was to revive the Panamanian schools --without U.S. funding. This ingenious officer talked the DoD Dependent School System into donating excess educational materials. He also discovered that Delaware was the "partner" of Panama through the private voluntary agency, Partners of the Americas, and convinced that state's authorities to contribute still more materials. In addition, he completed the more routine duties of assessing the school system and checking for combat damage.

Early indications of the overall success of CA in Panama included business returning to normal soon after the invasion, the reopening of schools, emergency services, communications, government ministries and getting the transport services (including buses and taxis) back in business. Equally important was the resumption of garbage pickup and street cleaning.⁵⁶ The MSG's chief of staff made it clear that:

we were not building anything new. [Rather, the focus was on] repairing health clinics, schools, and existing farm-to-market roads....What we did was maintain existing infrastructure.

MSG was not prepared to carry out this mission alone. According to its commander, the goal was "to set up a model to coordinate these projects...[and] make sure the Panamanian government gets credit at the local, provincial, and national level." Thus each infrastructure project had to be coordinated at first between MSG and the appropriate Panamanian government ministry. The problem here was that the Panamanian government at all levels was chaotic and often still corrupt. MSG made more than a start, however, coordinating two major engineering exercises between April and December of 1990. FUERTAS COMINOS 90 and COSECHA AMISTAD 90 repaired 69 schools, 21 clinics, 92 kilometers of roads, 17 bridges and 10 other projects, all of which received good publicity, thus helping to improve the popular image of the Panamanian Government. Certainly the civilian agencies were not ready for such work in 1990.⁵⁷

Much of this success came despite a lack of high-level planning for CMO in Panama. The 96th was able to perform its mission of combat support effectively because the Army generally, and understandably, did a better job of planning for the combat phase than for post-combat operations. On the other hand, the majority of post-JUST CAUSE CMO activities, to which RC CA brought such a multitude of their civilian skills and experience, had to be improvised in the field. The exclusion of civilian agencies and the U.S. Embassy (In the words of Ambassador Hinton, "I had no clue at all,") was a major shortcoming of DOD planning for JUST CAUSE and unreasonably delayed the formation of a country team and coordination/cooperation with MSG.⁵⁸ Further, both JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY were conducted without a country plan, although one had been formulated in the earlier BLIND LOGIC CA plan. To the end, CA operations in Panama remained reactive.⁵⁹ Surely, after Vietnam and Grenada, it was rather late in the game to be learning these lessons.

¹Adam C. Hart, "Whatever Happened to Civil Affairs? *Army* (December 1972), 27.

²The Kyres, 145.

³David A. Decker, "Civil Affairs: A Rebirth or Stillborn?", *Military Review* (November 1987), 61; John R. Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq. The U.S. Army Reserve in OPERATION DESERT STORM," Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (Washington: August 1991), and "Remarks," in U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, "Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium. Proceedings" (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: October 25-27, 1991), 137.

⁴Philip D. Coleman, "Civil Affairs in Transition -- Should We Question Present Doctrine?", *Military Review* (April 1975); Martin Binkin, *U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior*, The Brookings Institution (Washington: 1974), 56. Coleman "plugged into" the Army's renewed focus on parrying a Soviet strike through Germany by raising the truly horrific prospect of "nuclear warfare [causing] such utter panic as to multiply the World War II refugee problem manyfold.", 48.

⁵Hart. A good profile of RC CA is found in Headquarters, DA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, "Civil Affairs Personnel Survey Report" (15 June 1973). The conclusions were basically positive, noting that 41 percent of such personnel could be mobilized within six hours. But the report did note a relatively high percentage of company grade officers whose civilian occupation did not relate to their primary MOS, that a majority of RC CA officers had not transferred to the CA branch and that one-third were not CA branch qualified., *ibid.*, II-57-58.

⁶David A. Decker, "Civil Affairs: Rebirth or Still Born?", *Military Review* (November 1987).

⁷95th and 96th data based upon Adjutant General Lineage and Honors sheets and unit histories in "CA Lineage" folio, USASOC History Archives.

⁸Quotation in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Grenada Work Group, (U)"Operation URGENT FURY Assessment(S) (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: n.d.), XXII-7 (Info used is UNCLASSIFIED); 96th CA Battalion, "Civil Affairs Grenada, Civil Affairs Lessons Learned - Grenada," (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 24 November 1983), 1.

⁹COL (Ret.) G. Zinni, oral interview with author, 4 November 1996, 6. COL Zinni recollected that he was able to round up 40 volunteers out of about 120 officers and NCOs from the 358th CA Brigade in four hours on the telephone., *ibid.*, 9. These first deployed CA troopers apparently went down to Grenada on vocal orders only. ("my recollection is they did not have orders in their pockets.") This could have posed interesting complications had any been wounded or killed on the island., *ibid.*, 23.

¹⁰"Civil Affairs Lessons Learned in Grenada," 1.

¹¹U.S. Agency for International Development/U.S. Forces Caribbean Disaster Survey Team, Grenada, "Disaster Area Survey Report for Grenada," typescript, 4 November 1983, 5.

¹²"URGENT FURY Assessment," XII-19. (Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.) Barnes, "CA a LIC Priority," 45.

¹³Andrew M. Perkins, "Operation Urgent Fury: An Engineer's View," *The Military Engineer* (March-April 1984), 88-89. In the words of the former commander of the 358th CA Brigade, "It's not like you could open up the file drawer, thumb on back and pull out the Grenada packet and go.", 3.

¹⁴"Operation Urgent Fury, 28 October-31 January 1984, Report of Activities of the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade," vol. 1 Report, Section V, Phase II, passim; Zinni, 18 and passim.

¹⁵"Civil Affairs Lessons Learned," 3.

¹⁶"Ibid., " 3-4; (U)"URGENT FURY Assessment," XII-8 - XII-9. (Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.); "Disaster Area Survey Report," passim. Slide copy of "These Hoodlums" poster in USASOC Archives. See also Art House, "Grenada: Army Reserve Goes into Action," *Reserve Magazine* (Spring 1984); D. L. Spurlock, "Grenada Provides Classic Case," *The Officer* (August 1984); R. C. Barnes, Jr., "Grenada Revisited: Civil Affairs Operates in Paradise," *ibid.*, (July 1985).

¹⁷"URGENT FURY Assessment," XII-14, IX-1. (Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.) RC CA units were carrying out training operations in Grenada a full decade after URGENT FURY. See R. C. Barnes, Jr., "Grenada Revisited: Civil Affairs Operates in Paradise", *The Officer* (July 1985); Frederick C. Oelrich, "The 200K Call-Up: Just Cause vs. Desert Shield," *Special Warfare* (March 1992), 23.

¹⁸Even in the 1958 manual, however, MG was subordinated to CA., Daugherty and Andrews, 9-10.

¹⁹Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, *United States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm: Civil Affairs in the War With Iraq* (Washington: 9 October 1991), 10.

²⁰A good overview of these significant organizational changes of the 1980s can be found in the untitled history of USASOC, USASOC History and Museums archives. See also the authoritative "Civil Affairs a LIC Priority," by R. C. Barnes, *Military Review* (September 1988), 44-45; FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington: 17 December 1985); and Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, *United States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm: Civil Affairs in the War With Iraq* (Washington: 9 October 1991); and John M. Collins, "Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, 1986-1993" (Washington? 16 July 1993, 39.

²¹General Order No. 22, "Establishment of the U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Corps in the U.S. Army Regimental System (USARS)," 1 June 1989; U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry, memo for Commander, Civil Affairs Regiment, 14 April 1989. (In "CA Heraldry" and "Regimental Affiliation" files, USASOC History Archives (with other CA heraldic material).

²²Fishel, 34.

²³Meyer. 22.

²⁴Unclassified JULLS Long Report No. 22450-89258 (0042), submitted by 96th CA Battalion. 21 March 1990.

²⁵[96th CA Battalion] "Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF), "Operation Promoting Liberty, [sic.], n.d.; [ibid.], "Just Cause Civil - Military Operations," n.d.; U.S. Southern Command, "Command Briefing on Operation Just Cause," n.d., all in USASOC Archives; John T. Fishel, "The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the

Restoration of Panama," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania), 8-12, 21; Stuart Towns, "To Promote the Peace: A Brief History of the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade (Pensacola: 27 December 1995) 23-24.

²⁶Shultz, "Post-Conflict Use of Military Forces 149, 151. Thurman quotation *ibid.*; Fishel, "Fog of Peace," 29-31.

²⁷Schultz, "Aftermath of War," 47; quotation, *ibid.*, 55.

²⁸Opinion of MG William F. Ward, Chief of U.S. Army Reserve, in COL Herbert J. Smith, "Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) Executive Summary Observations 'Just Cause/Promote Liberty'", n.p., n.d., USASOC History Archives.

²⁹Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Bulletin: Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned* (October 1990), II-20-21.

³⁰Task List, S3 Section, CMOTF, n.d., USASOC History Archives.

³¹Douglas K. Meyer, "Civil Affairs in Panama: Is CA a Viable Asset for Future Conflicts?", Air War College Associate Studies Research Report (November 1990), 18; SFC Ben Davis, oral interview with author, 19 January 1993, 5-6; Miles, 6. A much smaller DC facility was opened in the Colon area., Meyer, 20. The DC facility was popular with combat unit GIs in that it gave them an excuse to dump their old, unwanted, MREs. Cases of the old military comestibles were distributed in the camp, opening the way for the issuing of the newer, and more popular, version., U.S. Southern Command, "Command Briefing on Operation Just Cause," n.d., 38; *ibid.*, "Promoting [sic.] Liberty," n.p.; Greenhut, 75-78; Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Just Cause: Lessons Learned*, (October 1990), III-23.

³²*Ibid.*, 18-19; SFC Davis oral interview, 3, 5; group oral interview, Company B, 96th CA Battalion, with MAJ Robert P. Cook, 326th Military History Detachment, 11 April 1990, 2, 7.

³³Grant Willis, "Panama: Did Politics Railroad Reserve Call-Up?", *Army Times* (11 June 1990).

³⁴Frederick C. Oelrich, "The 200K Call-Up: Just Cause vs. Desert Shield," *Special Warfare* (March 1992), 19; J. Greenhut, "To Promote Liberty: Army Reserve Civil Affairs in the Invasion of Panama, December 1989-April 1990," typescript (n.d., n.p.) 17. (LTC Greenhut's work was written under the official auspices of USACAPOC.)

³⁵Lord, 4-5. One authority believes that CA units were not called up due to concerns about political repercussions with Latin American nations., Douglas K. Meyer, "Civil Affairs in Panama: Is a CA a Viable Asset for Future Conflicts?" (Randolph AFB, San Antonio, Texas: November 1990), 8. USARSOC was looking for volunteers with skills in public safety, transportation, public works and utilities, public administration, Dislocated Civilians, public health, public communications and clerical and communications., *ibid.*, 12-13. Meyer assesses the volunteer expedient "worked extremely well....", *ibid.*, 27; JULLS Long Report 22643-20620 (00057) for an analysis of the problems caused by the reliance on volunteers.

³⁶Fishel, 68. See also Willis. See similar conclusions in anon., "Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) Executive Summary Observations 'Just Cause/Promote Liberty,'" 1. Orders for each volunteer specified that "You are ordered to active duty with your

consent," causing some of these volunteers to have difficulties with their civilian employers; in some cases, for example, they lost their health benefits, and those benefits for their dependents were not immediately picked up by the military health system. Greenhut, 17, 36.

³⁷"Civil Military Operations" (no pagination).

³⁸Ibid., 34; Oelrich, 19-20; Schultz, "Aftermath of War," 45-46, 57-58.

³⁹Greenhut, 25. Quotation from General James J. Lindsay, oral interview with Dr. John W. Partin, (31 July 1990).

⁴⁰Lord, 6; Meyer, 16, 12, 28; Fishel, 40; Schultz article, 157; *ibid.*, "Aftermath of War," 62-63.

⁴¹Fishel, 29. Fishel points out that U.S. planners must have been aware of Panama's long history of urban disorders., *ibid.*, 29. "Inside the Invasion," *Newsweek* (25 June 1990); Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "The Post-Conflict Use of Military Forces: Lessons from Panama, 1989-91," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (June 1993), 154; SFC Davis oral interview, 7.

⁴²Fishel, 45; *ibid.*, and Richard D. Downie, "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions? Establishing Order and Stability in Panama," *Military Review* (April 1992), 66; Woerner quote, Schultz, "Aftermath of War," 43; "Civil Military Operations."

⁴³Meyer, 23-24; Greenhut, 69-70.

⁴⁴Fishel, 37; Greenhut, 74.

⁴⁵"Civil Military Operations" (no pagination).

⁴⁶Fishel, 44-45. Commander, USMG, Memorandum for Commanding General JTF-PM, Subject: Public Forces Program (26 January 1990). COL Steele quoted President Arias as believing that firing every member of the old PDF would have immediately disenfranchised thousands of men who would have reacted with the only skill that many of them possessed-pulling triggers and beating people. For a detailed treatment of attempts to build a Civilianized Panamanian public safety force, see John T. Fishel, "Taking Responsibility for Our Actions? Establishing Order and Stability in Panama," *Military Review* (April 1992); Schultz, 155, 157, 160, 100-101; *ibid.*, "Aftermath of War," 67-70, MSG chief quotation, *ibid.*, 82. ICITAP's director ignorantly opined that "The U.S. military does not understand civilian police-community relations." This would indeed be news to those CA veterans who had reestablished democratic police systems in Germany, Japan and Austria. The MSG commander, in turn, wondered about the cultural awareness and sensitivity of ITICAP, *ibid.*, 159-160; Greenhut, 73; John Sell, "Panamanian Police Officers Receive Boost from Uniforms," *Tropic Times* (30 March 1990), 6.

⁴⁷Donna Miles, "A Real-Life Mission Helping Real-Life People," *Soldiers* (April 1990), 8; Transcript, oral history group interview, Company B, 96th CA Battalion, with R. P. Cook (326th Military History Detachment), 11 April 1990, Fort Bragg, NC, 10; Schultz, 155. According to one officer involved in the process, "they trickled into Panama one by one.", *ibid.*

⁴⁸Special Operations Command, (U)"Operation Just Cause: Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)" Final After-Action Report (SECRET) (15 March 1990), 7-9 (Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.); *ibid.*, (U)"Operation Just Cause Final After Action

Report," SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED (15 March 1990), 6-7 (info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴⁹Ibid., (U)" Operation Just Cause Final After Action Report," SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED (15 March 1990), 6-7 (info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

⁵⁰Ibid., 16. CA SFC Ben Johnson pointed out the real contribution of local priests and missions. "They helped with translation, distribution of food, getting vehicles for us to pick up food with and give us the intelligence...they knew who the bad guys were or [who] used to be bad guys.", oral interview with author, 19 January 1993, 2, 13; *ibid.*, 6 for weapons turn-in. Weapons turn-in also in 96th group oral interview, 12-13.

⁵¹Lord, 6; Meyer, 9, 12, 15. Meyer also points out that in the absence of unit call-ups and military orders, RC CA volunteers often experienced difficulties in obtaining releases from their employers., *ibid.*, 11. More positively, the space of time between their selection on 22 December and their departure for Panama on the 24th of that month had to be one of the most expeditious RC mobilizations in history., *ibid.* A good overview of CA ministries teams is found in SOUTHCOM (?) "Just Cause Civil-Military Operations" and "Civil Military Operations Task Forces (CMOTF), Operation Promoting [sic.] Liberty," briefing paper slides, n.d., USASOC Archives.

⁵²Greenhut, 64-66.

⁵³Fishel, 38.

⁵⁴Shultz, 78-79.

⁵⁵Greenhut, 82-83. For an informative account of the activities of the CMOTF/CATF Humanitarian Assistance Team, see the team's After-Action report (n.d.), USASOC History Archives.

⁵⁶Meyer, 26.

⁵⁷Fishel, "Aftermath," 105, 109-110; Shultz, "Post-Conflict Use," 162.

⁵⁸Fishel, "Aftermath," 125; Shultz, "Post-Conflict," 165.

⁵⁹"Civil Military Operations." (no pagination). See also Lawrence A. Yates, Joint Task Force Panama: Just Cause - Before and After," *Military Review*. (October 1991); USASOC "Just Cause 'Promote Liberty'" (2 May 1990), USASOC History Archives.

XIII

DESERT SHIELD/STORM AND PROVIDE COMFORT

"What a history - what a job. I'm in charge of Ur!" (CPT J. L. Todd)

It would certainly be correct to say that in no previous conflict had U.S. forces so completely triumphed in so short a time as in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. The remnants of the debilitating "Post-Vietnam War Syndrome" were well and truly laid to rest in the wake of that victorious 100-hour war. Here was the first large-scale test of the all-volunteer Army and of the "Total Army" (that is, Reserve and Active Component units and personnel considered equal in resources and contributions) and it was America's first post-Cold War conflict. This was also the U.S. military's first major involvement with a thoroughly alien society, different in race, culture and religion, but not necessarily of the Third World.¹

U.S. Army Civil Affairs operations in Southwest Asia were also the most complicated and extensive since World War II although concentrated within a much smaller time span. Between summer 1990 and spring 1991 U.S. Army CA personnel were involved in the occupation of hostile territory (southern Iraq), the liberation of a friendly nation (Kuwait) and a unique intrusive humanitarian relief mission (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT for refugee Kurds in northern Iraq). Virtually every CA unit participated in at least one of these operations.

There remained one constant with America's past conflicts; after the battle, after that 100 hours victory, the work of Civil Affairs troops was in many ways just beginning. For once, "lessons learned" from a previous campaign were truly learned, as RC CA units were mobilized and deployed as units, their personnel bringing with them their vast range of civilian experiences and skills.²

At the start of the Southeast Asian military buildup the Army carried 37 CA units within its structure with a total of 4,822 personnel of all grades. By this time Civil Affairs was an Army branch in the Reserves, was also a part of the Army's regimental system and officers and enlisted personnel wore distinctive branch and regimental insignias. The AC officers assigned to CA were not assigned to the Branch but were eligible for a CA specialty designator and skill code. There was still no proponent designated for CA at the Department of Defense (DoD) level, and this duty devolved by default upon the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, which, in fact, did a fine job during the Gulf War. RC CA units were by now the beneficiaries of a much larger process of consolidation and emphasis on Special Operations Forces (SOF) as well as the military build-up of the Reagan years.

The main joint U.S. headquarters, Central Command (CENTCOM), which had responsibility for the Southwest Asia Theater was not prepared to deal with civilians in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of neighboring Kuwait. CENTCOM had not been involved in the Panama invasion and had little understanding of, or interest or experience in Civil Affairs. Third U.S. Army, although it had a separate G5, saw little need for CA during Operation DESERT SHIELD, the initial defensive buildup in the wake of the Iraqi invasion. The reasoning was that because U.S. forces were in a defensive mode there would be no need for military government. Planners simply assumed that operations would take place in underpopulated areas ("just sand.")³ As a RC CA officer who had been working in the PSYOPS/Civil Affairs Division in the Pentagon on TTAD remembered soon after, "Civil Affairs really was not considered to be,...an important part of the J5 operation."⁴

Planning for a U.S. Civil Affairs response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait began with a tasking from 1st SOCOM to the 96th CA Battalion (A), the Army's only active duty CA unit, on 4 August 1990, a mere two days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to place a CA planner in the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) at Fort Bragg allotted to XVIII Airborne Corps. Four days later the battalion received a Joint Chiefs of Staff deployment order which listed its mission as: Provide Civil Affairs support to ARCENT (U.S. Army Central Command), handle dislocated civilians in the area of operations and support other service components of CENTCOM as required." The battalion dispatched support teams to the 5th Special Forces Group (A), the 24th Infantry Division and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) during the balance of August 1990. The Joint Staff, displaying considerably greater appreciation of the importance of CA than some subordinate commands, was well aware that the deployment of the 96th would leave other theaters "uncovered." However, the Chairman of the JCS was determined that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT) get the CA resources that he needed.⁵

On the 27th, a 96th assessment team, consisting of the battalion commander (LTC Michael Peters) and his staff, deployed to Saudi Arabia to determine the need for CA assets in the area. By this time, the 96th commander was "dual-hatted," serving as Army Central Command (ARCENT) G5 as well.⁶ All of this was taking place at a time when the exact U.S. response to the Iraqi aggression was still being determined. Upon its arrival in Saudi Arabia, the 96th's team early on had the mission of mobilizing host nation tactical unit support.⁷

At this early stage of DESERT SHIELD the 96th's assessment team did not consider the option of supporting an offensive operation. The assessments, however, did show that additional personnel were needed, and other 96th assets were soon deployed. Company A manned a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) at HQ U.S. Air Force Central Command (CENTAF). Company A was replaced by RC CA personnel in December and was then temporarily positioned to support VIIth Corps. Company B initially supported the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st and 24th Infantry divisions, the 1st Cavalry Regiment, the 16th Military Police Brigade (XVIII Airborne

Corps), Corps Artillery, 3d Corps Support Command (COSCOM), Rear Area Operations Center (ROAC) and XVIII Airborne Corps G5. It then was replaced by Reserve CA personnel in XVIII Airborne Corps and was subsequently attached to the French 6th Light Armored Division. Company C commenced host nation support and then assisted the U.S. Consulate in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in repatriation activities. Company D would provide direct support of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) during the combat phase of operations. The battalion also maintained liaison with the U.S. Marine Corps Central Command (MARCENT) and the Marine 3d CA Group. This initial work of the 96th was essential because among the Coalition forces only Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had even a rudimentary CA capability.

