JOURNAL OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS HISTORY

VERITAS



Volume 16 / Number 1

"This Vest May Save Your Life"
U.S. Army Body Armor from WWII to Present

Commando & Ranger Training, Part III
Forging Junior Leaders to Toughen Men to Win in Combat

Civil Affairs Supports the Assault
Company A, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion at the Torrijos International Airport Terminal

Azimuth

of the USASOC History Office

Volume 16, Number 1

The new format for *Veritas* has received very positive reviews from our readers. After our 'murder boarding' of the first rendition, abstracts will precede articles of two or more pages. Sidebars, providing important context, will be centralized to minimize presentation disruption. The 'Takeaways' section is a 'keeper.'

As stated before, the articles in this *Veritas* were 'born digitally' and were 'hanging' on our websites. Early access to forthcoming articles expands exposure and allows readers to comment prior to print publication. All articles are reviewed for OPSEC (operations security) and by Public Affairs (PAO) before being 'hung' digitally on our public website: https://arsof-history.org

The move to a new public website design quadrupled our audience to over 15,000 page visits every two weeks; viewing time reached almost 3 minutes. This is a significant achievement since web analysts consider view times over two minutes to be outstanding. ARSOF historical products are more accessible by multiple generations. Web links embedded in social media releases and QR codes in printed articles allow connection to microsites and website articles for more information.

Scanning a QR code in any of the following articles will take you to additional resources on our webpage. To demonstrate how we link print and digital products, this issue introduces four micro-sites posted on the site: "The First Special Service Force"; the "M29 Weasel"; "1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&LG) Korean War Leaflets," collected by a unit veteran; and "ARSOF in Panama." This shows how we integrate context into print and digital products using significant background information.

Articles in this COVID-19 period *Veritas* explain some 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion missions during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama: "Civil Affairs Supports the Assault"; "Averting Disaster"; and "No Ordinary Signal Unit." The evolution of Army body armor since WWII is a solid analysis of lifesaving and injury-reducing protective equipment for soldiers and airmen.

The experiences of a Commando-trained Ranger and Army amphibious operations instructor reveal how this training developed junior officers and sergeants who molded draftees into fit, confident soldiers to defeat Axis military forces in World War II. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) adaptation of the Blue Star Service Banner revives a hundred-year-old tradition of honoring wartime military service. These stickers are intended to ignite pride within our supporting families. They will serve to remind everyone that ARSOF is 'the tip of America's spear.'

The back cover alerts readers to the video interview of an SF icon, Sergeant Major (SGM) Tyrone J. Adderly, on our websites. SGM Adderly served in the Dominican Republic with the 82nd Airborne Division, in Vietnam with 101st Airborne Division and 5th SFG, the 6th SFG as a Son Tay Raider, and as an SF Qualification 'Q' Course Instructor. The embedded QR code will take you to our public website. Thanks for bearing with us as we expand historical presentations to full spectrum via 21st century technology. **— CHB**

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Collective Research Efforts

Following Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, Army SOF had a major role in the stability operations (Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY) until April 1991. This 'restorative' operation became 'white noise' when the Pentagon focused on the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait. The 7th SFG provided a reinforced company whose ODAs covered all of Panama. The 1st PSYOP Battalion kept a team at U.S. Southern Command and Army Reserve Civil Affairs personnel supported a Civil-Military Task Force and the *ad hoc* Military Support Group (MSG) of U.S. Army South. The USASOC History Office is filling the 'gap' in ARSOF history and would like to hear from PROMOTE LIBERTY veterans. Please email us at: arsof_history@socom.mil.

Collection Activities

Historical Record Collection Process

The USASOC History Office collects and preserves documents, photos and other historical records pertaining to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). The following guidance explains how to donate or transfer historic materials to this office.

How to Get Historical Materials To Us

Coordination: Contact the History Office via e-mail (**arsof_history@socom.mil**) to coordinate delivery and receipt of historical assets. A brief description of the types, condition, and quantity of materials is appreciated.

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ATTN: AOHS *(Veritas)*
E-2929 Desert Storm Drive
Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9110

Pickup Assistance: In exceptional cases, History Office personnel can assist with on-site collection of materials.

Please send all questions to:
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Check out the ARSOF History website:
https://arsof-history.org

Publication Information

Veritas: Is published by the USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (ISSN 1553-9830). The contents are not necessarily the official views of, nor endorsed by, the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or USASOC. They are compiled, edited, and prepared by the History Office.

Past Issues: Very few print copies of *Veritas* are maintained at the USASOC History Office. However, all *Veritas* articles are available digitally on the ARSOF History Website at **https://arsof-history.org**, and digital versions of *Veritas* are available for download at: **http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/search/collection/p16040coll7/order/nosort/.**

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Subscriptions: Those wishing to subscribe to print *Veritas* should e-mail Mr. Bob Seals at **robert.seals@socom.mil**. Please include ARSOF affiliation or list applicable military service. This helps us build a research network for future *Veritas* articles.

