


STANDING UP THE MACOM:
THE U. S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
1987-92



UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Directorate of History and Museums

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COMMAND HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: 1987-1992
STANDING UP THE MACOM

Prepared by the History Division
USASOC DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Dr. Richard W. Stewart
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1996



LTG PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
Commanding General

PREFACE

This command history attempts to trace at least some of the major events in a critical time period in the history of Army Special Operations Forces (SOF): 1987-1992. It is in no way meant to provide all the detailed staff actions or events of the United States Army Special Operations Command during this period. For one reason, such a volume would undoubtedly be highly classified and thus of minimal value to the Army as a whole and to much of the SOF community. For another reason, no five year history of SOF can attempt to be comprehensive given the huge numbers of actions, issues and operations dealt with by the USASOC staff and by the staffs of its Major Subordinate Commands (MSC)/Major Subordinate Units (MSU). From its creation in 1989, USASOC has supported dozens of large and small contingency operations alone.

Although this history makes no claims to comprehensiveness, the Command History office encourages those staff elements or units who feel that their story has been given short shrift to contact us with the details they would like to add. Since the USASOC history program is still very new, the flow of historical data into the office from the many units which comprise USASOC has been haphazard to say the least. Given the high OPTEMPO of USASOC, this is no surprise. However, USASOC and its subordinate elements have a tremendous story to tell, and this history should serve as a spur for staff elements and units to send in their historical reports, after action reports and other historical data to the Command History office so that their story can be captured accurately. The best sources of accurate historical data are the units themselves and if they are reticent about preparing their reports and sending their data with to this office, the resulting picture of their activities is bound to be skewed. The goal of the Command History office, as part of the Directorate of History and Museums, is to provide accurate historical summaries and for that mission we need the assistance of each unit, staff element and individual within USASOC.

To a certain degree, this historical report covers a wider time period than just 1987 to 1992. It includes some material dealing with the rejuvenation of SOF in the early 1980s. It also includes lists of some major commanders and staff directors up to the end of 1994. This may be logically inconsistent, but I felt it important to provide current lists of such personalities rather than cutting off the list arbitrarily in 1992.

Finally, I want to thank all those who helped make this history possible. They are too numerous to mention by name. However, in each of the units of the Army SOF community there is often one lonely individual--perhaps preparing for a change of station or in between staff actions--who gets tasked as an additional duty to be the unit historian and file the annual historical report. That individual often does his best with no recognition and little command support. However, without his best efforts, this command history would be very sparse. Those additional duty historians in the units send us information which we often cannot get elsewhere. So this first Command History of USASOC is dedicated to those unsung heroes of the historical process--the unit historian. The fact that they cared enough to attempt to do a good job on a thankless task means that at least a few snapshots of their unit's past remains preserved. Thank you for your efforts, and send us more history!



Richard W. Stewart, Ph.D.
Director, History and Museums

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LTG J.T. SCOTT
CG, USASOC MAY 93-AUG 96



LTG WAYNE A. DOWNING
CG, USASOC AUG 91-MAY 93



LTG MICHAEL SPIGELMIRE
CG, USASOC JUN 90-AUG 91



LTG GARY LUCK
CG, USASOC DEC 89-JUN 90

Chapter I: The Formation of the MACOM

The United States Army Special Operations Command is a unique organization with unique and special missions. USASOC was formally activated on 1 December 1989 as the U. S. Army's component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the joint command in charge of all Department of Defense special operations. USASOC is also the sixteenth Major Command (MACOM) of the U. S. Army, which has important implications for its role in reserve component operations, the materiel development and acquisition process, and funding and budgetary systems. It is also one of the smallest MACOMs with only around 14,000 active and 10,000 reserve soldiers.

MISSION: The mission of USASOC is to command all Army Special Operations Forces in the Continental United States and:

- 1) Execute operational control of Army Reserve Special Operations Forces (full command in 1991).
- 2) Coordinate training guidance with the Army National Guard Bureau for National Guard Special Operations Forces.
- 3) Provide training guidance and standards to overseas-based active Army Special Operations Forces through the theater commanders.

USASOC is further tasked with training, equipping, organizing and validating all Army Special Operations Forces for employment by unified combatant commands. In other words, USASOC is responsible for all aspects of preparing Special Operations Forces, active and reserve, for any peacetime or wartime missions. This is a large mission, but it is made easier by the fact that many SOF headquarters, units and the SOF school are co-located with Headquarters, USASOC, at Fort Bragg.

Standing up a new MACOM is a far from painless process. Several of those who were most intimately involved with the initial planning cells beginning in 1987 knew that it would be years before the MACOM organization would reach its final stage of development. The Chief of Staff of USASOC during a critical period of reorganization and re-examination of functions, COL Anthony Normand, stated many times that it would be at least a five years of trial and error from the date of activation of the MACOM until the organization would "settle" into a permanent pattern. This has proven true. A functional realignment of the original structure into one where all Special Forces (active and reserve) and all Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (active and reserve) units were placed under their own separate Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) of USASOC took place in November

1990. Another realignment involving moving several staff functions (such as resources management, force development, public affairs, history, and information management to name a few) occurred from October 1991 to October 1992. A new, provisional command (US Army Special Operations Integration Command, Provisional--USASOIC) was created to command and control the Rangers and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. General Wayne Downing, USASOC CG, 1991-1993, gave serious thought to the creation of a Special Operations Support Command in order effectively to coordinate the activities of the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion and the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion.¹ There has been no end to the possible combinations and permutations of the organizational structure of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF).

Despite the constant reorganizations of USASOC and its MSC, Special Operations Forces continued to reach historically high levels of Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO). The command sent hundreds of missions world-wide, ranging from a one man Mobile Training Team (MTT) to a reinforced "B" Team (a company headquarters in command normally of 6 twelve man "A" teams) in support of the six regional commanders in chief. In addition, major military operations included the massive deployment of over 7000 Army SOF personnel to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM/PROVIDE COMFORT, several hundred to Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE and still others to smaller operations such as FIERY VIGIL, SEA ANGEL, PROVIDE PROMISE, GTMO/SAFE HARBOR, JTF ANDREW, SAFE HAVEN, RESTORE HOPE. In the unsettled environment of the post-cold war Army, Army Special Operations Forces have carved out a critical mission area in support of US policy world wide.

On 27 September 1988, CPT Young of DA DCSOPS presented the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Carl Vuono with a briefing on the elevation of 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) to a Major Command (MACOM). The principal attenders included MG James Guest (Commanding General of 1st SOCOM), BG Sidney Shachnow (Deputy CG of 1st SOCOM, MG Ward (Chief of the Army Reserve) and members of the Army staff.² By all accounts, the briefing went well. Afterwards, Lieutenant General Norman Schwarzkopf, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, commented, according to one summary of the meeting, that, "This is a good package. We can

¹Interview with General Wayne A. Downing. See Appendix #2.

²MG Price, MG Hines, Mr. Manning, BG, O'Connell, BG Pagonis, MG Dominy, MG Reno, MG Morgan, BG Navis, BG Hennies and LTG Schwarzkopf (DCS for Operations) were also in attendance.

probably implement sooner than FY 94."³ General Vuono agreed and approved the plan as a concept for streamlining SOF Command and Control with the specific guidance that this streamlining not raise a new headquarters (1st SOCOM had been in existence as a provisional headquarters since 1982) and that readiness of SOF units was not degraded in the process.⁴ The path was now smooth for the creation of a new MACOM--a Special Operations MACOM.

The origins of the idea of creating a separate Major Command for all Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) are not clear.⁵ The near extinction of Special Forces in the 1970s must certainly have been a spur to the SOF leadership to consider ways and means of institutionalizing special operations more fully into the Army. There is little doubt that Special Forces came very close to a total disbanding by the mid-1970s. The 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) was inactivated in 1969, followed by the 6th SFG(A) in 1971, the 8th SFG(A) in 1972 and the 1st SFG(A) in 1974. There were even rumors in 1975 that the 7th SFG(A), focused to a great extent on the critical mission in South and Central America, was slated for inactivation. In order to forestall this, the Special Forces community decreased the size of the "B" team (Company level command and control headquarters) from 22 individuals down to 8 in 1975. By the end of the decade, the number of SF Operational Detachment "A"s in a Company was reduced as well from six down to five. The reactivation of two Ranger Battalions in 1974, an essentially conventional force trained to a high standard for short raids, threatened the "eliteness" of the Special Forces as well. It looked as if Special Forces were shortly going to become a mere historical footnote to the history of the Army; a footnote inextricably intertwined with the loss of the Vietnam war.

It is hard to say for certain what turned around the minds of the Army leadership. The disaster of the Iranian Hostage rescue mission in April 1980 may have highlighted both the need

³Memorandum for Record, Subj: 1st SOCOM as a MACOM Notes, 27 September 1988, by LTC McKinney in Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Master Plan for Elevating 1st SOCOM to Army MACOM Status, Vol I (Phase I), February 1989.

⁴Ibid.

⁵During a discussion with COL "Mac" Dorsey just before his last retirement (postponed for three years due to Operation DESERT STORM and an unfortunate parachute accident), mentioned that the first commander to bring up the concept of a Special Operations MACOM was COL George Marachek in the mid-1960s. If this is true, the long gestation time included the Vietnam War, the 1970s "roller coaster" of imminent abolition and the rebirth of Special Operations in the 1980s.

for a highly trained special operations capability and the dangers of "making do" with hastily thrown-together joint task forces. Then Chief of Staff of the Army General Edward C. Meyer drew his own conclusions about the poor condition of our special forces and moved to enhance those forces. Task Force 160, a highly trained organization of night-qualified helicopter aviators, was formed in 1981 out of elements of the 101st Aviation Group. A new Command and Control Headquarters, 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) was formed at Fort Bragg in 1982 (provisionally) and activated in 1983. The Institute for Military Assistance (IMA) at Fort Bragg became the U. S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School that year. BG Joseph Lutz, a highly respected Special Forces general (the first Special Forces Commanding General of a Special Forces Command), took command of 1st SOCOM at its creation and began preparing the groundwork for the revitalization of Special Operations Forces and the expansion of their capabilities. In addition, in a major test of national resolve and Special Forces skills, a number of Special Forces and other special advisors began working with the Army of El Salvador in the war against Marxist rebels. This struggle was so crucial to the rebirth of the spirit of Special Forces and the exorcising of the "demons" of Vietnam, that we should take a moment to look at the general outlines of the 12 year war in that country and the role of Special Forces in that conflict.

Special Forces in El Salvador, 1980-92

The U. S. Special Forces role in the recent insurrection in El Salvador began with a low key survey mission in 1981 to assess the security of U. S. interests in the country. The situation had been deteriorating since the military coup against General Romero on 15 Oct 1979. Successive military and civilian juntas had not been able to cope with the situation. In October 1980, the leftist FMLN (Farabundo Marti Liberation Nacional) was formed and in November and December, respectively, radio broadcasts (Radio Liberacion and later Radio Venceremos) from Nicaragua and weapons deliveries from Vietnam moved the insurrection into high gear. In January, 1981, the FMLN launched their "final offensive" in an attempt to overthrow the government. Its failure drove the insurrection into the countryside and led to a series of attacks on military units, power lines and other elements of the national infrastructure.⁶

As a response, the U. S. began training El Salvadoran units

⁶One valuable source of anecdotal evidence (consisting mainly of oral interviews with participants) on the early days of the El Salvadoran insurrection is Max Manwaring and Court Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1988.

using a variety of methods. The first battalion trained in El Salvador was the Atlacatl Immediate Reaction Battalion (IRB) in 1981. A Mobile Training Team from 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group(A), stationed in Panama, conducted the training. Another battalion (Ramon Beloso) was trained by Special Forces personnel at Fort Bragg the following year. In 1983, the U. S. also established a Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) in Honduras to train Salvadoran units without having to bring them to the U. S. Training teams from 7th Special Forces Group rotated through the RMTC to conduct training in marksmanship, communications, first aid, patrolling, small unit tactics, and a host of other basic skills. The RMTC trained El Salvadoran troops and Honduran troops (not simultaneously since the two countries have a deep enmity towards each other) from 1983 to 1985, while awaiting the construction of a new military training facility in El Salvador.⁷

In late 1984, under the direction of U. S. advisors, the El Salvadoran military established the Central de Entrenamiento Militar de la Fuerza Armada (CEMFA) in La Union. The U.S. advisors, members of the OPATT (Operations, Plans and Training Team) under the U. S. Military Group (MILGP) El Salvador, helped develop POIs, trained the trainers for the units, directly trained classes on patrolling, weapons, demolitions, first aid, communication, leadership, intelligence and even basic staff planning operations. The majority of the advisors were Special Forces trained personnel (this was before the establishment of the SF branch) on six month TDY rotations. The CEMFA would take recruits from units across the country and teach them basic military skills and a few more advanced skills. In addition to U. S.-like basic training, the CEMFA trainers, under the watchful eye of Special Forces and other branch advisors, conducted classes on the use of mortars, .50 cal machine guns, 106 and 90 mm recoilless rifles, claymores, commando operations, and sniper operations. The CEMFA mission was key to training the El Salvadoran Army which expanded from 8,000 men before 1980 to a hard-hitting counterinsurgency force of 54,000 by 1987.⁸

In addition to training Salvadoran soldiers and officers in

⁷One quick summary of the theory behind Special Forces advisory efforts--comparing Vietnam and El Salvador--is the Master of Military Arts and Sciences thesis by Major Mark Meoni, "The Advisor: From Vietnam to El Salvador", Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1992.

⁸Oral interview with LTC Ralph Hinrichs, Jr., then Latin American manager for the SATMO (Security Assistance Training Management Office) at Fort Bragg, NC. LTC Hinrichs was the head of the CEMFA in 1986 and the Senior OPATT in San Salvador from 1990-91.

the United States, Honduras and the CEMFA, Special Forces advisors were sent to each of the six brigade headquarters in the six military zones of El Salvador. Regular teams of advisors (generally no more than 2-3 officers and NCOs) lived, worked, and trained with Brigade soldiers for six months to a year. It was not possible to send more to each location because in 1981 an agreement between the government of El Salvador and the U. S. State Department limited the number of official advisors in country to 55. Many sites had only a single officer or NCO assigned, making close cooperation with his El Salvadoran counterparts a matter of life or death. Probably close to 200 Special Forces personnel were assigned as OPATT advisors from 1981-1992 with an additional 200-300 SF soldiers rotating through El Salvador as part of MTTs. Exact figures are difficult to come by, but probably another 1000 SF soldiers were assigned to additional El Salvador-related training missions at Fort Bragg, Fort Benning (School of the Americas), Panama and Honduras over the course of the conflict.⁹

El Salvadoran brigade headquarters (called cuartels) were located in Santa Anna, San Salvador, near Chalatenango, San Vicente, Usulután, and San Miguel. Other training sites were scattered throughout the brigade zones of operations. OPATT advisors would often travel to and from such smaller sites on a daily basis. In almost every case, due to the strict rules of engagement (ROE), the OPATT advisors would return to a major cuartel each evening.¹⁰

For political reasons, the U. S. had to enforce strict rules of engagement. In addition to prohibiting movement at night or remaining in an exposed training site overnight, the other ROEs included: do not fire unless fired upon, do not accompany El Salvadoran units on combat operations, maintain continuous communications with MILGP in San Salvador (even during an attack on the cuartel), and carry only personal protection weapons. The propaganda value of an American killed on patrol with an El Salvadoran unit was too great to permit any risks. However, many advisors would conduct final training patrols at the conclusions of reconnaissance training classes which would, of necessity,

⁹Some 180 Special Forces cadre were assigned to the 1982 training mission of the Ramon Belloso battalion at Fort Bragg. Five hundred is probably a conservative figure, but the lack of complete after action reports or any other form of documentation except for oral history interviews makes any numbers difficult to pin down.

¹⁰Oral history interviews with OPATT advisors: SGM Humberto Fraire, MSG Adolpho Reyes, MAJ Frank Pedrozo, MAJ Simeon Trombitas, MAJ Kevin Higgins, MSG Rafael Lopez, SFC David Chacon, MAJ Wayne "Pat" Richardson.

include movements through enemy territory. With no front line, it was not possible to avoid all risks. However, with few exceptions, advisors carefully avoided incidents. It was often up to each advisor to define exactly how the ROE applied to any given situation. Given the general maturity level and professionalism of the Special Forces officer and NCO, this was seldom a problem.

There were times, of course, when the strict adherence to the rules of engagement was not enough. The fight often came to the advisor. Given the nature of a guerrilla war, an attack could occur at any cuartel at any time. In the most publicized incident, which led to the death of a Special Forces sergeant, the guerrillas ("Gs" for short), attacked the headquarters of the 4th Infantry Brigade in El Paraiso, Chalatenango. The attack occurred at 0200 on 31 March 1987. The assault included demolitions, effective infiltration by well-trained assault squads and indirect fire, primarily from mortars. The "Gs" killed sixty-four El Salvadoran soldiers and wounded seventy nine others. SFC Gregory A. Fronius, a member of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, was killed while attempting to organize the resistance to the attack.¹¹ In 1988 a similar attack on the 4th Brigade cuartel found the El Salvadorans and their U. S. advisors more prepared. Despite some initial success penetrating the wire, the USAF forces and U. S. advisors Major James Parker, SSG Michael Roth, CPT Gilberto Aguiar, SFC Mario Orozco-Torres and 1LT Byron Castleman, fought back and by dawn the El Salvadorans had recaptured the camp. At least 11 enemy guerrillas were killed at the cost of 17 friendly KIA and 31 WIA.

In another instance, FMLN attacked the cuartel and a nearby training area in Zacatecoluca, La Paz four times in a six month period. MSG (now SGM) Humberto Fraire had just been assigned to the Engineer battalion at Zacatecoluca in January, 1989. The district had been quiet for months, but within two weeks of his arrival, the "Gs" hit. Coming from the east, the "Gs" blew the power poles that fed electricity into the town, infiltrated snipers through the streets and buildings toward the cuartel (which was in the center of the town), mopping up the Observation posts and listening posts OP/LP) and began firing into the cuartel. They also began firing rampas, a type of homemade mortar bomb, into the cuartel along with RPG-7 anti-tank rounds. MSG Fraire did not retreat to the "safety" of his quarters because of the vulnerability of his second floor quarters. Instead, MSG Fraire began coordinating the resistance and, when things looked grim, personally began firing M-79 illumination rounds over the heads of the defenders. The newly illuminated

¹¹Account taken from Wayne A. Kirkbride, Special Forces in Latin America: From Bull Simons to Just Cause, Newport News, VA: First Impressions, 1991, 81-82.

battlefield exposed the "Gs" to a deadly fire from the defenders. By dawn the attack had been repelled at the cost of around 12 El Salvadorans killed. Returning to his quarters, MSG Fraire saw where numerous rounds had gone through his room. He had been safer out on the perimeter walls than he would have been if he had hunkered down in his quarters. This was just the first of four attacks against the cuartel and a nearby former cotton mill which had been turned into a training installation.¹²

Neither the risks nor the relative safety of the Special Forces advisors in El Salvador should be overstated. Since the advisors were prohibited from engaging in direct combat operations, the majority of their time was spent in cuartels, training areas, or in supporting the MILGP in San Salvador in relative comfort. However, as in any guerrilla war, safety was never assured. Most advisors admitted to the fact that they never felt completely safe. The day-in and day-out tension left them each at a high pitch of readiness at all times. They were assigned bodyguards to help ensure their survival. However, the cuartels could be (and often were) hit at any time. Advisors had to stay alert and never let down their guard. It was a combat environment despite the determination for political reasons that El Salvador not be named a combat zone. SFC Fronius, MSG Fraire and most of the other advisors working by themselves surrounded by guerrillas or potential guerrillas would disagree with that determination.¹³

How successful was the Special Forces and U. S. advisory effort in El Salvador? The facts speak for themselves. The professional training imparted to the El Salvadoran military led to ultimate success on the battlefield. Despite military setbacks and the increase of international support to the enemy (including weapons from Nicaragua and Cuba and diplomatic recognition from France and Mexico), the El Salvadoran military fought back and beat the guerrillas to a standstill. When the "final" offensive of the FMLN was launched in 1989, the El Salvadoran military faced a few minor defeats, but rallied and decimated the rebels. The FMLN was forced to seek victory with a political solution; a military victory was no longer an option for them. Special Forces had helped make that victory possible. The cost in killed was small, in wounded, minor, but in lives changed because of the imminence of combat, Special Forces soldiers and their families paid a price.

The Special Forces role in the success in El Salvador should

¹²Oral History Interview with SGM Fraire at HQ, 2/7th SFG(A), Fort Bragg, NC, 4 February, 1993.

¹³In contradiction to the ruling that El Salvador was not a combat zone, all advisors were awarded imminent danger pay.

not be overstressed. Advisors from all branches of the Army spent tours in that country assisting the government. It is also important to remember that the success of the government was due in no small measure to the government itself. It reined in the death squads, established land reform and food relief programs and developed a sophisticated psychological warfare campaign. The government told its people what it was doing for them while highlighting what the FMLN were incapable of doing: building a better life for the people. El Salvador even conducted democratic elections in the midst of that war, astounding international observers. The destiny of El Salvador was clearly in the hands of its own government and people and U. S. advisors were only of small, though highly focused, value.

For Special Forces personnel, however, somehow the length of the struggle and the degree to which these "unconventional warriors" were able to adapt themselves into superb trainers and advisors under the strictest U. S. embassy control, served to prove, once and for all, that Special Forces personnel were back. Their skills as trainers of developing world forces made them logical choices for many of the advisory slots. In addition, the lack of incidents or embarrassing moments by those SF troopers helped convince the U. S. military and State Department personnel that Special Forces were not "Rambos" on the loose. Confidence within the Special Operations community and within the Army as a whole, in the ability and restraint of Special Forces personnel increased.

The success in El Salvador, critical though it was, was only one arena in which the revitalization of SOF proceeded apace throughout the 1980s. The following chronological summary may help list some key events in the period of 1972 to 1992 that show the fall and rise of Special Operations Forces.

The Revitalization of Special Operations - 1972-1992

- 1972 During the Vietnam War, Army Special Forces had expanded to seven SF Groups (1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th). The end of the war steadily sapped the numbers of SF soldiers, prompting the inactivation of 3rd SFG(A) in December 1969, 6th SFG(A) in 1971 and 8th SFG(A) in 1972.
- 1974 The Army inactivates the 1st Special Forces Group (A), establishing a low point in Special Forces organizational history. Only the 5th, 7th and 10th Groups remain active (with the 11th, 12th, 19th and 20th in the reserve component).

In contrast to the decline in the Army's unconventional warfare capability, the 1st Battalion,

75th Ranger Regiment is reactivated at Fort Benning, Georgia.

- 1975 In order to prevent the inactivation of yet another Special Forces Group, the SF community decreases the size of the Operational Detachment "B" (ODB) from 22 individuals to 8. This allows the creation of a sixth "A" Team in each company, improving the "tooth to tail" ratio.
- 1977-78 Plans are prepared for the imminent inactivation of the 7th Special Forces Group. The deteriorating situation in Central America, in part, prevents this from happening.
- 1979 Special Forces reaches a low point in numbers and capability just prior to the need for some national counter-terrorist capability.
- 1980 The Chief of Staff of the Army in 1980, General Edward C. Meyer, determines that the Army needs to enhance its capability to conduct special operations.
- 1981 Task Force 160 is established at Fort Campbell out of elements of the 101st Aviation Group. TF 160 begins high-risk training for the use of Army aviation assets at night in a wide variety of SOF missions.
- 1982 1st SOCOM is provisionally activated on 1 Oct to be the command and control headquarters for all active Army Special Operations units. These units include the 5th, 7th and 10th Special Forces Groups, the 4th Psychological Operations Group, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and the 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions.
- 1983 The Institute for Military Assistance (IMA) changes its name and organization. It becomes the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) and is aligned along the lines of a TRADOC School. This begins the process of the complete integration of Special Operations into Army systems, training and operations. USAJFKSWCS becomes the proponent school for Army SOF.

TRADOC publishes a two volume study on 30 June entitled Low-Intensity Conflict, which broadened the scope of Low Intensity Conflict studies to include diplomacy, guerilla warfare, military assistance, insurgency, counter-terrorism and revolution.

In October, U.S. Army Rangers, Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special

- 1983 Operations Aviation personnel participate in Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada in response to an unfriendly and bloody communist inspired coup. Despite many planning and coordination problems in this hastily executed operation, the mission is overall a success. However, those coordination problems, and some 9 SOF soldiers killed and 75 wounded, prompt further actions to improve the U. S. Army's SOF capabilities.
- 1984 Functional Area 18, the functional area for Special Forces, is established for officers and NCOs. In addition, Special Forces created the Special Forces Warrant Officer program to replace Lieutenants in the "A" teams with more experienced individuals.
- 1 Jul: Activation of the 75th Ranger Regiment.
4 Sep: Reactivation of 1st Special Forces Group (A).
- SOF Master Plan approved.
- 3 Oct: The 3rd Ranger Battalion is activated.
- 1985 PSYOP Master Plan approved.
- TF 160th is transferred from the 101st Airborne Div to 1st SOCOM on 16 Jan.
- 1986 The Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) is activated in January. The CLIC has published numerous influential documents in reviving Army-wide interest in Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.
- In February, TRADOC publishes 524-44, U. S. Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict.
- Goldwater-Nichols Act with the Nunn-Cohen Amendment provide for the establishment of a four-star unified combatant command for Special Operations with its own MFP-11 funding channel. This establishes, for the first time, a worldwide command and control mechanism for the armed services' Special Operations Forces.
- 528th Special Operations Support Battalion is activated (as the 13th Support Battalion) on 2 Jun and the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion is activated on 17 Sep.
- On 16 October 1986, TF 160 is reorganized into the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (SOAG).
- 1987 USSOCOM is established at MacDill AFB, Florida. Special

Forces is established as a Branch of the U.S. Army on 9 April (G.O. 35). The crossed arrow insignia is adopted as the branch insignia.

1988

Civil Affairs and Psyop career management field approved.

Initial classes of the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) program are conducted to screen applicants for the Special Forces Qualification Class. This helps ensure a higher quality SF Qualified soldier and reduces attrition from the highly competitive course.

USAJFKSWCS begins the Special Operations Staff Officer Course (SOSC) to integrate staff training in all the Special Operations disciplines.

In April, USAJFKSWCS receives concept approval for the establishment of Theater Special Operations Support Commands (TASOSCs) to aid in the intelligence and logistical support of SOF in theaters.

In May, USAJFKSWCS and XVIII ABN Corps begin initial testing of the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), a planning cell at the Corps to assist in preparing and coordinating Special Operations missions at the Corps. This later turns into the SOCOORD with the SOCCE becoming a temporary augmentation cell from an SF Group sent to a Corps or other element to assist in running a mission.

CA Master Plan approved.

In September, 1st SOCOM functionally reorganized as a separate MACOM staff and two MSC staffs (all active duty units under 1st SOCOM, Command and Control Active or CCA) and all Army Reserve units under USARSOC (Command and Control Reserve or CCR) When the activation of the MACOM occurs in December, the MACOM staff changes name to USASOC staff and continues to function.

1989

Activation of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) on 1 Dec as the Army's 16th Major Command (MACOM). Under USASOC are placed 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM), United States Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC), 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (SOAG) and the 75th Ranger Regiment.

USAJFKSWCS activates the 1st Special Warfare Training Group to consolidate training management functions in the school. This also reflects the large increase in numbers of soldiers trained over the recent years.

In late December, USASOC deploys Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP soldiers to Panama for Operation JUST CAUSE.

1990

In April, USAJFKSWCS publishes FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces. Part of this doctrine includes the creation of a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) to be attached to a Corps during missions. The SOCCE, along with the SOCOORD as a SOF element assigned to the Corps, is a key element in the integration of SOF operations into conventional unit operations and plans and, working with the SOCOORD, synchronizes SOF operations with Corps intelligence and operational requirements.

On 16 May, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group is inactivated and is replaced by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

On 20 June, the USAJFKSWCS is placed under the command and control (less OPCON) of USASOC instead of TRADOC. USASOC now has all elements of active Army SOF under its command and control except for forward-deployed units.

On 29 June, the 3rd Special Forces Group (A) is reactivated at Fort Bragg.

In August and September, USASOC units begin deployment to Saudi Arabia as part of DESERT SHIELD. SOF revitalization initiatives ensure that all units deployed are fully trained, equipped and prepared for operations across the spectrum in Southwest Asia.

On 27 November, USASOC functionally reorganizes to align all Special Forces under a new US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) and all Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units under a new US Army Civil Affairs Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). (1st SOCOM and USARSOC disappear.)

1991

Special Operations units participate in combat operations before, during and after Operation DESERT STORM. Units conduct Special Reconnaissance, Foreign Internal Defense/Coalition Warfare, Direct Action, Combat Search And Rescue, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations as part of the overall

operation. They are a vital component of the allied victory.

On 1 October, all United States Army Reserve (USAR) Special Operations Forces are assigned to either USASFC or USACAPOC. USASOC now commands and controls all U. S. Army SOF units except for National Guard units. National Guard units only fall under the training oversight of USASOC with command and control (in peacetime) resting with the various state governors.


On 18 November, USASOC creates the US Army Special Operations Integration Command (USASOIC) (Provisional) to serve as the Major Subordinate Command with command of the 75th Ranger Regiment and the 160th SOAR.

1992 USASOC undergoes a major reorganization (planning had begun the previous October) to reduce "layering" between the various headquarters located at Fort Bragg. A number of non-operational and training slots and personnel move from the MSC up to the MACOM.


Of the preceding events, there is little question but that the creation of 1st SOCOM, provisionally in 1982 with an official activation in 1983, was a major step forward in the establishment of a major special operations command and control entity. (See FIGURE 1 for 1st SOCOM initial organization.) However, 1st SOCOM had no direct control of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, which published doctrine for special operations, nor did it have a major impact on Army Reserve Component Special Operations Forces. As 1st SOCOM picked up command and control of the newly re-activated 75th Ranger Regiment in 1984 and the constantly reorganized Task Force 160 (which became a Special Operations Aviation Group in Oct 86 and then a Special Operations Aviation Regiment in May of 1990), the span of control for the headquarters grew wider. (See FIGURE 2: 1st SOCOM in 1987.)

1ST SOCOM (P)

(OCT 1982)



1ST SOCOM 1987



A number of papers and plans began percolating in the 1986-88 timeframe dealing with the growth and institutionalization of SOF. In the fall of 1986, TRADOC began a Systems Program Review for the Vice Chief of Staff. The Army began working on a SOF Master Plan, approved in 1988, which highlighted the need for closer integration of SOF. In November 1987, LTG Gerald Bartlett, CG of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, signed an internal memo that tasked CAC to work on ways to integrate SOF into the Army. According to MG James Guest, this was when the Army "first got serious" about true integration of SOF.¹⁴ SOF had not been included systematically in Army doctrinal manuals, it was given short shrift in senior Army schools such as Command and General Staff College and the Army War College and was, in short, given only lip service throughout the army.

Change was also occurring within the Special Operations community. Camp Mackall, a WW II training camp near Fort Bragg, was upgraded and provided new facilities for improved Special Forces training. Work also began on a new plan, entitled Campus 2000, for the upgrade of the Special Warfare Center and School. In April 1988, the concept for establishing Special Operations Support Commands (TASOC) in the theaters was approved in order to facilitate the connectivity of special operations units into the theater support base. The Special Operations Staff Officer Course (SOSC) was established in May 1988. Special Operations detachments began showing up at the Combat Training Centers (National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA; Joint Readiness Training Center then at Fort Chaffee, AR; the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, KS and the Combined Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels Army Training Center, Germany) to take part in exercises. To assist in the training of Special Operations Forces, USAJFKSWCS also activated the 1st Special Warfare Training Group on 15 June 1989 to integrate PSYOP, Civil Affairs and Special Forces training. All of these initiatives pointed in one direction: closer integration of Army SOF throughout the Army and the need for one headquarters to command and control these assets and "speak with one voice" on SOF doctrine and policy.¹⁵

In July of 1988, the Commanding General of FORSCOM, General Joseph T. Palastra, stated to General Guest that the need for an Army SOF MACOM had become apparent. There were too many pieces and players and FORSCOM was not in a position to manage adequately or to oversee the expanding SOF community. However, initial personnel figures of the creation of such a headquarters

¹⁴Interview by the author with MG Guest, CG, 1st SOCOM, at HQ, 1st SOCOM, 20 August 1990.

¹⁵Ibid.

were quite high: in the thousands. General Guest knew that the Army would refuse to pay such a bill. When asked directly why he did not propose such a figure to the Army, MG Guest flatly stated in a later interview that "I think it would have been too much for the Army."¹⁶ As result of the need for a MACOM but also the need for economy, General Guest's staff put together a solution to the problem: establish a MACOM, but do it without initially increasing manpower spaces. Phase II, command and control of USAR SOF (and training oversight but not command and control of the National Guard SF Groups which remain under state control until federalized), which was not to be implemented until Sep 94, was expected to change the manpower picture. In other words, the 433 personnel in HQ, 1st SOCOM in FY 1989 would be used to fill the MACOM, taking over some of the MACOM functions from FORSCOM and TRADOC for SOF. There would be no increase, at least as late as FY 94, when Phase II might force some adjustments. The only change in the personnel picture would be the progressive conversion of military spaces to civilian spaces (see below) to meet a 60 percent civilian 40 percent military mix by the end of FY 94.¹⁷

Figure 3:

Planned Conversion of Military to Civilian Spaces

FY	89	90	91	92	93	94
OFF	119	119	*	*	*	*
WO	9	9	*	*	*	*
ENL	188	188	*	*	*	*
TOT MIL	316	316	245	210	176	176
CIV	127	127	198	233	267	267
TOT	443	443	443	443	443	443

¹⁶Ibid. According to COL Juan Chavez one of the participants in the process of standing up the MACOM, "there was a lot of opposition throughout the Army to establish USASOC as a separate Major Command." During a 1992 interview, COL Chavez, retiring USASOC ODCSPER, gave most of the credit for accomplishing the action to Major General Guest. "Had we waited for additional resources to do it," he went on, "I don't think we would ever have done it." Interview by Dr. Stewart with COL Juan Chavez, DCSPER of 1st SOCOM and USASOC from June 1987 until his retirement in June 1992, at Fort Bragg, NC, 12 May 1992.

¹⁷Master Plan for Elevating 1st SOCOM to Army MACOM Status, pp. 2-1; 5-1.

The Chief of Staff of the Army approved the concept for the phased introduction of the MACOM at the 27 September 1988 meeting at HQ DA. On 20 October, DA sent 1st SOCOM a message formalizing that agreement. The message iterated that the agreement was predicated upon achieving the MACOM with "zero manpower growth in Phase I". This, however, included the redistribution of some spaces from FORSCOM as the workload transferred. (As it turned out, those spaces never arrived.) Zero manpower growth was also the "goal" for Phase II. The other stipulation was that "Full Army MACOM status should be achieved with no increases in the number of TDA headquarters organizations."¹⁸

The transition of 1st SOCOM into a MACOM occurred gradually. Under the close direction of Major General Guest, 1st SOCOM split itself literally into two headquarters focused on different ranges of issues. In essence, half of the headquarters began "acting" as if it were already a MACOM while the other half began focusing their attentions at the daily sustainment and training issues of the special operations units. Those functions which were most involved in current operations, day-to-day personnel business and other short-term functions became the nucleus of the new 1st SOCOM which was envisaged as an operational headquarters. Those functions which dealt with long-term planning, policy guidance and resource management in the "out-years" (reaching five years beyond the current fiscal year) were transferred to the MACOM, the United States Army Special Operations Command.

This "functional split" was soon followed by an actual split. In September, 1989, several months before the planned activation date of the new MACOM, the personnel involved in command and control for active duty SOF units physically moved their offices to an old stockade/isolation facility on Butner Road. Initially called CCA (Command and Control Active), they later were granted the use of the name 1st SOCOM after the activation of USASOC. In November of 1990, they became Special Forces Command. Those staff members involved in Command and Control Reserve (CCR) duties had already moved into a brick building on the south side of Ardennes Street next to the JFK Memorial Plaza. They were later called USARSOC (United States Army Reserve Special Operations Command) and, in November 1990, the U. S. Army Civil Affairs Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). Thus, the two new Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) of the new MACOM were actually in business five months before the

¹⁸Message from Department of the Army, DAMO-ODZ, to CDR, FORSCOM, CDR, US Army Intelligence School and Center, and Cdr 1st SOCOM, Subj: 1st SOCOM as an Army MACOM, DTG 201916Z Oct 88 in Headquarters 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) "Transition of 1st SOCOM (ABN) to a MACOM", May 1989.

activation of that MACOM and located in separate headquarters.¹⁹

One of the first issues which faced the new "acting MACOM" was the basic question: what is it that a MACOM does? FORSCOM itself was of some help in this role definition, but FORSCOM was so large and handled so many issues that it was able to provide only general guidance. As part of the solution to the problem of deciding what were the functions of a MACOM, the head of the 1st SOCOM transition team, LTC (P) Robert L. Floyd, and SFC Joseph Moore from Force Structure, DCSOPS, visited Western Command (WESTCOM) at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. WESTCOM was another new MACOM which had recently undergone all the pains of creation and role definition. LTC (P) Floyd and his team felt that they could learn from the recent experience of that MACOM in listing their new functions and perhaps avoiding some of the more obvious pitfalls in the creation of a new headquarters. LTC (P) Floyd and SFC Moore met with the heads of each directorate at WESTCOM from 17-21 October 1988 as well as with key members of the WESTCOM team which formed the MACOM. They gathered information, organization and functions manuals, job descriptions and personal guidance. It was a classic case of learning from the recent history of an Army organization.²⁰

In order to facilitate the transition process, 1st SOCOM established an office for transition. This one office, headed by LTC (P) Robert Floyd who was the Chief of Force Development/Force Management Section, was to be the single focal point for all issues relating to the creation of the MACOM. According to LTC (P) Floyd, the reason for the establishment of his team was so "the day to day staff offices don't have to worry about the pluses and minuses of what it takes to do this [transition] and the battles that had to be fought at FORSCOM and DA and all the coordination that went on there."²¹ Colonel Roger John, the 1st SOCOM Chief of Staff, established the team which answered directly to him. The team, with the "horsepower" of the Chief of Staff behind them, forced key elements of the headquarters to focus on the functions and issues facing them. According to one

¹⁹Chavez Interview.

²⁰Message from Cdr, 1st SOCOM to Cdr, WESTCOM, Subject: 1st SOCOM Coordination Visit, DTG 131415Z Oct 88. This visit was arranged by a phone conversation between MAJ Davis on the 1st SOCOM transition team and LTC Greene of the WESTCOM staff on 11 Oct 88. Principal members of the WESTCOM transition team were Mr. Forrest Murphy, ADCSOPS, and Ms. Chong, DCSFM.

²¹Interview by the author with COL Robert Floyd, then Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC) on 20 July 1990, at Headquarters USARSOC, Fort Bragg, NC.

participant in the process, Colonel Mercer "Mac" Dorsey, "Roger John, as Chief of Staff, forced us to get into detail. . . . He needs to get a lot of credit."²² Under the close direction of Colonel John, the team laid out the concept, organization and phasing of the transition.

As a result of the WESTCOM visit (and, according to some participants, numerous brainstorming sessions) the transition team identified some 505 functions which the new MACOM and its MSCs had to perform to accomplish the overall mission of funding, training, sustaining and deploying high quality special operations forces. After much discussion, 1st SOCOM divided up these functions into three categories: those performed by the new MACOM; those performed by a new MSC called Command and Control, Active (CCA); and those which would be done by another MSC, Command and Control Reserve (CCR). Some 257 functions were reserved for the MACOM with 102 passed on to CCA and 146 to CCR.²³ CCA of 1st SOCOM was staffed, tentatively, with 207 personnel with 217 staying at the MACOM. CCR was filled with a mix of full time manning (FTM), Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), Active Army and civilian personnel as well as some 88 drilling reservists.²⁴ All of the personnel decisions were made pending a U. S. Army Force Integration Support Agency (USAFISA-formerly USAMARDA or U. S. Army Manpower Requirements and Documentation Agency) survey in 1990 and again in 1991.

Early in the process, based on the guidance of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the transition to a MACOM was designed to occur in two phases: Phase I was the placement of all active headquarters and units under the MACOM and CCA and Phase II was to bring in all USAR units under CCR with the MACOM picking up most of the higher level reserve functions previously handled by FORSCOM. (A notable exception were the functions regarding the mobilization of reserve units which in DESERT SHIELD/STORM continued to be performed by FORSCOM as the Army's executive agent for mobilization of the entire force.)

Phase I, according to most participants, occurred with

²²Interview by the author of Colonel Dorsey, then departing Chief of Staff of USASOC, 27 July 1990, at HQ, USASOC, Fort Bragg, NC.

²³Headquarters, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne), "Transition of 1st SOCOM (ABN) to a MACOM", May 1989, Tabs J, K and L.

²⁴Tab H, SOF C2 USAR Executive Summary. FTM, AGR and Active Army made up 75 of the 163 spaces with the rest being drilling reservists. All of these numbers were tentative pending manpower survey results.

relative ease. Offices were moved, new jobs given out and energetic full-time officers, NCOs and civilians learned their new responsibilities as they performed them. By the time the MACOM was finally activated on 1 December 1989, the split of active functions had already occurred and both headquarters personnel (1st SOCOM and the new USASOC) had been operating in their roles for the past several months. It was not as easy to stand up the CCR and lay the framework for Phase II, the assumption of command and control of the "many headed hydra" that is the reserve component.

More complicated than the transition of the active component into two headquarters with different functions was the establishment of the "CCR", or U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC). The path to the consolidation of all USAR SOF under one headquarters (in essence creating a Reserve SOF Army Reserve Command or ARCOM) was not a smooth one. According to all those who participated in this process, the negotiations occurring at DA, Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR), FORSCOM and with the various ARCOM commanders were torturous. There is no question that the Army Reserve exists in a political world, and these concerns slowed the process immeasurably. According to one observer, each new initiative or proposal to create an Army Reserve SOF headquarters met with the same response: "You don't understand the political sensitivity of this issue."²⁵ Each decision had to be weighed, analyzed and defended on political as well as military necessity grounds.

The attempt to place all USAR SOF units nationwide under one command which would answer directly to an active army command was a new initiative. Like all new initiatives, a variety of approaches were tried out. At one time or another, seven different proposals were floated for the size, composition and location of this new headquarters. One solution to the command and control issue was simply to leave the command and control arrangement as it was, which had USARSOC continuing to operate through three ARCOMs. Another plan envisioned using the existing Civil Affairs Commands (351st in 6th Army area, 353rd for 4th and 5th Armies and 352nd for 1st and 2nd Armies) as MUSARCS (Major U.S. Army Reserve Commands) to control SOF in their areas. Still another postulated functional MUSARCS to command and control all SF, CA or PSYOP units nationwide along those functional lines. Finally, one of the key visionaries of the entire MACOM concept, General James Guest, brought the key players together and, after discussions with FORSCOM stated that there should be just one USAR SOF headquarters, and it would be at Fort Bragg. With current ADP systems available, there was no reason, in his mind,

²⁵Interview with Colonel Robert L. Floyd III, then Chief of Staff, USARSOC, formerly head of USASOC transition team, 20 July 1990.

why command and control could not be exercised nationwide from one location. FORSCOM agreed and, after much more discussion, the Chief of OCAR assented. With critical assistance, again, from Mr. Steve Croal of USAFISA, the manpower requirements were matched with the vision and Phase II of the transition plan was in place.

The plan for bringing all USAR SOF under one command was only the first step in the process. When USASOC was activated in December 1989, USARSOC was activated along with it. However, no units were placed directly under USARSOC's command and control, to allow for a transition period. That period was originally to last until October 1994, but was changed to October 1992 and then accelerated to begin in October 1991.

When USASOC was functionally reorganized in November 1990, (see next section on Organization) the plan for RC command and control changed as well. Rather than have all USAR SOF under one command (USARSOC), USAR SOF units were functionally distributed between two new commands: US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) and US Army Civil Affairs Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). Both commands were scheduled to assume full command and control of their USAR units (and USASFC was to assume a leading role in training the two National Guard SF Groups) on 1 October 1991. This change occurred on schedule, finishing up the work on reserve component command and control begun in 1988. USASOC now has the unique position of integrating RC and AC forces in its command to a greater degree than any other command in the Army outside of FORSCOM. It may well be a new departure for AC/RC relations if each "side" shows itself capable of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the other.

CHAPTER II. ORGANIZATION, REORGANIZATION AND REALIGNMENT:

A. ORGANIZATION.

USASOC has developed a unique organization to perform its wide range of missions. It has also produced changes in that organization that changed the structure of USASOC significantly from that initially planned. (See FIGURE 4: Proposed MACOM 1988) Upon its activation in December 1989, USASOC was configured with two major subordinate commands (MSC) and two major subordinate units (MSU) with OPCON only of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). (See FIGURE 5.) By the end of 1990, the entire command was reorganized along functional lines and the Special Warfare Center was under the command (less OPCON) of the MACOM. These realignments resulted in some turbulence that was not unexpected by those who had conceived the MACOM in the first place.²⁶

1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM), one of the major subordinate commands, was originally organized on 1 December with all active duty Special Operations units except for the Rangers and the Special Operations Aviation Group (formerly Task Force 160) under its command. The units included the 1st, 5th, 7th and 10th Special Forces Groups (Airborne), the 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG), and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. In addition, 1st SOCOM was assigned the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and the 112th Signal Battalion.


The other major subordinate command was the U. S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC). This command initially was scheduled to command all U. S. Army Reserve Special Operations Forces including the 11th and 12th Special Forces Groups, the 351st, 352nd and 353rd Civil Affairs Commands, and the 2nd, 5th and 7th Psychological Operations Groups.²⁷ That changed during functional realignment.

²⁶When asked during an interview about whether the functional alignment was originally in the mind of the planners, one of the key visionaries, MG Guest, stated flatly that it was always in the plan. The important thing in his mind was that the MACOM was created first, and then the MACOM could reorganize itself along whatever lines it wished without extensive higher level coordination or permission. Interview by the author with MG Guest, J3 USSOCOM, at HQ, USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, Tampa FL on 9 December 1991.

²⁷The three National Guard Special Operations units (19th and 20th SF Groups and the 1/245th Special Operations Aviation Battalion) remained under the control of the state governors.


PROPOSED MACOM

1988



United States Army Special Operations Command

1 December 1989



USASOC's two major subordinate units, that remained as direct reporting units to USASOC due to their national contingency missions, were the Ranger Regiment and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group.

B. REORGANIZATION:

While the establishment of USASOC as a MACOM was a major accomplishment, the organization was still less than optimum (and would continue to need tinkering over the years ahead. In order to streamline training and operations, USASOC underwent a series of reorganizations and modifications during the first year of its activation. Indeed, by the close of 1991, a special committee had been set up working for the Chief of Staff to recommend new functional realignment initiatives to return to the concept of a centralized MACOM with leaner MSCs organized according to their missions.

The first reorganization occurred in the Special Operations Aviation Group. On 16 May 1990, the Special Operations Aviation Regiment was formed.²⁸ (See Chapter VII) This reorganization was the culmination of a process begun in October 1986 when the splintered elements of Special Operations Aviation were initially brought under 1st SOCOM but remained for some years as separate entities. With the creation of the Regiment as a Major Subordinate Unit of USASOC, SOF aviation was rationalized and was able to "speak with one voice" on all SOF aviation issues within USASOC.

The second major organizational change to the structure of USASOC came in June 1990 when Army General Order No. 8.²⁹ This order rescinded General Order 39 of 29 December 1989 which originally had established USASOC's relationship with the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.³⁰ Initially, the school had remained under the command of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with USASOC having only Operational Control (OPCON). In June, this relationship was reversed with USASOC picking up all command responsibilities for JFKSWCS with OPCON remaining with TRADOC. It remained important for TRADOC to retain OPCON since

²⁸COL Billy Miller, "Special Operations Aviation", Army Aviation, July 31, 1990: 17-19 and MG James Guest and MAJ T. Michael Ryan, "The SOF Aviation Regiment" in the same journal: 20-23.

²⁹General Order No. 8, Headquarters, Department of the Army, MOSO-ODF, Washington, D. C., 20 June 1990,

³⁰General Orders No. 39, Headquarters, Department of the Army, MOSO-ODF, Washington, D. C., 29 December 1989.

the Special Warfare Center and School had to stay within the TRADOC system for the development of doctrine, materiel, training, organization and leadership. The Army has methodologies, systems and procedures for developing doctrine, instituting changes to the training base and entering the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) which drives the developmental and procurement systems. SWCS could not remain outside of these systems and still function effectively.

The next major change to the USASOC organization occurred on 27 November 1990 when 1st SOCOM became the U. S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) and USARSOC became the U. S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). All active and reserve Special Forces units (except for the National Guard SF Groups which by law must remain under state control until activation) were aligned under USASFC. This command thus picked up operational control of the 11th and 12th SF Groups while dropping full command of the 4th POG and 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. (They remained under the command less operational control of USASFC.) Conversely, the new USACAPOC dropped full command (retaining command less operational control) of the 11th and 12th SF Groups while picking up operational control of the active duty 4th POG and 96th CA Battalion. Thus the various functional specialties of Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations were finally united under their own command regardless of whether they were active duty or reserve component. (See Figure 6) That change occurred fully on 1 October 1991 by the publication of Permanent Orders 73-1³¹, 73-3³² and 73-2³³ which assigned all SOF USAR units directly to USACAPOC and USASFC, respectively. (See FIGURE 6.)

By the end of 1991, the full incorporation of Reserve Component units had only begun. In addition, the looming budget and manpower shortages that would affect the entire Army in the next few years prompted another initiative to streamline and focus the MACOM and its MSC. This functional realignment began with a study team created by, and working directly for, the


³¹Permanent Order 73-1, HQ, USASOC, 30 September 1991 assigned the 351st, 352nd and 353rd Civil Affairs Commands to USACAPOC effective 1 October 1991.

³²Permanent Order 73-3, HQ, USASOC, dated 30 September 1991 assigned 2nd, 5th and 7th Psychological Operations Groups to USACAPOC effective 1 October 1991.

³³Permanent order 73-2, HQ, USASOC, dated 30 September 1991, effective date 1 October 1991 assigned 11th and 12th SFG(A) to US Army Special Forces Command. Aggregate strength of each Group was 2,900 officers and men.

USASOC (FUNCTIONAL ALIGNMENT)

27 NOV 1990



* FULL USAR C2 ON 1 OCT 1991

USASOC Chief of Staff, COL Anthony H. Normand.³⁴ Their initial guidance was to focus on the problem of "layering" of functions in the MACOM and its MSCs and attempt to "manage change in a turbulent future". It was to be a "no-growth", but conversely "no cut" exercise to improve the effectiveness of the MACOM.

The team, consisting at first of LTC (P) Jerald Thompson and LTC William L. McMullen, began in October and November to do a vertical and horizontal functional analysis of which tasks were being performed at which level of the command. They presented the results of this initial analysis to the Command Group for determination to procedure with the movement of certain functions and personnel from the MSC to the MACOM or, in some cases, the strengthening of the function in the MSC at the expense of the MACOM. By the close of 1992, the analysis and staffing was still underway.

C: REALIGNMENT

The new year brought decisions about the scope and scale of the realignment of the command. The Commanding General, LTG Wayne A. Downing, provided his guidance to the expanded realignment working group operating out of the DCSR office.³⁵ The guidance was clear: avoid duplication (or layering) of functions throughout the command, use manpower savings to enhance effectiveness, keep the command informed and market the plan wisely and do not "split" responsibilities over several offices. Implied in this guidance was also a critical element: do not move the responsibility for a function without moving the resources (fiscal and manpower) to accomplish the function. More specifically, General Downing wanted the MACOM to perform the roles of organizing, training, equipping, administering, and educating the force, along with the combat developments, mobilization, deployment planning and materiel development responsibilities. He specifically wanted the Special Forces Command and the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command to be able to concentrate on training their assigned forces, validating their abilities to perform their missions and monitoring their overall readiness posture. The USAJFKSWCS was

³⁴The team was tasked in a memo date 3 October 1991 to conduct a study to analyze USASOC and its MSCs' organizational interfaces and effectiveness. See briefing charts in the USASOC Archives entitled, "Phase One - Establishing the Baseline" prepared by LTC MacMullen in February 1992 which mentioned the memo in its background section.

³⁵This Functional Alignment Planning Team was headed by Mr. Scott Strange, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The CG's guidance was presented to the group in a memo dated on 3 December.

to focus on developing doctrine, running the entry and advanced level training programs, and supervising the branch proponenty programs. USASOIC (P) was to concentrate on organizing, training and coordinating their major subordinate units to perform their unique missions. In short, USASOC was to handle the long range planning, the resources management (including the MFP-11 funds and Program Objective Memorandum process), the combat developments and force structure issues, and all of the major "housekeeping" chores of a MACOM while leaving the MSCs free to concentrate on their critical missions of training and monitoring readiness.³⁶

The results of all of this analysis were presented to the CG on 20 February and then again on 8 May 1992. During the process, all staff elements of the MACOM and MSC staffs provided input to the process. All of this input was considered and presented at the Commander's Conference from 27-29 May. General Downing decided on 16 June to implement the recommendations of the study not later than 1 October.³⁷

The full impact of this major reorganization was still not entirely clear as of the cut-off date of this study. Several new directorates were created at the MACOM level: notably the Force Development and Integration Directorate (FDI), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, the Directorate of Civilian Personnel, and the Directorate of History and Museums. Also, the DCS Personnel, Logistics, Information Management, and Resources Management expanded in size.

The most major change was probably the creation of the Force Development and Integration directorate. Taking elements from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), the USAJFKSWCS Combat Developments Directorate (DCD) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resources Management (DCSRM) offices, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and Integration created a new office to handle elements of all of those functions. Force structure migrated from DCSOPS while the entire Combat Development Directorate moved from USAJFKSWCS to USASOC. In addition, the DCSRSM office lost its programming and analysis section (responsible for the POM and other long range budget plans) to the new DCSFDI. USAJFKSWCS remained in the combat developments loop to the extent that the Commandant of JFKSWCS,

³⁶In progress review briefing presented to the CG, USASOC, by the USASOC Functional Realignment Team on 8 May 1992.

³⁷Implementation Plan Memorandum of Instructions, LTC William L. McMullen, AORM-MA, 7 July 1992. All staff elements had to prepare their own implementation plan not later than 14 August. A relocation plan was published for all elements on 3 August signed by the USASOC Chief of Staff.


at the time BG(P) David Baratto, was dual-hatted as the Deputy Commanding General for Force Development and Integration with major input into the process.

In short, the realignment of USASOC continues in the realm of unfinished business. The streamlining of roles, functions and responsibilities helped improve the efficiency (on paper) of the MACOM. Only the next few years of dealing with issues such as POM development, force structure changes and combat development initiatives can test the new structure. (See FIGURE 7: USASOC as of 1993)

United States Army Special Operations Command

1993

USASFC • US Army Special Forces Command
 USACAPOC • US Army Civil Affairs and
 Psychological Operations Command
 USAJFKSWCS • US Army John F. Kennedy
 Special Warfare Center and School
 USAOIC • US Army Special Operation
 Integration Command (Provisional)



* USAR UNIT ** USARNG UNIT

————— COMMAND
 - - - - - COORDINATION

CHAPTER III. FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS.

Each of the sections below list key personnel and their dates of each group or directorate of USASOC. While the cut-off date of this monograph is the end of 1992, we have included some individuals who assumed their roles in 1993 and later.

A. COMMAND GROUP.

Commanding General:	Dec 89-Jun 90	LTG Gary Luck
	Jun 90-Aug 91	LTG M. F. Spigelmire
	Aug 91-May 93	LTG Wayne A. Downing
	May 93-	LTG James T. Scott
Deputy Commanding General:	Dec 89-Jun 91	BG William Garrison
	Jun 91-Jul 92	BG Harley Davis
	Jul 92-Nov 94	BG Richard Potter
	Nov 94-	BG William P. Tangney
Deputy Commanding General ARNG:	90- 91	MG J. Boyersmith
	91- 93	BG M. Davidson
Command Sergeant Major:	Dec 89-Jul 91	CSM Ronnie Strahan
	Oct 91-Aug 93	CSM Jimmie Spencer
	Aug 93-	CSM Henry O. Bone
Personal Staff:		
Executive Officer:	90- 91	MAJ R. Stansfield
	91- 92	MAJ J. O'Shaughnessy
	92- 93	MAJ G. Richardson
	93- 94	CPT M. Moon
Aide-de-Camp:	90- 91	MAJ D. Kulich
	91- 92	MAJ M. Findlay
	92- 93	MAJ J. Dunn
	93- 94	MAJ A. Aycock
Chief of Staff:	Dec 89-Jul 90	COL Mercer Dorsey
	Jul 90-Sep 90	COL David McKnight
	Sep 90-Dec 90	COL Mercer Dorsey
	Dec 90-Nov 94	COL Anthony Normand
	Nov 94-	BG William P. Tangney

Secretary of the General Staff: 90- 91 MAJ D. Priban
91- 92 MAJ T. Day
92- 93 MAJ Tom Spoehr
Apr 93 - Jul MAJ H. Stryffeler
Jul 93 Mr. Charles Pimble

Protocol: 89- 91 Mrs. T. Valderrama
91- Mrs. N. Nicholson

B. PERSONNEL.

1. Responsibilities. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER) is responsible for command policy and actions related to: Active and Reserve Component personnel readiness and strength accounting; retention; personnel plans; military and civilian personnel management; quality of life and soldier and family support group policy; uniforms and standards of appearance; equal employment opportunity; education; suicide prevention and ground safety. The office monitors the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Control, Equal Opportunity, and Physical Security and Crime Prevention programs.³⁸ In 1992, USASOC underwent functional realignment of staff responsibilities. In addition to being responsible for overall major command personnel policy and actions, DCSPER assumed direct responsibility for the policy and actions of USACAPOC and USASF. This realignment was a conscious command initiative to relieve the MSUs of routine tasks and requirements associated with those functions while allowing subordinate command G-1s to concentrate their efforts on matters of readiness and operations.