In the words of the 96th commanding officer, "So what they did when they got on the ground was find out what the divisions needed, and find out how to get it, and get it lined up." The 96th's troops had for the most part primary military occupation specialties in the combat and special operations fields. (In fact a majority then were not CA-qualified, but then, many RC CA unit personnel also were not CA qualified.) They were thus familiar with the needs of the tactical units. For example, the battalion secured thousands of Bedouin tents from Saudi sources to house U.S. troops arriving in country. The 96th's teams did encounter transportation problems, in that the majority of their vehicles had to be left at Fort Bragg. A less-expected tactical unit support mission was the rounding up of scores of junked Saudi automobile hulks for VII Corps artillery practice. The 96th also took upon itself the task of keeping wandering Bedouin off the firing range. The 96th's commander also noted that the Saudis had arranged for NBC protective gear --for their own citizens. LTC Carl T. Sahlin (LTC Peters' successor after November 1990) pointed out the disastrous effect of any enemy NBC attack on unprotected third country nationals.⁸

Nonetheless, ASDSO/LIC early became convinced that the 96th was "operating beyond its capability and was not able to conduct an adequate assessment of this magnitude." There was a feeling that the 96th, configured as a Direct Support unit ("fire brigade") sometimes lacked an understanding of the broader assets that a RC CA unit could bring to the field. On the other hand, although at first the 96th could not foresee much of a CA mission in Southwest Asia, it soon reversed itself and recommended the calling of RC units to support the operation. The 96th commander felt that "We didn't need them [RC CA units] in the defense phase. We needed the tactical companies."⁹ That attitude changed as planning moved to the offensive phase.

Meanwhile, a Kuwaiti World Bank official had taken the lead in establishing the 20-man Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program (KERP) in mid-September, drawing upon the considerable financial and personnel resources of the Kuwait government in exile. Kuwait expatriate officials soon realized, however, that they would need help and looked to the U.S. State Department, which, in turn, directed the Government of Kuwait (GOK) exiled officials in the U.S. to the Department of Defense.

By this time the more prescient of U.S. officials were beginning to realize that President George Bush had meant what he said when he proclaimed that Iraq's conquest of Kuwait "will not stand." Kuwait was hardly a model of democracy, as numerous pundits were pointing out at the time, but, then, neither had been Poland on the eve of the Nazi invasion in 1939. The Bush administration, and eventually most of the United Nations, believed that the consequences of acquiescing in such a blatant violation of a nation's sovereignty would likely prove disastrous.

The DOD Joint Staff J5 delivered an effective briefing on its reconstruction assets to GOK officials, resulting in an unprecedented letter from the Emir of Kuwait (actually drafted by ASD/SOLIC) to President Bush on 9 October, specifically requesting Civil Affairs aid for the rebuilding of Kuwait. The letter then floundered within the State and Defense bureaucracies for some six weeks. There was opposition within the Office of the JCS and DA to becoming involved in a long-term non-military project that could divert resources from military operations. Other DA officers indicated that if the Army did have to go ahead with Kuwait relief it would prefer to accomplish such a mission with AC logisticians rather than RC CA soldiers. (The JCS Joint Civil Affairs Committee was apparently never activated, although the JCS CA Action Officer had so recommended.) Those most concerned with forwarding a DOD CA mission were the Assistant Secretaries for International Affairs, for SO/LIC and for Reserve Affairs. Their views prevailed and on the evening of 21 November the Director of the Joint Staff reluctantly gave his approval for the formation of the Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF) (officially 352d CA Augmentation), calling upon personnel from the 352d and its subordinate units.

As one authority points out, "The birth of the KTF was pure serendipity." It was result of the coincidence that Dr. Randall Elliott, a senior analyst in the State Department's Near East division, was at the same time Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the 352d Civil Affairs Command (Riverdale, Maryland). Furthermore, his office at State was just across the hall from that of his good friend, Edward Gnehm, the U.S. Ambassador-designate to Kuwait. Dr./COL Elliott personally informed and briefed surprised State Department officials and Ambassador Gnehm as to what Army assets were available for assistance to that occupied nation. Those assets could not be acquired by any AC officer during his normal 20-30 year career, but they were readily available in the RC. They included (in the words of the Deputy Commander, Third U.S. Army and the commander of Task Force Freedom), "executives at the State Department, managers of utility companies, public school administrators, lawyers, firemen, doctors, mechanics, policemen, to college students and day-care center administrators."¹⁰

At the request of the exiled Kuwaiti authorities, the Joint Staff provided a briefing for the Kuwaitis on 4 October. The Kuwaiti Ambassador, over the signature of the Emir of Kuwait, then presented a request, drawn up by OASD/SO-LIC, to President Bush for assistance

in putting together an emergency and recovery program. More specifically, we have an immediate and pressing need for certain specialties and expertise resident, among other agencies, in the United States Department of Defense.¹¹

U.S. authorities did not exactly fall over themselves in responding to the request. For some six weeks there was considerable to-ing and fro-ing between DOD and State as each tried to work ways to respond to the Emir's request. The Army proved extremely reluctant to become involved in a long term non-military project which would divert resources from military operations and, in fact, believed that the reconstruction of Kuwait would best be carried out by the State Department. (Shades of Franklin D. Roosevelt!)¹² If the Department of Defense had to become involved, both that service and the DOD's Emergency Planning Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy felt that the mission should be carried out by an *ad hoc* group, composed of representatives from various elements of the force structure, such as Medical, Military Police, Communications, Engineers, Quartermaster, etc. BG Mooney, 352d Commander, also thought that "DA people were a little uncomfortable that no clear line of authority existed from someone [in DA] to the KTF. The DA people were uncomfortable with the fact that the KTF would be working in the city of Washington, D.C., in many cases in civilian clothes, and because the KTF was in association with the Kuwaitis on a daily basis." The general pointed out that many of his "civilian soldiers" were Vietnam combat veterans, held the Combat Infantryman's Badge and some were also Special Forces qualified.¹³

It was as though the lessons of every U.S. conflict since at least World War II were being studiously ignored. What else but the U.S. Army had been the prime engine of development in the western United States, put former slaves to compensated labor and protected voters' rights in the former Confederacy, cleaned up and rebuilt Cuba, organized the reconstruction and democratization of its occupation zones of Germany, Japan, Korea and Austria after World War II or rehabilitated the infrastructures of South Vietnam, Grenada and Panama?¹⁴ However, DOD had been left holding the financial "bag" for CA Operations in JUST CAUSE when other government agencies had reneged on their promises to contribute. Furthermore, the infamous "Vietnam Syndrome" lingered, with something of a national policy against calling up the reserves, as "escalatory." President George Bush, however, a decorated World War II combat veteran, seemed immune to such mental anguish, and DESERT SHIELD saw the first use of the Presidential 200,000 call-up authority.¹⁵

OASD/SOLIC finally determined that the mission for Kuwait fell fully within CA doctrine and the Kuwaiti Task Force was activated on 1 December 1990.¹⁶ COL Elliott served as the primary liaison between the State Department and DOD. Most of the KTF's work comprised the advising on and tracking of contracts for the rebuilding of the nation, and generally assumed a "worst case" scenario. Some \$528,000,000 worth of contracts were developed by the KTF. Eventually the KTF numbered 63

personnel, 57 of whom were Army RC CA officers. These officers were Reservists mobilized principally from the 352d and consisted of personnel with civilian expertise in most of the 20 CA functions. Several of these officers brought with them their CA experiences in Panama. As a result of their good working relationship with the U.S. personnel of the KTF, the Kuwaitis would sign no contract or even talk substantially with anyone else. The bulk of the KTF planning was devoted to the drafting of Civil Affairs Annex G to the CENTCOM and ARCENT operational plans. However, the KTF was operating in a planning vacuum, as noted, with CENTCOM and ARCENT concentrating on the immediate restoration of services.¹⁷ A major planning shortcoming at this time was the failure of the GOK to retain the services of oil well fire fighters until after Saddam Hussein's large-scale igniting of so many Kuwaiti oil facilities, a strange omission considering that Kuwait's practically sole source of wealth was its oil. The 352d, on the other hand, had specifically instructed its 304th CA Group (Philadelphia) to develop a scenario dealing with the extinguishing of potential oil facilities fires, but the Government of Kuwait had not followed through on this initiative.¹⁸ Nonetheless, the KTF's commander, BG Mooney, accurately described the relationship between the KTF and the exile Kuwaitis as "very good" and the senior liaison officer from the 352d/KTF termed it "outstanding."¹⁹

To avoid the unhappy Panama fiscal experience the Secretary of the Joint Staff directed COL Elliott to involve as much of the U.S. government as possible. By the time the KTF had deployed to Southwest Asia, some 27 separate federal agencies, including the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) which provided the KTF's Executive Officer. Kuwaiti officials were generally ignorant of ways to respond to disaster, for their land had never suffered any natural or man-made disaster in modern times. The KTF therefore organized briefings for KERP from OFDA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Army Corps of Engineers. (The latter brought on board at the insistence of the KTF.) Here was another "lesson learned" from JUST CAUSE. The Department of the Army found itself responsible for the reconstitution of Panama after U.S. government civilian agencies, as noted above, had reneged on their promises to become involved.²⁰

An initial trivial disagreement about KTF office space and furniture could be said to have set the tone for the general relationship between DA and the KTF at the time. DA representatives were also conspicuous by their absence from the KTF while it was in the Washington, DC area. Most importantly from the Army viewpoint, the KTF was not in the CENTCOM chain of command. This also meant, as noted, that the KTF would not be in on the very close-hold CENTCOM planning for the liberation of Kuwait.²¹ Further, 3d U.S. Army and CENTCOM would not at the time forward any intelligence from Saudi Arabia, and what intel the 352d had it could not share with the Kuwaitis because of security considerations.

By mid-November, however, there did at least come a realization that significant numbers of civilians might very well be involved in forthcoming Coalition military operations. Saudi authorities quietly evacuated civilians during school holidays

prior to the beginning of the ground war. Until then, DC policy had been, in the succinct words of one officer of the 360th CA brigade (Columbia, South Carolina), "we're not going to get involved with DCs."²² CENTCOM now purchased substantial amounts of shelter materials, bottled and bulk water, medicines, food, etc.

The KTF was, after a series of "on-again-off-again" alert orders, which saw its commander, BG Mooney, being activated and inactivated three times (The KTF's command devolved upon COL Elliott) finally called to active duty on 1 December 1990. It deployed to Saudi Arabia, arriving on 31 January and immediately found itself being pulled three ways: "ARCENT wanted most of it, CENTCOM wanted some of it; Ambassador Gnehm wanted the KTF intact". BG Mooney, finally mobilized with the rest of the 352d, wanted to reincorporate the KTF members into their respective CA units. The parties concerned worked out a compromise in which the KTF generally remained as a single entity. Ambassador Gnehm, mindful of the deleterious effects of a continued barrier between the KTF and ARCENT/CENTCOM, spoke directly with General Schwarzkopf to assign a handful of KTF officers to liaison duties at ARCENT and CENTCOM. The majority of KTF officers continued to plan with the Kuwaitis, although their efforts now shifted to the emergency restoration of services.²³ Further KTF planning now shifted from long-term reconstruction to that of the emergency restoration of services.

As soon as it had arrived in Saudi, the KTF began to assemble "push packages" of supplies for emergency supplies when Kuwait was liberated. The packages, of course, had to be ready for timely forwarding by a truck fleet. However, General Schwarzkopf's logistics chief insisted to COL Elliott that "there's not a god damn truck [available] in Saudi Arabia" as all had been taken up with the Coalition armies' massive move to the west under Saddam's nose. COL Elliott knew, however, that the Kuwaitis were part-owners of a large Saudi trucking firm, and day following General Pagonis' remark, 150 rented trucks were awaiting the KTF.²⁴

ARCENT and CENTCOM had originally foreseen little use for CA, despite promptings by ARCENT G-5, and, in fact, even seemed to be in some doubt of its existence. The only operations plan for Kuwait City unrealistically envisaged either a peaceful Iraqi withdraw from the city or its clearing exclusively by Coalition Arab forces. ARCENT only began to plan for Kuwait after being ordered to do so by the CENTCOM Political-Military Division of the Policy, Plans and Strategy Directorate (CCJ-5). The CCJ-5 action officer at the time was a Major who carried CA as an additional duty. Because the KTF had no formal relationship with CENTCOM, the former received almost no information concerning the latter's plans, while CENTCOM itself knew relatively little about the KTF's activities and intentions. A further, more doctrinal, difference arose from the fact that ARCENT/CENTCOM planned for short-term emergency services in Kuwait, while the KTF concerned itself with the rehabilitation of the nation's infrastructure. The ARCENT staff kept telling its G-5 that "we don't have to worry about that because we are not staying. It's

not going to be a long-term thing." In the words of the 352d CA Command's After Action Report, the KTF "barely existed from the ARCENT perspective."²⁵ A JULS report later claimed that "Combat (and to a lesser degree CS and CSS commanders and line officers) were generally uninformed or misinformed as to CA capabilities and limitations. One cmdr thought he was getting a bunch of interpreters."²⁶ The 414th CA Company (Utica, New York) reported that "Most units did not know what to 'do with' a Civil Affairs unit and CA advance parties arriving in Saudi found that the tactical and support units to which they were assigned often did not even know that they were coming."²⁷ This ignorance was illustrated during a late December 1990 briefing at ARCENT headquarters by one of the officers of the 96th to "everybody wearing stars in that theater," on civil-military responsibilities. The presentation provoked some negative reaction. General Franks, for one, contended that his major mission was the destruction of Saddam's Republican Guard "and somebody else ought to handle all these civilians in his area." However, the ARCENT Commander, LTG John General Yeosock countered that "like it or not [,] civilians in [the commanders'] area are your problem...they were a command responsibility, and all you generals out there, use your civil affairs forces to handle them; that's what I gave you these CA forces for."²⁸ As the Secretary of the Army exclaimed in some exasperation:

A Civil Affairs Colonel who is a municipal planner or an expert in some type of municipal service, who's called to active duty [should] not have to first explain his credentials and why he's been called. That took place repeatedly during the Gulf War.²⁹

In the words of the 352d's Chief of Public Security and Safety Team:

we had an extremely difficult time being accepted because CENTCOM J-5 was suspicious of us, could not understand our mission with the Kuwait Gov't, wearing civilian clothes and/or living in civilian hotel w[ith] Kuwaitis. Over time, they finally came to understand our mission.³⁰

The 96th's commander also spoke of a the lack of awareness of the CA mission. ("Okay, civil affairs, here's some news releases for you.")³¹ An unpublished report by an SF and a CA officer concluded "tactical commanders were often unaware of the full scope of a CA unit's capabilities, indicating a need for including instruction on CA doctrine, missions, and capabilities in all branch officer basic courses, all branch officer advanced courses, the Command and General Staff Course, and the War College."³² The late arrival of RC CA units also posed its own problem. In the words of one tactical support RC CA unit (the 450th CA Company, Riverdale Maryland) "I

think the tendency was when we arrived, 'Well, now that you're here, we've been doing without you for so long, why do we need you here?'³³

On the other hand, CENTCOM CC-J-5 made its own blistering response, also unpublished:

No mission identified for CA people, No mission provided at USARSOC for CA people...Team leadership lacking; Team mission lacking, Personnel selection faulty (physical qualifications, functional expertise), Over emphasis on SOF validation; No emphasis on development of plan for CA to support warfighters or to support post-war activities....Limited guidance/interaction....Politics (buddy system). 352d not proactive. Also failed to provide leadership/ guidance. No plans developed; when finally developed at the behest of the CG, USARSOC, plan was poorly presented to CG, not staffed, did not include subordinate units, not in proper format. Unit determined to be 'broken' by CG...Team concept ill-defined....Rank structure excessively high (more supervisors than doers). KTF (352-) has no concept of the chain of command; fails to understand that they are not DOS [Department of State] assets, but rather work for DOD (political vs. military)....Delusions of grandeur (50 % submitted for Bronze Stars!!!)....Lip service to training....Poor reputation - CA assets not seen as the doers --"Joe Snuffy" tank driver doing all the work. Organizational expertise/management/leadership skills non existent from 07 down.³⁴

The rationale throughout the command of the 96th CA Battalion was that the senior RC CA headquarters in Panama had not handled itself well and that the Reservists were "whiners." The USACAPOC Inspector General did conclude that "Many reserve personnel were not mentally or physically prepared to go to war."³⁵

The CA planning situation began to improve in early December when a seven-member team from the 352d joined CENTCOM as the augmented CCJ-5, some 130 days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The expanded CCJ-5's planners were by then finally cognizant of the operational plans for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, particularly the combat phase, and began to work from two basic assumptions: that in the liberation of Kuwait the U.S. would be assisting a sovereign nation, but that in southern Iraq they would be occupiers, and thus liable under the Geneva Convention for the protection and welfare of the civil population there.³⁶

Because the vast majority of CA units would come from the Army, ARCENT was designated as the CA executive agent, and despite discouragement from the ARCENT staff, planned for the occupation of southern Iraq. It also planned for the arrival of CA units and their assignment but would allow the corps and division commanders the determination of how those CA units would be employed. In the end,

XVIII Airborne Corps, because of its experience with CA in Panama, adopted a fairly broad application of Civil Affairs. The VII Corps, because of its previous European environment, adopted a host nation support mode, or Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). It was also significant that XVIII Airborne Corps's G-5 was very experienced in the field and that VII Corps' was not.³⁷

The ARCENT, thanks in large measure to COL Elliott's briefings and "lobbying," established the Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF), with the 352d, again, as the core, two days after the 17 January 1991 opening of the air war against Iraq. That war seemed to proceed generally removed from civil-military or political-military considerations, with little, if any liaison with CA. The Iraqi electric power grid, for example, was put out of operation with little regard for the long-term impact of this action upon the civil population, even though planners had correctly anticipated a short-term war.³⁸

The 352d CA Command itself was mobilized on 25 January and now included General Mooney. However, in violation of CA doctrine, the 12 CA companies now in theater were not attached to the CATF/352d, but rather remained with the divisions and corps, which were reluctant to release them, although the 431st CA Company (North Little Rock, Arkansas) and 432d CA Company (Greenbay, Wisconsin) were eventually released to the CATF/352d. With these exceptions, the 352d would control no assets but its own troops. Food, water, trucks, medical supplies, etc., would have to come from the Government of Kuwait and ARCENT support.³⁹ Further, the RC capstone alignments were almost universally ignored.⁴⁰ On the other hand, USACAPOC was able to employ an efficient data bank to select RC personnel for various CA specialties.⁴¹

The mobilization itself could be chaotic, and has remained controversial, or at least vividly remembered, among most who underwent the process at Fort Bragg. The commander of the 353d CA Command (The Bronx, New York City) recalled "the mobilization process that we used was simply to get on board a plane." A USACAPOC G-3 Plans officer noted that approval to mobilize RC CA and PSYOP units required the concurrence of USASOC, USSOCOM, HQDA and JCS, and claimed that "Other DOD agencies seem to be able to bring their RC forces onto AD [Active Duty] virtually overnight;"⁴² Many units were originally "Capstoned" to different units and mobilized to proceed to other locations, such as Forts McCoy, Dix or McClellan, for mobilization. They found that they then had not only to change all of their transport arrangements, but that procedures perfectly acceptable at the previous mobilization sites were thrown out at Fort Bragg and had to be done all over. The assigned barracks were overcrowded, dilapidated abominations with three shower heads for some 150 personnel, about twice the number for which the structures had been designed. A wide variety of respiratory diseases multiplied and spread through the close quarters, aggravated by the unusually cold, humid December weather. There was a strong feeling that USACAPOC simply was unable to handle the 2,500 to 3,000 RC CA troopers simultaneously being processed at the post.⁴³ The 304th Group, the first

RC CA unit to achieve full deployment status, reported later that "Billeting, equipment storage, classroom space, and nighttime training areas were insufficient and inadequate." The 407th CA Company (St. Paul, Minnesota) wrote of "an emotional roller coaster that lasted until we were alerted for real." The commander concluded that he "never drew a regular pay check. I drew casual pay up until the last month that I was there." His troops had major and embarrassing problems inadvertently trying to pay their bills back home with worthless checks. The 418th CA Company (Belton, Missouri) noted that "no one would give us any solid information until the week before the first detachment was activated."⁴⁴ The commander of the 354th CA Brigade (Riverdale, Maryland) blisteringly reported:

Little cooperation or understanding of unit level problems by USACAPOC. Focus was on deployment [,] with no guidance on training in preparation for MCO or the AO or the theater area. USACAPOC was interested in meeting deployment statistics, not training. Emphasis was on SOF validation and PT. Little or no concern was given to deploying a functional CA unit, only [on] completing equipment roundout and meeting SOF validation.....The command exhibited negative pressure (implied and explicit threats and retribution for not complying with forced timetables and deadlines) and a lack of organized assistance to achieve unit readiness to work in Saudi Arabia.⁴⁵