Errata

In the article, "Michael L. Kunik: Peerless Professional, Patriot," *Veritas*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 7-16, the photograph on p. 15 was misidentified. It should read: Mr. Michael L. Kunik and his sister, Sharon Kunik Trent, 2019. Mike and his wife Elsie had six children, one son and five daughters; all are living. Thomas C. Kunik, born June 1965, is the eldest.

Contents

"No Ordinary Signal Unit"

The 112th Signal Battalion in Panama

by Christopher E. Howard



A 112th Signal Battalion soldier provides drop zone support during a Joint training exercise with the U.S. Air Force at Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, NC, in March 1990. (Photo courtesy of James S. Kestner)

Abstract: *Formed in 1986, the 112th Signal Battalion first experienced combat in Panama, during Operation JUST CAUSE, December 1989. Their support to Special Operations Command, South, validated the need for a dedicated Army Special Operations signal battalion.*

Bullets ripped through Hangar 450 at Albrook Air Station, Panama, in the late evening of 19 December 1989, just as U.S. Army Special Forces Major (MAJ) Kevin M. Higgins and his Company A, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A/3-7th SFG) prepared to depart for their H-Hour target: the Pacora River Bridge.[1] "We lifted off to go to the fight," Higgins explained, "but the fight had come to the men at the hangar."[2] Two of them were Staff Sergeant (SSG) Henry N. McCrae and Sergeant (SGT) Steven I. Elizalde, from the 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne), one of the newest Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) units.[3] Their small signal element, consisting of two Special Operations Communications Assemblage (SOCA) teams, was providing secure communications for the Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH), led by Colonel (COL) Robert C. 'Jake' Jacobelly.

Later, while he scanned his target from a cow pasture on the west side of the Pacora River, MAJ Higgins talked with Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) David J. Wilderman (J-3, SOCSOUTH) and Captain (CPT) Charles T. Cleveland (S-3, 3-7th SFG) "like they were standing next to me."[4] The SOCA team at Albrook provided Wilderman and Cleveland the situational awareness to prioritize high-demand assets, like the AC-130 *Spectre* gunship and the quick reaction force (QRF) at Albrook. Once committed, SOCSOUTH had nothing to reinforce other elements in contact.[5] Clear and timely communications were essential to mission success on the opening night of Operation JUST CAUSE, and the 112th Signal Battalion SOCAs delivered. They continued to do so throughout the operation.

This article details 112th Signal Battalion origins and explains how it was manned and equipped as a dedicated special operations communications battalion. The battalion's 'trial-by-fire' in Panama, 1989 – 1990 is highlighted. The focus is the three-man SOCA teams that provided SOCSOUTH and ARSOF elements

A critical H-Hour objective for 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) was to prevent the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) Battalion 2000 garrisoned at Fort Cimmaron from reinforcing PDF units in Panama City. Seizing the Pacora River Bridge, pictured here, was key to that mission. The task fell to 24 Green Berets from 1st and 3rd Battalions, 7th SFG, led by Major Kevin M. Higgins.

secure tactical communications during Operation JUST CAUSE and the follow-on stability operation, PROMOTE LIBERTY.

Origins

The Army committed to modernizing its special operations forces (SOF) after the hostage rescue mission in Iran (Operation EAGLE CLAW) failed in 1980. 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) was provisionally established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1982, to command and control ARSOF. About the same time, forward-thinking officers began 'beating the drum' for a signal unit capable of supporting both 1st SOCOM and theater-level Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Forces (JUWTF).[6]

From its activation in 1986 until 1990, 112th Signal Battalion soldiers wore the Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) of 1st Special Operations Command, its higher headquarters.



One such officer was MAJ James D. 'Dave' Bryan, a Special Forces (SF) and Ranger-qualified Signal Officer. His experience in 7th SFG (including two years commanding its signal company [1977 – 1979]) made him aware of the challenges inherent to joint special operations communications.[7] When Bryan returned to Fort Bragg in June 1984 as the Assistant Chief of Staff/Communications and Electronics Officer, 1st SOCOM, he championed the creation of an ARSOF signal unit capable of supporting ARSOF headquarters and task forces in multiple theaters. At the time, neither the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), the only joint signal unit, nor the SF signal companies, were resourced for those missions.[8]