2. Organization. The DCSPER office is divided in a Military Personnel Division, Plans/Programs/Policy Division, a Civilian Personnel Division (moved in 1993 to form its own Directorate), a Retention Branch and a Reserve Affairs Branch.

3. Key Personnel: DCSPER

1989-1992	COL Juan Chavez
1992-1993	COL G. Gresh
1993-	COL H. McMillan

4. Key Events.

a. SQI (Skill Qualification Identifier) for SOF Support Personnel: As early as April of 1987, while still 1st SOCOM, the command recognized the need to develop a method to identify and track specific SOF support personnel.³⁹ This would facilitate a rapid identification of those trained personnel throughout the army who could provide SOF support casualty replacements. The unique nature of SOF support requirements means that only those personnel who have served specifically in SOF support positions could effectively handle that task without

³⁸USASOC Regulation 10-1, Organization and Functions, 2 April 1990, pp. 6-1 to 6-11.

³⁹The issue was first raised at the PACOM (Pacific Command) SOF Support conference in April. FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, AOPE-PP, 16 Jan 1990, MAJ R. A. Harris, drafter.

extensive training time. In October 1987, the personnel office of 1st SOCOM began developing a list of those positions which required coding and tracking. PERSCOM (Personnel Command) concurred with the plan in December 1988, but staffing throughout the Army resulted in the raising of issues of proponency. Health Services Command and the Signal Center concurred for their MOSSs, but the Quartermaster Center and the Intelligence Center non-concurred. By the end of 1992, discussions were still underway on adding the SOF Support SQI.

b. Functional Proponency: DCSPER moved quickly after its formal establishment to help make USASOC the focal point for all Army SOF functional proponency issues relating to personnel. Proponency issues (such as which TRADOC school has responsibility for establishing the standards and development of MOS development, equipment procurement issues, doctrine, etc.) often have a major impact on how doctrine, structure, combat developments and personnel structures develop.⁴⁰ By working with USAJFKSWCS and the other USASOC staff elements, DCSPER labored hard to ensure that the new Special Forces Branch (established 9 April 1987) would find its voice and sponsor in USASOC. The concern of each Commanding General of USASOC has been to ensure that the SOF community is united and "speaks with one voice." This was particularly true with personnel issues such as training, leader development, promotions, assignments, etc. The office of USASOC DCSPER has begun to be recognized as the single voice on personnel issues in the SOF community.⁴¹

c. CMF 18 Shortages: The 18 Career Management Field (CMF) is the primary management field for all Special Forces soldiers. As such, one of the critical jobs of the DCSPER is to monitor the inventory of CMF 18 personnel in the system and the projected long-term strengths of qualified personnel. In most cases, the CMF 18 inventory was adequate throughout the early years of the MACOM. However, historically, the number of 18D personnel (Special Forces Medics) has been short of requirements. In November 1991, the command strength in 18D was only 81% of required.⁴² Despite optimistic projections of increasing to 83% by the first of the new year, overall 18D strength fell to 73% by

⁴⁰FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, Functional Proponency, ATSU-SP (USAJFKSWCS), 22 January 1990, LTC Ralph W. Hinrichs, drafter.

⁴¹FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, USASOC as Focal Point for Army SOF Personnel Issues, 26 January 1990, AOPE-MP, MAJ Stansfield, drafter.

⁴²FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, AOPE-MP, dated 1 Nov 91, Subject: CMF 18 Inventory Shortages (Mid Term).

4 October 1992.⁴³ Projections for FY 93-FY 95 were optimistic, however, with the DCSPER predicting 105 percent fill by the end of FY 95.

CMF 18 Percentage of Fill as of 15 August 1992⁴⁴

	18B	18C	18D	18E	18F	18Z	
TOTAL							
USASFC	106%	96%	74%	91%	84%	104%	93%
USAJFKSWCS	90%	95%	67%	91%	86%	132%	90%
USASOC TOTAL	102%	95%	73%	91%	84%	106%	92%

The obvious shortage of SF Medics is in part due to the high attrition rate in training. As a result, class size at USAJFKSWCS increased from 35 candidates to 80 by November 1991. In addition, the classes were granted a more liberal recycle policy and benefitted from a tighter screening of potential candidates. However, additional reasons for a high turnover rate included a drain of 18D to enter the Physician's Assistant MOS (600A) and the Special Forces Technician (180A) Warrant Officer program. These factors would continue to affect the numbers of trained 18D available for assignment to the units.

d. Tracking of Support Personnel: A perennial issue during the early years of the MACOM was an attempt to convince the Army to grant a Skill Qualification Identifier (SQI) for Special Operations Support personnel so that, regardless of their basic logistical specialty, personnel who had worked with the unique requirements of SOF skills could be "tracked" through the system. The award of the SQI of "S" would permit the SOF community to locate and manage selected skilled individuals who could have follow-on SOF assignments after completion of basic branch career requirements or would be available for emergency backfill if needed.

The SOF Support personnel would be airborne qualified, have successfully completed on-the-job-training and serve a minimum of 2 years in a SOF unit (waiverable to 1 year) or successfully participate in at least two unit exercises, or successfully complete the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and

⁴³FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, AOPE-MP, dated 4 October 1992, Subject: USASOC CMF 18 Inventory (Mid Term).

⁴⁴FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by SGM Simpson, AOPE-MP, Subject: USASOC CMF 18 Inventory (Mid Term), dated 4 October 1992.

Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).⁴⁵

e. A long-term problem within the SOF community has also been the perennial shortage of fully trained Functional Area 39 (FA 39) officers. The FA 39B officer is a specialist in Psychological Operations while the 39C is expert in Civil Affairs. Each fully-qualified officer (CPT-COL) is language qualified, has completed regional studies, has taken the Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations course and has completed graduate school. Each specialty is projected to remain in shortage into FY 95.

FA 39B (as of 4 Oct 92) at 72.2% overall fill

COL			LTC			MAJ			CPT			TOTAL		
AUTH/ASG/PROJ			A/A/P			A/A/P			A/A/P			A/A/P		
1	1	1	8	13	12	53	44	47	53	25	23	115	83	83

FA 39A (as of 4 Oct 92) at 54.6% overall fill

COL			LTC			MAJ			CPT			TOTAL		
AUTH/ASG/PROJ			A/A/P			A/A/P			A/A/P			A/A/P		
0	0	0	1	1	4	27	22	24	58	24	31	86	47	59

The lengthy course of training for these specialties makes it difficult for the command to fill projected requirements for the FA 39 fields. In addition, throughout 1991 and 1992, voluntary and involuntary separations throughout the Army resulted in a number of unscheduled shortfalls. Messages to CG, Personnel Command (PERSCOM) resulted in pledges of "priority of fill for FA 39 and filling requirements by the end of Sep 1992" but even that pledge was unfulfilled due to the high level of drawdown by the Army. The FY 93 allocation of officers to USASOC gave the command only 27 FA 39C officers and this shortcoming was addressed directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA).⁴⁶ The short term solution directed by the Vice Chief of Staff included assigning untrained CA officers to units to offset shortages and relooking the extensive training program required

⁴⁵FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, AOPE-PP, dated 6 April 1992, Subject: Tracking of SOF Support Personnel. Support MOS which would be authorized the SQI included, but was not limited to, the 25, 29, 31, 55, 63, 71, 74, 75, 76, 91, 96, 97, and 98 MOSs. The issue was well on its way to resolution by the end of 1992.

⁴⁶FACT SHEET for the Commanding General by MAJ Miller, AOPE-MPO, Subject: Functional Area 39 (FA 39) (LONG TERM), dated 4 Oct 92.

by the Functional Area. USAJFKSWCS was assigned to examined to problem while USASOC directed that untrained CA officers be assigned in accordance with the guidance of the VCSA.

f. Civilian Strength: Until 1992, the Civilian Personnel Division was a division within the office of the DCSPER. As such, the Chief of Civilian Personnel was a division chief of the DCSPER and addressed all issues within the DCSPER which affected civilian personnel. The increasingly critical role of civilians in the success of the MACOM and the functional realignment in October 1992 encouraged the Commanding General to create the Civilian Personnel Directorate as an office separate from the DCSPER.

The following chart reflects Command civilian strength as of 30 September 1992.⁴⁷ (DAC refers to Department of the Army Civilian, MT is Military Technician.)

Chart 1:

DA CIVILIAN STRENGTH AS OF 30 SEP 1992

UNIT	AUTH		ASSIGNED		% FILL		OVH		TEMP		TOTAL		% FILL	
	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT
USASOC	165	0	140	0	85%	0%	10	0	0	0	150	0	91%	0%
ISC	25	0	19	0	76%	0%	0	0	0	0	19	0	76%	0%
USASFC	54	0	44	0	81%	0%	13	0	1	0	58	0	107%	0%
1ST SFG	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0	0	1	0	1	0	100%	0%
7TH SFG	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	1	0	0	0	1	0	100%	0%
10TH SFG	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	1	0	2	0	3	0	300%	0%
11TH SFG	0	25	1	23	100%	92%	0	4	1	0	2	27	200%	108%
12TH SFG	0	16	0	13	0%	81%	0	14	2	0	2	27	200%	169%
SWCS	483	0	383	0	79%	0%	5	0	5	0	393	0	81%	0%
AOSI	34	0	13	0	38%	0%	0	0	0	0	13	0	38%	0%
CAG	77	0	71	0	92%	0%	0	0	0	0	71	0	92%	0%
TAPO	9	0	9	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	9	0	100%	0%
75TH RGR	23	0	23	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	23	0	100%	0%
160TH	10	0	10	0	100%	0%	5	0	2	0	17	0	170%	0%
USACAPOC	6	40	3	29	50%	73%	0	0	9	0	12	29	200%	73%
351ST CA	2	22	2	20	100%	91%	0	6	0	0	2	26	100%	118%
352ND CA	0	21	0	16	0%	76%	0	3	0	0	0	19	0%	90%
353RD CA	0	32	0	30	0%	94%	1	4	2	4	3	38	300%	119%
4TH POG	58	0	52	0	90%	0%	0	0	0	0	52	0	90%	0%
2ND POG	0	27	0	23	0%	85%	0	6	0	1	0	30	0%	111%
5TH POG	0	11	0	9	0%	82%	0	1	0	1	0	11	0%	100%
7TH POG	0	20	0	17	0%	85%	0	2	2	2	2	21	200%	105%
TOTALS	946	214	770	180	82%	84%	36	40	27	8	833	228	88%	107%

⁴⁷FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Mr. R. Vaquilar, AOPE-CP, Subject: Civilian Strength Status, 30 Sep 92.

The civilian personnel strength allocations per command within USASOC changed considerably upon the implementing of the functional realignment of the command in October 1992. The following chart shows numbers of DA Civilians and Military Technicians and their percentage of fill for the various units under USASOC control as of 30 December 1992.

Chart 2:

DA CIVILIANS AND MILITARY TECHNICIANS AS OF 30 DEC 1992

UNIT	AUTH		ASSIGNED		% FILL		OVH		TEMP		TOTAL		% FILL	
	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT	DAC	MT
USASOC	310	27	277	21	89%	78%	12	0	6	0	295	21	95%	78%
USASOA	11	0	11	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	11	0	100%	0%
USASOIC	21	0	17	0	81%	0%	3	0	5	0	25	0	119%	0%
1ST SFG	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0	0	1	0	1	0	100%	0%
5TH SFG	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0	0	1	0	1	0	100%	0%
7TH SFG	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0%
10TH SFG	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	1	0	2	0	3	0	300%	0%
11TH SFG	0	25	0	22	0%	88%	1	4	1	0	2	26	200%	104%
12TH SFG	0	16	0	16	0%	100%	0	9	0	4	0	29	0%	181%
SWCS	374	0	302	0	81%	0%	1	0	3	0	306	0	82%	0%
PERSCOM	2	0	2	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	2	0	100%	0%
SPSA	13	0	13	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	13	0	100%	0%
ISE DC	1	0	1	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	1	0	100%	0%
7 TASOSC	20	0	20	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	20	0	100%	0%
4 TASOSC	5	0	5	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	5	0	100%	0%
PMSOA	23	0	23	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	23	0	100%	0%
TAPO	9	0	9	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	9	0	100%	0%
75TH RGR	23	0	23	0	100%	0%	0	0	0	0	23	0	100%	0%
160TH	10	0	10	0	100%	0%	6	0	1	0	17	0	170%	0%
USACAPOC	7	13	3	9	43%	69%	0	0	3	0	6	9	86%	69%
351ST CA	2	19	2	16	100%	84%	0	6	0	0	2	22	100%	116%
352ND CA	0	17	0	14	0%	82%	0	2	0	0	0	16	0%	94%
353RD CA	0	23	0	18	0%	78%	0	2	0	5	0	25	0%	109%
358TH CA	0	5	0	5	0%	100%	1	1	0	0	1	6	100%	120%
361ST CA	0	10	0	10	0%	100%	0	0	0	1	0	11	0%	110%
422ND CA	0	1	0	0	0%	0%	0	1	0	0	0	1	0%	100%
4TH POG	58	0	57	0	98%	0%	1	0	0	0	58	0	100%	0%
2ND POG	0	31	0	26	0%	84%	0	5	0	0	0	31	0%	100%
5TH POG	0	8	0	6	0%	75%	0	1	1	0	1	7	100%	88%
7TH POG	0	19	0	16	0%	84%	0	2	0	1	0	19	0%	100%
TOTALS	889	214	775	179	87%	84%	26	33	24	11	825	223	93%	104%

C. INTELLIGENCE.

1. Responsibilities. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) is responsible for directing the intelligence, counterintelligence and security activities of all USASOC Special Operations Forces. He advises the commander on all intelligence training matters including current policy, doctrine, training opportunities and concept development. He develops and promulgates policy and guidance pursuant to the evaluation and monitoring of the readiness status of the AC and RC intelligence units.⁴⁸ He coordinates with higher, lower and adjacent intelligence organizations to influence doctrine and implementation of that doctrine within the special operations community.

2. Organization. The DCSINT is divided into the following areas: Plans, Policy and Programs Division, Requirements Management Division, Intelligence Electronic Warfare (IEW) Support Division, Security Division, and Special Security Office (SSO).

3. Key Personnel.

a. DCSINT	(1988-89)	COL D. McKnight
	(1989-92)	COL N. Smith
	(1992-	COL S. Epkins

b. Assistant DCSINT (1989-) Mr. S. Strange

4. Key Events.

a. USASOC, as the Army component of USSOCOM, requires the fastest and most accurate intelligence possible. One of the first initiatives of the intelligence section of USASOC was therefore to work with USSOCOM to develop SOCRATES (Special Operations Command Research, Analysis and Threat Evaluation System). This system provides automated intelligence data, voice and facsimile worldwide to the SOF community. It includes a local area network (LAN) at Fort Bragg which is currently operational and stand-alone and extended networks to all ARSOF units expanding the system (consistent with security requirements) to the wider SOF community. USASOC and USSOCOM are currently working closely together to improve and expand this system which will link the entire command. (See below for more details).

b. As a new MACOM, the DCSINT had to create new policies and command wide intelligence architectures to establish the

⁴⁸USASOC Regulation 10-1, 1991, p. 7-1.

procedures, positions and training standards for the intelligence function. As the intelligence office for a non-deploying headquarters, the DCSINT spent more of its effort establishing intelligence procedures and standards than it did performing the "classical" role of military intelligence of preparing and briefing daily threat assessments.⁴⁹ The DCSINT recommended changes to SOF doctrine on intelligence collection, managed Command-wide intelligence REDTRAIN (readiness training) funds, integrated intelligence requirements into exercises and monitored the overall intelligence training posture of the Command.⁵⁰

c. During Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, DCSINT was initially faced with a dilemma. None of the MACOM initiatives to restructure the intelligence flow within the command were yet in place, but the deploying units, especially the 5th Special Forces Group, needed intelligence support quickly. USASOC was able to expedite some cross-leveling of personnel and equipment, while USCENTCOM assumed responsibility for processing requests for intelligence information and national-system products. However, USCENTCOM's plans were not then sufficiently defined to accord priority to ARSOF requirements. The pace of events was initially quick and so the 5th Special Forces Group deployed with some of its intelligence requirements unfilled. As time progressed, the USASOC DCSINT was able to clarify validation procedures, arrange for the regular flow of intelligence to the deploying units and simultaneously worked on continuing issues of training personnel and obtaining the proper equipment (light tables, signals intelligence collection systems, etc.) for those forces. The 3rd Special Forces Group, which deployed later in the crisis, was the main beneficiary of this process. The DCSINT subsequently used the experience of Desert Shield to prepare more careful plans for monitoring the readiness of intelligence personnel throughout the command and establishing firmer links to vital national level intelligence organizations. These links should ensure that USASOC's subordinate units will be in a better position to fulfill many of their own intelligence needs when deployment becomes imminent.

⁴⁹An exception to that was during operation Desert Shield/Storm when, in order to foresee events and prepare to send the right mix of men and equipment into Saudi Arabia, the DCSINT spent a great deal of time analyzing intelligence products and briefing those results to the Commanding General. This resulted in the "stretching" of the staff of DCSINT since a MACOM intelligence staff is not manned for 24-hour wartime operations or for the production of current intelligence products.

⁵⁰Interview by Dr. Stewart with Colonel Nelson Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at USASOC from October 1989 to June 1992, at Fort Bragg, NC, 15 May 1992.

d. One of the continuing intelligence difficulties of Special Forces has been the irregular debriefing of SF teams, especially those on foreign mobile training teams (MTT) and the distribution of that information. Teams are regularly exposed incidentally to information on personalities, geography, culture, military organizations, etc. that would be operationally useful to future MTTs in that country. However, there has not been until recently a standardized (and used) format for that debriefing or a means to store and distribute that information. To fill that need, USSOCOM and USASOC established the SODARS (Special Operations Debriefing and Reporting System). This automated system established both the format and, because it was automated, the means with which to distribute the information. The system was tested with favorable results in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. However, in order to be successful, intelligence and operations personnel down to the "A" Team level need to commit themselves to making it work. Only team discipline, backed up by command interest, can ensure that teams are regularly and systematically debriefed. If the system is used, all will benefit; if only cursory attention is paid to such a resource, the information on the system will be of little value. This, once again, points out the truism that intelligence only results from disciplined and rigorous attention to detail.⁵¹

In February and March of 1992, a SODARS task force was established to review the backlog of approximately 100 SODARS reports in the DCSINT office. Much of the backlog resulted from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT. Problems with the confusing annexes to the debriefing reports were addressed and recommendations forwarded to USSOCOM for their review. The other major issue with the SODARS report was A lack of guidance provided to the operators in how to fill out the report correctly and according to standards. The USASFC G2 assisted the DCSINT by writing a memorandum of instruction for the operators on how to fill out the report. As of mid-1992, some 141 SODARS reports were in the DCSINT data base.

e. SOCRATES: Another major development within DCSINT, in conjunction with USSOCOM, was the development of SOCRATES (Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System). The SOCRATES is a USSOCOM-sponsored program designed to provide world-wide automated SCI (Special Compartmented Intelligence) data, voice, and facsimile to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community. The USASOC program has three components: SOCRATES Local Area Network (LAN), SOCRATES Stand-alone Capability (SAC), and SOCRATES Extension (EXT).

(1) The SOCRATES SCI LAN was installed in Bldg D-1705 in January 1991 and services all CONUS ARSOF units. It is

⁵¹Smith interview.

composed of 30 computer work stations and accompanying laser and dot matrix printers. The communications carrier for the data transfer is the USSOCOM-sponsored SCAMPI network.

(2) The SOCRATES SAC is a collateral stand-alone computer application using existing SOCRATES software, and allowing access to regional intelligence databases. Databases are loaded and updated quarterly by USSOCOM. The SOCRATES SAC fielding started with full delivery of systems to the 19th SFG(A) in Utah in late 1991. Fielding of these systems continued throughout FY92 in eight states having ARSOF RC/NG units. Through December 1992, 81 SOCRATES SACs had been installed at SOF RC/NG sites. USACAPOC requested an additional 25 systems to provide support to activated Civil Affairs Battalions.

(3) The SOCRATES EXT is designed to extend the SOCRATES on-line capability to all active component MSC/MSU's. The SCAMPI connectivity has been installed in USAJFKSWCS, 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th SOAR, 3d SFG(A), 7th SFG(A), 5th SFG(A), and 1st SFG(A) during FY92 to early FY93. Final accreditation testing of the LAN was completed in June 1991 with the results forwarded to USSOCOM J2. The USSOCOM forwarded the results to DIA with recommendation for full accreditation.

Fielding of systems was only part of the battle; training is also critical. From April 1991 through July 1992 USSOCOM MTT personnel trained 103 USASOC personnel on the use of the SOCRATES LAN functions. At the same time, USASOC personnel trained 103 RC/NG soldiers on the SOCRATES SAC.⁵²

f. Strategic Industrial Target Analysis System (SITAS): The SITAS was a special intelligence facility at Fort Meade, MD, which conducted strategic intelligence collection and processing functions for the MACOM. In late 1991, the operations and functions of SITAS (also called SFOD-I) were transferred from USASOC DCSINT to the G2, USASFC(A). The property at the SITAS facility currently belonging to USASOC was turned over to USASFC(A) and money for the continued operation of the Fort Meade facility was transferred to USASFC(A). Construction of a secure facility (SCIF) at Fort Meade was discontinued during the summer of 1991 pending a decision on the continued status of SITAS.⁵³

⁵²FACT SHEETS for the Commanding General, by Mr. G. Chandler, AOIN-ST, Subject: Special Operations Command Research, Analysis and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES), 5 August and 5 October 1992.

⁵³FACT SHEET for the commanding General, by Mr. E. Seemer, AOIN-PP, SUBJECT: Strategic Industrial Target Analysis System (SITAS), 7 Nov 1991.

In 1992 the Commanding General decided that SITAS was no longer a viable entity of USASOC and the operation was shut down. The published SITAS products were distributed to USAJFKSWCS and USSOCOM.

g. Mapping, Charting, & Geodesy (MC&G) Architecture Plan: The Theater USASOC MC&G Architecture Plan was developed in 1991 and 1992 to address programmatic and policy solutions for command MC&G support and training, and to ensure Army SOF obtained required MC&G products and services in a timely manner. Major deficiencies addressed in the plan were:

(1) The lack of an MC&G regulation which prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for obtaining, maintaining, and using MC&G products.

(2) Inadequate world MC&G coverage to meet SOF needs.

(3) Inadequate training of unit MC&G officers and NCOS.

The Draft plan was prepared in March 1992, and by April, USASOC Regulation 115-11 (Topographic) was published. The initial input on world-wide command MC&G requirements was provided to USSOCOM for merging with other SO component requirements. Further refinement of requirements continued throughout 1992 in coordination with input from subordinates.

Developing strategy for moving SOF into the digital age, DCSINT also starting working with the FULCRUM computer system, the SOF Planning and Rehearsal System (SOFPARS) and a SOF Aircrew Training system with the ultimate goal of full MC&G integration into the intelligence architecture of the command.⁵⁴

h. The USASOC REDTRAIN Program: The MACOM REDTRAIN (Readiness Training) is a carry over of the successful DA program which the command participated in as 1st SOCOM. It is designed to assist USASOC MI, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, and 18F/180A soldiers in sustaining and enhancing their MOS skills acquired in institutional training so they may maintain and improve the technical proficiency required of them to perform their operational intelligence support functions. The REDTRAIN augments in-unit, METL-focused MOS training with live environment training (LET) opportunities and various training courses. Some examples of REDTRAIN are:

⁵⁴FACT SHEETS for Commanding General, by Mr. Farr, AOIN-ST, Subject: Mapping, Charting, & Geodesy Architecture Plan, 7 Nov 91.

- Defense Intelligence College courses.
- SOCRATES, FULCRUM, ISIDS system training (SOF-unique).
- Interrogation techniques training.
- Security/counter-terrorism courses.
- Counter-narcotic intelligence courses and conferences.
- State Department regional studies courses.
- National Intelligence Agency training/exchanges.

The REDTRAIN program also funds the purchase of non-TOE intelligence-related training equipment, technical books, periodicals, and magazines. For example:

- (1) Telephone monitoring training devices for the SF Group signal security specialists.
- (2) The Tactical Voice Intercept Trainer (TACVIT) for the SF Group SIGINT/intercept operators.
- (3) JANE'S defense publications for all units.
- (4) CODETRAIN morse training program for SF Group morse code users.
- (5) Foreign language newspapers and magazines for all units, especially PSYOP and Civil Affairs.

The REDTRAIN training activities are based upon the command's operational mission requirements. There are, therefore, SOF-specific REDTRAIN training opportunities which have been established at USSOCOM, USASOC, and USASFC. The ODCSINT has established a program under the auspices of REDTRAIN to send soldiers to train at U.S. Defense Attache Offices (USDAO) in CINC-identified, high-priority countries world-wide. The REDTRAIN program also supports analyst interface/exchange with the unified commands and their supporting SO intelligence staffs, and the national-level intelligence agencies. The USASOC REDTRAIN Program is distinct from the DA program in that it is funded through MFP11 and MFP2 funds. Currently, funding for AC units is contained in SODP R055 and managed by the DCSINT.⁵⁵

i. SIGINT: Mission, Techniques, and Procedures (MTP): In late 1992, a SIGINT MTP workshop was held at Fort Bragg on 21-25 Sep 92. The focus of this workshop was to develop fully Support Operations Team - Alpha (SOT-A), Support Operations Team - Bravo (SOT-B), and Special Forces Group Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE) critical task lists (CTL) and supporting training evaluation outlines (TEO) which will be incorporated into an Army SOF intelligence MTP.

⁵⁵FACT SHEET for Commanding General, by Mr. Watkins, AOIN-ST, Subject: The USASOC REDTRAIN Program and SODP, 7 Nov 1991.

The Special Warfare Center and School has rewritten, and as of the end of 1992, was in the process of staffing the new MTPs for SOF units. One of these was a consolidated MTP for the SFOB/FOB which would include the S2 Sections and Military Intelligence Detachments at both SF Group and Battalion.

Additionally, the new edition of FM 31-20 (Doctrine for Special Forces (SF) Operations) is also in the staffing process. This FM has chapters outlining how SIGINT/EW support is provided to SF operations. FM 34-36 (Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronics Warfare Operations) is currently being reviewed for rewriting and publication. SIGINT/EW equipment, in the required quantities, was to be available for use by both active and reserve component units for the first time.

j. Intelligence Overwatch for Deployed ARSOF: In 1992, DCSINT conducted a study to determine intelligence deficiencies for OCONUS deployed ARSOF. A major shortcoming noted in the study was the lack of an early warning/alert system for ARSOF units deployed in remote areas. Specifically, it was reported that during normal deployments, regular communications with elements are not always possible. For example, SF Communications are usually limited to two times per 24-hours with no provisions for immediate communications (warning/alert). This deficiency has generated particular concern for some type of early warning/alert system for ARSOF elements deployed in remote OCONUS locations. The DCSINT explored the feasibility of using world-wide pagers to provide immediate warning/alert/recall capability for elements deployed in remote locations. The office also coordinated with SOCSOUTH J2 concerning the use of pagers within their AOR and worked with the DCSIM to research the feasibility of using world-wide pagers to warn/alert/recall deployed ARSOF. Their findings indicated that at present, only one company has done extensive research in the possible use or implementation of a world-wide paging system. That company was the American Mobile Satellite Communications Company (AMSCC). AMSCC's findings were that it was not cost effective to implement a world-wide system at this time. However, AMSCC is continuing to do research in the field of world-wide paging. DCSIM will also continue to track technology in this field for future implementation.

DCSIM was requested to identify any geographic areas in which pager systems are or can be employed. If there are any remote areas that pagers could feasibly be employed, the DCSINT goal was to investigate and determine if a cost and operationally effective fix for the deficiency could be established to aid in the protection of deployed ARSOF.

In summary, the ODCSINT's Intelligence Overwatch Program to uncover and resolve deficiencies in intelligence support to ARSOF

deployed OCONUS has proven to be very successful in determining what type deficiencies exist and how to deal expeditiously with them. However, one potential solution, the use of world-wide pagers to provide an immediate warning/alert/recall for ARSOF elements deployed in remote OCONUS locations, was determined not to be cost effective at this time based on present technology. Monitoring of capabilities will continue by this command for possible later use. Also, further coordination with DCSIM is ongoing to determine what areas of the world can be accessed by pager and if it is feasible to pursue pagers as an alternative system in these areas.⁵⁶

k. Special Operations Forces Intelligence-Vehicle (SOF-IV) and Man-Transportable SOCRATES (MTS). SORDAC (Special Operations Research, Development and Acquisitions Center) at USSOCOM with J2 support, is the Program Manager for the development of SOF-IV and MTS. USASOC DCSFDI is the ARSOF representative for functional and operational requirements, with DCSINT as the user representative, and USAJFKSWCS as proponent for Combat Development issues.

The SOF-IV requirement is for a mobile automated intelligence processing facility designed to provide intelligence support to mission planning and execution for deployed ARSOF. The MTS workstation provides a single workstation with a similar selection of capabilities.

The SOF-IV capabilities include SOCRATES access with the ability to receive, transmit, and process to provide intelligence for SOF mission planning. Techniques supported include national and tactical data input, imagery exploitation, database storage and retrieval, and communications interface. The configuration of the SOF-IV will be modular in design with several segmented components. Workstations can be configured to support varying mission profiles. MTS workstations can be similarly configured by selecting appropriate peripherals. The SOF-IV at Group/Regiment level and deployable SOCRATES at battalion level will provide Army SOF with Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) and other communications connectivity upward to theater/national level intelligence support. Contract award for the initial prototype of the SOF-IV is expected in August, with delivery of the prototype in 16 months, and full production in late FY 1994. The mission needs statement/operational requirements (MNS/ORD) for the deployable SOCRATES is being revised at USSOCOM after review by components. The (MNS/ORD) for the SOF-IV remains in staffing at USSOCOM. A Milestone II decision for SOF-IV and MTS was expected late in the

⁵⁶FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Mr. Tyner, AOIN-PP, Subject: Intelligence overwatch for Deployed ARSOF (Long-Term 91-180 days), dated 5 Aug 92.

year. Fifteen initial prototypes of the Deployable SOCRATES will be procured within the next year to satisfy USSOCOM requirements, replacing those systems that became non-operational after use in DESERT STORM. The distribution plan includes three for USASOC and five more available at USSOCOM. Full production was projected for 1994-97.

The basis of issue plan (BOIP) (as of August 1992) was for one SOF-IV for each active Special Forces Group, the Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and the 75th Ranger Regiment. The ORD will contain a proposed BOIP for one deployable SOCRATES for each SF Battalion.⁵⁷

1. Future SOF SIGINT/EW Systems: ARSOF elements employ manpack SIGINT/Electronic Warfare systems. Army Special Forces Groups are receiving the first of two new systems that will eventually replace the AN/TRQ-30, AN/PRD-10 and AN/PRD-11 systems. The AN/PRD-12 is in the process of being fielded in quantities of 12 per SF Group (4 per Bn). These systems do not meet all of the ARSOF requirements in terms of weight, battery consumption, operational capability and manpower. As a result, SOF has pursued an enhanced capability using commercial-off-the-shelf/non-developmental items (COTS/NDI) equipment. Prototype systems have been used by ARSOF units in a variety of locations and missions (both training and combat) in order to identify the systems best qualified to satisfy the varied needs of ARSOF units. Under USSOCOM's SIGINT enhancement program, each active Special Forces Group will receive 12 SOF SIGINT Manpack Systems (SSMS).

The SSMS is a manpackable, lightweight intercept and direction-finding (DF) system designed to be used by military intelligence soldiers (98G/98H) assigned to Army Special Forces Groups/Bns. SSMS has been designed to be employed in hostile and benign areas, in all types of terrain and climate, for periods of up to 45 days. SSMS is designed as a stand-alone DF system. The Components include: receiver and DF processor mounted in a signal PRC-77 box; high-frequency (HF), very-high-frequency (VHF), and ultra-high-frequency (UFH) DF antennas; a hand-held DF antenna; cassette tape recorder; solar blanket (for power); and associated cables.

In summary, the fielding of the AN/PRD-12 and the final fielding of the SSMS will provide ARSOF units with standardized SIGINT/EW equipment, in the required quantities, for use by both active and reserve component units for the first time.

⁵⁷FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by CPT Crawford, AOIN-ST, Subject: Special Operations Forces Intelligence-Vehicle, 5 Aug 1992.

Some of the key Dates in the SOF Manpack System Development were:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Date</u>
Milestone III	13 Apr 92
Request for Proposal Released	20 Apr 92
Integrated Logistics Support	2 Jun 92
Test and Evaluation Working	3 Jun 92
Source Selection Board	29 Jun 92
Contract	Aug 92
First Article Testing	Oct-Nov 92
First Unit Fielding	Jan 93 (Tentative)
Follow on Test & Evaluation	Jun 94
First Unit Fielding	Sep-Oct 94

Currently, SIGINT/EW equipment does not meet Army SOF requirements. Fielding of the new manpack for SOF is projected to be completed by September-October 1994. Upon completion of fielding, Army SOF will have standardized SIGINT/EW equipment, in the required quantities, in both active component and reserve component units for the first time.⁵⁸

⁵⁸Fact Sheet for Commanding General by MSG Walensky, Subject: Future ARSOF Manpack SIGINT Systems (Long Term: 91-180 Days), 5 Aug 92.

D. OPERATIONS.

1. Responsibilities. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS) is "a directing staff principal who advises and assists the Commanding General in matters pertaining to organization; training; plans, policies; exercises; force management; nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC); and aviation."⁵⁹ The DCSOPS handles unit readiness and readiness reporting, stationing of units, and monitors the OPSEC, EW and Deception responsibilities of USASOC.

2. Organization. The DCSOPS was initially divided into: an Aviation Division, Training and Exercise Division, Assistant for Reserve Component (RC) Division, NBC Division, Plans and Operations Division, and a Force Integration Division.⁶⁰ In 1992, the organization dropped the Reserve Component and Force Integration Divisions. The DCSOPS re-organized into a Training Division and an Operations, Plans and Exercises and Force Readiness Division. Branches within the divisions included administrative support, resources, RC training, current training, individual training, operations, plans and exercises, and force readiness.⁶¹

3. Key Personnel. DCSOPS:

(1989-90)	COL M. Dorsey
(1990)	COL D. McKnight
(1990-91)	COL J. Holt
(1991-94)	COL D. Katz
(1994)	LTC P. Lenaghan
(1994)	COL P. Kensinger
(1994-)	COL F. Toney

4. Key Events. Few military organizations, let alone Major Commands, are presented with two major military operations in the first year of their existence. USASOC faced just such a situation. Within days of the activation of USASOC, JUST CAUSE provided the first test of the new MACOM's procedures for dealing with a crisis. Upon completion of JUST CAUSE, USASOC remained vitally involved in Panama as the operation moved into PROMOTE LIBERTY with a heavy Civil Affairs involvement. Even as the command was watching that operation wind-down, the Iraqi invasion

⁵⁹USASOC Regulation 10-1, Organization and Functions, 1991, p. 8-1.

⁶⁰USASOC Regulation 10-1, Organization and Functions, 1991.

⁶¹USASOC Regulation 10-1 Organization and Functions (Draft), n.d., [1993].

of Kuwait early in August 1990 set the command in the middle of the largest and fastest deployment of U. S. forces since Vietnam: DESERT SHIELD. The development of staff procedures, section SOPs, optimum organizations and all of the other major actions necessary to ensure the smooth running of a new organization had to be undertaken in haste under the pressure of imminent conflict. That conflict became real in January 1991 with the commencement of Operation DESERT STORM. The command deployed over 7,000 Army SOF soldiers to serve in the Persian Gulf and more into Turkey to serve in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in support of the Kurdish refugees.

JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY: The events in Panama of December 1989 are well known. The increasing level of violence sponsored by dictator Manuel Noriega finally led to a U. S. armed response on 20 December. The roles played by U. S. Army Special Operations Forces included direct action (seizure and disabling of radio and TV stations, protection of forces at Torrijos Airport by seizing the Pacora River Bridge), psychological operations (loudspeaker teams accompanying assault and follow-on elements) and Civil Affairs (refugee control, rebuilding police forces, etc.). As a MACOM, especially as a new MACOM, there was little direct involvement by USASOC in the events of JUST CAUSE. After all, a MACOM is a major headquarters element with the missions of long-term budgeting, sustainment, combat developments and training for the entire Army Special Operations Forces community. It does not and will never have a deployable combat role. Nevertheless, USASOC's and that of its Major Subordinate Commands involvement in JUST CAUSE was critical.

The invasion of Panama was essentially a short operation. Although JUST CAUSE lasted from 20 December 1989 to 12 January 1990, most of the combat operations were concluded by D + 5, Christmas Day. USASOC barely had time to establish its Crisis Response Cell (CRC) and set up an Emergency Operations Center. USASOC's long-term mission--sustainment of a force and planning for additional forces and equipment--was never fully tested. Yet, a critical element of the establishment of USASOC in December 1989 was the simultaneous formation of a single Reserve Component command (USARSOC) for all RC Special Operations Forces. This element received its first major test in JUST CAUSE as well.

Almost immediately after USASOC received word of JUST CAUSE, it notified USARSOC.⁶² USARSOC quickly established its cell in the USASOC Emergency Operations Center. It were given the

⁶²USASOC passed the word to USARSOC at approximately 1000 hrs on 20 Dec and by 1030 hours, 21 Dec USARSOC established their Emergency Operations Center. HQ, USARSOC "Smart-Book", "Operation Just Cause/Promote Liberty (20 Dec 89 - 30 Apr 90), Daily Staff Journal, 21 Dec-22 Dec 89.

mission by the USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Colonel David McKnight, to "identify, select, validate, process and deploy individual USAR SOF personnel to support the Civil Affairs contingency operation in Panama."⁶³ Because some 96 percent of all of the Army's civil affairs assets are in the Army Reserve, USARSOC and its major subordinate Civil Affairs Commands would be key players in ensuring the long term success of the US operation in Panama.

USARSOC, in regular coordination with USASOC, began preparing lists of reservists with specific civil affairs skills who would be needed in Panama. The USSOUTHCOM war plans provided general guidance on CA requirements while CA and PSYOPS personnel in Panama developed the lists of specific needs. A Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) was organized, volunteers were located and mobilized and personnel were dispatched to Panama by 25 December. In later phases, CA functional/technical teams were organized from reserve volunteers and dispatched along with specific individuals who sustained the CA effort. Twenty-five volunteers formed the CMOTF and one hundred and eleven CA specialists were dispatched over the next few months to fill out the functional/technical teams. As BLIND LOGIC transitioned to PROMOTE LIBERTY (the long term nation rebuilding operation), the CMOTF was disbanded while individuals continued to be dispatched to help reestablish the Police Force, work with displaced persons and assist in rebuilding the government. While the rest of the Army was able to withdraw almost all of its additional personnel sent to Panama for the invasion, Civil Affairs personnel directed by USARSOC continued to be identified, notified and dispatched to "seal the victory." These Special Operations volunteers were being sent even as events in the Middle East began to spell out a new mission for USASOC and USARSOC.

DESERT SHIELD.

Within less than a year of its activation as a MACOM, USASOC in August of 1990 found itself in the middle of its second major military operation. This time, unlike JUST CAUSE, the operation was going to be of long duration. As such, USASOC established a Crisis Response Cell (CRC) and all of its major subordinate commands established Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) to process the information flowing from South West Asia and the requests for personnel, equipment and guidance. As a sustaining headquarters, USASOC entered into the entire range of requirements coming from DESERT SHIELD. The CRC at USASOC reported both to USSOCOM and to DA and worked with other MACOMs

⁶³USARSOC Operations Order 1-89, 211600R December 1989, Fort Bragg, NC. The Civil Affairs portion of JUST CAUSE, entitled BLIND LOGIC, was the basis for USARSOC planning.

such as the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM). Each staff element was represented in the CRC as they grappled with air movement requests, force validation requirements, acceleration of equipment acquisition actions and assisting in deciding on the ways and means of cross-leveling personnel and equipment for SOF units. Over time, the CRC evolved into a separate Operations Branch within DCSOPS with a full-time Command Center.

In many ways, USASOC went through a valuable learning process during the first few days and weeks of DESERT SHIELD. Unlike in JUST CAUSE, USASOC was now a fully integrated player in a large scale, long-term sustainment operation. It was intimately involved in 24 hours a day processing of data to ensure that identified Army Special Operations Forces were trained, equipped, validated by the theater CINC, alerted, dispatched to U. S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and sustained in theater. All of the MACOMs long-range planning, procurement and policy guidance skills were needed and used as Army SOF deployed to theater. The exact delineation of functions between USASOC, USARSOC and FORSCOM when it came to alerting, mobilizing and validating reserve component forces had to be worked out during operations. Plans for cross-leveling personnel and equipment between units of 1st SOCOM and USARSOC had to be coordinated. The development of rapidly changing plans for identifying and preparing national-level contingency forces proved an added complication. As forces and plans changed, USASOC prepared, staffed and often implemented major shifts in contingency plans to cover all other theaters and operations if a crisis should break out in the world outside CENTCOM.⁶⁴ At the same time, as the MACOM with its own doctrinal and training base, USASOC evaluated its long-term needs and identified how those needs would be satisfied. DESERT SHIELD focused USASOC's attention and synchronization efforts on problem areas which up until that time had been only theoretical.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN THE GULF WAR

Army Special Operations Forces played a critical role in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM even though much of those operations relied heavily upon conventional force. Although a small portion of the force (slightly over 1 percent of the total forces in theater--around 7100 soldiers), Army Special Operations

⁶⁴One such plan which was partially implemented was the activation of the 20th SFG(A) in January 1991. The 20th Group, a National Guard Special Forces Group, was moved to Fort Bragg, tested, validated and prepared for possible deployment. The 7th SFG(A) provided most of the evaluators. The 20th SFG(A) only sent a few personnel overseas to Turkey to assist in Provide Comfort. The Group inactivated in May 1991.

Forces carved out a unique niche on the battlefield.

One of those unique roles lay in accompanying coalition forces on the battlefield. Shortly after their arrival in theater, two battalions of the 5th SFG(A) began working with and training Kuwaitis, Saudis, Egyptians and Syrians. They helped reconstitute the Kuwaiti army from a handful of volunteers to form four brigades of light infantry, an armored brigade, a motorized brigade and a commando battalion in the finest tradition of Special Forces trainers worldwide. They developed new techniques and worked patiently with the Saudis and Egyptians to teach them how to use close air support, how to avoid fratricide and how to fight in an NBC environment. They even provided training on armored warfare and urban combat. Special operations forces also provided critical but low-key support to the Kuwaiti resistance. When the coalition forces launched their ground attacks, 109 SF teams accompanied each battalion, brigade and division of the Pan Arab force. Army SOF can take a great degree of pride in taking the theoretical promise of coalition warfare and turning it into a working reality. The coalition warfare ideas learned in this operation must be used to augment current doctrine on Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

In another mission area, SOF personnel worked jointly with the Air Force to develop better combat search and rescue (CSAR) techniques for the expected heavy losses of allied planes and aircrews in the air war. That those heavy losses never occurred is immaterial: if they had been needed they would have been ready. The superbly trained aviators of the 3rd Battalion of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, working with Air Force Special Operations, developed the procedures and techniques for staying on strip alert, for plotting courses to downed pilot locations through a host of enemy radar and ADA, and for maintaining ground security (thanks to 5th SFG(A) personnel on board the helicopters) during the pickup. Using these well-rehearsed techniques, Army SOF aviators rescued one F-16 pilot from certain captivity or death.

In a more traditional vein, 5th, 3rd and 10th Group personnel (amply supported by the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion) planned, prepared and conducted Special Reconnaissance (SR) missions deep behind Iraqi lines. These missions included searches for high value enemy strategic targets, lines of communication and command and control facilities. In addition, SF soldiers tested soil trafficability to assist the coming ground offensive, and provided surveillance of enemy avenues of approach in the U.S. forces sectors for enemy reinforcements. These missions, inserted deep behind enemy lines with the consummate skill of special operations aviators, provided instant, eyes-on-target intelligence to the conventional forces. They performed a mission no one else could and at great risk.

Overall, the Special Reconnaissance teams highlighted the need for better intelligence, better night vision devices and more responsiveness to the needs of conventional units, especially corps. Special Forces use of direct interfaces at XVIII Abn Corps and VII Corps--a Special Operations Command and Control Element and a Special Forces Operational Detachment-B at each corps--was a significant step in the right direction.

In terms of direct action, the involvement of special operations was only a comparatively small portion of SOF operations in theater. In most cases, the risk of sending SF teams deep into enemy territory outweighed the benefit, especially when "smart" munitions often could perform the same job without the corresponding risk. In a series of hasty direct action strikes in Kuwait city against specific buildings, however, SOF proved that intelligence plus resourcefulness can make a significant impact. In addition, SF personnel from the 3rd and 10th Special Forces Groups (assisted by the Air Force, Navy and the 4/17th Cavalry) fast-roped into the unoccupied U. S. embassy in Kuwait City in a dramatic demonstration of SOF assault techniques.

The role of psychological operations' units in theater was also highly significant. The 4th Psychological Operations Group orchestrated a complete plan for theater PSYOP which produced surrender leaflets, made ground and airborne radio broadcasts to sap enemy morale and accompanied US troops with loudspeakers teams. The quantity and quality of US psychological operations is apparent in the approximately 60,000 prisoners taken, the vast majority of whom claimed that they had been influenced by one of the PSYOP media. The countless news photographs of Iraqis holding up their "invitation" leaflets testifies to the high degree of success this unique "combat multiplier" had on the battlefield.

When the battle was over, of course, one critical member of the special operations family was just beginning the "ground war". The 352nd Civil Affairs Command moved quickly into Kuwait City to help the Kuwaitis with the long and painful process of rebuilding their ravaged homeland. The Command had set up a special Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF) in December in Washington to work with our State Department and the Kuwaiti government on reconstruction plans. With the collapse of the Iraqi Army and the liberation of Kuwait, the Civil Affairs personnel faced a challenge not seen by CA units since Korea. While their battle may not make the headlines every day as did the ground war, we should not forget that the ultimate failure or success of our entire policy in the region rested heavily upon their ability to assist the Kuwaitis in rebuilding their country. This would help construct a legacy of trust and respect with our allies in the region. In addition, the tactical CA support provided by the 360th CA Bde, 354th CA Bde, 304th CA Group, 96th CA Battalion and

their subordinate units added immeasurably to the means available to the tactical commander to prevent civilians from interfering with tactical operations.

Finally, it is significant that the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, which was scheduled to be inactivated in 1990, was almost unanimously hailed as being a critical asset to mission accomplishment. Working in an immature theater without doctrinal means to plug into the theater support system (the 5th Special Operations Support Command was not activated before this operation and never reached full capacity), the 528th provided essential support and services with a minimum of personnel. It was a major success story that cannot be overlooked as we reexamined ways to improve our connectivity with conventional support systems while ensuring that our own unique requirements are met through our own channels. Other support assets, especially the 112th Special Operations Communication Battalion, were equally necessary to mission accomplishment in this theater of varied missions and vast distances.

Army Special Operations Forces once again showed their ability to take on any mission, work with any ally and prove that numbers of soldiers are not as important as quality of soldiers. Their unique cultural awareness, tact and patience served us in good stead in a region with an entirely different approach to military problems. Working with Arab forces or penetrating 150 miles behind enemy lines, roping into an embassy or broadcasting news bulletins from airplanes or loudspeakers, rebuilding bridges or blowing up radars, special operators made their unique contribution to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.⁶⁵

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

The nature of Army Special Operations Forces often presents difficulties to a historian working primarily in an unclassified mode. Most Special Operations missions begin as classified missions which lose their classification in some instances after execution. In other instances, the missions remain classified. In many other cases, any discussions of even unclassified missions become classified when discussing vulnerabilities, weaknesses and degree of mission success. There is also a problem of scale. Special Operations Forces have an extremely high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) with individuals, teams and units deployed around the world on a constant basis. No complete listing of Army SOF missions or exercises is possible because of these twin problems of classification and sheer number. The

⁶⁵For more details on Army Special Operations Forces in Operation Desert Storm, see the classified study prepared by the USASOC Directorate of History and Museums in January 1993 (SECRET/NOFORN).

following are some "typical" operations and taskings which affected the DCSOPS in the 1989-92 time period.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS.

The expansion of the U. S. war on drugs did not leave the Army or Army Special Operations untouched. That drug trade consists primarily of four distinct operations: production of the raw drug, processing in laboratories, transporting it into a market, and sale on the streets. U. S. Army Special Operations can have a role in at least three of the four operations; federal forces remain prohibited from internal police operations to intercept drugs or dealers as they are selling their illegal wares on city streets.

Special Operators, by their nature, encourage the development of close working relationships with personnel in foreign countries. Special Forces Operational Detachments-A (SFOD-A) are regionally focused, linguistically prepared and culturally experienced. They can establish fruitful contacts in the military establishments and even local villages of their host country. While specifically prohibited from direct intelligence collection and interference in a host nation's affairs, it is inevitable that teams will obtain information about the local economic situation. In addition, the very mission of Special Forces is often to assist in Foreign Internal Development (FID) which can open up new areas to improvements, better markets and healthier government/citizen relationships. All of this assists in denying the narcotics traffickers the legitimacy and economic leverage with the people which they need to ensure their supplies of drugs. These drug lords too are dependent on the "hearts and minds" of the people who grow their crops, man their laboratories, process their coca paste, guard their runways and provide countless other services. In a similar manner to a counterinsurgency, once a drug lord is cut off from his workers and the workers see that the government is working hard to provide them a better (and legal) life, the criminals will find their business harder and less profitable. FID in many ways has the greatest potential value for Special Operations in that our operators are best positioned to attack the drug trade at the point of origin using their own unique skills to best advantage.

In the shorter run, USASOC has also begun working with Joint Task Force 6 and elements of the Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In conjunction with the BORTAC (Border Tactical force), USASOC has begun orchestrating the dispatch of special reconnaissance teams to work on federal land to observe overland drug smuggling avenues of approach. While still a small operation at the end of calendar 1992, indications are that Special Forces teams, working with civilian law enforcement and border control teams, can obtain valuable

training in reconnaissance and night operations while assisting in counternarcotics border control operations.

REACTIVATION OF THE 3RD SF GROUP.

In addition to organizing major command and major subordinate command headquarters, USASOC was able to assist 1st SOCOM (later USASFC) in reactivating another Special Forces Group (Airborne). The 3rd SF Group Headquarters was activated on 29 June 1990 and placed under 1st SOCOM on 1 July 1990. The 3rd Group's 1st battalion was immediately activated from personnel and equipment from the Fort Bragg based former 3rd Battalion, 5th SFG(A) and plans were made to activate the 2nd battalion at the end of FY 91 and the third battalion by the end of FY 92. However, the pressing need to support DESERT SHIELD and still maintain their growing mission load prompted USASOC to begin preparing for the activation of both battalions before the end of FY 91. Crossleveling of equipment and some personnel from other SF Groups was required in order to accomplish this ambitious goal. On 16 October 1991, the 2nd battalion of the 3rd SFG(A) was re-activated, followed by the 3rd battalion on 16 October 1992. For the first time since 1969, the complete 3rd SFG(A) was on the active Army rolls and Special Forces returned to a strength of five active duty groups and four reserve component groups.

HURRICANE HUGO (Virgin Islands Humanitarian Assistance)

In the wake of the devastation of the Virgin Islands by Hurricane Hugo in September, 1989, the National Command Authority directed elements of XVIII ABN Corps (Combined Joint Task Force 140) to restore order on the islands. On 21 September 1989, 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM), provided four Psychological Operations teams (18 personnel) to support the Corps. The teams from 4th PSYOP Group provided public information support, loudspeaker and radio message support to the effort to restore order. The teams stayed for more than three weeks and were an invaluable aide to the Airborne forces in restoring public order.

JUST CAUSE: Panama

Special Forces conducted a number of missions as part of Operation JUST CAUSE, December 1989. The details of many of those missions remain classified. However, three missions may provide a sample of the wide range of jobs that Special Operations Forces can do.

a. Cerro Azul TV Tower: As part of the operation to replace dictator Manuel Noriega with a democratically-elected government, one Special Forces team conducted a mission to prevent Noriega from rallying his scattered armed forces. The

mission was assigned by U. S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). On 20 December, an 18-man Special Forces team from 3rd battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A) was landed near the Cerro Azul television relay station above Panama City. They were accompanied by two TV technicians from the 1109th Signal Battalion. The team was carried to the site by Special Operations aviation helicopters from the 617th Special Operations Aviation Detachment (SOAD). The team members fast-roped to the ground, captured the station and removed several critical parts from the station which prevented its operation. After the combat actions were completed in Panama City, the team returned to the station, secured it again, and replaced the critical parts so that US PSYOP forces could begin PSYOP broadcasts. The team departed the station on 26 December.

b. Pacora River Bridge: A critical element of the USSOUTHCOM plan to secure the Torrijos/Tocumen international airport was for a Special Forces team from 3rd battalion 7th Special Forces Group (A) to prevent reinforcements from the nearby Fort Cimarron from crossing the Pacora River Bridge towards the airport. A 24 man team landed on the western side of the river just at H-Hour on 20 December for Operation JUST CAUSE. They were taken to the LZ by Special Operations and conventional unit helicopters from the 617th SOAD (2 helicopters) and 228th (one helicopter) Aviation Battalions. As the flight of three helicopters flew near the bridge, team members noted vehicles below them. After exiting the helicopters at the landing zone, the team members moved closer to the bridge. One team member stepped into the middle of the road near the bridge and fired his shoulder-fired light anti-tank weapon into the column of vehicles. The convoy was halted. Meanwhile, the team leader contacted a nearby AC-130 (an Air Force Special Operations attack plane) and vectored it onto the convoy. The mini-gun fire from the AC-130 destroyed several vehicles and forced the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) soldiers to flee the area. Only a few firefights were needed to convince the remainder to surrender or retreat. The minimal use of force was enough to accomplish the mission.⁶⁶

c. TORRIJOS/TOCUMEN and RIO HATO: On 20 December, three battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment (A) dropped onto critical targets in Panama to lead the way for the XVIII Abn Corps. The mission was assigned by US SOUTHCOM. First Battalion dropped into the darkness at the Torrijos/Tocumen Airfield and quickly seized the civilian and military portions of the airport. Despite a tense standoff with Panamanian Defense Force soldiers in the main terminal--the PDF members had taken civilian

⁶⁶The After Action Report (AAR) from the 7th SFG(A) suggests, based on the EPW debrief, that this was only the rear detachment. The main body had already crossed the bridge.

hostages--the Rangers neutralized the threat with a combination of diplomacy and direct action. At RIO HATO, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions dropped into withering anti-aircraft fire from an alerted PDF mechanized unit that was stationed there. Despite the fire, the Rangers seized the critical base and airstrip and put the PDF out of action in under 2 hours.

PROVIDE COMFORT:

After the completion of Operation DESERT STORM, United States Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 353rd Civil Affairs Command and 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and the 4th Psychological Operations Group were deployed to Turkey and Northern Iraq on 7 April 1991 for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Other units included the 7th Special Operations Support Command, the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion and the 431st and 432nd Civil Affairs Companies. Their mission was assigned by U. S. European Command (USEUCOM). These units were to prevent the death by starvation and exposure of more than 450,000 Iraqi Kurds who had risen in rebellion against the regime of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. More than 1700 Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel were instrumental in establishing refugee camps, rudimentary sanitary and hospital facilities and distributing food. Operating out of remote and primitive facilities, US Special Operations personnel worked with the local leadership to establish a sense of rapport and trust, which was so critical when dealing with a people as suspicious as the Kurds. The SOF teams prevented mass starvation and death, especially among the thousands of infants. After the situation stabilized, the teams of SOF personnel established waystations with food, medical care and sanitary facilities along the route back into Iraq. The refugees were persuaded to return home along safe routes mapped out by Special Forces teams. PSYOP leaflets with the routes printed on them and warnings about where minefields were located were distributed to the Kurds. The Kurds safely returned to their precarious existence in Northern Iraq. By June 1991, the assigned mission was accomplished and U. S. Army SOF personnel returned to their home stations.

SEA ANGEL:

In May 1991, U.S. Special Forces and Civil Affairs soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and 351st Civil Affairs Command, respectively, joined U. S. Marine Corps personnel in Bangladesh to assist in humanitarian relief operations. A major cyclone hit the low-lying country on 29 and 30 April killing as many as 100,000 people and stranding millions of others on mud-covered, disease ridden islands in the Ganges and Brahmaputra river deltas. Working through U. S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), SOF personnel joined Task Force PRODUCTIVE EFFORT in Bangladesh on 12 May. SOF personnel conducted

invaluable area assessments which allowed the Task Force (soon re-named SEA ANGEL after local comments that helicopters coming from the sea looked like angels coming to their rescue) to focus its aid into the hardest hit areas. Other units joined the Task Force, notably elements of the 364th Civil Affairs Brigade, the 322nd Civil Affairs Group, the 402nd and 413th Civil Affairs Companies and the 4th Special Operations Support Command. By the end of May, the situation had stabilized and the last SOF soldier returned to home station on 3 June.

OPERATION GTMO:

On 27 November, 1991, elements of the 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to assist the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps in coping with a flood of refugees from Haiti. The mission of establishing migrant camps was given to the newly established Joint Task Force for Operation Safe Harbor, shortly thereafter changed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) to Operation GTMO--the abbreviation for Guantanamo Bay. The 96th CA Battalion helped establish and administer six huge tent camps for up to 12,000 migrants. Using translators and carefully chosen local leaders, the 96th CA Battalion personnel, later joined by elements of the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), separated the discordant elements from the peaceful families, coordinated sanitation briefings and mess facilities and established order in the camps. The majority of the migrants were repatriated to Haiti in early 1992, leaving only a few political asylum candidates in place. The operation was still in place at the end of 1992, but at a much reduced level and with only a few Civil Affairs personnel remaining in Cuba.

OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF:

In August 1992, soldiers of the 2nd battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) deployed to Kenya to provide security for relief flights from Kenya to Somalia. They were part of Joint Task Force Provide Relief and they were assigned their mission by USCENTCOM. They provided an airborne reaction force consisting of two armed desert mobility vehicles in C-130s which would circle over the airstrips receiving relief shipments that day in Somalia. They were to provide an armed security force in case of incidents on the ground with Somali armed units or in case they had to protect a downed aircraft crew before a rescue could be arranged. In addition, medics and ground observers accompanied many relief flights into primitive airstrips throughout the southern portion of Somalia to determine local anti-aircraft weaponry, enemy order of battle and general area assessments. In many cases, they were the first U. S. soldiers on the ground in Somalia before the arrival of U. S. forces under the expanded relief operations of Operation RESTORE HOPE.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE:

On 28 December 1992, the Special Forces assets in Kenya were relocated to Somalia and joined Operation RESTORE HOPE, which had been underway since 8 December. They established an Advance Operations Base (AOB) in Belet Uen and, later, a Forward Operations Base (FOB) in Mogadishu. Operating under the Joint Special Operations Task Force (a component of the Unified Task Force), the Special Forces headquarters sent its teams out into the countryside to conduct reconnaissance assessments of the local situation. They assisted humanitarian relief efforts by defusing potentially dangerous situations and by establishing dialogues with various rebel factions. They provided essential, on the ground, order of battle intelligence for the U. S. forces in Somalia. Special Forces also supported the Canadians, Australians, Belgians and other coalition partners. They also identified mine hazards and assisted in planning for any expanded refugee support operations.⁶⁷ In addition to the Special Forces, teams of Civil Affairs planners and area survey personnel were sent to Somalia along with Psychological Operations personnel. PSYOP personnel very early in Operation RESTORE HOPE prepared and distributed leaflets explaining to the Somalis our reasons for being in their country and asking them not to impede the speedy movement of troops and relief convoys. PSYOP personnel also established a radio station and a newspaper to let the people of Somalia know the goals and missions of the US and UN forces in their country. Operation RESTORE HOPE ended on 4 May 1993 with the assumption of authority for relief operations by the United Nations forces (Operation UNOSOM II). However, U. S. Army Special Operations Forces continue to support this follow-on operation as of the end date of this study.⁶⁸

CTC INTEGRATION.

In accordance with the stated goals of CG, USASOC, the Army SOF community is attempting to become more fully integrated with all aspects of Army planning and operations. While rightly maintaining a sense of uniqueness (including unique needs for operations security or OPSEC), Special Operations will continue to make strides in "de-mystifying" its operations. Special operations can make its largest contribution to the Army by speaking the same operational language (or at least being able to translate SOF concepts into recognizable Army terms) and incorporating its plans into current Army contingency and operations plans. This must go even further than a few lines listed in a theater CINC's OPLANS. It includes participation in

⁶⁷One SF trooper was killed by a Somali mine near Balem Bale.

⁶⁸2nd Battalion, 5th SFG(A), Executive Summary- Operation RESTORE HOPE, n.d.

the staff process and the staff training process at all levels. Army SOF must retain its own special skills and procedures--they cannot be extended to the Army as a whole without diluting and weakening its standards--but those skills must be made available to support the conventional Army's plans in a timely and useful manner.

As part of this initiative to ensure that SOF has its place in Army councils, USASOC has increased the number of teams being sent to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, AR.⁶⁹ The JRTC is the "Low Intensity Conflict/Light Forces Operations" counterpart to the heavy force National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. Using laser devices and sophisticated computers, units at the JRTC practice their craft in an environment which is the nearest thing to war currently available. In addition, USASOC has assigned several personnel to the permanent staff at the Combined Arms Center's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth. BCTP is an elaborate battlefield simulation that teaches division and corps commanders and their staffs how to synchronize their actions in accomplishment of their wartime mission. It is essential that SOF be represented during these "dry-runs" as staff participants and as observers/controllers to ensure that due consideration is given at the division and corps level to unconventional warfare.

Relocation of the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG(A)

In August 1990, the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG(A), was relocated from Fort Davis, Panama, to Fort Bragg, NC to join the rest of the Group. Headquarters, 3-7th SFG(A), its support company (-) and companies A and B were returned to the US, leaving only C Company and a small support slice still in Panama.

MOVE OF 10TH SFG(A) FROM FORT DEVENS, MA TO FORT CARSON, CO.

On 12 April 1991, the Secretary of Defense announced the recommendation to close Fort Devens, relocate the 10th SFG(A) (-) to Fort Carson, CO, and provide \$51.2M for construction of permanent facilities for the 10th SFG(A) (-). In a 31 May 1991 Fort Carson facilities update, CG, USASOC indicated his desires and set planning in motion to attempt to relocate the 10th SFG(A) (-) in the summer 1992. The design expenditure (\$121,800) was approved and funds transferred. USASOC Prepared a relocation Concept Plan, which was signed and distributed 2 August 1991 to USASFC, HQDA and USSOCOM.

On 10 September 91 the Under Secretary of the Army directed funding for the 10th SFG(A) (-) move come from USSOCOM funds, not

⁶⁹As of the writing of this history, the JRTC is in the process of being relocated to Fort Polk, LA.

the Army: The 15 October 91 OSD PBD #738 indicated that the recommendation to close Fort Devens was predicated on long term savings and that the relocation was not a USSOCOM initiative, but one controlled by the planned base closures of BRAC. As a result, the Army was directed to fund the relocation. On 13 January 92, MG Schroeder, ADCSOPS, Army indicated in a message to CG, USASOC that funding streams did not fit USASOC desired timeliness but that the Army would fund the relocation.

On 29 January 92, CG USASOC responded to MG Schroeder's message identifying his rationale for relocation in FY 92. The message pinpointed ongoing operational commitments, reading of out year budget projections, and the reduction of relocation costs. On 3 Mar 92 personnel from USASOC, FORSCOM, USASFC and 10th SFG(A) met with Omaha District Corps of Engineer (COE) and commenced the verification of scope and cost data of the \$298K UMMC figure. The total cost of the projected move by then, rescheduled for FY 1994, was \$8.753M.

By the end of 1992, plans were far developed for movement into new facilities at Fort Carson for the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 10th SFG(A).⁷⁰

Memorandum of Understanding Between USASOC and FORSCOM

One of the thornier issues resulting from the creation of the MACOM and the separation of funding for the MACOM into the Major Force Program (MFP) 2 (Army Base Operations funds) and MFP 11 (Special Operations funds) lines. While the MFP 11 fundline was meant to cover most operational needs of the command, the Army, and FORSCOM in particular, seemed to believe that MFP 11 funds were an unlimited "cash cow" that should pay for all the needs, including what appeared to USASOC to be base operations, of special operations units on any Army installation. As a result of this dilemma, USASOC and FORSCOM (XVIII ABN Corps' higher headquarters) began hammering out a specific Memorandum of understanding (MOU) delineating specific responsibilities for each MACOM, especially in regards to funding, almost immediately after the MACOM was established in 1990. The MOU attempted to

⁷⁰The 1st battalion was scheduled to remain in Europe. However, the 1st Battalion closed down Flint Kasserne in Bad Toelz in 1991 and occupied new quarters at Panzer Kasserne in Stuttgart. Special Forces had been an integral part of the Bad Toelz community since 1953 when the one-year old 10th SFG(A) arrived in Germany to prepare its mission of conducting guerrilla operations in eastern Europe if the Soviets invaded the West. The departure of Special Forces from Bad Toelz--a common experience of virtually all the "old-timers" in Special Forces--was truly a severing of a link to the past.

establish a cooperative relationship between FORSCOM and USASOC. It recognized mutual responsibilities and set out agreements for effective transition of USASOC to full command and control of all Active Component and U.S. Army reserve SOF in the Continental United States. In reality, the two MACOMs early on discovered that they could not agree on the specifics of this relationship.

The MOU between FORSCOM and USASOC addressed command, coordination and support relationships between the two commands. The final coordinating draft of the MOU between FORSCOM and USASOC was forwarded to FORSCOM on 12 October 91. A meeting between FORSCOM and USASOC to resolve outstanding issues within the MOU was held on 21 November 91. The unresolved issues were:

- (1) Delineation of Base Operations (BASOPS) support.
- (2) Identification of funding responsibilities with respect to Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11).
- (3) Transition of Reserve units from FORSCOM to USASOC.
- (4) Responsibilities for the Ranger Support Elements.

Upon completion of the November conference all unresolved issues were still unresolved.

On 4 December 91, a USASOC level meeting was held to readdress the MOU. All necessary staff agencies had an action officer in attendance. Guidance was given to each action officer to get with their respective counterpart at FORSCOM and come to an agreeable solution and then provide this data to DCSOPS Policy Branch by 13 December 91. The imminent creation of the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) as a Major Command (which did not occur) meant that an additional party wanted to be included as a signatory on the MOU given the involvement of USASOC with Reserve units. Once all problems between USASOC and FORSCOM had been worked out, the MOU was to be sent to CDRUSARC for his review and comments. As of the end of 1992, the FORSCOM and USASOC MOU had not been ratified. However, both commands agreed, in principle, to operate on a daily basis as if the MOU had been ratified.⁷¹

MAJOR EXERCISES AND DEPLOYMENTS

⁷¹FACT SHEET for the Commanding General by MAJ Kass Saleh, AOP-POL, dated 05 October 92. Major Saleh also makes note in his fact sheet of a phone conversation between the CofS, USASOC and CofS, FORSCOM on 30 January 92, it was agreed that neither command will rush the completion of the MOU. The budget problems were seen as too difficult for swift resolution.

Major Deployments 1989-92

1. OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY: Dec 89-Jul 90: 7th SFG(A); 75th Ranger Regiment; 4th POG (-); 96th CA Bn (-); 160th SOA Group (-); 112th Signal Battalion (-); 528th SOSB (-) to Panama.
2. OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM: Aug 90-May 91; 3rd, 5th, 10th (-) SFG(A), 160th SOAR (-), 1/75 Ranger (-), 352nd Civil Affairs Command, 304th CA Group; 112th Special Operations Communications Battalion (SOCB); 528th SOSB; 4 POG (-); 96th CA Bn (-) to SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT.
3. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT I: Apr-Jun 91; 10th SFG(A); 353rd CA Command; 96th CA Bn (-); 8 POB (-); 7th SOSC; 112th Signal Bn (elements); 528th SOSB (elements). TURKEY and IRAQ.
4. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT II: Jul 91-; 10th SFG(A), TURKEY.
5. OPERATION SAFE HARBOR/GUANTANAMO BAY: Nov 91-1993; 96th CA Bn, 2/3rd SFG(A), 501st CA Det.; Haitian Migrant Relief in Guantanamo Bay, CUBA.
6. OPERATION SILVER ANVIL: Apr-May 92, Classified Mission for CINCEUR.
7. OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE: Aug 92, Classified ongoing mission for CINCEUR.
8. OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF: Aug-Dec 92, 2/5th SFG(A) (-), Humanitarian Relief Operations in KENYA and SOMALIA.
9. OPERATION HURRICANE ANDREW: Aug 92-Present; 4 POG, 96th CA Bn, 361st CA Bde, 7th SFG(A), 112th SOCB; Humanitarian Relief Operations in Miami, FLORIDA.

Major Exercises: The following is not a comprehensive list. Hundreds of small mobile training teams (MTT), site surveys, and deployments for training occurred throughout this period. Also not included in this listing are support to JRTC, support to Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), and MTTs and Special Reconnaissance missions in support of the national counter-drug strategy. A complete listing of all of these deployments is available in the USASOC Historical archives but is approximately 300 pages long and is classified. Records before August of 1990 are sketchy at best and are not entirely reliable.

Title	Country	Dates	Units
FUERZAS UNIDAS	URUGUAY	Nov-Dec 91	7th SFG(A)
FUERZAS UNIDAS	PARAGUAY	Apr-May 92	7th SFG(A)
FUERZAS UNIDAS	CHILE	Mar 92	7th SFG(A)
FUERZAS UNIDAS	ARGENTINA	May 92	7th SFG(A)
KEEN EDGE	JAPAN	Jan-Mar 92	12th SFG(A)
COBRA GOLD	THAILAND	Feb-May 92	1st SFG(A), 4 POG, 160 SOAR
ULCHI FOCUS LENS	KOREA	Aug 91-Jan 92	1st SFG(A), 8 POB, 353 POB, 364 CAB, 96 CAB
ULCHI FOCUS LENS	KOREA	Jul-Sep 92	1st SFG(A), 112 SOCB
BADGE TORCH/ BAKER TEPID	THAILAND	Nov-Dec 91	1st SFG(A)
BADGE TRAM	THAILAND	Mar-Apr 92	1 SFG(A)
CABANAS 92	PAN., HONDUR.	Feb-Jun 92	7th SFG(A)
BADGE MERAH	MALAYSIA	Jan-Jun 92	12th SFG(A), 112th SOCB
BALIKATAN 91	PHILIPPINES	Dec 91	19th SFG(A)
IRIS GOLD	KUWAIT	Nov-Dec 91	5th SFG(A), 8 POB, 96 CAB, 404 CAB
FOAL EAGLE 91	KOREA	Sep 91-Jan 92	1st SFG(A), 160 SOAR
TRADEWINDS 92	LANTCOM	Apr-Jul 92	3rd SFG(A)
INHERENT FURY	BAHRAIN	Feb - May 92	5th SFG(A), 8 POB, 96 CAB, 404 CAB, 160th SOAR
TANDEM THRUST/ KNIFE BLADE	KOREA	Jun 92-Sep	12th SFG(A), 19th SFG(A)
INDIGO DESERT	QATAR	Apr-Jun 92	5th SFG(A), 8 POB, 96 CAB, 404 CAB
OCEAN VENTURE	LANTCOM	Apr-May 92	3rd SFG(A)
BLUE VENTURE IV	PERU	Jun-Nov 91	7th SFG(A)

E. LOGISTICS.

1. Responsibilities. The USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) is the Commanding General's principal staff advisor on logistics plans, policies and procedures. He plans and coordinates combat service support to the command, develops staff logistical estimates and prepares the logistics portions of all USASOC Operations Plans or Orders. He also serves as the monitor of the Materiel Management Center (MMC).⁷²

2. Organization. The office of the DCSLOG is divided into four principal divisions: Logistics Plans Division, Logistics Management Division, Logistics Policy and Services Division and the Materiel Management Center.

3. Key Personnel.

DCSLOG	(1989-90)	COL R. John
	(1990-94)	COL J. Dunigan
	(1994-	COL T. DeLuca

4. Key Events.

a. The Materiel Management Center: As a MACOM, one of USASOC's key functions is the long term procurement and management of materiel. While procurement involves combat developments, doctrinal development and funding considerations, maintaining and monitoring materiel readiness is another battle entirely. Before the creation of the MACOM, with Special Operations Forces scattered throughout the army under a variety of materiel control, it could truthfully be said that no one in Army SOF could be sure what equipment was on hand, what was really needed, and where it was. With the incorporation of all Army Special Operations (with the exception of the National Guard) into one MACOM, the time was judged right for the development of a management tool to cut waste and ensure greater efficiency in the struggle for materiel readiness. The result was the establishment of the Materiel Management Activity (MMA) later changed to the Materiel Management Center (MMC).

The MMC is a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of DCSLOG USASOC, capable of property accountability, and readiness management. It originally was created to "develop and maintain authorized stockage list (ASL) and contingency stockage" while being "responsive and supportive" of the Major Subordinate Commands in

⁷²USASOC Reg. 10-1, p. 9-1.

the execution of their materiel and readiness responsibilities.⁷³ However, the final MMC structure would not support the development or maintenance of an ASL for command because "that capability wasn't built in sufficient quantity."⁷⁴ Its job was not to replace the materiel responsibilities of the MSC commanders but to assist and enhance their control over their own equipment.

The MMC is manned by supply and materiel professionals who can provide invaluable expertise to USASOC commands. The MMC can also provide, for the first time, a command-wide view of all the equipment on hand, ordered and in the system while providing snapshots of the readiness of such equipment across the board. Using automation, the MMC was able to identify, within months of its activation, almost \$15 million of excess property within the command of which \$14.2 million of the same property was short somewhere else!⁷⁵ The lateral transfer of such excess equipment resulted in tremendous savings since units did not have to order that "short" equipment. The MMC has already proven a valuable management tool to the command in effectively managing the 19 billion dollars worth of assets under its control.

b. Equipment Fielding of the 3d Special Forces Group(A): The Headquarters, Group Support Company (GSC) and the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) were activated on 1 July 1990. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between USASOC and U.S. Army Troop Support Command (TROSCOM) was not established to support these unit activations. The Management responsibility for the residual items from the unit activation of HHC and GSC was transferred to the unit PBO on 28 October 1991.

A MOA between USASOC and TROSCOM was signed on 24 October 1990 for the activation of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd SF Group. As per MOA and established milestones, the 2nd Battalion was activated at C-3 readiness level on 16 October 1991. The availability of communications equipment was the major shortfall. However, through the efforts of out of DAMPL (DA Master Priority List) fielding, redistribution and cross-levelling, the battalion was provided all its necessary items. The MOA for the activation of the 3rd Battalion was signed on 4 November 1991. The

⁷³Memorandum, AOLO-MMA, dated 30 March 1990, Subject: Revised Materiel Management Activity Implementation Letter of Instruction.

⁷⁴Note to the Historian, 22 January 1991 from Colonel Dunigan, DCSLOG, USASOC.

⁷⁵FACT SHEET [for the Commanding General, USASOC], AOLO, dated 3 Oct 1990, Subj: USASOC Materiel Management Activity (MMA).

activation date for this last battalion was 16 October 1992.

The problems encountered with the fielding of equipment to the 2nd Battalion were not duplicated in the fielding of equipment to the 3rd Battalion. Desert Storm was not a factor on equipment availability and SINGARS was scheduled to be fielded by DAMPL sequence in the March/April 1992 time frame. The battalion activated at well beyond the minimum required C-3 readiness level.

According to the DCSLOG action officer, TROSCOM, in its role as Army Materiel Command (AMC) Executive Agent for ARSOF equipment readiness, and the other AMC Major Subordinate Command commodity managers, were "very energetic" in support of the Total Package Fielding of the 3rd Special Forces Group.⁷⁶

c. Installation Deployment Support Element (IDSE) and Ranger Support Element (RSE). The deployment of forces for DESERT SHIELD/STORM from FORSCOM installations that host Ranger elements surfaced a significant logistic concern relative to IDSE and RSE support for Ranger deployments. For example, the deployment of the 24th ID necessitated FORSCOM to contract for the equipment requirements to support potential deployment of the 1st Ranger Bn at Hunter Army Airfield.

An agreement between USSOCOM AND FORSCOM stated that FORSCOM installations hosting Ranger Battalions would continue to provide Isolation Facilities to prepare, deploy, and recover redeploying Ranger Elements. However, funding for SOF peculiar requirements relative to IDSE and RSE support would continue to come from USASOMcC. In addition, USASOC continued to plan that the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB), if fully manned and resourced (estimated in FY 95) would perform Ranger support functions such as the RSE Fly Away Package, and CONUS/OCONUS REMAB (Ranger Marshalling Base) Mission.⁷⁷

d. Theater Army Special Operations Support Commands: The TASOSCs are subordinate functional commands of the Theater Army (TA) which provide the vital link between the TA and Theater Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) units. The TASOSC ensures that the TA meets its administrative, support, and sustainment responsibilities for ARSOF. The TASOSC has no operational mission and does not layer itself between the Special Operations

⁷⁶FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Mr. Richardson, AOLO-P, Subject: Equipment Fielding of the 3rd Special Forces Group (A), dated 15 Nov 1991.

⁷⁷FACT SHEET for Commanding General, by Mr. Ladner, AOLO-P, Subject: Installation Deployment Support Element (ISDE) and Ranger Support Element (RSE) date 15 November 1991.

Command (SOC) and theater ARSOF.

The TASOSC mission is to plan and coordinate the support and sustainment of theater ARSOF conducting Special Operations (SO). ARSOF command relationships are theater-specific and situation-dependent. The TASOSC commander exercises command of all assigned or attached Army forces, less OPCON of these ARSOF under the OPCON of the theater SOC (or another service, joint, or combined command). The TA commander may expand the scope of the TASOSC responsibilities, within his capabilities to resource it.

Although TASOSC missions are basically the same, command and control in each Theater is somewhat different:

1. 7th TASOSC (EUCOM), exercises command less OPCON of theater ARSOF and is OPCON to the theater SOC, and is authorized 99 personnel.

2. 4th TASOSC (PACOM), operates as a Support and Sustainment Headquarters is OPCON to the theater SOC, and is authorized 49 personnel.

3. 6th TASOSC (LANTCOM), exercises command less OPCON of theater ARSOF, and is aligned with XVIII Abn Corps not TA. It is OPCON the theater SOC, and is authorized 17 personnel.

4. 3rd TASOSC (SOUTHCOM), exercises command less OPCON of theater ARSOF and is OPCON to the theater SOC and is authorized 49 personnel.

5. In the 5th TASOSC (CENTCOM), a staff study was underway in 1991 to determine if 5th TASOSC were required and how best to utilize it. Current feelings are that ARCENT should retain the TASOSC and use it as Staff Augmentation to TA Headquarters. It was under the command and control of the Theater Army G3 and authorized 17 personnel.⁷⁸ At the end of calendar year 1992, the TASOSCs were still evolving into mature entities in the theaters.

e. Development of Combat Service Support for SOF Activities capable of providing SOF with austere support in immature theaters: SOF missions in the near term and the foreseeable future will involve activities in areas where theaters do not have sufficient CSS on the ground nor assets to deal with SOF peculiar/low density requirements. From the time of SOF employment until the theater can assume a full support role, a contingency support plug will be required to fill the

⁷⁸FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Mr. Ladner, Subject: Theater Army Special Operations Support Command, dated 15 Nov 1991.

gap. A contingency oriented CSS element capable of flexible tailoring in support of SOF missions and able to work in a environment where OPSEC is a great concern was required.

The element under development in the 1990-92 period was planned to provide SOF with the flexible support required to insure mission accomplishment in geographic areas where no current support structure exist or could be established in appropriate time frames. The concepts outlined in the ARSOF CSS study for support of Army SOF were approved by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army after a briefing on 27 June 91. USSOCOM, working with CASCOM, proposed building the 528th SOSB during FY 93-95 using additive end strength and will try to go to DOD for such authorization.

The Special Operations Support Bn (SOSB) TOE was approved by TRADOC and DA on 18 Mar 92. By the end of FY 93, resourcing from USSOCOM was planned to build up the SOSB from 250 soldiers in FY94 Baseline to 565 in FY96. One Forward Support Company was unfunded, based on a USSOCOM decision to change the mission to support at only One Regional Contingency.⁷⁹ The downsizing of Army forces, underway at the end of 1992, made the expansion of the 528th SOSB, despite its obvious mission utility, an unlikely prospect.

f. Special Operation Forces (SOF) Sustainment Planning Factors: The USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis (JMA) process identified the lack of SOF sustainment planning factors as a deficiency adversely affecting the quality of SO planning. As a result of the JMA process, USASOC DCSLOG was tasked to develop Army SOF Sustainment Planning Factors.

USASOC DCSLOG requested assistance from the MSCs to ensure their participation in the collection of logistics sustainment data during the period January - December 1992. USASOC DCSLOG also requested Combined Army Support Command (CASCOM) assistance in developing validated planning factors to sustain ARSOF operations throughout the operational continuum. CASCOM agreed to provide technical assistance in the development of ARSOF sustainment planning factors. The command also CASCOM demonstrated the utility of Requirements Determination Templates (RDTs) and received USASOC DCSLOG concurrence that RDTs would be used to disseminate current and future ARSOF sustainment planning factors.

On 27 January 92, DCSLOG held a conference to brief the SOF Sustainment Factors study objectives, methodology and milestones.

⁷⁹FACT SHEETS for Commanding General, by LTC Geiger, Subject: Development of Combat Service Support for SOF Activities (Long Term), 15 Nov 1991 and 6 April 1992.

CASCOM briefed the purpose, functions, and advantages of the RDTs and provided USASOC personnel Line Item Numbers (LIN) and rate lists for USASOC units. CASCOM also provided RDTs to all units and assisted the units in loading the RDTs to computers.

During 1992, USASFC and USACAPOC collected sustainment data during ARTEPs, Exercises, SF validations and deployments with submission to USAJFKSWCS and CASCOM. Beginning in 1993, USAJFKSWCS and CASCOM were to analyze and refine the collected data.

Once USASOC concurs with the data provided, it was to forward a joint CASCOM/USASOC memorandum, initiated by CASCOM, through HQ TRADOC, to HQDA/ODCSLOG, recommending that the revised rates be approved, and included in the Logistics Data Base (LDB), and distributed to USASOC units.⁸⁰

g. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) War Reserves: In July 90, HQDA DCSLOG tasked the United States Army Logistics Evaluation Agency (USALEA) was tasked by HQDA ODCSLOG to conduct an evaluation of combat service support capabilities for ARSOF units deploying to overseas theaters. One specific area of the analysis was the adequacy of war reserves to support combat sustainability for ARSOF units.

The result of the analysis justified the development and acquisition of a war reserve stockpile to enhance readiness and sustainability. USALEA developed recommendations for implementing this proposal. In Oct 91, a USASOC DCSLOG representative visited the DA DCSLOG War Reserves Division, to discuss the war reserve development process, and DA/MACOM responsibilities relative to war reserves development. USASOC DCSLOG also forwarded a letter to the DA DCSLOG requesting funding clarification with regards to MFP-11 and MFP-2 funds utilized for acquisition of war reserve materials.

The development of ARSOF War Reserves was a new initiative in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process for the MACOM. The DCSLOG developed an incremental SOF-unique item profile based on 10/20/30 percent of total value of the LEA recommendation. It did not include the cost data for secondary items for the listed Class VII materials. This profile was developed to determine the projected costs of the program.⁸¹

⁸⁰FACT SHEET for Commanding General, by Mr. Parker, AOLO-P, Subject: Special Operation Forces (SOF) Sustainment Planning Factors (Long Term), dated 5 Mar 1992.

⁸¹FACT SHEET for Commanding General, Mr. Andrews, AOLO-P, Subject: Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) War Reserves (Long Term), dated 5 March 1992.

F. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.

1. Responsibilities. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Resources Management (DCSRM), "plans and directs fiscal resourcing of all Active and Reserve Special Operations Forces. Provides advice and guidance to the CG, staff, and major subordinate commands (MSC) on all areas of resource management."⁸² He is the principal advisor to the Commanding General on budgeting, budget execution, accounting and financial management systems, management improvement systems and resourcing methods.

2. Organization. The DCSRМ, as of 31 December 1992, had four divisions: Program, Policy and Guidance (PP&G) Division; Budget Division; Management Division; and the Funding and Accounting Division. Planning and programming personnel, formerly part of DCSRМ from 1989-92, were withdrawn as part of the functional realignment of the command in Oct 1992 and moved to the new (as of October 1992) Force Development and Integration Directorate.

3. Key Personnel.

DCSRM	(1989-90)	COL E. Daniels
	(1990-93)	COL C. Broadhurst
	(1993-	COL W. Henglein

4. Key Events.

a. During a 1990 interview with the then Deputy Commanding General of USASOC, BG William Garrison, he was asked about what was the accomplishment of the command during its first year with the greatest long term consequences. BG Garrison stated unequivocally that it was the entry of USASOC, and thus all of Army SOF, into the POM (Program Objective Memorandum) process. Active participation in the POM process helps ensure that funding for Special Operations programs are planned for the "out-years" (the five years beyond the current Command Operating Budget or COB). Thus, special operations has matured to the point where it can manage not only its own yearly budget estimate submission, but also plan and program for the future. It now has an entry point into the DOD and DA funding systems to project and manage its long term fiscal requirements. By careful management of its place in this process, USASOC can ensure a much higher degree of fiscal stability in weapons procurement, personnel

⁸²USASOC Reg 10-1, p. 10-1.

levels, programs and operations.⁸³

b. Another critical element of resourcing was the entry of USASOC into the Major Force Program (MFP) 11 system. Under agreements with DOD, DA, USSOCOM and FORSCOM, most Army SOF operational needs are now met by MFP-11 funds. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) provides overall supervision of SOF funding including MFP-11 and non MFP-11 funding. This does not mean that all funding comes through MFP-11. All Army requirements (Base Operations, Army non-operational items) are still supposed to be funded through DA programs. However, operational funds come through MFP-11. During times of cutbacks, the position of Army SOF was greatly enhanced by having a major role in the Special Operations funding program. This did not insulate SOF from all cuts (BASOPS funds from DA are essential in running any Army headquarters or unit), but it helped ensure that the cuts which occurred did not cripple SOF's continuing operational requirements.

c. USASOC Management Studies/Surveys Program: Studies are analytical examinations of procedures, organizations or systems to identify needed improvements and provide alternative solutions for more efficient/effective use of resources to accomplish assigned missions. The products of such studies should include recommendations for more efficient and effective use of resources (personnel, funds, facilities, time and equipment). The source of the data for the planned studies are the Command Group, Staff Sections, Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) of USASOC and Internal and External Audit Reports or Inspections.

The dramatic reductions in funding from the creation of the MACOM through the end of 1992, with every indication that they would continue, made essential the more efficient use of resources essential. With a host of other constraints on resources, the study program was a valuable tool to the command in streamlining procedures and obtaining maximum utilization and benefits from all resources.

DCSRM completed the following studies, approved by the Chief of Staff, FY92.

(1) Management Assistance Study regarding decentralization of USACAPOC fund control and financial support to subordinate units.

⁸³Interview by the author of BG William Garrison, then Deputy Commanding General of USASOC, at Fort Bragg, NC, 10 December 1990.

(2) Organization/Functional Study to research redundancies that exist between USAJFKSWCS Combat Development functions and the USASOC Staff System Manager/System Officer roles and responsibilities.

The planned studies and survey program was a program with potentially long-term benefit to the command. Additional studies were for FY 93 and 94 included a Warehouse study, Stock Fund study and Force Modernization Management Milestone study.⁸⁴

d. Internal Management Control (IMC) Program: Internal Controls are procedures adopted by organizations to safeguard all resources (money, equipment, supplies, materials, time and personnel), assure accuracy and reliability of information, assure adherence to regulations, and promote efficiency and economy in the use of resources.

Effective 1 October 90, the USASOC Internal Control Systems Program was transferred from the US Army system to the DoD Internal Management Control (IMC) Program. USASOC continued to use the Army IMC publications to administer the program throughout 1991 and 1992. The only changes were in the reporting format. USASOC submitted reports instead of to USSOCOM.

The Army Management Control Plan (MCP) identifies those Army subtasks that require formal internal control review checklist evaluation and a five (5) year schedule for those evaluations. Internal Management Control Managers (at least one (1) for each USASOC staff section, MSC, and MSU) use DA checklists in their day to day operations and conduct formal reviews using these checklists in accordance with the MCP. This program is currently under restructuring to ensure that internal controls are in place in every functional area within USASOC down to the unit level.⁸⁵

e. Total Quality Management (TQM): The TQM Quality Education System (QES) training/education began in 1991 and was completed on 5 Dec of that year. The QES was a 20 hour course conducted 2 hours each week for 10 weeks (each session had multiple classes.) followed by sustainment training. The command required QES training/education to be attended by all USASOC HQ Staff personnel.

⁸⁴FACT SHEETS for the Commanding General, by Mrs. P. Stewart, AORM-MA, Subject: USASOC Management Studies/Surveys Program (Long Term), dated 5 March and 5 August 1992, modified by History Update dated 17 March 1994 from Mrs. P. Stewart.

⁸⁵FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Mr. R. Goad, AORM-MA, Subject: Internal Management Control (IMC) Program (Long Term) dated 1 Nov 91.

Initially, seven Quality Improvement Teams (QITs) were established to plan and implement the Quality Improvement Process for USASOC HQ. Each QIT prepared a Charter for Chief of Staff approval to delineate membership, relationships, responsibilities, and planned activities. A charter was submitted for the following QITs in 1992:

- (1) Cost of Quality QIT - chaired by COL J. Dunigan (DCSLOG)
- (2) Quality Awareness QIT - chaired by COL N. Smith (DCSINT)
- (3) Education QIT - chaired by COL Broadhurst (DCSRM)
- (4) Recognition QIT - chaired by COL Chavez (DCSPER)⁸⁶

TQM training was completed almost on schedule and some of the quality improvement teams were established and met to discuss their roles in instituting TQM throughout the command. However, after this initial interest, command support for the program waned and the teams stopped any regular meetings. The principles of TQM--involvement of all levels in a commitment to quality, use of quantification tools to prove the "cost" of non-conformance as an aid to obtaining the necessary resources and the recognition of the important of all members of a team to generating new solutions to problems--were valid and useful. However, much of external mechanism of executing a full, assembly production-line oriented, program were generally too cumbersome for most command sections to use and the teams fell into disuse. Active participation in TQM was suspended in late 1992 and early 1993.⁸⁷

f. Productivity Capital Investment Program (PCIP): The PCIP program was designed to fund capital investment of equipment, tools, and facilities. The command received in excess of \$900,000.00 in FY 1991 alone. USASOC received in the neighborhood of \$546,778 in FY 92. This money helped support numerous unfinanced requirements for the MACOM and MSC/MSUs. Despite the success of the program, HQ DA decided to discontinue

⁸⁶FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Mr. R. Goad, AORM-MA, Subject: Total Quality Management (TQM), dated 5 March 92.

⁸⁷As of the preparation of this report, USSOCOM has directed that TQM be "rejuvenated" and restructured into a more military oriented program to enhance command-wide participation. Comment by Mr. R. Goad to the Historian, 17 March 1994.

the program at the end of FY 93.⁸⁸

g. Procurement Actions: Any command faces the challenge of tracking the spending of the command over multiple years for long range projects. This spending can be divided into three major areas: general management funds (office equipment, civilian pay, training, etc.), procurement of equipment, and research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E). It is very difficult to analyze the flow of funds within any command: any attempt is little more than a snapshot of spending at any one time. However, the following two charts summarize the spending status of USASOC towards the end of the 1992 Fiscal Year in the two areas of procurement and RDT&E.⁸⁹

Chart 3: PROCUREMENT OBLIGATIONS

FY 92 Status

PROGRAM TITLE	PROGRAM	OBLIGATIONS	% OBLIG
Commo & Electronic Equip	58.557	9.271	15.8
MH47/MH60 MOD	320.714	198.585	61.9
Individual Wpn Ammo	1.479	0	2.4
Pyro Demo	3.337	0	0
Small Arms & Wpns	2.064	0	0
Psyop Equip	1.500	0	0
Misc Equip	28.946	0	0
TOTAL FY92	416.597	36.867	49.8

FY91 status: 207.756

PROGRAM TITLE	PROGRAM	OBLIGATIONS	% OBLIG
MH47E ADV DEV	25.500	0	0
MH60K ADV DEV	73.900	68.661	92.9
Rocket, Hydra	1.400	1.400	100.0
RAAWS Ammo	7.245	7.214	99.6
Commo and Electronic Equip	20.496	16.663	81.3
Small Arms & Wpns	.180	.123	68.3
Miscellaneous Equip	.561	.561	100.0
TOTAL FY91	129.282	94.622	73.2

⁸⁸FACT SHEET for Commanding General, by Ms. M. Dumais, AORM-MA, Subject: Productivity Capital Investment Program (PCIP) FY 92 Projects (Near Term), 5 August 92.

⁸⁹FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Ms. L. Rebello, AORM-BUR, Subject: Procurement Obligations as of 30 Jun 1992 (Long Term), 5 Aug 92.

FY90 status:

PROGRAM TITLE	PROGRAM	OBLIGATIONS	% OBLIG
4TH PSYOP Group	9.076	9.065	99.9
SOF Items Less Than \$2M	.689	.689	100.0
SOF MOD Radios	21.811	21.776	99.8
Multifunction Radar Transp	2.175	2.175	100.0
SOF Aircraft MODS	200.207	200.207	100.0
SOF Aircraft MODS Adv Proc	125.894	121.716	99.9
SOF Weapons	1.892	1.892	100.0
RAAWS Ammo	3.698	3.698	100.0
TOTAL FY90	365.442	365.218	99.9

Chart 4: RDT&E Obligations as of 31 May 1992⁹⁰

FY92 status:

PROGRAM TITLE	PROGRAM	OBLIGATIONS	% OBLIG
Special Ops Aviation	28.071	.153	.5
Airdrop	1.108	.696	62.8
Commo	1.983	.727	36.7
Munitions	9.819	9.048	92.1
Weapon System Dev	.129	.044	34.1
PSYOPS	2.434	.165	6.8
Clothing & Equip	.350	.125	35.7
TOTAL FY92	43.894	10.958	25.0

FY91 status:

PROGRAM TITLE	PROGRAM	OBLIGATIONS	% OBLIG
SOF Commo	2.907	2.245	77.2
Fire Control/ Mini Multiband Beacon	4.054	3.843	94.8
Mobility	.187	.187	100.0
Air Drop/Cloth & Equip	1.799	1.787	99.4
Munitions	13.456	13.432	99.8
Special Ops Aviation	17.800	12.116	68.0
TOTAL FY91	40.203	33.610	83.6

h. The MFP-11 program is, in essence, a separate funding line that comes to USASOC from DOD through USSOCOM. While any definitive statement on exactly how much Operations and Maintenance money was spent for command throughout the 1989-92

⁹⁰FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Ms. L. Rebello, AORM-BUR, Subject: Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) Obligations as of 31 May 92 (Long Term), 5 August 92.

period would be impossible, a snapshot of the status of the expenditure of MFP-11 funds at one point in time might be useful. For example, at the end of FY 91 O&M, Defense (MFP-11) Program status was as follows (in thousands of dollars):

Chart 5:

	<u>AFP</u>	<u>OBLIGATION</u>	<u>BALANCE</u>	<u>OBLIGATED (PERCENT)</u>
HQ, USASOC	19,494	19,491	3	100.0
AOSI	103,626	103,616	10	99.9
USASF CMD	42,628	42,592	36	99.9
USACAPOC	2,070	2,070	0	100.0
USAJFKSWC	29,605	29,605	0	100.0
FORWARD DEPLOYED	10,688	10,682	6	99.9
USAREUR*	3,004	3,004	0	100.0
USARPAC*	3,475	3,472	3	99.9
USARSO*	3,889	3,887	2	99.9
DET K*	289	288	1	100.0
6TH SOSC*	31	31	0	100.0
PM SOA*	14,274	14,274	0	100.0
AMC	1,077	1,077	0	100.0
TOTAL	223,462	223,407	61	99.9

*A MEMO ENTRY

For comparison, a chart of the status of FY91 OMA (MFP-2, 5, & 95) Programs is provided:

Chart 6:

	<u>AFP</u>	<u>OBLIGATED</u>	<u>BALANCE</u>	<u>OBLIGATED (PERCENT)</u>
HQ, USASOC	3,473	3,432	41	100
AOSI	142	142	0	100
USASF CMD	3,325	3,325	0	100
USACAPOC	177	177	0	100
TOTAL	7,117	7,076	41	99.4

The command also received reimbursement for specified overseas deployments as follows:

Chart 7:

	<u>REIMBURSEMENT</u>	<u>OBLIGATED</u>
DESERT SHIELD/STORM	20,929	20,938
PROVIDE COMFORT	2,125	2,125
FIERY VIGIL	3	3
TOTAL	23,057	23,098 ⁹¹

h. Reserve Components (RC) Source of Funding for USASOC Reserve Component Units. Few problems have troubled USASOC more than issues resulting from reserve component units. Most personnel within the MACOM have never dealt with reserve component units. Even those who had, had never dealt with the host of MACOM level issues on which they now had to work. Reserve Component funding was no exception to the rule. The following information was prepared as a fact sheet for the Commanding General in mid-1992 to attempt to clarify some of the issues resulting from funding (MFP-11) for RC units.

Major Force Program (MFP) 11 funding is provided to USASOC through two appropriations: Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA) and Operation and Maintenance, Defense Agencies (OMDA). Coordination on distribution and reporting on execution is provided to OCAR via USASOC. RPA funds flow from OSD to OCAR and then to USASOC. USASOC distributes funds for pay and allowances to SOF units Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS). OMDA funds flow from OSD to USSOCOM to USASOC. USASOC distributes funds for O&M expenses to SOF unit allotment holders via PBAS. For National Guard units, MFP 11 money is provided through National Guard Personnel, Army (NGPA) and OMDA. NGPA funds flow from OSD to NGB. The NGB distribute this money to the nine SOF States finance and accounting sections. The states' finance offices insure pay and allowances funding for SOF training. OMDA funds flow from OSD to USSOCOM to USASOC to NGB.⁹²

i. The drawdown of forces affected RC as well as active funding. As a result, in FY92, Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA) pay suffered a shortfall that affected USASOC units. The Program Optimization Budget Evaluation System (PROBE) Management Decision Package (MDEP) Detail listing of 30 Apr 90 distributed

⁹¹FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Joyce F. Lane, DCSRM, Nov 1991.

⁹²FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by MAJ D. Young, AORM-BUR, Subject: Reserve Components (RC) Source of Funding (Long Term), 5 Aug 92.

by HQDA provided \$29.295M for SOF RPA in FY92. The PROBE for 9 Nov 90 reduced the above amount to \$17.24M. A subsequent PROBE issued on 11 Mar 91 provided only \$16.001M. This was a critical reduction in RPA dollars which would have had a serious impact on the command's reserve component units. With the exception of Annual Training, all the Commands' activities would have been adversely impacted, with MOSQ and Operational Training being among those hardest hit.

The DCSRM's first action was to contact USSOCOM and HQDA (OCAR) to resolve the funding shortfall. They met with no success. The shortfall problem was next elevated to contacts between DCG, USASOC and the Deputy CINCSOC and later, between CG, USASOC and CINCSOC.

The FY92-93 USACAPOC Budget Estimate Submission (BES) validated \$27.388M in requirements for its major subordinate units (MSUs). This figure was subsequently reduced to \$25.174M. OCAR agreed to restore \$3.5M which it had withdrawn from the USASOC FY92 RPA AFP. The restored funding increased AFP by \$3.5M, less \$.229M withheld for Retired Pay Accrual. Initial RPA fund distribution received from HQDA included the \$3.271M for a revised AFP of \$19.272M, \$18.9M of which was made available to CONUS USAR SOF.

USSOCOM attempted to reprogram \$4.2M to RPA from OMDA after the appropriation was signed. It submitted a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict on 29 January 1992 supporting that reprogramming. In addition, the command moved to reprogram some of the \$60 million of DESERT STORM funds owed to the command from DA to go towards the shortfall. These efforts failed and by August of 1992, USASOC was forced to submit some \$7.196 million of unfinanced requirements to OCAR. The Command had to cancel a number of counterdrug training, operational training, refresher/proficiency training and career development training programs for the reserves in 1992 as a result of this problem.⁹³

j. USSOCOM Program Objective Memorandum (POM):
As part of the POM process for FY 94-99, USASOC was to consolidate, review and prioritize all Army Major Force Program 11 input to USSOCOM during the POM build. USSOCOM built the POM in three phases -- baseline, disconnects, and new initiatives. Budget estimate submissions and resources programmed in the President's Budget formed the basis for developing the FY94-99 POM baseline.

⁹³FACT SHEET for the Commanding General, by Mr. J. Miller, AORM-BUR, Subject: FY 92 Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA) Shortfall (Long Term), 5 Mar 92; Ibid., 5 Aug 92.

The USSOCOM SOJ8 initially allocated target Total Obligation Authority (TOA) to the components equal to 90 percent of the TOA continued in the President's Budget (to include MILPAY which was submitted to OSD in February 1991). Components competed for the remainder of their TOA. This total decrement had a significant impact on the build of the program in that there was no anticipated reduction in force structure. In that 100 percent of the authorized military positions was funded in the USASOC baseline, USASOC's total operating budget for FY 92 was decremented 20-30%.

The DCSRM developed the USASOC POM inputs for the 94-99 POM in increments representing levels of effort within each Special Operations Decision Package (SODP). Standard increment definitions were used for consistency with Army Management Decision Package (MDEP) increments. Increments approved by the USASOC Command Group identified acceptable resourcing alternatives to the CINCSOC, SECDEF, and Congressional committees during subsequent program decision reviews.⁹⁴ The resultant POM was submitted on schedule to USSOCOM for delivery to OSD. The POM will serve as the major programming document for the command to the close of the century.

⁹⁴FACT SHEET for Commanding General by Jennifer Doyle, AORM-PP, Nov 91.

G. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT.

1. Responsibilities. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management is responsible for advising and assisting the Commanding General and staff on information management in the tactical/theater, strategic and sustaining base areas. In addition, the DCSIM implements the command's Information Resource Management Program to include:

a. Developing and maintaining an internal headquarters and MACOM-wide information resource management program that implements the Army's Information Management programs and provides guidance and direction to subordinate organizations.

b. Conducting and maintaining a formal Information Requirements study (IRS) and associated mission and information analyses at the headquarters necessary to determine information requirements, to develop information models and to execute those analyses.

c. Providing automation systems, mail, distribution and records management support to USASOC and the MSC.

d. Coordinating for telephone and message support for USASOC and the MSC.

2. Organization. As of the end of 1992, the office of the DCSIM consisted of an administration office, a command and control division, a plans, programs, policy and studies division, a communications security division, a theater/tactical division, a strategic sustaining base division, a program resources division, an information services division (with records management, printing and publications and mail distribution branches) and, after the reorganization in October 1992, four forward support teams (one for each MSC).⁹⁵

3. Key Personnel.

1st SOCOM DCS IM	(1987-88)	LTC Frank Stump III
	(1988-89)	LTC Steven S. Sawdey
MACOM DCSIM	(1990-92)	COL K. Witt
	(1992-)	COL F. Klinck II

4. Key Events. The Office of the DCSIM was critical to the original decisions revolving around the ability of a small MACOM staff to command and control a world-wide Special

⁹⁵USASOC Organization and Functions Manual, USASOC Regulation No. 10-1, 2 April 1990.

Operations community. In an interview with one of the architects of the MACOM--Colonel Mercer "Mac" Dorsey--one of the key decisions, in his opinion, was that command and control of the disparate active duty and reserve Special Operations community was only possible with the small staff in question by the thoughtful use of the newest automation capabilities.⁹⁶ SOFNET (Special Operations Forces Network) was to be an important part of those capabilities. However, better use of data bases and automated intelligence sharing systems (SOCRATES) were also vital elements. Automation, as a tool for managers, would help tie together the widely scattered active and reserve assets of the command.

The Office of Information Management thus found itself an important player in developing new automation initiatives, buying new equipment on a large scale and working closely with USSOCOM to create SOFNET and work on creating a classified SOFNET. Its work, as the MACOM stood up, was seemingly never ending as offices moved, lines were re-done, new computers purchased, old ones phased out and as the entire command went through at least three major reorganizations. Each of these reorganizations resulted in an increased load of automation requirements. Some of these requirements in the 1989-92 period included:

a. In FY 1988, the 1st SOCOM Automatic Data Processing Division began the long-term process of establishing a command-wide data network called the Special Operations Forces Network (SOFNET). This was a network which would mature, over time, into a wide area network (WAN) capable of handling classified and unclassified data. Using the contracting vehicles of SRI International (until 1990) and SSDS (beginning in 1993), SOFNET (eventually called ASOCNet) was a multi-year project which was budgeted at \$9.5 million for research and development and \$5.8 million for sustainment as part of five one-year options. Full scale implementation and deployment of the network, which currently serves major command nodes as an unclassified E-Mail system, is expected in FY 1996.⁹⁷

b. Produced USASOC Regulation 25-2, Information Mission Area Modernization Plan in August 1992. This regulation outlined procedures and guidance for preparation of the command's Information mission area modernization plan in accordance with AR 25-1. DCSIM produced another important document produced in USASOC Circular 25-91-2, User's Group and Information Officer, dated 20 September 1991. This established the Command

⁹⁶Interview with Colonel Dorsey, then departing Chief of Staff, USASOC, 27 July 1990, Fort Bragg.

⁹⁷Information Paper, AOIM-CC, by Mr. Treneman, 17 March 1994, Subject: Army Special Operations Command Network (ASOCNet).

Information Mission Area Users' Group and the requirement for the designation of Information Management Officers (IMOs) for each staff element within USASOC. The DCSIM further published USASOC Circular 25-91-1 which established a Command Information Management Steering Committee (CIMSC) effective 24 April 1991. The CIMSC was made up of a representative of each directorate and MSC Chief of Staff but never met due to controversy over the "top heavy" nature of the body.⁹⁸

c. In July 1990, a new unit was activated to support USASOC's Information Management Area (IMA) functions and additional missions not compatible with standard DOIM functions. US Army Information Systems Command-Army Special Operations Command (USAISC-ASOC) was activated effective 1 July and the DCSIM for USASOC was dual-hatted as the Commander of the unit and the DCSIM. A new concept plan for the organization was drafted two years later with a proposed E-date of 1 October 1992. On that date, all USAISC-ASOC authorization were transferred to FORSCOM Information Systems Command to be documented on the 112th Signal Battalion (Fort Bragg's Signal Battalion).

d. On 1 October 1992, USASOC functionally realigned its information management assets, which increased the number of DCSIM personnel by 23 positions. These positions were divided up, in part, into Forward Support Teams to provide support to USASOC's MSCs which lost their assigned information management personnel to the MACOM. The DCSIM further reorganized and created the Command and Control Division and the Plans, Programs, Policies, Concepts and Standards Division.

e. The DCSIM provided printing, publication, copier, and mail and distribution and message services to the command. It prepared numerous regulations, staff directories, routing guides, and correspondence guides.

f. Collected, sorted and retired documents relating to Desert Shield/Storm.

g. Provided the Command with COMSEC services and obtained secure and unsecure telephone service from the 1112th Signal Battalion.

⁹⁸Information Paper dated 15 March 1994, Subject: DCSIM History 1987-92, prepared by AOIM-PP, in the USASOC History Archives.

H. ENGINEER.

1. Responsibilities. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer, has special staff responsibility for providing advice and assistance to the Commanding General and staff on all engineering matters. He develops concepts, plans and policies for engineer support of USASOC. The DCSENGR monitors base operations accounts, supervises and coordinates master planning, engineering, construction, operations, maintenance, and repair of buildings and other structures, and manages the command's Military Construction, Army (MCA) and Unspecified Minor Military Construction (UMMC) projects.

2. Organization. The DCS Engineer office consists of the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer, an Engineer Division, a Facilities Division and a military Engineer Division.

3. Key Personnel.

DCSENGR	(1989-92)	MAJ (P) R. Cantwell
	(1992-)	LTC F. M. Cain III
ADCSENGR	(1989-)	Mr. A. Parker

4. Key Events.

a. ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. One of the advantages of being a MACOM with virtually total management over its own finances, is the authority to analyze military construction requirements and plan for how to remedy construction shortfalls. Most construction projects need several years to plan, put out for bids and build. Thus, in its first year of activation no such large projects were completed. However, the groundwork had been laid for a number of major construction projects. Among these projects which were exempted from the 1990 DOD construction moratorium were:

- A flight simulator for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment at Fort Campbell, KY.

- An new hanger for the 160th SOAR at Fort Campbell.

- An interim special operations training facility at Fort Bragg, NC.

- An ADP facility at Fort Bragg.

In addition, several key projects were not exempted from the moratorium, but planning continued on the expectation of construction over the next five years. These projects included a new Command and Control Facility for USASOC (placing the headquarters of USASOC, USACAPOC and USASF C under the same roof),

an underwater operations training facility at Key West, FL, a SOF Medical Training Facility, new facilities (estimated at \$42M) for the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Carson, CO, and a company operations/supply facility at Fort Bragg.

Other major projects have included:

-The wind tunnel (Military Freefall Simulator).

-New headquarters for 3rd SFG(A).

-New headquarters and motor pool facilities for the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and 112th Signal Battalion.

New projects for the future included a new headquarters complex for the 4th Psychological Operations Group and their subordinate battalions and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. In total, USASOC has over \$90 million of military construction projects programmed for FY 92-97.⁹⁹

b. US Army Reserve Facilities: With the assumption of full command and control of USAR units in October, 1992, USASOC found itself with major construction and/or renovation responsibilities for its USAR units. A survey of the problems as of November 1991 listed a number of projects needed for upgrade of USAR SOF facilities.

As of November 1991, USAR SOF units occupied more than 80 reserve centers in 33 states. SOF units were the sole occupants of about 10 centers. In some cases SOF units were the predominant users, but in most locations the SOF units were small tenants. Most reserve centers nation-wide were old and overcrowded.

The USAR had only 53 percent of the facilities in 1991 that it needed to support the Reserves. Leases helped to reduce the deficit but were not enough. RC funding was being reduced and the situation was growing worse for all the USAR units. In addition, conversion to the L-series MTOE severely aggravated the crowding problem at most reserve centers occupied by SOF.

In 1991, six reserve centers were managed by the 351st CA CMD. All other centers occupied by SOF were controlled by the Army Reserve Command responsible for the area.

A number of SOF units faced severe problems. Some of the difficulties are listed below by location:

⁹⁹FACT SHEET [for Commanding General], AOEN, 4 Oct 90, Subj: Summary of Military Construction.

1. Newburgh, NY. 1st BN(-)/11th SFG (A) was the sole occupant of a decrepit ex-chemical factory. The USASOC DCSENGR worked with the Corps of Engineers to lease a suitable facility. The Command identified and assigned a priority to the unit.
2. Norristown, PA. The 358th CA BDE and 416th CA CO were the sole occupants of a center scheduled to be renovated and expanded as part of a FY 91 MCDA project to be awarded in 1991.
3. Riverdale, MD. The 352d CA CMD, 354th CA BDE and 450th CA CO were sole occupants of a crowded and noisy center. An MCDA project for expansion of the center is planned for FY 98.
4. Youngstown, OH. B/2/11th SFG (A) was a tenant in a badly overcrowded center. An old Naval Reserve Center next door was available to expand into, but FORSCOM had not budgeted for the \$60,000 start-up costs or the \$45,000 annual costs for BASOPS.
5. Reynoldsburg, OH. HQ and SPT CO/2/11th SFG (A) were sole occupants of a leased facility that was too small. The 246th POC was a minor tenant in a leased facility in nearby Columbus, OH. The USASOC DCSENGR staff worked with Reserve engineers to identify a leased facility at an airfield to support the SOF units and some Reserve aviation units.
6. Arlington Heights, IL. HQ and SVC CO/12th SFG (A), 1st BN(-)/12th SFG (A), 305th POB and 93d SDC occupy an old Nike site. The facilities were much too small to support their needs. An MCDA project to renovate two of the buildings and replace the rest was planned for FY 94, but was not funded.
7. St. Louis, MO. The 10th POB, 18th and 307th POCs were tenants in an overcrowded facility. An MCDA project to build a center for their sole use was planned for FY 98.
8. Belton, MO. The 418th CA CO, 308th POC and A/1/12th SFG (A) were tenants in a crowded, converted Air Force BX. An MCDA project to build a center for their sole use was planned for FY 96.
9. Hamilton Army Air Field, California. The 3d BN(-)/12th SFG (A) lost its facilities to Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). New facilities for the unit were designed for the Reserve enclaves at Hamilton AAF, CA. The DA BRAC office agreed to consider funding the increased L-series MTOE requirements (approximately \$2,000,000).
10. Portland, OR. The 364th CA BDE and 20th POC were sole occupants of a crowded center. The A/3/12th SFG (A) occupied two WWII wooden buildings at an Air National Guard base. An MCDA project to consolidate the three units was planned for FY 98.

FORSCOM projects that will support SOF units were at various stages of design or execution as of 1992:

- | | | |
|-----|----------------|--------------|
| (1) | Bronx, NY | 351st POC |
| (2) | Ft Jackson, SC | 360th CA BDE |
| (3) | Morgantown, WV | 16th POC |
| (4) | Knoxville, TN | 489th CA CO |
| (5) | Ft Lewis, WA | 448th CA CO |

In conclusion, many USAR SOF units were and are in badly overcrowded facilities. Conversion to the L-series MTOE only aggravated the crowded conditions. Projected inactivation of some units in the 1994-95 time frame promised some long-term relief from over-crowded facilities, but the exact extent of that inactivation was still uncertain at the end of 1992.¹⁰⁰

c. K-Span Building Capability: The need for a flexible and inexpensive building capability within the command led the DCSENGR office in 1991 to request the purchase and fielding of K-Span Automatic Building Machines (ABMs).

The fielding of K-SPAN ABMs was completed in late 1991. The fielding was as follows:

- | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------|------|------|
| (1) | 1st Special Forces Group (SFG): | 2 ea | ABMs |
| (2) | 3d SFG: | 2 ea | " |
| (3) | 5th SFG: | 2 ea | " |
| (4) | 7th SFG: | 2 ea | " |
| (5) | 10th SFG: | 2 ea | " |
| (6) | USAJFKSWCS: | 1 ea | " |
| (7) | 528th SPT BN: | 2 ea | " |

Fielding of K-SPAN Insulation Machines included two per SFG (A) and one in the 528th SPT BN (A). This machine gave the user the ability to create an environmentally controlled interior for storage buildings in a garrison environment or when deployed to an overseas, bare-base environment.