One episode seemed at least to symbolize the lack of understanding of RC CA mission on the part of the Active Component Army. MAJ (P) Orpheo "Chuck" Trombetta, Jr. had been attached to the Office of the Secretary, Department of the Army General Staff and was a member of the 352d CA command, and thus was not exactly a novice to staff work. MAJ (P) Trombetta pulled G-5 duty officer at XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, Fort Bragg, and every morning would brief its Deputy Commander on the build-up of DESERT SHIELD. The latter officer would remark on occasion that "We need to keep the Reserves out of this battle! This is an active duty battle!" On about the fourth iteration of that assertion, the Corps Chief of Staff gently pushed the Deputy Commander in the ribs and informed him that "Sir, everybody in this room is a Reservist,....They are helping man your twenty-four [hour] operation, because the force has gone forward."⁴⁶ The Commander of the 407th CA Company pointed out at the time that all of these problems occurred on the heels of "The absolute emotional and physical pandemonium of being notified three days before Christmas, reporting two days after Christmas, moving to Fort Bragg three days later and THEN NOT DEPLOYING FOR 30 some days."⁴⁷

Major difficulties and disagreements arose from the decision of BG Joseph Hurteau, USACAPOC Commanding General, a reservist with extensive Vietnam and Special Operations experience, to hold his mobilizing RC CA and PSYOP personnel to Army SOF standards and to apply those standards strictly. However, to have sent

mobilization validation teams to each Capstone mobilization facility would have overtax General Hurteau's limited resources. Thus the USASOC Commanding General approved General Hurteau's recommendation that Fort Bragg be designated as the RC CA and PSYOP mobilization base. This decision eased command and control problems and permitted more efficient cross-leveling of personnel and equipment. Both the SOF standards and the mobilization installation decision, however, provoked considerable resentment among many RC elements. In the end, except for the Kuwait Task Force and 352d CA Command Headquarters, all CA and PSYOP personnel deploying to southwest Asia were processed and validated out of Fort Bragg.⁴⁸ As for the meeting of SOF standards, it is difficult to disagree with the Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, when he asserted that

The old argument that I know he is 35 pounds overweight, but he is the greatest this or that won't prevail...I am telling you, he can be the greatest everything, but if you cannot get him in the door, nobody will listen to him.⁴⁹

Or, as one CA officer assigned to the Third Armored Cavalry (and himself a former armored Cav officer) recalled with some gratitude,

It [holding to SOF physical standards] really helped us in the desert....I lived in a CUCV....I think that's part of the job if you're going to be forward with those types of units.⁵⁰

It also helped that BG Hurteau could be seen on mornings jogging along with the troops.⁵¹

To be fair, some of the criticism of the SOF standard requirement was more than just "gripping." The views of one reservist officer from the 404th CA Company (Trenton, New Jersey), but deployed with the 304th Group merit consideration:

We had been under USACAPOC only about a year or so, and the validation process had just come in....It was kind of a culture shock as far as this "validation" process. It caused a lot of problems, because the people weren't ready to do that, and we didn't have the adequate time to do it on a IAT [Inactive Drill Time] basis.⁵²

Most RC CA units called up for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were poorly equipped and USACAPOC had to expend much time and money to bring these units up to minimal standards for deployment in the desert. ("We didn't have computers, we didn't have telephones, we didn't have radios, we didn't have vehicles." --a 352d officer)⁵³ The most egregious shortages included repair parts, radios, particularly secure sets; telephones, night vision goggles, lensatic compasses, and

Lorens or Magellan navigation equipment (all vital for desert operations). Many units had to obtain by one means or another this equipment from their supported organizations, or resorted to couriers. Most RC CA units were not authorized HMMWVs and had to make do with the obsolescent CUCV, an aging militarized version of the Chevrolet Blazer, which had four-wheel drive and a diesel engine but which could not keep up with fast-moving tactical units in the field. The commander of a combat support RC CA unit noted that

There are no spare parts in the 82d Airborne Division for our vehicles that we can get to. We need HMMWVs and we need them badly so that we are compatible with the 82d. We had these civilian vehicles [CUCVs]. You could not keep up with a HMMWV in the difficult terrain. A HMMWV can take a bump that will put you in intensive care in the civilian vehicle.⁵⁴

Very few civilian vehicles could be commandeered in Kuwait City because the Iraqi occupiers had pulled off their tires and shipped the tires back to Iraq and then vandalized them; remaining intact vehicles had been hidden by their owners.

RC CA units also faced shortages of ammunition for the M16A1 rifle. Further, the RC CA personnel were deployed in the camouflage green Battle Dress Uniforms (BDUs) which made them stand out in the desert and among most other U.S. Army units, which had been re-equipped with the Desert Camouflage Uniforms (DCUs). The BDUs made the RC units conspicuous in the desert, could have caused casualties if combat had been more intense or prolonged, and did nothing for the "Total Army" concept.. Further, most CA assets attached to tactical units were not cleared to receive classified intelligence from the supported G-2, simply because such distribution was outside normal routine.⁵⁵

The 304th Group, which arrived in theater in late January 1991, replaced the 96th in the host nation support mission. The 304th had been specifically oriented toward Southwest Asia, worked with the Assistant Chief of Staff for Host Nation Support of 22d Support Command (SUPCOM) and immediately went to work providing land for base camps and warehouses as well as buses, trucks, lumber for latrines and showers and water. The DESERT SHIELD buildup phase was proceeding rapidly and there was no time to wait for such material to arrive from the States. Because there had never been a major U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia an adequate logistics infrastructure was simply not there and agreements had to be made with the Saudi government for "assistance in kind" for supplies, services and facilities for Coalition forces. There were also no status of forces agreement or host nation support understandings with the Saudi government. The sole point of contact for logistics between that government and the U.S. ground forces was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Host Nation Support (ACSHNS) of the recently-reactivated 22d Support Command, the focal point itself for combat service support. In fact, the 22d's host nation staff

consisted primarily of CA personnel, initially from the 96th and, after December of 1990, from the 304th CA Group.

With more than 300,000 U.S. troops in the area of operations, working in about as different a culture as anything imaginable from that of North America or Western Europe, incidents with the civilian population were inevitable. To a great extent, however, due to the initiatives of ACSHNA these were few and for the most part minor. The ACSHNA also assigned liaison officers to the eastern Saudi province police and civil defense headquarters, an arrangement that was put to good use on the night of 25 February 1991 when 28 U.S. RC soldiers were killed and 98 wounded after an Iraqi scud missile hit their billet in Khobar, Saudi Arabia.⁵⁶

For its part the 304th established two unique HNS teams. The first were the Special Liaison Teams which served as a link between the 304th and SUPCOM and other CA units or elements in theater to facilitate logistic support. The second were the small Mobile Contract Teams, which traveled out each day to identify the required goods and services of the supported units and to match them to host nation vendors. The troops were indebted to the 304th for their unfailing water supplies in the 120-degree heat as well as for the Saudi-catered twice daily meals. The 304th with its orientation toward the area (It had participated in every BRIGHT STAR exercise since 1985), also had the mission of making U.S. troops aware of the cultural imperatives of the Arab world. In the field, the Group also was involved in the burial of enemy dead and provision of religious materials to EPWs.

The 413th CA Company, capstoned to the 1st Cavalry Division, was able to coordinate access to water wells controlled by a local emir. Due to a misunderstanding, this worthy had previously refused division G-5 access to these wells. On the other hand, the sight of combat forces riding into battle in contracted civilian buses must have presented a somewhat less than professional image of Coalition military professionalism.⁵⁷ The 422d CA Company (Greensboro, North Carolina) formed Town Teams that provided constant liaison between its supported division (the 24th) and rear area civilians. The teams generally coordinated military activities with the local emirs and coordinated local contracts for vehicle repairs. The 404th CA Company set up a scud alert system for its area.⁵⁸

U.S. planners had been anticipating U.S. casualties so heavy that civilians would initially have to fend for themselves. However, with the growing realization that there would indeed be civilians in the line of fire and maneuver and that the Coalition, under international law, had to provide for their concentration and care, the resistance to CA involvement began to deteriorate.

In point of fact, not only were there dislocated civilians from occupied Kuwait, but also third country nationals from the Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, etc., uprooted by the Iraqis from their lives and their work. The 450th CA Company (RC), on its own initiative, developed a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for dealing with civilians, particularly procedures for "frisking" them and the determination of who was a civilian and who might be an enemy soldier in civilian

garb.⁵⁹ (To treat civilians as EPWs is a breach of the Geneva Conventions.) The 404th company also prepared itself by practicing Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT), with other CA units acting as "Arab civilians."⁶⁰

However, personnel of the 360th CA Company soon learned by experience that not all Saudi officials shared their concern about refugees. After persuading a Saudi police chief to accept a bus load of DCs after the cease-fire, they later found that the unfortunates had quietly been transported back to the Iraq border. All Palestinians were automatically excluded from assistance but so also were Jordanians (King Hussein had backed the wrong side.) Kuwaiti authorities could also prove uncooperative; DCs claiming Kuwaiti citizenship had to document thoroughly that claim before they would be assisted.⁶¹

Three weeks before the opening of the ground war in southwest Asia, ARCENT/CENTCOM organized the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF, not to be confused with the earlier Civil Affairs Task Force), with BG Mooney as Commander. This new organization included: the KTF (now redesignated as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reconstruction, although the term "KTF" continued to be used), the 96th, the RC 431st and 432^d CA Companies, CA elements from the Kuwaiti and Saudi armies, representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (designated the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO), British Engineers, Explosive Ordnance Detachments from several Coalition nations, liaison elements from the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Kuwaiti Red Crescent and a composite team from USAID and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. The task force also trained Kuwaitis, Egyptians and Saudis in CA and accompanied these Coalition troops during the ground offensive. CCATF not only brought together the major organizations that would be involved in Kuwaiti reconstruction but it also helped to alleviate the hard feelings in ARCENT/CENTCOM toward the KTF's previous unconventional organization and operations.

General Mooney, however, felt that "this Civil Affairs Task Force [was created] to keep an eye on the KTF. Again, read that as being fearful of what the KTF was doing,". He was also not impressed with what he felt to be ARCENT's rather belated realization that "hey, we need someone to analyze the options of what we face up in Kuwait when we get there and how they can best be handled."⁶²

On 13 February, that is, a little more than one week before the opening of the ground war, the ARCENT CG realized that neither his command, as the executive agent for CA, nor the corps with their attached CA units, nor the 352d alone were the appropriate organizations to carry out the CA mission in Kuwait. These CA units would need the assistance of combat support units. LTG Yeosock thus formed the combined, composite Task Force Freedom under the command of his Deputy Commanding General, BG (P) Robert Frix, to execute that mission, which in the case of TF Freedom was the short-term restoration of emergency services in Kuwait City. Task Force Freedom comprised the CCATF, the 96th, the KTF, KERO of the Corps of Engineers, the fledgling Saudi and Kuwaiti CA units, under the Support Command

Task Force (BG Kenneth Guest commanding), the 301st Area Support Group, Military Police and Signal units and an aviation and a military intelligence brigade.⁶³ ARCENT/CENTCOM finally had the organization to do the job. In the words of one authority:

General Frix provided the high-level coordination and the clout needed to get resources. General Guest provided the logistical support. General Mooney provided the Civil Affairs know-how.⁶⁴

It cannot be determined whether the experience of the Military Support Group in Panama was called upon, but there was a remarkable resemblance between the two organizations; both had the mission of restoring services and civil government to ravaged friendly nations and both drew upon Army combat, combat support and other military services and civilian organizations to accomplish their missions.

However, the ground war opened on 24 February 1991, and lasted only a little more than three days - the "100 Hour War"--confounding once again the "experts," with their dismal tales of the "battle-hardened Iraqi Army," their dutiful retailing of Saddam's bluster about "The Mother of All Battles," or "30,000 U.S. body bags."

Moving forward with 1st Cav Division, the 413th CA Company, for example, plotted artillery exclusion overlays (to avoid civilian or cultural targets, if feasible), planned DC routes and collection points and identified bulk water supply points. At the same time, the 413th provided a good example of how the civilian skills and experience that RC CA soldiers brought into the field could support a combat unit. The company considerably eased operations in division rear mainly by dealing with host nation water supply and land use, but also through postal service, in providing Judge Advocate and medical support through a unit law and unit medical team, as well as in G-1 and G-2 support. The unit designed a much-appreciated waste water septic system for the division shower point, redesigned the electrical power grid and instructed division troopers in the maintenance of power generating equipment. Unit mess personnel gave training in field messes, noting that division food personnel had never operated such a facility. "Even the [413th's] plumber was in constant demand."⁶⁵

CA troopers from the start found themselves involved with EPWs, putting their language skills to work in interrogation for PSYOP and intelligence purposes. The CENTCOM J-5 handled overall EPW policy, which was generally regarded as a mission of the Provost Marshal. (The 96th's commander certainly believed that EPW handling was a mission for Military Police and PSYOP units.)⁶⁶ The 407th CA Company reported that on occasion "A Civil Affairs person was simply left with a gaggle of EPWs by the MPs."⁶⁷ The 413th noted that its supported division had "extremely limited" MP assets for this mission and organized a 32-man team built around its Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees (DPRE) and Public Safety teams' organic assets. This "platoon" then underwent extensive training in the laws of land warfare, search and seizure and preventive medical techniques, coordinated with

the Division G-3, its Provost Marshal Office, and was integrated into the division's plan for the handling of its EPWs. Beginning operations on 25 February, which continued into March, the company identified Iraqi medical personnel in the theater EPW cage located east of Hafir Al Batin and organized them (willingly, as most were graduates of U.S. medical schools) into service at the camp infirmary. The Company's medical team was then put under the operational command of the commander of the cage, where they performed triage and later assisted in medical treatment. The team also identified four VII Corps evacuation hospitals that could accept EPWs for treatment and provided security guards and transportation assets for their movements. In fact, the handling of EPWs became the 413th's main mission.⁶⁸

The 407th CA Company was also involved in the EPW/medical mission:

At 0800 hours, the 47th CSH has mass casualties and requested that the S-5 team come assist them....The doctors and nurses were having difficulty talking to the EPWs and determining where the patients' pain was, etc....Since no interpreter was available the EPWs that came into the hospital were questioned by SFG [Laurence] Anthony [who understood some Arabic] (if conscious) to determine if they spoke English. While SFG Anthony was doing this he also assisted the medics and nurses in stretcher carrying, patient care, removing clothing, x-rays and bandaging wounds.⁶⁹

Oddly, in this war, CA doctrine on EPWs and DCs was precisely reversed: doctrinally, the handling of EPWs is a Military Police, not a CA mission. Conversely, the ARCENT Provost Marshal's MPs assumed the DC mission, again contrary to CA doctrine. The MPs, with the best will in the world, were unfamiliar with the different legal responsibilities between DCs and EPWs. CA troopers also performed missions outside their doctrinal parameters. For example, a DC team from the 414th in support of the 93d MP Battalion responded to a developing riot in an EPW cage, although their assistance had not been requested by the MPs. The CA troopers realized that the disturbance was sparked by an explosive mixture of Kurds, Iraqi Army reservists, Regulars and Republican Guards that were being pushed into the cage promiscuously. With the assistance of their assigned interpreters, the CA troops identified the problem and defused the situation. These RC CA troopers had no particular knowledge of the area and its people, but they were culturally sensitive, made good use of their interpreters and were willing to listen.⁷⁰

The 489th CA Company (Knoxville, Tennessee) was able to give a near-textbook example of CA cultural sensitivity support to combat arms units. That unit's CO noticed that the operation plan for its supported division, the 101st Airborne, provided in some detail for the burial of enemy, U.S. and Coalition dead, but not specifically for the interment of Islamic remains as such. After consulting with the 489th's chaplain and with local Arabic personnel and conducting his own research, the commander drew

up and had accepted a special plan that covered this contingency and averted what could have proven an embarrassing instance of "infidel" insensitivity or even malice, not just from Islamic observers but from those who opposed America's role in Southwest Asia.⁷¹ The 413th CA Company also broke new ground when it transcribed EPW interrogations onto computer floppy discs and relayed them to its supported division (1st Cav) G-5 for analysis. This initiative resulted in a dramatic decrease in the time required for analysis and a corresponding increase in "real time" intelligence reporting.⁷² In all, 413th personnel processed between 20 and 25 thousand EPWs.⁷³

In another pioneering CA support example, defying conventional wisdom that female soldiers would prove a major embarrassment in the male-dominated Islamic nations of the Gulf, the 414th, 450th and 422d Civil Affairs Companies deployed female members in the field and found that they were invaluable in dealing with female and child refugees in or out of the camps.⁷⁴

The 403d CA Company (Liverpool, New York) also successfully went beyond the obvious. More than two weeks before the Coalition ground offensive, the unit had received copies of classified neighborhood plot maps for Kuwait City which also contained information on the Kuwaiti Resistance as well as on troop concentrations, including type and number and their locations. Realizing that "two-dimensional maps were of little help," unit personnel used the plot maps, plus information derived from interview of numerous Kuwaiti nationals, not only to correct considerable misinformation but to produce a full set of block-by-block large-scale, gridded plot maps and a computer-generated CMO estimate for the 64 designated Kuwait City neighborhoods and rural areas. Once in the city, CA and tactical troops found the super-map invaluable.⁷⁵

The 450th CA Company worked closely with the 82nd Airborne Division's Team EPW, a fast-moving, forward-processing, self-contained prisoner processing unit, operated by division MPs. With the 422d, they drew the mission of sorting out Displaced Civilians from EPWs that the team might net. Each of the 450th's CA teams in Team EPW included one female soldier to handle encounters with females, Coalition or enemy, military or civilian. Conversely, the 407th CA Company smoked out EPWs who had blended with civilians. Nonetheless, civilians were often rounded up along with EPWs until the former could be sorted out. An RC CA officer recalled that

We would get these Chinook [helicopter] loads of supposedly EPWs back, and they would be a bunch of displaced civilians in with them. Or the 101st G-5 would say, "I have some legitimate Kuwaitis." We would get them back and find out that maybe some of them were legitimate Kuwaitis, but an awful lot of them were not Kuwaitis. They were Iraqis.⁷⁶

The 101st Airborne Division in this case could have used the services of its attached 489th CA Company up front, but this RC outfit remained back in Saudi

Arabia. The 24th Infantry Division also left most of its CA assets to the rear and was thus unable to react to numerous incidents involving civilians. The attitude of many maneuver commanders and their staffs was, in the words of one RC CA officer, "We have to get the fighters and everybody else up here; we cannot bring all these CA folks."⁷⁷ Some 150 Kuwaiti nationals were identified by attached Kuwaiti interpreters. These allies could separate civilians from Iraqi EPWs who had shed their uniforms simply by detecting differing accents as well as by scanning documents or by questioning suspects. (Oddly, Team EPW lacked any translators.)⁷⁸ The 422d found that the indigenous translators "understood nuances of dialect that school-trained US linguists probably would not understand.", and, of course, they were highly-motivated to help free their country. CA teams and their interpreters had also worked with PSYOP units before the opening of the ground war to induce Iraqi border patrols to defect.⁷⁹ The 360th CA Brigade drew the mission of equipping and training these Kuwaiti interpreters for deployment to CA companies and teams, focusing on nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) warfare, map reading, reporting enemy information, first aid, and, very importantly, U.S. military rank structure.⁸⁰

The 407th reported on what could happen to Iraqis troops who fell into the hands of the Kuwaitis or the Saudis. During a meeting with the Emir of Ash Shubah, a 407th CA team noticed four men in local attire in the room, who seemed to be under guard. Shortly after greeting the emir, that worthy's son requested the Americans to join him in an adjoining room. There the son informed the CA troopers that the four were suspected of being Iraqi infiltrators. "We could hear a lot of yelling from the other room", they later reported. "When it was over we were unable to get any further information."⁸¹

In the absence of indigenous interpreters, language could prove a problem. The 96th commander reported later that his troops were trained in Arabic-Egyptian, "the other side of the Nile", and that their attempts to communicate with Saudis and Iraqis "were met with an amused smile." This commander also, surprisingly, stated that less than 50 percent of his deployed officers had taken formal CA training.⁸²

The 450th and Team EPW also assisted scores of Egyptian nationals as well as some 3,000 Iraqi dislocated civilians. (The few civilians rounded up by MPs and detained along with EPWs were soon freed by 450th members of Team EPW.) They aided civilians in general in spite of unofficial Army policy at the time against such help. In the words of the 450th's S-3:

These are American soldiers, they're going to take care of a little kid that's got his arm amputated, for God's sakes. And when women are coming around begging for water, it's going to happen.⁸³

In fact, the 404th reported later that its troops were assigned to checkpoints to "give food and water to anyone who looks like they need it." and concluded (not uniquely) that, "The operation resembled nothing in FM 41-10."⁸⁴ The 450th also had

the unusual mission (but similar to that facing MG troopers in Italy and France in World War II) of dealing with the diverse revolutionary or resistance groups, those who were fighting Saddam in Iraq or who had resisted his occupation of Kuwait.⁸⁵ Company B of the 96th in support of the French 6th Light Armored Division, conducted a classic MG operation, reminiscent of those carried out across Europe during and just after World War II. The RC CA unit attached a team to each of the four French infantry units and had a number of officers and NCOs who spoke French as well as two French linguists. Having obtained all the information they could about its objective, the 1,800-year-old town of As Salman, Company B personnel had drawn up a plan for its military government after its seizure by the French.

