


JOURNAL OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS HISTORY

Veritas



After devoting seven issues to Army special operations in the Korean War as part of the 60th Anniversary Commemoration, this *Veritas* covers our functional 'spectrum' from WWII to Vietnam. In the early months after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, commando unit training filled voids in Army amphibious doctrine. Scouts collected beach area information and provided an assault element to 'spearhead' the main invasion force. They also trained guides to bring landing craft into assigned beaches during daylight and at night. The 1st Ranger Battalion (Provisional) did these missions for the North African landings in 1943. The Army Amphibious Training Center (ATC) promulgated those vital skills while using British Commando training regimens to physically and mentally toughen America's soldiers.

While a 'hot' war was fought against Communist aggression in Asia, the Army bolstered its 'cold' war defenses against the Soviets in Europe. The 6th Ranger Infantry Company (RICA), much to its chagrin, was sent to Germany instead of Korea, and was deactivated by December 1951. Strategic and tactical psychological warfare (PSYWAR) missions in Europe were assigned to the newly activated and federalized U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&LG) and the Regular Army 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company in 1953. The assignment of Army special warfare units to Europe demonstrated how seriously the United States took the Cold War.

A major component of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) doctrine during the Vietnam era was Civic Action. Commensurately, the 41st Military Government (MG) Company became a Civil Affairs (CA) unit of the 95th CA Group at Fort Gordon, GA, on 25 June 1959. The 41st CA Company left for South Vietnam in 1965. Its CA teams supported the divisions in I, II, and III Corps from 1965-1967 and then served II Corps exclusively until 1970. Ingenious CA soldiers forged a rich history by adapting programs to fit changing combat environments. They 'made good things happen' despite the obstacles.

Back at Fort Bragg, the Special Forces soldier was permanently commemorated in a bronze statue. How that was accomplished and the artistic process associated with the statue are subjects of two articles. Our venerable 'Bronze Bruce' guards the USASOC Memorial Wall as fitting tribute to today's U.S. Army Special Forces.

The USASOC History Office appreciates the strong support from our units and veterans. The Congressional sequestration 'rocked our boat' hard. We remain dedicated and are back 'on azimuth.' CHB

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ERRATA

[From *Veritas* Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013: pg 6] Top photo caption should read: “CPT Robert I. Channon was formally ‘farewelled’ from Japan by ‘I’ Company personnel in the 187th ARCT Honor Guard.

THE SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIER

*People sleep
peaceably in their
beds at night only
because rough
men stand ready
to do violence on
their behalf.*



GREEN BERET
SYMBOL OF EXCELLENCE—BADGE OF COURAGE—
MARK OF DISTINCTION IN THE FIGHT FOR
FREEDOM—PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

by Eugene G. Piasecki


On the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's (USASOC) Memorial Plaza at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, there is a statue that according to Major General (MG) Edward M. Flanagan, Jr. in 1969 symbolized "the things for which Special Forces stands."¹ Located atop a five-foot green granite pedestal, this twelve-foot tall bronze soldier maintains a silent vigil over the more than a thousand names of 'Special Warriors' who made the ultimate sacrifice and are immortalized on the Memorial Wall. The sculpture, simply inscribed with the words "GREEN BERET," symbolizes the past, present, and future of Army Special Forces. Unveiled at the height of the Vietnam War, the statue demonstrates the dual roles of Special Forces soldiers who "do many things for good and, only reluctantly, very few for evil."² This article provides a brief history of this statue. It all began in 1964.

On 20 March of that year, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara officiated at the ceremony that changed the name of the Army's Special Warfare Center to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare (USAJFKCSW). Afterwards, Secretary McNamara challenged the Special Warfare community to erect a memorial for its soldiers who died in combat by personally donating \$1,000 to the CSW Command Sergeant Major (CSM), Francis J. Ruddy, to start the project. In 1964 this would not have been unusual. At that time, special warfare was defined as "the integrated application of the three major components of counterinsurgency (CI), psychological operations (PSYOP), and unconventional warfare (UW) by specially trained men to achieve their nation's objective—be it in cold, limited, or general warfare," and the best known soldiers engaged in that type of warfare were the Special Forces or Green Berets.³ The result was that since the majority of the special warriors killed in action at that time were men

who had volunteered for Special Forces, the figure chosen to represent all special warriors was a 'Green Beret'.⁴

To maintain the project's momentum until it was completed, a non-profit fund raising trust committee was established and registered in North Carolina. Named the Special Warfare Memorial Committee, it was formed from the officers, non-commissioned officers, and civilians of special warfare's three major components of Counter Insurgency, PSYOP, and Unconventional Warfare (CI, PSYOP, and UW). Its chairman, Colonel (COL) Jesse G. Ugalde, Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), was assisted by two additional subcommittees. The first was the Concepts and Construction Subcommittee, headed by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) H. E. Brown, Jr., the CSW Engineer Officer. The second was the Fund Raising Subcommittee, chaired by COL Louis A. Waple, Commander, 2nd Psychological Operations Group. The formation of the memorial committee allowed the members the opportunity to turn their attention to resolve the three major issues that could have potentially stopped the entire project: site selection and layout, choice of a sculptor, and raising funds to pay for the project.⁵


Robert S. McNamara was the Secretary of Defense for Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson during America's Vietnam involvement from 1961 through 1968. From 1968 through 1981 he was President of the World Bank.



This was Clark's plaza concept sketch that was submitted to the Special Warfare Memorial Committee and unanimously adopted in October 1966.

Private First Class Brian H. Clark had already earned a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree from Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, before entering the Army. He was assigned to Headquarters Company, 13th Psychological Operations Battalion when he designed the memorial.





At the top of this picture is John F. Kennedy Hall, headquarters of the Center for Special Warfare. After BG Albert E. Milloy (below) conducted the Memorial Plaza ground breaking ceremony on 13 March 1967, construction progressed at a steady pace. Milloy was a WWII veteran of the 504th PIR and Commander of the Center for Special Warfare from 1966 to 1968. He was promoted to Brigadier General while at the Center and commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam from August 1969 to February 1970.

The first challenge that faced the committee was to select a location and design for the memorial plaza. This was finalized by 1966 when the Special Warfare Memorial committee unanimously agreed on a 51,000 square foot plot directly across Ardennes Street from Kennedy Hall. The landscape design was created by Private First Class (PFC) Brian H. Clark of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 13th Psychological Operations Battalion.⁶ Clark's concept reflected both a harmony with the surrounding landscape and special warfare statue, as well as a 170 foot by 300 foot plaza of white cement and stone that contrasted with its surroundings at the same time it blended with Kennedy Hall. Although a commercial firm was awarded the construction contract, much of the preparatory labor was performed either by the men of the Center's engineer units as training or by other Special Warfare soldiers on a volunteer basis.⁷ This effort alone involved moving more than 600 tons of dirt so that the plaza's steps, planters, and southern magnolia, pink and white dogwood, and live oak trees would be on a distinctively horizontal plane.⁸

On 13 March 1967 the official memorial ground breaking ceremony was conducted at the John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare. Moving the first shovels of dirt were Brigadier General (BG) Albert E. Milloy, Commanding

General of the Center; Mayor Monroe Evans of Fayetteville, NC; and Mayor Wilton C. Jones of Spring Lake, NC. Also participating in the ceremony were BG Gordon T. Kimbrell, Deputy Post Commander of Fort Bragg; BG James M. Shepherd, Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 82nd Airborne Division; Mr. Ernie L. Massei, Jr., Vice President of Cape Fear Railways, Inc.; Captain (CPT) Charles Q. Williams, Special Forces Medal of Honor awardee; and CSM Charles R. Ferguson, the Center Sergeant Major.⁹ In his remarks, BG Milloy also recognized the significance of this particular monument when he stated that, "This memorial is more than a tribute to the men alone. It is also a tribute to their loved ones who wait at home, not knowing if their Special Warfare soldiers will return home... Let us all dedicate ourselves to the successful, early completion of this worthy project."¹⁰ With this phase on its way to completion, it was time to find a sculptor.

Sculptor selection was perhaps the committee's most challenging task and was only accomplished after carefully examining all the requirements and potential candidates. Assisted by the New York City National Sculpture Society, COL Ugalde and the Special Warfare Committee received advice on procedures for choosing an artist, suggestions on several sculptors to consider, and how best to comply with

the committee's 1964 trust agreement under North Carolina law. This last element soon became a priority over sculptor selection when the Special Warfare Committee realized that approval of the memorial first had to be obtained by the National Fine Arts Commission before the plaza could be conveyed to the National Battle Commission. The National Battle Commission would then assume the responsibility from the JFK Center for providing permanent site maintenance. Having initiated the action to meet these administrative and regulatory requirements, the committee's attention turned toward selecting a sculptor.¹¹

In the spring of 1968, this task was finally completed when the Special Warfare Committee awarded the sculptor's commission to Mr. Donald Harcourt De Lue of Leonardo, New Jersey. A member of the National Institute of Arts and Letters, the National Sculpture Society and the National Academy of Design, De Lue's specialty was creating large-scale sculptures "intended to last for thousands of years."¹² Among his other works that reflected this philosophy were a memorial figure at the U.S. Military Cemetery at Normandy, France; George Washington Kneeling at Prayer at Valley Forge, PA; and The Rocket Thrower done for the 1964-65 New York Worlds' Fair.¹³ A stickler for detail, De Lue meticulously planned his program of preparation. This



Mr. Donald H. De Lue, the Green Beret statue sculptor, was past president of the National Sculpture Society, member of the Allied Artists of America, and the Royal Society of Arts, London. Among his many awards were the Architectural League of New York Gold Medal, the Allied Artists of America Gold Medal, and a Guggenheim Fellowship.

included reading numerous articles about the JFK Center and its mission, receiving Special Forces briefings at Fort Bragg and in his studio, attending classes and training events, reviewing a number of slides and pictures of Special Forces soldiers in action, and having actual uniform and equipment items in his studio to use as references as he began his task.

Starting almost from the moment he was commissioned, De Lue produced a clay prototype of his concept for how the statue should look. Incorporating mannerist proportions with highly articulated musculature, De Lue's statue, per committee request, represented a Special Forces Sergeant First Class, dressed in jungle fatigues and boots, wearing a pistol belt and beret, and clutching an M-16 rifle in his right hand.¹⁴ Finished in June 1969, and reviewed and approved by members of the memorial committee, the statue was duplicated in a plaster-of-paris mold and boxed and shipped to Viareggio, Italy. There, the mold became the prototype used to cast the statue in a material known as golden bronze. Unique in its tolerance to nature's elements, golden bronze would result in the statue only darkening and not tarnishing with the passage of time. With the site selected and prepared, and a design finalized, the next step was to raise money to pay for it.

Realizing that it would cost more to complete the memorial than Secretary of Defense McNamara's personal donation, Sergeant Major (SGM) James A. Tryon of the 6th Special Forces Group came to the rescue. An eighteen-year Special Forces veteran, SGM Tryon established a trust fund into which all subsequent donations would be deposited. He then instituted a vigorous public-relations campaign which netted support for the project from active and reserve special warfare soldiers, as well as many of the Center's Department of the Army civilian employees. This was augmented by additional fund-raisers such as the Oktoberfest carnival and circus in 1968 and other direct personal donations. Among the most noteworthy of these were donations in excess of \$1,000 given by John Wayne;




John Wayne

John Wayne's admiration of Special Forces soldiers and their operations started when he visited several A-Camps on a visit he made to South Vietnam in 1965. A staunch supporter of American involvement in Southeast Asia, he requested and received full military cooperation and support from President Lyndon B. Johnson to make author Robin Moore's book, *The Green Berets* into a movie with the same title. Although heavily criticized for glorifying the Vietnam War, the movie was a commercial success and presented a positive view of the South Vietnamese military.

John Wayne produced, co-directed, and starred in the 1968 movie *The Green Berets*. As a token of his admiration and support for Special Forces, he donated \$5,000 toward building the Green Beret Statue. He additionally placed a memorial stone at the John F. Kennedy Memorial Chapel at Fort Bragg.


Donald De Lue on the Statue

“This soldier symbolizes all the good things a soldier does—combat or advising or whatever. He is not a merciless killer. He can go into a village and heal the sick and make friends...”



“He is first offering the hand of friendship. His M-16 is held in ready, with his finger on the safety, not the trigger. The weapon is there to be used only if necessary.”

“The jungle uniform clings to the soldier because of the wetness and the humidity. He is on a jungle trail...”



“I had all the military equipment he’s wearing in my studio so that I could copy every detail. And I had pictures of soldiers in uniform supplied to me by the center, also...”



“The snake beneath his feet is a symbol of evil. He has thrown a rock on the snake and stepped on it. He is out to destroy evil if he must...”



SSG Barry A. Sadler

SSG Barry A. Sadler, a Special Forces medic, composed and performed the song "The Ballad of The Green Berets" while recovering from a *punji* stick wound he suffered in Vietnam in 1965. Recording the song for RCA Victor Records in early 1966, it became number one on the Billboard Hot 100 chart for five consecutive weeks between 5 March and 2 April 1966. Sadler also sang the song on his television debut as a guest on The Jimmy Dean Show.



This boat and trailer and car were used as raffle ticket prizes to raise the final amounts needed to complete financing the memorial statue and plaza project.

Staff Sergeant (SSG) Barry Sadler (composer and performer of the “Ballad of the Green Berets”); Mrs. Billie Sapp, widow of CPT Stanley Sapp; the officers and men of the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Special Forces Groups; and Mrs. Lois A. Reno, whose husband, Master Sergeant Ralph J. Reno, had been listed as killed/body not recovered since July 1966.¹⁵

With the full support from the John F. Kennedy Center commanding generals, MG William P. Yarborough, BG Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr., BG (later MG) Albert E. Milloy, and MG Edward M. Flanagan, the committee achieved its goal by the Fall of 1969. Having raised almost \$100,000 as well as donated material and labor, the project was rapidly nearing completion with only a few details remaining to complete before the official dedication ceremony. One of these was placing a time capsule in the statue’s base. On 22 November 1969, exactly six years after President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, MG Edward M. Flanagan, Jr. placed a bust of President John F. Kennedy, a copy of the speech Kennedy gave authorizing the wear of the Green Beret by Special Forces, and a book of quotations from his other speeches inside the memorial’s cement pedestal. In addition to these, a Vietnam-era Special Forces uniform, flashes of all other active, U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) Special Forces units were also

added along with either green berets or distinctive unit headgear and unit insignias from each of the Center’s sergeants major. The Center Command Sergeant Major, CSM Carlos E. Leal, completed the donations by adding the capsule’s last item, a green beret complete with the flash of the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam.¹⁶

On 26 November 1969, an idea that began as a way to honor the memories of special warfare soldiers killed in combat became a reality. First Lieutenant (1LT) Drew D. Dix, a former enlisted Special Forces soldier awarded the Medal of Honor in Vietnam, and SGM James A. Tryon unveiled Donald De Lue’s statue on the plaza designed by PFC Brian H. Clark. In his remarks, MG Flanagan also recognized the more than 550 men who had been trained at the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance and Institute for Military Assistance who had lost their lives in Laos and Vietnam since 1960 by noting that the name of each of these men and those who died after the dedication was inscribed on a plaque to the rear of the statue. Concluding, MG Flanagan said that, “It is for these valiant sons, husbands, and fathers that so many relatives and friends joined in the raising of this memorial. The statue in Memorial Plaza symbolizes their pride in the accomplishments of those fallen soldiers whose memories they hold so dear.”¹⁷



Into the Memorial Statue’s time capsule MG Edward M. Flanagan, Jr. placed a bust of President John F. Kennedy and a copy of Kennedy’s speech authorizing the wear of the Green Beret by Special Forces.



Command Sergeant Major Carlos E. Leal was Command Sergeant Major of the Center when the Green Beret Statue was dedicated. A combat veteran of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, he was awarded the Combat Infantry Badge in each of these conflicts.



First Lieutenant Drew D. Dix was among the first enlisted Special Forces soldiers to be awarded the Medal of Honor. He received a direct commission to First Lieutenant and retired as a Major in 1982.



Military personnel attending the ceremony render Honors in memory of the 550 Special Warfare soldiers who had been killed in action in Southeast Asia since 1960.

Postscript

The story of the Special Warfare Memorial Statue and the men and women who made it possible did not end at the dedication ceremony. Soon after the plaza was completed, Specialist Fifth Class (SP5) Brian H. Clark was discharged from the U. S. Army and returned to civilian life. SGM James A. Tryon retired after twenty-eight years of service on 1 October 1969. John Wayne continued his



MG Edward M. Flanagan, Jr. delivered the address at the dedication of the Special Warfare Memorial Statue at the newly re-named John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, Ft. Bragg, N.C., on 26 November 1969.



Sergeant Major James A. Tryon (on the left of the statue) and First Lieutenant Drew D. Dix (on the right) unveil the Special Forces Soldier Statue on 26 November 1969.



MG Flanagan presented SGM Tryon his retirement certificate on 1 October 1969. SGM Tryon was a 28-year Army veteran with 18 of those years spent as a member of Special Forces.

Hollywood acting career until his death from cancer on 11 June 1979. Barry Sadler left the Army in 1966 and after several unsuccessful attempts at other careers, was shot in Guatemala City and died later from complications of his wound in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, on 5 November 1989.

Mrs. Lois A. Reno died in Fayetteville, NC, in 1989 without knowing that the remains of MSG Ralph J. Reno, a member of Reconnaissance Team (RT) Nevada, MACV-



Master Sergeant Ralph J. Reno was initially listed as missing-in-action in 1966 and pronounced killed-in-action in 1967. He was officially buried with full military honors in Arlington National Cemetery in 2011 after his remains were recovered in Vietnam and positively identified in 2010.

SOG, would be found in Vietnam in 2010 and buried with full military honors in Arlington National Cemetery on 8 September 2011. Donald H. De Lue continued to produce large-scale sculptures throughout the remainder of his career and died in Leonardo, New Jersey, at the age of 90 on 26 August 1988. The statue of the Special Forces Soldier remained across from Kennedy Hall until it and the undisturbed time capsule still in the base were moved to its new location on Desert Storm Drive on Fort Bragg, NC. On 9 December 1994, Lieutenant General (LTG) James T. Scott, then USASOC commanding general, dedicated a new

memorial plaza containing the re-located Green Beret Soldier statue as part of the new USASOC Headquarters building complex.¹⁸ ▲

EUGENE G. PIASECKI

Eugene G. Piasecki is a retired Special Forces officer who has been with the USASOC History Office since 2006. A USMA graduate, he earned his Masters Degree in military history from Norwich University and is currently pursuing a PhD. His current research interests include the history of Army Special Forces, Special Forces since its beginning in 1952, and the History of Camp Mackall, NC.

Endnotes

- 1 Specialist 4 Jerry Boatner, "Statue Memorializes Special Warriors," *Veritas*, Volume VIII, Number 16, 26 November 1969, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 2.
- 2 Program of Events, Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, 26 November 1969, "Statue dedicated to memory of fallen soldiers," USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 11.
- 3 Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, "Ceremony Culminates Five-Year Effort," 9.
- 4 Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, "Ceremony Culminates Five-Year Effort," 9.
- 5 Unclassified Message, CG, USAJFKCENMA, Fort Bragg, NC to DA (CINPO), *Memorial Dedication*, DTG 242151Z November 1969, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 3.
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- 7 Special Warfare News Release number 213, Office of Information, United States Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare (Airborne), 13 March 1967, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 2.
- 8 Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, "Clark's Plaza Design Complements Centerpiece," 6.
- 9 Special Warfare News Release number 213, 1.
- 10 Boatner, "Statue Memorializes Special Warriors," 2. This was also part of BG Milloy's "Special Warfare Memorial Ground Breaking Ceremony Commanding General's Remarks, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 11 Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, "Ceremony Culminates Five-Year Effort," 9.
- 12 "Donald DeLue, 90, Sculptor of Monuments," *New York Times*, 27 August 1988, Obituaries, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 13 Boatner, "Both Heart and Mind of Sculptor Donald De Lue Part of Bronze Artwork," 3.
- 14 Boatner, "Statue Memorializes Special Warriors," 2. Mannerism is an artistic style characterized by the distortion of elements such as proportion and space to heighten tension, power, emotion, or elegance. "Mannerism." Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2001. Accessed on 1 December 2011.
- 15 Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, "Ceremony Culminates Five-Year Effort," 9. SSG Barry Sadler wrote the lyrics and was the first to record the song, "The Ballad of the Green Beret." CPT Stanley Louis Sapp was an Air Defense Artillery officer and veteran of the Korean War and deployment with the 3rd Special Forces Group to Nigeria from August 1964 to February 1965. While commanding Detachment A-103 near the village of Gia Vuc, South Vietnam, CPT Sapp was killed by machine gun fire while leading a patrol across the Song Re River.
- 16 USASOC Public Affairs Office (PAO), "Special Operations Memorials: Past Present and Future," *Paraglide*, 19 November 2009, http://paraglideonline.net/111909_focus1.html. (Accessed on 7 November 2011); Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, "Statue dedicated to memory of fallen soldiers, 13. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 13.
- 17 Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, "Foreword by MG Edward M. Flanagan, Jr," 5.
- 18 USASOC PAO, "Special Operations Memorials: Past, Present and Future."





Born of CLAY Before *Bronze*

by Laura S. Goddard

Born of clay, the Special Warfare Memorial Statue, more commonly referred to as the 'Green Beret Soldier' statue, began life in the Spring of 1968 at the studio of renowned sculptor Donald De Lue, in Leonardo, NJ.¹ Designed to represent the Special Forces soldier, the statue started out as a 'maquette' or prototype, a sculptor's rough, small scale model, of the proposed sculpture.² This 'salesman's sample' shows commissioning clients, in this case the Special Warfare Memorial Committee, what to expect.

Once the Special Warfare Memorial Committee was satisfied with the artist's rendering, De Lue created a full size version in clay.³ When it was finished, the sculptor invited the memorial committee to visit his studio for final approval.⁴ With their blessing he proceeded to the next stage, preparation of the plaster cast. This was the mold for the bronze statue. The clay model was carefully laid in a wooden 'coffin' and plaster was poured all around it. Then the hardened plaster cast shell was fully cut away for shipment to the foundry in Viareggio, Italy. There, molten bronze was poured into the plaster cast.⁵ After the bronze cooled and hardened, the cast was broken away. The statue then had the flashing ground off. Finally it was cleaned and polished and a protective coating applied before being sent to the U. S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, at Ft. Bragg, NC.⁶

The Special Warfare Memorial statue, symbolic of the dual role of Special Forces as "constructors as well as destructors,"⁷ is 17 feet high. The soldier alone is 12 feet tall.⁸ The SF soldier is standing atop a concrete and marble pedestal. Inside the base is a time capsule containing a bust of President John F. Kennedy, and a book of quotations from his speeches, as well as berets with the appropriate insignia and flashes of Special Forces units, active, reserve, and National Guard at the time.⁹ ↑

Endnotes

- 1 Donald De Lue, "Both Heart and Mind of Sculptor Donald De Lue Part of Bronze Artwork," *Veritas* (Vol. VII, No. 16, 26 November 1969), 3.
- 2 *Maquette* - French, from the Italian *macchietta*, meaning speck, or little spot, sketch, diminutive of *macchia*, ultimately from Latin *macula* 'spot.'
- 3 Donald De Lue, *Veritas*, 3.
- 4 Donald De Lue, *Veritas*, 3.
- 5 Donald De Lue, *Veritas*, 3.
- 6 *Program of Events, Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, "Ceremony Culminates Five-Year Effort,"* 26 November 1969, 9, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 7 Major General Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., *Program of Events, Dedication of the Green Beret Statue, "Statue dedicated to memory of fallen soldiers,"* 26 November 1969, 11, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 8 Donald De Lue, *Veritas*, 3.
- 9 *Program of Events, Dedication of the Green Beret Statue,* 26 November 1969, 13, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Library of Congress photo.



Shown here are photos of what is believed to be Donald De Lue's clay 'maquette' of the Special Warfare Memorial Statue.

Above is the front view of the *maquette*. Part of a *maquette's* function is to realize the 3-dimensions of every element of the figure's form. The *maquette* would later be transformed into the full size, clay model of the Special Warfare Memorial Statue.

Note that De Lue delineated particular characteristics in the sculpture sketch to embody the spirit of the Special Forces soldier.



The *maquette* from the back, note the pipe support to stabilize the clay sculpture.



The clay sketch detailing the jungle uniform, form fitted to the soldier by moisture and sweat.



De Lue's envisage of the hand offered in friendship with the weapon held at the ready.




Rear view of the easy stance held by the soldier.



The clay study of the snake, symbolic of evil, with the boot using the rock to put an end to the snake's tyranny.





PSYCHE

**The 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group
Part I**

by Jared M. Tracy

In April 1951, a personnel officer in the New York-based, reserve 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group called First Lieutenant (1LT) Robert M. Zweck. “Bob, you’ve got to officially notify everyone in the unit” to report for induction into federal service. Zweck, a full-time radio technician for National Broadcasting Company (NBC), remembered that “the guys hated me. I called each guy and said, ‘Put your gear together.’”¹ Activated in the reserves in October 1950, the 301st RB&L, a strategic psychological warfare (Psywar) unit, was being federalized on 1 May 1951. Later that year, the unit deployed to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to satisfy requests for qualified Psywar personnel from Major General (MG) Daniel C. Noce, Chief of Staff, European Command (EUCOM).²

This article addresses the uniqueness of the 301st RB&L while detailing its formation, manning, and training before it deployed to Germany. The Group was noteworthy for several reasons. It drew people from several different reserve units after WWII. Many of its personnel held advanced degrees, had specialized civilian skills, or were proficient in foreign languages. Some of its reservists had high rank without having any prior military experience or training. By virtue of its Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC), the 301st was closely associated with NBC. And it was the only U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Psywar unit to be federalized during the early years of the Cold War.³ The roots of the 301st go back to the late 1940s.