USASOC also purchased a training package with the ABMs. Training from MIC Industries was held on 18 - 22 November 1991 at Ft Bragg, NC. Training consisted of the construction of two K-SPAN buildings on the Green Ramp of Pope AFB, NC. However, by the end of 1992, the contract for spare parts had still not been awarded due to a legal problem.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰Fact Sheet for Commanding General, no author, AOEN, SUBJECT: U. S. Army Reserve Special Operations Forces (USAR SOF) Facilities (Long Term), dated 18 November 1991.

¹⁰¹FACT SHEET for Commanding General, by SFC Monaghan, AOEN, Subject: K-Span issues (Short Term), date 8 October 1992.

Using the K-Span machine, the following facilities were constructed in 1991 and 1992:

1. Covered rigging facility at Fort Benning, GA.

2. Covered rigging facility at Fort Stewart, GA.

In addition, other facilities in Korea were undergoing cost estimation by the close of the calendar year.¹⁰²

d. Military Construction Program: A summary of major military construction projects undertaken by USASOC DCS Eng as of November 1991 provides an idea of their scope of work.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>		<u>PA (\$M)</u>	<u>% COMPL</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
BRAGG	TAC EQUIP SHOP COMPLEX	13.000	99	OCCUPANCY: 15 NOV 91	
BRAGG	ACADEMIC FACILITY	16.249	79	OCCUPANCY: 15 JAN 92	
BRAGG	GP & BN CMD & CTRL FAC	17.000	98	OCCUPANCY: 5 NOV 91	
BRAGG	FREEFALL SIMULATOR	4.995	68	OCCUPANCY: 1 APR 92	
BRAGG	INTERIM SPEC OPS CMLX	0.997	50	OCCUPANCY: 28 FEB 92	
BRAGG	CMD & CTRL FAC	21.000	0	OCCUPANCY: 1 NOV 94	
CAMPBELL	SOF FLIGHT SIMULATOR FAC	2.550	0	OCCUPANCY: 1 NOV 92	
CAMPBELL	ACFT MAINT HANGER (AVUM)	7.900	50	OCCUPANCY: 9 JUL 92	
CAMPBELL	CLS FACILITY	0.690		AWARDED: 25 SEP 91	
BRAGG	CO OPNS & SUPPLY FAC	2.400		100% DSN; CWE: 2.824K, AWTG AUTHORIZATION FOR BID OPENING FROM OCE	
BRAGG	SOF BN & CO OPNS FAC	6.000		100% DSN, RESITING FOR REDCOCKADED WOODPECKER	
KEY WEST	SPEC OPNS TRNG CMLX	8.500		BID OPNG: 11 JUL 91, AWD CWE: \$11.842, REPROGRAM REQ'D	
NORRISTOWN	USARC ADD/ALT	2.598		LOW BID 127% OF PA BID OPNG: 23 SEP 91 AWD CWE \$3.036 SEEKING FUNDS	
STW(HAAF)	SOF BN HQS FACILITY	1.800		FINALS REQUESTED	
STW(HAAF)	SOF TAC EQUIP SHOP	3.000		BID OPNG: 6 SEP 91, 8(A), LOW BID 127% OF PA	
BRAGG	USAISOMT	17.000		35% DESIGN	
CAMPBELL	AIFS STORAGE BUILDING	0.300		90% DESIGN	
CAMPBELL	SOF CMD/CTL FACILITY	5.800		75% DESIGN	
CAMPBELL	SOF TRNG & RECRUIT FAC	3.500		35% DESIGN	
CAMPBELL	SOF BN HQTRS BLDGS	4.350		35% DESIGN	
CAMPBELL	SOF SYS INTEGRATION FAC	1.940		35% DESIGN ¹⁰³	

¹⁰²Ibid. All the SF Group had been alerted, at the end of 1992, of the possibility of sending their K-Span machines to Florida to assist in the Hurricane Andrew Relief operation.

¹⁰³FACT SHEET for Commanding General, Mr. Lucas, AOEN, Subject: The Military Construction Program (Long Term), 18 Nov 1991.

I. STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

1. Responsibilities. The USASOC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) has special staff responsibilities to provide legal advice and support to the Commanding General and his staff. The office of the SJA is responsible for the Commanding General's exercise of General Court-Martial authority and his inherent review and supervisory authority over subordinate commands. He also plans, supervises, and coordinates organization, staffing, and training of USASOC reserve component legal personnel and units in coordination with the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve.

2. Organization. The SJA office is organized into an administrative office, an international and operational law section, an administrative/contract law section, a trial counsel section and a reserve component law section.

3. Key Personnel.

SJA	(1989-93)	LTC T. Lujan
	(1993-)	LTC H. Heffelfinger

4. Key Events.

a. Determining Courts-Martial Convening Authority for SOF: The proliferation of commands at Fort Bragg in the 1989-92 time period--US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC), and US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC)--led to some confusion about the exact delineation of Courts-Martial Convening Authority. To clarify matters, the office of the SJA put together the following summary of the problem.

The Commanding General, USASOC, and the Commanding General, USASFC, both exercise General Courts-Martial (GCM) Convening Authority. Generally, the Commanding General, USASOC, exercised supervisory and appellate authority over military justice matters for SOF. For example, the Commanding General, USASOC, would act on appeals from Article 15s imposed by the Commanding General, USASFC.

The Commanding General of USASFC had the authority to convene GCMs for all USASFC units at Fort Bragg: the 3d SFG(A), 7th SFG(A), 112th Signal Bn, and 528th Support Bn. However, the Commanding General, USASOC, exercised GCM convening authority for all soldiers, including Special Forces soldiers, assigned to the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, all soldiers assigned to HQ, USASOC, and those soldiers attached to HHC, USASFC, the 96th Civil Affairs Bn, and the 4th POG.

The Commanding General, USACAPOC, a Reserve Component

General Officer, was determined not to have GCM convening authority. AGR soldiers assigned to USACAPOC were attached to XVIII Airborne Corps for Military Justice. RC soldiers, in USACAPOC units at installations other than Fort Bragg, fell under the jurisdiction of their respective AR 5-9 support installations.¹⁰⁴

Other legal convening authority was determined as follows:

1. For AC SOF units at installations other than Fort Bragg; i.e., 1st, 5th and 10th SFGs; 75th Rangers; and 160th SOAR, GCM remained with the respective installation commanders.

2. Special Courts-Martial Convening Authority was to be exercised by group/regiment and separate battalion commanders.

3. Summary Courts-Martial Convening Authority was to be exercised by battalion commanders.¹⁰⁵

b. Legal Aspects of SOF Personnel on Counter-Drug Missions: SOF personnel are frequently involved in counter-drug missions in support of civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) both in CONUS and abroad. In order to ensure that SOF personnel remain strictly within the law, the SJA summarized some of the legal considerations of support to civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA).

The Secretary of Defense, in providing support to LEAs, is also authorized to conduct valid training exercises or operations for the purpose of aiding civilian LEAs (P.L. 101-510, section 1004, P.L. 101-189, section 1203). Training exercises or operations conducted under this authority in support of civilian LEAs should also provide a meaningful training benefit to DoD personnel. The training goals of any CD mission can be best served by articulating the specific METL tasks and subtasks the operation will enhance. Under certain circumstances, ensuring such a benefit to DoD personnel can allow the training to be nonreimbursed by the LEAs.

SOF support to LEAs inside the United States generally falls

¹⁰⁴On 12 March 1993, outside the scope of this history, the CG of USAJFKSWCS was designated a General Court-Martial Convening Authority by the Secretary of the Army, although his power actually to convene a court martial was withheld by the Commanding General, USASOC. Memorandum dated 1 March 1994 from Office of the SJA, Subject: Data for USASOC Historical Summary.

¹⁰⁵Fact Sheet for Commanding General, by LTC Tom Lujan, Subject: Courts-Martial Convening Authority for SOF, AOJA, 5 August 1992.

within one of the following categories:

(1) Intelligence Analysis. Intelligence analyst support to LEAs is specifically recognized as a category of legitimate support (CJCS Message 190050Z DEC 91). Military intelligence analysts could provide significant assistance interviewing US civilian LEA agents and conducting an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) of the particular locality based on those interviews. However, before intelligence personnel can be used, this use requires the coordination with and approval of the respective service General Counsel and the DoD General Counsel. In no circumstances, can the intelligence personnel collect information on U.S. citizens or U.S. persons (EO 12333). There is no prohibition of using intelligence personnel to train civilian LEA agents to perform intelligence analysis.

(2) Linguistic Support. Military linguists may be used to support LEAs by translating previously recorded conversations. This type of support is based on the underlying assumption that the recorded conversation is a product of a judicially approved wiretap or the LEA had some other legal basis for obtaining it. They may not translate real time conversations (CJCS Message 190050Z DEC 91). In addition, if the linguists are part of the US intelligence community, the approval of the DoD and Army General Counsels is required.

(3) Transportation. Transportation of civilian LEAs is authorized but some restrictions do apply [10 U.S.C. 374(b)(2)(E)(i), Public Law 101-510, section 1004 (as amended), DoD Dir 5525.5, CJCS Message 190050Z DEC 91)]. First, military personnel may not directly participate in civilian law enforcement activities. Second, every attempt must be made to minimize the possibility of armed confrontation between military personnel and civilians. Thus, military assets may transport civilian LEAs to and from an area near (but not into) the LEAs objective area. Costs incurred by the military must be reimbursed by the LEA unless the supported CINC determines that the activity results in a substantially equivalent operations or training benefit to the unit.

(4) Ground Surveillance and Reporting. Military personnel may not perform reconnaissance of any point target; individual vehicles, persons, or groups of persons; pursue suspicious persons or vehicles to provide their continuous coordinates; or perform systemic and deliberate observation of a person by any means on a continuing basis. They may conduct surveillance of an area from a fixed point and report the existence of persons or vehicles that are in or that enter the area. Military personnel may not track (i.e., move from their fixed position) these persons or vehicles in order to provide a continuous "fix" on their whereabouts. (E012333, CJCS Message

190050Z DEC 91)

(5) Equipment. DoD may make military equipment (such as IR, FLIR, NVGs, and secure communications equipment) available (loaned) to LEAs for law enforcement purposes. Equipment can be transferred cost free to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) if the equipment is excess personal equipment, comes from existing stocks, and does not require new expenditure of procurement funds. (10 U.S.C. 372) Some sensitive items may have security restrictions that would affect the transfer. Furthermore, DoD can train the LEAs in the operation and maintenance of this equipment. (10 U.S.C 373) DoD can also maintain and repair equipment transferred to LEAs on a cost reimbursed basis. (10 U.S.C. 374)

(6) Foreign Internal Defense Deployment For Training-Type Support. This could consist of civil affairs support to border communities and training support to local LEAs in such areas as basic firearms training, sensors, breaching equipment, etc. (10 U.S.C 373) The local LEAs could also be trained in PSYOP although foreign military personnel cannot receive such training. PSYOP teams or personnel may prepare a study or handbook of the area of operations for military or LEA use. Such training often results in a substantial benefit to the SOF unit in question, and therefore, would not require reimbursement by the LEA.

SOF CD missions OCONUS are conducted under the auspices of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and other applicable statutes. The extent of these missions is constrained by the above U.S. restrictions and the requirements of the foreign nations requesting our support. Any support provided at the request of a foreign government in excess of that covered below requires National Command Authority approval and CJCS execution orders.

a. SOF units and personnel are provided to CINCs for the execution of approved OPLANS and perform MTTs to host nation countries to assist in operational support and military security assistance in the CD arena, with particular emphasis in the Andean Ridge countries of USSOUTHCOM.

b. Support for OCONUS CD training/support is requested by a CINC through the country SAO and the State Department. A CINC has authority to commit 400 personnel for 179 days in support of these missions. (CJCS Message 190050Z DEC 91) Any support provided to a foreign Drug Law Enforcement Agency (DLEA) must be based on a request from a US federal DLEA.

c. The restrictions on the use of SOF forces OCONUS are basically the same as the CONUS restrictions listed above (especially in the seizure/ apprehension/confrontations with

support in direct tactical support of the operational portions of on-going DLEA/foreign DLEAs operations or of any activities where hostilities are imminent.

d. SOF personnel also have an obligation to monitor and report any human rights violations they observe while deployed overseas.

The complexity of counter-drug support highlights the need to involve unit legal advisors in the concept, planning, and execution of counter-drug missions. Individual teams receive a legal briefing prior to deployment on counter-drug missions. USASOC and its MSC are currently utilizing assigned legal assets to assist in accomplishing counter-drug missions.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶Fact Sheet for Commanding General, by Major D. C. Andrews, Subject: Permissible Actions That May be Taken by SOF Personnel on Counter-Drug Missions (Long-Term), AOJA, 5 August 1992.

J. INSPECTOR GENERAL.

1. Responsibilities. The USASOC Inspector General serves on the personal staff of the Commanding General. He advises the Commanding General on the state of discipline, morale, esprit de corps, efficiency, readiness and economy of USASOC units worldwide. He further receives, investigates, and reports on allegations, complaints, grievances, and requests for assistance by individuals and agencies.¹⁰⁷

2. Organization. The IG office is divided into the office of the Inspector General, the Inspections Division, the Administrative Division and the Assistance and Investigation Division.

3. Key Personnel.

IG	(1989-92)	LTC J. Garfield-Jefferson
	(1992-94)	COL E. Bessent
	(1994-)	LTC G. Frank

4. Key Events. The specific cases undertaken by the USASOC I.G. are sensitive and are not listed in this study. Any specific request for information on the I.G. Office should be directed to that office.

¹⁰⁷Operations and Functions Manual, USASOC Regulation Nol 10-1, 2 April 1990.

K. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE.

1. Responsibilities. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) has personal and special staff responsibility for operational Public Affairs planning and execution. He advises and assists the Commanding General and staff on media relations, command information, and community relations.

2. Organization. The USASOC PAO office is divided into a policy, plans, and operations division, a media/community relations divisions, and a major subordinate command (MSC) support division with liaison cells to USACAPOC, USASFC, USASOIC and USAJFKSWCS.

3. Key Personnel.

PAO	(1988-91)	LTC D. Gersh
	(1991-93)	LTC G. Norton
	(1993-)	LTC K. McGraw

4. Key Events.

a. Support to media queries on a host of special operations mission including Operations Just Cause/Promote Liberty, Desert Shield/Storm, Provide Comfort, Safe Harbor/Guantonomo Bay, Provide Promise, Provide Relief/Restore Hope, Sea Angel, and JTF Andrew, among others.

b. Supporting 44 Blue Productions' "World of Valor" series of documentaries on elite military forces of the world.

c. Supporting Adler Enterprises' production of "Elite Warriors" for Arts and Entertainment network.

d. Preparing informational displays for the yearly AUSA conferences, Special Operations Forces Expositions (SOFEX) and other public relations venues.

e. Obtaining the approval from the World War II Commemoration committee for the designation of USASOC as a World War II Commemoration Community. Activities hosted by the command included attendance at veterans' reunions, coordination of the laying of memorial stones for World War II Special Operations units (OSS Detachment 101, Merrill's Marauders, Ranger Battalions, OSS Operational Groups, OSS Jedburghs, Korean War Rangers, and Special Forces Association) and preparation of a series of articles derived from interviews of World War II veterans.

f. Constant update of the command briefing with

slides, text and videotape.

g. Assisted the PAO office in Los Angeles in the review/production of several major motion pictures including "Toy Soldiers", "Clear and Present Danger" and "You're in the Army Now."

L. CHAPLAIN.

1. Responsibilities. The USASOC Chaplain serves as a special and personal staff officer responsible for matters pertaining to religion, morals and morale as affected by religion. He manages, resources, evaluates and implements the command master religious program and assists in providing for the free exercise of religious faith and practice for all assigned/attached personnel. The Chaplain provides direct pastoral care to the command and installation-wide pastoral support as required. He also provides staff supervision and support to all ARSOF Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) to include staff assistance visits, IG inspection support, annual training conference, small unit training, personnel assignments, personnel actions, resource acquisition and management.

2. Organization. The Chaplain's office was a very small one under 1st SOCOM. It consisted only of a Chaplain, a Chaplain's assistant and an administrative NCO. The creation of the MACOM and subsequent realignment of functions had minimal impact on this office with only the addition of one chaplain.

3. Key Personnel.

Chaplain	(1989-1991)	COL William. Bateman
	(1991-1993)	COL John Flaska

4. Key Events.

a. Provided timely chaplain support to the command.

b. Formulated USASOC Chaplain plans and program development to include input into all command level plans, standard operating procedures (SOP), policy guidance, and SOF peculiar implementation of the Chief of Chaplain's program guidance.

c. Provided a comprehensive religious program for the command.

M. SURGEON.

1. Responsibilities. The USASOC Surgeon is responsible for all health and medical matters pertaining to special operations. He acts as the focal point for all SOF medical issues and advises the Commanding General on the management of all medical personnel. The Surgeon furthers works on plans to improve medical readiness and preparedness for contingencies and emergency deployments. He manages the medical intelligence program for USASOC and supervises the medical training program.

2. Organization.

(a) The current organization was established under the USASOC realignment in 1992. Prior to this, elements of the USASOC Surgeon's Office were located in USASFC and School), and USACAPOC. Under the realignment, the Surgeon's Office staff grew from five members to twenty-eight and now has the ability to provide greater support (e.g., medical intelligence) to the various elements of the command. Medical Intelligence -- the collecting of health, disease and immunization data from around the world -- is extremely critical to the long-term health of our much-deployed soldiers. The Surgeon's Office had the only dedicated medical intelligence staff within any MACOM and along with the other personnel assigned provide up-to-date guidance to command.

(b) The Surgeon's Office is divided into five divisions: medical operations, medical training, preventive medicine, medical logistics, and clinical psychology divisions.

(3) Key Personnel

Surgeon	(1989-	COL A. Meyers
Chief Med NCO	(1987-1992)	MSG T. Fahrenbruck
Chief Med NCO	(1992-	MSG R. Williams
from USASFC		
Chief Med Opns	(1992-	MAJ A. Moloff
from USASFC		
Chief Med Trng	(1992-	LTC R. Sutton
from USAJFKSWCS		
Chief Prev Med	(1992-	MAJ R. Erickson
Chief Med Log	(1992-	MAJ(P) S. Alano
Clinical Psychologist	(1992-	LTC G. Greenfield
from USAJFKSWCS		

(4) Key Events.

(a) EMT-P (Emergency Medical Technician -

Paramedic) Certification Training for 18Ds.

In 1991 and 1992, the USASOC Surgeon's Office helped develop a program to provide 18Ds (Special Forces Medics) training in paramedic skills and receive the ability of these personnel to obtain National Registry recognition as an Emergency Medical Technician - Paramedic. By the close of the year, 18Ds from Special Forces Groups within the Active and Reserve Components had trained on five occasions at the University of Texas, Health Science Center at San Antonio. The Center graduated 106 paramedics, 95 percent of which had been recognized by the NREMT (National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians) as Nationally Registered Paramedics.

Completion of this course awarded the civilian skill identifier, NREMT-P. The program was developed by the USASOC Surgeon's Office in union with the USASFC Surgeon's Office, the Joint Medical Readiness Training Center, the NREMT, and the University of Texas, Health Science Center. The course was designed expressly for the 18D and built upon his previous training and experiences. The course was scheduled to last for ten weeks with one course per training quarter offered to Special Forces 18Ds.

Classes covered a breadth of medical specialties ranging from cardiology and pharmacology to trauma management and pediatrics. Certification of 18Ds as Paramedics was considered advantageous to the military for the following reasons:

(1) EMT-P is a widely recognized skill identifier which will facilitate the 18D mission, worldwide.

(2) It will provide the 18D a "ticket" to civilian medical education facilities and sustainment programs. They will be able to train in skill enhancement programs currently not available in the military setting.

(3) It enhances the 18Ds' capabilities for the (relatively) independent duty status required of FID/Disaster Relief missions in foreign countries.

The 18D EMT-P training program has proven to be a great success. Arrangements were even made to send some trained 18Ds to emergency rooms in major city hospitals--the first being the Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical Service Systems (MIESS) in Baltimore, Maryland--to get extensive training on shock, trauma and other situations that resemble the stress of combat casualties. The EMT-P training program provides great job satisfaction for the 18Ds and, in the words of the USASOC Surgeon, "epitomizes tough realistic training, well aligned with the Medical Mission Task List (METL)."

(b) The MIEMSS Tutorial.

Since 1987, the USASOC Surgeon and MIEMSS had worked on a program for 18Ds, to attend the 18D Traumatology Tutorial at MIEMSS. This eight week program was designed to enhance the abilities of the 18D to care for the traumatized patient. The first 18Ds attended the tutorial in June 1992; they had to be MREMT-Ps prior to attendance at MIEMSS.

This program provided extensive didactic training in procedural skills, laboratory analysis, x-ray interpretation, emergency pharmacology, infectious disease and use of blood products. Graduates will have considerable experience in the management of normal and abnormal wound healing.

18Ds are assigned as Trauma Team members, and participate in surgery, daily rounds and lectures. They and will also be required to complete special research projects.

Pre-hospital ambulance experience in urban and rural environments enhances the 18Ds skills in the management of penetrating and blunt trauma. They also become adept in aeromedical evacuation requirements through association with the Maryland State Police Aviation Division.

Training of this caliber is unavailable through Army facilities. It is in keeping with the principles of "training the trainer" and "force multiplication."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸Office of the Surgeon, Historical Report 1987-92, in the USASOC Archives.

N. INTERNAL REVIEW.

1. Responsibilities. The Internal Review section is responsible for all internal audit and audit compliance activities of the command. The office performs internal reviews of appropriated and non-appropriated fund activities, follows up those audits to ensure corrective action has been taken and develops audit guides and trend data to assist the command. The office also provides the command point of contact for all external audit activities including the US General Accounting Office (GAO), Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency.

2. Organization. The Internal Review office consists of a Chief Auditor, two Auditors, an Audit assistant and a military technician.

3. Key Personnel.

Chief (1989-) Mr. W. Thornton

4. Key Events.

a. Audit of purchases in support of Operations Desert Shield/Storm. The objectives of these audits were to determine if local purchases made in support of the operations were necessary and if they were properly obtained with adequate controls used to insure proper accountability. A follow-up of this audit was conducted by the office in August 1992. All the recommendations made in the 1991 report had been implemented and the audit was closed.¹⁰⁹

b. Audit of .0012 Contingency Funds of the Secretary of the Army. The objective of this audit, conducted in September and October of 1991, was to determine whether these contingency funds for the use of the Commanding General (and often controlled by the Protocol office) were used for their intended purpose, that the obligations and disbursements were valid and that adequate fund controls were used.¹¹⁰

c. Audit of Training Ammunition Management. The objective of this audit was to evaluate the procedures for management, accountability, and control of training ammunition and explosives. IR completed its field work on this audit by April 1992, and submitted a report to the auditees with recommendations for improvement.

¹⁰⁹FACT SHEETS for the Commanding General, 8 Nov 91 and 5 Aug 92, AOIR, William Thornton, entitled Internal Review Actions.

¹¹⁰FACT SHEET, 8 November 1991.

d. Audit of Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW). IR completed field work on the audit of ADSW, a valuable tool for the utilization of Reserve Component personnel, by April 1992. The purpose of the audit was to determine if personnel on ADSW tours were used for the purposes intended.¹¹¹

e. Audit of USAJFKSWCS by the Army Audit Agency. US Army Audit Agency (USAAA) Audit of JFK Special Warfare Center and School began in May of 1992. Specific audit objectives were to evaluate whether: training resources were justified and used effectively; reimbursements for training were properly controlled and billed; training operations, including testing, were done in accordance with training ground rules and doctrine; doctrine and material requirements were based on battlefield functional mission area analysis and reducing operating and support costs; and whether the Army Internal Management Control Program, as it relates to training and doctrine, was effective. The audit was performed from May 1992 to May 1993. There were three findings addressed to USAJFKSWCS on Instructor qualifications, recycled students and bonus recipients.¹¹²

¹¹¹FACT SHEETS for the Commanding General, AOIR, by William Thornton, March and April 1992.

¹¹²FACTS SHEETS for Commanding General, by William Thornton, October 1992 and January 1993 entitled Internal Review Actions and Data for USASOC Historical Summary, AOIR, providing changes and additional data, n.d. in the USASOC History Archives.

O. ADVISORY GROUP.

1. Responsibilities. The Advisory Group provides liaison concerning United States foreign policy, international relations, information policy, special operations and low-intensity conflict, psychological operations, other service doctrine, policy and organization and related matters to USASOC and its MSC.¹¹³

2. Organization. The Advisory Group composed of the offices of the US Information Agency/Department of State Advisory, the Special Advisor, the USAF Advisor, the USN Advisor and the USMC Advisor.

3. Key Personnel.

USIA Advisor	(1989-90)	Mr. Frank Scotton
	(1990-92)	Mr. Frank Strovass
Special Advisor	(1989-93)	Mr. Paul Payne
USAF Advisor	(1989-93)	LTC Schaller
USMC Advisor	(1990-	LTC Alan Anderson
USN Advisor	(-91)	SCPO Mock
	(1991-	CPO C. Harris

4. Key Events. The Advisory Group coordinates liaison with agencies outside USASOC. The Special Advisor worked directly for CG, USASOC in coordinating operational requirements of the command with agencies outside the Department of Defense. The USAF, USMC and USN advisors were functionally realigned under USAJFKSWCS since the majority of their activities concerned the assignment and processing of other services' students attending various USAJFKSWCS courses.

¹¹³USASOC Regulation 10-1, Organization and Functions, 18-1-3.

P. HISTORIAN.

1. Responsibilities. The Command Historian maintains the history of the command, provides historical special studies as required by the operational needs of the command, preserves historical documents of the command and conducts oral history interviews of SOF personnel.

2. Organization. The Office of the Command Historian originally consisted of one command historian with staff supervision over the subordinate historical office of the USAJFKSWCS. In the functional alignment of 1992, the Office changed into the Directorate of History and Museums. It then consisted of the Office of the Director, a History Division and a Museum Division. The responsibilities of the office now include the production of the command history for all of USASOC, providing training materials and classes to USAJFKSWCS, preserving historical artifacts, supervising the Special Warfare Museum and capturing historical data and artifacts for USASOC and its MSC.

3. Key Personnel.

Command Historian	(1990-)	Dr. R Stewart
Director, History and Museums	(1992-	Dr. R Stewart
Assistant Command Historian	(1992-	Dr. S. Sandler
(Previously Command Historian of the USAJFKSWCS from 1985)		
Assistant Command Historian	(1993-	Dr. J. Fischer
Curator, Special Warfare Mus.	(1992-	Ms. R. Merritt
(Previously Curator under the USAJFKSWCS from 1980)		

4. Key Events.

a. The Command Historian deployed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for Operation Desert Storm and returned with historical documents and interviews to prepare a historical report of SOF participation in this conflict.

b. The Directorate established a Special Operations Archive Facility to more effectively preserve historical documents for the command.

c. Began 18 month action plan to accomplish the recertification of the JFK Special Warfare Museum.

d. Revised four two-hour lecture classes for presentation to USAJFKSWCS classes on the History of Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and MTT/FID (Mobile Training Teams/Foreign Internal Defense).

e. Gathered historical data from throughout the

command for classified and unclassified historical studies.

Q. SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTEGRATION.

1. Responsibilities. Provide command and control oversight of 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th Special Operations

2. Organization. Consisted of a small office to provide administrative and logistical support to 75th Ranger, 160th SOAR and Special Mission units.

3. Key Personnel.

Chief	(1989-91)	COL C. Briscoe
	(1991-)	COL J. Haluski

4. Key Events.

Reorganized into the US Army Special Operations Integration Command (Provisional) in December 1991. (See Chapter VII).

Commanding General	(1991-92)	BG H. Davis
	(1992-)	BG R. Potter

R. CONTRACTING.

1. Responsibilities. The Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) is the USASOC Commander's representative in ensuring that the contracting process for goods and services is in strict compliance with the law and Army regulations. The office procures supplies and services for all special operations peculiar missions, reviews all MOUs, MOAs and Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPR) and establishes USASOC policy regarding the interaction between USASOC and private industry.¹¹⁴

2. Organization. The Office of the PARC reorganized into the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Acquisitions and Contracting (DCSAC) in the 1992 reorganization. It consists of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Acquisitions and Contracting, a Contracting Officer, three contract specialists and a procurement assistant.

3. Key Personnel.

Principal Assistant	(1989-90)	MAJ G. Matherly
	(1990-93)	Mr. G. Doyle
	(1993-)	Mr. R. Cherry

4. Key Events.

One function which had to be created in toto for the new MACOM was the establishment of an office with contracting authority. Any MACOM needs to pay particular attention to this fiscally sensitive area. In January 1990, USASOC requested Contracting Activity Authority from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASARDA) in order to support the special operations mission. The commander of USASOC was granted contracting authority in March 1990 and was designated as the Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA). The Office of the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (OPARC) was established to perform this function. In September 1990, only 10 months after the establishment of the MACOM, DA granted authority to USASOC to execute its contracting mission and began executing this authority on 1 October 1990.¹¹⁵

The PARC also prepared and staffed a Special Operations Command Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement in 1991 in accordance with Army policy. The Supplement was approved by the

¹¹⁴USASOC Draft Regulation 10-1 (nd), 6-98.

¹¹⁵Memorandum for USASOC Historian from AOCO (PARC), dated 12 March 1991, Subject: Synopsis of the First Year of Activation of USASOC.

U. S. Army Contract Support Agency (USACSA) in September and distributed throughout the command in October.¹¹⁶

On 26 February 1992, General Carl Stiner, CINCSOC, requested that procurement authority granted by DA be withdrawn from USASOC and granted instead to USSOCOM under 10 USC 167. On 6 April 1992, the Honorable Stephen K. Conner, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition) notified USSOCOM of his decision to concur with General Stiner's request. The official transfer of contracting responsibility took place on 1 May 1993.¹¹⁷

In FY 92, the office of the DCSAC processed 79 contract actions worth some \$461,390. The following fiscal year, the expanded office processed 3,144 contracts worth \$8,282,427.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶FACT SHEET for Commanding General, by Mr. B. Cherry, AOCO, entitled USASOC Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SOCFARS) (Near Term), dated 1 Nov 91.

¹¹⁷Memorandum from Mr. Robert T. Cherry, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Acquisitions and Contracting, 7 March 1994, Subject: Data for USASOC Historical Summary.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

S. Force Development and Integration Directorate.

1. Responsibilities: Advises and assists the Commanding General, USASOC, and staff on all matters pertaining to force development and integration. Plans, programs, evaluates, and systematically manages the process of integrating new concepts, doctrine, training, equipment, and force structure into the Army SOF to sustain and enhance its combat readiness.¹¹⁹

2. Organization: Created in October 1992 with the functional realignment of the command, Force Development and Integration Directorate is organized into six main sections: Concepts and Plans Division, Programming and Analysis Division, Force Management Division, Combat Development Division, Integration Evaluation Division and Management Systems Integration Division.

3. Personnel: The Commanding General of the U. S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School also serves as the USASOC Deputy Commanding General for Force Development and Integration.

Deputy Commanding General for Force

Development and Integration (1992-94)	MG S. Shachnow
Deputy Chief of Staff (1992-93)	COL W. Tangney
(1993-)	COL W. Chrietzberg

4. Key Events: The Directorate was created in October 1992 out of the Force Integration Division of DCSOPS, the Programming and Policy Guidance Division of DCSR and portions of the Combat Developments Directorate of USAJFKSWCS. The goal was to create one Directorate that would combine all the long range planning, programming, combat developments and force development, structure and integration responsibilities of the command. Previous to this alignment, elements of these responsibilities were scattered throughout the MACOM, in different directorates and in portions of other MSCs.

The major accomplishments of the new FDI Directorate in 1992 were establishing the office, documenting the many TDA changes submitted by the command as a result of the realignment and still preparing for future force structure changes, and submitting the necessary programming and planning documents (such as the continuing battle to refine the command's POM) with USSOCOM and DA.

¹¹⁹USASOC Regulation 10-1, "Organization and Functions Manual" (Draft), n.d. [1993]

U. Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs

1. Responsibilities: The DCS for Reserve Affairs (DCSRA), serves as the senior US Army full-time manning officer in the command. He advises and assists the Commanding General on all matters pertaining to US Army Reserve SOF to include the Troop Program Unit (TPU) within USASOC. The DCSRA monitors all USAR activities through direct coordination with the staff and the AGRs at the staff and MSC level. The DCSRA represents the command on policy matters with the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR). He also monitors and reviews the utilization of all USAR SOF personnel throughout the command and reviews all USAR temporary tours of active duty (TTAD) and active duty special work (ADSW) actions for the command. He manages the USASOC individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) program.

2. Organization: The office of the DCSRA, established in 1992, consists of a Liaison Division, an AGR (active guard and reserve) Programs Division and a USAR Plans, Policies, and Program Division

3. Personnel:

Deputy Chief of Staff (1992-) COL D. Doll.

4. Key Events: The establishment of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs late in 1992, growing out of the realignment of the command, was the key event for this directorate during the 1987-92 time frame. The JFK Special Warfare Center had a position of USAR advisor in the early 1980s along with a strong IMA program. During the 1970s, the USAJFKSWC was operating as the senior Special Operating Forces headquarters and maintained many of the programs for supervising the training and operations of Special Operations units. With the establishment of 1st SOCOM in 1982, a Reserve Component Division was established in the AC of S G3 section. This section was headed by an O5 initially (LTC Geoffrey Barker from Aug 83 to Nov 87) and then an O6 (COL Larry Paul from 1987 to 1988 and COL Joe Detrich from 1988 to 1989). During the tenure of LTC Barker in this office, 1st SOCOM, as a deploying headquarters, established an IMA Augmentation Detachment (originally headed by COL G. W. Douglas) to provide USAR officers as backfill to 1st SOCOM when the Command had to deploy soldiers to support the Special Operations Commands in the theaters during exercises.¹²⁰

¹²⁰Conversation with LTC (Ret.) Geoffrey Barker, 12 August 1994. That program, started by LTC Barker who wrote the TDA and mission and obtained the concurrence of then Assistant Secretary of the Army Kenneth Berquist (also a Major USAR who took one of the positions--Deputy G3--in the new detachment), was virtually dismantled by LTC Barker's successor, COL Paul.

With the establishment of the US Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC) in 1989, under the command of BG Joseph Hurteau, all the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) positions which staffed the office migrated to that Command.¹²¹ With the increase in reserve issues resulting from operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM, it rapidly became apparent that the MACOM needed U. S. Army Reserve information just as much as its MSC (USARSOC until 1990 when it became USACAPOC). As a result, both DCSPER and DCSOPS created Reserve Component divisions. However, in 1992, the functional realignment of USASOC, USASFC, USACAPOC, USASOIC (P) and USAJFKSWCS allowed the consolidation of all of the Reserve Component advisors into one office. This facilitated a command wide approach to USAR issues, many of which were new to many active duty staff officers. Several AGR officers remained in various staff elements of USASOC (DCSPER, DCSOPS, DCSLOG, SJA, DCSFDI in particular), but USAR policy issues increasingly became centralized in the office of the DCSRA.

The other key issue--which would involve the time and manpower of the DCSRA, and one which would not be resolved until 1994 and beyond, was the pending inactivation of various reserve component SOF units. Beginning with various high-level USSOCOM decisions to cut the USAR Civil Affairs program by up to 30 percent, the USAR PSYOP units by 33 percent and the USAR and National Guard SF capability by 50 percent, the DCSRA was faced with fighting a series of uphill battles. These high-level decisions were driven by concerns for money, manpower spaces and projected utilization on the changing battlefields of the world. However, many of the decisions were being made without full consultations with Congress, and any astute observer of the Reserve Component world knows that ultimately any cut in RC forces is a political rather than purely a military decision. Attempts by USSOCOM to cut these forces by unilateral cuts in the "out-years" of the POM, were rapidly modified by political pressure. However, by the end of 1992, the office of the DCSRA was no more aware than the rest of the command on the size and type of future USAR force cuts, let alone the exact units to be involved.¹²²

¹²¹Much of the information in this section derives from conversations with SGM (Ret.) DeLay of the DCSRA office, LTC (Ret.) Charlie Aycock, of the DCSOPS office and LTC (Ret.) Geoffrey Barker. I much appreciate their time, interest, and memory of events from their own varied careers as active USAR soldiers.

¹²²As this historical report is being written, the final decisions are being implemented that will inactivate the 11th and 12th Special Forces Groups, both USAR units, along with the 5th

V. Safety

1. Responsibilities: The Safety office ensures that the command fully and effectively implements the Army and USASOC safety and occupational health programs. The office oversees the full range of health and safety programs including vehicle, equipment, aviation, hazardous materials, range, radiation, tactical exercises, systems, family and fire prevention and protection programs. The Safety office develops the plans, policies and directives to implement the program and conducts inspections and surveys to ensure compliance.

2. Organization: The office is headed by a Safety Manager and consists of four safety specialists and a safety NCO. These specialists work together on the general areas of: Safety and Occupational Health, Aviation Safety; Tactical Safety for Airborne, Maritime, Demolition Operations, Live Fire Exercises and Close Quarter Battle; and Safety Plans, Policy and Directives.¹²³

3. Personnel: Director: (1992- Mr. R. Knight)
Sr. Safety Specialist - Roger George
(Primary Area of Focus: Close Quarter Battle)
Safety Specialist - Al Whittekiend
(Primary Area of Focus: Maritime Operations)
Safety Specialist - Kathleen Crawford
(Primary Area of Focus: Occupational Safety and Health,
Radiation Protection)
Safety Specialist - Vacant (Primary Area
of Focus: Airborne Operations)
Safety Technician - Cathy Shank
(Administrative Support, Technical Support in Safety, Budget)
Safety NCO - SFC Ben Lucas,
Administrative Support, Hazard Communication, Fire Prevention and
Protection

PSYOP Group and the 1/245th Aviation Battalion (NG). The decision to inactivate both SF Groups from the USAR rather than one from the USAR and the other from the National Guard was made at the highest levels as part of the "off-site" agreements. Historically, the de facto deletion of the 18 Career Management Field (CMF) from the USAR MOS structure, and the inactivation of both USAR Special Forces units, is an end of a chapter. The 1st Special Forces Regiment was the only regiment in the Army which included Active, USAR, and National Guard units in the same regiment. As of September 1994, this was no longer the case.

¹²³USASOC Draft Regulation 10-1, "Organization and Functions" Manual, n.d. [1993], 5-16.

4. Key Events: The Safety office was formed in 1992 during the functional realignment of the command. The DCSOPS had an aviation safety position working in their Aviation Division from 1989 to 1992, but merged that position with the new safety office upon its creation. The office of the DCSPER performed the function of ground safety and safety for all SOF unique programs (HALO, HAHO, SCUBA) in their Plans, Programs and Policy Division from the moment of its establishment as the MACOM DCSPER on 1 December 1989. All of these functions were merged into the new safety office in October 1992.

The USASOC safety program is managed proactively focusing efforts on areas of high risk training and operations and regulatory compliance. By far the highest risk area is in parachute jumping. Between FY 88 and the end of FY 92, there were 545 injuries and 5 fatalities in parachute incidents.¹²⁴ This is out of a total of 53 fatalities and 1076 injuries from other causes such as PT injuries, tactical movement injuries, privately owned vehicle accidents, weapons and demolition training, fast rope training and skiing and sports injuries. Over half of all accidents in USASOC in a 5 year period were from parachute operations although only about 10% of the fatalities were related to parachutes.¹²⁵

The USASOC safety program maintains visibility throughout the command by developing accident prevention plans and programs directed toward reducing accidents in specifically targeted areas. Aggressive accident prevention programs are currently in place for:

a. Close Quarter Battle. The primary purpose of this program is to conduct annual safety surveys that focus on CQB/AMT training, facilities/ranges and personnel protective equipment; and to assist unit commanders in identifying and reducing related hazards.

b. Maritime Operations Safety. The Safety Office developed command guidance related to diving and maritime operations safety. It coordinated and worked in consonance with the Naval Safety Center to ensure command diving activities conducted operations and training IAW applicable US Navy instructions and USASOC Reg 350-20. The Office also reviewed and

¹²⁴USASOC Safety Office Summary Charts, in USASOC Archives.

¹²⁵Eighteen of the fatalities occurred in aviation accidents including 11 aviation fatalities in FY 89 alone. Other causes of fatalities included motor vehicle accidents (9), weapons accidents (4), scuba accidents (2) and a number of "other" accidents such as lightning, skiing, accidental falls and falling trees.

staffed all tactics, techniques and procedural changes incorporated in emerging guidance.

c. Airborne Operation Safety Survey Program. A program was established to standardize and put into place a comprehensive safety survey program for airborne operations. The program included static line and military freefall tactics, techniques and procedures, to include the safety related aspects of parachute packing operations and rigger facilities.

d. Command Inspection Program (CIP). The Safety Office actively participated in the Special Forces Command Inspection Program: (a compliance program). The safety office inspected those areas which fell under the purview of the safety officer as defined by USASOC Regulation 385-1 and other safety related regulatory guidance. Work place safety programs normally inspected as part of the Standard Army Safety and Occupational Health Inspection Program were inspected as part of the SF Command Program. The goal of the Safety Office is to participate in all MSU level CIPs.

e. Accident Prevention Plan. The Safety office moved quickly to establish an aggressive Accident Prevention Plan. The prevention plan was published to implement the provisions of AR 385-10, USASOC Reg 385-1, USASOC Safety Program Strategy and the Commanding Generals Safety Philosophy. The plan outlined actions for accomplishment by commanders, staff, collateral duty unit safety officers and leaders. It was to assist in reducing accidents and saving lives; it was the "cornerstone" document for the USASOC Safety Program. The Command will review and update the document annually.

f. Accident Statistics. USASOC has averaged one accidental fatality each month for the past five years. This figure does not include the accidental deaths that have occurred during combat operations. Annually, accidental injuries have rendered the equivalent of one ranger company combat ineffective. Besides the lost time and capability the annual cost of these accidents is approximately \$13M (ground and aviation). The vast majority of these losses were preventable. The goal of the USASOC Safety Office is to reduce accidental fatalities, injuries and property damage. A dynamic program tailored to the needs of the command was being generated at the end of 1992 for implementation the following year.

W. Headquarters and Headquarters Company:

1. Responsibilities: Provides command and control, administrative and logistical support to all soldiers assigned to HQs, USASOC, USASFC, and USACAPOC. Moved from Special Forces Command to HQ, USASOC, under the functional realignment in 1992.

2. Organization: The HHC of USASOC consists of a Commander, a Deputy Commander, a Personnel Services NCO, a Training NCO, an Air NCO, a unit supply Sergeant and a Property Book Officer.

3. Key Personnel:

Commander: (1992-93) CPT B. Gieniewski

(1993-) CPT J. Young

Property Book Officer: (1992-) Mr. Lonnie Watson

4. Key Events:

a. Established company standard operating procedures and guidelines to support USASOC with the necessary administrative assistance.

b. Coordinated airborne operations to insure that command personnel retain their jump qualifications.

c. Provided essential supply, weapons qualification, SQT testing, PT testing and other administrative support to USASOC headquarters personnel as the headquarters grew from 8,832 personnel in FY 88 to 25,312 personnel by the end of FY 92.¹²⁶

¹²⁶USASOC Growth, Average Yearly Strength Chart FY 88- FY 93 in USASOC Archives. Compiled by USASOC Safety Office.

IV. US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (USASFC)

I. 1st SOCOM.

1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) was activated, provisionally on 1 October 1982 in response to the U.S. Army's ongoing efforts to provide a more unified and efficient command structure for special operations. A key impetus behind the new command was the perception created in the wake of Desert One's failure that the United States lacked a credible special operations capability. The task of gaining the new organization official command status continued over the course of the following year until the unit activation was complete on 1 October 1983.

Headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the new command effectively divided the training and operational responsibilities of the earlier John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (JFKCENMA) and the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance (USIMA). The new command included Special Forces, Rangers, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs units. Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, the first 1st SOCOM Commanding General, summarized the new command's justification:

This initiative is part of the army's continuing effort to better structure our forces and gear our training and command linkages to achieve maximum flexibility. We have always planned extensively for large confrontations, but we realize that local insurgencies, regional conflicts and terrorist activities--conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum--are our most frequent modern-day experience and expectation...Revitalizing our Special Operations capability to meet this threat will provide the national command authority with options for commitment of forces where use of conventional forces would be premature, inappropriate or infeasible.¹²⁷

1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) assumed command responsibility for preparing and sustaining Special Operations Forces for Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, Psychological Operations, Ranger Operations, Civil Affairs, and other related missions.

¹²⁷USASOC Implementation Plan, Fort Bragg, NC, 1989, 1.

During the first six years of its existence, 1st Special Operations Command underwent considerable growing pains, resulting in an increase in size and responsibility. Special Operations Aviation (160th Special Operations Aviation Group-formerly Task Force 160), Support (528th Support Battalion) and Signal (112th Signal Battalion) units entered the command, adding to its capabilities. During Operation URGENT FURY, elements from the command received their first exposure to combat, acquitting themselves well under fire. The undertaking did, however, indicate continuing problems with the integration of SOF forces into conventional force operations.

In the wake of Operation URGENT FURY, a Senate Armed Services Committee conducted a full staff study on defense organization. The historical record of SOF operations did not escape scrutiny. The committee's findings concluded that "...the capabilities needed to respond to these threats [terrorism, insurgency, and other facets of unconventional warfare] are not the traditional ones of the armed services; (3) the services have a tendency in force planning to focus on high-intensity conflicts upon which resource programs are principally justified; (4) there is a need to coordinate the activities of the services as they seek to develop required capabilities in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; (5) there is a need for innovative thinking and new approaches to these threats..."¹²⁸ To correct problems with command and control, the committee recommended the creation of a new command structure for low intensity conflict and special operations.

In 1986, an amendment to Section 106 of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization directed that Department of Defense review the special operations components of the force structure. In order to provide a "Sense of the Congress" and underscore their intention, the Congress quickly followed the passage of Goldwater-Nichols with the Cohen-Nunn Act which directed that the review be completed within one year.¹²⁹ This provided the impetus for the Secretary of Defense's decision to form the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a new unified combatant command with responsibility for providing "operationally ready special operations (SO), psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs (CA) forces to regional unified commands and for commanding selected missions as directed

¹²⁸As quoted in Colonel William G. Boykin, "The Origins of the United States Special Operations Command," USASOC History and Archives, 5.

¹²⁹Ibid., 4.

by the National Command Authority (NCA).¹³⁰ 1st SOCOM and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School were slated to become the Army components of USSOCCOM as part of a new Army SOF MACOM.


The Secretary of the Army approved the elevation of 1st SOCOM to MACOM status on 27 September 1988 with final approval of the concept coming on 25 August 1989. Redesignated the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Department of the Army activated the new MACOM on 1 December 1989. With the creation of USASOC, the Army found itself better able to provide command and control to all elements of the Army special operations community to include Reserve component special operations forces. The new MACOM continued to maintain responsibility for the missions originally assigned to 1st SOCOM, but in addition gained supervisory responsibility for Army National Guard Special operations force readiness, organization, training, and employment in coordination with the National Guard Bureau and state adjutants general.

As USASOC assumed the higher level staff responsibilities as the SOF MACOM, 1st SOCOM reverted to a new role as command and control headquarters of all active duty SOF units: special forces, civil affairs and psychological operations. (See FIGURE 8: 1st SOCOM in 1987 and on 1 Dec 1989.) The first test of the new 1st SOCOM came with the December 1989 deployment of United States military forces to Panama for Operation JUST CAUSE. The majority of 7th Special Forces Group as well as the 528th Support Battalion and a slice of 112th Signal Battalion deployed as key players in the special operations portion of the attack plan. The significance of special operations to the Army's approach to LIC warfare became increasingly evident as JUST CAUSE transitioned into PROMOTE LIBERTY and the United States military directed its efforts toward helping the new Panamanian government restore order and stability to the country.


Several major changes occurred inside 1st SOCOM's force structure over the course of the year. On 29 June 1990, Department of the Army reactivated 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), last in the force structure in 1969. Personnel from the 3rd Battalion of 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) departed Fort Campbell for Fort Bragg, and formed the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne). In Panama, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces (Airborne) minus C Company closed down their headquarters and returned on 8 August 1990 to join their sister battalions of the 7th Group at Fort Bragg. C Company remained behind as a forward deployed ODB.

¹³⁰Concept of the Operations to USCINCSOC Operational Concept, United States Special Operations Command, USASOC History and Archives, 1-1.

1ST SOCOM (1987)



1ST SOCOM (ON 1 DEC 1989)



In August 1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, quickly crushing all opposition. The successful offensive left Iraq in control of more than 30 percent of known world oil reserves and in position to threaten Saudi Arabia's oil fields. The United Nations decision not to permit the conquest to stand provided yet another opportunity for Special Forces units to demonstrate their value in war. Deployment of 5th Special Forces (A) to SW Asia began in the weeks following the Iraqi invasion as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD. As CENTCOM developed contingency plans for the situation, 3rd Special Forces Group (A) was alerted for possible deployment to the Gulf and the 20th Special Forces Group (A) was told to prepare for possible activation to augment forward deployed units or to assume responsibility for other world wide missions should any other groups end up in Southwest Asia.¹³¹ 20th SFG(A)'s readiness rating made the former mission more likely than the latter as the unit would require an extensive period of training and validation prior to deployment. To prepare for unexpected contingencies that might arise before 20th SFG(A) could be deployed, 1st SFG(A) also received a warning order to prepare units to augment SOF forces SW Asia.


Achieving a functional alignment for ARSOF units came one step closer to reality with the 27 November 1990 redesignation of 1st SOCOM as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). (See FIGURE 9: Special Forces Command 1990) The new Special Forces command was functionally realigned and given units, active and reserve. One of its first missions was deploying 3rd SFG(A) to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation DESERT STORM. Concerns over the possible duration of the conflict and the strains this would place on the active force structure prompted a decision to federalize 20th SFG(A). The unit closed on Fort Bragg on 23 February and immediately began intensive training to certify and validate its units. The 7th SFG(A) provided the support necessary to train the 20th SFG(A). Because of the short duration of the ground campaign, the 20th never deployed to the Persian Gulf although a composite team did assist in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

Following the war, deployed elements from 5th, 3rd, and 10th SFG(A) began redeployment back to CONUS in early March. The last elements of 3rd SFG(A) boarded a plane for home in late April. The 10th SFG(A) had not been home long before the unfolding Kurdish refugee crisis in Turkey forced their return to the Middle East on a humanitarian mission. Designated Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the efforts of the 10th's soldiers eventually touched close to 500,000 refugees.

¹³¹USSOCOM to USASOC, Msg dated 031650Z Dec 90, Subject: "Activation of 20th Special Forces Group," SAB (U), USASOC History and Archives, 1.

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND

27 NOV 1990



————— COMMAND
- - - - - TRAINING OVERSIGHT
COORDINATION

While the world focused its attention on events in the Middle East, 7th SFG(A) continued its work in support of Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, a nation-building operation to rebuild Panama's public security infrastructure. In the reserve components, Special Forces Command assumed command and control of the United States Army Reserve Special Forces Groups, the 11th and 12th SFG(A); and assumed operational control over the 19th and 20th SFG(A). The Base Realignment and Closures Act of 1991 brought about by tight federal budgets and a changing geopolitical picture targeted Ft. Devens, Massachusetts for closure. As a result, plans were set in motion to relocate 10th SFG(A) to Fort Carson, Colorado.

USASOC's and USASFC's continued efforts to support the President's National Drug Control Strategy resulted in a closer working relationship between Special Forces units and law enforcement personnel both here and abroad.

Finally, USASFC expended significant effort in integrating Special Forces into the conventional arena. Special Forces' showing during the Gulf War suggests that this effort has made considerable strides.¹³²

1st SOCOM command authority over the Ranger Regiment and 160th SOAR had already been relinquished as of spring 1990 and control over 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and 4th Psychological Operations Group (A) had reverted to USARSOC (soon to be USACAPOC) at the start of the fiscal year. USASOC and USASFC planners were already at work developing plans to bring Special Forces National Guard and Reserve groups fully into the USASOC force structure.

II. Establishment of Special Forces Branch

A major development in the history of Special Forces occurred in 1987 with the creation of the Special Forces branch. The growing awareness of the Army's need to meet contingencies across the spectrum of conflict forced a re-evaluation of Special Force's role in the force structure and indirectly led to the establishment of a separate career branch to manage Special Forces personnel. The necessity for a new branch became apparent with Congress' decision to activate USSOCOM. Secretary of the Army the Honorable John O. Marsh believed there was little alternative to the establishment of a new branch. In a memorandum to Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickham, Secretary Marsh noted that the only "alternative to a branch is continued jury rigging and band-aid practices to entice young

¹³²MG Sidney Shacknow's Executive Summary, USAJFKSWCS Annual Historical Report, CY 91, 1.

officers to come in and stay in" Special Forces.¹³³ Nonetheless, Marsh had several concerns regarding the new branch. He questioned Wickham on how the Army would bring officers into the new branch. The complexity of Special Forces missions as well as the maturity demanded of personnel frequently operating in a non-Western cultural environment seemed to indicate that newly commissioned lieutenants would not be appropriate for Special Forces. He also questioned the Army's ability to insure Special Forces officers command and promotion opportunities while at the same time keeping them proficient in their other specialties.

Wickham had already staffed most of these issues and was prepared to answer Marsh's concerns. Wickham recommended that Special Forces not be considered an accession branch. He suggested instead that officers desiring transfer into Special Forces begin their careers with assignment to one of the Army's accession branches and attendance at an appropriate Officer Basic Course. Following a new lieutenant's initial assignment and selection for promotion to captain, an officer could then apply for Special Forces training. After successfully passing the Special Forces Selection and Assessment Program, an officer would attend his accession branch Officer Advanced Course followed by the Special Forces Qualifying Course. In recent years, it has become policy that all officers selected for the Special Forces Qualification Course attend the Infantry Officer's Advanced Course regardless of their original accession branch.¹³⁴ Wickham believed that the Army could insure command and promotion opportunities for officers in the new branch as well as sufficient opportunity for assignments in their secondary specialties. Reassured that the Army had a workable plan for the new branch, Marsh approved the establishment of Special Forces Branch on 9 April 1987. General Orders No.35 made the approval official.

III. Special Forces Groups

A. 1st Special Forces Group (1990)

1. Mission (1990): 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) is to conduct special operations (including foreign defense, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, and direct action within the Pacific Command (PACOM) area.

¹³³Memorandum Marsh to Wickham, dated 8 April 1987 in Special Forces Branch folder, USASOC History and Archives, 1-2.

¹³⁴Memorandum Wickham to Marsh; Subject: Special Forces Branch Action Memorandum, Tab A, dated 22 March 1987, Special Forces Branch file, USASOC History and Archives.

2. Key Personnel

a. Group (1990)

Commander: COL Richard A. Todd
Deputy Commander: LTC Harvey A. Teston
Executive Officer: MAJ Timothy S. Heinemann
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM Oliver R. Garcia
S-1: MAJ Kenneth Finlayson II
S-2: MAJ Michael P. McCaffrey
S-3: MAJ Richard W. Mills
S-4: CPT Jeffrey B. Blair
S-5: CPT (P) Patrick M. Robey
C&E: CPT Robert T. Bell Jr.
Staff JAG: CPT Steve Strong
Surgeon: MAJ Jon J. Wilson
Engineer: CPT Steve Land
Budget Officer: CPT Scott D. Anderson
Chaplain: MAJ Francisco D. Somera
Chemical Officer: CPT (P) Patrick McAndrew

b. 1st Battalion (1990)

Commander: LTC Mark D. Boyatt
Executive Officer: MAJ William J. Kay
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM Gary L. Baura

c. 2nd Battalion (1990)

Commander: LTC Glenn M. Harned
Executive Officer: MAJ Harold G. Wheeler
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM Carey Pennington

d. 3rd Battalion (1990)

Commander: LTC Richard C. Nickerson
Executive Officer: MAJ Michael J. Sutton
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM Werner LR. Skyba

e. Detachment K (1990)

Commander: CPT (P) Mike Mitchell
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM Edward Thatcher

f. Group 1991: No Annual Historical Report provided.

g. Group 1992

Commander: COL Richard Todd
COL Siegfried Hildebrandt
Deputy Commander: LTC Terry Houghtaling
Executive Officer: LTC Richard Mills
MAJ(P) Joe Kilgore

	MAJ Arthur Slavinski
Cmd Sergeant Major:	CSM Oliver Garcia
S-1	MAJ Kenneth Finlayson
	CPT Mike Lugo
	CPT Kenneth Evensen
S-2	MAJ Dennis Warriner
	CPT Andrew Frank
S-3	LTC Robert Hooker
	MAJ Barry Shapiro
S-4	MAJ Robert Stern
S-5	MAJ John Vantine
	CPT James Templin
	MAJ Larry Burkett
Chaplain	MAJ Francisco Somera
	CPT Floyd Brown
	MAJ William Underwood
JAG	CPT Ronald Miller
RMO	CPT Scott Anderson
	CPT Roosevelt Corpening
Surgeon	MAJ Peter Weber
	CPT Philip Harry
Engineer	MAJ Juan Gonzales
Chemical Officer	CPT Robert Bell
	MAJ Arthur Slavinski

h. 2nd Battalion (1992)

Commander	LTC Glenn Harned
	LTC Ronald Davis
Executive Officer	MAJ Kilgore
	MAJ Smith

i. 3rd Battalion (1992)

Commander	LTC Richard Nickerson
	LTC Lynn Lanzoni

3. Yearly Summary (1990):

a. 1st Battalion: (No information provided)

b. 2nd Battalion Operations: The battalion participated in seven major deployments to include: OPERATION AVALANCHE (Jan-Feb 1990), LEMPIRA (Jan-Apr 1990), JRTC 90-6 (Apr-May 1990), ULCHI FOCUS LENS (Aug-Sep 1990), DFT Peru (Aug-Sep 1990), BADGE NIGHT (Oct 1990), and GOLD WATCH (Oct-Nov 1990).

c. 3rd Battalion Operations: The battalion participated in nine major deployments to include: BADGE TORCH/TREK (Feb-Mar 1990), COBRA GOLD (Apr-June 1990), NIGHT COUGAR (Aug 1990), BADGE TORCH/TREK (Jul-Aug 1990 and Oct-Nov 1990), BADGE BUNDLE (Oct 1990), JRTC 91-1 (Oct-Nov 1990), CABER FOXTRAIL (Oct 1990), and BALIKATAN (Nov-Dec 1990).