Armed with Army studies and requirements documents, such as the Army Mission Area Analysis (1983), Special Operations Forces Master Plan (1984), and the Multi-command Required Operational Capability 2-84 (1984), Bryan prepared to brief his plan to the Army.[9] He recognized that the Signal Corps would be reluctant to support the creation of a dedicated "ARSOF Communications Support Element," which borrowed from Joint terminology; a signal battalion similar to those in the 'Big Army' would be an easier sell.[10] Bryan identified three specific needs for an ARSOF communications battalion: a flexible structure that allowed SOF communications packages to be tailored to the supported mission; a modernization strategy that ensured ARSOF communicators had state-of-the-art equipment, through priority placement on the Department of the Army Master Priority List; and a "professional home for ARSOF communicators" that grounded them for continuity and did not stunt their career progression.[11] His pitch succeeded, and the Army approved Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) 11015J500, "Special Operations Communications Battalion," on 1 April 1985.

The 112th Signal Battalion (Special Operations) (Airborne) was established provisionally in June 1986, with Bryan in command, and was formally activated at Fort Bragg on 17 September 1986.[12]

The 112th Signal Battalion activation ceremony program from 26 September 1986 became a keepsake for William D. Childs, one of its charter members. (Photo courtesy of William D. Childs)

Veritas Article: Airborne Signal

It inherited the lineage of the World War II-era 512th Airborne Signal Company and 112th Airborne Army Signal Battalion, both inactive since 1945. It had an authorized strength of 16 officers and 229 enlisted soldiers, organized into a Headquarters Detachment, a Base Operations Company, and a Forward Communications Support Company.[13] Manning came from excess Signal Corps billets rather than from within 1st SOCOM.[14] Its soldiers quickly identified themselves as 'Shadow Warriors,' derived from the unit motto *Penetra Le Tenebre* – Penetrate the Shadows.[15]

Per the TO&E, the 112th Signal Battalion was to "provide required C3 [command, control, and communications] systems between the unified commander, major special operations forces (SOF) headquarters, Army Special Operations Command [1st SOCOM] subordinate commands, and other commands as required/directed."[16] The battalion was to support SOCSOUTH and Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR), which belonged to Army-supported combatant commands (COCOMs): U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).[17] The battalion was also "to establish communications liaison teams at various levels within the host country and/or supported and adjacent commands." Those teams became synonymous with the equipment they used: the "Special Operations Liaison Communications Assemblage" (SOLCA), later simplified "SOCA." The battalion's fourteen SOCA teams were initially assigned to Company B, but a subsequent reorganization reallocated them evenly between two regionally aligned companies.[18]

Each SOCA team consisted of three soldiers: one Sergeant First Class (SFC/E-7), one Sergeant (SGT/E-5), and one Specialist (SPC/E-4), although it was not uncommon for Staff Sergeants (SSG/E-6) to serve as team leaders or for Privates First Class (PFC/E-3) to serve on SOCAs. Each team member was Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31C, Radio Operator-Maintainer or, less commonly, another 31-series MOS.[19] Airborne-qualified and able to deploy on the first aircraft, SOCAs provided secure communications between the theater-level SOF commander and subordinate elements.[20]

As the first 112th Signal Battalion Commander ('Shadow Six'), LTC Bryan oversaw a period of rapid growth for the new battalion. It doubled in size, from 144 soldiers at activation to its full complement of 288 by mid-1988.[21] Bryan prioritized getting the right people, fostering the right attitude, and providing them with the right equipment for the job.[22] In this, he was aided by Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Billie F. Phipps, a capable battalion staff, and highly competent

Distinctive Unit Insignia

Penetrate the Shadows

The 112th Signal Battalion Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI) was approved on 15 August 1986. Orange and white (silver) are the colors of the Signal Corps. The dagger, an established symbol of Special Operations organizations, is black and white (silver) in reference to the Battalion's covert and overt missions. It is winged to emphasize present day capabilities for speed of deployment by air. The black color enhances the motto which is translated "Penetrate the Shadows." The lightning flashes reflect electronic technology. The motto is in Italian in reference to the unit's first area of combat operations.

112th Signal Battalion | September 1986

Organization & Leadership



Major General (Ret.) James David Bryan was instrumental in winning Army approval for what became the 112th Signal Battalion. He then served as its first Commander, the first to hold the title "Shadow Six." In 2019, he was named an Army Special Operations Forces Icon.