Some of the 301st RB&L’s original members, including its commander, Colonel (COL) Ellsworth H. Gruber, served in various USAR elements since 1947. One of these units was borne out of NBC. David Sarnoff, a WWII brigadier general who served as General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s communications advisor and who later became the Chairman of the Board of Radio Corporation of America (RCA), proposed the creation of a reserve MRBC via the post-WWII Industrial Affiliation Program. In that program, corporations formed reserve units manned with their employees. The result of Sarnoff’s efforts was the 15 November 1948 activation of the stand-alone 406th MRBC. The 406th was commanded by NBC sales manager and Signal Corps Officer Captain (CPT) William B. Buschgen, and was populated with volunteer NBC employees.⁴

Drilling monthly at NBC studios, the 406th MRBC’s personnel already possessed the advanced technical skills needed to operate radio broadcasting equipment in an Army unit. One NBC employee who joined the MRBC was Robert R. Rudick. He had worked at NBC since 1945, starting in the Communications Department. He advanced to the Engineering Department after graduating from RCA Institute. He was also a National Guardsman in the 258th Field Artillery Regiment. The NBC-sponsored MRBC offered him the rank of staff sergeant (SSG) because of his expertise in studio work. Rudick elected to transfer from the National Guard to the MRBC, a separate USAR company from November 1948 until the activation of the 301st RB&L under COL Gruber two years later.⁵

On 3 October 1950, the Army activated the reserve 301st RB&L Group as a Table of Distribution and Allowances (T/D&A) unit, with the potential of having it placed in federal service for a two-year period. The 301st consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), four



MSG Frank S. Zablocki (left, standing), 2LT Robert M. Zweck (center, standing), and a group of enlisted men from the reserve 406th MRBC prepare for movement to Fort Tilden, New York, for rifle marksmanship training, November 1950.



Brigadier General David Sarnoff

Born in Russia on 27 February 1891, BG David Sarnoff emigrated to the U.S. in 1900. In 1906, he began working for the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America. Subsequently he held such positions as telegraph operator, chief radio inspector, contract manager, and commercial manager. In 1919, GE purchased the American arm of Marconi, which then incorporated into Radio Corporation of America (RCA). In April 1921, Sarnoff became general manager of RCA; within ten years he was company president. In December 1924, he was appointed a lieutenant colonel in the reserves, and was a colonel five years later. During WWII he served on active duty as a Signal Corps Officer, was GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Special Consultant on Communications, and attained the rank of brigadier general. Leaving active duty after the war, Sarnoff became Chairman of the Board of RCA in January 1949. Activated in November 1948, the NBC-sponsored 406th MRBC was the brainchild of BG David Sarnoff.



1LT Robert M. Zweck, 2LT David L. Housman, and 2LT Walter D. Ehr Gott (left to right) outside of the military induction center in New York City, 1 May 1951, the day that the 301st RB&L Group was federalized.

staff sections (S-1 [Administration], S-2 [Intelligence], S-3 [Plans and Operations], and S-4 [Supply]), a Reproduction (Repro) Company, and an MRBC.⁶ The MRBC absorbed the NBC personnel from the 406th MRBC (inactivated on 24 October). By early 1951, it was at full strength. However, staffing of the HHC and Repro Company took more time because the 301st had to recruit qualified reservists. The manning process continued after news of the RB&L's imminent federalization was received.

The 301st was to be federalized during Fiscal Year 1951, a period in which hundreds of thousands of reservists and National Guardsmen were ordered into federal service to support global Army operations.⁷ (Federalization was the process of placing a reserve military unit on active duty for a specified duration.) On 29 March 1951, COL Gruber formally announced that the 301st was being federalized on 1 May for two years. Prior to entering federal service, the burgeoning RB&L was accruing officers with previous military service and/or journalism, advertising, radio, or printing backgrounds.⁸

CPT James J. Patterson, HHC Commander, had both military and journalism experience. Born on 23 March 1923 into the family that owned the *Chicago Tribune* and New York's *Daily News*, Patterson graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1944. Commissioned into the infantry during

WWII, he led a platoon in the 69th Armored Infantry Battalion, 16th Armored Division in Europe, earning the Combat Infantryman Badge. After completing stateside military training as a fixed-wing pilot, he served in Kyushu, Japan, in the 24th Infantry Division's aviation section from 1946 to 1949. He returned to the U.S. and left active duty. He retained a USAR commission while working as a reporter for the *Daily News*. Patterson returned to active duty in April 1951 and briefly took counterintelligence training before reporting to the 301st.⁹

Another typical RB&L officer was CPT John D. McTigue. Born on 9 September 1911, McTigue had extensive radio experience before serving as the Group S-3, among other roles. Prior to WWII, he worked in the NBC press department. He was the publicity director for station WJZ



In 1950, NBC broadcast engineer Robert R. Rudick transferred from the 258th Field Artillery Regiment (National Guard) to the MRBC of the reserve 301st RB&L. Though he had not attended basic training, his technical expertise earned him the rank of staff sergeant.

REBUILDING PSYWAR

The activation, federalization, and deployment of the 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group occurred as part of the U.S. Army effort to rebuild its psychological warfare (Psywar) capability in the early 1950s. After WWII, the Army deactivated all of its tactical Psywar units and retained only a handful of active duty officers with experience in Psywar. Beginning on 25 June 1950, the Korean War underscored the Army's inability to wage Psywar. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (CSA) General J. Lawton Collins, and Army G-3 Major General Charles L. Bolte directed Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure to rebuild that capability. As head of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force during WWII, McClure was the perfect candidate. By January 1951, the general headed a new special staff section in the Pentagon, the Office of the Chief of Psywar (OCPW), reporting directly to the CSA.

Coordinating with the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, and Army Field Forces (AFF) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, the OCPW oversaw the establishment, training, and deployment of Psywar units. Tactical units included the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company which served in Korea (1950-1953); the 2nd L&L, an AFF element at Fort Riley and later at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and the 5th L&L, which deployed to Germany. AFF activated the 1st RB&L (strategic Psywar) in November 1950 to support UN and U.S. objectives in the Far East. The 6th RB&L was activated in April 1952 and was soon assigned to the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, along with the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). The federalization and deployment of the 301st happened concurrently with these events.¹



Frank Pace, Jr.
Secretary of the Army



GEN J. Lawton Collins
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army



BG Robert A. McClure
Office of the Chief of
Psychological Warfare

in New York from 1941 to 1943. During the war he served in the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information, the U.S. government's information bureau. Later, he became a public relations officer on the standing committee of broadcasters in the United Nations in 1947-1948; an assistant manager of special events at ABC; and a production manager at station WINS in New York. He also briefly worked for Radio Free Europe before joining the 301st.¹⁰ Like Patterson and McTigue, many of the RB&L's enlisted soldiers were specially qualified for service in Psywar.

Upon federalization, the 301st had 100 assigned enlisted reservists. These soldiers were augmented by new arrivals whose education, professional skills, and knowledge of foreign languages had been identified at Army induction and reassignment centers.¹¹ Specially qualified soldiers included Privates First Class (PFC) Melvin 'Mel' Juffe and Brook 'Mike' Paschkes; Corporal (CPL) Thomas F. 'Tom' McCulley; and Private (PVT) Alphonse A. Principato. Prior to serving in the HHC, PFC Juffe was a journalist for the Newark, New Jersey-based *Star Ledger*.¹² PFC Paschkes joined the 301st while working as an advertiser in the New York firm Lawrence Fertig and Company.¹³ CPL McCulley had experience operating the 35 x 45 Harris Press before entering military service and being assigned to the Repro Company.¹⁴ He had other qualified press operators in the company with him.

PVT Alphonse A. Principato was a foreman in a Boston printing firm, Arcana Graphics, when he was drafted in January 1951. Assignments personnel at the Fort Devens, Massachusetts, induction center interviewed him about his civilian experience. Principato noted that they "didn't know anything at all about printing!"¹⁵ His answers proved his expertise and resulted in orders to the Repro Company following basic training. Journalism, advertising, and printing were not the only skills needed in the RB&L.

The 301st required foreign-language speakers to serve in the S-3 and in the MRBC's Monitoring Section. Some who filled the vacancies spoke "six or seven languages," according to Principato.¹⁶ One example was CPL Cesare G. Ugianskis, son of a Lithuanian Army officer whose family emigrated to the U.S. in 1949. He joined the Army in June 1950 and took basic training at Fort Riley. Ugianskis served in the 1st RB&L until August 1951 when that unit deployed to support U.S. and United Nations objectives in Korea. His fluency in Russian, German, and Lithuanian merited his transfer to the 301st RB&L.¹⁷

Another linguistic asset to the unit was PVT Julien J. Studley. On 14 May 1927, he was born in Brussels, Belgium. Growing up, he learned French, Spanish, German, Russian, and Polish. His family fled Nazi-occupied France in 1941 and spent two years in Cuba before emigrating to the U.S. Studley joined the Tennessee National Guard and served as an artillery surveyor in the 278th Regimental Combat Team. Wanting to use his language skills in Psywar, he requested and received assignment to the 301st. While populated with multi-lingual, well educated, and professionally skilled

COLONEL ELLSWORTH H. GRUBER

Veteran of both world wars and professional newspaperman Colonel (COL) Ellsworth H. Gruber was ideally suited to command the 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group. Born on 30 December 1897, Gruber served in France with the 77th Division during WWI. After the Armistice, he returned to his home state, New York. After working for *The New York World*, Gruber became a proofreader and printing supervisor at the *Daily News* starting in 1922. Between the world wars, he served as a reserve Infantry Officer in the New York Military District.¹ Briefly assigned as a Publicity Officer in June 1940, Gruber served as an intelligence officer and rose to the rank of COL during WWII.² However, his post-WWII reserve assignments best prepared him for commanding the 301st RB&L.

In the late 1940s, COL Gruber was a key player in the limited reserve Psywar activity in the New York Military District. This stemmed from his friendship with WWII Office of Strategic Services veteran COL Garland H. Williams, commander of the 1173rd Military Intelligence Group, “the control group for New York City Reserve activities.” It was Williams who created an *ad hoc* section called GE-1 in the 1173rd for “military intelligence personnel interested in Psychological Warfare.” COL Gruber


became director of GE-1 on 22 November 1947.³ For the next eighteen months, the WWII veteran focused on training GE-1 personnel on Psywar methods and principles.⁴

On 21 June 1949, the 1588th Psychological Warfare Battalion (Training) was activated with the GE-1 personnel as cadre and COL Gruber as commander. When reserve interest in Psywar waned, 1588th personnel were transferred to the 1118th ASU, part of Army Field Forces’ Intelligence School at Fort Riley, Kansas. They formed a Special Projects Branch under Gruber, with the understanding that they all would transfer to a Psywar unit if one were created. That happened on 3 October 1950 when the 301st RB&L was activated. “Having served with COL Gruber in previous Reserve units . . . the majority [of Special Projects Branch personnel] elected to transfer [to the 301st].”⁵

COL Gruber commanded the 301st RB&L from October 1950 to August 1952.⁶ BG McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Pentagon, congratulated Gruber “on the work you have done in organizing, activating, training, and commanding this unit during its reserve phases and also during the active service.”⁷ On 31 May 1953, nine months after his return to the U.S., retired COL Ellsworth H. Gruber passed away at age 55.⁸



COL Ellsworth H. Gruber (second from right, walking) commanded the 301st RB&L from October 1950 to August 1952. The 7721st RB&L, the 301st's replacement in Mannheim, credited COL Gruber with being “instrumental in contributing much materially to the further development of the [301st] and Psywar.”



CPL Thomas F. McCulley, Offset Pressman (MOS 3167) in the Repro Company, had previous civilian experience operating the 35 x 45 offset Harris Press.



S-3 Linguist SSG Cesare G. Ugianskis (front) and PVT Vytenis Telycenas of the MRBC's Monitoring Section at work. Both soldiers stayed with the unit when the 301st RB&L transitioned to the 7721st RB&L in May 1953.



Drafted in January 1951, PVT Alphonse A. Principato had worked as a printing foreman in the Boston firm Arcana Graphics. An interview with assignments personnel upon induction at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, resulted in his assignment to the Repro Company.

soldiers and officers, the Group needed military training to meld it into a cohesive unit.

The 301st RB&L's training deficiencies were remedied at Fort Riley, Kansas. On 1 May 1951, an advanced echelon (ADVON) left Group Headquarters at 529 West 42nd Street, New York City, for Fort Riley. The main body departed by train on 7 May, and the entire unit was on station three days later. The 301st RB&L was assigned to the Army General School, along with the 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, the 5th L&L, and the 1st RB&L.¹⁸ Before beginning training, 301st soldiers and officers moved into Officer Candidate School (OCS) billeting on Camp Forsyth, a satellite of Fort Riley. They also had to complete extensive amounts of paperwork for pay, benefits, and supply purposes. Having fulfilled these tedious administrative requirements, the unit soon encountered a new problem.¹⁹

Regular Army cadre at Fort Riley gave 301st soldiers a cold reception. Operations Sergeant (SGT) Peter K. Dallo remembered, "We were absolutely hated because the guys that did the training were all regular military. Here we were, a bunch of young kids, most of whom had gone to college." Because of their education and professional skills, "Some of us had rank. This didn't go down too well with the regular [Army] guys."²⁰ SSG Rudick agreed: "There was a little bit of animosity toward us young snotnoses with rank from these battle-hardened veterans in the cadre." Rudick and others accepted the treatment because they needed the training and appreciated the combat experience of the Regular Army soldiers.²¹ Ranging from basic skills to corporate-sponsored radio broadcasting courses, training at Fort Riley had to meet a wide array of military and Psywar-related requirements.


First, courses were offered to accommodate the Group's officers. Eleven officers joined the Psychological Warfare Officers Course and graduated on 15 June. From 18 to 30 June, several officers attended a "refresher course in teaching and training methods."²² Simultaneously, enlisted men took general military training.

More than half of the RB&L's enlisted soldiers had not attended basic training. On 20 May, sixty-four of them were detached to A Company, 86th Infantry Regiment, 10th Infantry Division for "six weeks of hell and fire" (basic training). Having earned his rank for joining the MRBC back in New York, SSG Rudick found his present situation awkward. "Here I was, a staff sergeant, getting basic training . . . with a corporal as a cadre leader."²³ Completion of general military courses led to more specialized instruction.

Although former NBC employees in the MRBC knew how to operate radio broadcasting systems, the Army had little equipment for them to train on at Fort Riley. Accordingly, they took training off-post for additional practical experience. For example, 1LT Zweck and a team of enlisted soldiers went on Temporary Duty (TDY) to Quincy, Illinois. There, Gates Radio Company trained them to dismantle, assemble, operate, and transport radio antenna towers and transmitters. On 28 July 1951, SSG Rudick left for a 30-day TDY to Quincy to learn how to erect an antenna.



301st RB&L soldiers arrive at Fort Riley, May 1951. For the next six months, they took diversified training ranging from basic training provided by the 86th Infantry Regiment, 10th Infantry Division, to Psywar classes at the Army General School, to specialized training provided by Gates Radio at Quincy, Illinois.



Repro Company commander CPT Leroy E. Peck recruited PVT Albert A. Hartinian (above) as a Photographer (MOS 152). When Peck located him in mid-1951, Hartinian was in Advanced Individual Training at Fort Riley to be a Cook (MOS 3060).



An instructor at the Army General School describes delivery methods for Psywar leaflets, namely the 500-pound M105A1 'leaflet bomb' and the modified 105 mm artillery round.



1LT Robert M. Zweck (third from right) led a small detachment of soldiers to Quincy, Illinois, in summer 1951, for training sponsored by Gates Radio Company.

There, he found that rigging was not his forte. To avoid having to climb a 90' tower again, he redoubled his efforts on his existing strengths: engineering and maintaining power supply equipment.²⁴ MRBC personnel were not the only ones whose civilian skills were transferrable to Psywar.

Technical training came easy to Repro Company soldiers with expertise as civilian press operators. While a student himself, CPL McCulley helped instruct his classmates on how to work a printer. "Anytime the guys needed a hand with something, they would come to me."²⁵ In a similar way, PVT Principato frequently answered his classmates' questions about the letter press.²⁶ Meanwhile, the Repro Company continued filling vacancies with qualified soldiers to avoid having to train people from scratch.

The Repro Company needed a Photographer (MOS 152), and PVT Albert A. Hartinian was the answer. When Hartinian was drafted, he was already an experienced photographer. He completed basic training at Fort Riley before attending advanced training to be a cook (MOS 3060). Repro Company Commander CPT Leroy E. Peck visited the photographer at cook school to interview him and assess his skills with a camera. After that meeting, Peck began processing Hartinian's transfer, but faced administrative red tape. COL Gruber appealed to Headquarters, Fifth Army in Chicago to expedite the transfer. One day, as the culinary student sat in his barracks, a sergeant yelled, "Hartinian, get down here now!" The curious private reported to a captain who said, "I don't know who you know, I don't want to know. Get your stuff and report to

CPT Peck.²⁷ Skills like Hartinian's were vital as the 301st began turning out new Psywar products.

Starting in August 1951, the 301st produced original Psywar materials for training purposes. These included a leaflet "to incite work sabotage among Communist-held prisoners of war" and "to encourage their hopes for eventual liberation and freedom." Other products included:

[A] half-hour documentary dealing with the Communist Youth Rally in East Berlin; . . . printed leaflets and safe-conduct passes; [and] posters on subjects ranging from demands for the release of William Oatis [an American journalist charged with espionage by the Czech government] to a series designed to 'sell' America to Yugoslavia.



CPT Leroy E. Peck served with the 84th ID ('Railsplitters') during WWII. After the war, he became a newspaper editor in Riverton, Wyoming, before being recalled to active duty to command the Repro Company of the 301st RB&L.



Fifth U.S. Army SSI

Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, Chief of the Office of Psychological Warfare in the Pentagon, complimented the quality of these products and "expressed considerable satisfaction with the excellent work accomplished by the Group."²⁸ The 301st RB&L soldiers would soon get to test their abilities in Germany.

In early July 1951, the Group received unofficial notification of deployment to the FRG so that it could begin preparing for overseas movement. (Official orders arrived on 8 August.)²⁹ On 24 July, a team consisting of 1LTs Robert H. Horn, Paul N. Sanker, Gerald L. Steibel, and Alan L. Streusand arrived in Frankfurt, Germany, to plan for the unit's forthcoming deployment. Its first order of business was meeting with Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Richard G. Ciccolella, Chief of the Psywar Section, G-3 Special Plans Branch, EUCOM. The most important outcome of these meetings was finalizing the location of the RB&L's home in the FRG: Sullivan Barracks in Mannheim, roughly twelve miles northwest of Heidelberg. After planning with Ciccolella had concluded, the team focused on area familiarization.


The lieutenants immersed themselves in projects that would benefit the 301st main body when it arrived in November. They studied and wrote reports on the Communist World Youth Festival in Berlin and State Department informational activities in Europe. The 301st officers observed the combined Exercise JUPITER (hosted by the French First Army). Beginning on 27 September 1951, that exercise involved the U.S. V Corps and took place along an 80-mile stretch of the Rhine River. From 3 to 10 October, they observed the 5th L&L (tactical Psywar company) participating in EUCOM's Exercise COMBINE, a maneuver that involved 160,000 American, British, and French troops. Finally, the team planned for a EUCOM Psywar Display and



Including LTC Frank A. McCulloch, future commander of the RB&L, 301st students who attended the first Psychological Warfare Officers' Course (2 May-15 June 1951) were: (1) 1LT Alan B. Streusand; (2) 2LT Monroe B. Scharff; (3) CPT Edward A. Jabbour; (4) 2LT Walter D. Ehr Gott; (5) 2LT Edward Starr; (6) 2LT David L. Housman; (7) 1LT Robert H. Barnaby; (8) 1LT Lester S. MacGregory; (9) 1LT Paul N. Sanker; (10) LTC Frank A. McCulloch; (11) CPT Herbert Avedon; (12) 1LT Theodore Hood; and (13) 1LT Robert H. Horn.

SULLIVAN BARRACKS

The 301st RB&L arrived at Sullivan Barracks in Mannheim ① in November 1951, and remained there until May 1953. In January 1953, the MRBC dispatched a detachment to Kaiserslautern to relay American Forces Network's broadcasts to units in that area. The 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Seventh Army's tactical Psywar asset, was stationed in Böblingen ②.



Aerial view of Sullivan Barracks.



“The first sight of Sullivan Kaserne with its solidly constructed buildings, modern plumbing, and semi-private room design, did much to raise troop morale, at rather low ebb since the first days on the Callan.”



LTC Richard G. Ciccolella

During WWII, then-CPT Richard G. Ciccolella served as a company commander in the 16th Infantry, 1st ID in North Africa. Battlefield promoted up to lieutenant colonel, Ciccolella was wounded three times in Tunisia and was medically evacuated to the U.S. In October 1944, he again deployed to command the 141st Infantry, 36th ID (Texas National Guard). His unit was directly involved in the operations that in May 1945 yielded the capture of German Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt. After the war, the three-time Silver Star recipient served as Professor of Military Science at Georgetown University and on the Department of the Army staff before becoming Chief of the Psywar Section, G-3 Special Plans Branch, EUCOM. Ciccolella ultimately attained the rank of major general, serving in such positions as Chief, Training Division, Unit Training Readiness, Continental Army Command; Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division; Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan; and Deputy Commanding General, First U.S. Army, before retiring in 1973.¹



1LTs Robert H. Barnaby (left) and Robert M. Zweck (right) pose with CPT Victor U. Tervola, 1st RB&L, just before boarding chartered commercial aircraft destined for the East Coast. The 301st main body left Fort Riley on 2 November 1951 and was in the FRG about two weeks later.

Conference scheduled for 27-28 November in Heidelberg, Germany. Meanwhile, the 301st main body in Kansas completed its preparations for overseas movement (POM).³⁰

301st RB&L soldiers successfully completed three POM inspections (4-7 September, 24-26 September, and 3 October 1951) before moving to the East Coast. On 17 October, an ADVON led by the Group Executive Officer (XO), MAJ Howard A. Praeger, arrived at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, the staging area for the New York Port of Embarkation (POE).³¹ It stayed for ten days before sailing out of the POE. On 29 October, the main body performed a formal review for BG McClure at Fort Riley. According to an unpublished unit history, McClure “repaid the courtesy by an address in which he praised the unit for its past achievements and . . . indicated what [it] might expect overseas.” The main body left Fort Riley by chartered aircraft on 2 November, stayed at Camp Kilmer for a week, and then moved to the POE where it boarded the USNS transport *General R.E. Callan* (T-AP-139) for the voyage to Germany.³²

Docking at Bremerhaven, Germany, on 19 November 1951, the 301st RB&L traveled by train to Sullivan Barracks, a former Nazi *Wehrmacht* compound. According to a unit history: “The first sight of Sullivan *Kaserne* with its solidly constructed buildings, modern plumbing, and semi-private room design, did much to raise troop morale, at rather low ebb since the first days on the *Callan*.”³³ The 301st RB&L, assembled over the preceding months with professionally skilled reservists, draftees, and prior service personnel, settled in and began working. Its activities in support of EUCOM and U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) from November 1951 to May 1953 will be described in Part II.

The 301st RB&L Group followed an interesting course to becoming the U.S. Army’s strategic Psywar asset for EUCOM and USAREUR. First, the unit’s early personnel came out of numerous reserve units in the late 1940s, notably the NBC-sponsored 406th MRBC that was activated in November 1948. Second, the RB&L was activated, federalized, and trained as part of a concerted U.S. Army effort to provide theater commanders in Europe and the Far East with a Psywar capability. Third, it was a hodgepodge of prior service personnel, NBC employees, other reservists, and draftees. Most had advanced education, professional skills, or linguistic abilities, and some held higher enlisted rank without having had any prior military experience or training. With this article as a foundation, Part II on the 301st RB&L will describe the challenges of waging psychological warfare in Cold War Europe. ▲

The author would like to thank the veterans of the 301st RB&L for providing stories, documents, and photos related to their time in the unit. Thanks also to Mr. Walter Elkins.

JARED M. TRACY, PhD

Jared M. Tracy served six years in the U.S. Army, and became a historian at USASOC in December 2010. He earned an MA in History from Virginia Commonwealth University and a PhD in History from Kansas State University. His research is focused on the history of U.S. Army psychological operations.