The French and Company B entered the town on the morning of 26 February 1991. The secular mayor had fled, so the religious leader, the muhktar, was appointed in his stead. Civilians were directed to deal directly with the muhktar rather than with MG personnel, thus enhancing this newly-appointed civil official's legitimacy. As the initial emergency phase of MG passed, this official was given an increasingly wide range of responsibilities, such as food and water distribution and garbage pick-up as the initial, emergency phase of MG ended. Some 500 townspeople were encamped in the desert, fearful of returning to a town now ruled by what Iraqi propaganda termed "barbarous infidels." The DCs were then invited/persuaded to send representatives to the town to judge the situation for themselves. The word got back soon enough that the Coalition military forces in As Salman were allowing the civilians to get on with their lives, and a torrent of DCs began to descend on the town. Only pre-war inhabitants, however, were allowed to return. The law and order team established a check-point at which Kuwaiti translators were able to ferret out Iraqi Army deserters and civilians who had no connection with As Salman as well as to check questionable cases against captured police files. The company's sole female soldier, augmented by three other female troopers from Corps G-5, assisted in the searching of women. Lacking PSYOP support the MG unit had to draw up its own loudspeaker and leaflet messages to the returning civil population. Several Company B troopers had already attended formal blocks of instruction on PSYOP or had worked closely enough with such units so that their product, although "crude," was effective.

Once in town, civilians were able to attend sick call in the refurbished local clinic where French Army medics saw an average of 100 patients each day. Their water was being supplied and their trash hauled away by an Egyptian civilian volunteer, using local trucks put back in running order by Company B's mechanic. By 20 March, that is three weeks after the town had been seized, As Salman was self sufficient except for food and medical supplies. In fact, it could be argued that its citizens now actually enjoyed a higher standard of living than before the war; certainly their personal freedom was in considerably better hands than when Saddam's forces ran the place. It goes without saying that there were no known instances of hostility or resistance among these civilians or any other Iraqis caught up in the war, for that matter. In the end, the French professed themselves as perfectly pleased with the way that Company B had

kept civilians out of its area of operations. On 21 March Company B began the hand-off of As Salman MG to VII Corps RC CA units and began its redeployment.⁸⁶

Post-hostilities Civil Affairs operations outside Kuwait primarily involved refugee camps. ARCENT guidance had discouraged such camps and did not anticipate the Shia uprising that the United States to some extent had provoked. The emergence of a DC camp at Safwan attracted even more refugees, numbering between 10,000 and 15,000. In the words of one RC CA officer:

The concept of not going into the populated areas for the most part worked....But then as we sat there, the populated areas came to us basically as the civil unrest got worse and worse.⁸⁷

With significant numbers of DCs taking to the roads by 15 March, ARCENT now gave authorization for something it termed an "emergency assembly area," which sounded like DC camps by other name. This situation was finally resolved when the CENTCOM J-5 visited the Safwan "emergency area," and was so appalled by what he saw that he directed ARCENT to do something. The DC mission devolved upon Task Force Freedom, which although devoted primarily to the restoration of Kuwait, still had more than enough CA assets attached to the corps and their subordinate divisions to meet the requirement, and which also forwarded a CCATF AID Contractor team to assist. At least one CA officer on the scene had already exercised some initiative in the matter:

Even though I have been told not to give food or water to Safwan, I will deliver some. The Geneva Convention states the military commander MUST provide minimum food and water to civilians in his area. If one civilian dies of starvation or thirst, the commander will be a war criminal.⁸⁸

CPT Todd promptly raided abandoned Iraqi bunkers for food and water supplies for the Safwan refugees, who by this time were so crazed with thirst that they swarmed over his supply truck. From then on Todd had to throw off water bottles on the run.⁸⁹

The 404th CA Company operated all of the humanitarian assistance activities at the Safwan camp and also coordinated food distribution in the village of Safwan itself, avoiding the rioting that marked camps administered by the Saudis. CCATF saw to it also that refugees had access to a special "Islamic" MRE, from which the pork products had been removed.⁹⁰

An episode in the Safwan camp, however, did demonstrate the perils of a lack of cultural sensitivity. On a Friday afternoon during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, when Moslems are required to fast, pray and meditate, the 3d Armored Division band inexplicably strutted right through the camp, blaring a John Philip Sousa march!⁹¹

On 17 April the Saudi government agreed to assume responsibility for those seeking refuge in the kingdom, and a temporary camp was erected inside Saudi Arabia ten days later, to which these last refugees were flown in USAF aircraft from Safwan.⁹² Other camps, operated by the Kuwaiti Red Crescent or Saudi authorities, received some support from U.S. sources. Most of these DCs were generated by the internal Iraqi Shia uprisings against Saddam Hussein and their numbers would soon rise far above any pre-conflict planning figures. Another DC camp was established by two officers from the 489th CA Company near Rafah, Saudi Arabia, an area that had previously seen service as a stockyard and EPW camp.


U.S. Military Police were apparently unaware of the difference between the DC and the EPW missions, leaving CA personnel to sort out the confusion. The two missions merged on occasion, with DC teams assisting in the screening and the identification of both DCs and EPWs, and, in violation of the laws of war, DCs winding up in EPW camps. In fact, the joint operations of MPs and DC teams seem to have been more efficient than the DC teams working in isolation, particularly in the sorting out of EPWs who were seeking to meld into the civil population.⁹³

The CCATF was ordered to deploy to Kuwait City late in the evening of 27 February, and had deployed its 75 vehicles on the road to Kuwait City even before the Iraqis had decamped the metropolis. It arrived on the afternoon of the 28th ("I had a United States flag flying on my truck and every Resistance member stood up and saluted it....As we drove through, we saw the men crying."⁹⁴) Task Force Freedom itself arrived on 1 March.⁹⁵ The 352d had the great advantage that it had accumulated detailed intelligence from the Kuwaiti resistance of conditions inside the city, such as which buildings were mined and where the Palestinians lived.⁹⁶

At first, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) actually forbade any U.S. personnel, except those under its command, to enter Kuwait City. BG Mooney then inquired as to how SOCCENT planned to restore Kuwait City, and pointed out that he took his orders from a three-star general officer, LTG John Yeosock, Commanding General Third U.S. Army. SOCCENT then backed down and CCATF entered Kuwait City on its own.⁹⁷

The Iraqis had deliberately torched oil facilities before their evacuation of Kuwait. "The place was totally shrouded in darkness....It looked like it was midnight....I didn't want to breathe very deeply.", in the words of the 96th commander.⁹⁸ The CENTCOM J-5 had been in touch with the Kuwaiti resistance and had a reasonably accurate picture of the situation within the city. Although Kuwait City was to have been liberated primarily by Arab Coalition forces, few of them had any CA capabilities so that burden would fall primarily upon U.S. CA.⁹⁹ Nonetheless, this was a combined operation, and there were British engineers, explosive ordinance detachment teams from several Coalition nations, the Kuwaiti and Saudi CA teams, liaison personnel from the ICRC and the Kuwait Red Crescent, a mixed team from OFDA and an AID contractor in the city, all under the operational control of the CCATF.

CCATF



Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, Gulf War, USASOC History Archives

It was soon determined that the "worst case" scenario was unduly pessimistic; the Iraqi occupiers had "trashed," but had not devastated, Kuwait City. The city had been spared house-to-house fighting by the rapid retreat of Iraqi troops from the city. Still, the situation was daunting enough. In the words of Task Force Freedom's commander:

Kuwait had the appearance of a ravaged, war-torn country. Roads were filled with potholes, craters and burned vehicles. Portions of buildings had been destroyed by demolitions, while the remainder of the buildings had been gutted by fires. [This was something of an exaggeration.] Antiarmor and antipersonnel mine fields along the beaches were still intact and lethal. Unexploded ordnance was scattered throughout the residential areas, as well as public places. Domestic livestock and zoo animals had been maimed and were starving. Black smoke clouds from burning oil fires hung so heavily over Kuwait that one could not differentiate between noon and midnight. Tracers and the rattle of gunfire [mostly Arab celebratory firing, but causing casualties nonetheless] punctuated the darkness.¹⁰⁷

The main problems were in the water supply and electrical systems. Foresighted Kuwait City residents had tried to dispose of their garbage ("The Iraqis did very little in the way of garbage evacuation", as the 96th commander dryly noted), cached large amounts of food and had stored water in their ubiquitous rooftop tanks (as reported to CENTCOM J-5 by the resistance). However, no more water could be pumped up without electricity. Further, as the CCATF commander perceptively noted, the restoration of electric power would give the citizens a sense of security and a psychological message that the war was over and that healing was in progress. The power plants themselves were not that badly damaged, but the retreating Iraqis had blown down the distribution lines. The CCATF worked with military engineers to restore these services, no simple task considering that, per capita, Kuwaitis consumed more electricity than any other nation on earth. There was some duplication of effort here between CA damage assessment teams, Army Engineers and, later KERO. COL Elliott reported later that one food co-operative had been assessed 27 times!¹⁰⁸

By about 7 March, most of the cooperative food distribution points had been opened. Ingenious Tennessee Army Guardsmen cobbled together more than 50 police cars from nearly 500 wrecked vehicles, thus giving civilians an added sense of security.¹⁰⁹ Further, within 28 hours after the entry of CCATF into the city, two of its radio stations were back on the air with prepared scripts broadcast for various messages and announcements for the general population.¹¹⁰

Yet, until the Kuwaiti police force became operational, Kuwait City was without any official law and order force for all of 45 days. Apparently the U.S.

Ambassador did not wish to see Military Police on the streets of the city. In the words of the CCATF commander:

Check points were manned by resistance, by Kuwaitis, by neighborhood factions, you name it. If they had a gun and wanted to set some barrels up, that was a check point.¹¹¹

KTF and other CA personnel in the area also provided emergency care at a hospital for mentally and physically impaired children, assisted dislocated civilians and restored the educational infrastructure, but not before first seeing to it that the ordnance the Iraqis had stored in so many schools was removed. The 96th commander reported that his men were uncovering new booby traps into the third and fourth month after liberation, but he could not determine whether they had been set by Palestinians or, improbably, by "leftover Iraqi terrorists."¹¹² An RC Captain commanding an AC Explosive Ordnance company was all the better for his work in that in civilian life he was a special agent with the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.¹¹³ The 352d head of liaison recalled that CA troopers were carrying out some 700 varied operations per day.¹¹⁴

A Joint Unified Lessons Learned (JULLS) report summarized the unique "interface" between RC CA troops' civil occupations and their operations in the field:

watering livestock (This required a vet because the animals were malnourished), generator repair (team member was an electrician to run a pump), assisting police in squad repair (team member was a mechanic), surveying schools for safety (team member was a SWAT policeman) from stockpiled ordnance."¹¹⁵

CA personnel also helped in the restoration of sewage operations, restored public archives and monuments and assisted in fighting the 729 oil facilities fires set by the Iraqis. In the latter effort they worked with representatives of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Coast Guard and Department of Energy, as well as, of course, with Kuwait officials in dealing with the polluting effects of this act of ecological barbarism. They supported the U.S. Embassy with financial and currency advice and by purging water tanks, repairing the roof, making plumbing repairs and running communications wires that kept the embassy in contact with the outside world.¹¹⁶

In an "incredibly complex deal", CCATF worked out the purchase and delivery of several hundred water tanker trucks of water from Turkey. Another 3,000 trucks (that ARCENT planners had sworn could not be found anywhere in theater) moved 68,000 tons of emergency food, water and medical supplies into the city in the first two weeks after liberation. CCATF personnel were aware that while Kuwaitis, most of whom were wealthy, lived over a huge pool of oil and drove about in luxury private

autos, the Palestinians and other third nation nationals who performed Kuwait's manual labor had to rely on public transportation to get to work. The Iraqis had commandeered most of the Kuwait Public Transportation Company's buses for their precipitous evacuation of the city, but the CCATF was able to contract for 31 new buses for a basic service.

The CCATF's Arts, Monuments and Archives officer surveyed the nation's museum system and reported items looted from the National Museum and the Museum of Islamic Art to international authorities. The 418th CA Company made an assessment of the only damage recorded to an Iraqi monument. This was inflicted on the Ziggurat at Ur, birthplace of Abraham, and one of the world's oldest cities, declared by the UN in 1949 to be a World Cultural Site. Saddam, heedless of such cultural niceties, had built Tallil Air Field on a portion of the city site. The airfield was accordingly attacked by USAF warplanes on 24 January 1991 and the Ziggurat received some superficial damage. The 418th's assessment argued that the damage to the site was the fault of the Iraqi military and Saddam himself, and concluded forthrightly that "Both may be labeled as war criminals for the damage to Ur."¹¹⁷ These Arts, Monuments and Archives activities were probably the first official such CA missions since World War II. The CCATF also sorted out the records of the Bank of Kuwait to exchange the now-worthless Iraqi dinar for Kuwaiti currency and to see to it that Kuwait citizens did not suffer in the change-over.¹¹⁸

In addition to the common tendency of people recently freed from oppression to let their liberators do all of the work of reconstruction, CCATF personnel also had to contend with the fact that Kuwaitis were not in the best of times used to doing much work that did not consist of sitting behind a desk, wearing a suit and tie, and giving orders to foreigners. The CCATF commander termed this Kuwaiti attitude "our biggest headache.", and continued, "It was always 'Pay someone to do that.' They [Kuwaitis] would just sit there. They would pay you to manage the system for them."¹¹⁹

An officer of the 357th CA Company recalled how one of his subordinates finally shamed Kuwaitis into clean up their own water testing laboratory:

They were walking around and clenching their hands. "How we are going to start and what are we going to do?" Greg said, "First of all we are going to clean this damn place up!" They were saying "Who are we going to get to do it?" [Greg said] "We are going to do it." He had five guys and his people and they started scrounging up the room and literally took the lead and literally cleaned the place up. Eventually the Kuwaitis got embarrassed to the point, [of] "Well, we ought to help these Americans." and they started helping us...he motivated them to get involved in the process by literally taking charge and picking up a broom and pushing it."¹²⁰

In the acerbic words of the 352d's After-Action Report, "CCATF personnel verged on becoming another source of third-country national labor for Kuwaitis quite happy to let others do their work for them." COL Elliott confirmed that "They tried every trick in the book --I have to tell you --every trick in the book to try to get us to be third country nationals." When some officers suggested that CA companies pick up the fermenting trash, he replied pungently, "Let the god damn Kuwaitis smell the trash!"¹²¹ Personnel of the 357th were able to find a solution to this particular problem. Because no Kuwaiti would ever lower himself to drive a garbage truck, the 357th managed to round up some 2-300 Filipinos from Saudi Arabia and the general area to do the job.¹²²

Politics and ethnic enmities soon enough intruded into Kuwait City's rehabilitation. The Government of Kuwait insisted on controlling the distribution of food and water, resulting in near-disastrous delay. One senior Kuwaiti official, when asked why he had not included the one-half million Palestinians, about one-fourth of Kuwait's population, in his estimates for food distribution, replied "let them eat sand."¹²³ Kuwaiti citizens began washing their autos, watering their plants and even filling their ubiquitous swimming pools while the Palestinians were making do on subsistence levels of food and water. This imbalance may not have been entirely a result of Kuwaiti malice or resentment. The Kuwait authorities had made the logical if short-sighted decision to supply each city neighborhood equally. This meant that the densely-populated poorer neighborhoods in theory received the same amounts as did the wealthy, native Kuwaiti areas. These latter neighborhoods were comprised mostly of single-family houses, many of which were empty anyway because their wealthy owners had decamped to Saudi Arabia just before or during the Iraqi occupation. In the acid words of the commander of the 352d, "Given the amount of food stored around the city, even Kuwaiti ineptitude could not produce a real crisis."¹²⁴ If the after-action report by the 431st CA Company is at all accurate, the Kuwaiti authorities had inexplicably secreted some hundreds of water tankers, greatly inhibiting the distribution of water to local communities at a time of great need.¹²⁵ In the end, perhaps no thanks to the government of Kuwait, not one civilian died from thirst, starvation or lack of medical care after the liberation of the city.

Thanks in large part to the KTF's and the U.S. Ambassador's early insistence on the inclusion of human rights protections in all of their agreements with the Kuwaitis, and to the CCATF's getting representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross into Kuwait City as early as 2 March, what human rights abuses that did take place were not officially (or at least not openly) sanctioned. Originally, the Kuwait Ministry of Justice had no plans to reopen the court system anywhere in the near future. However, strong U.S. pressure brought the opening of martial law courts in which civilian judges controlled most of the procedures and KTF/CCATF officials made their concern for human rights known.

None of this came any too soon. On the day of the Coalition ground advance into Kuwait, a U.S. Army Colonel reported to CENTCOM headquarters that American

soldiers had captured an Iraqi Major and turned him over to the Kuwaitis --who promptly shot him to death. The Colonel now wanted to know if anyone (just possibly Army CA personnel?) had any expertise in dealing with human rights abuses. There was indeed such a plan, drawn up by 352d staff, but CENTCOM felt that it had more pressing matters. The plan was briefed to the Saudi and Kuwaiti commanders, but it took KTF/CCATF personnel on the ground to prevent human rights abuses, particularly against the despised Palestinians, who were widely believed to have collaborated with the Iraqis. Already Palestinians were being manhandled in their neighborhoods and a Kuwaiti armored unit had deliberately plowed through a Palestinian market, gleefully scattering civilians.

In another incident, which also illustrated how tenuous many of the accusations against the Palestinians really were, a KTF/CCATF civilian came upon 11 Kuwaiti soldiers kicking a young Palestinian while pointing guns at his head. The officer in charge excitedly proclaimed that the Palestinian had just shot and killed one of his men. Asking to see the dead body of the victim, the American was first informed that, well, the man had been shot but not killed, and then that the Palestinian had shot at but had not hit any of the troops. The American then asked to see the Palestinian's weapon, to determine if it had been fired. Well, no, actually, the weapon had simply been found in the Palestinian's apartment. The American extracted a promise from the Kuwaiti officer that the young Palestinian would be treated properly and handed over to higher headquarters.¹²⁶ In another incident, a team chief waded into a mob of Kuwaitis beating a Palestinian and took him, at pistol point, to the nearest police station.¹²⁷

The KTF and the U.S. Ambassador embarked on a human rights education effort directed at Kuwaiti officials, providing them with Arabic copies of U.S. human rights legislation, the Geneva Code dealing with EPWs and non-combatants and UN human rights enactments, plus their own interpretations. The Kuwait Crown Prince from the start proved most receptive. ("You shoot people, we are leaving....If you are worse than the Iraqis, who are you? And what is the international community going to think about you?")¹²⁸

The dangerous situation in the Palestinian neighborhoods was defused thanks in large measure to planning by the 304th CA Group's G-2, which was charged with monitoring the equitable distribution of food and with the monitoring of human rights violations. This G-2 section worked closely with the 513th MI Brigade, the 8th Marine Regiment and the 3d and 5th Special Forces Groups, generating daily neighborhood reports as to the threat situation in the various Kuwait City precincts. Each neighborhood was assigned a green, amber or red code to indicate its particular threat situation. This information gathering and assessment paid off when the Kuwait government planned another "sweep" for weapons, this time in the Palestinian Hawally neighborhood. The CATF, acting on information received from the assessment teams, reported to that government that such a sweep would probably be met with armed resistance: "[A] door-to-door search Belfast-style, would have resulted in large loss of

life on both sides"), pointing out that even the Kuwaiti Police opposed such an inflammatory operation."

A dusk to dawn curfew was imposed for the first 72 hours after liberation and military patrols were organized for the Palestinian neighborhoods. Civilian and military personnel made it a point daily to walk about the threatened neighborhoods, visiting police stations, taking names of people who had disappeared and giving clear notice that the Americans were watching. These actions reassured the Palestinians (who must have initially entertained strong fear and loathing of the American "Great Satan").¹²⁹

The KTF/CCATF made the definite decision to avoid at all costs the establishment of a Palestinian DC camp, having in mind the horrific 1982 massacres of Palestinians in their camps in Lebanon by Lebanese right-wing militiamen. Or as MAJ Natsios put it, "We...had nightmares of a Shaba and Shentilla [sic, Shatilla] Kuwait style." One 352d officer described such camps as:

increas[ing] the incidents of abuse as a visible and ready target. These camps act as magnets attracting people because of their free provision of services, create dependency, make violence against women easier, and spread disease. Finally, the camps attract activists who may organize demonstrations, violent protests and acts of civil disobedience which often lead to violent suppression.