112th Signal Battalion soldiers pose outside their temporary battalion headquarters near Gruber Road on Fort Bragg, NC, circa fall 1986. The battalion relocated across post early the following year.
(Photo courtesy of William D. Childs)

non-commissioned officers (NCOs). His command philosophy was condensed into five words: "Excellence in everything we do."[23]

From the beginning, battalion leaders promoted a competitive mindset. The soldiers responded, believing that theirs was a special unit, due to its unique ARSOF support mission.[24] Team sports and battalion runs built unit cohesion. Physical training was tough. Expectations were high, initiative was rewarded, and leaders were held accountable. Unit morale surged as a result.[25] "They knew it was not 'business as usual,'" Bryan recalled.[26]

Bryan also understood that most conventional Army communications systems were too bulky for ARSOF's short notice, small footprint deployments. To get the right equipment, the battalion customized standard Army signal systems to meet mission requirements and procured cutting-edge commercial systems when necessary.[27] It also fielded new super high frequency (SHF) satellite communications and high frequency (HF) multichannel systems. Special fabrication was done 'in house,' often with assistance from Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania.[28] Two such projects had major impacts.

The first was the SOCA kit, consisting of ultra-high frequency (UHF) tactical satellite (TACSAT), HF, and frequency modulation (FM) line-of-sight (LOS) radios; secure facsimile and teletype; encryption devices (KY-84, KY-57, KYV-5 or Sunburst processor); commercial power interface; and a generator.[29] In its original configuration, the kit weighed over 1,200 pounds and was transported in a coffin-sized container.[30] Battalion personnel cut the bulky metal racks that held the various systems to a more manageable size, and reorganized the other SOCA components until the entire kit fit in four footlocker-sized containers that could be carried by two soldiers and transported on a commercial aircraft.[31] This was important because aircraft space dictated number of personnel and equipment size. The SOCA was often the only 112th communications package deployed on ARSOF missions.[32]

A second customization project was installing a dual rear axle on the standard five-quarter ton M-1028 Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV), making it capable of hauling an AN/TSC-93A multichannel satellite terminal previously transported by an M35 two-and-a-half ton truck.[33] The eight-foot parabolic antenna, previously carried on a second truck, was modified to fit on a trailer attached to the custom CUCV.[34] The entire system could roll on/off a C-130 or C-141 aircraft, something not possible in its original configuration, but essential for SOF employment.[35]

In June 1988, LTC Bryan handed over command of the 112th to LTC Steven R. Sawdey, a likeminded officer who Bryan first met in Korea in the early 1970s, when both were in the 2nd Infantry Division. The transition was nearly seamless, as Sawdey shared his predecessor's commitment to technological innovation and realistic, mission-focused training.[36] To him, getting

the 'right people' included airborne-qualified soldiers, and he fought to keep this requirement when manning shortfalls led the Army to send non-airborne personnel to the 112th.[37] He also believed the best way to gain acceptance in the SOF community was to "get out there and do stuff."[38] Sawdey's command philosophy reflected an aggressive mentality, and included an addenda: "Be prepared to kill for the mission."[39] CPT James S. 'Steve' Kestner, one of his company commanders, made sure that every one of his soldiers read it: "We were not your conventional signal unit."[40]

The combination of tough training and high morale had LTC Sawdey's 'Shadow Warriors' eager to deploy and prove themselves.[41] Many of the battalion leaders, Kestner noted, were SF-qualified 'long-tabbers' or had previously served in Special Operations units, including its first two commanders.[42] Senior NCOs were highly trusted, having been proven under stress.[43] Experience had been gained in exercises like *FUERZAS UNIDAS* in USSOUTHCOM, and FLINTLOCK in USEUCOM. These exercises allowed the battalion to practice supporting a JSOTF, while identifying organizational and individual strengths and weaknesses.[44]

Panama

SOCAs gained operational experience in deployments to USSOUTHCOM, beginning with the HAT TRICK counterdrug missions in 1987.[45] After COL Charles H. 'Chuck' Fry, the SOCSOUTH commander, requested SOCA support in early 1988, teams began 60 to 90-day rotations to Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, and Colombia, often with only a two week break between trips.[46] The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) was grueling, but it became a point-of-pride for the SOCA men.[47] Team leader SSG Thomas A. Ayers, a charter member of the battalion, recalls being gone so much during the late 1980s that his landlord prorated his rent, and joked that he needed a Green Card to get back into the country.[48]

The 112th's SOCSOUTH mission took on greater importance as ARSOF intensified contingency planning for combat operations (BLUE SPOON) in Panama.[49] MAJ Donald Kropp, battalion Operations Officer (S-3), represented the 112th Signal Battalion in those sessions, with First Lieutenant Oliver K. Wyrtki.[50] Due to the persistent U.S. presence in Panama, robust fixed station communications networks already existed in the Canal Zone, but they were susceptible to attack from the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), and under surveillance

Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH) SSI.