Endnotes

- 1 Robert M. Zweck, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 20 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Zweck worked on the daily radio show of Eleanor and Elliot Roosevelt (deceased President Franklin D. Roosevelt's wife and son) in Radio City Studio 8F.
- 2 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological Warfare and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982), 111-113.
- 3 Prior to 1952, units and personnel in the reserves belonged to the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 implemented many changes to the military reserves, including designating the ORC as the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). For two reasons, the author has chosen to use the USAR designation when describing reserve matters prior to 1952. First, the redesignation occurred during the 301st RB&L's lifespan, meaning that it was, in the end, a USAR unit. Second, the USAR is more familiar to today's reader than is the ORC. See, e.g., Kathryn Roe Coker et al., eds., *United States Army Reserve Mobilization for the Korean War* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Reserve Command, 2013), and U.S. Army Reserve Command, *Army Reserve: A Concise History* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Reserve Command, 2013).
- 4 301st RB&L, unpublished unit history, no date, 1-2, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter 301st unpublished history; HQ, 1242nd Army Service Unit, "Special Order #181," 21 December 1948 and HQ, 300th Signal Service Group, "Special Order #24," 8 October 1950, cited in 301st unpublished history, 2-3; Peter Hellman, *Shaping the Skyline: The World According to Real Estate Visionary Julien Studley* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004), 66; Historical Data Card, 301st RB&L, Center of Military History (CMH), Fort McNair, Washington, DC, hereafter Historical Data Card.
- 5 Robert R. Rudick, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 9 August 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 6 Tables of Distribution (T/Ds) 250-1201, 250-1202, and 250-1203 outlined the HHC, Repro, and MRB Companies, respectively. The MRBC and Repro Companies of the 301st were not numbered. The reduced strength RB&L T/D allowed for 41 officers and 138 enlisted men.
- 7 On 30 June 1950, the Army's strength was just over 593,000. By 17 April 1951, the ceiling for Army manning was 1,552,000. The number of reservists and National Guardsmen federalized in FY 1951 was reported as 206,816. See, e.g., Robert W. Coakley, *Highlights of Mobilization, Korean War* (Washington, D.C.: CMH, 1959).
- 8 "Radio Reserve Unit to Go on Active Duty," *New York Times*, 25 April 1951, 51; HQ, First Army, "General Order # 45," 2 April 1951, cited in 301st unpublished unit history, 3. See also 301st RB&L, "301st: A View In Retrospect," *Psyche* 1/4 (no date, ca. May 1953): 4, hereafter "A View In Retrospect"; "NBC-Sponsored Unit Assigned Active Duty," *Audio Engineering* (May 1951): 57; 301st unpublished history, 3-4; Historical Resume of the 301st RB&L, 1, Box 567, Record Group (RG) 338: Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (WWII and Thereafter), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, hereafter 301st Historical Resume; HQ, 301st RB&L, "Assumption of Command, General Order # 6," 11 September 1952, Box 5819, RG 338, NARA.
- 9 Zweck interview, 20 December 2010; "James J. Patterson, Daily News Executive, 69," *New York Times*, 25 June 1992; "James J. Patterson, 1944," <http://apps.wwpnta.org/memorials/article/14311>, accessed 19 September 2013; *Shaping the Skyline*, 66.
- 10 "Behind the Mike," *Broadcast Advertising*, 15 June 1938, 46; "McTigue to WINS," *Broadcasting: The Newsweekly of Radio and Television Telecasting* (December 1949): 81; 5th L&L, "301st RB&L Sets Up Shop at Mannheim," *The Leaflet*, 30 November 1951, 1, hereafter "301st RB&L Sets Up Shop."
- 11 These locations included Fort Devens, Massachusetts and The Adjutant General-established Classification and Analysis station at Fort Myer, Virginia. See Robert W. Jones, Jr., and Charles H. Briscoe, "The 'Proper Ganders' 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group: Strategic Psywar in Korea, 1951-1954," *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 7/1 (2011): 28.
- 12 *Shaping the Skyline*, 66-67.
- 13 Paschkes ran into high school classmate Peter K. Dallo on a subway, and convinced him to join the 301st. Brook 'Mike' Paschkes, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 20 December 2010, and Peter K. Dallo, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 21 January 2011, both in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 14 Thomas F. McCulley, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 17 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 15 Alphonse A. Principato, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 17 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 16 Principato interview, 17 December 2010.
- 17 Cesare G. Ugianskis, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 27 January 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 18 Historical Data Card.
- 19 301st unpublished history, 5; "A View In Retrospect," 3.
- 20 Dallo interview, 21 January 2011; "Engagements," *New York Times*, 27 March 1955. Dallo was a Business graduate of Miami (Ohio) University who enlisted on 2 January 1951.
- 21 Rudick interview, 9 August 2012.
- 22 HQ, Fort Riley, "Special Order #136," 16 May 1951, and "Special Order #138," HQ, Fort Riley, 18 May 1951, cited in 301st unpublished history, 6; "A View In Retrospect," 3; 301st unpublished history, 8.
- 23 301st unpublished history, 6-8; Rudick interview, 9 August 2012. Prior-service enlisted personnel stayed behind for guard and Charge of Quarters (CQ) duty; to carry out police call, "barracks maintenance," and "area beautification"; and to prepare additional common task training for the unit, which went into use on 2 July 1951.
- 24 Rudick interview, 9 August 2012.
- 25 McCulley interview, 17 December 2010.
- 26 Principato interview, 17 December 2010. The more laborious letter press used letter blocks. The offset press made photographed copies of desired images, similar in concept to the modern photocopy method. The image would be photographed and put on the press; an aluminum plate

would be made and then put on a cylinder; the rolls would hit the cylinder with the plate on it, which would transfer the ink from the plate and produce prints as the rollers turned.

- 27 Albert A. Hartinian, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 29 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. CPT Peck was a WWII 84th Infantry Division Silver Star recipient and a postwar newspaper publisher in Riverton, Wyoming.
- 28 Quotes in 301st unpublished history, 8-9.
- 29 MG Charles A. Willoughby, G-2, Far East Command (FEC), had requested that the 301st be assigned to FEC to provide strategic Psywar support in Korea. However, the lengthy training program for the 301st, and the fact that McClure had already promised to provide MG Noce with trained Psywar personnel, led to the decision to send the unit to EUCOM instead. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 113; HQ, Fifth Army, "Movement Directive," 8 August 1951, cited in 301st unpublished history, 10.
- 30 301st RB&L Unit Journal, Vol. II, Entries 24 July 1951, 3 August 1951, 25 August 1951, 4 September 1951, 15 September 1951, 17 September 1951, 27 September 1951, 3 October 1951, 7 November 1951, and 20 November 1951, Folder "HQ, 301st RB&L Historical Reports, 1951-1952," Box 5819, RG 338, NARA.
- 31 "Advertising News and Notes," *New York Times*, 2 September 1948; "Back as Ad Manager of Brooklyn Union Gas," *New York Times*, 12 January 1953. Praeger was a former newspaperman and the manager of advertising and publicity at the Brooklyn Union Gas Company.
- 32 According to "A View In Retrospect," 3, the *Callan* left on 7 November, not 9 November. 301st unpublished history, 11-13; Historical Data Card.
- 33 According to the unit history, the "10-day trans-Atlantic trip probably constituted the most unpleasant period in the Group's entire history. There were two reasons for this: the accommodations and the food. The former were located in the bowels of the ship and compared unfavorably, said enlisted veterans, with those encountered in [WWII] troop ships. As for the food, enlisted men alleged that even the seagulls, inveterate scavengers of troop-ship garbage, turned back in disgust from the *Callan*, after sampling the second day's menu." 301st unpublished history, 14-15.

Rebuilding Psywar Sidebar

- 1 See, generally, *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 7/1 (2011), 7/2 (2011), and 8/1 (2012); Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002); "Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure," *U.S. News and World Report* (January 1953): 60-69; and memoranda from Edward A. Caskey to Robert A. McClure, 8 July 1948; McClure to Caskey, 14 July 1948; Charles L. Bolte to Albert C. Wedemeyer, 12 August 1950; John H. Stokes, Jr. to McClure, 21 August 1950; McClure to Charles A. Willoughby, 26 September 1950; and McClure to John O. Weaver, 24 October 1951, copies in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

COL Ellsworth H. Gruber Bio

- 1 "COL Ellsworth Gruber," *New York Times*, 1 June 1951, hereafter "COL Ellsworth Gruber."
- 2 "Reserve Corps Orders," *New York Times*, 5 November 1939; "Reserve Corps Orders," *New York Times*, 29 June 1940.
- 3 301st RB&L, unpublished history, no date, 1, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter 301st unpublished history.
- 4 301st unpublished history, 1. For more on GE-1 activities, see letters from Ellsworth H. Gruber to Robert A. McClure, 5 May 1948, 17 May 1948, 31 May 1948, 29 June 1948, 5 August 1948, 19 August 1948, and 5 September 1948; letters from Robert A. McClure to Ellsworth H. Gruber, 21 May 1948, 8 July 1948, 9 August 1948, and 8 September 1948; and routing slip from 'msmc' to Robert A. McClure, 24 August 1948, copies in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. For a biographical sketch of Jackson, see "C.D. Jackson," *f.y.i.*, 25 September 1964, copy in Folder "C.D. Jackson," Box 62, Abbott Washburn Papers, 1938-2003, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood Home, Abilene, Kansas.
- 5 HQ, 337th Military Intelligence Battalion, "Special Order # 5," 31 August 1950; HQ, New York Military District, "General Order # 39," no date; and HQ, 337th Military Intelligence Battalion, "Special Order # 19," 20 October 1950, all cited in 301st unpublished history, 2.
- 6 "Radio Reserve Unit to Go On Active Duty," *New York Times*, 25 April 1951; "NBC-Sponsored Unit Assigned Active Duty," *Audio Engineering* (May 1951): 57.
- 7 Memorandum from Robert A. McClure to Ellsworth H. Gruber, 28 August 1952, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 8 "COL Ellsworth Gruber."

LTC Richard G. Ciccolella Bio

- 1 "MG Richard G. Ciccolella, U.S. Army (Retired)," *Daily Press*, 2 January 2005; "Gen. Hurlburt Sees Training in Divisions," *Armored Sentinel*, 10 August 1962; Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, 5 March 1969, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972*; "Jack Anderson on the Washington Merry-Go-Round," 17 October 1969, <https://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/54251/b21f10-1017zdisplay.pdf> (accessed 23 September 2013); "President Martin: Serving Again," *eastern: The Eastern Kentucky University Alumnus* (Winter 1972): 19.



The **Sixth** Ranger Company

Look Sharp, Be Sharp, Stay Sharp

by Eugene G. Piasecki

“The mission of a ranger company as prescribed by [the] Department of the Army is to infiltrate through enemy lines and attack command posts, artillery, tank parks and key communication centers or facilities.”¹

When the North Korean Peoples’ Army (NKPA) invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950 the United States Army realized that its ability to defend and counterattack was extremely limited based on the massive demobilization of forces after World War II. Specialized units like the Rangers, Merrill’s Marauders, and First Special Service Force, trained to “take the war to the enemy” behind the lines by disrupting rear area operations and interdicting lines of supply and communication were deactivated by 1945. In July and August 1950, the Far East Command (FECOM) reacted to the situation in Korea by creating TDA units like the 8th Army Ranger Company and the General Headquarters (GHQ) Raiders from occupation forces already stationed in Japan. In September 1950, Army Chief of Staff General (GEN) J. Lawton Collins, announced his intent to activate and assign one Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) [RICA] to every active U. S. Army and National Guard infantry division.² The purpose of this article is to describe how one of these, the 6th RICA, performed a deterrent role in Europe rather than a combat assignment in Korea.

The first step in putting GEN Collins’ concept into action occurred on 15 September 1950. The Commandant of the Ranger Training Center (RTC), Fort Benning, Georgia, Colonel (COL) John G. Van Houten, reported to the Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces and was informed that training of Ranger type units was to be initiated at the earliest possible date.³ Simultaneously, an announcement was made Army-wide calling for Ranger volunteers. The RTC received the first group of volunteers, divided them into four companies, and started training them as company-sized units on 2 October 1950. Finished by 13 November 1950, these men formed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RICAs, and were already on their way to Korea when the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th RICA volunteers started their training cycle.⁴ The officers and men who formed the 6th RICA, traced their lineage and honors from World War II’s Company B, 2nd Ranger Battalion, were assigned to the Regular Army on 2 November 1950, and formally activated on 20 November 1950.⁵

Almost from its first formation at Fort Benning, the 6th started earning a reputation as a ‘one-of-a-kind’ unit even among the other Ranger companies. One of the principal reasons for this was the WWII veterans who filled the



The Korean War era Ranger Flag (left) and the 6th RICA SSI.



MSG Eugene H. Madison was a WWII veteran of both the 101st Airborne Division combat jumps into Normandy and Holland. After combat in Korea he would be commissioned and retire as a Captain at Fort Bragg, NC.

company’s three top leadership positions. Chosen to command the company was Captain (CPT) James S. ‘Sugar’ Cain. CPT Cain earned his battlefield commission as a member of the First Special Service Force (FSSF) in 1944. Assisting him was CPT Eldred E. ‘Red’ Weber, the company executive officer. Starting as a member of the 1st Ranger Battalion (‘Darby’s Rangers’), CPT Weber was transferred to the FSSF when the Rangers were disbanded in 1944. Completing the company’s command team was its senior non-commissioned officer (NCO), First Sergeant (1SG) Joseph Dye, Sr. 1SG Dye’s combat record included Ranger assignments from Dieppe, France, in 1942, through North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, and Cisterna, Italy, in 1944.⁶

With the company headquarters established, the remaining spaces in the platoons were filled by men looking for the challenges, opportunities, and excitement

that Ranger units provided. By convention, those assigned to the 6th RICA came through the normal 'volunteer pipeline' in no particular order. This process was the same for the officers as it was for the enlisted men. For example, Second Lieutenant (2LT) Clarence E. 'Bud' Skoien, 11th Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; First Lieutenant (1LT) Robert B. 'Buck' Nelson, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and CPT William S. Culpepper, 7th RICA, Fort Benning, Georgia, were all assigned to the 6th RICA as platoon leaders with little more than peace-time Army garrison experience.⁷ On the other hand, a greater number of the enlisted men like MSG Eugene H. Madison reported for duty with either combat, post-war Regular Army experience, or both.⁸ Through the combined efforts of the RTC cadre, CPT Cain, CPT Weber, and 1SG Dye, the knowledge gap between the two groups was soon non-existent.

Fully assembled at the RTC, the 6th RICA started training on Monday, 27 November 1950. Faced with the knowledge that training time was a precious resource not to be wasted, CPT Cain instituted eighteen-hour duty days by augmenting the RTC training schedule with additional


off-duty classes that ensured that every man was as fully familiar with every subject being taught as possible.⁹ Private First Class (PFC) Edmund Kolby remembered that "both officers and non-commissioned officers were up at 0400 hours every morning and spent more time in the field than in the classrooms."¹⁰ Individual physical, weapons, and tactical training were supplemented with other subjects like escape and evasion, village fighting, adjustment of artillery fire, and squad and platoon tactics. As an added task, each man's swimming ability was tested, and those who were weak or could not swim were given sufficient 'extra' time to practice and develop their proficiency.¹¹

After six weeks of exhausting marches, physical exercises, long hours, and little sleep, the 6th RICA prepared for its final evaluation. To measure how well the Rangers were able to perform individual and unit missions, the RTC implemented a five-day field training operational readiness test (ORT).¹² Designed to meet specific training objectives, the test started with a night, low-level, tactical parachute drop. This was followed by individual platoons conducting drop zone assembly procedures, night tactical movements, and locating and destroying a series of bridges. With that

This company picture was taken at Fort Benning, GA on 18 January 1951 after COL Van Houten presented the 6th Ranger Infantry Company guidon to CPT Cain (seated on the first row far left). Seated immediately behind CPT Cain is 1SG Dye.



Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) Organizational Structure, 1950 era



This organizational structure was common to all of the 1950 era RICAs regardless of whether their parent divisional headquarters was in the active Army or Army Reserve.

completed, the platoons moved on their own at night into a designated area, reassembled into a company element, performed a final night tactical march, and attacked a company-sized objective located on a piece of key terrain.¹³

Unfortunately, the 6th RICA's final training mission did not begin as anticipated starting with the initial parachute insertion. As the Rangers troop carrying aircraft approached their intended drop zones, it became obvious that the aircrews assigned to the mission had limited airdrop experience. Flying at various altitudes and aircraft speeds, the 6th RICA found itself scattered across the Georgia countryside with few Rangers landing on their intended drop zones. Compounding this problem was the fact that these same miscalculations and aircrew operational inconsistencies contributed to significant losses of key items of equipment, and resulted in numerous Ranger parachute injuries.¹⁴ These issues coupled with the fact that each of the four Ranger companies in the second cycle had already received reassignment orders resulted in the RTC terminating this final field training exercise after only three days.


With their last training parachute jumps completed at Fort Benning and their Ranger Infantry Company guidon received from COL Van Houten on 18 January 1951, CPT Cain assembled the company in the unit mess hall to tell them that the 6th RICA was being assigned to Germany instead of going to Korea. Ranger reaction to the news was nothing less than total shock and disbelief. PFC Ed Kolby probably best summed up the feelings of the many of the Rangers when he recalled that the attitude among the men was, "We were pissed. There was talk about going to the 5th or another company, but nothing ever happened."¹⁵



Major General (MG) Dahlquist and CPT Cain at *Flak Kaserne* in Kitzingen, Germany.



MG John E. Dahlquist commanded the 1st Infantry Division during the majority of the time the Rangers were in Europe. His last assignment was as the CG, U. S. Army Continental Army Command (CONARC) at Fort Monroe, VA.



From 7 to 17 February 1951 the USNS *George W. Goethals* transported the 6th Ranger Company from the Brooklyn Navy Yard to Bremerhaven, Germany.

2LT Bud Skoien recalled, “The feeling in the room was like someone had let the air out of a balloon with a pin.”¹⁶ Sensing that there might be problems, Skoien remembered that Cain quickly regained control of the situation and removed any options the men may have had to quit the company by telling them: “Don’t think that way; there will be enough war for all of you.”¹⁷ With the situation temporarily resolved, the 6th RICA grudgingly accepted its fate and began preparing for Germany.


On 1 February 1951, the five officers and one-hundred eighteen enlisted men of the 6th RICA departed Fort Benning by commercial train for Fort Dix, New Jersey, to complete their final overseas processing requirements before traveling to Germany. After a brief stay at Fort Dix and a much welcomed three-day pass, the 6th RICA boarded the USNS *George W. Goethals* at the Brooklyn Navy Yard and sailed for Germany on 7 February 1951. Landing at Bremerhaven, Germany, on 17 February 1951, the Rangers were treated to an overnight train trip, arriving at their initial home on *Flak Kaserne* in Kitzingen, Germany.¹⁸ As they began unpacking and settling in, they learned that they were assigned to the 1st Infantry Division (1st ID), commanded by Major General (MG) John E. Dahlquist; under the staff supervision of the Division, G-3 Operations and Training section. Their mission was to

“The feeling in the room was like someone had let the air out of a balloon with a pin.”

— 2LT Clarence E. Skoien

conduct Ranger-type operations throughout the Seventh Army area of responsibility.¹⁹ Quick to realize that this situation could work to the Rangers’ advantage, CPT Cain developed and implemented a training program that he hoped would deflect attention from at least four of the major issues that plagued the Rangers throughout their time in Europe.

First among these was the fact that despite Cain’s ‘Fort Benning pep-talk,’ 6th Ranger morale remained at an all-time low with both officers and men repeatedly requesting a transfer to combat duty with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) in Korea. Second, the lack of adequate training facilities, areas, and ranges did not support, develop, and maintain the advanced skills required to complete basic Ranger missions. Third was the lack of additional assigned and qualified unit administrative personnel to fill the positions of clerk-typist, records clerk, and armorer. Finally, with no vehicles assigned to the



European Zones of Occupation

By the time the Rangers arrived in Germany, the country had already been divided into its respective post-WWII Zones of Occupation. As indicated the city of Berlin was also divided among the former allied powers despite being completely encircled by the Russian Zone of Occupation.

- American
- British
- French
- Soviet
- Joint Control



The 6th RICA command vehicle. Formally identified as truck, utility, 4 x 4, ¼ ton, this vehicle was best known among American and allied soldiers as ‘the Jeep.’



Because of the number of rivers and streams in Europe, the Rangers practiced field expedient stream crossing techniques. Here they are constructing and utilizing poncho rafts to cross part of the Main River.

company, the Rangers had to borrow them as needed from one of the division motor pools. Of these, this situation was the easiest to fix and was partially resolved when the company was issued two, one-quarter ton trucks (jeep) and one, two-and-one-half-ton truck (deuce-and-a-half).

In the meantime, Cain refined his individual training concept so the Rangers would be ready for the company’s spring field training exercises scheduled for Grafenwohr, Germany. Starting with physical training (PT) the Rangers soon were conducting daily runs around Kitzingen’s military airfield and ‘occasional’ forty-mile forced marches in eight hours carrying full field equipment and weapons for the first ten miles.²⁰ Cain’s program swung into high gear with the assistance of 1st ID combat engineers who provided demolitions training tailored to a European battlefield. It consisted of preparation of charges, minefield breaching operations, timber cutting, bridge destruction,

and construction and emplacement of booby traps. Once these tasks were mastered to Cain’s satisfaction, he shifted his emphasis back to refreshing those basic skills that the Rangers had learned at the RTC at Fort Benning. These included advanced map and compass work, infiltration and guerrilla tactics, camouflage and concealment, communications, combat intelligence, and aggressor organization and tactics.²¹

Arriving at Grafenwohr in mid-May 1951, the Rangers went straight into training. Beginning with 60mm mortar and 57mm recoilless rifle range firing, Ranger squads and platoons soon became highly proficient at integrating these fires into maneuver training that focused on executing retrograde movements, raids, ambushes, and information collection and reporting. After a second week of individual tactical training and more range firing, the Rangers returned to Kitzingen where they finished the cycle by emphasizing squad and platoon employment and control techniques and field expedient stream crossings of the Main River. If the Rangers had any questions about the reasons behind CPT Cain’s training program, they were soon answered the more the company was integrated into the 1st ID’s annual field training exercise schedule.

Realizing that Rangers provided an additional capability to the 1st ID that it did not normally have, MG Dahlquist quickly put them to work as aggressors for every unit in the division.²² Starting at the squad level, the Rangers quickly demonstrated that their operational tactics, techniques and procedures could be used to assist in evaluating the preparedness of selected 1st ID units. For example, unchallenged squad penetrations into unit areas demonstrated that, except for the Air Control Warning Station at Hertz Base which was patrolled by Polish guards and dogs, other units and installation security procedures were not as efficient as they should have been. One case in particular involved the 5th Artillery Battalion where, after breaching one battery’s internal security, ‘painted wooden block’ demolitions simulated destruction of key facilities and equipment and tactical wire communications were actually disabled. The infiltration of the Giebelstadt Army Airfield produced a roster of the base commander and his staff, a list of the types of aircraft and armaments located there, and a detailed area map.²³

In July 1951, the 6th Rangers sharply increased their involvement with 1st ID maneuver units. Beginning with tank-infantry platoon-level training with the 63rd Tank Battalion, the Rangers also provided company support to the 16th and 26th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) exercises at Grafenwohr. When the RCT’s concluded their training at the end of July, the Rangers stood-down for two weeks to prepare for their next major training exercise

6th Rangers

FREEFALL



1

On 4 August 1951 while celebrating the 1st ID's Organization Day at Harvey Barracks in Kitzingen, Germany, the division's guests, soldiers, and families were treated to a once-in-a-lifetime experience. Approaching the parade field where the last 1st ID unit had passed the reviewing stand, was a C-82 *Packet* airplane from the 60th Troop Carrier Group stationed at Rhein-Main Air Base. On board the *Packet* were ten Rangers from the 6th RICA about to make European military aviation history. Under the watchful eyes of MG Thomas S. Timberman, CG, 1st ID; Brigadier General (BG) Charles E. Hart, CG, 7th Army Artillery, and BG Theodore L. Futch, CG Wurzburg Military Post, these Rangers were about to make a 'mass freefall parachute jump' to climax the anniversary review of 1st ID units stationed at Kitzingen.



2



3

1 The C-82 *Packet* was adopted by the Air Force after World War II and was the predecessor to the C-119 *Flying Boxcar*.

2 This is the parachute seat type AN-6510 worn by the members of the 6th Ranger Company during the freefall parachute jump that commemorated the anniversary of the activation of the 1st Infantry Division on 24 May 1917.

3 SGT Jim Bozeman, Jr. was the primary jumpmaster for the Ranger's freefall jump on 4 August 1951.

4 SGT Bozeman (L) conducts a pre-jump inspection on CPL Jesse E. McDonald to ensure his parachute and other equipment will function safely during the jump.



4

Broken into two, five man 'sticks,' the first set of jumpers was comprised of 1LT Cecil Kidd, Corporal (CPL) Donald Traynor, Private (PVT) Willard V. Moore, CPL Walter E. Kimmel, and Private First Class (PFC) Alfred F. Kelly. The second 'stick' contained 1SG Joseph Dye, Sr., PFC Lawrence R. Brown, CPL Jesse E. McDonald, PFC Virgil R. Hill, and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Howard Griggs. Jumping from an altitude of 1900 feet, this event was made even more noteworthy by the type equipment the Rangers were using. Rather than wearing the standard static-line equipped, twenty-eight foot diameter, T-7 parachute and harness, each man wore an AN-6510 seat-type parachute. Preferred by pilots because it allowed greater freedom of movement, the AN-6510 with its slightly smaller twenty-four foot diameter canopy allowed each man to individually open his canopy by using a 'pull-type' ripcord grip.

The procedures for the jump were quite simple. SGT James Bozeman, the primary Ranger Jumpmaster remained on-board the *Packet* and controlled each stick of five Rangers lined up at the left and right jump doors. When the 'green-light' indicated that the *Packet* had reached the proper location, altitude, and jump speed, Bozeman signaled the left stick to jump first followed by the right stick. To avoid possible mid-air entanglements, each Ranger in the left stick made a three-second count before pulling the ripcord grip, while those in the right stick counted to five.¹ With the exception of PFC Brown, who was temporarily knocked unconscious on landing but left the drop zone under his own power, all other jumpers landed successfully. While this would not be the last freefall demonstration, at this time it was a unique insertion capability not readily available elsewhere in Europe.²



During their assignment in Germany, the Rangers' permanent home was Harvey Barracks in Kitzingen, Germany.

with the 18th Infantry Regiment at Wildflecken, Germany. This time though, the Rangers were teamed-up with the 63rd Tank Battalion and 1st Engineer Combat Battalion to form the task force that would aggress against the 18th Infantry. At the conclusion of the exercise in mid-August, the Rangers remained in Wildflecken to “perfect various techniques in map and compass, river and stream crossing expedients, and infiltration and guerrilla tactics.”²⁴

Returning to Kitzingen, little did the Rangers realize that their participation in next trilogy of major training events would be their last ones as a unit. Starting with the 1st ID's Exercise DRAWBRIDGE (11 September 1951), they moved to V Corps' Operation JUPITER (27 September 1951), and ended with the annual European Joint Command (EJCOM) maneuver FTX-51 (Exercise COMBINE) (3 October 1951). Building upon the original operational concept of employing the Rangers as a theater asset, these exercises additionally showcased the unique skills and capabilities for which all the Ranger companies had been created. Despite the 1st ID change of command from MG Dahlquist to MG Thomas S. Timberman, and the lack of any division-sized exercises since October 1950, recently promoted Major (MAJ) Cain was more ready than ever to prove his Rangers' effectiveness.