Understandably, the Palestinians themselves were near panic. However, COL Elliott reported that "the KTF made a difference....The physical presence of KTF personnel in Hawally and physical intervention by KTF personnel had a calming effect."¹³⁰

Palestinians were, in fact, beaten and arrested by the Kuwaiti Army and resistance veterans. Hundreds disappeared, although most were known to have been simply shunted across the border into Iraq, some bearing the marks of extensive torture. However, bearing in mind the systematic camp killings of Palestinians in Lebanon nine years earlier, the situation in Kuwait would undoubtedly have been far worse in the absence of the CCATF's on-the-ground presence. The Kuwait government also belatedly realized that large-scale human rights abuses would tarnish the great victory over the Iraqis.¹³¹

It may well be that much of the success of RC CA in Southwest Asia was due, in the words of the commander of the CCATF, to the "degree of empathy toward the Kuwaitis beyond that usually found in men and women in the military."¹³² Nonetheless, the CCATF was careful to "prod but not push" the Kuwaiti authorities into the restoration of their nation. Slow and indecisive as those authorities may have been, Kuwait was not an enemy country, and matters would not have been helped by "can do" foreigners telling a proud and insular people how to take care of themselves.

There can be little doubt that Civil Affairs accomplished its mission in the Gulf War. Civilians did not interfere with military operation and their sufferings were brief

and promptly alleviated. Host nation support worked smoothly and CA troopers could take particular gratification in the realization that there was not one Saudi civilian casualty during the entire war and very few Kuwaitis.

With the restoration of essential services in Kuwait City, it was now possible to release tactical CA companies for redeployment to the U.S., beginning on 25 March and ending with the release of the 432d CA Company on 6 April 1991. The KTF was able briefly to revert to its earlier mission of assisting in the long-term reconstruction of Kuwait City. By that time, the Ministry of Health had become operational and the medical community was carrying 98 percent of its prewar workload. The international airport had reopened under Kuwaiti control, the police force was operating, a major Kuwaiti port had reopened and all major roads had been restored to heavy use. On 30 April rehabilitation operations were turned over to the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO), an *ad hoc* body assembled from Army assets. The KTF and its parent 352d CA Command arrived back in the U.S. on 10 May 1991.¹³³

The redeployment of RC CA units proved to some extent a repetition of the deployment operations. USACAPOC itself had to admit that "Due to the tremendous volume of soldiers in general and the lack of recent experience in executing such an operation, the planning and coordinating for demobilization was inadequate."¹³⁴

In all, some 43 percent of the total AC and RC CA authorized strength was committed and deployed during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.¹³⁵ Their operations had clearly saved thousands of lives. Civil Affairs had more than proved its worth in the field, despite early Army resistance and ignorance of the mission. This success was not foreordained. As the 96th commander later pointed out, civilians in the area were indeed fortunate that they were not faced with heavy, prolonged combat, for the other Coalition forces "had absolutely no capability in handling those problems" and the situation could have turned "tragic."¹³⁶

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney later paid RC CA a handsome tribute:

Your role in the U.S. Government assistance to the Government of Kuwait in its reconstruction of that country was exceptional, both for its swiftness and the depth of expertise which you provided. The extraordinary skills resident only in the Reserve Component were absolutely essential to these successes.¹³⁷

CA troopers could take further pride in the Secretary of the Army conclusion that the goals of the Coalition forces that fought the Gulf War "could not have been accomplished ...without programming Civil Affairs into the correlation of forces."¹³⁸

Operation Provide Comfort

(Or, "They don't teach you at war college what to do when 1/2 million people are dying.")

On 5 April President Bush, responding to world-wide media focus on the plight of some 360,000-760,000 Iraqi Kurds who had revolted against Saddam Hussein, and were now being brutalized by the Iraqi military, directed U.S. military forces to begin humanitarian assistance. Some 2,000 Kurdish children a day were reportedly dying in the hellish mountain refuges.¹³⁹ In the words of the Commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "while the beady-eyed killers, the combat forces in their very, very short war...got out of there very, very fast [,] the turmoil that followed became a Civil Affairs war."¹⁴⁰

On the 16th LTG John Shalikashvili, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) was named commander of Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT. On the same day, the Disaster Assistance Reaction Team (DART) from OFDA, under Mr. Dayton Maxwell (a general officer equivalent), conducted its first field site survey in conjunction with U.S. Special Forces personnel already on the ground in the area. The DART had been dispatched by MAJ Natsios, who had himself just returned to Washington.¹⁴¹ Again, there was a strong resemblance between Combined Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT and the Military Support Group in Panama, with both organizations making use of civil and military U.S. reconstruction organizations.

PROVIDE COMFORT was a unique intrusive humanitarian operation; there were no plans to consult Saddam Hussein on the matter. In fact, a significant mission of PROVIDE COMFORT was the intimidation of local Iraqi military and police forces.¹⁴² Perhaps not so surprisingly, as in most previous American conflicts CA was not in on the planning for this operation from anything like the beginning even though this was certainly primarily a CA mission.. In the words of the study drawn up by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School soon after the end of the operation:

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was viewed as primarily a Civil Affairs operation yet CA planners were not integrated into the planning from the very beginning of the operation, primarily because the CTF [Combined Task Force] staff was unaware of the capabilities and limited resources of these units. [This failure caused] unnecessary confusion and degraded the overall CA effectiveness of the mission.¹⁴³

Further, lacking readily available area studies for commanders, staffs and other critical personnel who were being committed to the operation, V Corps G-5 had to begin



Kurdish refugee shelters, the reason for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. USASOC History Archives

up a comprehensive plan and area study, but these were rendered obsolete by the rapid course of events.¹⁴⁴ This was going to be very much a "Come as you are" mission.¹⁴⁵

The 96th had already redeployed to Fort Bragg and most personnel were on leave. Sixty-five 96th troopers were initially sent over to Turkey and Northern Iraq where they linked with 10th British commando and Dutch Royal Marines as well as with the 431st and 432^d CA Companies as a component of Task Force Bravo. In their initial mission they established way stations where Kurdish refugees could obtain food, water and fuel and keep on going to safe towns or newly-established camps. Their primary mission was to operate DC camps. None of these troops had had the chance to rotate Stateside before being redeployed to PROVIDE COMFORT.¹⁴⁶ CA troopers also moved out into the field to fill in the gaps where NGOs were not functioning and to assist in Kurdish resettlement. They promptly established a system of way stations:

where a family could drive up...get handed their staples...we'd give them some fuel for their car. If they needed a spark plug...we'd give them that. They had a latrine they could use. They had a place they could clean up if they desired. Kind of a part grocery store, part motel.¹⁴⁷

Three RC CA companies and the RC 353d CA Command (New York City) were diverted from their redeployment to the new operation, and elements of the 96th were redeployed from Fort Bragg. Once in the field, the commander of the 353d CA Command, then-BG Donald Campbell, quickly realized that a CA brigade and at least three CA companies would be required to support a multinational/combined/joint mission of the expected magnitude.¹⁴⁸ In the case of the 353d, the EUCOM capstone trace was followed, and, in fact, BG Campbell claimed that without that relationship between EUCOM and the 353d "we would never have gone."¹⁴⁹ General Campbell was given command of the Coalition Combined Task Force (CCTF) Civil Affairs Command, which consisted of 447 personnel. It was supported by a Civil Military Operations Center at Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey, which was staffed by 353d and the 354th CA Brigade personnel and which tracked the flow of refugees and supported the CCTF in planning and executing the various humanitarian relief operations of PROVIDE COMFORT. In addition, the 354th CA Brigade was selected by the JCS because it had nearly completed its mission with VII Corps in Saudi Arabia and was the only such brigade still on active duty. The brigade also formed a Civilian Agencies Task Force (CATF), under its Deputy Commander, which deployed a number of CA teams in Turkey and northern Iraq to facilitate the transfer of military humanitarian relief operations to such key civilian agencies as the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Unfortunately, the UNHCR arrived at its decisions by majority vote of the representatives of the various civilian agencies and was fond of creating sub-committees to study the different problems as they arose. The obvious results were delay and a weak command and control network for these civilian organizations.¹⁵⁰

TF PROVIDE COMFORT had two subordinate task forces, Alpha and Bravo. TF Alpha, under the command of BG Richard Potter (Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Europe - SOCEUR), had the mission of finding, caring for and persuading the Kurdish refugees to come down from their camps. It consisted of U.S. Army Special Forces, some of whose units carried cross-trained CA warrant officers; some Coalition forces and was joined later by the 432d CA company. It also supported UK 40th Commando Forces, Royal Marines and coordinated with the 18th Engineer Brigade and the 18th MP Brigade), and was located in the Turkish mountains along the border east of Silopi. Three of the 432d's four Direct Support Teams were attached to Special Forces companies in the refugees' mountain camps, and the fourth was sent to 40th Commando, providing food distribution and camp organization and coordinating the movement from the refugees from the makeshift camps.

TF Bravo, under MG Jay Garner (Deputy Commander of V Corps), had the mission of setting up temporary camps for the refugees inside Iraq. This task force consisted of the 353d as the base of the organization, Coalition forces and the DART, and was headquartered in the town of Zakhu, in northern Iraq, home to many of the Kurds. In all, some 21,500 military personnel and 111 civilians from 11 nations (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the US) participated in PROVIDE COMFORT. For the first time on any large scale U.S. and Coalition forces worked closely with some 50 to 100 International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), such as the UN World Health Organization and the High Commission on Refugees; as well as with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs, also termed Private Voluntary Organizations --PVOs), including CARE, Red Cross/Red Crescent, Operation Mercy, the Overseas Development Agency, *Medcins san Frontiers*, Sisters of Mercy, Internal Rescue Committee, Christian Outreach, etc.¹⁵¹ Liaison with these organizations was a special mission of BG Campbell and some of his staff elements.

General Campbell, well aware that the canceling of redeployment plans for so many CA troops for PROVIDE COMFORT had caused "a major morale problem.", tried to ease matters by meeting with as many individual troopers as he could as they got off their aircraft and then talking with them individually about the mission.¹⁵²

Relations between the UN and Army CA were prickly. The former was reluctant, for example to enter Iraq without an invitation from Saddam Hussein! (Then again, some UN officials impertinently informed General Campbell that they had also been asked to enter U.S. Indian reservations, but had graciously refrained in the absence of an official invitation from the U.S. government, an argument that did not impress the general.) Once the UN High Commissioner for Refugees became convinced of the plight of the Kurds and of the fact that only a Coalition military could save them, the cooperation turned cordial.¹⁵³ Many UN personnel, as well as those from the NGOs, were astonished at the massive capacity of the military, particularly of its airlift, and eventually a positive relationship emerged which paved the way for the eventual hand-off of much of the relief operations and camp management to the UN.¹⁵⁴

Other NGOs also sometimes harbored suspicions about the military, which they looked upon as "destroyers" rather than as "helpers," the same type of people who caused much of the misery they were attempting to relieve. In many cases the NGOs had been on the scene earlier than the military and were self-sustaining. But beneath the obvious differences, they shared some significant attitudes. For example, both profess an abhorrence of "politics." As one researcher noted, however:

Despite their traditional apolitical stance, NGOs are political. They have their own agenda and their own turf. With a tradition of organizational autonomy and a liberating perspective that allows them to act when and where they want, they are not used to external direction, let alone the possibility that they could be political players....Moreover, every actor, to include the U.N. and regional actors, quite naturally has its own interests. Hopefully benign in their effect, they are not unknown to have a deleterious effect on everyone involved.¹⁵⁵

The troops, in turn, sometimes resented NGO people as "disaster groupies" who might "just appear" in the field ahead of the military and who all seemed to know each other from other well-publicized catastrophes. Many seemed children of the 1960s and '70s, with persistently negative Vietnam-era impressions of the military. *Medcins sans Frontiers*, for example, proved reluctant at first to share medical responsibilities with SF medics, but their attitude soon enough changed when they observed those medics effectively working in an austere environment without killing anyone. The IRC representative had a deep aversion to all things military from his experience in the Third World. For him, "Militaries are usually party to creating refugees." However, by the end of his month-long experience of working with Coalition military personnel in refugee Camp No. 1 he had to concede that, at least in this particular case, the military "provide[d] horsepower and efficiency....a real honest partnership" and now confessed "a profound respect for the military."¹⁵⁶ The CARE team leader in Iraq, remarked that:

What was incredible to me was how the military set up all the detail and complicated system at such speed with so little prior experience....It was great working with them - real professionals with a great attitude.¹⁵⁷

The representative of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee reported that the military was "reliable, on time, they report... [they] do it all." A disaster assistance expert for the Center for Disease Control reported that "I was impressed by the willingness of [military] field people to listen, take advice on prioritizing public health, and then get on with the job with extreme enthusiasm, discipline, and muscle that comes with military culture."¹⁵⁸ The Kurds

themselves respected armed soldiers and, of course, appreciated the very visible security that Coalition troops provided.¹⁵⁹

An informal CMOC was soon established in downtown Diyarbakir, Turkey, with attendees including representatives from the UN organizations, Save the Children, CAR, International Red Cross, International Rescue Committee, *Medcins san Frontiers*, etc.¹⁶⁰ The arrangement was more formalized with the establishment of the NGOs' unique coordinating committee, termed logically enough, the NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq (NCCNI), which was by all accounts a success, giving the NGOs a single voice with which to coordinate with the military. The NGOs came particularly to appreciate that the RC CA troopers, understandably, seemed the best able to relate to civilians. The DAST even asserted that he would insist on the participation of RC CA personnel in any similar future operations.¹⁶¹

Military personnel, for their part, came to appreciate the NGOs' dedication and experience. As the Director of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine recollected, "The NGOs were wonderful; their only problem was [*sic*] logistics and communications, something the military could provide."¹⁶² General Campbell also recorded a heartfelt tribute to the NGOs:

They are masters at going out and hiring, in this case, Kurds, to do all the work. They supervised them. They would bring in what it would have taken an American unit of 120 people by our calculations and using our doctrine to run a camp of 5,000....Well, we finally decided that... we could with about a dozen responsible Americans, hire Kurds to do all the work, get organizations like CARE and get the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance to hire CARE....And if they [CARE] needed a vehicle they would rent a local taxicab.....Our solution was to bring a three-quarter [ton] truck from the United States by air and plop it down on the ground....But we quickly learned from them and hired cabs ourselves.¹⁶³

There was another reason for the military's appreciation of the NGOs: they were the "ticket home." There had to be someone in place to whom the military could "hand off" the mission. As the representative of Disaster Assistance noted, "If you [the military] take charge, you can't leave."¹⁶⁴

Three DC camps were built on land leased from local landowners in the Zaku area with U.S. dollars. (At the black market rate of exchange, the \$200,000 paid to these entrepreneurs made them very rich men indeed.)¹⁶⁵ The camps were operated by the 418th, 431st and 432^d CA Companies, who, in turn, worked to have the Kurds run the camps themselves, so that the DCs would not degenerate into parasites. The very names of the camps showed commendable sensitivity: "Zozan" (neighborhood), "Gund" (village) and "Bajeer" (community).¹⁶⁶ An additional camp at Al Amadiya was established with CA advice and planning. The three RC CA companies were able

to obtain the cooperation of Coalition units and NGOs in camp construction. Kurdish workers were also transported down from their mountain retreats for this work, as much to get them out of the welfare habit as for their labor. (Actually, their value was "negligible" in the absence of an efficient payment system.) Again, local interpreters provided essential services, this time to the NGOs. The civilian skills of the 353d and 432d personnel in the camps, the water treatment specialists, the agronomists, the engineers, the medical doctors and personnel managers smoothed the construction and operation of the DC camps and eased coordination with civilian personnel and agencies.¹⁶⁷

The 432d recorded that although personally a clean people, ("The first thing they want to do is wash up."), the demoralized Kurds did tend to throw trash around the camps, and recommended that children be employed to police up the areas. Food distribution also posed problems:

Kurds will take anything free. All distributions must be from a controlled area. They will mob any distribution [,] especially air drops because they are conditioned to get food that way.

The 432d also warned camp administrators to "Expect about 1 fight every day at inprocessing." between families, which would often involve many people. The recommended course of action was "Make the fighters shake hands or kick them out of the camp." The technique must have worked, for the 432d reported that "No CA person was ever hurt or threatened."¹⁶⁸

The goal of PROVIDE COMFORT was to get the Kurdish refugees out of the camps as soon as possible and back into Iraq under UN and Coalition protection. Again, there was to be no repetition of the Palestinian refugee camps. General Shalikashvili pointedly vetoed the installation of wooden floors and insulation for the camps. In the words of a report by the 432d, "You do not make the camp too nice. You will draw people to the camp and never be able to get rid of them."¹⁶⁹

General Shalikashvili also put an end to the distribution of the Army's MREs, noting that those rations cost \$6 per day, while bulk food could be provided for less than \$1 per day. U.S. Army Special Forces had determined in their dealings with the Kurds, even before the camps were established, that the items the refugees most wanted were rice, flour, cooking oil, tomato paste, tea and sugar. (That, and chicken, could be said to be acceptable food almost anywhere in the world.) These staples were procured locally in Turkey and transported efficiently in bulk.

Transport of refugee supplies was increasingly awarded to Turkish and local Iraqi trucking concerns. Contracted civilian trucking was certainly a less expensive method than using tactical military trucks, with their high fuel consumption, and the contractors were eager for the work. However, there was some pilferage and a clever scam by Turkish drivers who drove out with almost empty fuel tanks and then loaded up with much cheaper Iraqi fuel to sell on the Turkish black market. As Turkish

customs caught on to the racket, long lines developed at border crossings as the vehicles were more carefully inspected. Still, the everyday hauling of refugee supplies could be much more economically performed by civilian trucks designed for such work than military trucks built for the rigors of a combat environment, just as bulk supplies or generic food proved much more economical and fitted to the mission than MREs.¹⁷⁰

Before General Shalikashvili's ending of MRE distribution, the Kurds, now that their lives were safe, began to make increasing demands on CA troops that went beyond food and shelter, such as more reconstruction of their villages. They would also select one or two items from their Army rations and throw out the rest; while they disdained corn as "animal food" and potatoes as "beggar food" (but would consume the latter in the form of French fries). Their reaction to the cheese balls and pie filling supplied through international humanitarian appeals, was, understandably, even more negative. The Kurds had some even more valid grounds in their objections to the used clothing passed on to them, often worn out or thrown together without regard to size. CA troops tolerantly attributed this new attitude to human nature and made due allowance, but they also realized the danger of creating a "race of beggars" (and quite particular ones at that) if the camps and the feeding were made semi-permanent.¹⁷¹ It was about this time also that military and civil relief authorities became aware that blanket distribution was assuming something of a marker reminiscent of the infamous Vietnam War "body count," with Washington seeming to determine the success of the mission primarily by the number of blankets distributed. Even with the arrival of warm weather, the flow was difficult to turn off.¹⁷² Military and NGO personnel had also to make a conscientious effort to steer clear of politics; the leader of the Kurds' largest faction exulted that "We are closer than ever to autonomy. This is the best chance that we've had in this century." Here was a political development fiercely resisted by Iran and Turkey, not to mention Iraq. Succoring the Kurds was a "tar baby" to which the Coalition rightly feared being stuck.¹⁷³

Troops of the 96th worked with PSYOP units, exhorting by loudspeaker the refugees in the local towns to clean up the place: no clean-up, no food. ("Soon these fires start popping up all over town where people were moving the rubbish around and at least burning it.")¹⁷⁴

Personnel of the 432d were by this time conducting extensive surveys of the town of Zahko, where many of the refugees would be resettling. Zahko's schools, water, health, judicial and fuel status were investigated, as well as its economic, postal, government and municipal services, prior to the refugees being relocated to the town and its environs. The first camp was turned over to the UNHCR, as planned and to considerable media fanfare, on 7 June 1991. The next day, when CA officers tried to contact the new camp mayor, however, they found that he had taken off to Geneva, Switzerland, for a two-weeks vacation! General Campbell later remarked with some asperity that:

We did all of the work and we quickly learned that once we gave up our responsibility that we had to have somebody there to take it over. Well, the UN was not that person or that entity or that organization.¹⁷⁵

By 7 July the mission in the mountains had been successfully completed and the refugees were either in the camps or had returned to their homes in the Security Zones set up by Coalition forces, after clearing out Saddam's police and military. On at least one occasion a U.S. Special Forces A Detachment commander informed a recalcitrant Iraqi unit that if they did not move out he would have to kill them. An A-10 attack aircraft circling overhead reinforced the point. The Kurds themselves could prove quite belligerent toward their Iraqi oppressors. A Baath political headquarters in Dohuk was rushed by a Kurdish mob, several Iraqis killed and the building burned down. The 431st escorted convoys of refugees returning to their homes, and when the Iraqi city of Dahok was opened for their return, that company assisted in their resettlement in the city. The 431st then moved into the city and provided food, tents, data on explosives and coordinated medical assistance, as well as daily resupply.¹⁷⁶ There were also the not unexpected problems of authority, although the armed Peshmerga Kurdish guerrilla fighters cooperated, some ending up as improvised "police."¹⁷⁷

Towards the end of the month most of the refugees had entered transit camps or had finally gone home. Coalition forces withdrew on 15 July, leaving the UN to manage most of the Kurdish refugee assistance program.¹⁷⁸ PROVIDE COMFORT had been the largest and most successful humanitarian relief operation at least since the Berlin Airlift of 1948-1949.