4. Yearly Summary (1991): One of the primary undertakings of 1st SFG(A) during the months following Operation DESERT STORM involved conducting disaster assessments in the wake of Cyclone Marian. The tropical storm struck 110 miles off the southeast coast of Bangladesh on the evening of 29 April 1991. Quickly recognizing the scope of destruction the storm had visited on the outlying islands, the United States established and launched a Contingency Joint Task Force consisting primarily of men and materials from Amphibious Group 3 and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Elements of 1st SFG(A) were assigned to the CJTF to provide Disaster Area Relief Teams (DART) to the afflicted area. Operation SEA ANGEL's commanding general, LTG Henry C. Stackpole, directed that the DARTs "conduct an area assessment of the affected area, establish secure communications between the outlying area, the relief center in Chittagong and Task Force HQ in Dhaka, make contact with the local military on site, establish landing zones for helicopter relief shipments, assist in the security of the landing zone" and "render immediate medical assistance commensurate with our capabilities."¹³⁵

Under the command of LTC Mark Boyatt, soldiers from 1st battalion 1st SFG(A) were some of the first American soldiers to establish a presence on the islands. Once on the ground, the DART teams experienced the kind of problems that would plague U.S. forces in subsequent OOTW operations in Somalia and Haiti. As a member of one of the DART teams, SSgt Dave Polny noted, the Bangladeshis expected us "to fix everything."¹³⁶ When it became clear that this would not be the case, disappointment settled in to the population. The problem was compounded by the painstakingly slow movements of Non-governmental Organizations to step in to alleviate the suffering.¹³⁷

As the United States assumed more of the burden for the disaster relief operation, another problem that frustrated efforts was the Marine Corps' inability to properly orchestrate the effort. CW3 Thomas Dawson, another DART team member, expressed disappointment that the Marines had apparently not mastered the concept of cross-loading air deliverable supplies. CW3 Thomas Dawson explained the problem and its solution:

The first set of supplies I received came after about eight days. We were expecting food, but instead we received about two tons

¹³⁵Paul A. McCarthy, *Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study* (Draft) Rand Corporation, (June 1993), 9.

¹³⁶SSgt Dave Polny, Interview by Joseph R. Fischer, 13 April 1994, transcript, USASOC Archives, Ft. Bragg, NC.

¹³⁷McCarthy, *Operation Sea Angel*, 5.

of soap--bars of soap. They unloaded every bit of soap that they had right there on our island and flew away. Other islands would get huge bundles of pots and pans; other islands would get all the food, maybe 150 to 200 sacks of potatoes...And so we started calling each other between the islands and bartering who's got the food and who has the soap and who has this and trying to do some fair exchange.¹³⁸

To the best of their ability, the DARTs sorted through the problems and reallocated supplies to the areas they were most needed. By the end of May, the situation was well under control and NGOs intricately involved in getting the storm battered areas needed relief. 1st battalion, 1st SFG(A) soldiers redeployed back to Okinawa on 29 May 94.

5. Yearly Summary (1992): Operations: 1st Special Forces Group executed an intensive training schedule over the course of the last year with the summary of Group deployments being covered under the individual battalions.

Logistics: Operation DESERT STORM forced considerable realignment in equipment across USASOC that did have an impact on operational tempo. One of the key tasks accomplished over the course of the year was the rebalancing of equipment to conform to MTOEs. The Group S-4 processed 362 internal and external lateral transfers. In addition, the Group completed swapout of all assigned CUCVs for HUMMWV series vehicles by obtaining M1037 Shelter Carriers from the FORSCOM QUICKSILVER program. One problem impacting on readiness was "STOP/START" funding during the end of FY92 and first quarter of FY93. Money existed sufficient for only eight months for High Priority (deadline creating) repair parts.¹³⁹

Surgeon: Driven in part by 10th Group's participation in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and the lessons learned from Operation BALANCE TORCH, the Surgeon's office developed a general "how-to" guide to planning MedCAP (Medical Civil Action Project) operations. Signal: Force modernization changes brought the addition of considerable quantities of new equipment to the Group. The additions to the Group's communication's capability came from the inclusion of the following: AN/GRC-233 Special

¹³⁸CW3 Thomas Dawson, Interview by Joseph R. Fischer, 13 April 1994, USASOC Archives, Ft. Bragg, NC, 15-16.

¹³⁹1st Special Forces Group Annual Historical Report, S-4 Section, CY93, 2.

Operations Communications Assemblage; AN/GSC-59 Lightweight Deployable Communications, AN/GSC-62 Tabletop Base Station, An/PRC-104B team HF radio, AN/PRC-119 team FM radio, and AN/TSC-122 HF multichannel system.

1. 2nd Battalion Operations: participated in BADGE TRAM, BALANCE KNIFE, TANDEM THRUST, ULCHI FOCUS LENS, URBAN STRIKE, DRAGON FLAME, BALANCE KNIFE, and FOAL EAGLE.

2. 3rd Battalion Operations: 1st SFG(A) participated in BADGE TORCH/TREK, COBRA GOLD, and CAJUN QUEEN.

B. 3rd Special Forces Group

1. Mission:

2. Key Personnel:

a. Group (1990)

Commander	(1990-92) COL Peter Stankovich (1992-94) COL Philip R. Kensinger
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Deputy Commander	LTC Jerald D. Henderson
Executive Officer	LTC Theodore C. Mataxis
S-1	MAJ Michael A. Black
S-2	MAJ Laurence D. Holt
S-3	MAJ David J. Schroer
S-4	MAJ Ronald L. Deming
S-5	MAJ Sheppard A. Sawyer
C&E	MAJ Jonathan S. Flora
Eng	MAJ David M. Patterson
Chaplain	MAJ Allen B. Boatright
Surgeon	MAJ Earl D. Bundy
Comptroller	CPT Evangelo Manoloules
JAG	CPT Guy J. Taylor

b. 1st Battalion (1990)

Commander	LTC James Parker
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c. 2nd Battalion (1990)

Commander	LTC Robert M. Bailey
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d. 3rd Battalion (1990)

Commander	LTC Richard Mills
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e. Biographies of Key Personnel (1990):

1. Colonel Peter Stankovich is a native of

Chicago, Illinois. He was commissioned as an Infantry Second Lieutenant through ROTC in 1966 from the University of Illinois, where he received a BA degree in Latin American Studies.

As an infantryman, Colonel Stankovich held a variety of assignments in Germany, Vietnam, Fort Carson, Fort Benning and Panama. He served as a platoon leader and company commander of three platoons and five companies, and in various battalion and brigade staff positions. He also served as Assistant S-3 for the 197th Infantry Brigade (Separate) as well as the Deputy G-3 of the 193rd Infantry Brigade (Panama).

In Vietnam, he served as a District Advisor and Intelligence Officer for the Phoenix Program. Colonel Stankovich also held senior instructor positions in both the United States Army Infantry School and the United States Army School of the Americas.

His Special Operations experience includes a number of tours with the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG(A) in Panama where he served as an Operational Detachment "A" (ODA 791) Commander, Executive Officer, and later Commander of Company C, Battalion Executive Officer, and ultimately Battalion Commander. Colonel Stankovich speaks fluent Spanish and personally conducted ten Mobile Training Team missions in Central and South America. During one of the MTTs, he served as a trainer and advisor to the Salvadoran Joint Task Force that implemented that country's first national counterinsurgency campaign plan. Prior to assuming command of 3rd SFG(A), he was assigned as a J-3 Operations Staff Officer at USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, Florida.

Colonel Stankovich is a graduate of the Military Advisor Training Assistance (MATA) Course, Special Forces Officer Course, Command and General Staff College, Foreign Area Officer Course, and the Inter-American Defense College.

His awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Purple Heart, four awards of the Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Vietnam Service Medal, Vietnam Campaign Medal, Defense Meritorious Unit Award, Army Superior Unit Award, Combat Infantryman Badge, Special Forces Tab, Master Parachutist Badge, and several foreign awards.¹⁴⁰

2. Colonel Phillip R. Kensinger, Jr is a native of Pennsylvania. He attended the United States Military Academy at West Point and received his commission in 1970.

¹⁴⁰Biography of Colonel Peter Stankovich in 3rd SFG(A) Change of Command Pamphlet dated 23 July 1992.

His first assignment was to the 3rd Armored Division in Germany where he served as a Recon Platoon Leader and Battalion S-1. His other Infantry assignments were with the 101st Airborne Division where he commanded HHC, 3rd Brigade and Company A, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment. He also served as 3rd Brigade S-1.

Additional assignments include service in J-3 USSOUTHCOM, as OPATT Advisor, El Salvador and a tour at the U.S. Army Personnel Center at Alexandria, Virginia.

Colonel Kensinger possessed considerable Special Operations experience. His first Special Forces assignment was as a Detachment Executive Officer followed by command of an Operational Detachment in 2nd Battalion, 7th SFG(A). He commanded a Special Forces Battalion Task Force in Honduras and subsequently served as Executive Officer for 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG(A) in Panama. Colonel Kensinger commanded 1st Battalion, 5th SFG(A) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. His next assignment was as chief of Special Programs and Deputy Division Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill AFB, Florida.

Colonel Kensinger's military education included attendance at the National War College, the Foreign Service Institute of Washington, Command and General Staff College, Foreign Area Officer Course, and the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. He completed the Military Free Fall, Special Forces Combat Diver, and Pathfinder Courses. Colonel Kensinger completed a Masters Degree in Area Studies at Louisiana State University. He is fluent in Spanish.

His awards and decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, three awards of the Meritorious Service Medal, Master Parachutist Badge, Combat Diver Badge, Air Assault Badge, Special Forces Tab, Ranger Tab, and Expert Infantryman Badge.¹⁴¹

3. Yearly Summary (1990):

a. DESERT SHIELD Operational Summary (Aug 90-Dec 90): 3rd Special Forces Group received early warning from 1st SOCOM that CENTCOM anticipated the need for another SF Group to in the Persian Gulf. At the time of notification, 3rd SFG(A) contained only one battalion. To augment the Group, 3rd battalion, 10th SFG(A) was attached for planning purposes as well as deployment.

CENTCOM and its assigned special operationd commanad (SOCCENT), anticipated one of two roles for 3rd SFG(A). The unit

¹⁴¹Ibid.

could either replace 5th SFG(A) in theater if DESERT SHIELD dragged on indefinitely or augment them if the FID/coalition warfare mission assigned to the 5th SFG(A) exceeded their ability to provide teams in support of allied forces. The missions envisioned for 3rd SFG(A) included direct action, special reconnaissance, and possibly unconventional warfare. Colonel Peter N. Stankovitch assigned 1st battalion, 3rd SFG(A) under the command of LTC Frank Toney, responsibility for preparing teams for direct action and special reconnaissance missions while 3rd battalion, 10th SFG(A) began preparations to assumed responsibility for the unconventional warfare mission.¹⁴²

A number of problems plagued the 3rd SFG(A)'s deployment. One of the key problems the Group dealt with during the pre-deployment period was that no upper-level command could provide a specific date for deployment. This made it difficult for teams to effectively plan their training programs. A second problem that became quickly evident was the lack of experience all the ODAs had in unconventional warfare operations.¹⁴³ Although still a Special Forces mission, little in the way of institutional memory existed in conducting this kind of mission. Furthermore, UW had not been a mission capable of generating much command emphasis during recent years. Logistics became a third area of concern. Stankovitch was told to insure he could deploy his unit without exceeding the lift capacity of the aircraft assigned to his unit. He received assurances that supply and equipment shortages could be made-up in theater from 5th SFG(A)'s stockpiles. Unfortunately, this information proved inaccurate. As deployment time drew closer, subsequent instructions made it clear that 5th SFG(A) could provide nothing and that 3rd SFG(A) was now to deploy with fifteen days supply stockage in addition to their normal deployment equipment. The revised estimate of the supply situation did not force any significant changes in the number of aircraft assigned for the Group's deployment.¹⁴⁴ As 1990 drew to a close, 3rd SFG(A) had made its preparations for deployment and was awaiting orders. Deployment to the SW Asia theater of operations would not occur until January 1991.

b. Yearly Summary (1991): Once in the SW Asia theater of operations, 3rd SFG(A) found itself working directly for the SOCCENT under the direction of Col. Jesse Johnson. 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG(A) provided the majority of 3rd SFG(A)'s assets in the Persian Gulf. LTC Toney, the battalion commander

¹⁴²Interview with Colonel Peter N. Stankovitch conducted by Dr. John W. Partin, 12 March 1991, USASOC History and Archives, 1-2.

¹⁴³Ibid., 5.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 7.

directed his battalion toward accomplishing three distinct missions.

The first mission consisted of preparing ODAs to perform Special Reconnaissance missions deep behind enemy lines in support of VIIth Corps. Directed by ODB 070, 3rd SFG(A) soldiers conducted five SR missions. The first mission occurred in VIIth Corps sector where planners envisioned smashing through Iraqi lines in their drive toward the Euphrates. This mission was a soil sampling mission and required the team to take samples, photograph the surrounding area, and make trafficability assessments. Col. Stankovitch directed other missions be directed against the Iraqi army's elite Republican Guard divisions. The teams' mission was to ascertain whether the Guards intended to drive south to attack VIIth Corps, withdraw west toward Baghdad, or remain in defensive positions.¹⁴⁵ Two of the missions were eventually cancelled due to changing friendly and enemy situations. The other three met with varying degrees of success.

The second mission entailed preparing three ODBs to secure, clear, and hold the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City.¹⁴⁶ Although 3rd SFG(A) had practiced this kind of MOUT mission on a quarterly basis, it still took the Group by surprise as it had not been part of their METL at Ft. Bragg.

Preparations for the direct action mission against the U.S. Embassy compound were hampered by lack of timely guidance from CENTCOM, nonetheless, with little more than a week to plan and rehearse the operation, 1st battalion's three ODBs put their concept for the operation to paper and rehearsed at King Fhad International Airport. The plan called for a simultaneous assault on the compound using both air and ground assets.

As soon as it became clear that coalition and U.S. forces had penetrated Iraqi defenses and driven to the outskirts of Kuwait City, the elements assigned to the mission deployed first to Kuwait International Airport and then on 28 February 91 to the embassy itself. Intelligence estimates for the embassy compound had been sketchy and confusing. One estimate suggested that an Iraqi reinforced mechanized infantry company might be lagered into the compound; other reports suggested that the complex was unoccupied but quite possibly boobytrapped.

The plan did not go according to schedule. Guided by a

¹⁴⁵Interview with Colonel Frank J. Toney by Dr. Joseph R. Fischer, 1 December 1993, USASOC History and Archives, 2.

¹⁴⁶Interview with Col. Peter N. Stankovich by John W. Partin, 12 March 1991, 11.

former Kuwaiti policeman and a Navy seal, the ground convoy wove its way through the streets of Kuwait City, slowed considerably by the size of cheering Kuwaitis but still managing to arrive at the embassy compound at 1300 hours, the designated time for the attack. Support helicopters from 4-17th Cavalry were already on site. The helicopters bringing the assault teams, however, were slow to arrive. When the assault teams did arrive and enter the compound via fastrope, they found it unoccupied. Nonetheless, under smoke filled skies from oilwell fires and a fading afternoon sun, the soldiers began the daunting task of clearing the compound, a challenge they accomplished in less than a day, although not without causing some collateral damage to the embassy and its facilities.

Following hostilities, 3rd SFG(A) soldiers worked closely with the Kuwaiti government in establishing a safe and secure environment in the war torn country. The unit's deployment back to Ft. Bragg came in April 1994.

b. Yearly Summary (1992): 3rd SFG(A) began the year with only two battalions activated and operating at or near assigned strength. The provisionally created third battalion had conducted some training but possessed insufficient equipment or personnel to warrant activation. The shortfalls were eventually filled permitting 3rd battalion's official activation on 23 July 1992.

The Group participated in two major exercises in 1992. Exercise OCEAN VENTURE II was a JCS exercise conducted in April and May with units deployed to Ft. Bragg, NC, Ft. Story, VA, and Key West, FL. Exercise TRADE WINDS occurred at Camp Lejeune, NC with the amphibious portion of the exercise occurring at Key West, FL. TRADE WINDS was a LANTCOM (Atlantic Command) exercise aimed at training Caribbean defense forces of several select nations. Other highlights of the training year included 1st Battalion's completion of a training rotation through JRTC in October 1992, and 2nd Battalion's assistance of federal agencies in the task of controlling Haitian immigrants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

C. 5th Special Forces Group

1. Mission (1990): 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) plans, prepares, and conducts Special Operations in support of U.S. objectives prior to and during open hostilities with a focus on the CENTCOM AOR.

2. Mission (1992):

a. Be capable of deployment to assigned contingency areas world-wide.

b. Plan, support, and conduct FID, SF, DA and UW missions in support of U.S. policies.

3. Key Personnel

a. Group (1990)

Commander:	COL James W. Kraus
Deputy Commander:	LTC Michael D. Shaw
	LTC Arturo P. Macal tao
	LTC Boyd D. Parsons
Executive Officer:	MAJ Ronnie F. Benson
	MAJ William Faistenhammer
Cmd Sergeant Major:	CSM David A. Sims
S-1:	2Lt Joseph M. Byers
	MAJ Stephen C. Stone
S-2:	MAJ Edward J. Howard
S-3:	LTC Daniel P. Brownlee
S-4:	CPT Rickey F. Yates
S-5:	CPT Lawrence G. Mrozinski
C&E:	CPT Terry L. Wiant
JAG:	CPT John D. Drake
Chaplain:	MAJ James R. Ritchie Jr.
Engineer:	MAJ David W. Washechek
	MAJ Robert L. Davis

b. 1st Battalion (1990)

Commander:	LTC Jerald L. Thompson
Cmd Sergeant Major:	CSM Winston A. Clough

c. 2nd Battalion (1990)

Commander:	LTC Kenneth R. Bowra
	LTC William J. Davis
Cmd Sergeant Major:	CSM Anthony R. Simon

d. 3rd Battalion

Commander:	LTC Michael D. Shaw
Cmd Sergeant Major:	CSM Thomas F. Griffith

e. Group (1991-1992) (Not submitted)

g. 1st Battalion (1992)

Commander	LTC Daniel P. Brownlee
Executive Officer	MAJ John D. Conger
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Winston A. Clough

h. 2nd Battalion (1992)

Commander LTC William Faistenhammer

d. 3rd Battalion (1992)

Commander LTC Michael D. Shaw
LTC Leslie L. Fuller
Executive Officer MAJ Mark V. Phelan
MAJ Leonard C. Blevins
Cmd Sergeant Major CSM Thomas F. Griffith
CSM Donald R. Beuckman

4. Yearly Summary (1990)

a. Training

1. Individual

a. Physical: As per U.S. Army regulations, each soldier underwent the APRT twice during the year. In addition, all soldiers assigned to ODAs, ODBs, SOTAs, SOTBs participated in weekly rucksack marches with assigned weapons and basic load. Battalion and company commanders established additional standards beyond those of the Group for soldiers possessing Special Forces-required specialty skills.

b. Marksmanship: Group soldiers underwent semi-annual qualification with individual weapons IAW USASF semi-annual certification requirements. Unlike Army-wide standards, Group soldiers were required to qualify expert. Marksmanship skills under limited visibility and/or NBC environment conditions were also stressed. Crew served weapons training and sustainment continued over the course of the year.

c. MOS: Soldiers in skill levels 1-4 received testing in their primary MOS. During the 1990s test, Group soldiers in the 18 series MOS averaged percent on their tests compared to the Army-wide average of percent. Soldiers with support MOSS fared better scoring an average of 88 percent against the Army-wide average of 77%.

d. Language: Group soldiers participated in the unit's first language lab since the Vietnam War. Soldiers underwent training in Persian Farsi and Modern Standard Arabic. The course was originally planned to be six months in duration but the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM deployment forced it to be cut short.

2. Collective: The Group commander's emphasis centered on multi-echelon joint training. Preparation for

FID/Coalition Warfare operations occupied much of the training focus. Although the Group's ODAs participated in wide variety of training missions prior to the DS/DS deployment, participation in the USCENTCOM CPX INTERNAL LOOK conducted at Hulbert Field, Florida in July 1990 proved particularly valuable several weeks later when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.¹⁴⁷

b. Major Operations:

1. SAFE PASSAGE: (Dec 89-Aug 90) The purpose of this operation was to assist the United Nations in the execution of the Salam Multi-National Demining Program. The programs stated objectives would be directed at training Afghanistan refugees in the skills necessary to make them aware of mines and the procedures necessary for demining fields still in existence. Training would take place in Peshawar, Pakistan. Continuing political instability within Afghanistan forced the United Nations to re-evaluate its initial goal that 15,000 refugees be trained in mine clearing and a program established capable of familiarizing 1.5 million Afghanistans in mine awareness. ODB 550 from 2nd Battalion, 5th SFG(A) deployed to Pakistan in December 1989 to commence training. These soldiers served as the primary trainers in the course until March 1990, when the United Nations directed that instruction be turned over to Afghanistan instructors. Special Forces soldiers were to continue to monitor training quality..

2. DESERT SHIELD (Aug 90-Jan 91)/DESERT STORM (Jan 91-Feb 91): The 5th SFG(A) was alerted on 6 Aug 90 for OCONUS deployment to Saudia Arabia in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. At first, it was unclear how much of the Group's assets would be required. One team sergeant noted, "It was hectic, even confused at times. First only one battalion was going, then a second battalion was alerted. Finally all three battalions were given the go-ahead despite 3rd Battalion lacking the bulk of its equipment and nearly all its personal weapons."¹⁴⁸ The Group immediately focused on critical tasks

¹⁴⁷Prior to INTERNAL LOOK, CENTCOM war plans had been built around the scenario of an offensive by the Soviet Union south through Turkey and Iran toward the Persian Gulf oil fields of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Reflecting changes in the geo-political situation, INTERNAL LOOK encompassed a different scenario, one that envisioned a regional conflict not unlike the situation that developed with Iraqi's conquest of Kuwait. See Interview with Colonel James W. Kraus by Dr. John W. Partin, 14 May 1991, USASOC History and Archives, 3.

¹⁴⁸Greg Walker, "Fit to Fight: The Fifth Special Forces Group in the Gulf," (Unpublished Manuscript) USASOC History and Archives, 4.

identified for the SW Asia operational environment. The battalions responded with weapons zeroing, NBC training, and language training. NBC training was vigorously conducted throughout the Group to assure that each individual received NBC survival training prior to deployment.

The Group began deployment on 26 August with the 1st Battalion deploying to King Fahd International Airport (KFIA). The remainder of the Group deployed on or about 8 September to King Khalid Military City (KKMC) with the final elements of the Group closing in theater on 21 September. Designated Special Forces Operational Base 50 (SFOD 50), the Group commander directed his battalion commanders to form three Forward Operational Bases (FOBs 51, 52, and 53) and directed that they begin preparations to defend Saudi Arabia against the possibility that Iraqi armored and mechanized infantry units might elect to continue their offensive southward. The battalions moved north in support of multi-national forces. Alpha and SOT-A teams took positions with Saudi border forces conducting Special Reconnaissance. The 5th Special Forces conducted FID missions with its coalition warfare counterparts. NBC, defensive operations, close air support planning, weapons training, land navigation, M60A1 to M60A3 tank transitions, vehicle movement techniques, surveillance techniques, MOUT operations, mine field breaching, field support planning, civil affairs operations/training and extensive medical train-up were also part of the first few months of hectic training. 5th SFG(A) planned to use multiple live-fire range exercises to hone the Group's weapons skills. A-teams were exposed to new weapons systems that increased their operational capabilities. Close air support was conducted at Half Moon Bay, Daharan, and the Group synchronized close air support procedures throughout the theater. NBC training took on a new dimension with the receipt of new NBC equipment.¹⁴⁹

During Operation DESERT SHIELD, 5th Special Forces Group soldiers became key players in tying together the various different contingents of the United Nations forces arrayed against the Iraqi Army. Working with Saudi Arabian Army units, Group soldiers conducted border reconnaissance along the Saudi-Kuwait-Iraq border. CENTCOM defined the focus of 5th Group FID operations as that of providing ground truth (reporting locations/activities/intentions of coalition units), and preventing anti-fratricide incidents with adjacent units. Given the wide variety of equipment present within the theater of operations and the fact that Soviet block vehicles and weapons were present in large quantities in both friendly and enemy forces, this proved no small undertaking. On the whole, 1st

¹⁴⁹S-3 Training Input, 5th Special Forces Group Annual Historical Report, CY 1990, USASOC History and Archives, 5.

Battalion served in the eastern sector with the Saudi Arabian army, while 2nd Battalion worked with the Egyptians, Saudi Arabians and Syrians. 3rd Battalion addressed itself to the task of rebuilding the Kuwaiti Army. 5th Special Forces Group (A) soldiers instructed their Arab allies in close air support, NBC-related subjects, MOUT, light infantry operations, mission analysis and operational planning, weapons, mobility/counter mobility techniques and anti-armor warfare. By November, 5th SFG(A) had become the base for the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF), consisting of 3rd Battalion 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion and 528th Special Operation Support Battalion as well as the Group's organic units. By the end of December, ARSOTF had conducted liaison work with seven Arab nations and provided CENTCOM with early warning abilities along the border area.¹⁵⁰

5th Group experienced a number of problems during deployment and execution of DESERT SHIELD. The availability of airframes to carry the Group and its equipment hampered the initial deployment. The problem stemmed from the fact that the Group's TO&E was undergoing modification and the changes had not been incorporated into the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).¹⁵¹ The problem was partially solved by mixing SF elements in with the 101st Airborne Division's deployment. The second problem centered on support requirements. Because 5th Group was a SOCCENT asset rather than a unit assigned to either XVIIIth Airborne Corps or VIIth Corps, securing necessary supplies, especially ammunition, was an ongoing problem.¹⁵² Finally, Colonel Kraus believed that the CENTCOM staff in general and General Schwartzkopf in particular, did not fully appreciate at the start, the capabilities of the Special Forces assets at their disposal, particularly those in white SOF.¹⁵³ In his press conference after DESERT STORM, however, General Schwartzkopf offered high praise to SOF units.

5. Yearly Summary (1992): 5th SFG(A) units participated in a number of operations during the calendar year to include: Battle Command Training Program, a National Training Center rotation, Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, and Exercise EASTERN EAGLE.

¹⁵⁰S-3 Plans and Operations Input, Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁵¹Interview with Colonel James W. Kraus, 14.

¹⁵²Ibid., 22.

¹⁵³"White" SOF is a term used extensively to describe SOF units whose missions, while often classified, are not compartmented or carried out by units whose existence is neither confirmed nor denied. "Black" SOF refers to compartmented units and missions. Ibid., 67.

D. 7th Special Forces Group

1. Mission (1992)

- a. Foreign Internal Defense
- b. Special Reconnaissance
- c. Direct Action
- d. Counterterrorism
- e. Unconventional Warfare

2. Key Personnel (1992)

a. Group (1992)

Commander	COL James G. Pulley
Deputy Commander	LTC Geoffrey Lambert
Executive Officer	LTC Danny L. Greene
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM William H. Rambo
S-1	CPT Paul P. Cale
S-2	MAJ Mark H. Johnson
S-3	MAJ Kevin M. Higgins
S-4	CPT Ronald Daniels
Surgeon	MAJ James M. Fudge
Engineer	MAJ James R. Riggins
Chaplain	CPT Larry N. Barber
Comptroller	CPT Edelmiro Fonseca
JAG	CPT Kevin Podlaski

b. 1st Battalion (1992)

Commander	LTC Remo Butler
Executive Officer	MAJ John Mulholland
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Richard D. Tudor

c. 2nd Battalion (1992)

Commander	LTC Patrick Lenaghan
Executive Officer	MAJ Francis Pedrozo
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Patrick McNamara

d. 3rd Battalion (1992)

Commander	LTC William Council
Executive Officer	MAJ Carlos A. Burgos
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Robert E. Hand

3. Yearly Summary 1992: No Annual Historical Report available.

E. 10th Special Forces Group

1. Mission (1991):

a. To plan and conduct special operations missions which are peculiar to Special Forces due to their organization, training, and equipment.

b. Plan and conduct FID as directed.

c. Be prepared to implement operations as provided for in Operations Plan, on order, and in support of SOCEUR.¹⁵⁴

2. Key Personnel (1991):

a. Group (1991)

Commander	COL William P. Tangney
Deputy Commander	LTC Kevin L. Brandt
	LTC Thomas J. McNamara
Executive Officer	LTC Leslie L. Fuller
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM George Moskaluk
	CSM Francisco T. Guerrero
S-1	1st LT B.J. Constantine
	MAJ William M. Dietrick
	MAJ Lloyd J. Gilmore
S-2	MAJ Gerald K. Brokus
S-3	LTC Werner C. Krueger
	MAJ Michael R. Kershner
S-4	CPT Michael E. Harrington
	MAJ Craig S. Jones
S-5	MAJ Kenneth E. Fortune
	CPT Mont Dolieslager
	MAJ John J. Cenney
C&E	MAJ Charles A. Cox
JAG	CPT Kevin H. Govern
Chaplain	CPT Thomas G. Russell
	CPT Ronald H. Thomas
Surgeon	MAJ Glenn D. McDermott
Chemical	MAJ Thomas C. Lehman
Engineer	MAJ Larry C. Shubat
Comptroller	CPT Brian O. Remmey

b. 1st Battalion (1991): No report on file

¹⁵⁴10th Special Forces Group Annual Historical Report, MEMORANDUM for the Commander, USASOC, 1-2.

c. 2nd Battalion (1991):

Commander	LTC John D. Bond
	LTC Timothy S. Heinemann
Executive Officer	MAJ Joseph B. McMillian
	MAJ Robert G. Brady
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Francisco T. Guerrero
	CSM Rolando J. Torres

d. 3rd Battalion (1991):

Commander	LTC Thomas J. McNamara
	LTC Steven H. Philbrick
Executive Officer	MAJ Henry A. Krigsman
	MAJ John L. Stanley
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Gerald A. Janis

e. Group (1992)

Commander	COL William P. Tangney
	COL Frank J. Toney, Jr.
Deputy Commander	LTC Leslie L. Fuller
	LTC Thomas J. McNamara
	LTC Chase N. Rogers
Executive Officer	LTC Chase N. Rogers
	LTC Michael R. Kershner
Cmd Sergeant Major:	CSM Francisco Guerrero
S-1	MAJ Lloyd D. Gilmore
	CPT Craig A. Byrd
S-2	MAJ Gerald K. Brockus
	CPT Dean A. Taylor
S-3	LTC Michael R. Kershner
	MAJ Charles A. King
S-4	CPT Christopher Lancaster
S-5	MAJ Kenneth E. Fortune
	MAJ John J. Cenny
	MAJ Christopher Bates
Engineer	Major Charles A. Cox
	CPT Darrell G. Gammill
	1LT Harold P. Xenitelis
JAG	CPT Kevin H. Govern
	MAJ Carlton L. Jackson
Chaplain	CPT Ronald H. Thomas
	CPT Paul H. Harwart
Surgeon	MAJ Glenn D. McDermott
	CPT Ty J. Vannieuwenhoven
	MAJ Raymond W. Watters
Comptroller	MAJ Brian O. Remmey
	CPT Milton L. Sawyers

3. Operations and Training 1991:

a. Summary: Calendar year 1991 was a period of world-wide historical change. Countries and new governments were created as Soviet communism collapsed. The change brought new-found stability to some areas, and insecurity in others. For the United States, the first test of the post Cold War environment came when Saddam Hussein invaded the small and prosperous country of Kuwait. The world events kept the 10th SFG(A) extremely busy. Elements of the unit were involved in DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, AND PROVIDE COMFORT II. In addition, the Group continued its customary training schedule with JRTC, Jumpmaster Course, and ITC certification.

Immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the 10th Group was alerted for possible deployment in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The Group responded by sending a Mobile Training Team (MTT), on 17 August 90, to Saudi Arabia to train the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The MTT's mission culminated in its coordinating artillery and armor fires on the initial assault of Kuwait City during the DESERT STORM ground campaign.

On 13 January 91, 10th SFG(A) deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey to conduct Search and Rescue missions as part of Joint Task Force PROVEN FORCE/ELUSIVE CONCEPT during Operation DESERT STORM. This force consisted of an SFOB, 1st Battalion (-) and 2nd Battalion (-). These elements redeployed to home station on 13 March 91.

On 14 January 91, the Group alerted A/3-10 to deploy in support of Operation DESERT STORM. A/3-10 deployed on 31 January and was attached to the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (A) to conduct special operations in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. This unit conducted special reconnaissance and training missions.

After a short respite at Fort Devens, the Group was called upon to provide humanitarian assistance to Kurdish refugees along the Turkish/Iraqi border. On 13 April 91, the SFOB along with 2nd Battalion deployed to Incirlik AB, Turkey as a part of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. 1st Battalion was already in country waiting to move with the SFOB to Silopi, Turkey. 2nd Battalion established its FOB at Yuksekovia.

On 16 April 91, 3rd Battalion deployed from Fort Devens to join her sister battalions under the command of the SFOB located at Silopi, Turkey. This was the first time in the Group's history that the SFOB deployed with all three battalions. The 3rd Battalion's mission was to conduct reconnaissance/area assessments/security operations and establish "way stations" to assist Kurdish refugees as they moved out of their camps back to their homes. On 1 May 91, the 3rd Battalion (-) deployed into

Northern Iraq via helicopter and conducted route reconnaissance through the mountains of Iraq.

On 26 May 91, 1st Battalion redeployed to Bad Tolz to begin their move to a new home station at Panzer Kaserne, Bolinger, Germany. On 28 May 91, 3rd Battalion redeployed to Fort Devens. In August, C/3-10th conducted two successful Jumpmaster classes. 3rd Battalion also successfully completed ITC certification following the culmination of a highly demanding FTX at Fort Drum.

The SFOB and 2nd Battalion began redeployment to Fort Devens on 31 May 91. Because of 2nd Battalion's participation in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, they were unable to participate in JRTC rotation 91-7.

On 22 July 91, the Group once again alerted 2nd Battalion to deploy to Incirlik, Turkey to conduct Combat Search and Rescue operations. Additionally, the battalion was to conduct Interoperability Training with the 39th SOW (USAF) and Turkish and French Military Forces.¹⁵⁵

4. Yearly Summary (1992)

a. Commander's Intent:

1. Place primary training emphasis on UW/FID missions.
2. Base battle focus analysis on developing detachment METL from the UW/FID missions.
3. Emphasize both language training and cultural training with a command language program at both basic and refresher levels, in country language training, JCET's and embassy rotations.
4. Promote SOF integration with conventional forces.
5. Maintain capability to execute assigned general war SR/DA mission.

b. Exercises:

1. Major Unit Deployments:

- a. 10th Special Forces Group opened the new year with Winter Environmental Training (WET) in New England and

¹⁵⁵Executive Summary, 10th SFG(A) Annual Historical Report, CY 91.

Canada. Training priorities underwent considerable change during the year largely due to political changes within the Tactical Area of Operations (TAO). To enhance 10th Group capabilities and to better serve the various contingencies now possible within the TAOR, the new METL emphasized contingency and peace keeping operations. As a result, language training and DAO support initiative now held higher priorities than had been the case in the past.

b. The 2nd battalion conducted both Alpine and Nordic skiing with equipment in Farlagne, Canada. Following this, the battalion's ODAs underwent tactical training culminating with an ARTEP under severe cold weather conditions at Loring, AFB, Maine. Other operations conducted by 2nd battalion included: ARCTIC EXPRESS, PHANTOM SABLE, and JTF-6.

c. The 3rd battalion started the year with elements involved in two real world operations: RESTORE HOPE and PROVIDE COMFORT. Elements not involved in these operations underwent cold weather training at St. Anne, Canada in January and February. ODAs conducted tactical long-range cross-country operations with combat and survival gear, culminating in a live fire exercise at Valcartier, Quebec Canada. Later in the year, 3rd battalion deployed to JRTC. In October, 10th SFG(A) deployed to England for OPERATION SILENT ENDEAVOR.¹⁵⁶

2. Company and ODA Deployments: Company A, 2nd Battalion, 10th SFG(A) originally received a tasking to support V Corps Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) 92-10 in Europe. The commitment soon evolved into full support and participation in REFORGER 92 as the SOF participant with the BCTP Warfighter Exercise being executed as a part of REFORGER in a Central Army Group (CENTAG) Command Post Exercise (CPX). Operating as the SOCCE, Company A was to plan and execute special operations in support of V (US) Corps. The operation revealed a number of problems. The Reforger exercise directive envisioned the use of Special Forces ODAs but only to conduct special reconnaissance operations under the OPCON of the USAREUR G2. The planning indicated an inadequate understanding of SOF command and control structures as well as a limited understanding of the capabilities of Special Forces units. Frequently, Special Forces personnel found themselves having to insert themselves into the action as V Corps had never practiced the use of a SOCCE in any previous command post exercises. Another problem requiring attention was the need to rethink the TOE allocation of communications equipment. SOCCE operations proved too communications intensive and the equipment necessary to make it work was simply not available nor allocated by the MTOE. As a result, SOF planning

¹⁵⁶Ibid.1.

time proved too long for the Corps' decision cycle.¹⁵⁷

F. 11th Special Forces Group: No Annual Historical Report available.

G. 12th Special Forces Group

1. Mission (1990): Prepare to deploy the 12th SFG(A) to theater to conduct Special Operations in specific JSOA's to achieve Theater objectives.

2. Key Personnel:

a. Group (1990)

Commander: COL John G. Townsend
Executive Officer: LTC James R. Meloy
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM Andrew Howard

b. 1st Battalion (1990)

Commander: LTC Frank Angyal
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM William Matayosian

c. 2nd Battalion (1990)

Commander: LTC Dave Rapp
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM George Hunt

d. 3rd Battalion (1990)

Commander: LTC James Liljefelt
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM John Boyce

e. Group (1991)

Commander: COL John C. Townsend
COL Frank J. Angyal
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM Andrew Howard

f. Group (1992)

Commander: COL Frank J. Angyal
Cmd Sergeant Major: CSM Andrew Howard

3. Yearly Summary: In October 1990, 86th ARCOM began the process of relinquishing command over 12th Special Forces Group (A) to USARSOC. Transition to the L-series MTOE forced the deactivation of the 77th MI Company and activation of four MI

¹⁵⁷After Action Report on Reforger 92, 7-9.

detachments. 12th SFG(A) participated in numerous training exercises over the course of the year to include: JTX FREQUENT STORM 91, JCTX COBRA GOLD, and JTX ROVING EAGLE. 12th Special Forces assumed responsibility for management of its own logistical functions on 1 October 90 as part of the Group's transition to USARSOC control.

4. Yearly Summary 1991: 1st Battalion of the 12th participated in a consolidated annual training exercise at Ft McCoy, Wisconsin, the objective of which was to certify SFODA's in ARTEP tasks. The battalion also ran an Expert Infantryman's Badge qualification course while training at Ft. McCoy. 2nd Battalion conducted similar training at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, while 3rd Battalion participated in Operation ROVING EAGLE at Camp Roberts/Hunter-Liggett, CA.

5. Yearly Summary 1992: In 1992, 1st Battalion took the lead as the first reserve component Special Forces battalion to undergo testing and evaluation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. 2nd Battalion also deployed to Fort Chaffee where it conducted live fire lane training. 3rd Battalion participated in Operation TANDEM THRUST at Camp Roberts and 29 Palms, CA as well as deployed 2 ODAs and the HQ Base to Operation KEEN EDGE in Japan.

H. 19th Special Forces Group (A) (National Guard)

1. Mission (1990):

2. Key Personnel

a. Group (1992)

Commander: COL Robert W. Butner

3. Yearly Summary (1990): 19th Special Forces Group began the year by providing command, control, communications and intelligence direction to their units in JTX FREQUENT STORM. This operation focused on testing SFOBs and SFOAs in their interoperability skills with U.S. conventional forces. FTX GOLDEN STAR tested the Group's standard operating procedures for deployment.

I. 20th Special Forces Group: (A) (National Guard): The lack of any historical report on file in this office prevents us from providing the mission and personnel of this unit.

a. DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM: The 20th SFG(A) became the first reserve component Special Forces Group ever to be mobilized to meet the demands of a world-wide contingency. The decision to activate 20th SFG(A) grew out of a request by SOCCENT to add a Group (-) (defined as Group HQ and two battalions) to

the SW Asia Theater of operations. The CINCCENT validated the request. The 3rd SFG(A), augmented with 3-10th SFG(A) was alerted for the mission. Because of CINCEUR/SOCEUR requirements, the remainder of 10th SFG(A) was slated for deployment to Turkey in support of DESERT SHIELD leaving their primary area of responsibility unsupported. USASOC believed that 20th SFG(A) would be able to assume the 10th Group mission after the completion of a train-up period. In the event 3rd SFG(A) deployed to SW Asia, the LANTCOM portion of their area of responsibility would also have to be assumed by 20th SFG(A). The decision to utilize the 20th SFG(A) to assume 3rd and 10th SFG(A) missions was based on the following reasons: 1) they had in the past conducted training with 5th SFG(A), were regionally oriented, and familiar with 5th SFG(A)-peculiar equipment; 2) they were a EUCOM asset, and possessed a regional orientation as well as practical experience working in the European environment; and 3) other active duty Special Forces Groups are not interchangeable in a FID/US scenario due to language requirements and regional affiliation.¹⁵⁸

The 20th SFG(A) mobilized on 20 February 91 and three days later converged on Ft. Bragg, NC to begin training. Once at Ft. Bragg, the U.S. Special Forces Command and the 7th SFG(A) put the 20th SFG(A) command through an intensive training cycle designed to validate ODA's as well as their supporting headquarters. Although the Persian Gulf War ended before the 20th SFG(A) was ready for deployment, elements of the Group did deploy to Turkey in support of OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT.

In March 1991, MG James A. Guest, commander of United States Army Special Forces Command, recommended to USASOC that 20th SFG(A) be demobilized and returned to the National Guard. The end of the war and the pending redeployment of the 5th SFG(A) and 3rd SFG(A) back the United States meant that insufficient missions remained to justify 20th SFG(A)'s continued retention on active duty. The USASOC Commanding General, Lieutenant General Spigelmire, approved the recommendation. The 20th SFG(A) was demobilized on 3 May 1991 in ceremonies at Ft. Bragg.¹⁵⁹

4. Yearly Summary (1992): The 20th SFG(A) participated in a number of operations to include: CABANAS 92, BURGOS 92, CAMALEONTE, SF 297, JRTC 92-9, and SF 360.

¹⁵⁸Desert Storm/Desert Shield Misc Documents relating to 20th Special Forces Group Airborne, USASOC Archives.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

IV. Support

A. 528th Support Battalion

1. General: The 13th Support Battalion (Special Operations) was redesignated the 528th Support Battalion (Special Operations) and constituted on 16 May 1987 in the Regular Army. The reactivation occurred at Fort Bragg, North Carolina with the battalion being activated in two sections. Each section approximated half of the total authorized personnel and equipment assigned to the battalion. The sectional activation process permitted a dual theater support capability.

During the first year of its existence, the battalion grappled with two major trends. Over the course of the year, the battalion expanded its support capabilities in support of 1st SOCOM while at the same time being at the mercy of doctrinal battles over how best to support SOF. The net effect of the doctrinal battle was to make it difficult to integrate the battalion into operations plans in support of theater SOCs.¹⁶⁰

2. Mission Statement: The mission of 528th Support Battalion (Special Operations), is:

a. To provide dedicated administrative and logistical support to the deployed senior Headquarters, Army Special Operations Command (HQ ARSOC).

b. When directed, provide dedicated direct support logistics of Special Operations Forces (SOF peculiar and limited conventional systems to deployed Army SOF as required in support of U.S. objectives in peacetime, contingencies, and war.

3. Operations CY 1988: Despite being relative newcomers to the command, 528th Support Battalion supported Special Operations forces across a wide spectrum of operations to include ELABORATE MAZE, PRIME CHANCE, ALPINE BANDIT, FLINTLOCK, PRAYER BOOK, ERNEST WILL, and a series of Ranger Sustainments/CAPEX missions. The battalion also successfully passed an externally-evaluated ARTEP, 1st SOCOM Command Inspection, and supported two 1st SOCOM EDRE/ARTEPs of Special Forces Groups.

4. Operations CY 1990: The year's operational tempo provided a challenging test of the battalion's stated mission to be able to support more than one real world contingency simultaneously. During Operation JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, the battalion provided hot aviation refueling, ammunition

¹⁶⁰528th Support Battalion Annual Historical Review dated January 1989, USASOC Archives, 1.

resupply, ground transportation, and movement control well into the spring. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army had decided in March 1990 to deactivate the 528th. The battalion's performance in Panama forced Department of the Army to relook the deactivation decision and assigned USSOCOM the task of studying the problem. Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait brought the battalion's second major deployment during the year. The 528th's performance during the ensuing conflict was instrumental in reversing the decision to deactivate the battalion.

4. Key Personnel (1988):

Battalion Commander	LTC Louis G. Mason
	LTC David L. Shaw
Battalion Cmd SGM	CSM Otis Norfleet

5. Key Personnel (1990):

Battalion Commander	LTC Norman Gebhart
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6. Key Personnel (1992):

Battalion Commander	LTC Donald E. Plater
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6. Biographies of Key Personnel:

a. Lieutenant Colonel G. Mason was born at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 1945. He was commissioned in the Regular Army in 1967 upon graduation from the University of Southern Mississippi. His initial assignment was with the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam where he served in Detachment B-55. He further served as a parachute rigger operations officer in the 82nd Airborne Division and as Chief, Supply Division, ACofS, G4, US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. He served with 1st Corps Support Command as a Company Commander in 1971 and 1972. Lieutenant Colonel Mason also served with the Military Equipment Delivery Team in Cambodia, the Airborne Department of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Assistant Professor of Military Science at the University of North Alabama, and as Chief of Logistics for the US Army Institute for Military Assistance. Prior to his arrival in 1st Special Operations Command, he was the Chief of Supply Systems Management, ACofS, J4, Korea. He comes to the 13th Support Battalion after having served as the ACofS, G4, 1st Special Operations Command for the past 22 months. He received a Masters Degree from Georgia State University and a Doctorate in Education from the University of Alabama. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Quartermaster Advanced Course, the Military Freefall Course, Special Forces Officers Course, and the Parachute Rigger School. His decorations include the Bronze Star for Valor with Oak Leaf Cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Joint Service Commendation

Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Combat Infantry Badge and the Master Parachute Badge.¹⁶¹

b. Lieutenant Colonel Norman A. Gebhard was born on 5 January 1951 in Omaha, Nebraska. He was a Distinguished Military Graduate from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, receiving a BS degree in Education and commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Regular Army, Ordnance Corps in 1973.

He was detailed to the Infantry for initial training and while serving his infantry detail at Fort Lewis, Washington, he was an assistant Brigade S-4 and a weapons platoon leader. At the completion of his infantry detail, LTC Gebhard was assigned as a company XO, and warehouse platoon leader in the 295th Supply Company (GS). He was subsequently assigned to the 54th Engineer Battalion (Combat) as the Battalion S4, Wildflecken, Federal Republic of Germany. He was later assigned as the wheel vehicle branch chief and as a supply officer in the 5th Corps Material Management Center, Frankfurt, Germany. Upon returning to the states, LTC Gebhard was the S3 of the 7th Supply and Transport Battalion, Fort Ord, California. He was further assigned as the Commander, Company A, 7th Supply and Transport Battalion. He was then assigned as the enrollment officer at the University of Rhode Island, ROTC Detachment. Upon reassignment to Fort Lewis, he was the Deputy G-4, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) and XO of the 99th Support Battalion (Forward). Arriving at Fort Bragg in July 1988, he was assigned for duty with 1st SFOD-D, prior to assuming command of the 528th Support Battalion in July 1990.

LTC Gebhard is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Supply Management Officer's Course, Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course, Petroleum Officer's Course, the Naval Command and General Staff College, and the Jumpmaster Course. He holds a BS degree in Social Sciences, an MBA in Business Administration, and an MA in international Affairs. His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (2-OLC), ARCOM (2-OLC), AAM, and the Parachutist Badge. He has received the Southwest Asia Service Medal (2-BS), and the Kuwait Liberation Medal.¹⁶²

c. Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Plater was born on 14 August 1951 in East Saint Louis, Illinois. He was a Distinguished Military Graduate from the University of Tennessee, receiving a BS degree in Business Administration and commissioned

¹⁶¹Misc Documents on 13th Support Battalion (528th Support Battalion), USASOC Archives.

¹⁶²528th Special Operation Support Battalion Change of Command Pamphlet, 14 July 1992, 3.

an RA Second Lieutenant, Air Defense Artillery in 1973.

His first assignment was to a divisional air defense battalion, 1st Battalion/59th ADA (SP), in Germany where he served as a Platoon Leader, Maintenance Officer, and Battalion S-4. His next assignment was to the 3rd Battalion-4th ADA (ABN) at Fort Bragg where he was a Battery Commander and Battalion S-4. In Korea, LTC Plater served as a Battery Commander in the 2nd Battalion/61st ADA (SP). Upon his reassignment to Fort Bragg, he was an Assistant G-4 in the 82nd Airborne Division and then became the Group S-4 for the 5th Special Forces Group (ABN). After that, he spent time in one of the Army's special mission units as its Logistics Officer. His most recent assignment has been as the Deputy Director for Logistics and Chief, Logistics Plans Division, the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

LTC Plater is a graduate of the Air Defense Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Chapparral/Vulcan Qualification Course, Jumpmaster Course, Supply Management Officer's Course, Military Operations Familiarization Course, Senior Officer's Logistics Management Course, and the United States Marine Corps Command and General Staff College.

His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (5-OLC), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (1-OLC), Army Achievement Medal (2-OLC), and the Joint Meritorious Unit Award. He has received the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Southwest Asia Service Medal (2-BS), and the Kuwait Liberation Medal. He is a Master Parachutist.¹⁶³

B. 112th Signal Battalion

1. General: The activation of 1st SOCOM created a need for additional signal capabilities to meet the new headquarters needs. In order to enhance SOF communications capabilities, the Army re-activated 112th Signal Battalion on 17 September 1986 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Shortly after activation, the battalion received orders for deployment to the US Southern Command Theater.

The 112th provided continuous communications support to several US security efforts in the Southern Region as well as Drug Enforcement support. In 1989 the Government of the United States chose to exercise its treaty rights in Panama through the deployment of US troops on Operation NIMROD DANCER. With less than twelve hours notice, 112th soldiers deployed as part of that exercise to support Special Operations training missions. At the

¹⁶³Ibid., 4.

same time, the unit provided tactical communications support for Joint Special Operations Exercises in various SOF Theaters worldwide.

Joint Special Operations Theater support culminated in the Battalion (-) deployment on Operation JUST CAUSE. In December 1989, elements of the 112th were among the first to deploy to Panama and join other 112th soldiers already in country supporting the Joint Special Operations Headquarters.

After Operation JUST CAUSE, battalion elements continued to provide support during Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY as US forces assisted the Panamanian people in working toward a democratic form of government.

Upon returning to Fort Bragg, the battalion immediately began the process of fielding new upgraded communications systems. The 112th became the first unit in the Army to field High Frequency Multichannel transmission equipment and one of the first to upgrade multichannel satellite systems. At the same time, the unit continued efforts to down size battalion unique communications assemblages.

With the activation of United States Army Special Forces Command in November 1990, 112th Signal assumed responsibilities for providing communication support to the new headquarters. The first challenge facing 112th Signal proved to be in support of SOF operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. While in Southwest Asia, the unit earned its seventh battle streamer and a Unit Commendation. While in theater, the unit provided command and control connectivity to two Special Forces Groups, CENCOM, XVIIIth Airborne Corps and Department of Defense elements. When the fighting came to a close, soldiers from the 112th would continue to support SOF needs until they redeployed to Fort Bragg on 31 March 1991. Some of the battalion's soldiers remained behind to provide communications support during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

The following year, on 26 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck Florida bringing widespread devastation to coastal regions. In order to augment FEMA efforts at disaster relief, 112th Signal dispatched communications teams to operate command and control communications for Special Forces Detachments working in the stricken area.

In October 1992, the 112th was re-aligned within the force structure, coming under the command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (A). The change would more clearly define the role of the battalion to support all Special Operations Forces at the Theater Special Operations Command and Army Special

Operations Command levels.¹⁶⁴

2. Mission Statement: To simultaneously provide dedicated theater level signal support to two joint special operations forces commands, their subordinate special operations forces headquarters, and other commands as required or directed.¹⁶⁵ At level 1, the battalion is capable of:

a. Providing staff supervision for the planning, installation, operation, maintenance, and system control for two joint theater level SOF communications systems simultaneously.

b. Simultaneously installing, operating, maintaining, and controlling two joint theater level communications systems that provide two large signal nodes, and smaller extension nodes with the following services:

1. Multichannel SHF satellite links
2. Multichannel HF links
3. Telephone switching and limited cable and wire installation
4. Technical control facilities
5. Net Radio interface via UHF satellite, HF, and VHF single channel radio.
6. Net radio interface via UHF satellite, HF, and VHF single channel radio.
7. UHF Satellite, HF, and VHF single channel radio.
8. UHF satellite, HF, and VHF single channel data, radio for voice and facsimile communications.

c. Provide a signal path for SSO, WWMCCS, and Weather communications, and terminal devices for SSO and weather circuits.

d. Provide service into the DCS, host nation, and

¹⁶⁴History: 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion (Airborne), Misc. documents relating to 112th Signal Battalion, USASOC Archives, 2-4.

¹⁶⁵U.S. Army Signal Center and School Special Operations Signal Battalion, Table of Organization and Equipment, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army), Tab D-1.

theater communications systems.

e. Provide secure en-route communications

f. Provide a total of fourteen quick reaction single channel radio systems for command and control/liaison support that are deployable by ground, air, or amphibious assault.

g. Rapidly deploy by air, (without use of MHE), Land and set to support special operations force contingency mission.

h. Maintain a comsec account and provide unit and (DS) direct support level maintenance for cryptographic equipment.

i. Provide unit and direct support (DS) maintenance for all organic signal equipment and limited general support (GS) level maintenance for organic SOF peculiar signal equipment.

j. Provide unit level maintenance for organic vehicles, generation power equipment, trailers, and environmental control systems.¹⁶⁶

3. Key Personnel

Commander (1986)	LTC James D. Bryan
Commander (1988)	LTC Steve Sawdey
Commander (1990)	LTC Samuel Higdon
Commander (1992)	LTC Don Kropp

4. Biographies

a. LTC James David Bryan took over command of the 112th Signal Battalion following twenty-two months as the 1st Special Operations Command (A) Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics. He is a native of Birmingham, Alabama. LTC Bryan graduated from Jacksonville State University and was commissioned as a Regular Army Officer in January, 1970. He graduated from North Carolina State University with a Masters Degree in Adult Education in 1975 and is currently in the dissertation phase of a Doctorate in Education at Nova University.

Previous Special Operations assignments include: Instructor and Operations Officer, Communications Division, JFK Institute for Military Assistance (1971-72); Executive Officer and Operations Officer of the Support Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1973-75); J-6, JUWTF during numerous USREDCOM JRX (1974-1977); Commander, Signal Company, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1975-1977).

¹⁶⁶Ibid., Tab D-3 and D-4.

Conventional assignments include: Battalion C-E Officer, 3/325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division (1970-1971); Battalion S-2/3, 122nd Signal Battalion, (Korea) (1972-1973); Battalion and Brigade C-E Officer, 1-52d Infantry (Mech) and 3rd Brigade, 1st Armor Division (Germany) (1979-1980); and Chief, Training and Professional Development Division, HQ U.S. Army Recruiting Command (1980-1983)

LTC Bryan is a graduate of the Signal Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the NATO Electronic Warfare School, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is Airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces qualified and is a master parachutist. Awards and decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal w/oak leaf, the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, the Humanitarian Service Medal, the National Defense Service Medal as well as overseas and military service medals.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷Activation of 112th Signal Battalion pamphlet dated 26 September 1986, USASOC Archives, 4. Other command biographies are not available in the archives.

V. US. CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

A. MISSION:

The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, a subordinate command of USASOC, consists of all active and reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. The mission of the command is:

To command and control U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces in the implementation of USASOC policies, plans and programs to ensure that USACAPOC forces are organized, equipped, trained and validated to meet worldwide employment requirements in support of their wartime/peacetime mission [and] Upon mobilization, continue to perform mission as stated above and assist in the mobilization of USACAPOC units and individuals, as directed by USASOC.¹⁶⁸

B. ORGANIZATION:

USACAPOC is commanded by a drilling reservist. The first USARSOC/USACAPOC commander was BG Joseph C. Hurteau, who served from 1 December 1989 to 2 May 1993. BG Hurteau had also been the commander of the 1st SOCOM Augmentation Detachment (Airborne), noted above, from October of 1985 to April of 1987, as well as the Deputy Commanding General (Reserve) (Individual Mobilization Augmentee) for 1st SOCOM from March 1988 to the activation of USARSOC. BG (later MG) Donald F. Campbell succeeded BG Hurteau as USACAPOC Commanding General in May 1993.¹⁶⁹

C. Key PERSONNEL:

As of the end of CY 92, key headquarters personnel of USACAPOC, in addition to the Commanding General, included:

Deputy Commanding Officer:	COL J. Blanchette
Command Sergeant Major:	CSM S. Foust
Chief of Staff:	COL R. Heyford
Secretary of the General Staff:	MAJ S. Cage
G-1 Personnel:	Mr. A. King
G-2 Intelligence:	MAJ G. Hunnicutt
G-3 Operations:	Vacant

¹⁶⁸USACAPOC, "Command Briefing," paper slides, Ft. Bragg:
n.d.