During Exercise DRAWBRIDGE, the 6th Ranger Company's second platoon, led by 1LT Buck Nelson, successfully swam a rope across the Main River and established a crossing point at 0430 hours on 16 September 1951. Under MAJ Cain's direct command, the 1st and 3rd platoons in assault boats, crossed the Main River

undetected, secured vital road junctions, sealed off the battlefield, blocked retreat routes, and prevented supplies and reinforcements from reaching 'enemy forces'.²⁵ This same level of success was also achieved during Operation JUPITER when the Rangers crossed the Rhine River. This time, though, the first and third platoons led by 2LT Bud Skoien, secured the area near the Frankenthal Bridge while 1LT Nelson's second platoon guarded an engineer tactical bridge site near the town of Worms. Having the Rangers conduct their crossing thirty minutes prior to the planned 26th Infantry Regiment assault enabled the 26th Regiment to shift its timetable forward, begin moving fifteen minutes after H-hour, and being completely across in one hour.²⁶

Exercise COMBINE, the last European operation for the 6th RICA was unique in that it was also the first tactical parachute drop of American paratroopers in Europe since the end of World War II in 1945.²⁷ Supplied with parachutes and air delivery items from the 557th Quartermaster Parachute Aerial Supply Company, the Rangers jumped from a twelve-plane formation of C-82 *Packet* aircraft of the 60th Troop Carrier Group on 3 October 1951.²⁸ Leading the Ranger 'aggressors' against the Seventh Army's 'friendly forces' was MAJ Cain whose mission was to seize and hold a key *autobahn* bridge across the Rhine River to cut 'friendly' supply lines. Following this, the company reorganized into platoon-sized elements and operated behind the 7th Army's front lines to harass and raid at random.²⁹ Completing all assigned missions, the Rangers returned to Kitzingen at the end of COMBINE on 10 October 1951.

Arriving back at Harvey Barracks the Rangers received the second-worst piece of news in their brief history. After considerable study, the Department of the Army decided to disband all the RICAs and had issued a message on 29 September 1951 that the 6th RICA was to be completely inactivated by 1 December 1951.³⁰ This time though, each man was given a choice of one of three options: (1) remain in Europe, (2) return to the U. S., or (3) volunteer for Korea. As the men made their choices they were reassigned as quickly as possible. MAJ Cain and Bud Skoien returned to the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY, but would not remain there for long. Cain volunteered to go to Korea and Skoien became one of the original members of the newly forming 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, NC. Eugene A. Kuta, future editor of the RICA newsletter, volunteered for Korea and was assigned to Company A, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) from 1951 through 1952. Ed Kolby, Red Weber, and Joe Dye were among the approximately forty Rangers who remained in Europe in a classified assignment.



Corporal Eugene A. Kuta volunteered for combat duty in Korea after the Rangers and was a member of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team from 1951 through 1952.



1SG Joseph Dye was a WWII veteran whose service with the Rangers began at Dieppe, France, in 1942 and went through Cisterna, Italy, in 1944. His final assignment was at the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, NY, where he was an advisor and trainer with the Cadet sport parachute club.

The 557th Quartermaster Parachute Aerial Supply Company supplied the Rangers with parachutes, air delivery items, and rigging support during the entire time they were in Germany.



Ranger Infantry Companies (A)

Assignments



1st RICA
2nd Infantry Division
(Korea)



2nd RICA
7th Infantry Division
(Korea)



3rd RICA
3rd Infantry Division
(Korea)



4th RICA
1st Cavalry Division
(Korea)



5th RICA
25th Infantry Division
(Korea)



6th RICA
1st Infantry Division
(Germany)



7th RICA
Ranger Training Command
(Fort Benning, Georgia)



8th RICA
24th Infantry Division
(Korea)



9th RICA
31st Infantry Division
(Alabama National Guard)



10th RICA
45th Infantry Division
(Oklahoma National Guard)



11th RICA
40th Infantry Division
(California National Guard)



12th RICA
28th Infantry Division
(Pennsylvania
National Guard)



13th RICA
43rd Infantry Division
(New England [CT, ME, RI, VT]
National Guard)



14th RICA
4th Infantry Division
(Fort Carson, Colorado)



15th RICA
47th Infantry Division
(Minnesota & North
Dakota National Guard)



RICA "Able"
Ranger Training Command
(Fort Benning, Georgia)



RICA "Baker"
Ranger Training Command
(Fort Benning, Georgia)



GHQ Raider Company
Special Activities Group
X U.S. Army Corps (Korea)
(12 November 1950- 1 April 1951)



8th Army Ranger Company
25th Infantry Division (Korea)
(25 August 1950- 28
March 1951)

NOTE: a. RICAs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 inactivation ordered 25 July 1951;
b. RICAs 10, 11 inactivation ordered 13 September 1951;
c. RICAs 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 inactivation ordered 29 September 1951.

By direction of the Department of the Army, all of the Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) [RICA], to include those in the Army National Guard, were inactivated by 1 December 1951. The personnel spaces that resulted from these units were not lost to the U. S. Army, but were then used to form the Psywar Center and 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, NC.

The inactivation of all the Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) did not mark the end of U. S. Army Rangers or Ranger training. The Ranger spirit, developed during World War II and passed on to the Korean War-era Ranger Infantry Companies, remained alive in the Ranger Training Command, transferred to the Infantry School's Ranger Department in 1951, and is now an integral part of the current Ranger Training Brigade at Fort Benning, GA. Although the men of the 6th RICA did not experience combat as a unit, they can always be proud of the fact that in Europe they were the 'Tip of the Spear' and were prepared to sacrifice everything to preserve freedom. Perhaps the greatest tribute to this small group of volunteers was provided by Mrs. James S. Cain, MAJ Cain's widow, when she confided to 'Ranger' Eugene A. Kuta some years later, "his (MAJ Cain) proudest accomplishment was being the commanding officer of the 6th Airborne Ranger Company."³¹ ▲

EUGENE G. PIASECKI

Eugene G. Piasecki is a retired Special Forces officer who has been with the USASOC History Office since 2006. A USMA graduate, he earned his Masters Degree in military history from Norwich University and is currently pursuing a PhD. His current research interests include the history of Army Special Forces, Special Forces since its beginning in 1952, and the History of Camp Mackall, NC.

Endnotes

- 1 The Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA, *Ranger Company (Tentative) Revision No. 1*, The Ranger Training Command, 28 March 1951, 1.
- 2 Directive issued by the G-3, Department of the Army, to the Chief of Army Field Forces dated 7 September 1950. This information was part of a Staff Study concerning Ranger type Units prepared by the Ranger Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia on 26 December 1950. Record Group 339, Entry 190, Box 10, Folder "Ranger History," National Archives.
- 3 Status Report, Headquarters Ranger Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, to CG, Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces, 7 November 1950. Commissioned in the regular Army Infantry in 1926, COL John G. Van Houten served in various Infantry Regiments in New York, the Philippines, and Texas, as well as three years in the Civilian Conservation Corps. During World War II, he served in combat with the 9th Infantry Division as chief of staff, regimental commander, and assistant division commander. Known as the father of U. S. Army Ranger School, Van Houten was inducted into the Ranger Training Brigade as a Distinguished Member on 21 April 2005.
- 4 Robert W. Black, *Rangers in Korea* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1989), 28. Of these four companies, only the 5th and 8th RICAs would go to Korea. The 6th went to Germany and was attached to the 1st Infantry Division, and the 7th RICA's 6 officers and 90 enlisted remained at the RTC at Fort Benning as the Ranger holding company pending the beginning of the third training cycle. During this second cycle, an extra platoon of 44 black enlisted and two officers would be assigned to the 8th RICA.
- 5 U. S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC. *Lineage and Honors Information*. "75th Ranger Regiment Lineage and Honors Information as of 31 January 2012." Annex 2. <http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcesturc/lineages/branches/inf/0075ra.htm>. Accessed on 9 April 2012.
- 6 Howard L. Katzander, "The Rangers are Here," *Stars and Stripes*, 15 April 1951, Features Section, Volume 8, Number 360, VI.
- 7 Clarence E. Skoien, "The Story of an Airborne Ranger Company: November 1950-December 1951," undated, "unpublished", USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. CPT William S. Culpepper, USMA 1946, was commissioned in the Infantry and served in Japan from 1947-1950 with the 19th Infantry and Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM). Returning to the 14th Infantry at Fort Carson, Colorado, he then went to Fort Benning, Georgia, as a member of the 7th RICA until he was transferred to the 6th. In 1951 he deployed with the 6th RICA to Germany, but was quickly reassigned to the 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division. CPT Culpepper later transferred into the Ordnance Corps, and spent the remainder of his tour in Germany with the 7th Army. Culpepper Family Tree – Captain William Stephen Culpepper, Jr. <http://gen.culpepper.com/ss/p50182.htm>. Accessed on 11 April 2012.

- 8 Skoien, "The Story of an Airborne Ranger Company." Eugene H. Madison was a WWII veteran of the 101st Airborne Division and jumped into both Normandy and Holland and then fought in the Battle of the Bulge. Remaining in the Army after the war, he became a platoon sergeant in the 6th RICA, and volunteered for duty in Korea. There he served as a 1SG in Company C, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, was awarded the Silver Star, and received a battlefield commission. He retired as a Captain in 1963.
- 9 COL (ret) Clarence E. Skoien, 6th Ranger Company, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 22 December 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Robert B. Nelson, "Sixth Company Unit History," *The Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) of the Korean War*, Winter 2007, 6. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 10 Edmund Kolby, 6th Ranger Company, interview by Eugene G. Piasecki, 5 January 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 11 Nelson, "Sixth Company Unit History," 6. MAJ Jesse L. Morrow of the Ranger Training Command was detailed to give this extra swimming instruction for two hours at a time during the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th weeks of Ranger Training.
- 12 Larry E. Ivers, "The 6th and 7th Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne), 1950-51," *The Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) of the Korean War*, Fall 1997, 12. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 13 Nelson, "Sixth Company Unit History," 6.
- 14 Nelson, "Sixth Company Unit History," 6.
- 15 Kolby interview, 5 January 2012.
- 16 Skoien interview, 22 December 2011.
- 17 Skoien interview, 22 December 2011.
- 18 Nelson, "Sixth Company Unit History," 6. Also going to Germany on the same ship with the Rangers were members of the 280 mm, M-65, Atomic Cannon Company that was assigned to the 7th U. S. Army. *Flak Kaserne's* name was changed in 1962 to Larson Barracks in honor of CPT Stanley L. Larson, Company C, 10th Engineer Battalion. CPT Larson was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for minefield clearing operations at Anzio on 23 May 1944.
- 19 Skoien interview, 22 December 2011 with follow-on comments provided on 18 June 2012.
- 20 Skoien interview, 22 December 2011. Kolby interview, 5 January 2012.
- 21 Nelson, "Sixth Company Unit History," 6.
- 22 Skoien interview, 22 December 2011.
- 23 Robert B. Nelson, "Sixth Company Unit History," *The Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) of the Korean War*, Spring 2007, 6. Copy in USASOC USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 24 Nelson, "Sixth Company Unit History," 6-7.
- 25 "'Foe' Gains 30 Miles in UK Zone Exercise," *The Stars and Stripes (European Edition)*, 17 September 1951, Volume 9 (Ninth Year), No. 152, page one, continued on Page 12, Column 2. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 26 Bernard H. Liebes and Campbell Sanders, "Ike Sees Yanks, French assault Rhine in games," *The Stars and Stripes (European Edition)*, 29 September 1951. <http://www.arpipes.com/news/from-the-s-s-archives-ike-sees-yanks-french-assault-rhine-in>. Accessed on 5 January 2012.
- 27 "Enemy Paratroopers Attack Vital Rhine-Autobahn Bridge," *The Stars and Stripes (European Edition)*, 4 October 1951, Volume 9 (Ninth Year), No. 169, page one, continued on page 12, Column 1. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 28 Skoien interview, 22 December 2011. "United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE)," *C-82 Operating Units and Markings*, <http://www.c82packet.com/unitmarkings.html>, accessed on 10 May 2012. U.S. Army Quartermaster Foundation, "Aerial Delivery and Parachute Rigger History," http://www.qmfound.com/aerial_delivery.htm. Accessed on 5 January 2012. In his interview Bud Skoien states that the 557th was assigned to Headquarters, Seventh Army, European Command and supplied and maintained all the parachute and air delivery items used by the Rangers. He also states that Cain's relationship with COL Jay D. Bogue, commander of the 60th Troop Carrier Group worked to the Ranger's advantage when the Group needed parachutists for its Operational Readiness Test (ORT). Breaking the company into squad 'sticks', as many sticks as were available were assigned to as many C-82s as possible to qualify the crews to conduct parachute operations.
- 29 Nelson, "Sixth Company Unit History," Spring 2007, 7.
- 30 Robert W. Black, *Rangers in Korea* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 206. Brigadier General (ret) Russell W. Volckmann, letter to Mrs. Beverly Lindsey, 21 March 1969, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The 3,000 spaces that formed the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg came from the disbanded Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne).
- 31 Eugene A. Kuta, "Sixth Company News," *The Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) of the Korean War*, Fall 2004, 12. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

6th Rangers Freefall Sidebar

- 1 Private Bob Stock, "Rangers Demonstrate First 'Free' Fall Parajump," *Army Times*, 21 August 1951 (Europe). Property of Mr. Eugene A. Kuta.
- 2 Arthur Noyes, "Free-Fall 'Chute Jump Features Kitzingen Fete," *The Stars and Stripes*, 5 August 1951, Volume 9 (Ninth Year), No. 109, 2. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Accessed 5 January 2012.



on the Loose
Kreuzotters

by Jared M. Tracy

The 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 1951-1952

“To conduct the tactical propaganda operations of a field army and to provide qualified psychological warfare specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate staffs.”

— Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company Mission
Table of Organization and Equipment 20-77, 1 September 1950

In October 1951, the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, Seventh U.S. Army’s tactical psychological warfare (Psywar) asset in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was in the throes of a major training exercise called COMBINE. The company’s primary mission was printing leaflets for Aggressor, U.S. units role-playing as opposition forces. One style of leaflet warned ‘U.S. forces’ of the *Kreuzotter*, “Germany’s only poisonous snake.” *Stars and Stripes* reported, “‘Enemy’ aircraft showered propaganda leaflets by the thousands on Allied troops, one leaflet warning that the Allies were fighting in areas infested by poisonous snakes.”¹

In fact, the *Kreuzotter* was fake. Radio repairman Private First Class (PFC) James M. Niefer later described the impact of the leaflet. “Rumor had it that the guys were really scared about it and they wouldn’t sleep on the ground. They slept in their vehicles because they were afraid the snakes would crawl into their sleeping bags.” The snake hampered the exercise so much that German newspapers had to assure American units that it did not exist.² The *Kreuzotter* leaflet was one original product developed by the 5th L&L after it deployed to Böblingen, FRG, in 1951 to provide Seventh Army with a tactical Psywar capability.

This article chronicles the first two years of the 5th L&L, one of only a handful of tactical Psywar units that the U.S. Army established, trained, and deployed during the first few years of the Cold War. The 5th was part of the Army’s larger effort to create a viable Psywar capability following North Korea’s 25 June 1950 invasion of its southern neighbor. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., U.S. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins, and Department of the Army (DA) G-3 Major General Charles L. Bolte directed Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure to lead that initiative.

Having served as Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force during WWII, BG McClure was the ideal officer for this task. In August 1950, he reported to the Pentagon (initially for temporary duty [TDY]) “in connection with planning for Psychological Warfare.”³ As a result of the general’s efforts, within six months the Army established three organizations to facilitate the activation, training, resourcing, and deployment of Psywar units. These organizations were the Psywar Division in the G-3, DA (September 1950), the Psywar

Division in the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas (1950-1951), and the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) in the Pentagon (January 1951).⁴

As the head of the OCPW, McClure’s priority was providing trained and equipped Psywar units to theater and field army commanders faced with the Communist threat in Europe and the Far East. For that purpose, by spring 1951 the Army had activated the tactical 1st, 2nd, and 5th L&L Companies and the strategic 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group. It also federalized the reserve strategic 301st RB&L Group. Contemporary doctrine allotted each field army one L&L Company and each theater command one RB&L Group. Accordingly, the 1st L&L supported the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, the 1st RB&L supported the Far East Command (FEC) and the United Nations Command in Korea, and the 301st RB&L supported the European Command (EUCOM) in the FRG. (The 2nd L&L stayed in the U.S. to serve as Army Field Forces’ training element.) In September 1951, the 5th L&L deployed as a tactical asset for Seventh Army, the largest Army combat formation in Europe.⁵ The history of the 5th L&L began six months before its movement overseas.

The 5th L&L was activated on 19 March 1951 at Fort Riley, Kansas, as part of the Army General School.⁶ Essentially a unit on paper only, the 5th L&L started with just a handful




John W. Sanders beside the company sign, Fort Riley, Kansas, 1951.



Seventh U. S. Army SSI

5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company

Organizational Chart / 1951 - 1952



of people who had transferred from the 1st RB&L and 2nd L&L (also assigned to the School). The commander, First Lieutenant (1LT) William J. Brennan, and his assistant, 1LT John E. Eckenrode, Jr. (formerly of the 1st RB&L), began building a training program for the fledgling company. On 26 April, when New York native Captain (CPT) Robert K. Wensley replaced Brennan as 5th L&L commander, the company had less than one-third strength with 30 men.⁷

Initially, the company's personnel shortage forced it to stray from Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) 20-77. That T/O&E called for a company headquarters and three operational platoons: Publication, Propaganda, and Loudspeaker. However, the 5th L&L organized with a company headquarters and two platoons, Publication and Loudspeaker.⁸ The company headquarters managed administration, mess, supply, training and transportation. Publication Platoon's functional sections handled research (Intelligence); writing and illustrating (Propaganda); preparing photographic plates (Camera and Plate); printing (Press); and preparing leaflets for dissemination by artillery shells or bombs (Processing). The Loudspeaker Platoon had three loudspeaker sections with linguists, radio repairmen, and mechanics.⁹ In the summer of 1951, the company welcomed many highly educated, professionally skilled, and multi-lingual personnel into the ranks.

Soldiers were assigned to the 5th L&L because they had college degrees, worked in journalism, advertising, or related fields, or spoke multiple languages. Army induction and training centers (such as Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and Fort Myer, Virginia) screened draftees and prior service personnel for these kinds of backgrounds.



The Publication Platoon's Propaganda Section: PFC James K. Rowland, SGT David E. Lilienthal, Jr., 1LT John E. Eckenrode, Jr., PFC Virgil M. Burnett, CPL James J. Klobuchar, SGT Robert W. Ferguson, PFC Donald M. Andrews (seated), and CPL Earl W. 'Bud' Moline.



CPT Robert K. Wensley commanded the 5th L&L from April to November 1951 before transferring to the 1st ID while in the FRG.



LEFT: PVT Silvio 'Joe' Perilli in 1950. Perilli was among the 34 soldiers who transferred from the 2nd to the 5th L&L in June 1951 to ensure that the latter had enough European linguists for its forthcoming deployment to the FRG.

RIGHT: PFC Brook 'Mike' Paschkes at the Noncommissioned Officers Academy in Munich in 1952. In 1950, he joined the reserve 301st RB&L. After being drafted in February 1951 and completing basic training at Fort Bragg, he reported to the 5th L&L at Fort Riley.

One exceptional soldier selected for service in the 5th L&L was PFC David E. Lilienthal, Jr. The son of a high-level governmental agency head, Lilienthal had written for the *Harvard Crimson* and reported for the *Saint Louis Post-Dispatch*. After being drafted in 1950 and completing basic training, he helped Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John O. Weaver, CPT Robert Asti, and the rest of the Army General School's small Psywar Division with the development of the Psychological Warfare Officers' Course. Reassigned to the 5th L&L in early 1951, he became Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of the Propaganda Section. In that position, he supervised "writers working alongside the unit's artists to produce the materials we turned out, mostly mock leaflets for use in Army maneuvers."¹⁰

One of Lilienthal's soldiers was Private (PVT) James J. Klobuchar of Ely, Minnesota. The University of Minnesota journalism graduate and writer for the Minneapolis *Star Tribune* was drafted in November 1950. After completing basic training at Fort Riley, Klobuchar awaited orders to a permanent duty assignment. "A major in personnel at Fort Riley had looked at my résumé" and took note of his education and writing ability. The young journalist reported to the 5th L&L as a writer in the Propaganda Section.¹¹

Another soldier selected for the 5th L&L was PFC Brook 'Mike' Paschkes. In 1950, the Lawrence Fertig and Company advertiser joined the reserve 301st RB&L in New York. Drafted into the active Army in February 1951, Paschkes completed basic training with the 540th Field Artillery Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, before reporting to the 5th L&L.¹² Lilienthal, Klobuchar, and Paschkes made up but a few of the almost 90 personnel in the 5th L&L by June 1951.¹³ Having focused primarily on getting organized and placing personnel, the company discovered that it only had a couple of months left before deployment.

When in June 1951 CPT Wensley learned that his company was going to the FRG, he became concerned about the shortage of European linguists. These assets would be needed to turn out products in case of war. He raised the issue with the Psychological Warfare Division and the Army General School. As a result, the Army transferred 34 enlisted soldiers (many of them multi-lingual) from the 2nd to the 5th L&L.¹⁴ One of the new transfers was PVT Silvio J. 'Joe' Perilli. Perilli's father emigrated from Italy to West Virginia in 1913, served in the U.S. military during WWI, and went back to West Virginia in 1920 after getting married in Italy. Born in 1928 in Masontown, West Virginia, Joe Perilli and his family moved to Italy in 1932 and lived there until 1948 before returning to West Virginia. The fluent Italian speaker was drafted in July 1950, took basic training at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and reported as a linguist to the 2nd L&L. He recalled, "All of the linguists from Europe were transferred from the 2nd L&L to the 5th L&L," including himself.¹⁵

Another linguist reporting to the 5th L&L around the time of the personnel shuffle was PVT Boris A. Niepritzky. Drafted in St. Paul, Minnesota, in September 1950, the native Ukrainian proceeded to his first duty station, Aberdeen



Logo of the 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company



Native Ukrainian SSG Boris A. Niepritzky, linguist in the Loudspeaker Platoon.



The 5th L&L's linguists assembled. According to T/O&E 20-77, a full-strength Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company had seventeen linguists, with four in the Propaganda Platoon (or Section) and the rest in the Loudspeaker Platoon.

Proving Ground, Maryland, after completing basic training. There, he translated Russian manuals about Communist weapons that were acquired by the U.S. Army and were displayed in the post museum. “All of the sudden, I got orders to report to Fort Riley, Kansas.” His fluency in Russian earned him a slot in the 5th L&L’s Loudspeaker Platoon.¹⁶ Lilienthal later remarked, “One extraordinary aspect of our service . . . was the presence of a number of Eastern European linguists in our ranks—young men native to those countries who emigrated to the U.S. after WWII and were drafted at the time of Korea.”¹⁷ With its personnel in place, the company’s pre-deployment training and readiness activities increased.

Scheduled to arrive in Germany in September 1951, CPT Wensley ordered the 5th L&L to complete all necessary requirements before 1 August. According to a company yearbook, “The eight-hour day was abandoned. The company forgot about free Saturday afternoons and off-duty evenings.” By 8 July (three weeks before Wensley’s deadline), the 5th completed all weapons qualifications, combat indoctrination courses, training requirements, and inspections.¹⁸ Most enlisted personnel took leave, only to have a major flood delay their return to Fort Riley until late July.¹⁹ Once the unit reassembled, a final round of inspections ensued. “After about a week of almost daily inspections, the IG gave the 5th a [Preparation for Overseas Movement] inspection rating of superior, and said that of all units which had left Riley for overseas the 5th was the sharpest and best prepared.”²⁰

The company then deployed. On 3 August, an advanced party left for Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, the staging area for the New York Port of Embarkation (POE).²¹ Eighteen days later, the 5th L&L main body arrived at Kilmer. After a week of sightseeing, soldiers shipped out from the POE for Bremerhaven, Germany, aboard the USNS transport *General C.H. Muir* (T-AP-142). On ship, bored Psywarriors read, wrote letters, and played games on the deck, as PFC Perilli remembered.²² One soldier’s experience aboard ship was atypical.

“One extraordinary aspect of our service... was the presence of a number of Eastern European linguists in our ranks — young men native to those countries who emigrated to the U.S. after WWII and were drafted at the time of Korea.” — PFC David E. Lilienthal, Jr.




5th L&L soldiers about to depart Fort Riley for the East Coast, August 1951. They are John Smith, John W. Sanders, and Marcos J. Kaganski (bottom); Sidney L. Dratch, Thomas Hirlinger, Harry P. John, William A. Ulman, and Edward M. Vargo (middle); and Spiros Sperides (top).

Unit photo outside of the *Panzer Kaserne* in Böblingen, FRG, and artist’s rendition of the 5th L&L’s unofficial logo.