Soldiers from Company A, 112th Signal Battalion conduct an engine running operation (i.e. 'hot load') onto a waiting C-130 Hercules aircraft in preparation for an airborne operation at Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, NC, in March 1990. The Airborne requirement helped build *esprit de corps* and promoted an elite mindset among 112th soldiers. (Photo courtesy of James S. Kestner)

To make its AN/TSC-93A satellite terminal transportable on a C-130 aircraft, the 112th Signal Battalion worked with the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and Tobyhanna Army Depot to modify a standard M-1028 Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle, seen here, with dual-wheel rear axle. The project was completed in June 1988, and field-tested during the FLINTLOCK exercise of U.S. European Command. (Photo courtesy of Joseph R. Lalla)

The Bridge of the Americas spans the Panama Canal on the Pacific side, near Panama City. During JUST CAUSE, it provided a ground link between Howard Air Force Base on the canal's west side, and the constellation of U.S. bases to the east, including Albrook Air Station. 112th Signal Battalion soldiers deployed to Panama for JUST CAUSE arrived at Howard, then reported to SOCSOUTH HQ at Albrook. (Photo courtesy of Robert T. Davis)

Captain (CPT) James S. 'Steve' Kestner (right) and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Robert Malton (left), Company A, 112th Signal Battalion, conduct sustained airborne training at 'Green Ramp,' Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, December 1989. Their jump that day was ultimately cancelled due to U.S. Air Force repositioning of aircraft for the impending invasion of Panama (Operation JUST CAUSE). By 20 December 1989, the two men were on their way to Panama to 'plus up' 112th Signal Battalion signal support to SOCSOUTH.
(Photo courtesy of James S. Kestner)

by at least three Soviet ships transiting the Canal.[51] Furthermore, existing secure military networks were insufficient to accommodate the demand resulting from the large influx of forces in BLUE SPOON. Accordingly, MAJ Kropp planned for the battalion to supply the Joint SOF headquarters in Panama with its own satellite communications network, but knew that it would take time to move the equipment into place.[52]

In early October 1989, with tensions between the U.S. and Panama escalating, two SOCA teams deployed as part of the security enhancement mission.[53] Those teams, which included SSG McCrae and SGT Elizalde, were on the ground when Operation JUST CAUSE began on 20 December. However, the 112th did not receive the expected call to deploy more forces. As ARSOF units jumped into combat that night, and while 3-7th SFG carried out its D-Day missions, the majority of the 112th Signal Battalion was at Fort Bragg feeling "painfully invisible."[54]

The omission was unintentional, a consequence of the short notice deployment, rapid pace of combat operations, and not being included early in the XVIII Airborne Corps-orchestrated deployment list. MAJ Kropp had planned a greater part for the 112th, but those factors reduced the battalion role.[55] As a result, 'Shadow Warrior' contributions to JUST CAUSE were largely tactical. It was "SOCA-led war for the 112th," said CPT Kestner. Regardless, LTC Sawdey sent him to Panama to "sort out what's going on" and to figure out how to get more of the battalion into the fight.[56]

On 20 December, CPT Kestner and SFC Robert Malton flew to Panama, arriving at Howard Air Force Base. The two were taken by a 3-7th SFG security element to SOCSOUTH headquarters at Albrook Air Station. There, Kestner briefed COL Jacobelly, who praised the two SOCAs in country. He told Kestner to help the SOCSOUTH J-3 and J-6 'plus up' signal support by writing a Statement of Requirements to justify more SOCAs.[57] Kestner worked with MAJ Roberto A. Ortiz, the J-6, and CPT Charles Cleveland, the S-3, 3-7th SFG.

As CPT Kestner worked to get more SOCAs into Panama, Hangar 450 at Albrook came under fire a second time, most likely stray rounds from a gunfight near Quarry Heights.[58] The SOCA radio operators noticed

that the radio signal was suddenly much weaker. Quickly checking their equipment, they discovered that the tactical satellite antenna atop the hangar was rendered inoperable by gunfire.[59] A backup system was activated, but it was a reminder that the fight was ongoing, despite major tactical successes in the opening days.

With the requirement for three additional SOCAs validated on 24 December 1989, the teams were notified.[60] SSG Thomas Plunkett, SGT Darell A. Brown, and SPC Glenn G. Oliver made up one of those SOCAs. Like many, SGT Brown had been to Central America multiple times since joining the 112th two years prior. This time, inclement weather at Fort Bragg presented an unexpected obstacle to him and the others assembling for deployment. A neighbor with a four-wheel drive (4x4) vehicle delivered SGT Brown to his unit.[61] LTC Sawdey sent out 4x4 trucks to gather others stranded by the snow.[62] Once all of the teams were present, they departed as scheduled, reporting to SOCSOUTH Headquarters on Christmas Day.[63]

Initially, the SOCAs in country were all located near Panama City, either at Albrook or Howard, but several 'pushed out' with supported ARSOF elements.[64] SGT Brown's SOCA team stayed at Albrook, providing a link between SOCSOUTH HQ and the teams at the remote forward operating bases (FOBs). SSG Thomas A. Ayers' SOCA team, by contrast, went to FOB 72 at Rio Hato airfield with Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) 710, 2-7th SFG, who had relieved the Rangers.