In summary, of course, there were weaknesses revealed and lessons to be learned from the great coalition endeavor that was DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM as well as PROVIDE COMFORT. Referring to the latter operation, for example, the commander of the 96th lamented for himself "and in all my officers, a lack of the detailed knowledge about the United Nations and about the International Red Cross, about the Red Crescent, and all of those types of organizations," and called for detailed instruction in these organizations, their capabilities and their philosophies, as part of formal CA training. He also noted that the British and the French forces were much easier to work with than U.S. conventional units. The reason was simple: the British brought a wealth of such experience from Northern Ireland, the French from Algeria in the 1950s and from their client nations to this day. ("Help these people. It was almost intuitive with them.")¹⁷⁹ For all of these problems, the 96th certainly had earned its Meritorious Unit Commendation for its mission in Southwest Asia. ("The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) earned the reputation as being indispensable to ARCENT during the campaign", in the citation's words.)

DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT held numerous lessons for Army CA. One of the first was that the continuing tension between the RC CA component, and the Active Army must abate in light of the continuing deployment of

Army units in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and with the contraction in size of the U.S. military. The Active Component simply does not have the skills to provide for the restoration of civil infrastructures in either Third World or developed areas. On the RC side, it could be argued that the scale of involvement was excessive, that two RC CA brigades could probably have done the mission carried out well enough by four. However, this argument might well smack of hindsight.¹⁸⁰

The question of the use of individual RC volunteers also had to be addressed. Volunteers might or might not be the most qualified for a mission; the point was that personnel should not be selected primarily because they are available. RC CA veterans of the Gulf War also were virtually unanimous in their opinion that their units should follow their Capstone trace and know beforehand their mobilization site. They also hoped that they had seen the last of Fort Bragg's World War II barracks.

In the end, there was no documented case of any civilian death at the hands of the Coalition forces, ground or air, surely one of the most impressive records in military history. The USAJFKSWCS after-action study concluded that:

All CA Forces in Desert Shield/Storm (AC and RC) demonstrated extraordinary flexibility, performing a wide range of missions many of which were only loosely related to CA by Doctrine. RC CA personnel were particularly impressive in this regard, exhibiting considerable flexibility of response and mission capability, largely because of civilian acquired skill.¹⁸¹

¹These observations were recorded by the Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., former Secretary of the Army, in his remarks at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's *Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium. Proceedings, 25-27 October 1991* (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: n.d.), 22. The task of the historian would be considerably eased and the record better preserved if other U.S. military operations were followed so soon by such professional symposiums.

²An instructive contrast between RC CA in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD is found in Frederick C. Oelrich, "200K Call-Up: Just Cause vs Desert Shield." *Special Warfare* (March 1992). Gordon W. Rudd, "Operation Provide Comfort: Humanitarian Intervention in Northern Iraq," Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1993.

³John Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War With Iraq," in CA symposium, 146. This material is found also in *United States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm* (Washington: 9 October 1991).

⁴LTC Ed Miller, interview with Dr. Stewart, 14 July 1991, 6.

⁵Dennis Barlow (Joint Staff J-33), "Joint Staff Civil Affairs Actions During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM," typescript (n.d.), 1. (LTC Barlow is certainly being present-minded when he writes that "CA deployments and activations during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM...were more extensive and complex than at any other time in US history.", *ibid.* After all, there was World War II.)

⁶96th CA Battalion(A), Operational Summary of Actions by the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (ABN) During Operations Desert Shield/Shield [sic.]/PROVIDE COMFORT," 11 September 1991, n.p.; LTC Sahlin interview with LTC W. A. McGrew and Dr. Thomas Crouch, Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, 20 November 1991, 4. (copies of transcripts of CLIC interviews in USASOC History Archives).

⁷Headquarters, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (A), Memorandum for Participants in the Civil Affairs Symposium, 25-27 October 1991, 11 September 1991.

⁸96th CA Battalion, "Operational Summary of Actions by the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Abn) During Operations Desert Shield/PROVIDE COMFORT," 11 September 1991, in *Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War*; USACAPOC, "Civil Affairs Support to Operation Desert Storm," n.d., in *Proceedings*, 253; MAJ M. Pinckney, (Executive Officer, 96th CA Battalion), interview with McGrew and Crouch, 20 November 1991, 1-2; LTC Sahlin, interview, 1, 7-8; Sahlin, "Civil Affairs Observations in Operation Desert Shield.," 24 January 1991, USASOC History Archives.; Norman F. Hubler, "Civil Affairs and Wartime Host Nation Support," *Military Review* (July 1992), 74; John T. Fishel, "Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 31 August 1992, 20.

⁹COL Patrick W. Carlton, "The Kuwaiti Task Force: A Unique Solution to Kuwait's Reconstruction Problems", typescript, n.d., 7, USASOC History Archives. Quotation from Sahlin interview, 3; USACAPOC, "Civil Affairs Support to Operation Desert

Storm," n.d.; *Proceedings*, 254; L. Blount, "Civil-Military Operations During Operations Desert Shield/Storm from a USCENTCOM Perspective," *Proceedings*, 229.

¹⁰Frix and Davis, 3; LTC Howton, interview, 14 July 1991, 1-4; Brinkerhoff, 176; Carlton, 6.; Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, *Civil Affairs in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and PROVIDE COMFORT, 1990-1991: Some Views of the Operators about Mobilization*, Thomas W. Crouch, William A. McGrew, eds. (Langley Air Force Base: July 1993) 30.

¹¹Fishel, 18. An informative account of the formation of the KTF can be found in BG Mooney, 352d Commander, with Dr. R. Stewart, 14 July 1991. (copy in USASOC History Archives).

¹²Brinkerhoff, 53; "Remarks by Honorable James R. Locher III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, for the Civil Affairs Symposium, October 25, 1991," 15, 19.

¹³Carlton, 11. BG Mooney interview, in Crouch and McGrew, 16-17.

¹⁴Carlton, 10. The Civil Affairs Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, the CA proponent was also of little help. Amazingly, DAMO-ODP argued that

The Army is not structured or resourced, and does not have the...primary mission to accomplish the full range of the mission contemplated in the Kuwaiti request.... Civil Affairs units do not possess material resources or equipment to directly provide physical support to the civil sector."

quoted in *ibid.*, 11. This at the very time when experienced utility, public safety, public health, public administration and public works RC CA specialists were trying to get on board to support the Army mission in Southwest Asia.

¹⁵Oelrich, 19. In the words of one authority, "Most of the Civil Affairs community was still trying to reorganize from the ill effects of the war in Vietnam, and the Reserve Civil Affairs community were not even on the playing field.", Brinkerhoff, "Remarks by John R. Brinkerhoff for the Civil Affairs Symposium, October 26, 1991," *Proceedings*, 73.

¹⁶Fishel, 18; MAJ (P) O. Trombetta, Jr interview, 30.

¹⁷352d CA Command, "Combined Civil Affairs Task Force Operations Desert Shield/Storm After-Action Report," April 1991, 2-3 and *passim*; BG Mooney interview, 16. As late as 28 January the Kuwaiti oil minister could only refer to a "plan" to fight oil fires, but even this first step had not been agreed upon. (U) Memo for the Record, CENTCOM J5, Subject: Report of Meeting at Embassy of Kuwait on 28 January 1991," RG 518, box 1, vol. III, tab K., Confidential. (Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.); Carlton, 18-19; Fishel, 21-22. The KTF also saw to it that the Kuwaitis would "buy American" whenever possible; more than 80 percent of the total dollar value of all contracts it concluded were with U.S. firms., *ibid.*, 19.

¹⁸304th CA Group, memo for Commanding General ARCENT SUPCON, Sub: Summary of 304th Civil Affairs Group Activities, 6 March 1991; *ibid.*, "memo for Commanding General 22d Support Command," 7 April 1991; *ibid.*, "Synopsis of the Mobilization and Deployment of the 304th Civil Affairs Group in Support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (27 Dec '90--3 Jun '91," in *Proceedings*, 396; 352d After Action Report, 4; COL Larry Blount, interview with Dr. Stewart, 13 July 1991, 13; Orpheo Trombetta, Jr., interview, 31; COL Charles Sadek, interview, 13 July 1991, 6. COL Elliott is scathing about Kuwaiti lack of planning for possible oil fires:

Basically it came down to they fooled around for a full month.... Their concern was that the oil companies had to ask for each team \$22,000 per day The Kuwaitis only wanted to pay \$20,000.... I mean, you are burning 5 million barrels of oil and you are worrying about \$16,000. Am I missing something here?

Collins interview, 16. For the actual arrangements for fighting oil fires in Kuwait see MAJ Thomas R. Wilson (352d), oral interview with Dr. Crouch, 2 August 1993.

¹⁹Sadek, 4; and BG Mooney, interviews, 18.

²⁰Fishel, 22; Elliott, interview, 8; BG Mooney, interview, 11-12. See also Agency for International Development. *Kurdish Relief and Repatriation: DOD-AID/OFDA Partnership - The AID/OFDA Kurdish Response After-Action Report*. Washington. December 1991.

²¹Brinkerhoff, 179; Carlton, 7, 12; Dennis Barlow, "Joint Staff Civil Affairs Actions During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM," *Proceedings*, n.d., 14, 218; COL. E. Duncan, 35th CA Command, interview with author, 13 July 1991, 31

²²COL John Hays, 360th group interview with Dr. Stewart, 3 November 1991, 17.

²³"The Kuwait Task Force," *Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War*, 263; Carlton, 16, 22, 23; 352d CA Command, After Action Report, 297; P. Mikesh (ASD/SOLIC), "Read ahead for the Civil Affairs Symposium," 212-213; MG Robert Frix and CPT Archie L. Davis, "Task Force Freedom and the Restoration of Kuwait," *Military Review* (October 1992), 3. There may have been further resentment among the AC CA community toward the 352d, which was stationed near Washington, DC, because the latter was politically well-connected and did not hesitate to use those connections to lobby for the command and the RC CA community., Carlton, 2.

²⁴CINCCENT General Norman Schwartzkopf, while chronicling that "We had to bring Kuwait city back to life, which meant repairing and turning on the water supply, electrical power grid, and telephones, helping the police maintain order,...and a thousand other tasks.", never mentions CA or the KTF., Schwartzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: 1992), 490-491; neither does Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds. *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm*,

U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washington: 1995). ARCENT staff quotation from Fishel, 26. MG William G. Pagonis, in charge of logistics for CENTCOM, mentions CA only once in his book *Moving Mountains* (Boston: 1992), 11, but does not refer to the KTF or to other CA units. Brinkerhoff, 176; Carlton, 6.; *Civil Affairs in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm*, 30.

²⁵"Combined Civil Affairs Task Force After Action Report," 6; 293; 352d CA Command, After Action Report (April 1990), 292; Fishel, 19-26; ARCENT G-5, "Army Central Command G5 Activity During Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield," n.d.; Carlton, 21.

²⁶JULLS Number 32810-16200(00009).

²⁷414th CA Company, After Action Report, n.d., USASOC History Archives; "Read Ahead Paper for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm," 502; 354th CA Company, After Action Report, "Doctrine," 1; Gerry L. Suchanek and Thomas W. Watson, "Civil Affairs in Operation Desert Storm: Observations and Initial Impressions" (n.p., n.d.), 6, USASOC History Archives.

²⁸LTC Sahlin interview with author, 7 August 1991; 11, also interview with Dr. Crouch, 11. LTG Yeosock had earlier displayed some skepticism toward the KTF during a briefing by BG Mooney, but this attitude apparently did not extend to the mission of Civil Affairs itself.; Brinkerhoff, 191. COL Elliott, however, claimed that "they were hostile to us; basically wanted to beat us up.", Elliott interview with Dr. Stewart, 14 July 1991.

²⁹Hon. John R. Marsh, remarks before CA symposium, *Proceedings*, 25.

³⁰MAJ Pritchard interview, 14.

³¹LTC Sahlin interview with author, 5.

³²Handwritten remarks by COL Ronald M. Smith, in "Self Interview Questionnaire for Use by CA Symposium Participants.", USASOC History Archives. G. L. Suchanek and Thomas W. Watson in "Civil Affairs in Operation Desert Storm: Observations and Initial Impressions" (n.p., n.d.), 5.

³³LTC King Davis, interview with author, 21 September 1991, 13.

³⁴Staff, CENTCOM C CJ-5, "Observations/Impressions" (Riyadh: 6 April 1991), n.p. The commander of the 96th gives a more balanced appraisal from the viewpoint of the Active Component Army: "There were [CA] people that just spent their whole time bellyaching about being there...not enough pay, not enough training —everything....On the other hand, there were...there were just fine hard working men that I'll be happy to serve with again.", Sahlin interview with author, 25. LTC Sahlin also praised "the guys that they brought in to flesh out the G-5, they were top-notch people," Sahlin interview with Dr. Crouch, 4. As for RC CA units' "top-heavy" rank, the commander of the 360th pointed out that such rank did not excuse, for example, one of his Colonels, a Circuit Court judge in civilian life, from operating a latrine!, COL M. L. Love, Jr., interview with Dr. Stewart, 2 November 1991, 15. The 413th observed that, in view of that unit's "top-heavy officer structure," "it is expected that officers will partake in mission-essential chores.", 413th, "AAR - Operation Desert Storm" (3 March 1991), Appendix D, USASOC History Archives.

³⁵MAJ J. Virgin, "Desert Shield Observation," n.d., USASOC History Archives.

³⁶Fishel, 19, 24-26. In LTC Sahlin's words, "ARCENT didn't want the extremely expensive overhead of bunches of lieutenant colonels and colonels from the reserve component there until they were needed." Ibid, 3. LTC Sahlin's Executive Officer did note that "from what I saw and what I heard from several ranking officers in the Third Army headquarters, they just didn't want the reserves.... They had some sort of bad experiences, and as long as it seemed that we were just going to sit in the sand and park our butts, they did not see where they would have to bring the reserves on and resisted it to the very end." Sahlin interview with McGrew and Crouch, Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, Virginia, 20 November 1991, 2. MAJ Pinckney also spoke of a "turf battle, colonels not wanting other colonels moving in, and it was specifically mentioned they did not want a reserve CA general.", Pinckney interview, 3; Hubler, 74; Oelrich, 20.

³⁷Fishel, 27. Elements of the 360th CA Brigade also participated in host nation support for U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. ("we would load that [flatbed truck, tractor-trailer] with everything from portable wash stands and latrines to rations to toilet paper to comfort kits.... You scrounged, you sent the stuff forward."), CSM Cosgrove and SGT Jacobs (no first names given), interview with Dr. Stewart, 3 November 1991, 3, 8. The 354th CA Brigade also provided Port Support Activity for VII Corps at Dhahran and Al Khobar, managing the full range of activities to provide for some 9,000 troops in transit to the tactical assembly areas., 354th After-Action Report, *Proceedings*, 230.

³⁸Fishel, 32.

³⁹"Combined Civil Affairs Task Force," 21-13; 352d CA Command After Action Report, 300.

⁴⁰U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, [U]"U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned 'Desert Shield/Storm,'" SECRET [Fort Bragg, North Carolina: n.d.], 2-53 (info used is UNCLASSIFIED.) For activation of RC CA units for the Gulf, see "RC Call-Up Issue - Desert Storm" folder, USASOC History Archives.

⁴¹COL Sadek, 352d CA Command, interview with Dr. Stewart, 13 July 1991, 2.

⁴²MAJ Brown, USACAPOC G-3, (U)"Desert Storm Observations"(S) in USACAPOC memo for Commander, USASOC, Subject: "Lessons Learned from Desert Shield, 15 April 1991" (Info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴³The 24 interviewees who deal with the topic in U.S. Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, *Civil Affairs in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and PROVIDE COMFORT, 1990-1991* are unanimous in their strong feelings about the deplorable condition of the facilities allotted to mobilizing RC CA at Fort Bragg.

⁴⁴General Campbell interview, 48; memo, headquarters 304th Civil Affairs Group, Subject: "Synopsis of the Mobilization and Deployment of the 304th Civil Affairs Group in Support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (27 Dec '90--3 Jun '91), 400. 407th CA Company, "Desert Storm Civil Affairs Symposium, Desert Storm After Action Report," 1 October 1991, 484. COL R. E. Duncan interview, 32. The 304th was no more impressed

with its redeployment process at Fort Bragg., *ibid.*, 413; 418th CA Company, "Mobilization: The 418th Goes to War," report for CA Symposium, all from *Proceedings*, 506.

⁴⁵Commander, 418th CA Co., memorandum for Commander, 354th CA Bde., subject: After Action Report for 418th CA Company, 5 May 1991.

⁴⁶Trombetta interview, 30. MAJ (P) Trombetta charged that "There was a distinct move by the active component to keep the Civil Affairs personnel out of country." [Southwest Asia], Trombetta interview, 13 July 1991, 2; LTC(P) M. W. Halvorson, memo for Commander, Mobilization/Validation Cell, USACAPOC, 30 January 1991, USASOC History Archives.

⁴⁷LTC(P) M. W. Halvorson, memo for Commander, Mobilization/Validation Cell, USACAPOC, 30 January 1991, USASOC History Archives.

⁴⁸USACAPOC, "Civil Affairs Support," 255, 258. The S-3 of the 450th CA Company claimed that only his unit and the 489th CA Company had a working, efficient capstone relationship, the former with the 82d Airborne Division, and the latter with the 101st Airborne Division., MAJ Pritchard interview, 19-20; Brinkerhoff, 156. The 354th's After Action Report also complained that it could not utilize JFK Special Warfare Center and School, "the proponent agency for Civil Affairs activities" and that "the school was unprepared to provide intensive CA instruction.", n.p.

⁴⁹General Wayne Downing, remarks before the CA Symposium, *Proceedings*, 59. The 414th CA Company pointed out that its mobilized personnel had, after all, 30 days to meet those standards, and admitted that "more would not have been deployable if the unit had not had 30 days to pass all the SOF requirements.", 414th CA Company, "Read Ahead Paper for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm," *Proceedings*, 501. The commander of the 450th CA Company asserted positively that "so all of these techniques which my soldiers had never been introduced to before, we worked on those in the three weeks we had at Fort Bragg..., so that when we got there they had done it before and they knew how to do it and it worked great.", LTC Davis, interview with author, 21 September, 1991, 6.

⁵⁰LTC Arthur Kinney, interview with Dr. Richard Stewart, 3 November 1991, 23. Other positive views of SOF validation are in CSM Cosgrove and SGT Jacobs, interview with Dr. R. Stewart, 3 November 1991, 1-1; also COL Howton, interview with *ibid.*, 14 July 1991.

⁵¹LTC James Christopherson, interview, in Crouch and McGrew, eds., 71.

⁵²LTC Bruce L. Masey interview in Crouch and McGrew, eds. 50.

⁵³COL Larry Blount, interview, 13 July 1991, 8.

⁵⁴352d CA Command, JULLS Nos. 14533-81400(00009) and 14536-34500(00010).

Quotation from LTC Davis interview, 9. See also Memorandum for Commander, 360th CA Bde., Subject: MTOE Equipment Evaluation, 1 April 1991, which claimed that the unit's trucks could transport only 50 percent of the unit personnel.; LTC B. Masey, "404th(-) Attached to 3rd Armored Div., VIIth Corps After Action Report," 10 April 1991, both in USSOC History Archives.

⁵⁵(U)JULLS Number 32805-99400(00008);Brinkerhoff, 159-161; 354th CA Company After Action Report, n.p.; COL Raymond House interview, 2 November 1991, 7; (U) JULLS No. 32712-91400 (00003); *ibid.*, Number 3210-35700(00001); LTC Arthur Kinney, interview with Dr. Stewart, 3 November 1991, 9; MAJ D. T. Clark interview, 3 December 1991, 20. The 404th CA Company reported that upon arrival in Saudi, combat and combat arms supply officers simply refused to issue BDUs to their soldiers., 404th CA Company, "Subject: Unit Participation in Operation Desert Storm," *Proceedings*, 471. Both CA and PSYOP units also reported to Fort Bragg short of public address systems. USACAPOC was able to arrange lateral transfers of this gear from non-deploying units, and even bought Sony "boom boxes" for some units at a cost in equipment uniformity., *ibid.*, 161; 422d CA Company, *Proceedings*, 525. On the other hand, COL R. E. Duncan, of the 352d CA Command asserted that his people had no commo problem because "I had 60 hand-held radios so we took our own communication....it was those other folks that didn't plan that didn't have it." [radios]. Duncan interview, 13 July 1991, 15, 16. USAJFKSWCS, "Desert Shield/Storm," 2- 59-61. (info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

⁵⁶LTC Norman F. Hubler, "Civil Affairs and Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Operation Desert Shield/Storm (5 May 1991), USASOC History Archives. (LTC Hubler was assigned to the 304th and attached to the 22d SUPCOM).

⁵⁷304th Desert Shield/Desert Storm report, 411; *ibid.*, Command Report. To add insult to injury, at the time of the 304th's redeployment, some 200 of those civilian buses were still unaccounted for., *ibid.*, 412. The Bedouin presented a unique problem. They were not Displaced Civilians, because, as perpetual wanderers they had no place from which to be displaced, and they were certainly not EPWs in that they held allegiance to no army or country. They were also almost always armed. (The romantic image of the camel-riding tribespeoples soon had to be discarded; they drove about in pickup trucks.) (U)JULLS Number 14301-97000(00015). Water wells incident from USAJFKSWCS, "Desert Shield/Storm," 2-49 (S) (info used is UNCLASSIFIED); MAJ David Blackledge interview with Dr. Stewart, 3 November 1991, 12-13. See also series of 304th after-action reports, March-May 1991, USASOC History Archives; Todd reminiscences.