This map of the Federal Republic of Germany ('West Germany') shows the relation of that nation to neighboring countries, as well as the location of the state of Baden-Württemberg within the FRG. The 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company was stationed in Böblingen (1); Seventh Army just outside of Stuttgart (2); European Command (EUCOM) in Heidelberg (3); and the 301st RB&L in Mannheim (4). (Map by Mariano Santillan).



Seventh United States Army Organizational Chart / December 1952



In order to get head-of-the-line privileges for chow, PVT Niepritzky volunteered to run two motion picture projectors for the hundreds of bored soldiers. "I had no idea how to operate them." After a couple of hours of tinkering, he thought that he had figured it out. "The first showing was at 2:00 that afternoon." The hallway outside "was full of G.I.s sitting on the floor waiting for the movie." The film was not rewound and played upside-down; Niepritzky could not correct either problem. There were "G.I.s screaming, pounding at my door yelling 'Throw him overboard!'" The harassment continued for a couple of days, "but then it simmered down and I finally learned how to switch the films, how to go from one projector to another."²³

As Niepritzky performed this extra duty, other soldiers practiced their trades to pass the time. Publication Platoon members produced a daily mimeographed newsletter, *North Atlantic Signal*, as the *Muir* steamed toward Europe.²⁴ According to PFC Klobuchar, the *Signal* "was made up of the usual things that happened aboard ship with some humor. We



Photos of the devastation on Fort Riley, Kansas, resulting from flooding in summer 1951.

The **FLOOD** at **FORT RILEY** May–July, 1951

In summer 1951, a major flood impacted the 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group, the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, and other units stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas. For several weeks, Kansas experienced some of the worst rainfall in its history. In May, the state received 200 percent of average monthly rainfall, 300 percent in June, and 400 percent in July. In mid-July, the Kansas River crested at 34.5 feet, causing floods that isolated the post and inflicted irreparable damage to many facilities.¹ Private (PVT) Julien J. Studley of the 301st RB&L remembered “grass on the telephone poles and the wires” because of water elevation.² These conditions affected unit training and activities.

Stationed at Fort Riley since May, the 301st dealt with the flood in different ways. Between 11 and 14 July, its soldiers helped with “flood control efforts” before seizing the opportunity to train and operate in the abysmal field conditions. A detachment






from the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company manned the radio station W7NKX/C, “for a time the only means of radio communication from Fort Riley to the outside world.” A Repro Company detachment “published a newspaper for Camp Forsyth [Fort Riley] personnel, affording an account of both local conditions and some world news.”³ The flood provided a unique training opportunity for the 301st, but it caused headaches for the 5th L&L, which was preparing to deploy to Germany.

First, 5th L&L soldiers had a hard time returning to post after a couple of weeks of pre-deployment leave. One person impacted was Second Lieutenant (2LT) Gordon B. White, an officer in the Loudspeaker Platoon. “The railroad tracks going into Fort Riley were underwater, so they routed us up to Omaha and then to Kansas City. I had to report to the MPs at the train station and say ‘How can I get to Fort Riley? I’m supposed to be there tomorrow.’” He learned that soldiers had to fly in. “Fortunately, I was on the first

planeload they sent in because the water kept rising and the second plane had to turn around and go back. There wasn’t enough of the airfield left for them to land.”⁴ By late July, most 5th L&L soldiers had returned from leave, only to encounter another problem.

The L&L discovered that the 519th and 520th Military Intelligence Service Platoons had occupied their barracks because their own had flooded. The unit’s last-minute deployment preparations were complicated because many of its soldiers were “living in tents up on the hills.” According to 2LT White, other elements “expropriated our generators (we had generators to run the loudspeakers) to supply electricity up in the hills to the guys in the tents. It was really a difficult situation.”⁵ The flood complicated things for the 5th L&L and provided a training opportunity for the 301st RB&L, in both cases breaking the routine of training and garrison life at Fort Riley.



“It was really a difficult situation.” — 2LT Gordon B. White

also interviewed people in other units.²⁵ The platoon did not make too many issues of the *Signal* before the *Muir* docked at La Pallice, France on 6 September. There, it dropped off units assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's combined command, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe. However, the 5th L&L remained on board.

On 9 September, the *Muir* docked at Bremerhaven, and the 5th L&L soldiers disembarked and began moving to their new home in the FRG. They traveled about 340 miles by train to Böblingen, just southwest of Stuttgart, in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. There, they joined other U.S. units, including the 175th Military Police Battalion, 19th Ordnance Battalion, 732nd Medical Detachment, 301st Signal Group, and the 97th Signal Battalion (Operations). 5th L&L soldiers moved into their barracks while married officers and senior NCOs moved into their quarters.²⁶



The Seventh Army's Reproduction Plant in Heidelberg where 1LT Dan Hicks, Jr. and his 23-man detachment printed leaflets for Exercise COMBINE in October 1951. In addition, from this location, Seventh Army published its weekly newspaper, *Sentinel*.



Enlisted soldiers from the Publication Platoon assemble leaflet books for COMBINE. Standing (left to right) are Thomas Ehrlinger, William Schwartz, Jr., Stuart G. Hunting, Earl W. 'Bud' Moline, Spiros Sperides, Donald C. Kisabeth, Robert Bernadini, John Giannini, and Karl L. Conant. Sitting (left to right) are Marcos J. Kaganskie and Harry P. John.

Soon after Seventh Army's tactical Psywar asset got settled into Böblingen, it began printing original materials, starting with *The Leaflet*.²⁷ That mimeographed newsletter reported on personnel changes, promotions, current events, training exercises, sports, and other information. In November, the Publication Platoon started printing *The Leaflet* on the offset press using the same processes "involved in turning out actual leaflets," thereby using it as a training opportunity.²⁸ The 5th soon had the mission of developing leaflets and other products for a major EUCOM training exercise.

Scheduled for 3-10 October 1951, Exercise COMBINE intended to test friendly forces' ability to defend against a surprise Communist attack and to evacuate U.S. civilians and dependents. It would ultimately include 160,000 U.S., British, and French soldiers. EUCOM Commander-in-Chief General Thomas T. Handy was the commander of the combined maneuver.²⁹ In late September, the 5th L&L learned more details about its members' places and roles in COMBINE.

5th L&L personnel were delegated tasks at several different locations. CPT Wensley would coordinate the company's actions from the mobile headquarters of the exercise's aggressor forces. 1LT Charles E. Lowenthal,



5th L&L leaflet developed for Aggressor during Exercise COMBINE, October 1951. This deceptive leaflet warned 'U.S. forces' of the *Kreuzotter*, "Germany's only poisonous snake." No such snake existed.



meet 'Combine Connie'...

Pal, you're going to need something to take your mind off hill-chasing, cold nights and barking sergeants.

You get fed up with those things fast on maneuvers.

The girl in the picture will be able to help you out of your trouble. Connie's going to be on the air nightly over Aggressor Network with the easy-listening, breezy kind of chatter that should warm up those cold nights. And make you forget about sergeants and slogging.

There'll be plenty of music - - and plenty of Connie.



Listen for her over Aggressor Network.

195108

Leaflet advertising COMBINE Connie, October 1951. Intended to distract 'U.S. forces,' Connie broadcasted multiple times a day on five frequencies on Aggressor Network during Exercise COMBINE.

former officer in the 2nd Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) during WWII and now the Loudspeaker Platoon Leader, would represent the 5th L&L at Seventh Army headquarters near Stuttgart.³⁰ On 19 September, EUCOM notified the company that its primary mission in the exercise was producing leaflets for Aggressor.

The leaflet mission fell on a 23-man detachment led by 1LT Dan Hicks, Jr. On 27 September 1951, Hicks' group arrived at its exercise location, Seventh Army's Reproduction Plant in Heidelberg. The detachment developed and printed six different varieties of leaflets in-house during the exercise. It also printed leaflets of six additional designs that were sent over by the Propaganda Section under 1LT Leif Oxaal.³¹ The Propaganda Section's wartime role involved processing requests "for dissemination of leaflets to an enemy . . . to try to induce them to surrender." For the exercise, "We developed appeals that we thought were suitable," remembers Klobuchar.³² To gauge the impact of the leaflets after they were employed, the 5th L&L attached one observation team from the Publication Platoon to each of Seventh Army's three divisions at the time: 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions (IDs) and 2nd Armored Division.³³

The 5th L&L produced a high quantity of leaflets (over 120,000) during COMBINE. In addition to the *Kreuzotter* leaflet campaign that aimed to scare U.S. forces by warning them of a fictitious snake, the 5th L&L dropped leaflets promoting "COMBINE Connie." U.S. forces were distracted by COMBINE Connie's soothing voice which



U.S. soldier reading leaflets during Exercise COMBINE, October 1951.

they heard several times a day on Aggressor Network, a mock enemy radio network.³⁴ These products impressed many COMBINE participants, including Seventh Army commander LTG Manton S. Eddy. He later sent a written commendation to the 5th L&L and highlighted the efforts of 1LT Hicks' detachment at Heidelberg.³⁵ The 5th L&L could safely call its first major exercise a success.

With Exercise COMBINE behind them, 5th L&L soldiers had new opportunities to practice their creative skills. On 12 October 1951, Corporal (CPL) Robert W. Ferguson, PFC Earl W. 'Bud' Moline, and PFC John W. Sanders went TDY to EUCOM headquarters in Heidelberg. There, they produced artwork for five displays to be "sent all over EUCOM . . . to tell the Psywar story to high-ranking U.S. officers," completing the bulk of this task by 25 November. The largest display was 12 feet high and 29 feet long; the others were 4 feet high and 8 feet long. Reporting back to the company on 26 November, Ferguson commented, "There was a lot of work to do up there, but everybody was friendly and helpful . . . [We] really enjoyed it." PFC Sanders stayed at EUCOM a bit longer to add the final touches before returning to the 5th.³⁶

Military training complemented these more artistic projects. In fall 1951, the 5th L&L developed a sixteen-module curriculum on military subjects, including land navigation, guard duty, first aid, customs and courtesies, land mine warfare, and chemical, biological, and atomic warfare.³⁷ Practical exercises supplemented classroom instruction. In late November, a Chemical Corps soldier visited to train the L&L on the M5 Gas Mask and other protective equipment. 1LT Lowenthal then led 30 soldiers at a time into a gas-filled tent with cleared and sealed masks. According to *The Leaflet*, every soldier "removed his mask, gave his name, rank, and serial number, and fled . . . [T]ickling throats and tear-filled eyes attested to the success of the mission."³⁸ Occasionally, 5th L&L soldiers took combat arms training from other U.S. units. For example, on 13 May 1952, Sergeant (SGT) Paul Drobiezewski and PFC Perilli received orders to participate in infantry training with Seventh Army's VII Corps (28th and 43rd IDs) about 200 miles away in Hohenfels.³⁹ The company continued honing its military skills, even though many of its assigned draftees neared the end of their service obligation.

Keeping track of personnel disposition was a priority for company leadership. In November, First Sergeant (1SG) Chester Damiani, veteran of the 1st MRBC in the Mediterranean Theater during WWII, posted a 'discharge timetable' in his office. The first column on the timetable showed "the date each individual can be assured of leaving EUCOM for the States; the second show[ed] the discharge date." The 1SG invited troops to visit his office one at a time "to forestall an eager stampede into his office." A second chart showed soldiers' accrued leave, which many soldiers took advantage of.⁴⁰

The desire to go home peaked around Christmas 1951, but the company took measures to alleviate homesickness. Reliable mail service kept letters and gifts coming and helped

to sustain positive morale. In addition, the Publication Platoon printed Christmas cards that were "artistically created and handsomely inscribed in German." Each card required five runs through the press, totaling 15,000 impressions. Every soldier in the company received thirty cards to mail home to friends and loved ones.⁴¹ The holidays did not stop the arrival of new equipment or personnel, nor did they halt training.

In late 1951, resolving the shortage of M38 4 x 4 jeeps for the Loudspeaker Platoon remained one of the company's highest priorities. (The platoon had not participated in Exercise COMBINE because it did not have its T/O&E-authorized allotment of sixteen M38s.) Thanks to the persistence of Motor SGT Paul R. Erickson, the company procured all of its vehicles by January 1952.⁴² New personnel showed up to the platoon concurrently with these vehicles.

One new arrival to the Loudspeaker Platoon was PFC James M. Niefer. Drafted in summer 1951, the telephone lineman from New York completed basic training at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania. After arriving in Germany, an Army assignments office "shipped me off to the 5th L&L. They pegged me for communications in the Loudspeaker unit." He reported just before Christmas 1951.⁴³

After briefly attending radio repair school in Ansbach, Bavaria, PFC Niefer rejoined his unit to repair loudspeaker equipment, an ongoing problem. The 300-watt LS-111/UIQ-1 loudspeaker "was mounted on the framework on the front of the jeep, the [AM-76A] amplifier was in the jeep, and the generator was in the trailer." The equipment was "cobbled together" for mobile loudspeaker operations. This set-up presented practical difficulties. "The jeep bounced up and down so much that the vacuum tubes in the amplifier broke," and there were only "a few spare parts" to do the necessary repairs.⁴⁴ 1LT Gordon B. White, OIC of one loudspeaker section, echoed Niefer's negative appraisal of the system set-up: "The loudspeakers were not designed for bouncing jeeps. Our men had a lot of trouble keeping them operational in the field."⁴⁵ These practical issues did not keep the platoon from conducting realistic training.

Loudspeaker Platoon Leader 1LT Lowenthal, section OICs 1LT Clayton R. Taylor, 1LT Oxaal (transferred from the Propaganda Section), and 1LT White, and Platoon Sergeant, Sergeant First Class (SFC) George Tomczyk, required their soldiers to train on their equipment in field conditions.⁴⁶ Priority loudspeaker missions involved having linguists make surrender appeals to enemy troops and public service announcements to civilians in liberated areas. 1LT White recalled that there were "fifteen or twenty European languages" spoken by linguists who were assigned to the platoon for those missions.⁴⁷ For example, SGT Niepritzky, a squad leader assigned three jeeps, frequently read leaflets in Russian through amplified loudspeakers during training.⁴⁸

Niepritzky's fluency in Russian came in handy during an unexpected run-in with Soviet military officers during a training exercise in early 1952. He and CPL David B. Nuckols were traveling by jeep on a back road during the



Formerly head of the Propaganda Section, loudspeaker section OIC 1LT Leif Oxaal (right) discusses the best location to make simulated loudspeaker surrender appeals with PFC George Biriuk and CPL David B. Nuckols (top), and (below, left to right) PFC Stanley E. Frazier, CPL Raymond Shymansky, CPL Andrew J. Tkachuk, and CPL Russell A. Schmidt.



The Loudspeaker Platoon's officers: 1LTs Gordon B. White, Charles E. Lowenthal, Clayton R. Taylor (back), and Leif Oxaal.

exercise when they spotted a car bearing Russian plates ahead. By virtue of being U.S. Army soldiers in Cold War Germany, Niepritzky and Nuckols had been briefed to be on the lookout for this sort of situation. The Soviets had liaison officers in the area, but they were not allowed to observe American exercises and were not authorized to be on that road. Speeding ahead, the Americans ordered the Soviets to pull over. After parking on the side of the road, Niepritzky walked up to the other vehicle. He overheard the officers talking about "stupid Americans" in Russian. "I gave them a 'tongue-lashing' in Russian and a lesson on 'stupid Americans.' They were absolutely shocked that I spoke in their Russian 'slang.' I ordered them to follow us to the next MP [Military Police] station, which they did."⁴⁹ Once Niepritzky returned to his unit, he resumed practicing surrender appeals via vehicle-mounted loudspeakers.

“I gave them a ‘tongue-lashing’ in Russian and a lesson on ‘stupid Americans.’ They were absolutely shocked that I spoke in their Russian ‘slang.’” — PVT Boris A. Niepritzky

In addition to transmitting verbal messages through loudspeakers, the Loudspeaker Platoon broadcasted sound effects like “tank noise” to confuse target audiences. 1LT White described one such use of this tactic while supporting Aggressor during an exercise. “The Aggressor Chief sent us out to some place thirty miles away from where he was really massing his forces. We would make tank noise. People . . . would hear the noise, and they would say that there’s a whole tank division coming down the road. It was very deceptive; it worked.”⁵⁰ Just as the Loudspeaker Platoon continued training despite equipment issues, so did the Publication Platoon.

Under the leadership of 1LT Dan Hicks, Jr. and SFC Karl L. Conant, the Publication Platoon had to surmount chronic equipment and supply problems. With its three 10 x 14 Davidson Model 221 lithographic presses shipped in from the U.S., the unit faced the problem of getting replacement parts in Germany. It also had a shortage of paper. “A big problem all along has been supply,” wrote SGT Lilienthal in a February 1952 letter to CPT Robert Asti at the Army General School’s Psychological Warfare Division. “We’re in the laborious process of establishing supply channels, but for a month, I understand, we won’t be able to print anything. We’re plumb out of publication expendables. After that, supplies ought to be coming in regularly. Still, after a year and a half of Psywar, [we have] no typewriters for the writers and no brushes and inks for the artists. If it weren’t for the personal equipment of the EM [enlisted men], it would be nigh impossible to operate.”⁵¹ SGT Robert K. Hankins and others in the Headquarters supply section worked to address these issues as Publication Platoon struggled to keep printing.

The Publication Platoon put out a large quantity of materials despite its supply problems. From September 1951 to September 1952, it printed over 385,000 products, mostly leaflets for exercises. To develop, print, and distribute effective products in training and during war, the platoon needed dependable support from each of its sections: Intelligence, Propaganda, Camera and Plate, Press, and Processing.⁵² These sections worked together “to determine the best strategies in appealing to foreign populations and enemy troops,” according to CPL Klobuchar.⁵³ Ironically,



CPL Boris A. Niepritzky (right) making a loudspeaker broadcast in Russian during maneuvers, 1952.



Loudspeaker Platoon soldiers during an exercise, 1952. In this instance, loudspeakers blared “tank noise” in order to confuse ‘U.S. forces’ as to the size and location of Aggressor’s armored forces.

personnel from the platoon and the entire company also had to appeal to American forces in Germany.

One of the 5th L&L’s priorities was spreading awareness of Psywar among other U.S. Army units in Europe. PFC Leonard M. ‘Len’ Rudy, a leaflet writer transferred from the 6th RB&L, noted that “in the 1950s the Army in general did not support Psywar. Simply put, they didn’t know our mission or what we might contribute to an overall battle plan.”⁵⁴ The 5th L&L dispatched personnel to educate other units about Psywar. In November 1951, 1LT Oxaal presented a three-hour lecture to the 97th Signal Battalion (Operations).⁵⁵ In March 1952, one ten-man team led by 1LT White spent six days in Bad Kreuznach explaining the value of Psywar to 2nd Armored Division units.⁵⁶ As part of this initiative, 1LT White recalled that “we would try to hold little classes to teach friendly troops what to expect if the Russians tried to use propaganda on them.”⁵⁷ Sometimes the company invited people to its location to explain its activities.

As part of its public relations campaign, the 5th L&L invited guests to the company area on ‘Unit Day,’



Publication Platoon Leader 1LT Dan Hicks, Jr., and his Platoon Sergeant, SFC Karl Conant, review their unit's weekly training schedule.

“In the 1950s the Army in general did not support Psywar. Simply put, they didn’t know our mission or what we might contribute to an overall battle plan.”

— PFC Leonard M. ‘Len’ Rudy

19 March 1952, to mark its first anniversary. The event was hosted by CPT Paul C. Doster, since November 1951 the 5th L&L commander. Doster described the planned activities: “An exhibition, including a short film on psywar, a leaflet exhibition, a recording of a loudspeaker appeal, and a loudspeaker equipment exhibition, will be displayed and conducted in the Company Commander’s office. The Publication Platoon vans, as well as all other Company working areas, will be open for inspection by the guests.”⁵⁸ For the event, Seventh Army’s Psychological Warfare Officer, LTC Ralph O. Lashley, sent a letter praising the 5th L&L for “the superior attitude you continuously display and the superior work evidenced in all that you do.”⁵⁹ On Unit Day, CPT Doster confidently remarked to guests and soldiers, “We’re the best company in EUCOM now. I’m sure of that.”⁶⁰ He had chances to prove that in the ensuing months.

The unit remained active for the rest of 1952, training and providing Psywar support for military exercises. For example, in late spring, it supported a Command Post Exercise for the Seventh Army.⁶¹ In July, the Publication Platoon developed leaflets for Civil Affairs/Military Government units. The following month, interrogators, artists, and writers attended additional EUCOM-provided Psywar training in Munich. In maneuvers in September, the 5th confused “the ‘enemy’ with black propaganda,” sent “limber-tongued linguists far behind ‘enemy’ lines,” dropped generic, pre-approved (“canned”) leaflets, and “enervated the ‘aggressor’” with loudspeaker appeals.⁶² Training intensity continued despite changes in company leadership.

The 5th L&L had to maintain continuity in the face of command changes. In November 1952, CPT Doster moved to a new assignment. Seventh Army commander, LTG Charles L. Bolte, wanted “to find a new commanding



CPT Paul C. Doster (right) conducts an After Action Review following a field problem.

officer as well qualified as CPT Doster.” After consulting BG McClure about the best candidate, Bolte pulled CPT Phillip S. Miller from the 28th ID to command the 5th L&L.⁶³ The fourth commander in less than two years, Miller held the unit to a high standard. He and 1SG Damiani frequently inspected soldiers’ uniforms, equipment, and barracks. They ensured proficiency in physical fitness, marksmanship, and other core tasks.⁶⁴ CPL Klobuchar recalls, “We were required never to forget that we were soldiers of the U.S. Army, and that we were to know how to handle an M-1.” It was also “important for the officers to keep us in shape physically.”⁶⁵ While training and adhering to military standards never stopped, there was down time.

One of the ways that 5th L&L soldiers spent their off-duty time was traveling around Europe on leave. PFC Paschkes, Seventh Army *Sentinel* reporter and editor after leaving the 5th, got to visit family in Southend, England. CPL Alexander Davidovits and others took in such famous French attractions as the Eiffel Tower and the Louvre.⁶⁶ SGT Alvin Miller and CPL Hall M. Roberts spent \$39 on a three-day tour of prominent cities in Switzerland.⁶⁷ PFC Perilli visited his parents in Rome before leaving the 5th L&L in September 1952. Although soldiers got to explore the Old World, they never lost sight of the big picture. As Perrilli recalled, “The Cold War was on, and so one had to be prepared for some unexpected circumstances.”⁶⁸

This article has explained the history of the 5th L&L in 1951-1952, including its activation in March 1951, its organizing and brief training at Fort Riley, and its preparations for overseas movement. Deployed to the FRG in September 1951, the 5th L&L thereafter provided realistic Psywar support for Seventh Army exercises to practice its doctrinal mission, despite frequent supply shortages. In addition, unit personnel traveled around to educate other U.S. Army units on the value of Psywar. Finally, the company tried to maintain its positive reputation by excelling in inspections and exceeding military standards. Not surprisingly, in late 1952, LTG Bolte found the 5th L&L “in excellent condition and very active, both in garrison and in maneuvers.”⁶⁹ On a more personal note, 1LT Gordon B. White said, “We had outstanding people in that outfit, and it was not just good skills. They were intelligent, hardworking, motivated people. I was very lucky.”⁷⁰ ↑

The author would like to thank the veterans of the 5th L&L for providing stories, documents, and photos related to their time in the unit.

JARED M. TRACY, PhD

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LEFT: LTC Ralph O. Lashley, Seventh Army’s Psychological Warfare Officer.



RIGHT: CPT Paul C. Doster, the third commander of the 5th L&L. He came to the 5th L&L from the 97th Signal Battalion (Operations) in November 1951 and remained in command for a year.



BG William C. Bullock (left), BG Robert A. McClure’s successor as Chief of Psywar, visits the 5th L&L on 21 March 1954. Escorting him are (left to right) LTC Merle S. Hotchkiss, Lashley’s successor as Seventh Army’s Psywar Officer; 1LT Fred W. Wilmot, 5th L&L Executive Officer; and CPT Phillip S. Miller, 5th L&L Commander.