¹⁶⁹Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, "Readahead for the Civil Affairs Symposium", (Fort Bragg, NC: 25 October 1991), 29.

Information Management Cell: MAJ Noonan
Inspector General: LTC J. West

D. UNITS:

As of late 1992, USACAPOC(A) consisted of the following RC CA units: (See attached organizational charts, FIGURES 10-13)

351st Civil Affairs Command (Mountain View, California), oriented towards Pacific Command.

Subordinate units:

364th CA Brigade (Portland, Oregon)
407th CA Battalion (GP) (Fort Snelling, Minnesota)
407th CA Battalion, Detachment 1 (Winona, Minnesota),
425th CA Battalion (GP) (Santa Barbara and Oakland, California and Fort Lewis, Washington respectively).
445th CA Battalion (GP) (Oakland, California)
448th CA Battalion (GP) (Fort Lewis, Washington)
426th CA Battalion (FID/UW) (Upland, California)
322nd CA Brigade (Honolulu).

352d Civil Affairs Command (Riverdale, Maryland), oriented towards Central Command.

Subordinate units:

360th CA Brigade (Columbia, South Carolina)
401st CA Battalion (GP) (Webster, New York)
450th CA Battalion (GP) (Riverdale, Maryland)
489th CA Battalion (Knoxville Tennessee)
354th CA Brigade (Riverdale, Maryland)
403rd CA Battalion (Mattydale, New York)
414th CA Battalion (Utica, New York)


353d Civil Affairs Command (the Bronx, New York), oriented toward European Command.

Subordinate units:

304th CA Brigade (Philadelphia)
402d CA Battalion (GP) (Tonawanda, New York)
411th CA Battalion (GP) (Danbury, Connecticut)
443rd CA Battalion (GP) (Warwick, Rhode Island) respectively).
308th CA Brigade (Homewood, Illinois)
415th CA Battalion (GP) (Kalamazoo, Michigan)
432nd CA Battalion (GP) (Green Bay, Wisconsin)
321st CA Brigade (San Antonio, Texas)
418th CA Battalion (GP) (Belton, Missouri)
490th CA Battalion (GP) (Abilene, Texas)
404th CA Battalion (FID/UW) (Trenton, New Jersey)
358th CA Brigade (King of Prussia, Pennsylvania), oriented toward Atlantic Command.
416th CA Battalion (GP) (King of Prussia, Pennsylvania)


CA FORCE STRUCTURE

Organizational Alignments (Effective 1 Oct 92)




CA GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS

(Grouped by Commands, Effective 1 Oct 92)




PSYOP FORCE STRUCTURE

Organizational Alignments (Effective 1 Oct 92)



PSYOP GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS

(Grouped by Commands, Effective 1 Oct 92)



361st CA Brigade (Lubbock, Texas), oriented toward Southern Command.

413th CA Battalion (GP) (Lubbock, Texas)
431st CA Battalion (GP) (North Little Rock, Arkansas)
486th CA Battalion (GP) (Broken Arrow, Oklahoma)
478th CA Battalion (FID/UW) (Perrine, Florida)

The 422nd CA Battalion (Airborne) (Greensboro, North Carolina): an independent Major Subordinate Unit, oriented worldwide.

The USACAPOC RC PSYOP units consisted of:

2nd Psychological Operations Group (POG) (Cleveland, Ohio).

Subordinate units:

13th PSYOP Battalion (EPW) (Fort Snelling, Minnesota).
19th PSYOP Company (EPW) (" ").
39th PSYOP Company (EPW) (" ").
93rd PSYOP Company (Arlington Heights, Illinois)
14th PSYOP Battalion (Mountain View, California), oriented toward Pacific Command.
1st PSYOP Company (TSC) (San Diego, California)
4th PSYOP Company (TSC) (Sacramento, California)
20th PSYOP Company (TSC) (Portland, Oregon)
24th PSYOP Company (TSC) (Aurora, Colorado)
362nd PSYOP Company (TSC) (Fayetteville, Arkansas)
15th PSYOP Battalion (TSB) (Fort Thomas, Kentucky), oriented toward Atlantic Command.
3rd PSYOP Company (TSC) (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)
21st PSYOP Company (Cleveland, Ohio)
16TH PSYOP Company (Morganton, West Virginia)
246th PSYOP Company (TSC) (Blacklick, Ohio)
350th PSYOP Company (Cleveland, Ohio)
305th PSYOP Battalion (Arlington Heights, Illinois), oriented world-wide.
10th PSYOP Company (TSC) (Forest Park, Georgia)
244th PSYOP COMPANY (TSC)
245th PSYOP Company (TSC) (Dallas, Texas)
308th PSYOP Company (Belton, Missouri)

5th PSYOP Group (Washington, DC)

Subordinate units:

7th PSYOP Battalion (RSB) (Washington, DC), oriented toward Atlantic Command.
12th PSYOP Company (TSC), (Washington, DC)
305th PSYOP Company (RAC), (" ")
360th PSYOP Company (TSC), (Wilmington, Delaware)

7th PSYOP Group (San Francisco)

Subordinate units:

10th PSYOP Battalion (St Louis, Missouri), oriented worldwide.
18th PSYOP Company (" ")
307th PSYOP Company (RSC) (" ")
349th PSYOP Company (RAC) (Fort Snelling, Minnesota)
353rd PSYOP Battalion (RSB) (San Francisco), oriented toward Pacific Command.
15th PSYOP Company (RSC) (Upland, California)
306th PSYOP Company (SDC) (Los Alamitos, California)
353rd PSYOP Company (RSC) (" ")
361st PSYOP Company (RSC) (Bothell, Wisconsin)

The two Active Army USCAPOC units, headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as of the end of 1992 were the 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) North Carolina and the 4th POG (A). The 96th contained a headquarters and companies A through D. Under the 4th was the 1st, 6th, 8th, 9th and PSYOP Dissemination Battalions, all worldwide oriented.¹⁷⁰

E. HISTORY:


The more recent historical roots of USACAPOC go back to October 1985, with the formation of the 1st Special Operations Command Augmentation Detachment (Airborne). This unit of 30 soldiers formed a nucleus that evolved into the U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC). (See FIGURE 14) USARSOC, formed on 1 December 1989 as a Major Subordinate Command under USASOC, was conceived of as a "super ARCOM" (Army Reserve Command) which would exert oversight over all U. S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces units. The new command was designed to provide a single source for USAR SOF, to fix authority, responsibility and accountability for those forces. Its other objectives were to enhance training and readiness and ensure long-range planning and near-term execution.

Within days of USARSOC's activation, the command went into action with Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. USARSOC immediately began identifying and mobilizing individual volunteer reservists for duty in JUST CAUSE and in the succeeding CA operation, PROMOTE LIBERTY. JUST CAUSE saw 150 CA specialists deployed along with 2,000 temporary tours of active duty (TTAD) volunteers. PROMOTE LIBERTY deployed 40 personnel per iteration (35 police officers and 5 CA support personnel).

Some of the first U. S. Army soldiers to see action were troopers of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion who jumped with U.S.

¹⁷⁰"USACAPOC Directory" (Fort Bragg, NC: August 1993).

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND



Army Rangers at H-Hour at the Torrijos-Tocumen airport on the night of 20 December 1989. They quickly established collection points for prisoners as well as for the wounded and civilians at the airport. Other CA troopers, many of them Reservists who were called up or who volunteered as individuals, served as interim law and police officers and processed the more than 5,000 Panamanians detained by U.S. forces.

A major and most challenging task for CA forces in Panama was the establishment of a non-political, non-threatening indigenous police force. Compromises were necessary; mere membership in the old Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) would not necessarily disqualify a candidate for the new service. Some CA troopers, the majority of whom were law enforcement officers in civilian life, provided expertise and a large measure of dedication to the establishment of a new, civilianized professional police force that would be an asset to Panamanians, not the paramilitary strong arm of the regime.

Civil Affairs troops also established a Displaced Civilians (DC) facility that was rated by the International Red Cross as one of the best that they had ever inspected. In fact, identification cards had to be issued to keep unauthorized civilians out of the facility. Individual reservists of the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) brought to Panama their expertise in hospital and public health administration, waste disposal, customs, drug enforcement, gas, electrical and water distribution, veterinary medicine and agronomy, to name just a few of the skills needed for the resurrection of Panama in the wake of combat, embargo and years of repression and turmoil. As had been the case in Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada in 1983, a contingent of CA soldiers remained in Panama until August 1990. They were working on Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, the more long-range establishment of a functioning, democratic nation.¹⁷¹ In both URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY, CA forces were

¹⁷¹"Civil Affairs in 'Just Cause'," Special Warfare, Spring 1990; C. S. Welton II, "Army Reservists Serve in Panama Operation," Army Reserve 36, no.2 (1990); E. F. Dander, Jr., "Civil Affairs Operations," eds. B. W. Watson and Peter Tsouras, Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: 1991; J. A. Kingston, "Profile in Professionalism: U.S. Military Support Group - Panama," SO/LIC News, 2, No.2. See also taped oral interviews conducted by USAJFKSWCS/USASOC Command Historians, on file in USASOC Historical Archives. A more jaundiced view is provided by J. Greenhut, "To Promote Liberty: Army Reserve Civil Affairs in the Invasion of Panama, December 1989-April 1990," typescript for USACAPOC (Fort Bragg, N.C.), n.d. [1990]. For PROMOTE LIBERTY see also after-action reports, briefing slides, etc. in "Promote Liberty" folder, USASOC Historical Archives.

called upon to react quickly to a fast-breaking contingency operation, yet they still managed performed their duties effectively and earned widespread popular support.

The lessons of JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY were still being studied and written up when USARSOC once again had to mobilize troops for the field, this time for duty in Southwest Asia, in the largest activation of reservists since the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961. In the midst of all this, on 27 November 1990, USARSOC was realigned and redesignated the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne). (See FIGURE 15) On that date, the command lost the responsibility for its Special Forces units and assumed responsibility for all CA and PSYOP units, active and reserve component. Full command and control of all reserve component CA and PSYOP units came on 1 October 1991, which was at least three years ahead of the schedule originally drafted back during the period of the formation of the MACOM.

During the Gulf War SOF operations, more than 2,650 active and reserve component soldiers were deployed by the new USACAPOC in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and PROVIDE COMFORT. These soldiers included active and reserve component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers from across the country.


Civil Affairs

Initially, ARCENT (U.S. Army Central Command) ignored any need for a large in-theater Civil Affairs capability in Saudi Arabia, perhaps hoping that there would be few civilians in the area of expected operations. Nonetheless, the 96th was the first CA unit to deploy to Southwest Asia, in August 1990.¹⁷² The first RC CA unit arrived in Saudi Arabia on 16 January 1991, and the last, the 407th CA Company on 9 February. The RC CA units deployed to Southwest Asia were:

360th CA Brigade	In support of XVIIIth Airborne Corps
450th CA Company	
489th " "	" "
422d " "	" "
413th " "	" "

¹⁷²(Company B of the 96th was initially given the job of supporting French units because of its European orientation and its French linguists.)

US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 1992



* USAR UNITS

407th CA Company	In support of 1st Corps Support Command, XVIII Airborne Corps
354th CA Brigade	VII Corps
418th CA Company	1st Infantry Division, VII Corps
401st " "	1st Armored Division, VII Corps
404th " "	3rd Armored Division, VII Corps
414th " "	2d Corps Support Command, VII Corps

As they were activated, both CA and PSYOP reserve units had to undergo a tough SOF Validation Program, managed by USARSOC/USACAPOC. Initial results for many units were poor. However, the USARSOC/USACAPOC commander, BG Joe Hurteau, would brook no compromise: all RC personnel mobilized had to meet SOF standards.¹⁷³ In the end more than 85 percent of CA Reservists qualified for deployment, showing that most RC soldiers could indeed meet the high SOF standards. The CA units called up for DESERT SHIELD/STORM also exhibited some deficiencies in the areas of uniforms, weapons, vehicles, radios, navigation gear, public address systems and repair parts. USACAPOC personnel worked long hours, utilizing IDT (Inactive Duty for Training), AT (Annual Training), ADT (Active Duty for Training), ADSW (Active Duty Special Work), TTAD (Temporary Tour of Active Duty) and, when needed, MT ("My Time").

Planning for CA support in Southwest Asia began with the formation of the Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF), a U.S. government and Kuwait government (in exile) and U.S. Army office, organized on 1 December 1990 in Washington, D.C. and deployed to Saudi Arabia in February of 1991. The first KTF troops mobilized were 57 Army Reservists from the 352d CA Command and the 354th CA Brigade.

In Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM had only just begun to realize that the job of reconstituting Kuwait could not be left entirely to Arab coalition forces, as was the original intention. Accordingly, upon the arrival of the KTF and the 352nd CA Command, CENTCOM formed the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) under BG Howard T. Mooney (also CO of the 352d) for this mission. The CCTF consisted of the 352d (-) the 431st and 432 CA Companies and the KTF. The 96th CA Battalion (-) was in direct support of the CCATF. The final CA organization in Southwest Asia was Task Force Freedom, created by ARCENT, as a small command and control cell for all relief and reconstruction in Kuwait.

The CCATF moved into Kuwait City on 1 March 1991 and concluded their humanitarian assistance mission on 30 April. The results of their work were quickly apparent. Not one Kuwaiti

¹⁷³BG J. Hurteau, oral interview with then-USAJFKSWCS Command Historian, 9 August 1990.

died from thirst, starvation or lack of medical attention after liberation day. By early April, 50 percent of Kuwait's telecommunications and transportation systems had been restored and one-third of its electrical power.¹⁷⁴

CA troopers had to use all of their cultural sensitivities in dealing with the liberated Kuwaitis. For decades, the Kuwaiti reaction to manual labor was to allow Third World nationals to do all the dirty work under contract. This attitude clashed, of course, with the U.S. military "can do" mind-set. The initial reaction to a problem for a U. S. soldier was to work hard--even manual labor--to get the job done whether it was garbage collection, food distribution or street sweeping. However, serious conflicts between these two different approaches to problems were apparently avoided with mutual forbearance.¹⁷⁵

The CCATF was not so fortunate in forestalling human rights abuses in Kuwait directed toward the thousands of third country nationals.¹⁷⁶ The KTF had been aware of the potential for human rights abuses well before the beginning of hostilities. As early as mid-December 1990, one senior official of the Kuwaiti government-in-exile, when asked by a KTF staffer why he had not requested food planning for the Palestinian inhabitants of his nation, had replied (perhaps with the legendary quote of Marie Antoinette in mind), "let them eat sand." But there was an understandable CA concern that went well beyond feeding arrangements: the 1982 massacres of Palestinians at the Shatila and Shaba camps in Lebanon provided a chilling reminder of what could be the fate of this ethnic group at the hands of vengeful Kuwaitis.

Civil Affairs planners emphatically rejected the idea of refugee camps. Not only did they bear in mind the Lebanon killings, but they also realized that such camps could act as magnets for activists with murder or mayhem on their minds. The camps could also create dependency, make violence against women easier and spread disease.

¹⁷⁴Gulf War Symposium, passim.

¹⁷⁵Official reports are reticent in dealing with this sensitive subject, but it does come out in taped after-action interviews with USASOC Historians on file in the USASOC History Archives.

¹⁷⁶For mobilization of CA personnel and units, see T. W. Crouch, and W. A. McGrew, "Civil Affairs in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort, 1990-1991: Some Views of the Operators about Mobilization" (Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, VA: July 1993).

The final protection plan called for a dusk-to-dawn Kuwait City curfew for the first two weeks after liberation, military patrols in the Palestinian neighborhoods, aiding the entry of various international refugee assistance agencies into these neighborhoods and the positioning of Allied troops to block Kuwaiti access to those areas.

Quite early in the liberation of Kuwait City, it became obvious that Arab Coalition troops were not interested in the plan, and random abuses of the Palestinians began. KTF troops then drove into the Hawally Palestinian neighborhood to establish a presence and to reassure the Palestinians that they would be safe. The response was an outpouring of gratitude and the establishment of trust and admiration for the United States, no small change for Palestinians brought up on hatred of America for its support of the "Zionist entity" (Israel).

Civil Affairs became the eyes and ears of the United States Ambassador to Kuwait, who had few other means of maintaining any American deterrent presence in the Palestinian neighborhoods without CA troops.¹⁷⁷ Investigation of human rights abuses were carried out by the Human Services Team of the KTF and the CA Public Safety Team. Officers of these teams then persuaded Kuwaiti legal authorities to hold legally-constituted trials for suspected collaborators. As was well reported at the time, these trials had their elements of farce and lack of due process, but they did act as something of a safety valve for Kuwaiti anger and desire for revenge.¹⁷⁸

PSYOP

The Gulf War would also see the greatest use of U.S. Army PSYOP since the Vietnam War, and, like Civil Affairs, one of the

¹⁷⁷The other U.S. presence throughout Kuwait City was, of course, U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers of the 3rd SFG(A). They two were critical "eyes and ears" of the U.S. command and the ambassador in keeping possible human rights abuses in check.

¹⁷⁸Andrew Natsios, "Preventing Human Rights Abuse in Kuwait," in "Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium, Proceedings," U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Ft. Bragg, NC: 1991); 352d Civil Affairs Command, "Task Force Freedom, Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report," April, 1991, in *ibid.*, 308-309; also J. R. Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq", in USAJFKSWCS, "Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War, A Symposium" (Fort Bragg, NC: 25-27 October 1991). See also transcripts of oral interviews conducted by USASOC Command Historians with personnel of the 352 CA Cmd, the 450th CA Co, the 354th CA Bde and the 96th CA Bn, on file in the USASOC Historical Archives.

most successful. Within a week of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait a ten-person PSYOP planning cell had deployed from Fort Bragg to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), MacDill AFB, Florida to develop a strategic PSYOP plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia and the buildup of coalition forces in Southwest Asia. The overall plan was worked out with the cooperation of the CINCCENT and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁷⁹

On the tactical level, U.S. PSYOPS targeted the Iraqi soldiers and officers of specific units to encourage their desertion, to deter them from war crimes and wanton destruction of Kuwait, to convince them that they had been lied to by Saddam, that the Coalition had no quarrel with them, and that the majority of the civilized world, including many Islamic and Arab nations, was arrayed against them.

Unfortunately, the approval of these plans and their implementation were delayed as they were worked through the higher commands in Washington, DC until the middle of December 1990. By that time, many of the plans' initiatives had been overtaken by events. The procurement of host nation linguists, intelligence, and production facilities were also adversely affected. As well, Saddam Hussein's propaganda mills were trumpeting an orchestrated campaign calling for the Islamic world to rally against the "infidels" and the "new Crusaders." Indeed, the implementation of the strategic PSYOP plan might have been even further delayed had not the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) sent a strong follow-up message to the Chairman of the JCS.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹COL A. Normand, oral interview with US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Command Historian, 10 Oct 91. (All interviews cited were held at Ft. Bragg, N.C. unless otherwise noted.) 4th POG AAR, 4.

¹⁸⁰U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), (S) "U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned, 'DESERT SHIELD/STORM'" (U), Ft. Bragg, NC, n.d., 3-8. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. Memo for Commander, USASOC, from Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, subj: Lessons Learned from DESERT SHIELD, 15 Apr 91; COL J. Jones, 8th POB, oral interview with USASOC Assistant Command Historian, Washington, DC, 20 Sep 91; Memo from Chief, USAJFKSWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOES)/PO/SOIS Division, sub: PSYOP Lessons Learned from DESERT STORM, n.d.; COL L. Dunbar (4th POG CO), oral interview with USASOC Assistant Command Historian, Ft. Bragg, NC, 29 Jul 91; USAJFKSWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), "PSYOP Lessons Learned from DESERT STORM," n.d. According to the 4th POG's Commander, General Schwarzkop's message was a blistering memorandum, referring to "blundering bureaucrats." But it broke

The Army's only active component PSYOP unit, the 4th POG, consisting of the 1st, 6th, 8th, 9th, and PSYOP Dissemination Battalions, assumed command and control of all PSYOP units and elements in Southwest Asia. The 4th reported to CENTCOM, which exercised operational command of all U.S. PSYOP assets in theater.

Although no complete Reserve Component PSYOP unit served in Southwest Asia, major elements of the 18th, 19th, 244, 245th, 246th and 362nd PSYOP Companies were deployed.¹⁸¹

One of the earliest strategic PSYOP products from the DESERT SHIELD period was the 15-minute video entitled "Nations of the World Take a Stand" produced for the USIA. This video, reproduced in four languages, emphasized the arraying of the civilized world against Saddam. Agents smuggled 200 copies into Baghdad itself.

The clandestine Voice of the Gulf (VOG), consisting of three AM and two FM stations, began operations on 19 January, 1991, two days after the opening of the air war. The VOG initially carried only music, then music and news, and finally, music, news and PSYOP appeals. To the end, the fiction was maintained that this was purely an Arab station, and this deception probably had much to do with the fact that EPWs reported that the new VOG was their third most listened-to radio station, after the BBC and Radio Monte Carlo.¹⁸²

the log jam, and within a few days the entire plan had been approved. COL A. Normand interview. For the "other side", see Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Apr 92, J-27-31; R. R. Begland, "Lessons of Value to be Learned from Operation Desert Shield, Desert Storm - Provide Comfort," draft, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, VA, 5 Mar 92. (no pagination).

¹⁸¹Memo, 4th POG to USAJFKSWCS Directorate of Evaluation and Studies (DOES), sub: (U) After Action Report for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, 3 Jun 91, 4-8, (SECRET). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸²Ibid., 10-11; 4th POG briefing slides, "as of 4 Jun 91," slides 23-27; COL Dunbar, oral interview with USASOC Assistant Command Historian, 29 Jul 91; CPT R. Graves (4th POG), oral interview with USASOC Assistant Command Historian, 5 Dec 91. The BBC's reputation in the Middle East goes back to before World War II, when the service reported fairly accurately the clashes between Arabs and Jews in British mandatory Palestine. To the end, according to EPW interrogations, the enemy in the Gulf never twigged to the clandestine nature of the VOG. CPT B. F.

As the calendar moved inexorably toward the UN deadline of 15 January for an Iraqi pull-out from Kuwait, the earliest U.S. PSYOP leaflets emphasized that time was running out for the Iraqi soldier. One leaflet showed a stock Arab figure pointing out that fact to a non-plussed Iraqi soldier. Another stock regional figure, "Global Head", emphasized that "The World Sends You a Gift of Peace." All of these early leaflets were composed only after close consultation with Saudi authorities; most were, in fact, drawn by Arab illustrators to lend an authentic Middle East/Arabic cast to the leaflets.¹⁸³

Undoubtedly the most successful of the PSYOP leaflets of the entire war was apparently initiated or at least encouraged by the "CINC" himself (General Schwarzkopf) and was dropped early in the air war. This was the now-famous "B-52" leaflet campaign, directed against six specific Iraqi military units, which had been chosen because of their morale and leadership. Radio broadcasts and leaflet drops informed a unit, by name, that it would be bombed the next day, and urged its troops to leave the area. U.S. Air Force heavy B-52 bombers duly bombed the target unit on that date. Soon after, other broadcasts and leaflets reminded the stunned survivors of had hit them and solicitously repeated the message of further bombing "for the last time." The final B-52 strike could be counted on to produce heavy defections among the survivors. The bombing was bad enough, but any remnants of Iraqi morale were devastated by the realization that the Americans could, with impunity, "telegraph their punches." According to EPW debriefings, this was the most successful PSYOP campaign of the Gulf War, and easily one of the most successful in U.S. military history.¹⁸⁴

Other early leaflets stressed Arab brotherhood. A particularly effective example featured Coalition Arab forces seated at an al fresco dinner with their Iraqi brothers. The leaflet prominently displayed bananas; the Iraqi love of that succulent fruit had been unrequited because of the UN embargo.

On the eve of the ground war, U.S. PSYOP now emphasized the

Auftengarten (4th POG), oral interview with USASOC Assistant Command Historian, 17 Dec 91.

¹⁸³Oral interviews, COL Dunbar, LTC Jones, MAJ W. Lee, 4 Mar 92; CPT B. Auftengarten, 17 Dec 91; CPT R. Graves, 5 Dec 91, with USASOC Assistant Command Historian.

¹⁸⁴Originals or copies of this leaflet, and all others referenced here, are on file in the USASOC Archives, Ft. Bragg, NC and with the 4th POG, FT. Bragg, NC. 4th POG AAR, 18. A similar effort, the "B-29 leaflet" was used to great effect over Japanese cities towards the end of World War II.

superior, death-dealing weapons technology of the Coalition. Apparently the Iraqis particularly feared the Stealth fighter - "The Plane Nobody Can See" - and U.S. leaflets played on the theme of Stealth fighters destroying helpless Iraqi soldiers and equipment. On a more positive note, Iraqi troops were given leaflet and broadcast instructions on how to avoid such a fate and safely to surrender.

U.S. PSYOP planners showed a commendable knowledge of their enemy by playing upon the recent and bloody Iran-Iraq War. One leaflet showed a taxi driving past a startled Iraqi soldier with a flag-draped casket lashed to its roof, a reminder of how the many dead of that war had come home.

By this time PSYOP units were also dropping that classic appeal, the safe conduct pass. Most of these played upon the enemy's homesickness and war-weariness. Many leaflets that emphasized another theme also urged surrender or "rescue," or contained multiple messages. Other leaflets added to the CINCCENT deception plan, which hinted strongly at the probability of a spearhead Marine Corps landing on the beaches of Kuwait, and thus diverted a significant amount of enemy strength from the Coalition's "end run" to the west.¹⁸⁵ In all, some 29 million U.S. Psyop leaflets were dropped in the Kuwait theater of operations by aircraft and artillery.¹⁸⁶

Electronic PSYOP also served to deceive the enemy. Each tactical maneuver brigade had loudspeaker PSYOP teams attached; many of these 66 teams were drawn from the Army Reserve Component.¹⁸⁷ Some PSYOP teams broadcast recorded armor sounds near the front lines, then left the area quickly. The Iraqis would respond with a barrage that hit empty sand. The enemy soon enough caught on to this ruse - only to be surprised and overwhelmed almost bloodlessly later by real Coalition armor.¹⁸⁸

This technique also was also played out in a joint context. CPT James R. Richardson, Operations Officer of the RC 245th PSYOP Company (Airborne), Dallas, TX, was attached to a Marine division. Informed that Marine LAVs (Light Armored Vehicles) were being fired upon as they approached the border area. CPT Richardson's talked initially skeptical operations officers into recording the noises of LAVs starting, stopping, and moving

¹⁸⁵Ibid., 14; COL L. Dunbar interview.

¹⁸⁶DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, J-28.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., J-30.

¹⁸⁸LTC Jones interview; USAJFKSWCS, "U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned, DESERT SHIELD/STORM," 2-74.

around. That night, loudspeaker teams moved up to the berm and played the recorded noises. Retiring quickly to a sheltered area, they watched as Iraqi artillery and rocket rounds soon after fell on the area just vacated. Then pre-alerted Marine artillery locating units pin-pointed the sites of the enemy pieces and called in air or artillery strikes to good effect.¹⁸⁹

Neither print nor electronic PSYOP denigrated Iraqi soldiers. They were always depicted as brave men led astray by the evil Saddam and who would be received with dignity upon leaving the battle.

For the first time on any significant scale, U.S. PSYOP personnel continued to work with the enemy after his surrender. The RC 13th PSYOP Battalion (PW/CI), the only U.S. PSYOP unit designated to aid in the handling of EPWs, served as the first screening level for enemy prisoners. Five EPW PSYOP Support Teams from the 13th supported the 800th MP Brigade at one MARCENT EPW and four corps cages. These teams successfully conducted an EPW pacification and cooperation campaign by identifying English-speakers, informal group leaders, disguised officers, cooperative prisoners, intelligence officers, and agitators. They were also able to forward intelligence to corps and PSYOP intelligence, and to conduct pre and post-testing of PSYOP leaflets and broadcasts. The 13th also encouraged a number of Iraqi EPWs to broadcast this theme and to emphasize their good treatment after surrender.¹⁹⁰

The day following the cease-fire on 28 February 1991, a PSYOP task force was constituted to provide operational and tactical support for liberation and consolidation operations in Kuwait City. The task force operated in Kuwait City for one month, primarily assessing Kuwaiti morale, distributing public service announcements as to the location of food, water, and medical services, warning of unexploded ammunition. The PSYOP soldiers also did their best to protect third country nationals

¹⁸⁹CPT J.R. Richardson, oral interview with USASOC Command Historian, 23 Apr 92. Another PSYOP team, at the request of their Marine battalion commander, played recorded Scottish bagpipe music while going through the breach. CPT Richardson interview. See also transcript of oral interview with LTC Jones, commander 8th POB.

¹⁹⁰LTC Jones interview; 13th PSYOP Bn (PW/CI) JULLS Long Reports, 29 Mar, 4, 11 and 14 Apr 91, USASOC Archives; 4th POG AAR, 31-32; "U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned," 2-71 - 2-72; CPT B. L. Auftengarten, oral interview with USASOC Assistant Command Historian, 17 Dec 91; LTC J. Noll, 13th PSYOP Bn, telephonic oral interview with USASOC Assistant Command Historian, 29 Aug 92.

from abuse at the hands of Kuwaiti civilians and military.¹⁹¹ By the middle of July 1991, virtually all Coalition forces had redeployed from northern Iraq and U.S. PSYOP operations in Southwest Asia ceased.¹⁹²

In all, there can be little question but that the air campaign, allied with PSYOP, "quickly took the heart out of the Iraqi army and contributed to its sudden collapse...many enemy soldiers were demoralized to the point of defecting, deserting, or being ready to surrender at the first shots of the ground battle."¹⁹³

Many CA and PSYOP troops had not even redeployed to the United States from Southwest Asia when they were called upon for a large-scale Humanitarian Assistance mission, the rescue of Iraqi Kurds being brutalized by Saddam Hussein. President Bush ordered the operation in early April 1991, at a time when UN reports indicated that about 2,000 Kurds, mostly children, were dying each day in the mountains where Iraq, Iran and Turkey meet. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT developed, with no prior planning or preparation, into a major effort that in two months employed more than 20,000 military personnel from six nations. The effort was particularly delicate in that Kurdish tribal territory spread over the three bordering nations, all of whom had suppressed of Kurdish dreams of autonomy.

The UN relief personnel, although represented at military conferences, also were wary of coalition forces. But they soon enough realized that only the military had the capability, particularly the airlift capacity, for such a major relief operation. In fact, when the time came for the handoff of the operation from coalition forces to the UN, the latter was unable to secure even the necessary 500 armed guards for its food convoys; by the end of June 1991, only 100 had arrived.

The PROVIDE COMFORT Task Force was formed on 6 April and

¹⁹¹9th Bn., 4th POG, SITREP/INSUMs, 23-24 Mar 91, USASOC History Archives.

¹⁹²DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, J-27; USAJFKSWCS DOES, (S) "U.S. Army Special Operations," (S). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED., 3-10. The quote has been widely disseminated. Also series of transcripts or audio tapes of oral interviews conducted by USASOC Assistant Command Historian with personnel of 4th POG, 1991, in USASOC History Archives.

¹⁹³(S) "Army Lessons Learned, Operation Desert Storm," (U), I, Strategic Desert Storm Special Study Project (U). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, n.d. (upgrade date, 28 Aug 91), 1-158.

was composed of about 500 U.S. troops and another 5,000 Allied soldiers. Between April and early May, the 418th, 431st and 432d CA Companies from Task Force Freedom, the 418th CA Company, from VII Corps support arrived in Turkey, along with 63 troopers from the 96th CA Battalion. In early June, the Commanding General of the 353d CA Command, then-BG Donald F. Campbell, was called to active duty, and deployed to EUCOM to begin planning for PROVIDE COMFORT. BG Campbell and his planning team then moved on to Turkey, where he was appointed the Deputy CTF Commander (less operational control) for Civil Affairs of the Task Force.

Although Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was based at Incirlik Air Base in Eastern Turkey, most operations took place in Northern Iraq. The main mission of the Task Force was the establishment and operation of refugee camps. Three such camps were opened at Zakhu by the 432st and 432d CA Companies, while an additional camp at al Amadya was established with CA advice in planning and operation.¹⁹⁴ Task Force troopers realized that humanitarian assistance consisted of more than simply air-dropping relief supplies. At least after the initial period of starvation was passed, cultural sensitivities to certain foods surfaced, including, of course, an aversion to pork among the Muslim Kurds. But baby formula, for example, could prove lethal to already dangerously malnourished or sick infants if combined in unsterilized bottles or with polluted water. Once the refugee camps were functioning, coalition forces established a security zone, from which the murderous Iraqi troops and security forces were removed, and in which the Kurds could re-establish their lives in peace.

CA troops, many of whom were reservists coming directly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, worked alongside Special Forces teams from the 10th SFG (A), helping to establish way stations for the refugees coming down from the hills. They also worked beside U.S. and allied soldiers, UN representatives and non-governmental relief organizations (NGO) in the refugee camps and labored in the cities, towns and villages to resettle the Kurds safely back in their homelands.

PSYOP personnel and their equipment began redeployment from the Persian gulf region on 28 March, 1991. However, 29 members of the 6th Battalion, 4th POG, found themselves deployed from Saudi Arabia to Incirlik, Turkey on 25 April in support of CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴CA Gulf War Symposium, 70-75.

¹⁹⁵LTC G. W. Rudd, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: One More Tile in the Mosaic, 6 Apr - 15 Jul 91," for the U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.; 450th CA Co., "Experiences of the 450th," 17; 354th CA Bdg., "Operations DESERT STORM and PROVIDE

One of the first tasks of the CJTF PSYOP contingent was the drawing up and distributing of leaflets encouraging the Kurds to come down out of the mountains for relief in the camps that the task force and other agencies were establishing. The leaflets outlined safe routes to the camps, and emphasized graphically the dangers of leaving those routes and falling victim to antipersonnel devices liberally scattered throughout the countryside.¹⁹⁶

Other leaflets explained the contents and use of Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) and the preparation of powdered baby formula. In addition, PSYOP troops composed a registration tape that played over and over on the camp loudspeaker system, providing immediate information to newly-arrived refugees and cutting the camp registration effort by about one-half.¹⁹⁷ By the time of the handoff from coalition military forces to the UN and non-governmental agencies, operation PROVIDE COMFORT had proved a successful, almost textbook example of a military humanitarian relief operation; the Kurds certainly were distraught at the military's departure.¹⁹⁸

In all, more than 2,650 active and reserve component soldiers were deployed by the new USACAPOC for operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM and the largest humanitarian mission since the Berlin Airlift, PROVIDE COMFORT. And there would be little rest after these operations; active duty and reservist CA soldiers were deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to help in Haitian refugee assistance operations and then to Miami for relief

COMFORT," and "354th CA Brigade's Participation in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT," in "Civil Affairs Gulf War Symposium Read Ahead Documents," 25 Oct 91, Ft. Bragg, NC, n.d.; USAJFKSWCS DOES, "Operation Provide Comfort: Lessons Learned, Observations," draft, Ft. Bragg, NC, 27 Nov 91, 8, 188-198.

¹⁹⁶Originals and copies of these leaflets are on file with 4th POG and USASOC History Archives. MAJ J. Summe, oral interview with USASOC Assistant Command Historian, 15 Aug 91.

¹⁹⁷USAJFKSWCS DOES, draft, "Operation Provide Comfort: Lessons Learned, Observations," 27 Nov 91, 191; MAJ Summe interview. For further description of PROVIDE COMFORT, see Begland, n.p.

¹⁹⁸Rudd, "One More Tile,"; USAJFKSWCS Department of Evaluations [sic.] and Standardization, "Operation Provide Comfort: Lessons Learned, Observations" (Fort Bragg, N.C.: 27 November 1991); D. S. Elmo, "353d Civil Affairs Distribute Food to Kurdish Refugees, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command Briefback, summer 1991; "Civil Affairs Gulf War Symposium," passim.

operations in the wake of Hurricane Andrew.

The command's October 1992 realignment emphasized the training and readiness function of the subordinate units, and the majority of administrative and support positions were assumed by USASOC. The majority of personnel were in the G-3 Operations, Inspector General and Staff Judge Advocate offices, with only small cells for personnel, intelligence, logistics and information management support. Training management and oversight became the most important missions of USACAPOC, involving yearly training plan validation and developing a standardized methodology for CA and PSYOP training. Influential voices are increasingly being raised to advocate using the U.S. to deal with such U.S. domestic problems as inner city blight and poor schools as well as civil unrest.¹⁹⁹

The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) in its short but significant existence, has had to "hit the ground running" in a series of operations that tested its organizational structure, doctrine and training far sooner than anyone at the beginning had imagined.²⁰⁰ By the end of 1992, USACAPOC had assumed full command and control over all active and USAR Civil Affairs and PSYOP units. The real challenges lay ahead to realign the CAPOC staff to accomplish their new, highly focused mission.

¹⁹⁹For an imaginative argument against such employment of the Army, as well as citations of articles advocating such a course, see C. J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters, Winter 1992-93.

²⁰⁰BG Joseph Hurteau, oral interview with USASOC Command Historian, USACAPOC Hdq., Ft. Bragg, NC, 9 August 1990; Richard Stewart, USASOC Command Historian, "USACAPOC History," Ft. Bragg, n.d.; USACAPOC "Command Briefing" slides, Ft Bragg: 17 Oct 91; USACAPOC, "Operation Just Cause After Action Report, Ft. Bragg, NC: 26 Jan 90

VI. US ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE
CENTER AND SCHOOL

The years 1987-1992²⁰¹ saw the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) caught up in the great expansion of Special Operations Forces (SOF) that was a part of the general expansion and improvement of the U.S. military forwarded by Presidents Carter and Reagan. This expansion and improvement did not always meet with approval among the higher command authorities, and as a consequence, serious changes in SOF did not begin until 1983 when the Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, tasked the USAJFKSWCS Commandant, BG Joseph C. Lutz, to prepare an analysis of current and future needs for the revitalization of SOF. This initiative was "the first positive initiative to enhance special Operations forces in the past ten years."²⁰²

In 1984, SF NCOs had received the separate Career Management Field 18, the SF Warrant Officer Program Military Occupational Specialty 180 was established and Special Forces was recognized for the first time as an officer career field with the institution of Specialty Code 18, which soon after became FA 18. In the same year, the 1st Special Forces Group (A) was reactivated at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Two years later, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 authorized the most far-reaching organizational changes in U.S. special operations since the end of World War II. Those sections pertaining to SOF provided for a new four-star unified Combatant Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for all Army, Air Force and Navy SOF, as well as an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.²⁰³

A steady, decade-long buildup of SOF continued through the

²⁰¹Unless otherwise indicated, years used here refer to Calendar Years (CY).

²⁰²Commander's General Remarks," U.S. Army Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, "Manpower Survey Report," for USAJFKSWC, U.S. Army TRADOC (Fort Monroe, VA: 17 November 1983). An authoritative overview of the SOF revival of the 1980s can be found in W. C. Broadhurst, "Revitalization of Army Special Operations Forces," thesis (Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL: 1987).

²⁰³J. P. Nichol, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict: U.S. Progress and Problems, Issue Brief (Congressional Research Service, Washington: 18 May 1990).

1980s. By 1991 the revival of SOF had raised the number of SF groups from three to five active and four reserve.

The year 1987 was particularly notable for the achievement of a long-sought SF goal when the Department of the Army established Special Forces as a separate officer career branch.²⁰⁴ In addition, the Army authorized the Crossed Arrows collar insignia, and Jungle Green as the Special Forces Branch color.²⁰⁵ The Department of the Army also awarded in that year the SF Tab to former soldiers who had served with Special Forces predecessor units, such as OSS Detachment 101, Operational Groups or Korean War Partisans.²⁰⁶

At the "Schoolhouse" the year 1987 saw the completion of a "Master Plan" which dealt with this expansion of SOF, an expansion that would see student input rise from 7,900 in FY87 to 13,600 in FY97. As early as FY90 the Center and School would be short 70,000 square feet for classrooms, support facilities, etc; thus the need for the New Academic Facility classroom building was all the more pressing. This increase would not come in Special Forces only; the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) enlisted instructional course load for both 96F AIT and BNCOC was expected to double in the same time frame.²⁰⁷

The USAJFKSWCS could not wait for new facilities to come on line, and in 3QFY87 the first 96F BNCOC course was instituted. The beginning of the year also saw SWCS complete the installation of the Automated Instructional Management System (AIMS), and the Army Functional Filing System (TAFFS) replaced by the Modern Army Record System (MARKS).²⁰⁸

The momentum of change and expansion continued through 1988. In June of that year the Center and School made significant changes in its SF Qualification Course (SFQC), beginning with an extension of such training from one day short of twenty-one weeks to a full six months.

²⁰⁴SWCS Bulletin (June 1987); Defense Week (22 June 1987), (interview with the Honorable John o. Marsh, Secretary of the Army).

²⁰⁵Msg., DAPE (28 January 1987)l Ltr of Approval to Commander, TRADOC (22 May 1987). The official designation is actually "Bottle Green," #80156.

²⁰⁶Army Personnel Bulletin (July 1987).

²⁰⁷"Long-Range Plan for United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School," n.d. [May 1987].

²⁰⁸"USAJFKSWCS Master Plan," (n.d: [1987]).

Even more significantly, the Center and School initiated in 1988 a three-week Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) segment. Based upon the training of the highly-regarded British and Australian Special Air Service Units, the SF candidates in the SFAS course now took this course on temporary duty rather than permanent change of station, which resulted in appreciable financial savings. More importantly, they could be tested psychologically and physically before even entering the SF Qualifying course, and the unsuitable weeded out early, to the benefit of the Army, the Center and School and the candidate himself. The program was not designed to teach, rather it was designed to assess performance and to select candidates with the strongest potential for the successful completion of SFQC. Throughout the program, candidates were subjected to various forms of psychological and physical stress, which included sleep denial, inspections, issuing of limited or misleading information, maintenance of a strict living environment and limited privileges. Specific activities included a ruckmarch (a 30 lbs. rucksack for 3 miles), a battlemarch (a 45 lbs. rucksack for 10 miles) a 3.8 mile run, military orienteering, rappelling, rafting, log drill and assessments of candidates' responsibility, intelligence, trustworthiness, teamwork, judgment, etc. The pilot class ran from 12 June to 2 July 1988.²⁰⁹

Another pilot course was inaugurated in that year, the Special Operations Staff Officer Course (SOSOC). The SOSOC was designed to give mid-level officers and NCOs joint manning and operations experience .

That year also saw the development of Army SOF (ARSOF) keystone doctrine and its integration into joint and Army doctrine. The SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) established a Doctrine Development Branch, within which a small team of SWCS subject matter experts produced the coordinating draft of FM31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations by August. This draft was the first fundamental revision of SF doctrine since 1974, and introduced a set of fundamental principles for Special Operations (SO) activities, aligned SF doctrine with AirLand Battle doctrine, placed new emphasis upon conflict short of war and shifted to a new decentralized command and control concept that supported the SF Group LTOE. The branch also worked closely with the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to integrate emerging ARSOF doctrine

²⁰⁹SWCS Regulation No. 611-1, SFOT Program, 18 July 1988. The program was originally termed Special Forces Orientation and Training, but was changed soon after to the current Special Forces Assessment and Selection. The argument was that the latter title more accurately reflected the purpose and conduct of the program.

into FM-100-5, Corps Operations; FM 71-100, Division Operations and TC 90-14, Antiarmor Operations on the Integrated Battlefield.²¹⁰

Also in 1988, the 23rd Air Force, Hurlburt AFB, Florida, began operations in support of the Center and School by way of its newly-created Detachment 6 at nearby Pope AFB.²¹¹

The Center and School's one department devoted exclusively to leader development, the NCO Academy, achieved operational status in 1988, conducting its pioneer class from 29 February to 25 May. In addition, the responsibility for the CMF 18 (SF) Basic NCO Course (BNCOC) was transferred from the SWCS Special Forces Department to the Academy.²¹²

At the direction of the SWCS Commanding General, BG James Guest, the Joint Force Integration Department (JFID) was established on 22 June. This initiative came in the wake of the activation of the SF Branch, the approval of a functional area for Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and continued Congressional interest in SOF. The new JFID assumed responsibility for the Joint Mission Analysis (JMA), an analysis of SOF-related requirements in the context of the five regionally-oriented joint commands in order to determine the validity of existing doctrine, training, force structure, material and command and control structure. The JFID early found a number of significant SOF integration deficiencies, including "profound lack of a common understanding, actions conducted without effective coordination, emphasis mainly on material "fixes," need for centralized management of capability development, inadequate interface concerning doctrine, training, force structure and material development, lack of common data base, an absence of a centralized analysis and management of results, lack of multiple points for total integration, failure of current organization to support proponenty requirement and lack of ability comprehensively to forecast and support program requirements. In the following years, JFID attacked each of these problems.²¹³

The Center and School developed Functional Area 39, the

²¹⁰USAJFKSWCS Annual Historical Review, 1988, 2.

²¹¹Memorandum of Agreement between 23rd Air Force and the USAJFKSWCS, signed 10 November 1987 and 11 December 1987.

²¹²"NCOA" files, USASOC History Archives; SWCS Annual Historical Review for CY88, 23.

²¹³Msg., USCINSOC, to dist., subJ: "USSOCOM JMA for USSOUTHCOM, 1st Quarter FY 89, 29 July 1988; SWCS JFID briefing slides.

Army's newest career field, which was approved by the Department of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel on 29 February. FA 39B was assigned to Civil Affairs (CA) officers and FA 39C to PSYOP officers. This FA was designed to produce Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers who were both leaders and functional experts. And with the establishment of the SF Branch and Career Management Field, the skill identifier S for enlisted soldiers and Additional Skill Identifier 5G for officers became no longer necessary. The SWCS Proponency Office requested and received DA permission to delete these identifiers.²¹⁴

Finally in 1988, the Center and School fully implemented the SFQC Staff Ride to the Gettysburg National Military Park. Although the Battle of Gettysburg might seem to yield few SOF-specific examples, this clash does offer timeless lessons in leadership, terrain analysis, command and control, etc.²¹⁵

The year 1989 saw the reorganization of the Center and School's training departments into the 1st Special Warfare Training into the 1st Special Warfare Training Group (SWTG) (Airborne). The 1st SWTG(A) also absorbed the former 1st Special Warfare Training Battalion. This reorganization was undertaken due to the great increase in the number of students matriculating through the training battalion; the end of FY 89 saw 12,000 such students, the greatest such load since the Vietnam Conflict, as compared to a little more than 5,400 students in FY 87.

The training battalions of the Group were organized by their missions: each company of the 1st Battalion was responsible for the training of offices, allied officers and warrant officers, for SFAS or for field training of Phases I and II, or for support. The 2nd Battalion was responsible for advanced skills training. The 3rd Battalion was chartered to instruct, train and develop PSYOP, CA, Special Operations, International Studies and foreign languages.

This reorganization provided an opportunity for the establishment, in September, of an upgraded special staff officer position to act as the proponent for Psychological Operations, filling the long-term need for a dedicated, full-time point of contact for the Center and School to deal with PSYOP issues. This office planned professional development requirements, individual education and training requirements for officers and enlisted personnel, accession of officers to Functional Area (FA) 39, structure of the force, distribution of PSYOP personnel and the general health of FA 39 and Military Occupational Specialty

²¹⁴SWCS, Annual Historical Review, 1988, 4, 43.

²¹⁵"Staff Ride," USASOC SF History Archives.

(MOS) 96F for the active and reserve components. The office also served as the proponent for active component CA officers (39C).²¹⁶

Other SWCS organization changes included the transfer of the International Military Student Office (IMSO) from the School Secretary's Office and its being combined with the Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). The Group was activated by SWCS permanent orders on 15 June; the formal activation took place on the SWCS Organization Day, 19 November.²¹⁷ In addition, the Threat Division of the SWCS Directorate of Combat Developments, the Classified Control Point and the Security Division of the School Secretary's Office, was consolidated to form the Intelligence and Security Office (ISO), directly subordinate to the SWCS Deputy Commander.

The Center and School passed a significant training milestone in October of 1989 with the participation of the 1st SWTG(A) in the first integrated training of SOF at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. The purpose of this participation was; 1) To train SOF units in accordance with current doctrine, 2) provide a mechanism to enable both conventional and SOF commanders to appreciate the strengths and limitations of their respective forces, 3) to provide advanced training for joint special operations under the most challenging conditions of low and mid-intensity combat. The SOF play at the JRTC in 1989 included Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Special Reconnaissance, PSYOP and CA.

The Battle Command Training Program was the capstone of the four service training centers (the National Training Center [NTC], the Joint Readiness Training Center [JRTC], the Combat Maneuver Training Center [CMTC] and the BCTP itself) which pulled together Army-wide division and corps commanders to deal with any threat from Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) world-wide. The BCTP and the JRTC were the primary means for the training and integration of SOF exercises. As early as September of 1988, the Center and School had begun its support of BCTP with

²¹⁶CG, USAJFKSWCS, Memo for dist, "Establishment of a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Proponency Office," 18 Sep 89 (document #16).

²¹⁷USAJFKSWCS Permanent Orders 69-4-6, 15 Jun, and 74-2-6, 26 Jun 89 (Document #1); COL J. Moroney, Commanding Officer, 1st SWTG(A), oral interview with SWCS Command Historian, 16 Dec 89; and CPT(P) Charles Carter, HDQ S-1, 1st SWTG(A), 24 Apr 90; Fayetteville Observer/times, 29 Oct 89; Special Warfare, Summer, 1989; Fort Bragg Paraglide, 22 Jun 89; command briefing, 2nd Bn, 1st SWTG(A), 24 Jul 89; CY 89 historical reports, HHC, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Bns and Support Bn, 1st SWTG(A).

observers/controllers.²¹⁸ Consequently, the SWCS Joint Force Integration Directorate (JFID) designed the Command Integration System (CIS), using SWCS-produced Joint Mission Analysis (JMA) scenarios and the LIC Capabilities Requirements Studies (LCRS) methodology in developing its simulations. The CIS hardware, software and facilities, represented the following eight programs: 1) PANTHER LIC simulation, 2) Special Operations Integration Training Simulation (SOITS), 3) Special Operations Staff Officers Course (SOSOC), 4) Foreign Internal Defense/Internal Defense and Development (FID/IDAD), 5) LIC Capabilities Requirements Studies/Joint Mission Analysis (LCRS), 6) Special Operations Executive Aid (SOEA), 7) Special Operations Lessons Learned Management Information System (SOLLMIS) and 8) Command and Briefing Intelligence Facility/Media Production Center (CBIF/MPC).²¹⁹

In August, a Memorandum of Agreement between NAVSPECWARCOM and the Center and School transferred proponency for all SOF maritime operations to the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM). The naval command would standardize maritime training and review, validate programs of instruction, assist SWCS in the testing, validation and evaluation of joint maritime operations equipment and control student standards for entrance and graduation and instructor qualifications. (SWCS would command Company C, 2nd Battalion, Waterborne Operations, of the 1st SWTG(A) until the transfer of the Key West facility and of the responsibility for waterborne operations to COMNAVSPECWARCOM in FY 93.) SWCS would also provide oversight of construction and funding and recommend changes in maritime operations training,

²¹⁸Special Warfare, winter 1989; SWCS Memo, Trip Report, Combined Arms Center, Council of Colonels meeting, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 4 Dec 89. See also "Combat Training Center and Battle Command Training Programs Put Leaders and Soldiers to the Test," Army, (Oct 88); SWCS DOTD, Program Branch Fact Sheet, Purpose: To Provide the CAC Council of Colonels of the status of SOF integration into Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), 30 Nov 89; *ibid*, Unit Training Division, Information, Purpose: "To provide new battalion and group commanders information on the status of the integration of Special Operations Forces into the Combat Training Centers," 13 Feb 90; SWCS DOTD charts SOF Support to FY 90 JRTC Rotations," *ibid.*, "SOF Support to FY 90 BCTP Rotations," n.d.

²¹⁹Memo, SWCS Joint Force Integration Department, "The Command Integration System (CIS)," 30 Nov 89, document #2; *ibid.*, Fact Sheet, "The Command Integration System (CIS)," 21 Aug 89; oral interview, MAJ G. C. Krynicki, JFID, 20 Mar 90. MAJ S. Bucci, "Fighters vs Thinkers: The Special Operations Staff Officer Course and the Future of SOF," Special Warfare, spring, 1989.

doctrine, safety, equipment or interoperability to the naval command, and both parties to the MOA agreed to continue the instructor exchange between Company C and COMNAVSPECWARCOM.²²⁰

In a further SOF maritime development in 1989, the Center and School former Advanced Skills Department (now 2nd BN of the 1st SWTG(A) completed in 1989 a new manual, Special Forces Waterborne Operations (TC 31-25). This manual replaced FM 31-25, which was based on Navy diving manuals and did not include surface waterborne SOF operations.²²¹

The Center and School completed its development of the Internal Defense and Development Education and Training program on groundwork laid the previous year. The IDDET course, termed Foreign Internal Defense/Internal Defense and Development, emphasized practical field applications, simulations and case studies and was designed for foreign and U.S. middle level staff officers and commanders responsible for organizing, coordinating, integrating and supporting IDAD. The Department of Defense Joint Staff as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (Hon. Charles S. Whitehouse) called for top priority for this course, which was first held, despite some initial problems, at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, Florida, 14 to 21 April.²²²

²²⁰SWCS Memo for COMNAVSPECWARCOM, Subj: "Memo of Agreement for Maritime Operations, 31 Jul 89," document #12; SWCS "Talking Paper," "Joint Waterborne Training at Key West, FL," prepared by MAJ W. Nelson, 28 Dec 87; LTC D. Hill, Director, SWCS Special Operations Advanced Skills Dept., Memo, SWCS for SWCS Deputy Commander, Subj: "USN Input to Waterborne Operations Division, Key West, Florida," 18 Nov 88; Msg Form USACINCOSOC (Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM), to COMNAVSPECWARCOM, Subj: USSOCOM Proponency for Maritime Operations," 22 Feb 89; Information Paper, Mr. R. Mountel, SWCS JFID, Subj: "Special Operations Forces (SOF) Maritime Operations," 9 Nov 89, document #13; USSOCOM Joint Special Operations School Integration Committee (JSOSIC) Report 88-1 (n.d.); Special Warfare, winter, 1989, 42-42; *ibid.*, summer, 1989, 66; Mr. S. Holmstock, SWCS DOTD, oral interview with SWCS Command Historian, 16 Apr 90. notes

²²¹See "From the Commandant," Special Warfare, winter, 1989 and 45; *ibid.*, summer 1989, 64-65; SWCS Proponency Update, 10-12; and Mr. S. Cook, SWCS DOTD, oral interview with SWCS Command Historian, 12 Apr 90.

²²²SWCS Proponency update, document #6, 6; SECDEF, msg., to Dist., 20 Jan 89; director, DOD Joint Staff, Memo, for ASD/SOLIC, sub: "Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Education and Training," 23 Mar 89 (document #6); chief, Revolutionary Warfare Branch, memo with enclosures, to USAJFKSWCS/SOISD (MAJ Johnston),

A major project in doctrine development by the Center and School was its creations of scenarios for the Joint Mission Analysis. SWCS developed the first draft scenario for the U.S. Southern Command, European Command and Pacific Command, which were converted to LIC scenarios. These scenarios dealt with LIC by country, with regional war for six months and global war, and for six months after one year of LIC. They were then sent to the Army's Combined Arms Center, where they were used to introduce LIC to CAC war gaming for the first time.²²³

By 1989 the activation of the Special Forces Branch, the approval of FA 39 for Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs and the continued Congressional support for SOF, made it imperative that these forces be integrated throughout the Army and at the joint level. Accordingly, and in response to a directive from the TRADOC Commanding General, the Center and School developed the Special Operations Forces Integration Action Plan (SOFIA). The SOFIA, divided into four categories: doctrine, training and education, combat developments and joint action, sought to integrate SOF into the conventional Army. But it also, conversely, had the goal of integrating conventional Army and joint special operations into SOF manuals. The SOFIA was also concerned with obtaining the increased manpower needed

sub: "IDAD After Action Report," 24 May 89; memo for deputy commanding general TRADOC and commander, Combined Arms Center, sub: "Internal Defense and Development Education and Training," 22 Jun 89, document #7; memo with enclosure, thru commander, 1st SWTG(A), for SWCS DOTD, subj: "Assignment of New Task Numbers for FID/IDAD Course (3A-F59)." (See FID/IDAD Task List" encl.); Memo thru commander, Company C, 3rd BN, 1st SWTG(A), for commander, 3rd BN, 1st SWTG(A), subj: "Trip Report - OSD SOLIC, FID/IDAD Course Meeting, 13 Dec 89," (Document #8); MAJ J. Johnston, SWCS Special Operations International Studies, telecom with SWCS Command Historian, 2 Jul 89; Special Warfare, summer, 1989, 65; MG H. L. Cox, III, 1st SOCOM Deputy Commander in Chief, tasking notes to staff, 26 Dec 89. For further documentation of SWCS courses in 1989, see Center and School Catalog FY 89 (document #9), Ft. Bragg, NC (n.d.)