Sergeant (SGT) William D. Childs (left), Staff Sergeant (SSG) Henry N. McCrae (center), and SGT Darell A. Brown (right) pose in the SOCSOUTH radio room at Albrook Air Station in January 1990. All three were seasoned Special Operations Communications Assemblage (SOCA) operators, having multiple deployments to their credit. JUST CAUSE provided them their first combat deployment. (Photo courtesy of William D. Childs)

They kept information flowing between the Operational Detachments Alpha (ODAs) operating in the field and the ODB, and between the ODB and SOCSOUTH HQ.[65]

On 30 December, two more SOCA teams were validated to support the *ad hoc* Civil Military Operations Task Force being established to support Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY stability operations.[66] By the time these teams arrived on 1 January 1990, the PDF was largely neutralized and Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega was holed up in the *Nunciatura* in Panama City. Nonetheless, the lack of civil institutions and law enforcement presented problems.



SGT Childs, pictured above and in inset, was one of three 112th NCOs that SOCSOUTH Commander Colonel Robert C. 'Jake' Jacobelly took with him to *La Comandancia*, former Panama Defense Forces (PDF) headquarters in early January 1990.
(Photos courtesy of William D. Childs)



SOCA Locations during Operation JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY

When LTC Sawdey and his battalion command sergeant major (CSM) Louis 'Lou' Black got to Panama, he pushed to support all SF ODBs and ODAs operating throughout Panama with SOCAs.[67] They provided critical TACSAT capabilities and secure, real-time communications to forward SF elements. The SOCA supporting ODB 770, A/3-7th SFG was SOCA Team Four, made up of SFC Elijah C. Harvin, SGT William D. Childs, and SGT James Shepherd.[68]

Headquartered at La Chorrera, Panama, SOCA Team Four sent critical information and intelligence to the battalion, and provided the ODB commander with printed operations orders, intelligence assessments, and updated rules of engagement from SOCSOUTH. These were passed to the ODAs further afield.[69] "It was a fast-moving situation," recalls Higgins. "The SOCA instinctively distinguished routine from critical message traffic, and alerted the commander accordingly."[70] The SOCA Team Four mission with ODB 770 ended in mid-March 1990. Their two months of superb support did not go unnoticed.

The SOCSOUTH memorandum that awarded the Special Forces Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) as a combat patch for Operation JUST CAUSE participants included eighteen 112th Signal Battalion soldiers. When SOCA Team Four was inadvertently left off the list, MAJ Higgins formally requested his three SOCA communicators be added.[71] COL Jacobelly did so. "The 112th SOCA Team shared our hardships and dangers and manned the perimeter," Higgins explained. "That is why SFC Harvin's team earned the right to wear the SF shoulder patch."[72]

Conclusion

The 112th Signal Battalion presence in Panama peaked at 30 personnel in early January 1990. It included seven SOCA teams, LTC Sawdey, CSM Black, and several staff planners.[73] Some 112th soldiers redeployed back to Fort

In David, Panama, the SOCA team supporting Operational Detachment Alpha 773 operated out of the local sheriff's office. The SOCA set-up pictured here included TTY-76 teletype, AN/PCS-3 UHF satellite communications radio, AN/PRC-70 FM radio, various encryption devices, a power supply, data modem, and portable generator. The team's facsimile (fax) machine is located between the two racks. (Photos courtesy of William D. Childs)

CPT Steve Kestner (right) hands off the Company A, 112th Signal Battalion guidon to his battalion commander, LTC Steven R. Sawdey, at a June 1990 change-of-command ceremony. Incoming commander, CPT Eric G. David (center), stands ready to receive it. Kestner, David, and Sawdey all deployed to Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE. (Photo courtesy of James S. Kestner)

Takeaways:

1 The 112th Signal Battalion was conceived as an expeditionary unit, able to provide dedicated communications to SOF headquarters in two theaters simultaneously.

2 Five SOCA teams provided SOCSOUTH secure communications during Operation JUST CAUSE; two additional SOCAs supported civil-military operations during PROMOTE LIBERTY.

3 Due to the short duration of JUST CAUSE, the 112th Signal Battalion's large multichannel satellite terminals were not needed in Panama. It was truly a SOCA-led war.