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- 3 Memorandum from John H. Stokes, Jr. to Robert A. McClure, 21 August 1950, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 4 For more on this effort, see, e.g., letter from Robert A. McClure to Charles A. Willoughby, 26 September 1950, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* 7/1 (2011), 7/2 (2011), and 8/1 (2012); Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002); Robert A. McClure, "Trends in Army Psychological Warfare," *Army Information Digest* (February 1952); "Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure: Psychological Strategy as a Preventative of Large War," *U.S. News and World Report* (January 1953): 60-69.
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- 8 Headquarters, Fort Riley, "Special Orders #89," 30 March 1951, NPRC; Department of the Army, "Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) 20-77," 1 September 1950, CMH; 5th L&L, "5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 1951-1952," no date, Box 365, Record Group (RG) 338, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, hereafter 5th L&L yearbook.
- 9 "7,000 Hours."
- 10 Emails from David E. Lilienthal, Jr. to Jared M. Tracy, 16 and 17 March 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. **Lilienthal's father had previously been Chairman of both the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Atomic Energy Commission.**
- 11 James J. Klobuchar, 5th L&L, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 28 January 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; email from James J. Klobuchar to Jared M. Tracy, 24 September 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 12 Brook 'Mike' Paschkes, 301st RB&L and 5th L&L, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 20 December 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 13 Morning Reports, 31 May 1951, 1 June 1951, 5 June 1951, 6 June 1951, and 14 June 1951, 5th L&L, NPRC.
- 14 The 5th in turn transferred 32 others to the 2nd. Headquarters, Fort Riley, "Special Orders #165," 14 June 1951, NPRC.
- 15 Silvio J. 'Joe' Perilli, "From Rome, Italy to Wheeling, West Virginia" (published by author, 2007), 30; Silvio J. 'Joe' Perilli, 2nd L&L and 5th L&L, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 25 February 2011.
- 16 Boris A. Niepritzky, 5th L&L, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 11 March 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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- 21 5th L&L yearbook; Historical Data Card, 5th L&L; Klobuchar interview, 28 January 2011.
- 22 Perilli interview, 25 February 2011.
- 23 Niepritzky interview, 11 March 2011.
- 24 5th L&L yearbook; Doster speech, 19 March 1952.
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- 26 5th L&L yearbook; 5th L&L, "Directory and Station List of the United States Army," 13 June 1952, 514-520, USAHEC; "5th Couples Get Quarters," *The Leaflet*, 30 November 1951, 2.
- 27 5th L&L yearbook; Historical Data Card, 5th L&L.
- 28 5th L&L, "Leaflet Puts on New Coat," *The Leaflet*, 30 November 1951, 1.
- 29 Frederickson, *The American Military Occupation of Germany*, 182, 199; "New War Games to Start: Allied Troops in Germany Will Seek to Repel 'East' Invasion," *New York Times*, 3 October 1951; Doster speech, 19 March 1952.
- 30 5th L&L yearbook. **CPT Wensley soon left the 5th L&L to command a unit in the 1st ID. CPT Paul C. Doster succeeded him. The Loudspeaker Platoon could not participate in COMBINE "because its equipment hadn't arrived from the ZI [Zone of Interior] yet at that time."**
- 31 Oxaal was a Nordfjordeid, Norway native who served in the Royal Norwegian Air Force during WWII, joined the U.S. Army during Korea, and graduated from the first Psywar Officers Course in June 1951.
- 32 Klobuchar interview, 28 January 2011.
- 33 Frederickson, *The American Military Occupation of Germany*, 199.
- 34 5th L&L, "Off the Air, On the Air: Meet 'Combine Connie,'" leaflet, no date (ca. October 1951), and "Combine Connie" Broadcasts Every Night," leaflet, no date (ca. October 1951), copies in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. **The frequencies and times were: 3232 KC (2000, 0000, and 0200 hours); 3020 KC (2030 and 0030 hours); 2220 KC (2100 and 0100 hours); and 2264 KC (2130 and 0130 hours). 'COMBINE Connie' was also on one medium wave frequency, 1502 KC, at 1800, 2230, and 0130 hours.**
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- 37 5th L&L, "Company Gets First Training Examination," *The Leaflet*, 30 November 1951, 1-2.
- 38 5th L&L, "With Mask, Gas: 5th 'Men from Mars' Get Tear Treatment," *The Leaflet*, 30 November 1951, 4.
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- 41 5th L&L, "They Still Love the Mailman," *The Leaflet*, 30 November 1951, 2; 5th L&L, "5th Processing Holiday Cards," *The Leaflet*, 30 November 1951, 4; Morning Reports, 30 November 1951 and 31 December 1951, 5th L&L, NPRC.
- 42 5th L&L yearbook.
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- 45 **White was a Political Science graduate of the University of California, Berkeley; an Infantry Officer commissioned in 1949 via ROTC; and a fluent Spanish and French speaker.** Letter from Gordon B. White to Jared M. Tracy, 1 October 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 46 5th L&L yearbook.
- 47 Gordon B. White, 5th L&L, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 24 June 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 48 Niepritzky interview, 11 March 2011.
- 49 Letter from Boris A. Niepritzky to Jared M. Tracy, 21 September 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 50 White interview, 24 June 2011.
- 51 Letter from David E. Lilienthal, Jr. to Robert Asti, 27 February 1952, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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- 53 Klobuchar interview, 28 January 2011.
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- 55 5th L&L, "Oxaal Lectures to 97th on Psywar," *The Leaflet*, 30 November 1951, 2.
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- 57 White interview, 24 June 2011.
- 58 CPT Paul C. Doster, "Memorandum to All Personnel of the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company," 17 March 1952, Box 365, RG 338, NARA; "7,000 Hours."
- 59 LTC Ralph O. Lashley, "Memorandum from the Office of the Psychological Warfare Officer to the Officers and Men of the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company," 15 March 1952, Box 365, RG 338, NARA.
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- 62 "7,000 Hours."
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- 64 "7,000 Hours."
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- 68 Perilli, "From Rome, Italy," 32; "Trio Leaves this Week," 1; Headquarters, Seventh Army, "SUBJECT: Travel Orders to the United States," 19 September 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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- 1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Kansas River Flood Set Records in 1951," <http://www.noaa.gov/stories/s678.htm> (accessed 21 December 2010). **Water stood eight feet deep in parts of nearby Manhattan. Flooding caused \$20 million worth of damage at Fort Riley and Manhattan.**
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“We’re not in Kansas anymore”

The 41st Civil Affairs Company in Vietnam Part II



by Troy J. Sacquety

While conducting a Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) in 1969 at the resettlement village of Edap Enang in the II Corps area of the Central Highlands, Civil Affairs (CA) medic Sergeant (SGT) David J. Forbes realized that something was odd. “I had a Vietnamese come in limping . . . blood dripping down his leg. I [could] see an entry wound but no exit . . . He said it happened out in the woods. But . . . I had to wonder what he was doing in a Jarai [one of the indigenous Montagnard tribes] village.” Despite the unusual circumstances, Forbes removed an American 5.56mm bullet, bandaged the wound, and gave his patient antibiotics. “I never asked questions . . . he had a buddy with him and the medics told me after they left that they were VC [Viet Cong]. Who knows? I always helped anyone in line.”¹ Forbes’ experience was not abnormal for 41st CA Company personnel in Vietnam.

This article, the second of two, examines the 41st from 1968 until it was disbanded in 1970.² Part I covered 1965 to 1967 and described the unit’s difficulties during that period: a lack of senior guidance; decentralized chain of command; lack of training; and unreliable logistics support. Those problems continued. What was significantly different was the impact of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Despite that, the 41st CA overcame the problems and succeeded in assisting the civilian population of South Vietnam. A brief review of Part I sets the stage for 41st operations in 1968.

Following an insurgency that led to the ouster of the French colonial government, the 1954 Geneva Accords divided Vietnam into a Communist North and an ostensibly

democratic U.S.-supported South. VC guerrillas in the South tried to unify all of Vietnam under Communist rule. By 1965 the South Vietnamese government teetered on collapse. The U.S. decided to commit conventional military forces to stabilize the situation. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) requested a Civil Affairs Company.³ The 41st CA Company was the first of three similar organizations assigned to Vietnam.⁴ At the time, the U.S. Army was embracing the concept of special warfare, of which Civil Affairs was a part.⁵

Army doctrine defined CA as the aspects “which embrace the relationship between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in a friendly or occupied area where military forces are present.”⁶ Army Field Manual 41-10 “Civil Affairs Operations” explained the CA role in unconventional (UW) and counter-guerrilla warfare. “CA operations are so conducted as to engender stable conditions which are unfavorable to guerrilla activities through the relief of local destitution, restoration of law and order, resumption of agricultural production, reestablishment of local government, and measures to enlist the active support and sympathy of the local population.”⁷


However, few in the Army knew what CA was and even fewer senior commanders knew how to properly employ a Civil Affairs unit. Despite repeated inquiries to the Department of the Army before deployment overseas, the only guidance given to the 41st was to help the local inhabitants and increase their faith in local and national authorities. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Theodore Llana, Jr.,

In the Vietnam era, there was substantial confusion surrounding the terms ‘Civic Action’ and ‘Civil Affairs.’ Both terms concerned the interaction of military forces with civilian populations. However, while many U.S. military units conducted Civic Action, only Civil Affairs units performed the latter function. From period manuals, we get the following explanations:

Civic Action is defined as, “the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas contributing to economic and social development which would serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.” (*Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage – 1962*, as cited in ST 41-10, *Civic Action Handbook*, Mar 1964)

Civil Affairs is defined as, “those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in a friendly (including US home territory) or occupied area where military forces are present. In an occupied country or area this may include the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority by the occupying power. (FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Dec 1961)

As can be imagined, there was considerable confusion over the terms. Therefore, many in the U.S. Army, including senior leaders, did not understand what Civil Affairs units brought to the table.



SGT David J. Forbes, a Civil Affairs medic, treated friend and foe alike during his time with the 41st CA Company.



SP5 Jerry Bisco of Team 15 provides dental care for villagers near Pleiku. Such medical care, to include treating residents at a local leper colony, was often the first modern medicine to which the villagers ever had access.




Some 41st CA Teams helped the locals build schools, such as this high school at Truong Hoc Vinh Hy. 1LT Earl C. Palmer said "Education is the most priceless thing that you can own in Vietnam. They have no trouble with high school drop-outs there."


(November 1966-July 1967) said: "I would have liked to have gotten [clearer] direction."⁸ How MACV parceled out the 41st CA teams exacerbated LTC Llana's problems.

Headquartered at Nha Trang, the 41st CA Company had sixteen numbered teams consisting of five to six men each.⁹ Individual teams were under the operational control (OPCON) of U.S. Army and U.S. Marine combat units in three of South Vietnam's four Corps areas. The goal of the 41st was to raise local standards of living and to demonstrate the benefits of local and national government. They were supposed to help villagers with projects designed to build commerce opportunities and self-sufficiency. In the absence of guidance from the 41st CA Company or the units to whom they were OPCON, the teams established their own priorities based on the availability of materials, local interest, and resident skills. Their most popular projects were construction or repair of schools, medical dispensaries, bridges, roads, culverts, dams, spillways, fish ponds, and wells. Additional and constant projects included refugee assistance, MEDCAPs, which focused on medical and dental care, and agricultural and educational programs. Although a MACV asset, U.S. Army Civil Affairs were lumped under the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program to build the rural population's trust in South Vietnam's government.

Established in May 1967, CORDS was to coordinate the U.S. civilian and military rural pacification activities sponsored by the Army, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). This hybrid command was composed of integrated civilian and military personnel at all levels. CORDS' directors, first, Ambassador Robert William 'Blowtorch Bob' Komer, and then future CIA director William E. Colby, held three-star general authority. CORDS set up advisory teams in all 44 provinces and the 250 districts of South Vietnam. The Army CA teams were to win the 'hearts and minds' of the rural South Vietnamese people. Since by 1968 its teams were primarily centered in II Corps, the 41st was the only CA asset available to CORDS in the First Field Force, Vietnam



Civil Operations & Revolutionary Development Support



CORDS was a novel, Vietnam-era experiment formed in May 1967 to coordinate U.S. civil and military rural pacification programs. It had a hybrid civil-military structure that integrated military and civilians in command at all levels. CORDS' civilian heads, such as Ambassador Robert William 'Blowtorch Bob' Komer and future Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William E. Colby, held the equivalent of three-star general rank and were one of three deputies directly reporting to the MACV commander. CORDS included all American agencies in South Vietnam dealing with overt pacification and civilian field operations including the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and the CIA.

CORDS civilian/military advisory teams were dispatched throughout South Vietnam's 44 provinces and 250 districts. They had a two pronged approach: to help win the 'hearts and minds' of the rural South Vietnamese people and to pair intelligence collection with direct/covert action. U.S. Army Civil Affairs was part of the overt side of CORDS mission to garner rural population trust in South Vietnam's government.


The U.S. Army originally made up the majority of CORDS personnel but the civilian presence grew as the war continued. In 1970, CORDS changed its name from 'Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support' to 'Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.' CORDS was a success, and Communist activity declined in the areas where it was fully implemented.

(IFFV).¹⁰ The 41st had just come under the general direction of CORDS when the Communists launched a massive offensive on Tet, the Vietnamese New Year holiday.

The Tet Offensive changed the American outlook on the Vietnam War. The well-coordinated country-wide assaults began on 30-31 January 1968. VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units attacked more than 100 towns, cities, and military installations. Viet Cong hit the U.S. Embassy in Saigon while the NVA captured Hue, the traditional

capital of Vietnam. Although it proved to be a military disaster for the Communists, the startled media coverage of Tet provided the American public with the opposite reality. This gave the Communists an unintended strategic psychological victory. After repelling the NVA and VC forces, MACV directed U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV) to recapture the cities. The countryside was temporarily surrendered to the Communists. The Tet scare forced the 41st teams to adopt different *modi operandi*.

41st Civil Affairs Organization in II Corps, February 1968



(Teams 3, 5, 10, & 16 were assigned to the 29th Civil Affairs Company in I Corps and not directly under the 41st Civil Affairs Headquarters control.)

*Detachment designators B & C are names only and do not denote levels of command as in an SF group.

*Denotes rank commanded by.

Commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel (LTC), the 41st Civil Affairs Company was organized similarly to a Special Forces 'B' Team. From Company headquarters at Nha Trang, the commander monitored the geographically dispersed CA teams, and directed the centrally located Civilian Supply, Public Health, and Public Welfare Teams.¹ The sixteen generalist teams [platoons after 1968] can be likened to SF 'A' Teams and served primarily in Vietnam's rural areas.² The Company's TO&E authorized strength was 70 officers and 120 enlisted men with 73 vehicles. However, chronic personnel shortages were the norm.³ In 1969, a new TO&E reduced unit strength to reflect reality. Despite the paper reduction of teams, the company managed to keep its existing—and even additional *ad hoc* CA Teams—in the field by 'creative' personnel management.⁴

Although any team could be tailored to meet mission requirements, a TO&E CA Team consisted of six personnel—three officers and three enlisted men—each with a different specialty. 1LT Gary Faith explained: "41st CA Teams were supposed to have (1) Captain, Infantry as the CA Team Commander, (1) Lieutenant (LT), Military Intelligence, (1) LT, Engineer, (1) E-7 or E-6 Interpreter, (1) E-5 or E-4 Medic, and (1 or 2) E-4s with a specialty such as Agriculture, Military Police, Animal Husbandry, Intelligence or whatever the [team] commander thought he needed."⁵

Administratively, the 41st CA Company was a theater asset of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The 41st CA Teams were parceled out to the Corps Commands. Then, the Corps Commands detailed the teams down to the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) Province and District Headquarters.

Unlike the two other CA companies that arrived in Vietnam later, the 41st CA Teams were spread among three of the country's four Corps areas. In 1966, the four 41st Teams in I Corps (3, 5, 10, 16) were attached to the 29th Civil Affairs Company and eventually transferred to that unit.⁶ The 41st teams working in III Corps were reassigned to the II Field Force (II FFV) on 12 June 1966.⁷ It would be 1968 before those teams returned to 41st control. Such a confusing geographic spread for the small Company created problems. As 1LT Lee Livingston recalled years later, "All the different teams were doing different things. But we didn't know each other was doing it."⁸



During the Tet Offensive, the security situation throughout South Vietnam deteriorated. Here is one of Team 14's bridge projects that was damaged by the VC.



The 41st CA teams often had contact with local South Vietnamese militia called Regional Forces (RF)/Popular Forces (PF). Called 'Ruff-Puffs' for short, the RF/PF often provided labor and force protection for CA projects.



Much of the 41st Civil Affairs Company's work after the Tet Offensive was focused on helping refugees.



To help the local economy the 41st sponsored cottage industries by providing materials to the refugees. The CA Teams then arranged to sell the products to American troops. Some, like Montagnard crossbows, sold so well that the refugees could not keep up with the demand.

41st CA Locations 1968

Corps	Team	Attached to	Location
I Corps	3, 5, 10, 16	29th CA CO	
	1	MAC-V	Khanh Duong
	2	MAC-V	Ban Me Thout
	4	MAC-V	Song Mao
	6	MAC-V	Tam Quan
	7	MAC-V	Phan Thiết
	8	4th ID	Camp Enari
II Corps	9	MAC-V	Edap Enang
	11	MAC-V	Phu My
	12	MAC-V	Ham Thuan
	13	MAC-V	Bong Son
	14	MAC-V	Qui Nhon
	15	MAC-V	Pleiku
	Provisional	MAC-V	Nha Trang, Cam Ranh



After the Tet Offensive, the 41st CA Teams worked to improve the economic situation of the many Vietnamese that came to the refugee camps. This carpenter uses wood from packing and ammunition crates to make furniture.

After Tet, village improvement projects like those done in 1966-67 were an exercise in futility. First Lieutenant (1LT) David A. Clark (Team 14) reported that after the Tet Offensive, his team could work only in secure areas.¹¹ Previously, they had been building or repairing five bridges, but gave up after the VC mined the road to one, bombed another, and placed explosives “beneath the decking” of a third.¹²

The demands of heavy combat during Tet strained the American supply chain. This dramatically impacted the already resource-constrained 41st teams.¹³ Even food was scarce. 1LT David J. Schaffner recalled: “We did not have any capability of preparing food. We got some C rations and later on scratched around and got some LRRP [dehydrated Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol] rations that were really prized.” He said “we were kind of a scrounge operation . . . it was like camping out, with limited support.”¹⁴ Despite the environment, the 41st was deluged with a refugee problem because so many villagers fled to Vietnamese resettlement camps.¹⁵

CORDS estimated that the Tet Offensive resulted in more than 600,000 refugees throughout South Vietnam.¹⁶ Because villagers fled the now Communist-controlled countryside, by April 1968 most 41st CA teams were “occupied full time in refugee relief.” This equated to building housing and providing medical care, food, and clean water.¹⁷ The threat of epidemic disease in the camps resulted in 41st CA teams giving 13,783 immunizations. They also completed more than 200 projects during 1968, including building 39 bridges and

15 schools, constructing 63 road drainage culverts, and supervising the improvement or construction of 4000 kilometers of road. CA teams also managed the repair of 13 bridges, 12 culverts, and 30 kilometers of roads. Since the civilian population or Vietnamese regional security forces provided the labor, they acquired ownership and took pride in having learned how to do similar projects for themselves.¹⁸ The CA five-to-six man teams also promoted artisan skills to improve the economic circumstances of the refugees.

For example, Team 7 gave Montagnard refugees at Song Trao the materials to make crossbows and weave baskets that the CA soldiers marketed among the American soldiers. Most profit went to the craftsmen, but a little was put aside for village improvements.¹⁹ This enterprise was so successful that the Montagnards “were unable to keep up with the constant demands from American units for crossbows.”²⁰ Unfortunately, the 41st was less effective with agricultural programs.

Well-meaning American agricultural programs that touted increased food production in the refugee camps did not factor local economic conditions or the indigenous diet. Team 9 at Edap Enang, introduced a larger breed of pig to increase local food supplies. 1LT David J. Schaffner, who inherited the project when he came to the team, obtained leftover food from a far-away Army mess hall to ‘slop’ the pigs. He did not realize how hungry the Montagnards were. “I noticed that as we were putting that slop into the hog troughs, a little bit later the Montagnard kids would come along with gallon cans to scoop it out . . . for [their] dinner. I thought ‘Hey Toto, we are not in Kansas anymore.’”²¹ And, unlike the native pot-belly breed, the larger imported pigs were not used to poor sanitation or having to scrounge for scraps. They soon died of disease and malnutrition.²²

The 41st CA teams tried to introduce a higher-yield rice strain (IR-8). It needed pesticides and fertilizers but yielded far more than native types. “The only problem we had with it was that the Vietnamese would not eat it . . . it would triple their yield, but they said that it did not taste right,” said 1LT Earl C. Palmer (Team 14).²³ 1LT Schaffner (Team 9) summed it up: “We tried many projects but a lot of time we put the cart before the horse. In today’s jargon, we were not using appropriate technology.”²⁴

Although the CA teams tried to assist the refugees as much as possible, the ethnic Vietnamese dominated government demonstrated little concern for the Montagnards. Captain Darrell J. Buffaloe (Team 9 from November 1968 to August 1969 at Edap Enang) recalled that “we had very little interaction with the government of South Vietnam. The problem I saw was that the U.S. and the Government of Vietnam did not understand the culture of the Jarai Montagnard people.”²⁵

Corrupt local Vietnamese administrators perpetuated the poor conditions in the refugee camps. New arrivals had only what they could carry and often found little available housing. Local officials often pilfered construction materials



Lieutenant General William R. Peers, the commanding general of I Field Force Vietnam, awarded the 41st a Meritorious Unit Commendation in 1968 for assisting the peoples of South Vietnam. LTG Peers places a streamer on the 41st Company flag while Company commander, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel H. Bauer looks on.



The IR-8 strain of rice was developed in the early sixties and substantially increased yields. Although the 41st tried to introduce it in Vietnam, the strain was not widely accepted because it required the use of pesticides and fertilizers and did not taste the same as native rice.



1LT David A. Clark served on Team 14 during the Tet Offensive.



1LT Earl C. Palmer.

furnished by the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments. Many coerced the refugees into buying back the same stolen materials. Given little recourse, many chose to return to their villages in the VC-controlled areas. Therefore, Saigon-appointed province chiefs were responsible to some degree for negating the efforts of the CA teams promoting the legitimacy of South Vietnam's government.²⁶

The U.S. Army recognized the accomplishments of the 41st CA Company with a Meritorious Unit Citation for its service post-Tet.²⁷ Lieutenant General William R. Peers, the commander of I Field Force, Vietnam centered in the II Corps area, awarded the 41st CA the citation for "tirelessly instilling in the Vietnamese people a greater confidence in themselves and their government, thereby making them less dependent on U.S. support. Through their initiative, determination and resourcefulness, the men of the company have materially advanced the struggle against Communist aggression in the Republic of Vietnam."²⁸ Later, LTG Peers admitted that the Army commitment to CA was not "anywhere near what it should be."²⁹ By late 1968 and into early 1969 the CA teams were able to return to the countryside to conduct projects in villages, much like had been done before Tet, because the security situation was much improved.

1LT Gary W. Faith (Team 15) worked under the direction of the MACV Province Advisor and closely with CORDS and USAID. "We did not get much direction from [41st] headquarters . . . only administrative support . . . We did not get a lot of direct assignments so we kind of went out on our own to take a look at some of the villages . . . we would not tell anybody where we were going except the radio operators [at the Province Advisor Teams] . . . We would invariably try to find one route in and another out to avoid ambushes. Keeping in contact with the radio operators at the MACV compound was our force protection."³⁰ Staff Sergeant (SSG) Jimmie Gonzalez Jr. (Team 15) said that they always tried to get out of villages around Pleiku by 1600 to return back to base in daylight.³¹

Typical CA missions were conducted by two or three men, one of whom was a medic. Jeeps had sandbags on the floor for mine protection and pulled a supply trailer. Faith

said "We would get into the villages as fast as we could and do a MEDCAP." Faith assessed "the number of males there, and asked questions about strange people coming into the village . . . trying to see who was who and what was what." Then, "We took care of the immediate needs [malaria, dehydration, malnutrition, and diarrhea] . . . if they did not have medications, we would try to get them, but only enough for a day or two because we knew that some of the meds would be picked up by the [VC] . . . Probably the most popular treatment was getting teeth pulled. There was no anesthetic but they were not used to it anyway," said Faith.³² Medics, the centerpiece of the MEDCAP, were the 'tip of the spear' for the CA units because they opened the way with 'hands on' treatment. The rest of the team had to find commonalities with the residents.


Since the early days, the 41st CA soldiers always had to find 'common ground' with those in the villages. Acceptance in a community made their work easier and more effective. A simple way to do this was to partake in local food and drink when offered to avoid offending the locals. Home-brewed rice wine was a regular offering. It was drunk through a straw from a large open pot. SGT Forbes (Team 9) said he never wanted to "visualize what was in the pot. I drank it as fast as I could . . . I got so drunk that I did not care!"³³ 1LT Gary Faith (Team 15) said, "The worst thing you could do was lose suction on the straw and have to start sucking on it again. You would pull up something from the bottom, but you did not know if it was a bug or a piece of rice."³⁴ Speaking Vietnamese also helped, but even this was problematic.

SSG Jimmie Gonzalez was the interpreter on Team 15 at Pleiku. He learned Vietnamese at an *ad hoc* language school in the U.S. However, he found that the Montagnards were reluctant to speak that language. Gonzalez also spoke French, having previously been assigned to Verdun, France. Knowing that Vietnam was a former French colony, Gonzalez tried his French. The Montagnard elders "lit up" upon hearing French and were then eager to work with the CA team.³⁵ The CA soldiers also had to become ingenious to obtain supplies.

SP5 Ronald E. Matheson recalled that because of their liberal appropriation of supplies, his CA team operated "on the fringe." "Our Team Leader, CPT David R. Caswell, got us out of more scrapes with MPs . . . than I can really remember. We made friends where it counted . . . we basically were good scroungers. CPT Caswell sometimes was surprised at [the materials] we came up with, but told me one time something that I believe today: 'Where there is a will, there is a way.'"³⁶ SSG Gonzalez described how his Team 15 upgraded their weaponry. They were first outfitted with M2 carbines that they received from a nearby Special Forces team. Because they did not feel comfortable with the M2s, they traded them for WWII-era M3 'Greasegun' submachine-guns. Then, they traded them for M-16s and an M-79 grenade launcher—all off the books.³⁷ Supply shortages were the least of the persistent problems.

41st CA Locations 1969

Corps	Team	Attached to	Location
II Corps	1	MAC-V	Khanh Hoa
	2, 2A	MAC-V	Darlac
	4	MAC-V	Binh Thuan
	6	MAC-V	Binh Dinh
	7	MAC-V	Binh Thuan
	8	4 th ID	4 th ID
	9	MAC-V	Pleiku
	9A, 11	MAC-V	Binh Dinh
	12	MAC-V	Phu Yon
	13, 13A, 14, 14A	MAC-V	Binh Dinh
	15	MAC-V	Pleiku
	Cam Ranh	MAC-V	Cam Ranh
	Nha Trang	MAC-V	Khanh Hoa



Building Rapport & Getting Dirty

1 SSG Jimmie Gonzalez's knowledge of French from a tour in Europe unexpectedly helped him in Vietnam. Because Vietnam was a former French colony, many village elders could converse in that language.