⁵⁸LTC Ed Miller interview, 14 July 1991, 9.

⁵⁹MAJ Pritchard interview, 28.

⁶⁰404th, *Proceedings*, 471.

⁶¹COL John Hays, 360th group interview, 3 November 1991, 21. For selected cases dealing with the disposition of DCs, see "360th CA Bde, Desert Storm file," USASOC History Archives; and COL M. L. Love., Jr., interview with Dr. Stewart, 2 November 1991, 21; 401st CA Co., Company After Action Report, 26 March 199; LTC James R. Ward, oral interview with Dr. McGrew, 11 April 1992.

⁶²BG Mooney interview, 25 (quotation, 23).

⁶³Fishel, 37; Carlton, 24; Frix and Davis, 4; 352d CA Command, After Action Report, 10-12; Blount, 234; Howton interview, 11-13, 24-25. Richard W. Stewart, (U)"Army Special

Operations in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm," SECRET, USASOC History Office (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: January 1993), 113. (info used is UNCLASSIFIED). BG Mooney interview, 25. A 352d CA Command officer agreed that

And a lot of it evolved because we had been tasked with the mission under Department of State and Defense and then they created this CCATF to give General Mooney a job —that's true and simple...and from then on it was a head-knocking contest because Randy [COL Elliott] was told he was working for State, and Mooney said, 'No, you are working for me.'There was a lot of jealousy of the KTF, a lot of jealousy....it got top heavy. All they did was brief the work that we did. The KTF still did all the work.

COL R. E. Duncan, 352d CA Command, interview with author, 13 July 1991, 29.

⁶⁴Brinkerhoff, 67; Fishel, 37. A less enchanted view of the "thing called Task Force Freedom" is provided by MAJ Trombetta, 352d liaison element, interview, 4.

⁶⁵413th CA Company, "Report of the 413th Civil Affairs Company in Desert Storm," n.d., *Proceedings*, 493, 495; MAJ Royce Wittie, 413th CA Company, with Dr. Crouch, 7 March 199, *passim*.

⁶⁶Blount, 235; Sahlin interview, 12. LTC Sahlin characterized the rationale for CA's EPW mission as "well, you're civil affairs, they're prisoners, that's a lot like being a civilian, fix it!", *ibid*.

⁶⁷407th CA Company, "Desert Storm Civil Affairs Symposium, Desert Storm After Action Report," *Proceedings*, 486. (emphasis added) .

⁶⁸413th CA Company, After Action Report, 3 March 1991, n.p.; *ibid.*, report for CA Symposium, 495-496. The use of the older "Displaced Person" term rather than "Displaced Civilian" is not explained.

⁶⁹407th CA Company, After Action Report, S-5 Team, 5th MASH, 6, USASOC History Archives.

⁷⁰414th CA Co., After Action Report, "14th MP Bde CMO Support," USASOC History Archives; USAJFKSWCS, "Desert Shield/Storm," 2-47; HQDA, ADCSOPS-FD (U)Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned(S/NF) (info used is UNCLASSIFIED), 3, n.d., II-263-267.

⁷¹489th CA Company, report for CA Symposium, n.d., *Proceedings*, 595, 596. A JULLS report found that CA Chaplains "by virtue of their education, were the most knowledgeable US source on history and customs of the middle east" [*sic.*], Number 14311-88700(00016). But a 360th Colonel claimed that the actual physical disposal of Iraqi remains was "a fiasco," with conflicting guidance and information. COL House interview, 1.

⁷²413th CA Company, "Report of the 413th Civil Affairs Company in Desert Storm," n.d., *Proceedings*, 492.

⁷³MAJ B. Bickel interview, 11.

⁷⁴414th CA Company, report for CA Symposium, 502; 422d CA Company, "Civil Affairs in Support of Division Combat Operations," n.d., *Proceedings*, 525; Blount, 234.

⁷⁵403d CA Company, "403d Civil Affairs Company and Operation Desert Storm," *Proceedings*, 464; USAJFKSWCS, (U)"Desert Shield/Storm" NOFORN/SECRET , 2.35. (Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.)

⁷⁶MAJ Blackledge interview, 18. See also 450th CA Co., After Action Report, n.d., USASOC Historical Archives.

⁷⁷Blount, 231; Sahlin interview with Dr. Crouch, 5; MAJ Blackledge interview, 14.-19.

⁷⁸"Experiences of the 450th Civil Affairs Company During the Persian Gulf War, and Lessons Learned," *Proceedings*, n.d., 578; 422d presentation for CA Symposium, *Proceedings*, 526; "Report of the 414th Civil Affairs Company in Desert Storm," n.d., *Proceedings*, 492. The 414th CA Company reported that its EPW work with the MP brigades was its "most successful mission.", 414th report for CA Symposium, 502; 407th CA Company, *Proceedings*, 486; LTC Kinney interview, 11, and *passim*. The 401st performed a similar service jointly with MI and MP assets., 401st CA Company, "The 401st Civil Affairs Company and Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War," *ibid.*, 454; and *ibid.*, 401st After Action Report, 26 March 1991. See also USAJFKSWCS "Desert Shield/Storm," 2-49.

⁷⁹422d CA Company, "Civil Affairs in Support of Division Combat Operations," *Proceedings*, 525-526. JULLS No. 14548-49900(0013), from the 432d CA Command, spoke highly of the Kuwaiti interpreters ("They were flexible and willing to undertake any task assigned....enabled us hit the ground running.")

⁸⁰360th CA Brigade, "360th Civil Affairs Brigade," after-action report, n.d., USASOC History Archives"; *ibid.*, 360th Civil Affairs Brigade Narrative Operation Desert Shield & Desert Storm," *Proceedings*, 389. JULLS Number 32817-47700(000010), however, noting that only one mobilized CA unit had a Middle East Area of Operations and that its language requirement was Farzi (Persian), concluded that more could have been done in the utilization of this most valuable asset --indigenous interpreters.

⁸¹1LT Jeffrey L. Lebakken, memo for 1st COSCOM G-5, Sub: Meeting with the Emir of Ash Shubah, 10 January 1991, USASOC History Archives.

⁸²LTC Sahlin interview with author, 12; 96th Memo for Participants in Civil Affairs Symposium, 446.

⁸³MAJ Pritchard interview, 32-39; 450th CA Company, "Crossing the Line," 35.

⁸⁴404th, *Proceedings*, 474.

⁸⁵450th CA Company, "Crossing the Line," 39.

⁸⁶MAJ Douglas Nash, "Civil Affairs in the Gulf War: Administration of an Occupied Town," *Special Warfare* (October 1994).

⁸⁷MAJ Blackledge interview, 22. For refugees, see also 407th CA Company After Action Reports, USASOC History Archives; and MAJ John R. Randt, "On the Road to Safwan, Iraq," *Army Reserve Magazine* (April 1991).

⁸⁸Todd reminiscences, entries for 13, 14 March 1991.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Mooney interview, 28; Todd reminiscences.

⁹¹404th CA Company, *Proceedings*, 474; 354th CA Brigade, After Action Report, n.p.; COL Blount interview, 13 July 1991, 25-27. See also "CENTCOM G5 Activity During Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, typescript, 6, USASOC History Archives. MAJ Trombetta contended that ARCENT did not acknowledge its responsibility for refugees until the appearance of an article in the *New York Times* drew attention to the growing problem. Trombetta interview, 14.

⁹²Fishel, 43-44.

⁹³JULLS Number 32724-93500(00007); Sahlin interview with Dr. Crouch, 10; Blount interview, 25. Personnel of the 360th give particularly high praise to MP units for their assistance with refugees. They also pointed out that "if you weren't pure, 100 percent Kuwaiti, you had no chance." (with Kuwaiti relief officials),. 360th group interview, 27-30 for Kuwaiti officials and passim for MPs. For other CA DC operations, see 422d CA Company Operation Desert Storm After Action Report (n.d.), USASOC History Archives. Also COL John Meyers, 304th Group, oral interview with (?), 3 August 1993. COL Meyers is highly critical on the conditions at Rafaha under the Saudis: "When a U.S. helicopter crewman simply passed a bottle of water to a camp refugee, "We had to do a straight pop up to get out of there. It caused a riot, right there at the aircraft with the rotors turning." Meyers interview, 9.

⁹⁴CPT Joe Todd, reminiscences of CA service in Southwest Asia, typescript, entry for 28 February 1991, USASOC History Archives.

⁹⁵MAJ Pinckney interview, 8. BG Mooney interview, 24. Their movement was not helped by the fact that they secured vehicles only hours before their movement, and most of these were cast-off CUCVs from VII Corps -which was getting the new HMMVs. 352d After Action Report, 298.

⁹⁶COL Blount interview with Dr. Stewart, 12. See also the detailed Kuwait City study drawn up presumably by the CCATF, dated 24 February 1991, USASOC History Archives.

⁹⁷BG Mooney interview, 25-26; MAJ Trombetta interview with Dr. Stewart, 33.

⁹⁸LTC Sahlin, interview with author, 17-18.

⁹⁹COL Blount, 231.

¹⁰⁰Fishel, 39; COL R. E. Duncan, 352d CA Command interview, 13 July 1991, 10-11. (March 1992).

¹⁰¹Trombetta interview, 12, 15.

¹⁰²431st CA Company, "Read Ahead Paper," *Proceedings*, 528. See also collection of after-action reports and assessments of Kuwait City by officers of the 431st in USASOC History Archives.

¹⁰³401st CA Company, "401st CA Company and Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War," *Proceedings*, 454; 431st CA Command Agriculture After Action Report - Operation Desert Storm, 28 March 1991, USASOC History Archives. U.S. troopers for a day gave up much of their own washing and drinking for these animals, whose most pressing need was simply for water., Trombetta interview with Dr. Stewart, 12.

¹⁰⁴CPT Bob Vogelsang, "Treating the Animals of Kuwait," *Special Warfare* (March 1992).

¹⁰⁵The 432d CA Company also concerned itself with the animals wandering about the city, feeding abandoned horses, and locating, watering, consolidating and feeding dairy cattle., *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶432d CA Company, "After Action Report, Operation Desert Storm," *passim* and attachment No. 2 (7 April 1991), n.p., USASOC Historical Archives; BG Mooney interview with Dr. Stewart, 30, 36. See also 432d's school damage assessments and later HRS Status Reports for March-April 1991, USASOC Historical Archives.

¹⁰⁷Frix and Davis, 4. The 352d's after-action report noted that "the condition of Kuwait City was less of a disaster than anticipated.", 352d CA Command, 286, 301. For oil fires see also Wilson oral interview, *passim*.

¹⁰⁸COL Randall Elliott interview, with Dr. Stewart, 14 July 1991, 5. In one of the very few intelligent instances of Iraqi sabotage (as compared to their mindless vandalism), the occupying forces had carefully destroyed several city substations, cut key cables and removed the cut pieces to prevent easy splicing. Stewart, 134. (info used is UNCLASSIFIED.) For food and water distribution in Kuwait City, see 432d CA Company, After Action Report, Attachment No. 1, page 1. (n.d.).

¹⁰⁹432d CA Co., After-Action Report No. 7 April 1991, USASOC History Archives; Frix and Davis, 6-8; 352d After Action Report, 302-305; JULLS Number (00013); Sahlin interview with author, 17-26. "Garbage" quotation, *ibid.*, 19; MAJ Trombetta interview, 18; 432d CA Company, After Action Report, 7 April 1991, USASOC History Archives; 431st CA Company, After Action Report, Operation Desert Storm, 28 March 1991, *ibid.*

¹¹⁰COL Duncan interview, 4.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 19; BG Mooney interview, 30.

¹¹²Sahlin interview with author, 24.

¹¹³Frix and Davis, 8.

¹¹⁴Trombetta interview, 18.

¹¹⁵(U)JULLS Number 32719-42700(00006).

¹¹⁶Carlton, 25; Frix and Davis, 10; Brinkerhoff, 183-187. Secretary of the Army Michael Stone noted that "It is not an exaggeration to say that bringing Kuwait back to life in the early days following the Iraqi departure would not have been possible without the 352nd", *ibid.*, 187. On the other hand, commanders might have shown a little more concern for the water problems of their own troops: there were a mere nine shower heads available in Kuwait City for the entire U.S. Army. It was not merely a question of personal comfort.

This presumed oversight caused long lines, lost man hours and wear and tear on vehicles driving to and from these few sites. 432d CA Command, JULLS No. 14465-02100(0004).

¹¹⁷CPT J. L. Todd, memo for Commander, 4th Brigade, sub: "Damage to Ziggurat of Ur," 29 April 1991; also Todd reminiscences. ("What a history - what a job. I'm in charge of Ur!"), *ibid.*

¹¹⁸Sadek interview, 10-11.

¹¹⁹BG Mooney interview, 33.

¹²⁰COL Duncan interview, 22.

¹²¹352d After Action Report, 24-25, 26, 28; Elliott interview, 6; COL E. R. Duncan, 352th CA Command interview with author, 13 July 1991, 17-18.

¹²²*Ibid.*, 17-18.

¹²³This statement was made directly to COL Elliott by a Kuwaiti official (name garbled in transcript), Elliott interview with Dr. Stewart, 10. See also Andrew Natsios, "Preventing Human Rights Abuse in Kuwait," *Proceedings*, 317, and (U)JULLS 32719-42700 (00006) A 352d officer recalled "the reluctance of the Kuwaitis to commit themselves to sign on the dotted line to provide water and food and medical care.", LTC Ed Miller interview, 11; JULLS 32719-42700(00006).

¹²⁴352d CA Command After Action Report, 18. COL Elliott agreed that "Some of it [maldistribution of food] was "just due to their [Kuwaitis] own inefficiency and stupidity.", Elliott interview with Dr. Stewart, 7. The 96th's commander also reported on the Kuwaiti authorities' unwillingness to provide reconstruction and relief to the Palestinians., LTC Sahlin interview with author, 20. In all fairness, it should be added that the Government of Kuwait paid for all restoration services, and paid on time., Fishel, 42.

¹²⁵431st CA Company After Action Report, n.p.

¹²⁶Natsios, 319; Fishel, 41. An unclassified JULLS noted that "military Psyop units did not anticipate, and hence did not target the underlying causes of the civil strife and animosity," Number 14341-63700(00001).

¹²⁷COL Elliott interview, 12.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, 11.

¹²⁹LTC Michael Cleary, "Civil Affairs Information Collection in Kuwait City," *Special Warfare* (April 1995), 11-12.

¹³⁰Andrew Natsios, "Preventing Human Right [sic.] Abuses in Kuwait," *Proceedings*, 318-319; quotation in Charlton, 20.

¹³¹352d After Action Report, 307-308. COL Elliott gives a figure of some 20 persons known to have been killed by Kuwaitis during KTF's tenure., interview, 11.

¹³²Frix and Davis, 10. Similar sentiments are found in 352d After-Action report, 22.

¹³³Carlton, 26-27; Frix and Davis, 8; Fishel, 44.

¹³⁴USACAPOC, "Civil Affairs Support," 258. A 360th officer termed it "A lot of wasted time." Unit personnel had completed the bulk of their paperwork in Saudi Arabia, "So it was wasted time." at Fort Bragg; COL House interview with Dr. Stewart, 22.

¹³⁵USACAPOC, "Civil Affairs Support," 256.

¹³⁶LTCSahlin interview with author, 11.

¹³⁷Quoted in Carlton, 28.

¹³⁸Hon. John A. Marsh, Jr., remarks for CA Symposium, *Proceedings*, 26.

¹³⁹A perceptive account of operation PROVIDE COMFORT can be found in Chris Seiple, "Square-Dancing into the Future: The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship and the CMOC in Times of Humanitarian Intervention," thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (December 1995). This work was soon after published as *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*, Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 1996). See also Gordon W. Rudd, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: One More Tile On the Mosaic, 6 April - 15 July 1991," typescript, U.S. Army Center of Military History (n.d.). An early day-to-day account of one CA officer's work in PROVIDE COMFORT is in Todd reminiscences.

¹⁴⁰General Wayne Downing, remarks before CA Symposium, *Proceedings*, 56.

¹⁴¹Fishel, 53.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 55-56; "PROVIDE COMFORT Participation," *Proceedings*, 364; 432d CA Company, After Action Report, 7 April 1991, *ibid.*; 354th report, *Proceedings*, 348.

¹⁴³USAJFKSWCS Department of Evaluation and Standardization, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: Lessons Learned, Observations" (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: n.d.), 15, 206.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 204, 222.

¹⁴⁵Rudd, [2]. As the commander of the 354th observed, General Shalikashvili's general guidance was correct because he "didn't know what to do either....They don't teach you at war college what to do when a 1/2 million people are dying.", quoted in Seiple, 86.

¹⁴⁶Sahlin interview with Dr. Crouch, 15. As LTC Sahlin pointed out, PROVIDE COMFORT was the mirror image of DESERT SHIELD. In the former, CA assets had been deployed without much knowledge of their mission, and more-or-less developed in the field. In the latter, the mission was clear-cut before the troops were deployed. The missions also differed in that there was to be no "nation-building" with the Kurds. "It was a very rudimentary humanitarian service mission that was clearly stated in the beginning. We did it. Then we came home.", *ibid.*, 15-16. General Campbell, however, pointed out that at the beginning of PROVIDE COMFORT the Kurdish camps were often considered a "tar baby" and that "we were all concerned that we would be there forever." Campbell interview, 26 (General Campbell was absolutely correct. Certain U.S. Army SF, PSYOP and Special Operations Aviation elements were deployed in that area until 1997.

¹⁴⁷MAJ D. T. Clark interview with author, 3 December 1991.

¹⁴⁸354th CA Brigade, *Proceedings*, 349. General John R. Galvin, ECOM Commander, understood and appreciated the CA mission; he also knew BG Campbell and wanted his expertise, all good arguments for preserving the CAPSTONE trace in RC mobilizations,

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, *United States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm* (Washington: 9 October 1991), 56.

¹⁴⁹BG Campbell interview with LTC McGrew, 6.

¹⁵⁰354th CA Brigade, After Action Report (n.d.); *ibid.*, "Operations Desert Storm and PROVIDE COMFORT," n.d., *Proceedings*, 350; *ibid.*, LTC James A. Ahrens, Memorandum for Commander, 354th CA Bde., Subject: After Action Report, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," 2 June 1991; USAJFKSWCS, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," 111. CPT Todd, who was there from beginning to end, is scathing on UN personnel: "We never see them....They have 55 vehicles and the only time I see the workers is when they come here to eat....The NGOs are 1,000 times more effective than the UN.", Todd reminiscences, entry for 7 June 1991.

¹⁵¹The 354th gives a figure of 60 NGOs, but other sources give varying figures., 354th CA Brigade, "Operations a Desert Storm and PROVIDE COMFORT," n.d., *Proceedings*, 348; 432d CA Company, memo for CG, 352d CA Command, Subject: "After Action Report, Operation Desert Storm," 7 April, 1991, *Proceedings*, 531. However, as the USAJFKSWCS study noted, the Kurds came down out of their mountain camps in their own time and not necessarily when the SF, CA and Allied troops were ready for them., "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," 217. See also Seiple, 41-43; 432d CA Company, "CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT After Action Report" (Green Bay, Wisconsin?), 1.

¹⁵²BG Campbell interview, 6, 13, 50; 432d CA Company, "From Green Bay to the Persian Gulf, *Proceedings*, 562; LTCSahlin interview with Dr. Crouch, 12. One of the problems that General Campbell addressed personally was the fact that, after being told that they would be leaving almost immediately for a high-priority operation, many CA troops had been "bumped" from aircraft in favor of tent poles, of all things. General Campbell explained that the tents had earlier been forwarded without the poles, and that, considering the weather conditions at the time, "if the Kurds are dead when we get there it isn't going to do much good to have a refugee camp set up.", *ibid.*, 14. See also Fishel, 52. The JFKSWCS after-action study of PROVIDE COMFORT agreed that RC CA morale was "low" initially, but that, for the most part, as they got into their work, their sense of accomplishment in this humanitarian mission greatly improved their attitudes., "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," 202.

¹⁵³Campbell interview, 18-24; 354th CA Brigade report, 348.

¹⁵⁴Rudd, [37]. For the UNHCR side of the story, see UN Information Bulletins Nos. 2-4 (May-June 1991).

¹⁵⁵Seiple, 9.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 68-69; Rudd, [11]. See also D. G. Goff, "Building Conditions for Humanitarian Operations: Operation Provide Comfort," U.S. Army War College Study Project (1992).

¹⁵⁷Quoted in CPT David S. Elmo, "Food Distribution During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," *Special Warfare*(March 1992), 9.

¹⁵⁸Seiple, 55-63.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰432d CA Company, "After Action Report, Operation Desert Storm, 7 April 1991," *Proceedings*, 535.

¹⁶¹USAJFKSWCS, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," 114. The study, which presumably had no ax to grind between AC and RC CA, also argued that "the 96th CA Bn...was not adequate in size or expertise to meet the requirements of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT....The entire operation...might not have been successful were it not for the relocation and use of several RC CA units on active duty in the Gulf Region." 200.