²²³USSOCOM "USCINCSOC Operational Concept," 28 Jul 89 (Document #1); draft SWCS Memo for distr., "USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis (JMA) Tasking"; Memo for the Record, Mr. John E. Griffith II, "Joint Mission Analysis Scenario Development," n.d.; Msg. USCINCOB, 15 Aug 89 (document #2); notes of telecom, SWCS Command Historian with Mr. J. Griffith, 20 Mar 90 and CPT M. Robinson, 27 Mar 90, both of SWCS JFID; MEMO FOR DIST. FROM DIRECTOR U.S. ARMY TRADOC ANALYSIS COMMAND, SUBJ: "DRAFT EUROPE OPERATIONAL "SCENARIO (S/NF), 31 JUL 89 (DOCUMENT #3), INFO USED IS UNCLASSIFIED; response with encl., Director SWCS DCD, 5 Sep 89; Special Warfare, Spring 1989.

to fulfill the additional training and education needed for that integration of SOF into Army combat training centers. By the end of the year, the priority of the SOFIA had changed to focus on training and education, in line with a decision by the SWCS Commanding General.²²⁴ In order to develop and implement the SOFIA the Center and School activated its Special Operations Forces Integrator office.²²⁵

The SWCS in 1989 established another SWCS integration office, that of the Civil Affairs Integrator, to conduct a thorough review of Civil Affairs organization, functions and activities and to insure that theater requirements were planned, fulfilled or identified. The Center and School Commanding General further directed that the new office emphasize the requirements of CA units and activities and to examine the SWCS organization to see that CA-related tasks were properly carried out, particularly in regard to the proper balance between the Center and School's teaching responsibility and the proponent function for FA 39 and Branch 38. The office revised all CA doctrinal publications, Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP)s and CA officer course literature to ensure that these materials reflected the Army's current training philosophy.²²⁶

The SWCS CG also realized at about the same time that although the Army Battlefield Operating Systems described the tactical functions performed at corps level or below, and the Theater Operating Systems dealt with the operations of joint forces at the operational level, neither adequately defined SOF functions. The Concepts and Studies Division of the SWCS Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) was given the task of further developing the Special Operations Forces Operating Systems (SOFOS), already in draft form, to list the functions and generic tasks performed by SOF while executing a mission. It

²²⁴Special Operations Forces Action Integration Plan (Fort Bragg, NC, n.d.), "Action Plan Overview"; Special Warfare, spring, 1989, 50; CPT James Coffman, Jr., SWCS JFID, Memo for dist., subj: "Trip Report, Combined Arms Center Council of Colonels Meeting at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 4 Dec 89," 5 Dec 89.

²²⁵MAJ H. J. McGarrah, SWCS SOF Integration Officer, oral interview with SWCS Command Historian, 21 Apr 89; SOFIO historical report.

²²⁶SWCS CA Integrator, "Civil Affairs Activities," 22 Jun 89; ibid., memo for dist, subj: "Minutes of the Meeting of the Commanding General, United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), with the Senior Civil Affairs Commanders," 9 Jun 89; ibid., 4 Jan 89; ibid., subj: "Responsibilities and Functions of the Civil Affairs Integrator (CAI), 4 Apr 89.

further served as a common reference system for combat developers, analysts, trainers and planners for the analyses and integration of SOF into their main and collateral missions.²²⁷

Also in 1989, the SWCS Proponency Office prepared and published the first Special Forces Personnel Plan, encompassing all Branch personnel, through which Proponency personnel could review long-range trends, evaluate the present and project future personnel requirements. This plan was particularly valuable as the Branch expanded to meet the worldwide requirements for SF assets and expertise of the new unified commands.²²⁸ A similar project in 1989, a comprehensive readiness support program, tracked the readiness of all Army active and reserve SOF, spotted problem areas and focused SWCS support on the reserve component.²²⁹

The SWCS Public Affairs Office began publishing of the SWCS journal, Special Warfare, with its first issue in April 1989. The journal carried items of immediate interest to the SOF community as well as more long-range concerns.

As a part of the far-reaching "Campus 2000," (later "Campus 2005") the unsightly World War II collection of "temporary" inadequate, deteriorated tar paper or metal buildings and pit-type latrines that made up Camp Mackall, an isolated training subreservation of Fort Bragg was finally done away with. Its welcome replacement was the newly-completed James N. Rowe Special Operations Training Facility, completed in December after two years of construction and a cost of \$6.1 million. The Rowe facility supported training for SFAS, the SF Qualifying Course (SFQC) and Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE).

In addition, the scattered collection of 75 "temporary" World War II buildings at Fort Bragg itself that housed much of the SOF training activities on Smoke Bomb Hill were in nearly as

²²⁷"Special Operations Forces Blueprint of the Battlefield," SWCS Pamphlet XX-X (Fort Bragg, NC: n.d.), (document #6); SWCS DCD historical report for 1989.

²²⁸USAJFKSWCS "Special Forces Personnel Plan" (Fort Bragg, NC: Jul 898), (document #1).

²²⁹MR. R. Mountel, Director, SWCS Joint Force Integration, Fact Sheet, "Purpose 'To Provide an Overview of Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) Support to the Army's Special Operations Forces Readiness Program,'" 9 Nov 89. (document #2), and oral interview Mr. Mountel with SWCS Command Historian, 12 Apr 90; SWCS JFID briefing slides, same subject, 23 Oct 89; ibid., "Key Issues," n.d. (document #3); CDR, TRADOC, msg. to dist., subj: "Branch Unit Readiness," 1 Sep 89.

poor a condition as the old Camp MacKall, energy-wasting, fire hazards and maintenance nightmares. Further, their wide dispersion prevented the efficient utilization of training, staff and students. One of the earliest replacement project for these buildings was a large, state-of-the art Academic building, a \$16.8 million structure that would consolidate academic and academic support and provide a fare more effective learning environment. Construction commenced in the fall of 1989 and a completion date of June 1991 was scheduled. The "New Academic Facility," however, was not opened until July of 1992.²³⁰

In December of 1989, the Center and School became a component of the Army Major Command, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), activated at Fort Bragg on 1 December. The roots of this reorganization go back at least to 1982, when the new command exercised operational control of all Army SOF in the continental United States, with operational control of all RC SOF. It was designed to rationalize command and control of Army Special Operations Forces and improve Army support to USSOCOM.²³¹

In the field of SWCS-developed SOF equipment, the development of most of this equipment was outlined in the USAJFKSWCS Special Operations Forces Mission Area Analysis (SOMAS(U) (SECRET)/NOFORN). This document was, in turn, based upon authorization signed by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William Howard Taft IV, which outlined the development of Major Force Program 11, in January 1989, establishing longterm SOF financing.

The joint SOF equipment projects brought to completion in CY

²³⁰SWCS paper briefing slides for Campus 2000 (n.d.); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Savannah District, The Future; USAJFKSWCS (Fort Bragg, NC: n.d.), (document #7); SWCS Engineers Division historical report for 1989; CAMPUS 2000/2005 material, supplied by SWCS DOTD, in USASOC History Archives; SWCS School Secretary historical report for 1989.

²³¹HQ, DA, "Master Plan for Elevating 1st SOCOM to Army MACOM Status," vol. 1 (Phase 1), Feb 89 (Document #10); "USASOC Implementation Plan," 1st SOCOM (Ft Bragg, NC: Oct 89); HQ, USSOCOM, "USASOC Implementation Plan" (Fort Bragg, NC: n.d. [1989]); USASOC Command Historian, memo for dist., subj: "Synopsis of the First Year of Activation of USSOC," 17 Jan 91; "Army Special Forces under Revised Command Structure," The Static Line (February 1991); Director, SWCS Joint Force Integration Office, memo for dist., subj: "Functional Relationships Between Special Operations Command, and Training and Doctrine Command," 2 January 1990; USASOC Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Special Operatons Command (Fort Bragg, NC: 29 August 1990.)

89 included:

1) M86 Pursuit Deterrent Munition. A light-weight, hand-deployed version of the artillery-delivered ADAM mine. When activated, it deployed 20-foot trip wires and could self-destruct.

2) Surface Swimmer Support Set: Designed for SOF maritime operations, consisting of waterproof bags of various sizes, dry suit, compass, swim fins, diver's knife, watch and life vest.

3) Medical Equipment Set, Laboratory consisted of a lightweight microscope and related laboratory equipment, even including a power source for the microscope and centrifuge.

4) Sniper Weapon System (SWS, M-24): A 44-inch, 7.62mm bolt action rifle with ten-power scope and carrying case, weighing 13 pounds, which began to replace the M-21 weapons system. 4) The Multi-Fuel Individual Squad Stove (MISS), a joint U.S. Army-Marine Corps program featured a small, lightweight stove, that could heat rations, melt snow or provide warmth, burning gasoline, kerosene, JP4, aviation fuel or diesel fuel safely.²³²

Army-specific SOF equipment fielded in CY 89 included:

1) The Mobile PSYOP Transmitter (MOPOT): A modular radio and television broadcast transmitter that enabled PSYOP forces to reach worldwide targeted audiences and was a great improvement on the current GRC-122 with its 1950's era single-channel band.

2) The Desert Mobility Vehicle System (DMVS): A modified High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). Before the end of the year 75 DVMS were added to the inventory of the 3rd SFG(A).

3) The Lightweight-Extreme Weather Shelter: An off-the-shelf, three-man tent which met SOF specifications.

4) The light-weight 30-Day Ration (RLW-30): Compact ration containing 2,000 calories for daily consumption, solely for SOF use.

5) The Modular Printing System (MPS) was composed of three modules for use by PSYOP units. The light-weight printing plant module could stand alone to produce small amounts of leaflets. But combined with the press section module and the finishing section module, the three-module system could produce no less than 1.2 million leaflets per day and be used with operations up to the corps and theater level. The need for such a system was demonstrated in the Grenada incursion. The 9th PSYOP Battalion

²³²SWCS DCD historical report for 1989.

received the MPS in September.²³³

Unfortunately, the Center and School had to hold two memorial services in 1989; the first was to remember 11 Special Forces troopers killed in the crash of their CH53 helicopter on 12, the heaviest single loss of life in SF history to that point.

The SF troopers memorialized were:

CPT A. Broussard
CPT A. Brown
SSG R. Griswold
SFC G. Wayne
MSG R. Berryhill
SFC L. Evans
SSG J. Bigler, II
SSG K. Campbell
SSG K. Livengood
SGT L. Endress
SGT T. Hollway

The Smoke Bomb Hill community was further shocked one month later by the news of the assassination in Manila of COL James N. Rowe. COL Rowe, utilizing his terrible experiences as a prisoner of war at the hands of the Viet Cong, was instrumental in establishing the Center and School's Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) course. At the time of his death, COL Rowe headed the Joint U.S. Military Advisor Group, responsible for the training of Philippine military forces in their counter-insurgency operations against Marxist guerrillas.²³⁴

During the year 1990, Center and School personnel focused their attention on the first combat deployment of SOF since the Grenada landings of six years previous. Operation JUST CAUSE and its sequel, PROMOTE LIBERTY, the U.S. landings in Panama and post-combat rehabilitation, seemed amply to justify the SOF doctrine, training and equipment developments that had emerged during the previous decade.

²³³After Action memoranda, concept evaluation programs, statement of need and Operational and Organizational (O&O) Plan, Special Warfare, spring, winter 1989; CPT (P) J. Pierce, oral interview with SWCS Command Historian, 2 May 90; DCD historical report.

²³⁴Fayetteville Times, 14, 15, 22 Mar 89, Fayetteville Observer, 26 Mar 89; "Rowe" file, USASOC History Archives. COL Rowe, oral interview with SWCS Command Historian, 9 Jul 87; videotaped interview with SWCS Chaplain (n.d.).

In the wake of these operations, the Center and School's Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DOES) compiled and coordinated "Lessons Learned" at the direction of the USASOC Commanding General and the SWCS Commanding Generals. DOES basically concluded that:

If Special Forces is going to operate contingencies with minimum planning and preparation, more resources and time have to be focus[ed] on training. The success in the countryside as the operation transition to PROMOTE LIBERTY was based on the SF elements applying their basic UW/FID doctrine on their own initiative, rather than command and control system executing PROMOTE LIBERTY plans and orders.²³⁵

Hardly had these lessons learned from SOF Panama operations begun to be digested when the deployment of SOF to Southwest Asia in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, increasingly absorbed the attention of the SOF community, including the Center and School during CY 90.

In 1990, the Center and School's training philosophy was authoritatively spelled out by its Commanding General in his study, "Vision of the Future." BG Baratto emphasized that, over the long term, after the current structure was manned to its full authorization, USAJFKSWCS planned to sustain the force by using the SFAS to build a pool of SF candidates and thus enable every SFQC to be filled with quality candidates. The result should be that the Center and School would field a well-rounded SF soldier who would not only be proficient in special operations unique environment but also be totally familiar with the basic infantry skills.²³⁶

²³⁵Director, USAJFKSWCS Joint Force Integration Office, Summary Sheet Action Request, to AC, USAJFKSWCS, subj: "Lessons Learned from Operation JUST CAUSE," 23 Jan 90; Memo through Deputy Commander, USASOC, to Commander, USASOC, subj: "Lessons Learned from Operation JUST CAUSE," n.d.; Commanding General, USASOC, memo for Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS, subj: "Lessons Learned from JUST CAUSE," n.d. Quote from Chief of Staff, DOES, Coordination/Information Sheet, subj: "7th SFG(A) SFOB Operations during JUST CAUSE," n.d.

²³⁶LTC R. T. Griffin, Chief, USAJFKSWCS Proponency Office, draft paper, "Vision of the Future," 24 Sep 90, 4-6; *ibid.*, Summary Sheet, "Purpose: To Provide the Assistant Commandant with a draft of the USAJFKSWCS Vision of the Future and to Obtain his authorization for its release to HQ, TRADOC," 24 Sep 90; (Compiled at direction of the USAJFKSWCS CG.); MG Van Loben Sels, TRADOC, note, subj: "Future TRADOC," 5 Sep 90; CG, USAJFKSWCS, memo to DA, subj: "Special Forces Personnel Initiatives," 19 Mar

One important new means of "filling the force with quality" came into effect with the Army National Guard Pretraining Program. Under the previous system of RC entry into SFAS, too many resources were being wasted in turning back candidates who should never have entered in the first place. At the direction of the National Guard Bureau and with the concurrence of the Center and School Commanding General, detailed analyses and preparations produced a two-week Program of Instruction (POI) was instituted which gave the RC candidate a grounding in basic soldier skills, leadership and "The Special Forces Attitude." This new POI specifically emphasized physical training, land navigation training and rucksack marching, and was available to all qualified RC soldiers. The first iterations of the program, From February to June of 1990 proved outstandingly successful. The pretraining graduates attained a 76 percent selection rate in SFAS, compared to the 46 percent selection rate of those RC soldiers who had not attended pretraining. This success rate was not far below the AC candidates's selection rate of 52 percent. (A further comparison, of the last classes to enter the SFQC without SFAS showed attrition rates as high as 80 percent. Not surprisingly, the USAJFKSWCS Commanding General termed pretraining "a real success story," and stated that the program had "done more to turn around the Guard and Reserve attitudes than anything else."²³⁷

Another means of "filling the force with quality" was instituted in CY 90. This was the 18X Program, begun as a means of compensation for the high rate of attrition for SFAS as well as to meet the recruiting needs raised by the activation of the 3rd SFG(A). The program was designed to fill the force with prior servicemen, such as former Rangers or Navy Corpsmen, who had skills particularly valuable to SF. Those candidates in this program who failed any requirement up to SFQC would be separated from the Army; those who failed the SFQC would be retained through a board of action and reclassified to meet Army needs. A unique aspect of the 18X program was that candidates were encouraged to get in good physical condition on their own initiative. They could do this through the USAJFKSWCS Physical Training Handbook, which outlined a five-week individual physical training program to be undertaken prior to arrival at the 1st

90.

²³⁷USASOC PMAD paper copy briefing slides, "Manning the Force," Jan 90; SWCS Reserve Components Office, semiannual historical report; MAJ G. Rollins, oral interview with SWCS Command Historian, 28 Aug 90; notes of USAJFKSWCS CG's remarks to heads of SWCS departments/offices Mission Conference, Bordeaux Inn, Fayetteville, NC, 11 Jun 90.

In response to concerns about the small number of ethnic and racial minorities in Special Forces, the Analysis Branch of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine conducted an analysis on the question between late 1989 and early 1990. Focusing on the questions of the quality of the candidates, whether the SFAS was actually doing what it was designed to do and whether the SFAS assessors were properly trained and competent to evaluate candidates. The Analysis Branch analyzed three iterations of SFAS, conducting one-on-one interviews, collecting surveys and questionnaires and assessing material compiled from the SFAS candidate in-processing data sheets.

The Branch concluded that there was no racism or discrimination involved in the SFAS program, but that more data was needed, particularly a racial breakdown and that an effort should be made to assign a minority cadre for assessment. (It should be noted that among those who should know, that is the 1700 persons who graduated or did not graduate from SFAS during the studied time frame, not one mentioned an incident of bias or discrimination or even a perception of any such incident.²³⁹

The Medical Sergeant course underwent a significant change in its training philosophy. After 1990, candidates would no longer continue their training at Fort Sam Houston for the Special Operations Medical Course (SOMED), and then return to Fort Bragg for Phases II and III. Afterward, all SF Medical Sergeants began their training at Fort Sam Houston and upon completion of their SF Medical Sergeant Course then completed the Field Phase and MOS training at Camp MacKall (Fort Bragg). Their training was also extended by ten weeks.

Other training initiatives of CY90 included the distribution of audio cassette tapes of International Morse Code for Communications Sergeants to take home with them or use in

²³⁸USAREC Circular 601-90, "Personnel Procurement: Special Forces Prior Service Program," 8 Oct 91; ibid., pamphlet 601-25, "In-Service Special Forces Program," 20 May 91; oral interviews with SGM W. Frisbie, USAJFKSWCS Proponency Office; and SFC M. Curtis, SF Recruiting, both 26 Feb 92.; and with LTC D. McCracken, CO, 1st BN, 1st SWTG(A), 10 Mar 92; USAJFKSWCS, Special Forces Assessment and Selection Physical Training Handbook (Fort Bragg, NC: n.d.).

²³⁹Summary Sheet, from Director, USAJFKSWC DOTD, sub: "FEA [front end analysis] for SFAS Program, 5 Jun 90; CPT L. French, Memo, plus enclosures,, Performance Technologist, DOTD, subj: GT 110, Requirements for SFAS, Minorities in Special Forces, Performance Deficiency, n.d.

their personal vehicles and the lengthening of instructional and review time. Other changes in the program helped to ensure that in the previous three years not one student had to be dropped from the program for academic reasons.²⁴⁰ In addition, the Evasive Driving Course commenced in July. This eight-hour block of instruction was a segment of the SWCS Individual Terrorism Awareness Course.²⁴¹

Following the SWCS Commanding General's guidance, the Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP) was inaugurated. The LADP was a leadership training program that compared performance to a particular standard or performance indicator, giving periodic feedback and developing plans to improve leadership performance. The LADP formed the core of the Army Concept Based Requirements System. (CBRS).²⁴²

The development of SWCS doctrine during CY90 was dominated by the Commanding General's "Vision of the Future." This study concluded that Special Forces and their training would be molded by the missions of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counter-terrorism well into the foreseeable future. The "Vision" considered that these missions would increase in value for the Army as the Soviet threat seemed to recede through 1990. The Army doctrine of AirLand Battle-Future (ALB-F) recognized the importance of low intensity conflict in future arenas of conflict, and this recognition, along with SOF's growing role in the Army would obligate the Center and School to play a significant part in the development of Army doctrine. The study concluded that the Center and School had to move rapidly toward a central role as the joint integration center for all SOF doctrine.²⁴³

Also on the subject of doctrine, the Army manual FM 30-20,

²⁴⁰USAJFKSWCS Inspector General, semiannual historical report.

²⁴¹1st Training Battalion, 1st SWTG(A) semiannual historical report for CY1989.

²⁴²HQ, TRADOC, Memo plus enclosures for dist., subj: Instructions for Integrating the Leadership Assessment and Development Program into Resident Leader Training Courses, 27 Oct 89; CG, USAJFKSWCS, Memo for dist, subj: Leadership Assessment and Development (LADP) in USAJFKSWCS, 6 Apr 90; USAJFKSWCS DOTD SFDD semiannual historical reports.

²⁴³LTC R. T. Griffin, Chief, USAJFKSWCS SOPO, draft paper, "Vision of the Future," 24 Sep 90; MG Van Loben Sels, note to CMDS/Branch Schools Commandants, subj: Future TRADOC, 5 Sep 90.

Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, which was based primarily on SWCS input, was completed in January of 1990 and put into circulation. The previous such manual, FM 31-20, dated from 1977, and did not, of course, deal with the joint capabilities presented by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and later federal legislation.²⁴⁴

In accordance with the number one priority for 1990 of the Center and School Commanding General, the SWCS recruiting effort was drastically restructured and expanded, in conjunction with Recruiting Command. Two years earlier the Center and School had only six recruiters; during 1990 it incorporated no less than 26 Gold Badge recruiters into the overall SOF structure through the use of permanent recruiting stations. Special Forces Recruiting Teams (SFRT) were located close to SFGs and Ranger battalions, although this did impose a very heavy burden on the SWCS Surgeon, to whom all of these increased physical examinations were forwarded.²⁴⁵

The year 1990 also saw the SOLLMIS Data Bank come on line. The concept of retaining military lessons learned was not new, of course, Such lessons could be called up from the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) as well as the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned. But these systems contained little SOF-specific material. SOLLMIS was a user-friendly, fully-automated electronic library developed by the Center and School's Information Management System (IMO). Observations and experiences of soldiers assigned to special operations and security assistance missions could be fed into SOLLMIS, and users could make their selections from a succession of menus, needing only to type data into the program when recording observations, lessons learned and/or recommendations.²⁴⁶

The Center and School's Special Operations Proponency Office (SOPO) submitted a recommended change to AR 611-201, proposing the creation of CMF for Civil Affairs Specialist in the Reserve Component (RC). The proposal would establish CMF 38, CA

²⁴⁴FM 31-20, draft, "Doctrine for Special Forces Operations"; DOTD semiannual historical reports.

²⁴⁵CG, USAJFKSWCS, memo for CG, USASOC, subj: Special Forces Group and Ranger Regiment Medical Assistance for Special Forces Recruiting Teams (SFRT), 1 Aug 90; K. Wycoff, "Special Forces Increasing Troops," Paraglide, 7 Jun 90.

²⁴⁶SWCS Division of Evaluation and Standardization, "Special Operations Lessons Learned Management Information System" (Information Paper for Security Assistance Officers), n.d. document #3; notes of oral interview, SWCS Command historian with LTC M. Harris, SOLLMIS project officer, 12 Dec 89.

and MOS 38A, CA Specialist, and was made because of the development of the new CA LTOE. The previous H-series TOE had no single MOS that could adequately support CA -specific functions as they would be under the new LTOE. The proposal was approved by the Army Personnel Integration Command in November of 1990.²⁴⁷

A similar development for the MOS came in February of 1990, when the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) approved the establishment of Enlisted CMF 37 (PYOP) and MOS 37F (PSYOP Specialist). Army Psychological Operations had long enjoyed a relationship with Military Intelligence, first with MI MOSSs being documented with the Skill Qualifying Indicator (SQI) "W" PSYOP, and, later, with the establishment of MOS 96F in October 1985. As this MOS matured it became increasingly evident, however, that the continued tie to MI, with the Center and School acting as the subproponent, placed the MOS in the awkward position of serving two masters. This situation prompted the Center and School to request that it assume full proponentcy for 96F and to propose the creation of a PSYOP-specific CMF/MOS. Due to the length of time that this changeover would require, the Center and School signed a memorandum of agreement with the Army Intelligence Center and School (Fort Huachuca, Arizona) that permitted PSYOP specialists to continue attending the MI Advanced NCO Course there until the USAJFKSWCS PSYOP-specific Advanced NCO Course began at the Center and School.²⁴⁸

The Center and School itself underwent three reorganizations in CY90. The first saw a restructuring to reflect the new position of Chief of Staff and Secretary of the General Staff (SGS). The primary function of the Chief of Staff was to oversee the daily operations of the USAJFKSWCS and to promote staff coordination. A SGS office was established from the existing Chief Executive Officer position; the SGS also absorbed the Center and School's Protocol Office. The office of the School Secretary also consolidated all functions of its officer, civilian and enlisted personnel management that had been previously scattered among its Officer Management Section, the

²⁴⁷Director of Military Occupational Development, USAPIC, memo for Commander, USAJFKSWCS, subj: Approved Change to AF 611-201, E-9104-14, Establishment of CMF 38, CA, and MOS 38A, Civil Affairs Specialist, 13 Nov 90; *ibid*, memo for dist (same title), 16 Nov 90; "Mos 38 A Civil Affairs Specialist," 27 Feb 90; USAJFKSWCS briefing slides paper copy prepared for CG, USAJFKSWCS; "MOS 38, A Civil Affairs Specialist," 27 Feb 90; USAJFKSWCS SOPO semiannual historical reports.

²⁴⁸MSG C. Rome, "The PSYOP Specialist," Special Warfare, winter, 1991; DA USAPIC, Soldier Support Center, memo for dist., subj: Approved Change to AR 611-201, E-9090-2, MOS 96F (PSYOP Specialist), CMF 96, 23 Feb 90.

1st SWTG(A) and the School Sergeant Major. In addition the two branches of the Intelligence and Security Office (ISO), Threat and Intelligence, went through several reorganizations to meet evolving mission requirements, and by the end of the year had been consolidated to form a single Threat Branch.²⁴⁹

The responsibility for the development of SOF-specific equipment lay with the Center and School, and a number of significant pieces of such equipment were fielded in CY90. Probably the most significant SOF-specific item fielded in CY90 was the Desert Mobility Vehicle (M1026 HMMWV) portion of the Desert Mobility Vehicle System (DMVS). The Low Capacity X-Ray Machine was also fielded to SF units in that year, along with the Lightweight Deployable Computer and the AN/PRC-132 Radio (Mod 50). Each of these SOF-specific items was sent to the field on a Limited Procurement Urgent Basis as a result of Operation DESERT SHIELD in Southwest Asia.²⁵⁰

As a final note to CY 1990, the School Psychologist reported that he was seeing an increasing number of SWCS cadre coming to him because of their depression and anxiety during the DESERT SHIELD military buildup in Southwest Asia. These men were anxious that they were not on orders for deployment to a potential war zone.²⁵¹ That attitude spoke volumes about the Center and School during 1990.

Calendar year 1991, of course, was dominated by the Gulf War, in which SWCS-trained SOF forces and SWCS-developed SOF-specific equipment played so successful a role. In the end, the Center and School found that the SOF doctrine it had developed and taught had been generally validated by Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT, particularly in the areas of Coalition Warfare and Unconventional Warfare.

By the second half of CY91, two significant studies had been completed by the USAJFKSWCS DOES on SOF in operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT. "Special Operations Lessons Learned 'Desert Shield/Storm'" was completed by August as was "Lessons Learned" for PROVIDE COMFORT. These reports

²⁴⁹ISO semiannual historical reports. CY90 also saw the SWCS JFID and its functions and resources assumed by the new US Army Special Operations Command and then deactivated in March. USAJFKSWCS Secretary, memo for dist, subj: Joint Force Integration Directorate (JFID) Deactivation, 8 Mar 90; Director, JFK DOTD, memo for AC, subj: JFID Deactivation Plan, 9 Mar 90.

²⁵⁰DOTD semiannual historical reports for CY90; POM Command Fact Sheet, n.d.

²⁵¹USAJFKSWCS Psychologist semiannual report FOR CY90.

consolidated the lessons learned observations that had been collected by the lessons learned team that had deployed to Southwest Asia, as well as from after-action reports of participating units and personnel.²⁵²

A number of pieces of SOF-specific equipment were also validated by combat experience in the Gulf War. The Desert Mobility Vehicle enabled SOF teams operating in an arid or desert environment to move faster with all of their sustaining equipment and supplies, thus giving them more time for the mission itself. As noted above, the DMVS was fielded in limited numbers, and that seemed to be the only criticism of the vehicle -- that there weren't enough of them. Other SOF-specific equipment items developed by the USAJFKSWCS and fielded to Southwest Asia included the Leaflet Artillery Round, the Modular Print System, and the Special Operations Improved Cryptographic System.²⁵³

During the mobilization of the 20th SFG(A), the Center and School provided pretraining for 360 non-MOS qualified 20th SFG(A) soldiers prior to their attendance at SFAS. The training was conducted by the Utah Army National Guard and the Rhode Island Army National Guard under the supervision and control of the Center and School's Army National Guard Advisor, which provided not only the pretraining, but also the billeting, mess and administrative support for the Group.²⁵⁴

The Center and School also was tasked to provide 14 Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) for Southwest Asia. These teams required 35 instructors to spend more than 123 days in CONUS and Saudi Arabia in training in excess of 9,000 U.S. and Kuwaiti personnel. The Training Company, Company B, 3d BN of the 1st SWTG(A) also deployed an MTT to Fort Dix, New Jersey to train Kuwaiti

²⁵²USAJFKSWCS DOES semiannual historical report for Jul-Dec 91; USAJFKSWCS DOES (U) "U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned 'Desert Shield/Storm'" S/NOFORN, Ft Bragg, NC, n.d., info used is UNCLASSIFIED; DOES draft "Operation Provide Comfort: Lessons Learned Observations, 27 Nov 91.

²⁵³DCD POM Sheets, n.d., p. G355-6; *ibid.*, submission, n.d.; DOTD Systems Management Branch, semiannual historical report for Jan-Jun 91; POM Fact Sheets, n.d., 360-364; *ibid.*, p. G-360-368; Material Requirements Facts Sheets; DOTD semiannual historical reports for Jan-Dec 91; DCD semiannual historical report for Jan-Jun 91, 13; *ibid.*, Material Requirements Fact Sheet, Nov 91; *ibid.*, DCD POM Fact Sheet, n.d. G365-9.

²⁵⁴SGT S. D. Hallford, "Federalization: 20th SFG Becomes First SF Unit to be Activated," Special Warfare, March, 91; SWCS RC Office semiannual historical report for Jan-Jun 91.

interpreters and translators in Civil Affairs.²⁵⁵

At the Center and School itself, the SOF Integration Office integrated Army Special Operations Forces into the core curriculum and elective program of the Army Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) in a long-term project. In addition, the 3rd Battalion of the 1st SWTG(A) assisted in the integration of CA and PSYOP into the Programs of Instruction (POI) of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the School of the Americas and other Service schools.²⁵⁶

The year 1991 finally saw the acceptance of the MH-60K Special Operations Aviation helicopter, a process that began in 1986, and had its origins in the failed Iran hostage rescue operation of 1980. However, development costs had risen so high on this \$1 billion-plus program that the original procurement of 34 MH-60s had been cut to 23.²⁵⁷

Early in CY91, the Center and School dealt with the question of the Special Forces Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant (SFAOIS) course. This "keystone" course for the SF noncommissioned officers corps, taught operational skills to the SF NCO. In response to end-of-course critiques and comments from the National Training Center, the Center and School held a Curriculum Review Board which eventually concluded that students should be graduates of the Special Forces Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (SFANCO), that the course should include blocks of instruction in the integration/synchronization

²⁵⁵SWCS SATMO semiannual historical report for Jan-Jun 91.

²⁵⁶Trip Report, twelve officers and civilians from 1st SWTG(A), DOTD and USASOC, subj: Trip Report, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Integration into the Command and General Staff Officer Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7-12 April 1991, 9 May 91; COL J. Moroney, Director, DOTD, memo for dist., subj: Management Plan for Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Integration into the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), 14 May 91; USAJFKSWCS DOTD SOF Integration Office, semiannual historical report for Jan-Jun 91; Fort Bragg Paraglide, 15 May 91; USAJFKSWCS "Commandant's Report," 3rd Quarter, FY 91, 6.

²⁵⁷Minutes of Meeting, Test Integration Working Group 91-1, Special Operations Aircraft held at St. Louis, MO on 29-31 Jan 91; Special Operations Aircraft MH-60K Program Review, held at Stratford, CN on 13 Feb 91; DA, Project Manager, Special Operations Aircraft, memo for dist, subj: Minutes of the Special Operations Aircraft Material Fielding Meeting, 20-24 May 1991, 17 June 91; DCD Special Operations Aircraft, Mid-Year Review, 2 May 91.

of the Battlefield Operating System (BOS) into light/heavy battalion combined operations, regional Low Intensity Conflict Command Post Exercise. In addition, the Center and School added eight hours of instruction to provide additional information and training the better to prepare the students to carry out CPX requirements, eight new subjects were recommended by the CRB for inclusion in the revived course, and four blocks of instruction were dropped.²⁵⁸

Another SWCS training development saw the implementation of the Team Sergeant Program. The new 63-day course was a change from the previous method of evaluating students by rotating faculty advisors. In the new Team Sergeant Program, each student ODA now had a single Cadre Team Sergeant assigned to it for the entire 63 days as well as an Observer Controller Evaluator assigned to each ODA to provide feedback.²⁵⁹

Later in the year, a Front End Analysis (FEA) of the vexed language problem found, not surprisingly, a "defeatist" attitude in the SOF community. The FEA's authors forthrightly concluded that "No amount of program upgrading and resource allocation will produce improved language performance unless there is a corresponding upgrading in dedication, energy, accountability and supervision by SOF commanders in languages.", and made numerous recommendations. As a result, the Center and School discontinued its Special Forces Functional Language Course (SFFLC), which according to the FEA did not provide adequate initial entry training language skills. In its place, the Center and School began to change over to an interactive, computer-based voice recognition course, termed the Basic Military Language Course.²⁶⁰

As a consequence of the recommendation of the FEA, the joint Language School, (SOFLO) was provisionally established in January of 1991. The mission of this new office was to serve as the program manager and advisor to both the institutional and nonresident SOF language training for which SWCS was the

²⁵⁸Director, USAJFKSWCS DOES, memo for USAJFKSWCS DOTD ITD, subj: Special Forces Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant (SFAOIS) Course Curriculum Review Board (CRB), 28 Jan 91; SFC C. Alderman, DOTD, memo for USAJFKSWCS Commander, subj: Special Forces Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant (SFAOIS) Course Curriculum Review Board Proceedings, 26 Mar 91.

²⁵⁹1st Bn., 1st SWTG(A) semiannual historical report for Jan-Jun 91.

²⁶⁰USAJFKSWCS DOTD, "Front End Analysis Report for U.S. Army Special Forces Foreign Language Requirements," Ft. Bragg, NC, Jan 91; COL S. G. Dodson, DOTD Chief, oral interview with Center and School Command Historian, 26 Nov 91.

proponent. It was also responsible for SOF language training concepts, direction, planning milestones and training aid products management as well as serving as the executive agent for SOF language training for USASOC and USSOCOM.²⁶¹

In April the Department of Defense Inspector General Office (DODIG) interviewed the SOF Language personnel in regard to the SOF language training program. The DODIG concluded that the SOF community had not adequately identified its language requirements and that recent experience in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM had demonstrated that a lack of foreign language capability could negatively affect operations. For the rest of the year the USAJFKSWCS and the DODIG continued their dialog and kept the door open for a better understanding of the SOF language program and its problems.²⁶² But as a tangible result of this focus on SOF language requirements and training, Special Forces Qualification became a three phase process, that is SFAS, SFQC and Language Training. Although students received their Branch/CMF 18 upon successful completion of SFQC, they were no longer assigned to units without completion of language training.²⁶³

The year also saw the establishment of the new Intelligence Training/Doctrine Branch (ITD) within the Intelligence and Security Office (ISO), while the ISO itself was reorganized. With these two developments, the ISO had an increased capacity to support training development within the Center and School. An example was, the SOF-unique Intelligence Automated Data Processing (ADP) instructional courses for the Center and School's Command Group, staff and students. The office could then rapidly organize information briefings for the Commanding

²⁶¹Director, DOTD, Summary Sheet, subj: Establishment of the Joint Special Operations Language Office, Short Title, Joint Language Office, 1 Feb 91; ibid., memo thru Commander, USAJFKSWCS, subj: Establishment of the Joint Special Operations Forces Language Office, Short Title, Joint Language Office (JLO), n.d.; USAJFKSWCS Regulation 10-1, "Organization & Functions," 1 Apr 91, 12-21. USAJFKSWCS SOF Joint Language Office semiannual historical report for Jan-Jun 91; DOTD semiannual historical report for Jan-Jun 91.

²⁶²USAJFKSWCS Chief of Staff, memo thru CDR, USASOC, subj: Transmittal of Information Requested by DODIG, 16 Aug 91; DOIG, Audit Report Army Special Forces Foreign Language Program, 27 Sep 91; DOTD semiannual historical report for Jul-Dec 91.

²⁶³CDR, USASOC, msg. to dist., subj: SOF Language Requirements, 30 Sep 91.

General and other key personnel, etc.²⁶⁴

The print media was not neglected in 1991. The Center and School published the Army Special Operations Reference Data Book. This publication provided information on organizational structures for Army SOF units, based on the table of organization, equipment and doctrinal publications extant at the time of publication.²⁶⁵

Finally, for CY 1991, Center and School installed its Video Teletraining (VTT) system. After coordinating with the Joint Language Office, DOTD and the SWCS training departments and a representative of the Defense Language Institute (Monterey, California), the system went on line, 17 May 1991, with the first official teletraining exercise taking place on 11 June.²⁶⁶

Calendar Year 1992 saw MG Baratto leave his position as Commanding General of the USAJFKSWCS to command the Southern European Task Force and 5th Area Army Command. MG Barato had served as Commandant of USAJFKSWCS since 1988, longer than any other commandant in the Center and School's history. He was succeeded by MG Sidney Shachnow. (A piquant note was added by the presence at the change of command ceremony, 24 July, of two Russian general officers. MG Shachnow had fled his native Lithuania 42 years earlier in the wake of that nation's seizure by the Soviet Union.) On the same day, the "Father of Special Forces," retired COL Aaron Bank (who was also Honorary Colonel of the SF Regiment), cut the opening ribbon of the USAJFKSWCS new Academic Facility, a \$19.5 million structure which was designed for academic training in the basic SF Qualification Course, advanced SF skills, regional studies, SOF functional language

²⁶⁴ISO, semiannual historical reports for Jan-Dec 91.

²⁶⁵USAJFKSWCS, Army Special Forces Special Operations Reference Book (Fort Bragg: 1991); *ibid.*, Commandant's Report, 3rd Quarter, FY 91, 7.

²⁶⁶DOTD, semiannual historical report for Jan-Jun 91. Also in the field of informational electronics, the DOES Statistician continued the expansion of the Center and School's Research database. By the end of the year, for example, Defense Language Laboratory scores could be picked up from SFAS recruiter data and from the 1st SWTG(A) as SF candidates proceeded through in-processing for SFQC. Director, DOES, memo for dist., subj: SFAS Statistics and the USAJFKSWCS Research Database, 12 Aug 91; *ibid.*, memo for Commanding General, subj: DLAB and DLPT Scores, 30 Oct 91; DOES semiannual historical report for Jun-Dec 91.

training, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.²⁶⁷

The Center and School completed the transition from Skill Qualification Test (SQT) to Self-Development Test (SDT) early in CY 1992. The new SDT was developed and validated with input from each of the active duty and reserve component SF groups. One major difference between the SQT and the SDT is that the latter, in addition to the questions from the soldier's Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), also includes questions on leadership and training. The SDT process is still under development Army-wide, and scores will not be counted for the record until 1994. Ultimately, SDT results will be used for personnel management decisions such as promotion and assignment.

The Publications Division of DOTD completed three field manuals in CY92: FM 31-26, (U)Special Forces Advanced Operations Techniques (S/NF) (revised); FM-31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense and FM-33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures.²⁶⁸

In April, the Center and School was formally designated the USASOC executive agent for all SOF language training, effective 1 May. The resultant "Mission Statement Change" specified that the Center and School would "serve as lead agent in all matters pertaining to the training, policies, programs, and procedures for SO [Special Operations], PSYOP, and CA forces language requirements and capabilities."²⁶⁹ On 16 July, the 3d Battalion of the 1st SWTG(A) received the Army Superior Unit Award for mission accomplishment in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM from 13 December 1990 to 12 December 1991.

By CY 92, the Center and School could feel that the so-called ramp-up, that is, the activation of the 1st and 3d SFGs, had been so successful that it was now time to concentrate on sustainment of the force. For example, it would be possible now to reduce the intake from the SF Prior Service Option (18X),

²⁶⁷C. E. Jones, "'Father of SF' Dedicates SWCS Academic Facility," The Bugle, August 1992.

²⁶⁸DOTD historical report for CY92.

²⁶⁹USASOC Commanding General, memo for Commander, USAJFKSWCS, subj: Mission Statement Change," 20 Oct 92; MOA between USAJFKSWCS and Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, subj: Formal Agreement of Cooperation in Technical Support and Procedures in Special Operations Forces (SOF) Language Matters, signed 29 Aug and 15 Oct 91.


noted above, eventually to use it only as necessary.²⁷⁰

At the end of CY92 the Center and School could look back upon almost a decade of development and expansion under its two Commandants of the era. Significant milestones included the establishment of the SF career branch, the Special Forces Assessment and Selection Course, the NCO Academy, the "Campus 2005" physical expansion, near-total electronic data dissemination, joint integrated training, new training manuals, the Special Warfare professional journal and courses and the activation of the 1st SWTG (A). Operations JUST CAUSE, PROMOTE LIBERTY, DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT amply demonstrated that the developments of the years 1987-1992 paid off in the only arena where they really counted, that is, in combat and in the field.


In addition to accomplishing the mission of the Center and School, USAJFKSWCS undertook a new look in 1992 as the organizational structure which had evolved throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (see FIGURE 16) further changed under the USASOC driven functional realignment (see FIGURE 17). The change of structure provided for a leaner and more focused organization which could concentrate on the training mission while passing the sustainment missions, especially combat developments and resource management, up to the new MACOM.

²⁷⁰MG S. Shachnow, memo for Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, subj: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) Accession Mission and Training Requirements for Fiscal Year (FY) 93, n.d.

US ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL 1992



US ARMY JFK SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL 1992--AFTER FUNCTIONAL REALIGNMENT



VII. US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTEGRATION COMMAND
(PROVISIONAL) (USASOIC) (P)

USASOC, as a major Army command, has as some of its primary responsibilities the management of the long-range planning, programming, force structure and systems acquisitions for the Army Special Operations Community. Yet, upon its activation in 1989 as a MACOM, USASOC found itself with two major subordinate units (MSU) of Regimental size reporting directly to the headquarters with constant operational requirements. Partly as a result of the need to provide some intermediate oversight of the extremely active 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, USASOC had created several special offices over the years to perform this function. In 1989 and 1990 it was the Office of Special Operations Integration. In December 1991, those functions were assumed by a new command reporting to USASOC: the United States Army Special Operations Integration Command (Provisional). (See FIGURE 18.) Its mission was to provide command and control for the two Regiments and to provide logistical and administrative support for other special mission units. The commander of the unit was also dual-hatted as the Deputy Commanding General of USASOC. Upon its activation, that was Brigadier General Harley Davis. In 1992, command shifted to Brigadier General Richard Potter.

75th RANGER REGIMENT (See FIGURE 19)

I. Historical Overview of 1987

A. General Summary


B. 75th Ranger Regiment

1. Mission: To plan and conduct special operations in support of US policies and objectives.

a. Specified Missions:

1. Command and control all Ranger battalions
2. Serve as tactical command and control headquarters for Ranger task forces
3. Undertake necessary planning for world wide employment of Ranger assets
4. Supervise Ranger battalion training

US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTEGRATION COMMAND (PROVISIONAL) 1992




*SPECIAL MISSION UNITS

**OK NATIONAL GUARD

————— COMMAND
 COORDINATION

75TH RANGER REGIMENT ORGANIZATION 1992



TRADOC

5. Develop Ranger doctrine in coordination with

techniques

6. Input to Light Infantry doctrine and training

7. Experiment with new equipment, to include off-the-shelf items, and share results with the Light Infantry community

8. Draw members from the entire Army, and after service with the Regiment, return them to line units of the Army imbued with the Ranger philosophy and standards.

b. Implied Missions:

1. Contingency planning for all Ranger missions

2. Maintain high performance Ranger Regimental and battalion staffs.

3. Standardization of the following:

-TACSOP, RSOP, ASOP	-Entry/Exit Criteria
-Battle Drills	-RIP/Pre-Ranger Crs
-Combat Tasks	-Off/NCO Cert.
-Load Plans	-Live Fire Modules
-Marking Systems	-Spec Ops Training

4. Conduct Company/Battalion ARTEP's, EDREs

5. Manage Ranger Exercise Program

6. Eliminate distractors which inhibit Ranger battalion's total concentration on the basics.

7. Maintain good relations on all Ranger host installations.

2. Key Personnel:

Regimental Headquarters

Commander	COL Wesley B. Taylor
Deputy Commander	LTC Edward M. Chamberlain
Executive Officer	LTC Michael J. Pearce
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM George D. Mock
S-1	CPT Kim R. Kadesch
S-2	LTC Donald C. Seay
S-3	LTC Shelby T. Stevens
S-4	MAJ James M. Willey

3. Operations and Training: The 75th Ranger Regiment executed an exceptionally challenging training schedule during the year. Included among the major operations the Regiment and its organic battalions participated in were: OPERATION GOLDEN EAGLE (Feb 87), OPERATION ECHO RIDGE (Mar 87), OPERATION SOLID SHIELD (Apr 87), BEST RANGER COMPETITION (MAY 87), OPERATION BRIGHT STAR (Aug 87), OPERATION OSPREY (Sep 87), and JOINT READINESS TRAINING.

II. Historical Overview 1988

A. General Summary

B. 75th Ranger Regiment

1. Mission: Same as for CY 1987

2. Key Personnel

Regimental Headquarters

Commander	COL Wesley B. Taylor, Jr.
Deputy Commander	LTC Michael J. Pearce
Executive Officer	MAJ Kenneth W. Strauss
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM George D. Mock
S-1	MAJ Dorian T. Anderson
S-2	MAJ Harvey H. Latson
S-3	MAJ Henry J. Salice
S-4	MAJ Ronald L. Allen
S-5	MSG E. Raymond Wells

1st Battalion

Commander	LTC William F. Kernan
Executive Officer	LTC MAJ John M. Mitchell
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM David L. Dalton
	CSM William H. Acebes

2nd Battalion

Commander	LTC John J. Maher III
Executive Officer	MAJ William Leszczynski
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Mariano R.C. Leon-Guerrero

3rd Battalion: No listing provided

3. Operations and Training: Throughout the course of CY-88, the 75th Ranger Regiment continued to sustain its worldwide, no notice combat capability through an intensive series of training exercises. The Regimental Command and Staff insured

that each Ranger battalion received an external evaluation on mission skills as well as a series of command inspections to judge administrative, logistical, and morale readiness. The regiment and its battalions participated in the following training exercises during the calendar year: JOINT READINESS TRAINING (Jan-Mar 88), Operation OCEAN VENTURE 1-88 (Apr 88), Operation FLINTLOCK (Apr 88), Operation BALD EAGLE (May 88), Operation UNITED THRUST (May 88), JOINT READINESS TRAINING (Jul 88), JUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER (Aug-SEP 88), JRTC 89-0 (Oct 88), and JRT 1-89 (Dec 88).

III. Historical Overview 1989

A. General Summary

B. 75th Ranger Regiment

1. Mission: Same as for CY 87

2. Key Personnel

Regimental Headquarters

Commander	COL William F. Kernan
Deputy Commander	LTC(P) Henry L.T. Koren
Executive Officer	MAJ Kenneth W. Stauss
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Mariano R.C. Leon-Guerrero
S-1	MAJ Dorian T. Anderson
S-2	MAJ Harvey H. Latson
S-3	MAJ Henry J. Solice
S-4	MAJ Ronald L. Allen

1st Battalion

Commander	LTC William F. Kernan
	LTC Robert W. Wagner
Executive Officer	MAJ John W. Mitchell
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM William H. Acebes

2nd Battalion

Commander	LTC(P) John J. Maher III
	LTC(P) Alan H. Maestas
Executive Officer	MAJ(P) William J. Leszczynski
	MAJ Clyde M. Newman
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Marioano R.C. Leon-Guerrero
	CSM Thomas R. Duke

3rd Battalion

Commander	LTC Robert M. Hensler
	LTC Joseph F. Hunt
Executive Officer	MAJ Thomas R. Turner
	MAJ Danny R. McKnight
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM John E. Jones

3. Operations and Training: The 75th Ranger Regiment and its organic battalions maintained a 48 week training schedule over the course of the calendar year. Highlights of the regiment's training year included: battalion level training exercise in Puerto Rico (Jan-Feb 89), Operation CASINO GAMBIT (Feb 89), JRT (Feb-Mar 89), Operation SAND EAGLE (Mar 89), JRTC (Apr 89), LANCOM (May 89), JOTC (July 89), CABANAS (Sep 89), and Operation ELIGIBLE RECEIVER (Sep 89). The most important contribution made by the 75th Ranger Regiment came during Operation JUST CAUSE when regimental elements conducted two simultaneous airborne assaults at Torrijos Tocumen and Rio Hato airfields on 20 December 1989. Rangers conducted numerous follow-on missions in support of operational objectives.

IV. Historical Overview 1990

1. Mission: See CY 87 mission statement

2. Key Personnel

a. Regimental Headquarters

Commander	COL William F. Kernan
Deputy Commander	LTC(P) Henry L. T. Koren
Executive Officer	LTC Bruce D. Grant
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Mariano R.C. Leon-Guerrero
S-1	MAJ Donald K. Bridges
S-2	LTC Richard K. Bridges
S-3	MAJ John M. Bednarek
S-4	MAJ Thomas J. Patykula

b. 1st Battalion

Commander	LTC Robert W. Wagner
Executive Officer	MAJ Brian M. Pentecost
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Donald P. Lamica

c. 2nd Battalion

Commander	LTC(P) Alan H. Maestas
Executive Officer	MAJ(P) Clyde M. Newman
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Thomas R. Duke

d. 3rd Battalion

Commander	LTC Joseph F. Hunt
	LTC James T. Jackson
Executive Officer	MAJ Danny R. McKnight
	MAJ Dorian T. Anderson
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM John E. Jones
	CSM Gerald E. Klein

3. Operations and Training: Elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment continued to maintain a challenging training schedule throughout the calendar year. Key deployments included: Operation CAM STRIKE (Feb-Mar 90), JRT 2-90 (Mar-Apr 90), NTC (Apr 90), LANCOM OV (Apr-May 90), JRT 3-90 (Jul-Aug 90), DFT Camp Pendleton (Jul-Aug 90).

V. Historical Overview 1991

1. Mission: See CY 87 Mission statement

2. Key Personnel:

a. Regimental Headquarters

Commander	COL David L. Grange
Executive Officer	LTC Bruce D. Grant
Deputy Commander	LTC(P) Wayne M. Barth
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Mariano R.C. Leon-Guerrero
S-1	MAJ(P) Donald K. Bridges
S-2	LTC Richard Inokuchi
S-3	LTC John M. Bednarek
S-4	LTC Thomas J. Patykula
S-5	MAJ Patrick Carpenter

b. 1st Battalion

Commander	LTC Kenneth W. Strauss
Executive Officer	MAJ Purl K. Keen
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Donald P. Lamica

c. 2nd Battalion

Commander	LTC Alan H. Maestas
Executive Officer	MAJ William G. Minton
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Thomas A. Duke
	CSM Jesse G. Laye

d. 3rd Battalion

Commander	LTC James T. Jackson
	LTC John T. Keneally
Executive Officer	MAJ Dorian T. Anderson

MAJ Francis H. Kearney
Cmd Sergeant Major CSM Gerald E. Klein

3. Operations and Training: Elements of 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry as well as the regimental headquarters executed operations in support of a Joint Task Force during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Major deployments conducted during the remainder of the calendar year included: Operation CAMEL HUMP (Mar 91), JRT 3-91 (Jul 91), JRT 4-91 (Sep 91), Operation MONGADAI (Oct 91), JRT 1-92 (Nov 91), Operation IRIS GOLD (Dec 91).

VI. Historical Overview 1992

1. Mission: See CY 87 mission statement

2. Key Personnel:

Regimental Headquarters

Commander	COL David L. Grange
Deputy Commander	LTC(P) Wayne M. Barth
Executive Officer	LTC Bruce D. Grant
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Mariano R. C. Leon-Guerrero
S-1	MAJ(P) Donald K. Bridges
S-2	LTC Richard Inokuchi
S-3	LTC John M. Bednarek
S-4	LTC Thomas J. Patykula
S-5	MAJ Patrick Carpenter

1st Battalion

Commander	LTC J. Michael Bednarek
Executive Officer	MAJ James M. Morris
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Philip L. Sebay

2nd Battalion

Commander	LTC Gary D. Speer
	LTC Robert A. Portante
Executive Officer	MAJ William G. Minton
	MAJ Stanley B. Clemons
Cmd Sergeant Major	CSM Jesse G. Laye
	CSM Francisco G. Magana

3rd Battalion

Commander	LTC John T. Keneally
	LTC Francis H. Kearney
Executive Officer	MAJ(P) Francis H. Kearney
	MAJ Ronald C. Russell

Cmd Sergeant Major CSM Gerald E. Klein
1SG Jeffrey L. Greer
CSM Reginald Salinas

3. Operations and Training: The Ranger Regiment continued to sustain its intensive training cycle over the course of the calendar year. Major training events conducted included: REGIMENTAL GUNSMOKE (Jan 92), Joint Readiness Training (Jan 92), BCTP War Fighter Exercise with 101st Airborne Division (Feb 92), JRTC 92-5, CONOPS (Mar 92), Stinger FTX (Mar 92), CAPEX (Apr 92), JRTC Rotation 92-6 (Apr 92), Operation OCEAN VENTURE CPX (May 92), Operation FOAL EAGLE (May 92), JRT 3-92 (May-June 92), Operation SAND EAGLE (Jul 92), Operation MANGUDAI (Aug 92), Operation GUNSMOKE (Aug 92), Operation ULCHI FOCUS LENS (Aug 92), Operation TROPIC STRIKE (Sep-Oct 92), JRT 4-92 (Sep-Oct 92), Naval Gunfire Training (Oct-Nov 92), BCTP with I Corps (Oct-Nov 92), JRT 1-93 (Nov 92) and Operation LEATHERNECK RANGER (Nov 92).

160th SOAR

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)
(SOAR)²⁷¹

Commanders:

1980- ?	LTC JACOB B. COUCH
? -83	LTC BARRY SOTTACK
1983-85	COL TERRENCE HENRY
1985-86	COL CLYDE A. HENNIES
1986-89	COL JOHN N. DAILEY
1989-90	COL WILLIAM MILLER
1990-92	COL JOSEPH A. FUCCI
1992-	COL BRYAN D. BROWN

Background:

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment grew out a number of fragmented aviation organizations created in the 1980s to perform Special Operations missions. Task Force 160 was created in 1981 after the failure of the Iranian Hostage Rescue mission. Immediately after the failure of that mission and the destruction of several aircraft at Desert One, the Army began

²⁷¹Some of the few current sources of Special Operations Aviation are a series of articles in Army Aviation, July 31, 1990. The articles are: Special Operations Aviation Regimental Commander, Colonel Billy Miller, "Special Operations Aviation" pp. 17-19; 1st SOCOM Commander, MG James A. Guest and Assistant MACOM Aviation Officer, USASOC, MAJ T. Michael Ryan, "The SOF Aviation Regiment", pp. 20-23; and MAJ Russell D. Carmody "Dedicated Aviation Support", pp. 24-26. These articles served as some of the sources for the following.

preparing its own special aviation capability.

In the summer of 1980, volunteers were requested from elements of the 101st Aviation Group of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, KY. The C/158th Assault Helicopter (UH-60 Blackhawks), A/159th Aviation (CH-47 Chinooks) and B/229th Attack Helicopter Battalions (OH-6 Little Bird gunships) provided almost all the volunteers for a hazardous mission that everyone knew had something to do with the Iranian Hostage crisis.

The men and machines embarked on an ambitious training program. The crews trained in low altitude flying, at night, with what today seems primitive full faced night vision goggles. The crews of the task force "pushed the envelope" of capabilities of their aircraft and themselves. One of the volunteers, CW3 Randy Jones out of the attack helicopter unit, afterwards remarked:

We probably trained, in fact I know we did, we trained harder and did more concentrated [training] that I ever had in my aviation career, and a lot of it was self-generated. There was nobody to train us, we just had a mission and . . . we found our best peer group representatives to put our heads together on what we thought was the best way to go about accomplishing the training to meet the mission that we had set aside for us."²⁷²

During the course of the training, the Iranian hostages were released and the mission was canceled. However, the Army decided to maintain the capability to conduct long distance missions at night and Task Force 160 was born. By October 1981, Task Force 160, as it was known, was in existence and it was constituted as the 160th Aviation Battalion on 1 April 1982.²⁷³

In 1983, the 160th Battalion faced one of its greatest

²⁷²Interview by Dr. Richard W. Stewart, USASOC Historian, with MW4 Randy Jones, 3 February 1992, at HQ, 160th SOAR, Fort Campbell, KY.

²⁷³Originally, some of the staff officers of the fledgling unit wanted to have the unit called the 202nd Aviation Battalion: "twice as good" as the 101st. However, the Department of Heraldry denied the request since no unit with those numbers had ever existed. The second choice was the 160th Battalion, since it was the next number in sequence from 158th and 159th Battalions, both of which units had provided the bulk of the men for the unit. Interview with LTC Robert Nelson and LTC Bob Yuill, HQ, 160th SOAR, Fort Campbell, KY, 5 February 1992.

challenges; a challenge that almost spelled the end of the unit. In a series of accidents at night in March, July, August and October, the battalion lost four aircraft and sixteen personnel. (See chart 1) The Army was concerned that the unit was "pushing the envelope" farther than men or machines were ready to go. As a result, a "Blue Ribbon Panel" was assembled at Fort Campbell to examine what could be done to "fix" the problem of training accidents or, barring that, to recommend dissolution of the unit. After hours of testimony and investigation, the Panel issued its report. While covering many areas, the main impact of the report seemed to be the creation of a formal training program to work new members of the unit up to speed slowly and with an experienced pilot on hand at all times. Prior to the accidents, at least according to some early members of the unit, the training was "fragmented." There was " a little training here, a little training there, and throw them in the cock pit and let's go do this stuff."²⁷⁴

One of the testifiers before the Blue Ribbon Plan was Warrant Officer Randy Jones. He recommended that a formal training program be adopted, what later turned into "Green Platoon" which would take a new, highly skilled volunteer pilot, and turn him into a fully mission qualified (FMQ) special operations pilot.²⁷⁵ He recommended that new members be assigned to a separate platoon where they would undergo extremely rigorous and 100% supervised instruction by experienced pilots. The 160th Battalion commander at the time, Colonel Terrence M. Henry, concurred and together they brief the 101st Division Commander, MG Thompson. The battalion still fell under the command of the 101st at that time. General Thompson concurred in this plan "to stop hurting people"

²⁷⁴Interview by Dr. Richard W. Stewart, USASOC Historian, with Retired Warrant Officers Eddie Hill and Wes Komulainen, at HQ, 160th SOAR, Fort Campbell, KY, 5 February 1992.