2 Like soldiers everywhere, the 41st Teams drew kids like a magnet. Building rapport with the locals often began here.

3 Members of the 41st had to engage in local cultural activities lest they unintentionally offend those that they were trying to help. One ceremony that the 41st Teams could not refuse was drinking home-brewed rice wine through a straw out of a clay jug.

4 Soldiers of the 41st made fast friends with many of the Vietnamese children as did Specialist Richard MacAdoo.

5 Lieutenant Gary W. Faith was on Team 15.

6 The soldiers of the 41st CA Company came from a variety of backgrounds. For instance Glen L. Mizer, the interpreter and senior non-commissioned officer of Team 9, was a veteran of the 5th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) (RICA) during the Korean War.

7 A popular project, when time and material was available, was to make playground equipment for the children. Such projects went a long way in winning over the locals.

8 Another project for the 41st teams was to provide veterinary care. SP5 Ron E. Matheson holds a calf down while another 41st CA member gives it an injection.

9 Although they were not supposed to do the job by themselves, CA personnel had to 'get dirty.' They often had to show the locals how to perform tasks, get them enthused about a project, and then step back so that the villagers developed a sense of ownership.

10 In general, Civil Affairs units in Vietnam were not high on the Army's priority for supplies. They often had to scrounge materials, such as this metal roof sheeting, in order to accomplish their projects.

11 Team 9's house at Edap Enang. In front of the quarters are barrels filled with earth and topped with sandbags for protection against VC attacks.



8

9

10

11



A goal of the 41st teams was to get the locals involved in projects, such as mixing concrete to form into blocks. After the concrete was mixed, it was put into forms and left to harden. Not only did helping on a project give them a sense of ownership, but it also taught the villagers construction skills.



A dearth of CA-trained officers was a constant. Civil Affairs companies were officer-heavy organizations. However, in April 1969, only four of the fourteen 'authorized' Team commanders had attended the Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, GA.³⁸ Those that did, like 1LT Gary W. Faith, recalled that "the Civil Affairs Career Course focused on both conventional and unconventional war. We learned about Military Government as well as Civic Action. Most helpful was material about language, customs, religion, peoples, culture, the history of Vietnam, and taboos. I think the CA training I had allowed me to keep a better focus on our mission and made me much more sensitive than others about the indigenous people."³⁹ He was one of the lucky few to arrive with CA training.

With few CA-trained officers, the 41st had to educate and train incoming personnel for their CA roles and missions in South Vietnam. Officers, often assigned directly from replacement depots, had little idea what CA was. The company headquarters in Nha Trang gave them a short course in revolutionary warfare and encouraged them to either to attend the CORDS orientation course in

Saigon or to complete the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance (today's USAJFKSWCS) 'Internal Defense and Development' (IDAD) correspondence course. After 1968, the 41st headquarters also hosted two-to-three day Civil Affairs Platoon (Team) Commander's Conferences to allow officers to share their successes and failures with their peers in the 29th and 2nd CA Companies.⁴⁰ Chemical Corps CPT M. Szalachetka, assigned to Team 6 in 1969, was an officer new to CA.⁴¹ When asked at the time if the in-country training prepared him, he responded, "I wouldn't use the word adequately, but I would say that . . . they enabled me to have a basic grasp and understanding of what the team was doing." But, "I wish I had been better trained in Civil Affairs."⁴²

Some assigned soldiers went straight to a team without the benefit of even a little training.⁴³ Transportation Corps 1LT Glenn Sullivan recalled that when reassigned from a Truck Company directly into the 41st, he was totally unaware that CA existed. He was put aboard a C-7 Caribou and flown to his new team. "The first day we were out, we were digging a well . . . I was totally lost."⁴⁴ The enlisted soldiers rarely had experience in Civil Affairs before being slated for the 41st CA Company. They were assigned based on their MOS, civilian skills, or education specialty.⁴⁵



President Richard M. Nixon began 'Vietnamization,' in which the South Vietnamese were given greater responsibility for their own defense, thereby allowing American servicemen to come home. The 41st Civil Affairs Company was selected to return to the United States in 1970.

It was U.S. domestic politics that determined the fate of the 41st CA in Vietnam. In late 1968, President-elect Richard M. Nixon promised a war-weary America that after taking office he was going to reduce U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Under 'Vietnamization,' U.S. units began turning over the brunt of the combat operations to a well-equipped and better trained South Vietnamese military. Amazingly, the 41st was one of the first units selected for deactivation in 1970. When he received orders to disband the 41st CA in-country, LTC Jonnie Forte, Jr. said, "It came as a surprise to everyone that Civil Affairs companies would be taken out of Vietnam at this time." He believed that the core of 'Vietnamization' was pacification and development. "From this standpoint it absolutely makes no sense whatsoever to deactivate a Civil Affairs company [when that is] our

Lineage of the 41st CA

The 41st Civil Affairs Company traces its lineage to the end of World War II. Formed at the Presidio of Monterey, California, on 25 August 1945, the 41st Military Government Headquarters Company served on occupation duty in South Korea from 1 November 1945 until its deactivation at Kunsan on 31 May 1947. Redesignated on 1 February 1955 as the 41st Military Government Company, the unit was reactivated on 18 March 1955 at Fort Gordon, Georgia. It was redesignated the 41st Civil Affairs Company on 25 June 1959.¹ While assigned to the 95th Civil Affairs Group, elements of the Company served in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The 41st was the first Civil Affairs unit assigned to the Republic of Vietnam, and served there from December 1965 until its deactivation on 28 February 1970. The unit received the Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm, the Vietnamese Civic Actions Honor Medal, and three awards of the Meritorious Unit Commendation.² Three of its members were killed in Vietnam: 1LT Sigfrid R. Karlstrom, 2LT Robert James Sovizal, and Specialist Four William Edward Dick, Jr.³



I FFV Commanding General Lieutenant General William R. Peers and 41st Civil Affairs Company Commander Lieutenant Colonel Daniel H. Bauer celebrate the company's award of the Meritorious Unit Citation for its actions from 1 January to 31 July 1968.

mission." LTC Forte concluded by saying that in order to win the war, South Vietnam had to get its citizens "to feel that government will respond to their needs . . . We are not going to win the war just by shooting and killing people."⁴⁶

The CA teams took the news hard. SP5 Ron E. Matheson said, "We knew in January [1970] that the 41st was being [disbanded] in February. My first concern was giving away to the 'Yards' and Vietnamese some of the things we had accumulated for ourselves . . . It was [only] a matter of time before the US was going to pull out of 'Nam' altogether." "I still wonder what happened to those 'Yards' and Vietnamese that we came to know personally."⁴⁷ Thus, after five years of service in Vietnam, the U.S. Army deactivated the 41st CA Company on 28 February 1970, with little concern for its successes.

What did the 41st CA accomplish? 1LT Earl C. Palmer (Team 14) believed they made a difference: "Whenever you enter an area, it was always obvious when a CA Team had been there. The yards in front of the houses had been swept and there was no trash in the yards."⁴⁸ 1LT Glenn Sullivan (Team 13) echoed Palmer's comments. "We felt that we were doing something positive. We were very aware that it was an issue of 'hearts and minds' . . . we really felt like we were trying to make a difference and that the Vietnamese appreciated what we were doing."⁴⁹ The 41st did make a difference in Vietnam, despite a lack of direction and dedicated support.

It was through individual perseverance, a strong work ethic, and a personal sense of mission that the soldiers of the 41st Civil Affairs Company succeeded. After relinquishing command in August 1969, LTC Daniel H. Bauer summed it up well: "Our mission was not the mission of combat

assault, but that of supporting the people of Vietnam in finding better ways to help themselves to a better life. In the accomplishment of this mission we have at times been misunderstood. We have been relegated to a position of low priority and yet have been able to persevere. Any unit can do an outstanding job when all of the resources are furnished without question, but only an outstanding unit can accomplish its mission with minimal support and resources."⁵⁰

With ARSOF forces engaged worldwide today, it is important to remember that CA is an integral part of UW. Although these Vietnam experiences are a small part of CA history, the actions of those veterans provided good examples for today. An innovative and enthusiastic CA effort, even if done uphill, is always a force-multiplier. Their accomplishments were not forgotten. On 25 September 2012, the 41st CA Company's lineage became a part of the newly activated 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB) of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade.⁵¹ When the 83rd CAB stood up, several 41st veterans were proudly in attendance. ♣

***Thank you:** I would like to thank the veterans of the 41st Civil Affairs Company who provided their time and materials for this series of articles on the 41st Civil Affairs Company in 1965-1970. In particular, Elmer M. Pence, John Schmidt, Larry A. Castagnato, Lee Livingston, Gary W. Faith, Patrick S. Brady, Jimmie Gonzalez, David Gunn, David Forbes, David Schaffner, Ronald E. Matheson, Earl Palmer, Ivars Bembris, Darrell J. Buffaloe, David Clark, Dr. Michael D. Sparago, Theodore Llana, Jr, and Andrew Lattu went out of their way to answer questions and furnish photographs.*

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- 31 CSM (ret) Jimmie Gonzalez, Jr., interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 25 September 2012, USAOC History Office Classified files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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by Charles H. Briscoe



COMMANDO & RANGER TRAINING

*Preparing America's
Soldiers for War*



During World War II there were two Ranger training programs in the U.S. Army. The one most familiar is the organization and training of America's 'Commando' in Great Britain during the early summer of 1942. Led by artillery Major (MAJ) William O. Darby, the 1st Ranger Battalion (Provisional) spearheaded the amphibious invasion of North Africa in November 1942. The combat successes of this European Theater of Operations (ETO) provisional force, manned 'out of hide' with volunteers from 1st Armored and 36th Infantry Divisions in England, prompted formation of two more battalions. The response to create provisional Ranger battalions was akin to the U.S. Marine Corps decision to form special elements—Raiders, Scouts, and Parachute battalions—for WWII.¹

The second effort, less well known, was the Army's Commando and Ranger programs for junior leaders and soldiers, the first being a critical component of amphibious operations. The Army Ground Forces (AGF) historical section did include the Commando training in their 1946 study on the Amphibious Training Center (ATC).² (Note: Some WWII Army vernacular will be used to give the reader a better 'feel' for attitudes and positions in those times.)

The purpose of this article is to describe the Commando training (first to special units, and then to all soldiers) provided to those infantry divisions cycled through the Army's ATC in 1942 and 1943. Commando training to provide the lead assault force for an amphibious invasion was integral to the ATC curriculum. The impetus behind forming a special unit and individual training was the British Commandos. U.S. military leaders needed a quick, simple way to build physical toughness and mental agility to deal with the problems and rigors of combat. President

Artillery COL William O. Darby, Class of '33, USMA, organized the 'American Commando,' the 1st Ranger Battalion in England.



The European Theater of Operations-approved SSI of 1st Ranger Battalion (Provisional).



From 1943-47 Marines wore unit SSI on their Service A dress uniforms. Marines never wore SSI on the right shoulder as the Army does to signify combat service.



Sixteen U.S. Army Air Corps B-25B Mitchell medium bombers flew off the aircraft carrier USS Hornet to attack Japan on 18 April 1942.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and his confidant, William J. Donovan (later Office of Strategic Services [OSS] director), and Army Chief of Staff, General (GEN) George C. Marshall, were strong advocates of the Commando concept. Their influence reached deep. The ATC program, begun in June 1942, became marginalized by the plethora of specialty training centers and 'special' units activated from March to September 1942 by the military and OSS.³

When Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) James H. Doolittle and his Army Air Corps 'Raiders' attacked Tokyo and other Japanese cities on 18 April 1942, they raised the spirits of Americans just as the Commandos had done for the British people. The sixteen twin-engine B-25B *Mitchell* medium bombers, launched from the aircraft carrier USS *Hornet*, showed the Japanese that the United States could still project combat power despite the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor. Just as Great Britain's Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill believed that any offensive actions in dark times would bolster the morale of English-speaking peoples, President Roosevelt extolled the value of 'commando-like' raiding in his radio 'fireside chats' to restore confidence in America.⁴ LTC Doolittle was 'taking the fight to the enemy.' Imbuing U.S. soldiers with the will to fight and win was a task for Army leaders.

'Shoestring' Commando training to mentally and physically harden U.S. soldiers for the realities of combat was enthusiastically embraced by Army officers scrambling against resource constraints. In June 1942, the Commando concept was taught at the newly activated ATC at Camp Edwards on Cape Cod, MA. To appreciate how crazy things were for America's 'greatest generation' and to show how unprepared the country was for war in late 1941, the accompanying sidebars provide background and context.

A number of salient points are emphasized in the sidebars. The American military was unprepared to defeat Axis forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East simultaneously. In late 1941, it could barely defend the coasts and protect the Panama Canal, critical to massing our two-ocean navy. British and American leaders negotiated *quid pro quo* agreements because our military was incapable of seizing key defensive terrain in the hemisphere (European islands). Allied war materiel (Lend-Lease) for England was the initial priority for industrial mobilization, not equipping an outdated Army and Air Corps that was in the throes of rapid expansion through national conscription. Britain's Commandos were providing results that seemed worth emulating.

Army interest in special operations heightened after General Marshall visited British Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) in January 1942 and observed Commando training. In less than a month MG Lucian K. Truscott was in England establishing an American section in COHQ and organizing a U.S. Army 'Commando.'⁵ The Chief of Staff was equally concerned with developing combat-like experiences and tougher fitness regimens for mobilizing divisions. The Second U.S. Army's summer and

fall Tennessee Maneuvers revealed that junior leadership and physical condition were still major problems in late 1941.⁶

LTG McNair, the AGF commander, faced with GHQ priorities for amphibious, winter and desert warfare, and paratroop development, acquiesced on establishing specialty training centers in specific environments and which standardized doctrinal training in the Army. Not a Commando fan, he emphasized that his top priority was individual fitness for all soldiers. In the six months from March to September 1942, four Army specialty training centers were established: a Desert Training Center; an Airborne Center; an Amphibious Training Center; and a Mountain Training Center.⁷ While the Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center was initially organized at Fort Meade, MD, in January 1942, it was not truly functional until it was relocated to Camp Hood, TX, in September.⁸ All Army specialty training centers incorporated physical fitness into instruction. Though the original AGF plan called for establishing three ATCs at Camp Edwards, MA, Fort Lewis, WA, and Carrabelle, FL, immediate access determined the initial site.⁹

LTG McNair tasked promotable Colonel (COL) Frank A. Keating, Chief of Staff, 2nd Infantry Division, San Antonio, TX, to evaluate the proposed sites. Shortly afterwards, the new brigadier was directed to establish an ATC at Camp Edwards, a Massachusetts National Guard facility, by 15 June 1942 and have a four-week shore-to-



U.S. Army Air Corps Brigadier General (BG) James H. Doolittle was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for organizing, training, and leading the April 1942 raid on Japan.

Ignoring the

SPREADING GLOBAL WAR

Though war hit China hard in 1937, Europe was awash in conflict by 1938. However, it was not until France collapsed in the first two weeks of May 1940 that fire alarm echoes were finally heard over the Atlantic. The German *blitzkrieg* that swept across Western Europe closed almost all friendly ports on the continent. The ten-division British Expeditionary Force (BEF) with its 500 Royal Air Force planes barely escaped envelopment. In their flight from Dunkirk, the BEF abandoned its light and heavy weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The infamous Royal Navy, sorely bereft of amphibious vessels, commandeered private pleasure yachts, coastal shipping and fishing boats, and ferries to rescue the BEF soldiers. Nazi submarines had turned the Atlantic into a shipping graveyard. After Germany suddenly invaded Russia in late 1941, violating their mutual non-aggression treaty, America's Lend-Lease materiel production had to be increased and shared. Protection of the sea lanes and air ferry routes became vital to sustain the Allied fight in Europe.

Enemy control of Danish, French, and Dutch islands in the Western Hemisphere posed threats to American continental defense, the Panama Canal, and Lend-Lease delivery. Known Axis meteorological stations in isolated northern Greenland ("weather comes from the West") radioed forecasts and alerts via long range aircraft to submarines, battleships, and *Luftwaffe* all over Europe. Danish-controlled Iceland was six flying hours from New York City and Germany had aircraft with that range.¹ European holdings in the Western Hemisphere became key terrain for the Allies.

Since Marines could be sent overseas without Congressional approval, the 6th Regiment in California was shipped to Iceland in July 1941 to form 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional). They cooperatively defended that country with Britain's 49th Territorial Army Division. When the 49th was recalled to England for home defense duty, the Marines performed the mission alone until relieved by the Army in the spring of 1942. The 1st Marine Division, while assigned occupation contingencies in the Caribbean and Atlantic, could not seize key islands without Navy transport and landing craft. Since President Roosevelt was pushing for a second European front in 1942, more emphasis was placed on amphibious operations despite landing craft shortages, doctrinal differences between the Army and Navy, and service theater priorities. Lacking a Marine-like force to spearhead an amphibious invasion, building a Commando capability was incorporated into the Amphibious Training Center curriculum along with their tough physical conditioning.²




The 1st Marine Brigade wore the British 'polar bear' SSI while in Iceland.



The British 49th Territorial Army Division wore a polar bear SSI related to its ill-fated attempts to recapture the Norwegian ports of Trondheim and Narvik in April-May 1940.







British 49th Territorial Army Division SSI



European Colonial Possessions

- Great Britain 
- France 
- Denmark 
- Netherlands 

Transatlantic Logistics- 1941-42


- Naval Base 
- Transatlantic Airways 
- Transatlantic Supply 
- Merchant Losses 

As of 1942



Schematic Diagram of Channels of Command and Coordination

Headquarters Amphibious Training Command, Camp Edwards, Mass., 12 June 42



Inclosure No. 1 to U.S. Army Amphibious Training Command, General Order No. 1, dated 12 June 1942 showed 'channels of command and coordination.' Highlighted in yellow is the Commando Division.



BG Frank A. Keating, a WWI combat infantryman, did amphibious landings in 1940-41 with the 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Marine Division on the West Coast.

shore amphibious operations training program ready for an infantry division in thirty days. Included was to be a ten-day "course of instruction in over-water 'Commando' raids."¹⁰ The post-Pearl Harbor GHQ staff panic stage that lasted until mid-March 1942 was quickly replaced

by unrealistic objectives sent down from AGF. Seasoned officers, familiar with a new command's penchant for quickly rescinded 'get it done yesterday' directives and constantly changing requirements, focused on what they could do based on available time and resources.

Leaders could always default to PT (physical training) without regard for weather or lack of equipment. Physical and mental hardening of soldiers began immediately and became integral to all training. The ATC cadre, drawn from the Regular Army 1st, 3rd, and 9th IDs, briefed 45th ID commanders and staff [National Guard (NG)] on the program before launching into amphibious training on 14 July 1942. The ATC's Commando Division briefed overwater raiding, commando operations, and tactics before organizing a separate training site for its course.¹¹

The Commando Division instructors had ten days to toughen 'Groupment F,' the ATC's provisional commando task force (CTF), and prepare it to lead the division culmination exercise, an invasion of Martha's Vineyard. The CTF had infantry command and staff and specific tactical elements; a rifle company; a section of the RCT intelligence and reconnaissance platoon; a battalion medical section; and six platoons: antitank, 81mm mortar, engineer, communications, antitank mine, and ammunition and pioneer.¹² MAJ William B. Kunzig, the 'commandant' of Commando training isolated the CTF on Washburn Island in a spartan field camp to keep them focused.¹³

Jump Starting Army Manpower

The authorized 200,000 man volunteer Regular U.S. Army, scattered in regiments across the country, had to get up to strength. Two infantry divisions (one on each coast) had been tasked to practice shore-to-shore amphibious operations—loading men, equipment, and supplies aboard ships for overseas movement, offloading the fighting force and its armament and equipment into a variety of landing craft, and then ferrying them in waves to an established beachhead. This was much different from a Navy-sponsored Marine Corps ship-to-shore amphibious assault to seize and secure beach landing sites for follow-on main attack forces coming ashore in landing craft. Since becoming an imperial power our Navy had been in charge of the Caribbean and Pacific. With Japan's military control spreading across the Pacific and endangering American coaling stations, Navy focus shifted to the west. As National Guard (NG) divisions were activated and subsequently federalized by the U.S. president, a national draft was being debated by Congress.

By the time the legislative branch passed the first peacetime draft in U.S. history (16 September 1940) well-trained Japanese, German, and Italian armies had already overrun huge parts of Asia, Europe, and Africa. Males, 18-45 years of age, selected by lottery, were to serve for twelve months, but only in the continental U.S., possessions and territories. Congress set a 'cap' on soldiers in training at 900,000. President Roosevelt could federalize NG divisions for two years of active duty. While appearing somewhat prescient in light of the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Oahu, Hawaii, those early numbers proved to be less than 20 percent of that required for WWII.¹

National mobilization to build a 1.6 million man Army in 1940 was simply the first preparatory step for waging war. The second, more difficult and time-consuming step, was training the 'mobilized' to be soldiers. The Louisiana Maneuvers, the largest 'war game' in American history (400,000 troops), begun in the fall of 1940, stretched into the next spring. More maneuvers followed in the Carolinas and Tennessee. Conducted ostensibly to evaluate organization (square [4 regiments] versus triangle [3 regiment] infantry divisions), doctrine, mobility, state of training, and leadership, General Headquarters (GHQ) and regional Army maneuvers highlighted the antiquated state of the U.S. Army, weak leadership, and the poor physical state of its soldiers.²

The attack on Pearl Harbor pulled America into WWII. It was March 1942 before GHQ acknowledged that it could not do everything necessary to raise, equip, and train the constantly growing Army and Air Corps (latest estimate 3.6 million) to defeat battle-hardened Axis forces. Lieutenant General (LTG) Lesley J. McNair organized Army Ground Forces (AGF) command specifically to train units, update tactics, and write doctrine while GHQ in the War Department, following 'Europe First' strategy, concentrated on war plans across the Atlantic.



LTG Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, March 1942 – July 1943, promoted to Brigadier General (BG) in October 1918, became the youngest general officer in the U.S. Army at age thirty-five



The Army Ground Forces SSI was adopted by U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) in 1955 and by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) in 1973.



“The Commandos were tough” was the caption in the 1946 AGF study of the Amphibious Training Center.



After completing the British Commando course in 1942, First Lieutenant (1LT) Jack T. Shannon, future executive officer, 10th SFG and the first 77th SFG commander, was attached to the ATC Commando Division for several months.



MAJ William B. Kunzig, Commando Division chief, ATC, shared a ship’s cabin with MAJ William O. Darby during the 1st Infantry Division’s amphibious training off Long Island, NY, in 1940-41.


The CTF training ran continuously for ten days. Everyone trained together. Instruction was given by Commando Division cadre and British MAJ Berald E. Woodcock (a veteran of No. 1 Commando) with the assistance of CTF officers and sergeants. The training was designed to harden the students physically, perfect basic infantry squad and platoon tactics, teach techniques of hand-to-hand combat and self-defense, and practice specific commando raiding tactics.¹⁴

The subjects covered in the first class were:

1. Conditioning exercises consisting of obstacle courses; bayonet, grenade, and hand-to-hand fighting methods;
2. Use of the compass; map reading; military sketching; message writing; aerial photograph reading;
3. Mine techniques; demolitions; knots and lashings; crossing barbed wire and beach obstacles; operating and disabling motor vehicles and weapons;
4. Preparation of personnel for commando raids; reconnaissance patrol techniques; booby traps; operation of personnel at night;
5. Techniques of rubber boat operations; techniques of embarking and debarking from landing craft; boat formations;
6. Interrogation of prisoners; planning and conducting raids; and practical work in the form of night raids to secure information and destroy ‘hostile’ installations.¹⁵

All of the instruction would be tested as part of the preparation and planning for the division invasion. Amphibious landings were to be as realistic as possible within the constraints of safety and availability of troops, equipment, and boats. The beaches of Martha’s Vineyard were covered with barbed wire, obstacles, and buried explosives. Dynamite was triggered by cadre to simulate naval gunfire support, artillery, and land mines. The 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion played the role of enemy defenders. The CTF, controlled by the 45th ID staff, would land first to assist the company of parachute infantry from Fort Benning, GA, that were ‘jumping in’ to seize the nearby airfield.¹⁶ Then, the main assault would follow.

Available landing craft could carry a full regimental combat team (RCT) and then bring in token representation from the remaining two RCTs and division rear echelon



BG Keating (3rd from left) posed with British exchange officers at Camp Edwards.



Initially activated as Engineer Amphibian Brigades in the mid-1942, they were renamed Engineer Special Brigades and wore this blue SSI. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd supported the Amphibious Training Center before ordered overseas; the 1st went to Europe for the North Africa, Sicily, and Italy landings before Normandy, while the 2nd and 3rd went to the Pacific. U.S. Navy Amphibious Scouts and Raiders wore a red background version of this SSI.

in subsequent waves. Even with boat shortages, the amphibious landings were carried out successfully on 18, 19, and 20 August 1942 amid loud explosions, billowing smoke, dropping parachutists, and the roar of landing craft motors. It was good practice for the engineer boat and shore units (initially Engineer Amphibian Brigades, then Engineer Special Brigades [ESB]) that, while supporting the ATC, were being organized, trained, and shipped overseas, minus equipment.¹⁷

The only constant among the ESBs was the 'handed off' landing craft. Maintenance was simply lackluster because newly-assigned engineer privates got on-the-job (OJT) training by the few school-trained watercraft mechanics in the newly forming brigades. This was usually done at night ('learning by doing' was the wartime style of instruction) because all operating boats were needed for amphibious training during the day.¹⁸

After the 45th ID landings, MAJ Kunzig, the Commando 'commandant,' reported that improvisation was a constant because critical equipment (like compasses) and quality aerial maps were unavailable. Unstable dynamite was regularly substituted for TNT. Films of the only amphibious training to date (1st ID in 1941) could not be shown to soldiers beforehand because only direct current (DC) electricity was available on Washburn Island. In spite of these issues, Kunzig rated CTF results as satisfactory.¹⁹

The AGF observers were impressed with the results because "General Keating was operating on a shoestring."²⁰ They neglected to report that GHQ and AGF staff bureaucrats required the general's signature on almost all requests from personnel to equipment to munitions and even housekeeping supplies.²¹ Regardless of viability, the AGF schedule, once started, was difficult to check from below.