¹⁶²Seiple, 55. In that the DOTD had three different Directors in 1991 and there is no date given for this quotation, this officer is so far unidentified.

¹⁶³BG Campbell, interview McGrew, 37.

¹⁶⁴Material and quotations in Seiple, 55-56, 65-68. One of the most unexpected but welcomed of the NGOs was a group of British firemen, who rotated on 30-day tours, distributing food, hauling bags of supplies and making themselves generally useful., MAJ Clark interview, 15. Clark added, "Now I'd love to have a whole company of British firemen. They were great." Ibid.

¹⁶⁵BG Campbell interview with Dr. Crouch, 35.

¹⁶⁶Headquarters United States European Command, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: After Action Report (n.p.: 1992), 13.

¹⁶⁷418th CA Company, "Mobilization, 1991: The 418th Goes to War," n.d., *Proceedings*, 510.

¹⁶⁸432d CA Command, "Civil Affairs After Action Report, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT.", *Proceedings*, 17. At least one account, however, tells of a more serious incident in which two feuding extended families were put into the same camp by MPs, over the warnings of CA troopers. The MPs had to fire shots into the air to quell the resultant disturbances. Todd reminiscences, 45.

¹⁶⁹"Civil Affairs After Action Report: Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," 432d CA Command, CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT," *ibid.*, 3.

¹⁷⁰Rudd, 33; Elmo, *passim*.

¹⁷¹MAJ Clark, interview with author, 123, 14; USAJFKSWCS "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," 24, 42. Another "lesson learned" was that the troops should not throw candy and other similar items from moving vehicles. A number of Kurdish children were killed or injured diving for the treats, *ibid.*, 29; Rudd [14-15]; Todd reminiscences., 47.

¹⁷²Rudd [5].

¹⁷³Seiple, 72-73.

¹⁷⁴LTG General Shalikashvili, remarks, *Proceedings*, 67. The commander of the 96th reported that his unit distributed about 100 tons of food staples per day. Sahlin interview with Dr. Crouch, 15. Quotation from MAJ Clark interview with author, 7, 9. See also

USAJFKSWCS, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," 17; 432d CA Company, "Current Situation Report in Zahko, 8 May 1991, in "CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT."

¹⁷⁵BG Campbell interview with Dr. Crouch, 36. Similar conclusions are found in the MAJ Pritchard interview, 42. Rudd characterized the chief of the UNHCR field office as very weak and who left most of the work to the NGOs and the military., Rudd dissertation, 49.

¹⁷⁶Rudd, 17; 431st CA Company, *Proceedings*, 528; 354th report for CA Symposium, 348; Rudd thesis, 352. Other such incidents are found on 354-355, 364. Camps and their populations through 23 May 1991 can be found in Seiple, 71.

¹⁷⁷MAJ Clark interview, 8-9.

¹⁷⁸Fishel, 57; Rudd [36].

¹⁷⁹Sahlin interview with author, 12, 16. Similar material in interview with Dr. Crouch, 14.

¹⁸⁰USAJFKSWCS, "Desert Shield/Storm," 2-54. (info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁸¹USAJFKSWCS, "Desert Shield/Storm," 2-50. (emphasis added). But one authority claims that the Army still shies away from the "big picture." "They still don't get what they did right; they talk in terms of logistics: the number of tents put up, the number of latrines built...the military thinks the goal is feeding people, giving medical attention...that's wrong, they must change the course of conflict in a way that saves lives.", Andrew Natsios, quoted in Seiple, 75-76. (emphasis in original).

CONCLUSIONS

U.S. Army Civil Affairs troopers undoubtedly had little time during DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT to reflect on the long history of their specialty. However, they had certainly added greatly to the two centuries deposit of Civil Affairs/Military Government experience, some problematical (Montreal, South Korea) but most quite successful, from the early development of their own nation to the rehabilitation of Germany --or of Kuwait City. This success should not be so startling. After all, the U.S. Army is "a government on the shelf" that can feed, transport and police itself.¹ The Civil Affairs troopers of the Army, AC and RC, are the core of that "government on the shelf." The missions and tasks, in their basics, never seem to have changed all that much.

The U.S. Army's historical record in Civil Affairs and Military Government is one of significant, even inspiring, accomplishment. This record undoubtedly reflects some basic attributes of the U.S. Army itself. Horrendous exceptions like the My Lai Massacre aside, that army is not noted for any widespread killing, pillaging or molestation of civilians. It speaks well for the U.S. Army as a whole that in the decades before Civil Affairs became an Army Branch, such work was carried out, of course, by soldiers seconded from practically every other military specialty.

It is not just that the U.S. Army deployed to defeated or war-devastated nations to protect their civilians as mandated by international law, and then restored much of their infrastructure and their cultural heritage. The Army also could be considered in the light of the historical record the most significant organization for the physical development of the United States itself, at least during its first century of independence, no small accomplishment given the lack of interest in the Army or even anti-military sentiment at the time. The United States in the first half of the 19th century was in many respects an underdeveloped nation, and until the establishment of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1865, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point was the sole university-level technological institute in the U.S. In the absence of the Army and of any sentiment that would have accepted the federal government's large scale direct involvement in economic enterprises, it is difficult to see how 19th century America's roads, bridges, canals, dams or railroads could have been built so early. Further, without the protection offered by the Army, it is possible that the indigenous peoples within the western boundaries of the United States might have been nearly extirpated.²

During the first half of the 19th century, the Army was involved in extensive Military Government in Mexico, in the U.S. Civil War and in Southern Reconstruction. The U.S. Army MG in Mexico was the most inarguably successful. By making and enforcing rules of conduct upon his troops in their dealings with Mexican civilians, Major General Winfield Scott ensured that those troops, alien invaders deep in enemy country, could carry out their duties basically unhindered by those civilians.

The greatest successes of U.S. Army MG were the post-World War II occupations of Germany, Japan and Austria. In those former enemy nations (although the status of Austria was debatable) entire societies were remade, in the face of the "experts" who asserted that no army could impose democracy "at the point of a bayonet," and that only the "brash," naïve Americans would even make the attempt. The assertion had a certain superficial air of validity, but in the special circumstances of total defeat, those nations were receptive to the ministrations, directives and teachings of U.S. Army MG. To this day, these once-belligerent nations have remained economic powerhouses, staunch in their adherence to democratic government and actual allies of their former conquerors. No other army can look back on such an accomplishment, certainly not on such a scale.

The common sins or vices of U.S. Military Government were far more likely to be petty officiousness, impatience, bureaucratic obfuscation or cultural ignorance. Even the officers guilty of such failings were for the most part trying to do their best to assist, rather than to exploit helpless civil populations under their immediate control. Very few were venal and far fewer brutal.

One proof of this benign record is the fact that there is no documented account of any post-hostilities overt opposition to U.S. Army Military Government or Civil Affairs. This is an incredible record, when one understands that during World War II, for example, the U.S. Army's sole Civil Affairs Division peacefully handled the affairs of some 80 million Allied and enemy European civilians. (Of course, there were instances of passive obstruction, "misunderstandings", protests, etc.) By way of instructive contrast, at roughly the same time, the German Army had to deploy four divisions solely to keep order in occupied Yugoslavia, with scant success.

There have been failures as well, of course. The most egregious would be the Army's MG of Montreal in the earliest years of the American Revolution. An ineffective, bigoted commander and his ill-disciplined troops saw to it that the "14th Colony" remained just a mirage, as a bedraggled, demoralized U.S. force abandoned Quebec to the jeers and curses of its inhabitants. The MG of South Korea after World War II must also be accounted as something of a failure in that there was some question as to whether the people there were any better off than they had been when they had suffered under decades of grinding Japanese exploitation.

Those exceptions aside, CA troopers can take more than simple self-satisfaction from their overall good record. Rather, it can also actually serve as a guide for current and future operations. With CA now an Army branch, there has been for more than two decades no need for "additional duty" CA or MG officers. Further, the simultaneous MG examples in Japan (good) and in South Korea (bad) demonstrate the imperative necessity of prior knowledge of the territory to be administered. Civil Affairs and Military Government are not considerations to be added at the end of an operational plan on a "nice to have" basis. Such an attitude was a basic cause, for example, of the wide-spread and unexpected looting in December of 1989 that actually cost Panama far more than the military operations that led to the liberation of that nation from Manuel Noriega's tyranny. On the other hand, a knowledge of the area, a more than competent commander and about as much knowledge of the area that could be gleaned in the very limited time available resulted in perhaps the most successful

Humanitarian Relief operation of modern times, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which saved tens of thousands of Kurdish lives in the wake of the Gulf War.

In fact, PROVIDE COMFORT likely set the template for future CA operations. The collapse of the Soviet empire has left basically only certain "rogue states" as possible deliberate disturbers of the peace. Thus, U.S. Army CA has been and is likely to be in the near future primarily deployed to humanitarian assistance operations. Such employment should not, however, be seen as something new and unprecedented. There are, of course, such general Army disaster deployments, as in the aftermaths of the Johnstown Flood, the San Francisco earthquake or Hurricane Andrew. Army MG and CA troops were also involved in specifically civilian relief operations in each of their war and post-war deployments. MG forces practically rebuilt Okinawa after it had passed through its "storm of steel" in 1945. In Vietnam, widespread Civic Action programs assisted the Vietnamese themselves in the rebuilding and improvement of their infrastructure, often using the "small is beautiful" concept that became so fashionable in the following years. Small-scale irrigation projects, a local sawmill, a rebuilt school or medical clinic, a local food processing plant or water works or a well-run refugee center. During the Philippine Insurrection early in the 20th century, U.S. Army MG carried out similar projects, also against a background of significant opposition in the United States, as in Vietnam. These were down-to-earth civil reconstruction and development projects in the wake of a disaster --war-- that are virtually indistinguishable from today's disaster relief or humanitarian assistance operations, and we can learn from them.

Only the Reserve Component of the Army can bring the particular skills needed for the restoration of economies and national infrastructures. The Army, of course, has its Corps of Engineers, but no electric traction specialty. The RC, on the other hand, does contain a number of NCOs who have years of experience with the New York and Boston subways. Recently, they went to work reviving the Sarajevo tram car system. The Army has no natural gas transmission specialists. But the RC had at least one NCO, employed by a New England gas firm, who rebuilt the thimble-rigged and very dangerous Sarajevo gas lines. The Army has its Finance specialty, but nothing in banking. But it does have RC Colonels who are international financiers in their civil careers, and who put together an international financial aid package for Bosnia. The RC COL/Dr. Randall Elliott, a high-ranking State Department career official, served as liaison between the State Department and the Department of Defense while administering the Kuwait Task Force and its \$528 million in contracts drawn up for the restoration of Kuwait.

Further, as in PROVIDE COMFORT, and as the record of the last decade indicates, the United States military is more likely to operate in a multi-national context in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Peace Operations or Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations in the near-future. That context will also not be exclusively military, but, as also in PROVIDE COMFORT and operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, will involve non-governmental relief organizations. Such operations will require a high degree of cultural awareness and sensitivity to avoid debilitating friction between different military units and civilian organizations.

Some have argued that today's CA operations have to be undertaken against a background of "political" constraints that is "unprecedented." Again, even a short dip into history will show that such considerations are really nothing new. The Continental Congress sent a delegation (which included Benjamin Franklin) up to Montreal to see for itself the mess there that passed for Military Government. After the Civil War, Congress monitored the activities of the Freedmen's Bureau. Early in World War II, the uproar sparked by the infamous Darlan-Eisenhower deal in North Africa early in World War II echoed through the White House and Congress and was only stilled when the offending French admiral was conveniently assassinated. President Johnson himself monitored operations in Vietnam often down to the operational level, and consistently goaded commanders to do more in "the other war" to win over Vietnamese civilian "hearts and minds." Given the intensely international and media interest in such operations as Humanitarian Assistance, which has been increasingly in demand, it is most unlikely that such constraints would vanish or even diminish.

What is different, however, at least to a degree, is the public awareness of military operations, almost as they happen. As late as the Vietnam's "living room war," Americans got their images from the "nightly news" programs featuring events that had transpired about 24 hours earlier. By the 1980s, however, viewers could tune in to television cable news continually for "real time" events interpreted by "experts," often self-appointed, across the globe. Army CA administrators of the Haitian internee camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba observed TV camera operators, who were covering the Rev. Jesse Jackson's tour of the camp, enticing Haitian waifs to approach the wire, thus adding a contrived poignancy to the scene. Short of an overt war situation, publicity and media manipulation can only be expected to increase and even to intensify in future CA operations. The American public will not tolerate their military's operating in an information vacuum.

These operations will likely be basically configured by high policy considerations laid down by civilian officials far from the field and will be conducted in the white light of publicity. If the historical record is any indication, however, there should be little doubt that U.S. Army Civil Affairs will continue successfully to fulfill its missions. They may have differing titles, but through the years there has been little change in those missions: Populace and Resources Control, Foreign Nation Support, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Civic Action Civil [foreign] Defense, Civil Assistance, Civil Administration in Friendly Territory and Civil Administration in Occupied Territory. In a phrase, "Secure the Victory."

¹Tony Auletta, quoted in Karen Guttieri, "The Clausewitzian Loop: Civil Military Operations in American Interventions," paper delivered at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 16-22 April 1996.

²This is not mere supposition. By the middle of the 19th century, British settlers, either directly or indirectly, had wiped out to a man the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies of Newfoundland and Tasmania.

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96th CA Battalion, Company B, group oral interview with MAJ Robert P. Cook, 326th Military History Detachment.

Baratto, BG(P) David, Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS, with author.

Blackledge, MAJ (no first name given), 360th CA Brigade, with Dr. R. Stewart.

Blount, Larry, 352d CA Command, with Dr. Stewart.

Clark, MAJ D. T., 96th with author.
Cosgrove, CSM and SGT Jacobs, 360th, with Dr. Stewart.
Davis, SFC Ben, 96th, CA with author.
Davis, LTC King, 450th CA Company. with author.
Duncan, COL R. E., 352d, with author.
Elliott, COL Randall, 352d, with Dr. R. Stewart.
Frankel, Herman, with author.
House, Colonel Raymon, 360th, with Dr. Stewart.
Howton, COL. (no first name given) 352d, with Dr. Stewart.
Kinney, LTC Arthur, 360th, with Dr. Stewart.
Lindsay, General James J., USSOCOM CG, with Dr. John Partin.
Metaxas, BG (Ret.) T., with author..
Meyers, COL John, 304th CA Group, with ?
Miller, COL Ed, CENTCOM CA, with Dr. Stewart.
Nobleman, Eli E., with Dr. Stewart..
Pritchard, MAJ J., with author
Sahlin, LTC C., 96th CO, with author.
Sadek, COL (no first name given), 352d, with Dr. Stewart.
Thurmond, Hon. Strom, With Dr. D. Hogan.
Toscani, Frank E., with K. A. Oravetz. 1983.
Trombetta, MAJ (P) O., 352d, with Dr. Stewart

With Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (all transcribed; transcriptions in USASOC History Archives)

Adrian, CPT Lawrence, 353d
Allen, CPT Brooke E., 450th
Beahm, COL Robert, 352d
Bellhouse, LTC R., 353d
Bengston, MAJ L. 407th CA Battalion
Brooks, LTC Mark, 352d
Byrd-Day, CPT Claudia, 422d
Campbell, BG(P) Donald F., 353d.
Company B, 96th CA Battalion.
Chicosky, SSG M., 422d
Davis, LTC King Jr., 450th
Flynn, COL John, 353d
Grupper, COL A. P., 353d
Hall, CPT William, 422d
Halvorson, COL John, 353d
Halvorson, COL Michael,
Harbell, MAJ John, 352d
Hess, LTC Michael E., 353d
Hillard, MAJ Sara, 489th Huber, LTC James, 352d

Jennings, MAJ Thomas, 404th
Johnson, 1st Lt. David, 450th
Lambrino, LTC J. 354th CA Brigade
Larue, LTC James, 489th
Lewis, MAJ T. A., 96th CA BN
Mathews, CW2 Sandra, 404th CA Battalion
Meyers, COL John V., 354th
Muller, LTC Kurt, 353d
Murphy, LTC Patrick, 353d
Nash, MAJ, Douglas, 96th
Natsios, MAJ Andrew, 352d
Nelson, MAJ N., 96th
Nicholson, MAJ Grover
Overman, (no first name), 96th ?
Pinckney, MAJ M., 96th
Quigley, MAJ A. H., 450th
Revay, MAJ Karen, 414th CA Battalion
Rottman, 1lt, James B., 422d
Sahlin, LTC Carl T., Commander, 96th
Schulz, CPT Rudy, 96th
Sullivan, CPT Robert, 450th
Uting, CPT G. A.
Ward, LTC James R., 360th
West, LTC Joseph, 422d
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS¹

1 st SOCOM(A)	1 st U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Airborne)
AC	Active Component
AEF	American Expeditionary Force (World War I)
AFHQ	Allied Forces Headquarters (World War II, Mediterranean)
AG	Army Group
AMGOT	Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (World War II)
ARVN	Army of the Republic of [South] Vietnam
ASDSO/LIC	[U.S.] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict
BG	Brigadier General
BHU	Basic Hospital Unit (Korean War)
BMU	Basic Medical Unit (Korean War)
BV	Brevet (rank)
CA	Civil Affairs
CAD	Civil Affairs Division (World War II)
CAS	(8 th U.S. Army) Civil Assistance Section
CASA	Civil Affairs Holding and Staging Area
CAT	Civil Affairs Training (School) (World War II)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIC	Counter-Intelligence Corps
CICFFE	Commander-in-Chief Forces Far East (World War II)
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (Vietnam)
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
CINCSOUTH	U.S. Commander-in Chief Southern Command
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
COL	Colonel
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (Vietnam Conflict)
COSSAC	Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command
COSSAC	Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command (World War II)
CPT	Captain
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone (Vietnam)
DC	Displaced Civilian(s)
DP	Displaced Person(s) (World War II through URGENT FURY)
ECAD	European Civil Affairs Division (World War II)
ETO	European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations US Army (World War II)
FEC	Far East Command (Korean War)
FFI	French Forces of the Interior (World War II)

¹All acronyms and abbreviations herein are U.S. Army terms, unless otherwise indicated.

FUSAG	First U.S. Army Group (World War II)
GHQ	General Headquarters
GO	General Order
GVN	Government of [South] Vietnam
GYA	German Youth Agency (post World War II)
HICOG	High Commissioner of Germany (post-World War II)
HMMWV	High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle
IDS	Information Dissemination Section (occupation of Japan)
ICD	Information Control Division (post-World War II occupation of Germany)
ISB	Information Services Branch (post-World War II occupation of Germany)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JUSPAO	Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (Vietnam War)
KILA	Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (U.S. occupation of South Korea)
KMAG	Korean Military Advisory Group
LANTCOM	U.S. Army Atlantic Command
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LT	Lieutenant
LTC	Lieutenant-Colonel
LTG	Lieutenant General
MACV	Military Advisory Command Vietnam
MAJ	Major
MATA	Military Advisor Training Assistance (Vietnam)
MFA&A	Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives subcommittee division of AFHQ (World War II)
MG	Major General
MG	Military Government
MREs	(Army) Meals Ready to Eat (food rations)
MTT	Military Training Team (Vietnam)
NARA	National Archives and Record Group (U.S.)
NDC	National Defense Corps (Korean War)
OCCA	Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs (post-World War I U.S. MG of Germany)
OMGUS	Office of Military Government of Germany (post-World War II occupation)
OSS	[U.S.] Office of Strategic Services (World War II)
PAVN	People's Army of [North] Vietnam
PCAU	Philippine Civil Affairs Unit (World War II)
PDF	Panama Defense Forces
RADM	Rear Admiral
RIAS	Rundfunk im Americanischen Sektor—Radio in the American Sector (post-World War II U.S. occupation of Germany)

RC	Reserve Component
RF/PR	Regional Forces/Popular Forces (Vietnam)
RG	Record Group (National Archives)
ROK	Republic of [South] Korea
RVN	Republic of [South] Vietnam
SACSA	Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Vietnam era)
SCAO	Senior Civil Affairs Officer (World War II
SCAP	Supreme Commander Allied Powers (Japan occupation)
SF	Special Forces
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (World War II)
SNAFU	Situation Normal, All Fouled Up (World War II and after)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SWPA	Southwest Pacific Area (World War II)
TDY	temporary duty
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UNC	UN Command (Korean War)
UNCACK	UN Civil Assistance Korea
UNCURK	UN Commission on Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNKR	UN Korea Reconstruction Agency
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (World War II and early post-war)
UNTCOK	UN Temporary Commission on Korea
USACAPOC(A)	U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
USAAF	U.S. Army Air Forces (1942-1947)
USAF	U.S. Air Force (1947-)
USAFIK	U.S. Army Forces in Korea
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development (post-1945)
USAJFKSWC(S)	U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (after 1986 "and School")
USAMGIK	U.S. Army Military Government in Korea
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USFFE	U.S. Forces Far East (Korean occupation and war)
USIS	U.S. Information Service
USMAAG	U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (Vietnam)
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
WAC	Women's Army Corps (World War II, Korea)
WD	War Department (after 1947, Department of the Army)