²⁷⁵The levels of certification in the 160th are different than other aviation units. After four months of training in "Green Platoon", a pilot is BMQ or Basic Mission Qualified. He is thus certified to serve as a co-pilot during missions. After 12-18 months of training in a wide variety of operations in different terrain worldwide, a pilot can become Fully Mission Qualified (FMQ). This certifies the pilot as capable of performing as the pilot in command and a planner for SOF missions. After fully mission qualified, an experienced pilot could advance to the level of "flight lead" after 36-48 months and sustained high performance. A "flight lead" qualified pilot was certified to plan and lead special operations aviation missions.

and laid the basis for the formal training program.²⁷⁶ The unit was not abolished, but rather received additional training guidance and resources. The accidents, with few exceptions, ceased. (See Chart 8 for all Nightstalker casualties.)

At the same time that the Blue Ribbon Panel was conducting its hearings, the 160th got involved in its first special operations mission in Grenada: Operation URGENT FURY.

The details of 160th involvement in Operation URGENT FURY--the invasion of Grenada in October 1983--are still classified. It was the first test of elements in the unit and was conducted at very limited notice. Planning on the operation began only on the Thursday, the 20th of October, according to one participant, and the invasion was launched on the 25th.²⁷⁷ The planners hurriedly met at Fort Bragg the next day, wrote the operations order, coordinated with other Special Operations Forces participants and prepared to launch. The forces launched, conducted their missions and returned by the 27th of October.

As with all first operations, especially those conducted in a hurry, there were problems. The lack of skilled planners on the ground in Grenada was a handicap. In addition, after the initial operations, elements of the Task Force conducted some of their operations in the daylight: a misuse of a highly trained night operating unit. The 160th paid the price, with the loss of one UH-60A and its pilot, CPT Keith J. Lucas, in that daylight mission.

From the conclusion of Operation URGENT FURY to their involvement in JUST CAUSE in 1989, elements of 160th Aviation Battalion maintained their high state of training and conducted numerous classified exercises and operations. In addition, the 160th planned and conducted Operation PRIME CHANCE (1986-88) and Operation MOUNT HOPE III (Jun 88) to name a few. Many of the details of these and other operations remain classified. However, some elements of a major SOF success in Operation Prime Chance have reached open sources.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶Interview by Dr. Richard W. Stewart, USASOC Historian, with MW4 Randy Jones at HQ, 160th SOAR, Fort Campbell, KY, 3 February 1992.

²⁷⁷Oral History interview by Dr. Richard W. Stewart with LTC Nelson and LTC Yuill, 5 February 1992, HQ, 160th SOAR, Fort Campbell, KY.

²⁷⁸"Ambush in the Gulf" by Russell Watson and John Barry, Newsweek, October 5, 1987:24-7. This synopsis of 160th operations in the gulf is taken from this open source article and neither confirms nor denies their accuracy.

Chart 8: Nightstalker Memorial
 HQ, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment

LEFT Marker

17 Jul 1980	CH-47	290	CW2 Bobby M. Crumley
21 Sep 1981	OH-6	B160	CW3 John W. Williams
29 Mar 1982	UH-60A	984	SGT Ricky D. Zizelman
10 Jul 1983	CH-47	845	CW4 Larry K. Jones
			CW3 Thomas B. Crosson III
			CW2 James N. Jansen
			SSG Mark J. Reilly
			SSG Luis A. Sanchez
			SSG Mark D. Cornwell
4 Oct 1983	UH-60A	999	CW3 William H. Tuttle
29 Apr 1985			SP4 Richard J. Thompson
			1SGT Ronnie Orebo
27 Apr 1987	MH-6H	656	CPT Frederick M. Maddock III
20 Dec 1989	AH-6A	84-24678	1LT John R. Hunter
			CW2 Wilson B. Owens

RIGHT Marker:

4 Nov 1980	OH-6	168	SP4 Timothy Hensley
7 Oct 1981	OH-6	39	LTC Michael Grimm
20 Mar 1983	CH-47	527	CW4 Ralph L. Thompson
			CW2 Donald K. Alvey
			SGT Claude J. Dunn
			SP4 Jerry L. Wilder
			PFC Gregory D. Eichner
26 Aug 1983	UH-60A	993	CPT Robert E. Brannum
			WO1 Allen E. Jennins
			CW2 David W. Jordan
25 Oct 1983	OH-60A	002	CPT Keith J. Lucas
20 May 1988	AH-6	17276	CW3 Stephen A. Hansen
			CW3 Jerry H. Landgraf
21 Feb 1991	MH-60L	251	CPT Charles W. Cooper
			CW3 Michael F. Anderson
			SSG Mario Vega-Valazquez
			SSG Christopher J. Chapman
3 Oct 1993	MH-60L		CW3 Clifton P. Wolcott
			CW2 Donovan L. Briley
			CW4 Raymond A. Frank
			SSG William D. Cleveland, Jr.

In Operation PRIME CHANCE, the aviators of the battalion operated from floating barges in the Persian Gulf and flew nightly missions over water. Their presence deterred Iranian speedboat teams from their attacks on international shipping. In two instances, according to newspaper accounts at the time, when the Iranians moved heavier boats into action, the 160th proved to be decisive weapon with international implications. Helicopters of the unit located the Iran Ajr, a mine-laying ship, laying mines in shipping lines in the dead of night in September 1987. The aviators took it under fire and temporarily halted the minelaying before returning for refueling. After refueling, the helicopters returned and found the ship had commenced laying mines again. A stronger attack with mini-guns and rockets caused the crew to abandon ship and naval elements later boarded the ship with its incriminating cargo. The pictures of the ship with mines on board exploded like a thunderclap throughout the world press.

The following month, the 160th took on a Boghammer patrol boat and two Boston Whalers and sank them both. Operating at night over the Persian Gulf in brutal flying conditions, the Nightstalkers provided proof once again of their flexibility and skill. In this mission of "high political content", SOF aviation proved to be just the right surgical force for the operation.²⁷⁹


B. Reorganization:

The proven capabilities of the 160th Aviation Battalion in the early and mid-1980s led to the need for additional aviation resources within the Army Special Operations Community. The 129th Aviation Company was formed at Hunter Army Airfield in Savannah Georgia in October 1986 to provide a similar capability for the Rangers. Out of the 129th came the 617th Aviation Detachment at Howard Air Force Base, Panama, which had five of the 15 UH-60s of the 129th. There were other assets spread throughout the Army which needed some measure of consolidation. The Oklahoma National Guard also had the 245th Aviation Battalion with 25 AH-6 and 23 UH-1 helicopters. In addition, each Special Forces Group had an aviation platoon of four UH-1 helicopters each. The high optempo of these units, in particular the 160th, and the special management concerns of aviation units with their high maintenance costs, led to several reorganizations. (See FIGURE 20: Special Operations Aviation 1986)

The first major step occurred on 16 October 1986. On that date, the Special Operations Aviation Group was activated as a replacement for TF 160 and as an interim step in the creation of one special operational headquarters for all Army Special

²⁷⁹Ibid.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION 1986



*1 PER SF GROUP

————— COMMAND
 COORDINATION

Operations Aviation. Plans were underway, as well, by 1987 to create a SOF Aviation Brigade to serve as that headquarters.²⁸⁰ However, by 1988, 1st SOCOM staff actions were underway to create a Special Operations Aviation Regiment instead.²⁸¹

In September, 1988, 1st SOCOM prepared a concept on a Special Operations Aviation Regiment and briefed it to the Commander in Chief (CINC) United States Special Operations Command. The Army and TRADOC concurred in the plans and changed the designation of the 160th SOAG to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) with an effective date of 16 May 1990. The DCSOPS of the Army gave the final approval to the plan on 19 February 1989 and full reorganization was implemented in September 1989.

The operating concept of the new Special Operations Aviation Regiment was to: "organize, train, equip and validate Army SOA forces for worldwide employment in support of contingency missions and the warfighting CINCs." Key to implementing this concept were the following operating principles: maintain current capabilities available to other headquarters; enhance safety, standardization, and maintenance; provide unity of command; centralize policy, planning and direction; plan for the future of SOF aviation; provide major subordinate units quality aviation support.

Phase I of the consolidation of Special Operations Aviation (SOA) required the activation of the 3rd battalion, 160th SOA Group on 16 September 1989. The 3/160th was originally activated as the 129th Aviation Company on 3 October 1986 under the 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM). The 129th had a distinguished record in Vietnam where it was active from 9 October 1965 to 11 Feb 1972.²⁸² The company was reorganized at Fort Bragg in March 1973 and inactivated in September 1979. On 16 January 1988, the 129th was inactivated and Company A, 3rd Battalion 160th Aviation was constituted and activated at Hunter

²⁸⁰SOF Aviation Brigade Activation LOI, in USASOC Historical Archives.

²⁸¹IPR on Activation of 3rd Battalion 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), dated 15 Sep 1988, in USASOC Historical Archives.

²⁸²The unit served in Dong Ba Thin and supported the 2nd Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine Brigade during operation Jefferson as its first combat operation. The unit had originally been stationed at Fort Campbell, KY where it was activated on 3 July 1965 just prior for departure for Vietnam. The company was reorganized at Fort Bragg in March 1973 and inactivated on 15 September 1979. Taken from the unit history, 3/160th in the 1991 Annual Historical Report of 3/160th in the USASOC Archives.

Army Airfield. On 16 September 1989, Company A reorganized into the 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Group which became a Regiment in May 1990. The Battalion served in Saudi Arabia from September 1990 to April 1991 and was awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its role in the Gulf War.²⁸³

The full development of the 3/160th moved in steps. Phase I had 1st SOCOM direct that the four aviation platoons of the Special Forces Groups were to be made OPCON to the Commander, 3/160th. The commander of the 3/160th created an additional company, Company D, to decrease his span of control. 1st SOCOM then realigned command of the 617th Aviation Detachment, Panama, to the Commander, 3/160th with OPCON remaining at Special Operations Command (SOCSOUTH) U. S. Southern Command.

Phase II of the consolidation of SOA reorganized the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group's seven companies into two subordinate battalions: the 1st and 2nd battalions. Those two battalions were not joined with the third battalion in the Group because of the uniqueness of the Group's (formed out of TF 160th) peacetime mission. At this time, all active component Special Operations Aviation was placed under two commanders, an improvement from the previous eight. In the last quarter of FY 90, D/3/160th was deactivated and their helicopters transferred to 1/245th of the Oklahoma National Guard. The activation of the Special Operations Aviation Regiment on 16 May 1990, found the new Regiment with a new force structure (See FIGURE 21) The transformation of a hodge-podge of special operations aviation assets into one unified structure was now complete.


C. OPERATION JUST CAUSE

JUST prior to activation as a Regiment, elements of Task Force 160 participated in Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama in December 1989. Unlike URGENT FURY, operations for JUST Cause were well-planned, well-rehearsed and were thus conducted with clockwork precision. Special Operations conducted operations from Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport to enemy installations at Rio Hato, to the Cerro Azul TV tower to a host of other large and small targets or potential targets. A number of the missions remain classified. Some 429 personnel of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group were involved in Operation JUST CAUSE along with 11 AH-6, 11 MH-6, 7 CH-47 and 19 MH-60 helicopters.²⁸⁴

²⁸³Ibid.

²⁸⁴Three were lost in combat operations. Message from CDR, 1st SOCOM, Fort Bragg, NC to CDR, USASOC, 012330Z Jan 1990, Subject: SITREP Operation Just Cause/Promote Liberty.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION 1993



For the seizure of Rio Hato, AH-64 Apaches were attached to the 160th elements in order to assist the Rangers in their two battalion drop on the airfield. They also worked together with AC-130 Specter gunships of Air Force Special Operations.²⁸⁵ Four AH-6 "Little Birds" went in with a Blackhawk helicopter which established a rearming point on the ground at an isolated spot of the airfield. The "Little Birds" then divided into two elements and provided close in mini-gun and rocket support for the Rangers. The enemy was apparently already alerted and the firing was "fairly intense" in the words of one participant.²⁸⁶ It was a clear night with a big moon, and the Nightstalkers prefer to fly in near total darkness to give them their edge.

Special operations aviation helicopters from the 160th and 617th Aviation Company were involved in other operations during JUST CAUSE. They carried Major Kevin Higgins and his two "A" teams to the Pacora River Bridge to hold that bridge against a convoy of the PDF from the Cimarron Cuartel. One helicopter was lost in the downtown area during another mission. The operations of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group during JUST CAUSE are just another example of flexible and skillful special operations assets and their many uses on the battlefield.

D. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 160th deployed initially to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD. They were later joined by other elements of the Regiment, but the majority of support of Army Special Forces missions in the Gulf War was provided by 3/160th. The battalion, under the command of LTC Dell Dailey, was placed under the command and control the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) but fell under the operational control of the air asset manager, an Air Force Special Operations commander, and the Commander of Special Operations Command, Central: COL Jesse Johnson.

One of the first missions given to 3/160th Special Operations Battalion upon arrival in theater was to plan for combat search and rescue (CSAR). Original estimates for the

²⁸⁵When the Little Birds went in close, the AC-130 pulled back so as not to fire onto the darkened helicopters. According to one participant, it was "tough to be in the same fire zone with the AC 130." Oral History Interview by Dr. Richard W. Stewart with MW4 Randy Jones, 3 February 1992, HQ 160th SOAR, Fort Campbell, KY.

²⁸⁶Oral History Interview by Dr. Richard W. Stewart with MW4 Randy Jones, 3 February 1992, HQ, 160th SOAR, Fort Campbell, KY.

opening days of air operations in DESERT STORM were that as many as forty pilots might be shot down the first night. This degree of loss was obviously unacceptable to the theater commander and to the American public. Every measure that could be taken to rescue any percentage of those pilots would be time and money well spent. General Schwarzkopf turned to Special Operations Forces to provide him that capability.

Originally an Air Force mission, combat search and rescue (CSAR) became increasingly difficult and dangerous to perform in a high threat environment. The standard Air Force rescue helicopters were sitting ducks to enemy air defense assets since they were large, slow and operated generally in the daytime. Special operations aviation assets, however, were specially configured to penetrate enemy airspace at night with a high degree of survivability. Modified CH-53 (PAVE LOW), CH-47 (CHINOOK) and UH-60 (BLACKHAWK) helicopters, flown by superbly trained pilots of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and the 3rd battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) were the only assets available which could reasonably expect to rescue downed pilots with any degree of success.

The commander of the air component of SOCCENT, AFSOC or Air Force Special Operations Command, was designated the single air asset manager for special operations aviation missions. He provided mission guidance to their own assets at Raha, Ar Ar and Al Jouf and to the 3/160 helicopters at King Khalid Military City. In the CSAR mode, both assets responded to the Joint Recovery Coordination Cell (JRCC) at Riyadh, but final approval for all CSAR missions came directly from the SOCCENT Commander. This included missions flown north of the 33 degree 30 minute line which was the line of demarcation between missions flown out of Saudi Arabia and those flown out of airbases in Turkey. (The CSAR missions flown out of Turkey were part of JTF Proven Force under the command of EUCCOM. However, their rescue missions were coordinated with SOCCENT who retained final approval since CINCCENT was the supported CINC.)

The principal army asset of the CSAR mission was the 3rd of the 160th SOAR out of Hunter Army Airfield, GA. The 3/160th had 8 MH-60s and 7 MH-47s by the time the war began. The helicopters had additional improvements placed on them in December and January including improved infrared suppressions systems (HIRS-Hover Infrared Suppressions System), Robertson internal fuel tanks, miniguns and other protection devices and navigation aids.

In addition to equipment improvements, 3/160th spent the time between their arrival in early September and the beginning of the war in undergoing extensive training drills. Pilots and attached security personnel of the 5th SFG(A) rehearsed their rescue procedures relentlessly. "Volunteer" pilots were given

food, water and a rescue radio (for emergencies) and deposited in the desert perhaps a hundred miles from civilization. Helicopter crews on exercise strip alert were notified of a rescue mission and given the general coordinates of the "downed" pilot. The crew would then plot their zig-zag course through notional enemy radar sites, load up their well-armed security personnel and fly a high-speed, low altitude course to those coordinates. Once in the general vicinity, the helicopter would begin its search pattern as the downed pilot flashed his infrared beacon. Despite the dust, distance and darkness, the helicopter pilots invariably were able to spot their target.

Security for the helicopters was provided by two heavily armed SF personnel with each MH-60 Blackhawk and four such personnel for each MH-47 Chinook. In addition, a Special Forces and a 3/160 medic would try to accompany each mission. The role of the SF team members was primarily to protect the helicopter by establishing a security observation post 50-100 meters in front of the helicopters as they landed to pick up downed pilots. Each security team member would have PVS 5 night vision devices to assist in watching for enemy intervention. While security was being established, another team member would make physical contact with the pilot, verify that it was indeed a U. S. or allied pilot (and not an Iraqi trap) and check the pilot over quickly for wounds. If the pilot was alright, the SF team member would assist him to the helicopter where the medics would pull another quick check. The security would then be withdrawn and the helicopter would leave. The firepower of the SF team was substantial (AT-4, M203, LAW, and even a SAW upon occasion) and this, coupled with the mini-guns on the helicopters, gave each pilot rescue mission plenty of self-protection.

Once the procedures had been developed, the next key was "rehearsal, rehearsal, rehearsal". As two Special Forces team members stated late in February 1991, "we practiced any scenarios you could imagine."²⁸⁷ Teams were assigned to each helicopter and went on each of the practice runs. One of the lessons learned on these practice runs was that the helicopter should not land too close to a pilot if the pilot was suspected of being wounded. The rotor would throw up such a dust storm that the medics would be unable to apply sterile dressings or clean the wound at all. Helicopters would land as much as 100 meters away from potentially injured pilots whereas they would land as close as possible to uninjured ones.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁷Interview with SFC Earl James, SFC Timothy Smith and CW2 Rick Detrick, 22 February 1991, HQ, 3/160th SOAR, KKMC.

²⁸⁸CPT Chris Allen was pulled from his team as the air war grew closer in order to assist the 2nd Battalion S-3 staff the Jump Battle Staff (JBS), a field command post which was to follow

Special operations aviators, maintenance personnel, crewmen and security personnel all combined to work hard on performing a difficult and dangerous mission with a minimum of guidance. Their attention to detail and extensive use of rehearsals to improve mission performance under the exacting conditions of night flying in the dust, winds and navigational hazards of the desert set the standard for aviation excellence.

With the commencement of the air war on 17 January, 1991, the role of the 3/160th changed from one of passive training to active waiting. The crews were on rotating strip alert, waiting to be launched into Iraq to pick up one of the dozens of expected allied pilots shot down by Iraq. Estimates were that as many as forty pilots might be shot down on the first night of allied bombing attacks. These projections proved, thankfully, to be overly pessimistic. The massive loss of planes and pilots did not occur, however. Nevertheless, the crews waited on alert, continued to practice their craft during "down time" and waited.

Only once did the Army special operations aviators have a chance to pull off a pilot rescue. Those pilots who were shot down were, in most cases, quickly seized by Iraqi soldiers or civilians and imprisoned. However, in the early evening of 17 February, an F-16 pilot, CPT Scott A. Thomas, was shot down just 60 miles north of the Iraq-Saudi border. His chute was seen by his wing man, voice contact was established with him on the ground, and no Iraqis were in the immediate vicinity. It looked like an ideal chance to pull off a rescue.

CW3 Thomas A. Montgomery was sitting in the ready room of the 3/160th HQ at King Khalid Military City. He was not thinking about possible rescue missions, in part because he was not on strip alert. When the call came down about a downed pilot, another crew which was on alert began planning a zig-zag course through enemy radar to those coordinates. However, before they could take off, a problem developed with their helicopter. In a classic, "Hey you", Montgomery was told to get together his crew (co-pilot CW3 Joel Locks, Crew chiefs Paul Laduca and Kurt Hixenbaugh, medic PFC William Mudd and two Special Forces security team members, SFC Edmund Wilson and SSG Douglas M. Patterson) and take the mission. At the last minute, the back-up aircraft (two helicopters were generally flown on these missions in case one was downed) developed problems and Chief Montgomery took off on his own. The other helicopter joined them later at a rendezvous point south of the border.²⁸⁹

the Egyptian Corps headquarters through the breach and into Kuwait. Johnson Interview, 27 March 1992.

²⁸⁹The other helicopter was piloted by CW3 Todd Thelin and CW3 John H. Aberg also of 3/160th SOAR.]

As Montgomery flew on the course worked out by the other team, he gained immediate confidence when he contacted one of the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) monitoring the rescue. AWACS confirmed the presence of an active fighter/bomber CAP (Combat Air Patrol) in case of problems. It also relayed the arrival of the helicopter ("a friendly low and slow") in the area to avoid any unpleasant consequences to the helicopter. Montgomery felt confident when he knew that "someone was watching" out for him.

With communications crystal clear, for once, Montgomery and his wing man flew an angled flightpath of approximately 80 miles towards the coordinates given them. In doing so, they apparently flew directly over the pilot but could not see him in the dark. Then the pilot, realizing the problem, turned on his infrared beacon. As Montgomery began his search pattern, he made one turn and then, as he finished the second turn, he spotted the beacon. Despite the imminent arrival of a severe thunderstorm, the helicopter flew within 20 feet of the ground at around 140 knots directly toward the beacon. At this point the helicopter began to be illuminated by enemy radar. Montgomery counted multiple radar hits and, as he was coming in on final, the missile alert light went off. Enemy trucks were spotted in the distance, only 30 minutes away. As the helicopter descended towards the beacon, an enemy missile lock was noted but he must have been on the high ground--the lock was broken as they dipped behind the hills.

The pilot on the ground heard the helicopter, but apparently could not see it. The first inclination he had about the nearness of the Blackhawk was when the prop blast hit him. At that moment, unsure of whose helicopter it was, he dropped into a fetal ball. The SF security team jumped out, got to him and checked for injuries. None were noted at that time although later they discovered a small scratch on his chin. Assured that the pilot was fine, the team shook him and let him know he was being rescued. They then helped him to the helicopter. He did not have the strength or presence of mind to make it without help. The experience was simply too traumatic.

CW3 Montgomery took off and headed for home. Using commendable fire discipline, his gunners resisted the urge to fire their mini-guns at the approaching Iraqis. As soon as they were 10 miles outside of the area of the pickup, they informed AWACS which then notified the fighter/bombers that they were clear. At that point the Air Force took care of those Iraqis with cluster bombs.

Moving back into Saudi Arabia, the two Blackhawks maintained an average of 20 feet altitude and 140 knots with an additional 20 knots of tail wind. The flight was uneventful except for one alert Iraqi who fired a surface to surface missile at them. SGT Laduca spotted it out of the right hand side of the bird in the eight o'clock position. He also saw, with some degree of anxiety that it had turned towards them and was accelerating. Luckily, the missile ran out fuel just short of the helicopter and dropped out of sight. After that, the flight continued without incident. The pilot was given minor medical attention at the 3/160 hanger and had an emotional reunion with his wing man who landed at KKMC to find out if he was alright.

The rescue operation had worked without a flaw. The hours and hours of rehearsals made the actual operation almost anticlimactic. "Almost" except for the excitement of getting shot at and saving a pilot from almost certain captivity and possibly death. An outstanding pilot, well trained and rehearsed, and an outstanding helicopter, the modified Blackhawk, combined to accomplish a difficult and important mission behind enemy lines.

In addition to the CSAR mission, pilots of the 3/160th were involved in the insertion and extraction of Special Forces Special Reconnaissance Teams. Helicopters of the battalion inserted terrain reconnaissance and "hide-site" teams deep behind enemy lines on six different occasions in February. Flying at night at near zero visibility, the 3/160th helicopters penetrated the border at ease and deposited their valuable cargo with unerring accuracy. Most of the missions did not stay on the ground their full projected time. In those instances, the special operations aviators came back, twice while it was still light, and picked up the teams again. One dramatic story of the rescue of a distressed Special Forces teams shows the degree of danger faced by each pilot and crew of the helicopters of Desert Storm.

The Special Forces team had been compromised in their "hide site" early in the morning on 24 February 1991 and were fighting for their lives by midmorning. JUST that day, Operation DESERT STORM had entered the ground phase and the SF team's mission was to perform special reconnaissance over 150 miles behind enemy lines. Inserted by helicopter on 23 February, they were discovered shortly after daylight by inquisitive villagers and for several hours they had fought off increasing numbers of armed villagers and hastily assembled militia troops. They called for

emergency extraction although nightfall was several hours away.

At 1414 hrs, local time, the team leader was relieved to hear the sound of a helicopter in the distance. Despite it being broad daylight with enemy forces increasing in the area, their rescue was at hand. The pilot of the MH-60 Blackhawk, CW4 James Crisafulli, flew his bird with tremendous skill.²⁹⁰ As the team leader recounted later, "he was screaming down the road, going around 140 knots off the side of the road, one side of a 20 foot [high] power line, six feet off the deck." CW4 Crisafulli spotted the team, stood the Blackhawk on its nose, jumped over the power line, pointed his nose toward the team and put it into a controlled crash. The team thought the helicopter had crashed for real and had a moment of utter desperation. However, the helicopter was still operational and Crisafulli and his team fought off encircling enemy soldiers with newly installed mini-guns, killing at least three enemy with direct fire. The SF team hurriedly got on the Blackhawk and Crisafulli "powered it out of there" in the words of the grateful Special Forces team leader. With AK-47 rounds coming from all directions, the Blackhawk took off, nearly flying over two heavily armed gun jeeps which had not been noticed until then. The MH-60 took at least six direct hits by enemy ground fire but kept flying at full speed. After the helicopter landed in friendly territory, it was determined that it was out of action for the rest of the war. However, the Blackhawk had kept flying when it was needed, despite those hits. In addition, neither enemy action nor the dangers of flying a low level emergency exfiltration mission had deterred Chief Warrant Officer Crisafulli from accomplishing his job.

In the words of the rescued team leader, CW4 Crisafulli's skill so impressed him that he would "do anything in this world, if I know that we got people like that pilot backing us up. . . that pilot saved our lives." CW4 Crisafulli was awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross for this action.²⁹¹

One additional mission of the 3/160th should be discussed as part of their contribution to Operations Desert Shield/Storm:

²⁹⁰His co-pilot was CWO Randy Stephens.

²⁹¹Interview by Dr. Richard W. Stewart with Team Leader of Team 008B, King Fahd International Airport, Saudi Arabia, 26 February 1991.

the photo recon missions flown off Kuwait by a helicopter of the 3/160th before the start of the ground war. This mission had its origin in Saddam Hussein's environmental attack on Saudi Arabia by opening the valves of an oil platform off the coast of Kuwait and releasing a huge oil slick into the Persian Gulf. It was vital that low level reconnaissance of this oil platform occur to gather information for the CINC.²⁹² The mission lasted from 25-28 January 1991.

Two MH-60 helicopters, the lead one piloted by MAJ Mark Ochsenbein, A Company Commander, were flown from KKMC to Ras Al Mishab on 25 January and picked up a camera team. From there the helicopters flew to the oil platform six miles off the coast (within artillery range) and hovered in the area for several minutes in broad daylight taking photographs. With no visible enemy reaction, the helicopter departed and immediately dispatched the film to Riyadh for developing before the CINC's evening briefing. Apparently they did such a fine job that the exact same mission was given to the crew the next day, "breaking" as a SF security team member was later to say, "every rule I was ever taught about patrolling".²⁹³ This dangerous reconnaissance mission was repeated a second day, and then a third. Finally, when the same pattern was flown for the fourth time, the crew knew they were in trouble. The films were showing up on CNN nightly and the Iraqis, as was well known, were interested watchers of CNN. On the fourth mission, within seconds of departing the area around the oil platform, 30-40 artillery rounds splashed in the sea right where the helicopter had been hovering. The mission was almost a disaster, but their timely photographs were valuable weapons in the propaganda war against Hussein. However, once again we see that lives are occasionally put at risk when basic operational security common sense is ignored.

The 3/160 returned home to Fort Campbell in March and April 1991 with a deep sense of satisfaction of a job well done. The 3rd battalion suffered no fatalities in the Gulf War.

Other elements of the Regiment lost four men on 21 February 1991 while involved in a still classified mission: CPT Charles

²⁹²Interview with MAJ Mark H. Ochsenbein, Co. Commander A Co. 3/160th SOAR, 22 Feb 1991, KKMC.

²⁹³Smith and Earl interview, 22 Feb 1991.

Cooper; CW3 Michael Anderson; SSG Mario Vega-Velazquez; and SSG Christopher Chapman.

E. 1991-1992:

At the conclusion of Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the 1,889 man strong Regiment prepared to resume "normal" operations. Part of that normal operation included the regularization of Regimental functions. Regimental key personnel in the 1990-92 timeperiod included:

Commander:	COL Joseph A. Fucci	5 Nov 90-Oct 92
	COL Bryan D. Brown	Oct 92-
XO:	LTC James R. Myles	15 Feb 91-92
	LTC Thomas M. Dockens	92-
DCO:	LTC John Binkley	May 90-91
	LTC Robert Yuill	91-
	LTC Thomas E. Matthews	14 Sep 91-92
CSM:	CSM Zeandrew Farrow	6 Apr 88-92
	CSM Robert L. Page	92-
S-1:	MAJ Benjamin F. Adams III	Jun 91-92
	MAJ Gregory Williamitis	92-
S-2:	MAJ Joseph Preston	Jun 89-
S-3:	LTC Ray A. Nelson	Jun 87-Feb 92
	LTC Joseph A. Smith	Feb 92-
S-4:	MAJ Edwin P. Woods, III	Jun 90-

1st Battalion: Organized into four companies (HHC Assault Helicopter Battalion, SOF, two Assault Helicopter Companies and an Aviation Maintenance Company, AVUM/AVIM) with a strength of 508 personnel.

Commander:	LTC Bryan D. Brown	90-Jul 91
	LTC Dell Dailey	Jul 91-93
	LTC Tom Mathews	93-
XO	MAJ John T. Moore	
	MAJ Benny G. Steagall	
CSM	CSM Mark A. Ruiz	
S-1	CPT Strep T. Kuehl	
	CPT Steven C. Guess	
S-2	MAJ Joseph W. Preston	
	MAJ Edward F. Jordan	
S-3	LTC Frank D. Whitehead	
	LTC Darrell E. Crawford	
S-4	CPT Keith J. Ross	
	CPT Donald G. Lisenbee, Jr.	

HHC CPT Charles M. Yomant
CPT Gregory A. Stoddard

Major Exercises/Operations:

Desert Storm	Saudi Arabia	Jan-Apr 91
JRT 2-91	Ft. Bragg, NC	12-29 Mar 91
CAPEX	Ft. Bragg, NC	11-18 May 91
JRT 3-91	Hunter AAF, GA	16 Jul-2 Aug 91
NIFTY POET	Guam, M.I.	17-20 Aug 91
LONG JUMP	UK	18-31 Aug 91
CALYPSO CHAMP	Thailand	21 Aug-20 Sep 91
AFFIRMATIVE TURMOIL	Oceana, VA	22-27 Sep 91
JRT 4-91	Yakima, WA	28 Sep-13 Oct 91
WITTY AUTHOR	Panama	27 Oct-8 Nov 91
CAPEX	Ft. Bragg, NC	1-4 Dec 91
KIOWA RUNNER	Hunter AAF, GA	5-13 Dec 91
JRT 2-92	Hunter AAR, GA	Feb-Mar 92
LEGIT CADENCE	NTS, NV	Mar 92
CAPEX	Ft. Bragg, NC	Apr 92
POINTED SPEAR	Hurlburt Field, FL	Apr 92
JRTC 92-6	Davis AF, OK	Apr-May 92
JRT 3-92	Ft. Benning, GA	May-Jun 92
PROUD WARRIOR	Italy	Jun 92
ROWDY UPROAR	Yakima, WA	Sep 92
JRT 1-93	Hunter AAR, GA	Oct 92
ONSET THUNDER	29 Palms, CA	Nov 92
UNDERWAY	Oceana, VA	Nov 92 ²⁹⁴

2nd Battalion: Organized into four companies (HHC, A, B, and D) effective 16 February 1991. Total personnel strength: 345 authorized.

Commander:	LTC Gordon Hearnberger	-30 Jun 92
	LTC Thomas M. Ryan	30 Jun 92-
XO:	CPT (P) Richard Enderle	90- 6 Jun 91
	MAJ Richard L. Polczynski	6 Jun 91-15 Jul 92
	MAJ William L. Books	
CSM:	CSM Robert L. Page	
	CSM Gilbert G. Ramirez	

²⁹⁴Taken from 1/160th SOAR Annual Historical Report 1991, compiled by unit personnel and by CPT Robert C. Guillot. This report is unclassified.

S-1	CPT Thomas Beane		
S-2	CPT James Briley		- 4 Aug 92
	MAJ Michael C. Talbott	4 Aug 92-	
S-3	CPT Ricky Boyer		-10 Jun 92
	MAJ Scott Thomas	10 Jun 92-	
S-4	CPT Russell Kern		90- 5 Jun 91
	CPT James Campbell	6 Jun-	14 Jun 92
	CPT Stephen P. Wilkins	14 Jun 92-	
HHC	CPT Jay Jones		90-28 Jun 91
	CPT Russell Kern	28 Jun 91-	5 Jun 92
	CPT Richard A. Bucher	5 Jun 92-	

Major Exercises/Operations:

1991: Desert Storm, 3 JRT exercises, 4 JRTC rotations, and 2 OCONUS deployments.²⁹⁵

1992: Dunking Refresher at Jacksonville, FL in Jan; Ranger Support at Fort Benning and JRT 2-92 support at Hunter AAF in February; Aerial Refueling and min-gun training at Hurlburt Field, FL and Ranger 29, Ft. Campbell in March; CAPEX at Fort Bragg, POINTED SPEAR in SOUTHCOM and OCEAN VENTURE at Fort Bragg in April; JRT 3-92 at Fort Benning and JTF-6 Support at Indian Spring, NV in May; CELTIC STRIKE at Fort Devens, ROBIN SAGE at Fort Bragg and PROUD WARRIOR in Italy in June; SAND EAGLE in England in July; JRTC at Fort Polk, LA in August; ROWDY UPROAR in September; EMBRYO STAGE JRT at Hunter AAR, GA and 7th SFG(A) Support at Fort Bragg in October; GOTHIC MAGIC at Fort Bliss, TX in November; and JRT in Death Valley, CA in December.

Also during 1992, the 2/160th conducted the longest nonstop flight ever performed using Army helicopter aircraft. Three MH-47 Chinooks departed Puerto Rico on December 15th and flew non-stop with 3 air refueling missions on the 1,630 mile trip to Fort Campbell, KY. The flight took over 15 hours.

3rd Battalion: The Third Battalion consists of four companies (HHC, Assault Helicopter Company, Medium Helicopter Company and an Aviation Maintenance Company (AVUM/AVIM) for a total of 285 authorized personnel, 10 MH-60 and 8 MH-47

²⁹⁵Taken from the 2/160th Annual Historical Report for 1991 compiled by 1LT Raymond L. Fischer, S-3

helicopters .²⁹⁶

Commander:	LTC Dell L. Dailey	90-91
	LTC James A. Cerniglia	91-92
	LTC Frank G. Whitehead	92-
XO:	MAJ James Casey	
CSM:	CSM John D. Cole	
S-1	CPT Leonard Martineau	
S-2	1LT George K. Thomas	
S-3	MAJ Robert E. Bruns	
S-4	CPT Paul N. Nasi	
HHC	CPT John C. Buss	

Major Exercises/Deployments:

Operations Desert Shield/Storm, 2 SF Training missions at Fort Bragg, one support to counternarcotics operations in USSOUTHCOM, 2 JRTC support missions, 3 missions in support of JTF-6 (Apr-Jun, Aug-Sep and Oct-Dec 92) support missions for 1st, 3rd 5th, 7th and 11th SFG(A) and 75th Ranger Regiment. Exercises included CELTIC STRIKE, DRAGON FLAME, OCEAN VENTURE.

617th Special Operations Aviation Detachment: Attached to 3/160th but obtains mission guidance and OPCON from USSOUTHCOM. The 617th SOAD is the only forward deployed SOA asset. It has four platoons: a flight platoon, an operations platoon, a Headquarters platoon and a maintenance platoon.

Major Exercises/Deployments:

Exercise CABANAS 91 and nine other regional deployments in support of CINCSOUTH.

E. CONCLUSIONS:

The formation of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) was a key element in expanding the reach of Army Special Operations forces. These highly skilled aviators are capable of performing hazardous missions under low light combat conditions in support of national, strategic or tactical operations. They maintain a capability unmatched by any other aviation arm in the world. As they enter their second decade of service to the Army, the nation, and the special operations

²⁹⁶Taken from the 3/160th Annual Historical Report for 1991.

community, their motto continues to be, "Nightstalkers Don't
Quit."

VIII. CONCLUSIONS:


USASOC still has a long way to go to fulfill its potential as a MACOM. Personnel in a new major headquarters do not immediately and intuitively know how their functions should be performed at the level of a MACOM. Long term planning, policy and guidance is at once essential and difficult to accomplish since the guideposts are few and far between. Personnel, military and civilian, who are experienced at the lower levels of Special Operations, which was the norm until recently, often find it difficult to "get out of the weeds" and focus beyond the horizon. Yet, such vision is necessary if USASOC is to accomplish its primary goal of being the focal point for all SOF guidance and long term development. If SOF is ever truly to "speak with one voice" in Army councils, USASOC is going to be the key. USASOC is the only command which can provide consistency in synchronizing the disparate "visions" and approaches to operations, training and doctrine that SOF has taken over the years. If USASOC can perform this role and allow the Special Operations personnel in the units to do what they do best--specific, focused, current operations--it will have performed a vital service to the Army and to the Special Operations community. If USASOC spends its time instead on current operations and second-guessing the units to the exclusion of its necessary role as the planning headquarters for all of Army Special Operations, it will be abdicating a role no other organization can fill.

Symptomatic of the clarification of roles, missions and responsibilities for the new MACOM is the phenomenon of reorganization. USASOC and its MSC have undergone at least two major reorganizations in its first three years and countless manpower surveys, office realignments and shufflings. All of these changes are laudable attempts to "fine-tune" the MACOM in a period of dwindling financial and manpower resources. USSOCOM, the higher joint headquarters, has also continued to refine its role as a world-wide combatant command and its changes have necessarily affected the way USASOC does business. It is doubtful if this MACOM has seen its last reorganizations, especially as the cuts in Army end strength continue to affect all parts of the force. Yet through it all, the focus on the mission--get the resources to the right unit for an appropriate and approved mission at the right time--continues to drive the soldiers and civilians of USASOC to perform their jobs to the best of their ability.

APPENDIX 1: PREVIOUS COMMANDING GENERALS' BIOGRAPHIES

Biography

Lieutenant General Michael F. Spigelmire
Commanding General
U.S. Army Special Operations Command



Personal Statistics

- Born November 12, 1938, in Frederick, Md.
- Married to the former Linda Diane Cast of Columbus, Ga.
- Their son, Christopher, is a cadet (Class of 1991) at the U. S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.

Education

- Received a commission as a Second Lieutenant in June 1960 upon completion of the Reserve Officer Training Corps curriculum and awarded a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science from Loyola College, Baltimore, Md.
- Received a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. in June 1972.
- Graduated from the U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., in June 1978.
- Graduated from the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., in May 1971.
- Attended the Infantry Officer Advanced (1966) and Basic (1960) Courses.

Major Assignments

- Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C., from June 1990 to Present.
- Chief of Infantry, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Infantry Center and Fort Benning, Commandant, U. S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., from Sept. 1988 to June 1990.
- Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart, Fort Stewart, Ga., from July 1987 to Sept. 1988.
- Assistant Division Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Ga., from Aug. 1985 to July 1987.
- Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (Plans, Operations and Mobilization), U. S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga., from Jan. 1984 to Aug. 1985.
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), VII Corps, U. S. Army Europe and 7th Army, Stuttgart, West Germany, from March 1981 to Jan. 1984.
- Commander, 197th Infantry Brigade (Separate), Fort Benning, Ga., from March 1979 to March 1981.
- Deputy Director for Combat Developments, U. S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., from June 1978 to March 1979.
- Chief of the Division Restructure Liaison Office, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, from April 1977 to July 1977.
- Commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas from Nov. 1975 to March 1977.
- Commander, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, from Sept. 1975 to Oct. 1975.
- Executive Officer, 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, from Aug. 1974 to Sept. 1975.
- Assistant Secretary of the General Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D. C., from May 1973 to Aug. 1974.

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U.S. Army Special Operations Command
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5213

Major Assignments (continued)


- Operations Staff Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, the Pentagon, Washington, D. C., from June 1972 to May 1973.
- Plans and Programs Officer Advisory Team 96, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Republic of Vietnam, from Jan. 1970 to July 1970.
- Senior Advisor, Advisory Team 56, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Republic of Vietnam, from July 1969 to Jan. 1970.
- Instructor, Company I, U. S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga. from July 1967 to Feb. 1969.
- S-1 (Personnel and Administration), 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 8th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division, U.S. Army Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam, from Dec. 1966 to July 1967.
- Commander, Company C, 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 8th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division, U. S. Army Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam, from May 1966 to Dec. 1966.
- Executive (Operations) Officer, Company A, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army, Bad Toelz, West Germany, from Feb. 1965 to June 1965.
- S-3 (Operations), Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA), 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army, Bad Toelz, West Germany, from July 1964 to Feb. 1965.
- Commander, ODA, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army, Bad Toelz, West Germany, from Feb. 64 to July 1964.
- Executive Officer, ODA, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army, Bad Toelz, West Germany, from April 1963 to Feb. 1964.
- Aide-de-Camp to the Division Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), U. S. Army Europe and 7th Army, Augsburg, West Germany, from March 1962 to April 1963.
- Assistant S-3 (Operations), Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Battle Group, 19th Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division, U. S. Army Europe and 7th Army, Gablingen, West Germany, from March 1962 to May 1962.
- Platoon Leader, Company A, 2nd Battle Group, 19th Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division, U. S. Army Europe and 7th Army, Gablingen, West Germany, from Oct. 1960 to March 1962.
- Assistant Special Services Officer, U. S. Army Garrison, Fort George G. Meade, Md., from June 1960 to Aug. 1960.

Awards & Decorations

- Distinguished Service Medal
- Legion of Merit
- Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device (With 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Purple Heart
- Meritorious Service Medal (With One Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Air Medal (With Numeral "2" Device)
- Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device (With One Oak Leaf Cluster)
- National Defense Service Medal
- Vietnam Service Medal (With four campaign stars)
- Humanitarian Service Medal
- Army Service Ribbon
- Overseas Service Ribbon (With Numeral "3" Device)
- Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal
- Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry (With Gold Star)
- Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Honor Medal, First Class
- Combat Infantryman Badge
- Master Parachutist Badge
- Ranger Tab
- Special Forces Tab
- Army Staff Identification Badge
- Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross Unit Citation (With Palm)

Biography

Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing Commanding General U.S. Army Special Operations Command



Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing was born in Peoria, Ill. He was commissioned a second lieutenant and awarded a bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy in 1962. He also holds a master's degree in business administration from Tulane University. His military education includes completion of the basic and advanced officer courses of the Infantry School, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Air War College.

He has held a wide variety of important command and staff positions culminating in his current assignment as the commander of the United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C., from August 1991 until present. General Downing brings extensive command experience in combat arms units to his current assignment.

He has served in a variety of key assignments that include: Commander, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va.; Director of the Washington Office, United States Special Operations Command, Washington, D.C.; Deputy Commanding General, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C.; Commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Ga.; Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Bamberg, Germany; and Secretary of the Joint Staff of the United States European Command, Stuttgart, Germany.

As a junior officer, he served with the 173d Airborne Brigade in Okinawa and Vietnam from 1963 until 1966. He served a second combat tour in Vietnam with the 25th Infantry Division from 1968 to 1969. Following duty as a Senior Research Analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., he served with the 1st Ranger Battalion, Fort Stewart, Ga. and then commanded the 2nd Ranger Battalion at Fort Lewis, Wash.

General Downing's awards and decorations include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal; the Silver Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster); the Defense Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters); the Soldier's Medal; the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device (with five Oak Leaf Clusters); the Purple Heart; the Defense Meritorious Service Medal; the Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters); and the Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device (with three Oak Leaf Clusters). General Downing has also earned the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Master Parachutist Badge, the Ranger Tab, and the Pathfinder Badge.



18 Nov 91

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U.S. Army Special Operations Command
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5216



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE, FORT BRAGG, NC 28307 (919) 432-6005



Lieutenant General James T. Scott

Commanding General
of the
U.S. Army Special Operations
Command (Airborne)

Lieutenant General James T. Scott was born in Stephenville, Texas. Upon completion of course work and Reserve Officer's Training Corps curricula, he was commissioned an Infantry second lieutenant from Texas A&M University. He also holds a masters of business administration degree from Fairleigh Dickenson University. His military education includes the basic and advanced officer courses at the Infantry School, Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

He has held a wide variety of command and staff positions. He served two tours in Vietnam -- his first with the 12th Aviation Group and the 25th Infantry Division as a platoon leader and later a company executive officer and company commander from May 1965 until May 1967. He served his second Vietnam tour with the 1st Logistics Command as an Assistant G3 and Aide-de-Camp and later in the 4th Infantry Division as a battalion and brigade operations officer (S3) from May 1968 until August 1969. He also served as the Assistant Division Commander, 24th Infantry Division, during Operation Desert Storm. His most recent assignment has been as the Commander, 2d Infantry Division, Korea.

Past assignments include: Commander, Special Operations Command, Europe; Deputy Director, Plans and Policies, J5, United States



Pacific Command, Hawaii; Chief of Staff, 25th Infantry Division; Commander, 3d Brigade (505th Parachute Infantry Regiment), 82d Airborne Division; Commander, 1st Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; Division Operations Officer (G3), 2d Infantry Division; and Commander, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division.

General Scott's awards and decorations include: the Silver Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster); the Defense Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster); the Distinguished Flying Cross; the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device (with four Oak Leaf Clusters); the Purple Heart (with Oak Leaf Cluster); the Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters); the Air Medal; and the Army Commendation Medal. General Scott has also earned the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Master Parachutist Badge, and the Ranger Tab.

He is married to the former Carol Wilson of Coleman, Texas. They have two daughters: Amanda, age 21, and Lisa, age 19, who is a student at Texas A&M University.

APPENDIX 2 USASOC AND MSC COMMANDERS (AS OF 1 JAN 1995)

(Includes Active Duty Special Forces and PSYOP Groups)

COMMANDING GENERAL

DEC 89-JUN 90	LTG GARY LUCK
JUN 90-AUG 91	LTG MICHAEL F. SPIGELMIRE
AUG 91-MAY 93	LTG WAYNE A. DOWNING
MAY 93-	LTG JAMES T. SCOTT

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL

DEC 89-JUN 91	BG WILLIAM GARRISON
JUN 91-JUL 92	BG HARLEY DAVIS
JUL 92-NOV 94	BG RICHARD POTTER
NOV 94-	BG WILLIAM TANGNEY

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL ARNG

90-91	MG J. BOYERSMITH
91-93	MG M DAVIDSON

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

DEC 89-JUL 91	CSM RONNIE STRAHAN
OCT 91-AUG 93	CSM JIMMIE SPENCER
AUG 93-	CSM HENRY O. BONE

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND

27 NOV 1990-30 AUG 91	MG JAMES GUEST
30 AUG 91 - 24 JUL 92	MG SIDNEY SHACHNOW
24 JUL 92-	MG HARLEY DAVIS

US ARMY RESERVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

1 DEC 89-27 NOV 90 BG JOSEPH HURTEAU

US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

27 NOV 90-2 MAY 93	BG JOSEPH HURTEAU
2 MAY 93-	MG DONALD CAMPBELL

US ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL

1952-53	COL CHARLES H. KARLSTAD
1953-54	COL GORDON SINGLES
1954	COL THOMAS MCANSH
1954-56	COL EDSON D. RAFF
1956-58	COL WILLIAM J. MULLEN
1958-61	BG GEORGE M. JONES
1961-65	BG WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH
1965-66	BG JOSEPH W. STILWELL, JR.
1966-68	BG ALBERT E. MILLOY
1968-71	BG EDWARD M. FLANAGAN, JR.
1971-73	MG HENRY E. EMERSON
1973-75	MG MICHAEL E. HEALY
1975-77	MG ROBERT C. KINGSTON
1977-20 JUN 1980	MG JACK V. MACKMULL
20 JUN 80-AUG 84	BG JOSEPH C. LUTZ (ALSO 1ST SOCOM CMDR FROM 01 OCT 82 (PROVISIONALLY). (1ST SOCOM AND USAJFKSWC SEPARATE ON 1 OCT 1983) (PROMOTED TO MG ON 1 JUL 84)
1 OCT 1983-85	MG ROBERT D. WIEGAND
1985-JUN 88	BG JAMES A. GUEST
JUN 88-24 JUL 92	BG DAVID J. Baratto
24 JUL 92-JUL 94	MG SIDNEY SHACHNOW
JUL 94 -	MG WILLIAM GARRISON

1ST SOCOM

1 OCT 82-07 AUG 84	BG(MG) JOSEPH C. LUTZ
7 AUG 84-30 JUN 88	MG LEROY N. SUDDATH, JR.
30 JUN 88-27 NOV 90	MG JAMES A. GUEST

US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (PROVISIONAL)

18 NOV 91-24 JUL 92	BG HARLEY DAVIS
24 JUL 92-NOV 94	BG RICHARD W. POTTER
NOV 94-	BG WILLIAM TANGNEY

75th RANGERS

3 OCT 84 - 15 AUG 85	COL WAYNE A. DOWNING
15 OCT 85 - 23 JUL 87	COL JOSEPH S. STRINGHAM
23 JUL 87 - 12 JUL 89	COL WESLEY B. TAYLOR
12 JUL 89 - 5 JUN 91	COL WILLIAM F. KERNAN
5 JUN 91 - JUL 93	COL DAVID GRANGE

JUL 93 - PRESENT

COL JAMES T. JACKSON

160TH SOAR

1983 - 1985	COL TERRENCE HENRY
FEB 85 - NOV 86	COL CLYDE A. HENNIES
NOV 86 - JUN 89	COL JOHN N. DAILEY
28 JUN 89 - 5 NOV 90	COL WILLIAM MILLER
5 NOV 90 - 92	COL JOSEPH A. FUCCI
92 - OCT 94	COL BRYAN D. BROWN
OCT 94 - PRESENT	COL DELL DAILEY

1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

NOV 83 - 30 JUL 86	COL DAVID BARATTO
30 JUL 86 - FEB 88	COL JOHN DAVID BLAIR, IV
FEB 88 - 90	COL EDDIE J. WHITE
90 - 92	COL RICHARD TODD
92 - 94	COL S. HILDEBRANDT
94 -	COL RUSSELL D. HOWARD

3D SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

29 JUN 90 - 92	COL PETER STANKOVICH
JUN 92 - JUN 94	COL PETE KENSINGER
JUN 94 -	COL MARK D. BOYATT

5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

JUN 80 - DEC 82	COL HOLLAND E. BYNAM
12 DEC 82 - 25 JUN 85	COL JAMES GUEST
25 JUN 85 -	COL LAWRENCE W. DUGGAN
88 - NOV 89	COL HARLEY DAVIS
NOV 89 - AUG 91	COL JAMES KRAUS
16 AUG 91 - 16 AUG 93	COL KENNETH R. BOWRA
16 AUG 93 - PRESENT	COL JOHN W. NOE

7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

80 - JUN 83	COL EDWARD T. RICHARDS
JUN 83 - APR 85	COL STUART PERKINS
15 APR 85 - 87 (?)	COL J. P. WAGHELSTEIN

(?) 87 - 90	COL ROBERT JACOBELLY
90 - 92	COL H.F. SCRUGGS
92 - 8 JUL 93	COL JAMES PULLEY
8 JUL 93 - PRESENT	COL JAMES S. ROACH

10TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

80 - 81	COL PARIS DAVIS
OCT 81 - JAN 82	COL ROMAN RONDIAK
7 JAN 82 - 19 JUN 84	COL RICHARD POTTER
19 JUN 84 - 20 JUN 86	COL JAMES L. ZACHARY
20 JUN 86 - JUN 88	COL ROGER G. SEYMOUR
JUN 88 - JUN 90	COL JESSE JOHNSON
JUN 90 - JUN 92	COL WILLIAM P. TANGNEY
JUN 92 - JUN 94	COL FRANK TONEY
JUN 94 - PRES	COL GEOFFREY C. LAMBERT

4TH POG

81 - 84	COL HAROLD F. FRALEY
84 - 86	COL MELVIN KRIESEL
DEC 86 - 88	COL WILLIAM DE PALO
88 - 90	COL ANTHONY H. NORMAND
90 - 93	COL LAYTON DUNBAR
JAN 14 93 - PRESENT	COL JEFFREY JONES

APPENDIX 3: USASOC PRINCIPAL STAFF AS OF 1 JAN 1995

CS	COL ANTHONY H. NORMAND BG WILLIAM P. TANGNEY	DEC 90-NOV 94 NOV 94-
DCS	COL FLOYD WATSON	OCT 94-
SGS	MR. CHARLES PIMBLE	JUL 93-
SPECIAL ADVISOR	MR. JAMES A. MONROE MR. PAUL PAYNE	JAN 94- DEC 89-DEC 93
PROTOCOL	MRS. NANCY NICHOLSON	1993-
DCSPER	COL HAYWARD B. ROBERTS COL HOWARD MCMILLAN COL G. GRESH COL JUAN CHAVEZ	SEP 94- JUN 93-SEP 94 DEC 89-92
DCSINT	COL STEVEN A. EPKINS COL N. SMITH COL DAVID MCKNIGHT	JUN 92- 1989-92
DCSOPS	COL FRANK TONEY COL PHILIP KENSINGER LTC PATRICK J. LENAGHAN COL DARRELL W. KATZ COL JAMES HOLT COL DAVID MCKNIGHT	NOV 94- JUL 94-NOV 94 MAR 94-JUL 94 SEP 91-MAR 94 JUN 90-SEP 91 DEC 90-JUN 90
DCSLOG	COL THOMAS DELUCCA COL JOHN DUNNIGAN COL ROGER JOHNS	AUG 94- AUG 90-AUG 94 DEC 89-AUG 90
DCSRM	COL WILLIAM HENGLEIN COL CARL BROADHURST COL E. DANIELS	JUN 93- JUL 90-JUN 93 DEC 89-JUL 90
DCSIM	COL EARL F. KLINCK COL KAY WITT	APR 92- JUL 90-APR 92
DCSFDI	COL WALTER B. CHRIETZBERG COL WILLIAM TANGNEY	MAR 93- NOV 92-MAR 93
DCSEN	LTC MARION CAIN	JUL 92-

	MAJ RICK CANTWELL DEC 89-JUL 92
PAO	LTC KEN MCGRAW MAY 93- LTC GEORGE NORTON JUL 91-MAY 93 LTC DON GERSCH DEC 89-JUL 91
CHAPLAIN	COL JOHN A. FLASKA JUL 91-
IG	LTC FRANK COL ELMO BESSENT 92-94 LTC GARFIELD-JEFFERSON AUG 91-
SURGEON	COL AL MEYERS (JUL 87) DEC 89-
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS	DR. RICHARD W. STEWART JUL 90-
DCSAC	MR. BOB CHERRY 93- MR. GREGG DOYLE JUL 90-93
IR	MR. BILL THORNTON
SJA	COL HARLAN HEFFELFINGER JUN 93- LTC TOM LUJAN DEC 89-JUN 93
SAFETY	MR. RON KNIGHT NOV 92-
DCSRA	COL DON DOLL NOV 92-
CPD	MS. CHRISTINE HADLEY APR 93-OCT 94 MR. RUFO VAQUILAR NOV 92-
HRD HUMAN RESOURCES DIRECTORATE	MS. CHRISTINE HADLEY OCT 94-
HHC	CPT JEFF YOUNG 93- CPT BOGDAN GIENIEWSKI JUN 92-93

Appendix 4: Major Subordinate Command Commanders

USAJFKSWCS, 1ST SOCOM, USASFC,
USARSOC AND USACAPOC COMMANDERS



MG SIDNEY SHACHNOW
CG, SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND AUG 91-JUL 92
CG, USAJFKSWCS JUL 92-JUL 94



BG DAVID BARATTO
CG, USAJFKSWCS JUN 88-JUL 92



MG JAMES GUEST
CG, USAJFKSWCS 1985-JUN 88
CG, 1ST SOCOM JUN 88-NOV 90
CG, SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND NOV 90-AUG 91



MG HARLEY DAVIS
DCG, USASOC JUN 91-JUL 92
CG, SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND JUL 92-



BG JOSEPH HURTEAU
CG, USARSOC DEC 89-NOV 90
CG, USACAPC NOV 90-MAY 93



MG DONALD CAMPBELL
CG, USACAPOC MAY 93-

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