Changes in CTF curriculum for the 36th ID (24 August through 4 October 1942) reflected more practical work at night. Night training requiring maps and compasses, explosives rigging, and mine placement, detection, and removal accomplished dual purposes and increased mental stress. Conditioning included speed marches, log exercises, and British Commando wall scaling with the 'toggle rope' (see photo).²²



(L) The 45th Infantry Division was activated in September 1940. (R) The 36th Infantry Division was federalized in November 1940.





Wartime demands reduced resources and preparation for training, but ATC classes at Camp Edwards were rated successful by Army Ground Forces inspectors.



The British Commando 'toggle rope,' designed for climbing, pulling, and garroting an enemy sentry was adopted by the Americans.

AMPHIBIOUS LANDING INSTRUCTION



1 The ATC evaluated the Ford GPA Seagoing Jeep or 'Seep' as part of its amphibious equipment research and development mission.

2 The solution to landing craft shortages was to practice debarking from wooden boat mock-ups.

3 Landing craft beached on Washburn Island awaiting troops for daily amphibious training.

4 The 1945 Navy manual sketch portrays the difficulty infantrymen face debarking a craft in a surf landing.

5 'Dry' cargo net training on the Camp Edwards towers prepared soldiers to climb down from troop transports to landing craft and get back aboard the ship if weather prevented landings.

6 Soldiers held rifles at the down ramp height to teach men to jump down onto the beach from their landing craft. Note that they are carrying .30-06 M1903 Springfield rifles.


By the time the 36th ID got to Cape Cod, a Commando TF camp was set up eight hundred meters from the RCT cantonment on Washburn Island, but, on the opposite side of Waquoit Bay. Commando students slept in shelter-half 'pup' tents, messed in the open, used open-pit latrines, and bathed with salt water. While part of the physical hardening, time to construct billeting was not available.²³

Instruction was done in the field on adjacent obstacle, grenade, and bayonet courses. A Commando Efficiency Course was routed through the woods. It was a lot like Immediate Action courses today. Instructors ingeniously created and staged pop-up, swinging, and drop-down dummies with bladders of pig's blood that exploded when impaled with a bayonet. Explosive booby traps, trenches, various wire obstacles, and smoke were interspersed. Everyone competed against the clock. 'Commandos' were trained quite well 'on the cheap.'²⁴

Just as the ATC cadre got into a smooth training rhythm with the 36th ID, AGF ordered the immediate relocation of the center to the Florida Panhandle. Engineers had been working since late summer to build an ATC base (renamed Camp Gordon Johnston in February 1943). The ATC staff was to begin training the 38th ID on 23 November 1942. The 2nd ESB would accompany the ATC staff to Florida. The landing craft would 'water convoy' back to Florida, retracing the inter-coastal waterway route used in June.²⁵ Additional officers, equipment, and resources accompanied new ATC objectives set personally by LTG McNair. Most notably, the formation and training of a provisional Commando TF for each division was dropped.²⁶

General McNair, never strong on the Commando concept, favored retaining only those tough training features that would condition all U.S. troops for combat. He was not interested in making 'super killers' out of a select few. All soldiers would get live-fire battle 'inoculations' and practice street fighting tactics as part of their physical and mental hardening for combat.²⁷

Camp Johnston had space to simultaneously train a reinforced infantry division, the 2nd ESB, the ATC staff, and the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion. Each RCT camp had its own 'special training area' with obstacle, grenade, and bayonet courses. These locations also had sites for *jiu-jitsu*, knife and bayonet fighting, hand-to-hand



The high water table in the Florida Panhandle made water crossing obstacles simple to make.



This aerial view of the Camp Johnston infiltration course shows how soldiers were 'inoculated' to the realities of combat, crawling a hundred meters amid explosions, smoke, and machinegun fire thirty inches above the ground.

The 38th ID invasion exercise (28-30 December 1942) was considerably better supported by the newly-activated 3rd Engineer Special Brigade than the first, ten days earlier.



Before live firing the Landing Craft MCM .50 cal Browning M2 machine guns from the sea, the 38th ID infantrymen were oriented to the height and swaying motion using this Jeep mock-up.




The Battle Practice course trained soldiers to engage multiple targets in succession with infantry small arms instinctively fired from the hip.

combat, and live explosives training. Swim instruction in nearby lakes and the Gulf of Mexico was tasked to each RCT. The objective for weak and non-swimmers was to survive if the landing craft sank. The better swimmers were taught rescue techniques. All RCTs rotated through the division amphibious training site as well as the live-fire training areas.²⁸

Live-fire courses were “vigorous, exciting, and full of thunder.”²⁹ The Camp Johnston obstacle courses were considered the toughest in the Army. Seventeen obstacles were spread over 550 meters. Each course could handle 125 men in 40 minute intervals. Specially designed combat lanes required crawl approaches for attacking bunkers and foxholes with live grenades. Soldiers practiced bare handed killing techniques until they were instinctive like the mantra, “Kill or be killed!” The ATC incorporated the toughest parts of Commando training.³⁰

The combat infiltration course ‘inoculated’ troops with battle noise, smoke, confusion, and physical danger. Soldiers, separated by lanes, crawled across a football-sized field littered with barbed wire obstacles, logs, stumps, shell holes, and trenches amid explosions and smoke. They hugged the ground because the interlocking trajectory fire of six machineguns was thirty inches above their heads. The Battle Practice course trained soldiers to advance instinctively firing from the hip .45 cal. pistols, M-1 Carbines, M-1 Garand rifles, the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), Thompson submachine guns, and M1919A1 light machine guns to engage pop-up targets in their lane.³¹ All this live-fire work was preparation for the final infantry evaluations.

Ground combat training for the infantry battalions culminated with two days of live-fire street fighting in a reconstructed logging village called ‘Harbeson City.’ Every



All infantry platoons of the 28th Infantry Division were given a live fire evaluation of their ability to fight in streets and clear buildings in 'Harbeson City' at Camp Gordon Johnston.

rifle platoon had to 'solve' a tactical live-fire problem in the village. Fire teams and squads scaled walls, climbed into buildings with and without 'toggle ropes,' fought in stairways and from rooftops, employed small arms and hand grenades most effective in houses, located and eliminated explosive booby traps, searched and cleared buildings while firing and maneuvering in the streets. Unfortunately, 'Harbeson City' was not finished in time for the 38th Infantry Division to benefit from it.³²

A newly activated 3rd ESB turned the 38th ID invasion exercise (17-19 December 1942) into a major debacle by landing units as much as twenty-five miles away from objectives. Radio communications broke down and control was lost at all levels. The same mistakes cited for the poorly executed 'assault' landings on Guadalcanal (August 1942) and North Africa (November 1942) were prevalent: cavalier attitudes covered widespread ignorance among staff officers; a lack of detailed planning; poor organization; weak executions; and scant appreciation for the difficulty of amphibious invasions. The problems showed that American and British military leaders were neophytes in this type of warfare. The 3rd ESB was in bad shape.³³

The ATC staff suffered 'up close and personal' embarrassment. BG Keating ordered the invasion exercise repeated 28-30 December. The 3rd ESB, now subordinate to the ATC, began a crash training program personally directed by Keating. While the second invasion was deemed satisfactory, significant changes had to be made before the next division, the 28th ID, arrived at Camp Johnston.³⁴

As the Marines had learned from Guadalcanal, infantry and supporting units needed amphibious scout training. This ATC oversight was glaringly revealed during the 38th ID invasions. Officers from the Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance Company training on the Atlantic side of Florida at Fort Pierce agreed to teach the course at the ATC.³⁵ Thirty selected personnel from the 28th ID and the 3rd ESB attended from 11-24 February 1943. 'Amphibious Scouts' were taught: tactical handling of rubber boats and small landing craft in smooth and rough water; to land



The U.S. Navy Amphibious Scouts and Raider School at Fort Pierce on Florida's Atlantic coast emphasized small rubber boat handling in all weather.




The Navy at Fort Pierce practiced 'wet' cargo net embarkation into and debarkation from landing craft.

silently, without detection on different types of shores in daylight and at night; to collect onshore intelligence before invasions; and to guide landing craft into assigned beaches.³⁶ Shore intelligence collection and landing craft routes had to be addressed.

Critical information for invasion planning purposes included nearby road nets, natural and artificial obstacles (land and underwater), and key beach data (physical layout, currents and tides, obstacles and limitations, natural approach channels, and their impact on landing personnel and heavy equipment). Enemy dispositions had to be scouted immediately preceding assaults and during the invasion for tactical reasons. A system of visual (code flags in daytime and flares for night) and radio signals were developed to maintain contact with the invasion force offshore and to channel landing craft to designated invasion beaches.³⁷ Despite their successes with shore-to-shore basic amphibious training and realistic combat hardening of the soldiers, the ATC Special Training personnel were scrambling.

Amphibious scout students underwent a tough regimen, more akin to British Commando individual and unit



Damaged landing craft were strewn along beaches for twenty miles after a freak electrical storm (7 March 1943) turned the 28th ID invasion into a nightmare.



Ironically, the U.S. Assault Training Center, established in June 1943 at Woolacombe Beach in Devon, England, faced shortages of landing craft just like the ATC did a year earlier.

training. They learned day and night scouting and patrolling using compasses and maps. The men learned to operate and navigate rubber boats, landing craft, and small patrol vessels using navigation charts. Long ocean swims, daily multiple workouts on the obstacle and combat infiltration courses, and constant day and night reconnaissance exercises geared 'scouts' for their special roles.³⁸ The efforts of BG Keating and the Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance Company paid big dividends.

The 28th ID got 'all the bells and whistles' in attachments for their invasion landings. The 79th Smoke Generator Company used 4.2 inch mortars mounted inside landing craft to cover the beaches with smoke. Barrage balloons kept aircraft clear of the 'invasion fleet' and landing sites until a freak natural disaster occurred during the second night (7 March 1943). A severe electrical storm from the Gulf hammered the coast relentlessly all night. Radio contact with the landing craft was broken and control was lost. All of the 302nd Coast Artillery balloons, moored along the beaches, were torn loose and destroyed. Fourteen soldiers drowned when their landing craft swamped. Damaged vessels were strewn twenty miles along the coast. Despite the calamity, amphibious operations using scouts was doctrinally validated.³⁹ However, unbeknownst to most ATC cadre, drastic change was coming.

A week after the 28th ID departed, Army Ground Forces announced that the ATC was to be disbanded. After a year of service infighting over proponent responsibilities, the Navy accepted the shore-to-shore amphibious training mission as well as ship-to-shore. A U.S. Assault Training Center, established in England in June 1943, was given the ATC mission of preparing troops for amphibious operations.⁴⁰ After ten intense, stress-filled months, during which the 45th, 36th, 38th, and 28th IDs received amphibious and Commando training, the U.S. Army's stateside program came to an abrupt end.



Taken off the boats after the first day landings and moored along the beach, all barrage balloons from the 302nd Coast Artillery were lost in the storm.

In 1946, AGF historians summed up the amphibious training effort succinctly:

“The story was the same from the start to finish of the Amphibious Training Center: bickering and indecision in higher Headquarters [Navy and Army]; expansion of the training mission and objectives without corresponding expansion of facilities [instructor personnel, construction, and equipment resources]; and attempts on the part of the Center [ATC] to accomplish its mission with what was available. Improvisation and plain Yankee ingenuity frequently saved the day.”⁴¹

The emphases on the physical hardening of soldiers and realistic conditioning for combat, begun as Commando training at Camp Edwards and given to all soldiers at Camp Johnston, was continued as Ranger training in the Second Army infantry division camps well into 1944 (see “Second U. S. Army Ranger Program” in the next issue). The four units trained at the Army’s Amphibious Training Center were National Guard units federalized before the U.S. declared war: the 45th ID was activated September 1940; the 36th ID in November 1940; the 38th ID in January 1941; and the 28th ID in February 1941.⁴² As some of the earliest federalized by President Roosevelt, all had completed basic individual and unit tactical training phases and had been evaluated in a large maneuver.⁴³ Training at the ATC further hardened the troops for combat.

The provisional CTF training at Camp Edwards proved the value of the Commando TF as an assault force for amphibious operations. Their organization, tactics, and skills training as well as individual mental conditioning and physical hardening was validated during the 45th and 36th ID invasion exercises. The CTF proficiency and smaller beaches at Martha’s Vineyard (several miles versus twenty miles along Florida’s Panhandle) masked the poor level of training in the rapidly-fielded ESBs. Though Commando combat skills and physical conditioning was provided to all soldiers at Camp Johnston, the absence of a specially-prepared assault force to precede the division landings in Florida revealed how poorly trained the 3rd ESB personnel were. Adding the Marine’s ‘Amphibious Scout’ course filled the CTF void in the 28th ID and got the attention of the 3rd ESB focused. The next article, “Second U. S. Army Ranger Program” will explain how junior leader training and realistic combat conditioning, integral to the ATC Commando training in 1942 and 1943, was carried forward. ▲

Special thanks goes to CPT Marshall O. Baker, AGF Historical Section, for including the Commando training in his 1946 study on the short-lived CONUS Amphibious Training Center, Ms. Nancy L. Kutulas, Librarian, Special Warfare Medical Group for locating his work, and to retired MG John C. Raaen, Jr., the HHC Commander, 5th Ranger Battalion, WWII, for reviewing this article.

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Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations Latin-America, POW Recovery, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 In the summer of 1941, a contingent of American Marines led by General Julian C. Smith toured Britain and observed Commando training. They were provided detailed information on the Commando unit organization and equipment as well as their specialized training. Subsequently, forty USMC officers and NCOs were attached to No. 3 Commando for two months of training. A second group arrived in April 1942. When the Marine Raiders left for the Pacific in August 1942, direct contact with the Commandos ended. LTC T. Ely, Office of the DCO, to MAJ Daniell, War Office, 31 July 1941, WO 193/405 cited in Andrew L. Hargreaves, *Special Operations in World War II: British and American Irregular Warfare* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 112-113. The Army disbanded the Ranger Battalions after WWII as the Marines did to the Raider, Parachute, and Amphibious Scout units.
- 2 The Army Ground Forces. CPT Marshall O. Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center: Study No. 22* (Washington, DC: Army Ground Forces Historical Center, 1946).
- 3 In the six months from March to September 1942, AGF established four specialty training centers: desert, mountain, airborne, and amphibious. The ‘special units’ created were: 1st Ranger Battalion (ETO) Provisional) followed by the 3rd and 4th Ranger Battalions, the Canadian-American First Special Service Force, Marine Raider Battalions, Amphibious Scouts, and a Parachute Battalion as well as the Army parachute and glider battalions. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. The Army Ground Forces. United States Army in World War II* (Washington, DC: Department of Army, Army Ground Forces Historical Section, 1947), 340; Christopher R. Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991), 175-176; David W. Hogan, Jr., *Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 18, 22.
- 4 Michael E. Haskew, *Encyclopedia of Elite Forces in the Second World War* (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2007), 47.
- 5 Hargreaves, *Special Operations in World War II*, 113.
- 6 The Army Ground Forces. MAJ Bell I. Wiley and CPT William P. Govan. *History of the Second Army: Study No. 16* (Washington, DC: Army Ground Forces Historical Section, 1946), 33.
- 7 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 340.
- 8 “Camp Hood, Texas” at http://www.tankdestroyer.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=391&Itemid=391 accessed 2/24/2014.
- 9 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 5.
- 10 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 6, 7.
- 11 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 10, 30, 36, 49-52, 56.
- 12 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 10, 14, 34, 36, 49-50; Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops. The Army Ground Forces. United States Army in World War II* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1948), 489-490.
- 13 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 10, 30, 36, 49, 50, 56. Interestingly, MAJ William B. Kunzig, USMA Class of 32, shared a wardroom with CPT William O. Darby aboard ship during the 1st ID regimental ‘amphibious’ landing training. They did this off Long Island, NY, in 1940. Retired MG John C. Raaen, Jr., who spent his West Point First Class summer with the 3rd Amphibious Brigade at Waquoit Bay, provided an unpolished assessment of CTF training: “The Commando Task Force was confined (to prevent AWOLs) as well as isolated on Washburn Island. It was a dreadful place. Morale was below water. Instead of going AWOL, soldiers deserted. Leadership was dreadful and cruel.” Briscoe email from MG John C. Raaen, Jr., Subject: Comments on Draft Commando/Ranger Article dated 5/2/2014, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 14 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 50-51, 52. ATC instructors were augmented by officers from Engineer Amphibian Command, and British officers: MAJ Berald E. Woodcock (No. 1 Commando), MAJ Phillip R. Drew (Suffolk Regiment), MAJ Fleming (Royal Armoured Corps), LT P.R.G. Worth (Royal Navy), and MAJ E.T. Thompson (Royal Corps of Signals). Most returned to England when ATC moved to Florida. CPT Jack T. Shannon, executive officer, 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) and first commander, 77th SFG, who had completed Commando training in England, served in the ATC Commando Division until assigned to the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment in mid-September 1942. From there Shannon volunteered for the OSS U.S. Army Amphibious Training Command, Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, letter, SUBJECT: Transfer, 2 September 1942. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 15 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 49-52.
- 16 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 53-54. The CTF, instead of assisting the paratroops seize the airfield, reached that target before the airborne assault commenced.
- 17 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 53-54, 22-23. The First Amphibian Brigade formed at Camp Edwards in late May 1942. About halfway through the amphibious training of the 45th ID, it was shipped overseas. The renamed Second Engineer Special Brigade which had been activated in June 1942 was tasked to support the ATC.
- 18 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 53-54, 22-23.
- 19 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 35.
- 20 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 36, 46, 48.
- 21 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 36, 46, 48.
- 22 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 54-55.
- 23 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 56.

- 24 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 56.
- 25 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 12, 57. Three hundred Army amphibious engineers ferried thirty-eight landing craft from Florida's West coast to quiet Waquoit Bay surrounding Cotuit and Washburn Islands. For thirty-eight days landing craft chugged through inland waterways, across bays, and navigated high seas to reach Cape Cod, Massachusetts. "Camp Edwards" at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Edwards accessed 1/6/2014.
- 26 COL Gordon Johnston, the son of Confederate General Robert Daniel Johnston, graduated from Princeton University in 1896. He was the highly decorated Spanish-American War enlisted 'Rough Rider,' Philippine Insurrection (Medal of Honor), Cuban Occupation, Mexican Incurson, and WWI (Distinguished Service Cross, three Silver Stars, and Purple Heart) veteran. "Colonel Gordon Johnston, U.S. Army" at <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/gjohnstn.htm> accessed 3/21/2014; Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 48, 58; When the Commando TF training was dropped in a mid-November 1942 prior to the ATC relocating to Florida, MAJ William B. Kunzig, the original Commando Division Chief, turned over his personnel and equipment to MAJ Hoskot, director of the Special Training Division. Kunzig was promoted to LTC and sent to the Naval War College before assignment to the U.S. Assault Training Center at Woolacomb, England. There he conducted battalion and regimental landing exercises for units force-listed for the Normandy invasion. "Memorial: William B. Kinzig 1932" at <http://apps.westpointaog.org/Memorials/Article/9496/> accessed 2/5/2014; Michael Taylor, "Gen. William Kunzig dies - Presidio last post," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 3 May 2008 at <http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Gen-William-Kunzig-dies-Presidio-last-post-328545> accessed 2/4/2014.
- 27 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 59-60.
- 28 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 59-60.
- 29 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 60.
- 30 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 60.
- 31 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 60-61.
- 32 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 63, 65.
- 33 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 63, 65.
- 34 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 63, 65.
- 35 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 66-67; 1LT Leo B. Shinn, "Amphibious Reconnaissance," *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 1945), 51.
- 36 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 66-67; Shinn, "Amphibious Reconnaissance," 51.
- 37 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 66-67; R.C. Williams, Jr., "Amphibious Scouts and Raiders," *Military Affairs* (Fall 1949) Vol. XIII: No. 3, 150.
- 38 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 66.
- 39 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 17, 66-67. Instruction on shore-to-shore amphibious operations was provided to two groups of War Department General Staff officers (7-13 February and 17-23 February 1943) to prepare them for overseas assignments. That speaks well for the ATC reputation.
- 40 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 17, 66-67, 69. Ironically, the 38th ID, slated for the Pacific, went through the Navy's amphibious training a second time in Hawaii. "38th Infantry Division" at www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/ccccccbtchron/cc/038id.htm accessed 3/11/2014.
- 41 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 48.
- 42 Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 489-490.
- 43 Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 489-490.

Ignoring the Spreading Global War Sidebar


- 1 U.S. Department of State. Proposed Letter of Agreement. Secretary Cordell Hull to Minister of Denmark Henrik de Kauffmann, dated 7 April 1941, in Appendix A of *The Coast Guard at War: Greenland Patrol II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Public Information Division, Historical Section, 1945), 206, 10.
- 2 *The Coast Guard at War: Greenland Patrol II*, 2-3, 10, 206; COL James A. Donovan, U.S. M.C. (Ret), *Outpost in the North Atlantic: Marines in the Defense of Iceland. Marines in World War II Commemorative Series*, 1991, at http://www.nps.gov/history/online_books/npswapa/extcontent/usmc/pcn-190-003118/sec1.htm accessed 2/18/ 2014.

Jump Starting Army Manpower Sidebar

- 1 By January 1942, the Army's manpower objective had risen to 3.6 million men with 69 divisions to be activated that year. Nine new armored, 27 infantry, and 2 airborne divisions were activated, far short of the target. But, three years later, the Army had 8 million men and 89 combat divisions. Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941*, 185. The War Department had ordered the 1st Infantry Division (ID) on the East coast and the 3rd ID on the West coast to conduct landing operations as directed by GHQ on 26 June 1940. The Navy's lack of sufficient amphibious landing craft meant that the infantry battalions of a regiment were rotated though training. These limitations meant amphibious training for artillery, armor, and service support units was impossible. Ironically, GHQ transferred the amphibious mission from the trained 1st ID to the untrained 9th ID in February 1942. Greenfield, Palmer and Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 87, 89, 90, 91; Hogan, *Raiders or Elite Infantry*, 13.
- 2 Hogan, *Raiders or Elite Infantry*, 13.



The Newest Additions to the United States Army Special Operations Command **MEMORIAL PLAZA**



MARS Task Force

The MARS Task Force, or 5332nd Brigade (Provisional), was the second Long Range Penetration Group (LRPG) created for service in Burma and succeeded the more well-known GALAHAD (Merrill's Marauders). Emplaced on 14 September 2012, the Memorial Stone for the MARS Task Force displays the unit insignia on the right, which is also the current Distinctive Unit Insignia for the U.S. Army Rangers. On the left is the shoulder sleeve insignia for the China-Burma-India Theater, in which the MARS Task Force served. At each lower corner are the main units of the LRPG. In the middle of the stone, representing a pack mule carrying a 75mm howitzer, is the insignia for the MARS Task Force Mountain Artillery Association, which funded the stone.



Detachment A, Berlin Brigade

Detachment A, Berlin Brigade was created from carefully screened and selected members of the 10th Special Forces Group located in Bad Toelz, Germany. Officially moved to West Berlin in 1956, the members of Detachment A spent the remainder of the Cold War training and preparing to execute USEUCOM unconventional warfare, stay behind, and direct action operations as well as counter-terrorist contingency plans. By late 1983, changes in Allied and Soviet military demographics across Europe negated the requirement for the Detachment's unique capabilities and skills and the unit was deactivated in December 1984.



Task Force DAGGER

Task Force DAGGER was formed in October 2001 from elements of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), and the Air Force Special Operations Command. Its mission was to conduct special operations in support of Afghanistan's Northern Alliance commanders to overthrow the Taliban regime. For its actions in successfully liberating every major city and town in Afghanistan by December 2001, Task Force DAGGER was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation and the Joint Meritorious Unit Award.



Commander, USASOC
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Future Veritas...

Commando Extraordinary

by the USASOC History Staff

Major Otto Skorzeny, the scar-faced Austrian who rescued the Italian Fascist leader, Benito A. Mussolini, from the Gran Sasso mountain hotel on 17 September 1943, was among several hundred senior German officers interrogated by the 7734th Historical Detachment, 1947-1948. Thus, LTC (later BG) Theodore C. Mataxis, a combat infantry battalion commander, began a lifelong friendship with the commando. His carbon copy of Skorzeny's original account will be illustrated with the photos that turned the rescue into a Nazi Psywar triumph.



Second U.S. Army Ranger Program

by Charles H. Briscoe

Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, and WWI veteran, LTG Ben Lear, an Olympic equestrian bronze medalist, created the Second U.S. Army Ranger School in January 1943. Six hundred junior officers and enlisted men from all Second Army elements were taught why they were fighting and how to do so dirtier than their Axis foes. They were trained to become Ranger instructors to get their unit soldiers emotionally and physically fit to win in combat. This was the WWII genesis of junior leader training, the backbone of today's U.S. Army Ranger School.



Psyche

The 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group in Germany, Part II

by Jared M. Tracy

Arriving in Germany in November 1951, the federalized reserve 301st RB&L Group served as European Command's (EUCOM) and U.S. Army, Europe's (USAREUR) strategic Psywar asset through May 1953. It could not disseminate Psywar products into the Iron Curtain, but it trained hard for its doctrinal mission. In mid-1953, USAREUR created the 7721st RB&L to backfill the de-federalized 301st RB&L. The 7721st deactivation in September 1953 removed the Army's strategic Psywar presence in Germany for years.