Bragg in January and, by the end of March 1990, only a small element, led by CPT Eric G. David, was supporting stability operations.[74]

Although limited in numbers, the 'Shadow Warriors' in Panama 'punched above their weight,' providing SOCSOUTH and other ARSOF units secure communications when theater systems were overwhelmed.[75] MAJ Kropp reported that, "in many cases, the 112th provided the only communications lifeline available to deployed Special Operations elements" in Panama.[76] LTC Sawdey described the performance of his veterans as "magnificent."[77]

Some of those who spent Christmas 1989 in Panama would spend the next one in Saudi Arabia supporting Operation DESERT SHIELD. LTC Sawdey was not among them. He received orders for the Army War College, and handed over command to LTC Samuel R. Higdon in June 1990. Prior to leaving, Sawdey addressed his battalion. Noting the lack of fanfare for ARSOF returning from Panama, he told his soldiers, "It's in the nature of our character to be quiet professionals. Our identity is to be defined by what we accomplish, not who we are."[78] Every soldier in the formation nodded. "At that moment," CPT Kestner "knew the 112th Signal Battalion was a brotherhood."[79]

Post-Script

112th soldiers returning from Panama brought home a bullet-riddled satellite antenna, retrieved from atop Hangar 450, Albrook Air Station. LTC Sawdey had it mounted on a sturdy wooden base. It served as the 112th Signal Battalion Commander's Cup for years to come – a literal 'war trophy.'

The tactical satellite antenna damaged by hostile fire at Albrook Air Station, Panama, in December 1989 was returned to Fort Bragg, NC, following JUST CAUSE. LTC Sawdey had it mounted to a wooden base and donated it to the battalion. It became the 112th Signal Battalion Commander's Trophy. The inscription on the base of the 112th Signal Battalion Commander's Trophy describes the situation at the time it was damaged. The names of Company Commander and First Sergeant from each year's winning company line the top and bottom of the base. A close-up of the antenna reveals the bullet hole near its base that rendered it inoperable.

Acknowledgements:

The author would like to thank the veterans who made this article possible: MG (Ret.) James D. Bryan, COL (Ret.) Kevin M. Higgins, COL (Ret.) Steven R. Sawdey, COL (Ret.) Donald Kropp, COL (Ret.) James S. Kestner, SFC (Ret.) Thomas A. Ayers, SFC (Ret.) Steven I. Elizalde, SFC (Ret.) Darell A. Brown, Mark Buchner, and William D. Childs.

In memory of COL (Ret.) Steven R. Sawdey, the second Commander, 112th Signal Battalion, who passed away on 20 November 2019. He generously shared his recollections of the 112th, and its role in JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, with the author. He is remembered fondly by those who served with him, and especially by the 'Shadow Warriors' he led from 1988 to 1990.

Endnotes

1 COL (Ret.) Kevin M. Higgins email to Christopher E. Howard, "SUBJECT: Re: Note from the History Office, Thursday," 8 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Higgins email, date. "Before midnight on December 19, we launched four teams (Tinajitis-4, Cimmaron-4, Cerro Azul-9, Pacora Bridge-24) to remote corners of the battlefield and into uncertain situations. As we stood outside SOCSOUTH (TF BLACK), Albrook Hangar, awaiting the UH60s for pickup, the PDF opened fire."

2 Lawrence A. Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Operation JUST CAUSE, December 1989 – January 1990* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2014), 219, hereafter Yates, *Operation JUST CAUSE*, page number; Higgins email, 8 October 2019.

3 SFC (Ret.) Steven I. Elizalde, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 2 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

4 Higgins email, 8 October 2019; USASOC Post-Mission Briefing, "Operation JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY," 2, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. "The Pacora River Bridge was a critical node to prevent movement of [PDF] Battalion 2000 from Ft. Cimmaron to reinforce Torrijos-Tocumen Airport. A Task Force BLACK objective, MAJ Higgins and 21 [sic] other members of Co A-3/7th SFG (A) executed a hasty ambush (with AT-4 fire) on arrival to prevent a PDF convoy from reaching the Ranger airhead that had not yet been consolidated at the airport." Higgins' element was credited with destroying a six-vehicle convoy at the bridge, with AC-130 support. For more information on the Pacora River Bridge mission, see Yates, *Operation JUST CAUSE*, 210-220, and Michael E. Krivdo, "'Hold That Bridge,' the 7th Special Forces Group and Operation JUST CAUSE," 20 December 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/215407/hold_that_bridge_the_7th_special_forces_group_and_operation_just_cause.

5 Higgins email, 8 October 2019.

6 MG (Ret.) James D. 'Dave' Bryan, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 17 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Bryan interview, date; COL (Ret.) Donald Kropp interview with Christopher E. Howard, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Kropp interview, date; MG (Ret.) James D. Bryan email to Christopher E. Howard, "SUBJECT: Re: 112th in Panama," 2 December 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Forces (JUWTFs) were the precursors of both Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) and Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs). JUWTFs were not permanent, rather they were established by a Theater Combatant Commander for a specific operation or mission, and answered directly to a Joint Task Force (JTF). They were sometimes designated by a Theater designation such as JUWTF-A, for Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). In the early 1980s, "Special Operations" started supplanting "Unconventional Warfare" as the umbrella term for the Special Operations Forces (SOF) mission set. Theaters began adopting the term Special Operations Command (SOC) as early as 1983, in lieu of JUWTF. These SOCs, codified as Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) in 1986, were subordinate unified commands, vice temporary task forces. Concurrently, the terms JSOTF and Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) replaced JUWTF to refer to a TF established for specific operations or missions.

7 MG (Ret.) James D. 'Dave' Bryan, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 15 November 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Bryan interview, date. Bryan's experience as JUWTF J-6 (Communications Officer) during multiple U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) Joint Readiness Exercises (JRX) from 1974 to 1977 exposed him to joint SOF communications requirements. Bryan spearheaded efforts to modify existing 7th SFG signal equipment to better enable the JUWTF and Army Special Operations Forces to talk to the Joint Task Force (JTF). This kind of adaptive problem-solving proved valuable, once Bryan took command of the 112th Signal Battalion in 1986.

8 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; Kropp interview, 30 October 2019.

9 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; LTC J. David Bryan, "Theater Signal Support of Special Operations Forces Headquarters," 10 March 1989, https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA209806; MG (Ret.) James D. Bryan email to Christopher E. Howard, "SUBJECT: Re: 112th in Panama," 3 December 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

10 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

11 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; MG (Ret.) James D. 'Dave' Bryan email to Christopher E. Howard, "SUBJECT: Re: 112th in Panama," 28 November 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Bryan email, date. "The Army Signal Corps in the mid-80's," Bryan explained, "was equipped and organized for a European war with the Warsaw Pact - in other words, big trucks, big vans, big generators, huge logistics tail, and large numbers of Signal soldiers each trained in a single MOS. The 112th, on the other hand, was required to be highly deployable and mobile, highly mission-tailorable. To get those unique capabilities in the aggressive timeline we were facing to be [operational], we were moved up as an Army priority for fielding (its Master Priority List [MPL])."

12 Although the activation ceremony was held on 26 September 1986, the date of the activation orders, and hence in the official lineage and honors, was 17 September 1986. The battalion recognizes 17 September as its birthday.

13 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

14 LTC William E. Lane, "Joint Special Operations Task Force Communications: Tenets for Successful Operational Communications in Military Operations Other Than War," 19 May 1997, 4, https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA328080, hereafter Lane, "JSOTF Communications," page number; Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; Kropp interview, 30 October 2019. In the mid-1980s, the Army fielded a system called Mobile Subscriber Equipment, similar to a cellular phone network. The automation it permitted reduced the demand for Signal Corps positions. This, and the inactivation of a signal battalion in Germany, provided the billets used to create the 112th Signal Battalion. That the positions came from the Signal Corps, and not from within 1st SOCOM, helped protect the 112th from inactivation, when 1st SOCOM proposed to disband the battalion to create more Special Forces positions (circa 1989-90).

15 Bryan interview, 15 November 2019.

16 Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 11015J500: Special Operations Communications Battalion," 1 April 1985, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter TOE 11015J500, 1 April 1985.

17 Lane, "JSOTF Communications," 4. The Special Operations Task Force Europe (SOTFE) became SOCEUR in 1983; SOCSOUTH was established in 1986.

18 TOE 11015J500, 1 April 1985. When the battalion's two companies were regionally aligned with U.S. European Command and U.S. Southern Command, the SOCAs were divided equally between the companies (seven SOCAs each).

19 TOE 11015J500, 1 April 1985. Tactical communicator (i.e. SOCA) positions in the Forward Communications Support Company were coded with Direct Combat Probability Code P1, indicating the highest probability of combat. The initial TO&E called for the SOCA team leader to be an 18E (Special Forces Communications Sergeant), but this was not implemented, largely due to the fact that excess Signal Corps billets were used to man the battalion.

20 LTC Donald Kropp, "Task Force Communications: The Special Operations Paradigm," *Special Warfare* 6:2 (May 1993): 31, hereafter Kropp, "Task Force Communications," page number.

21 COL (Ret.) James S. Kestner, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 9 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Kestner interview, date.

22 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. "Despite the fact that the unit had formed during a period of relative peace where operational deployments and missions were sparse, both LTC Bryan and LTC Steven R. Sawdey [Bryan's successor] were looking for soldiers and leaders who were eager to accomplish much, establish an enduring unit identity, and succeed on every mission…To do this, they realized that we needed soldiers with the right skill sets and attitudes, and were equipped with communications equipment packages that made them expeditionary, and not just deployable."

23 Bryan interview, 15 November 2019. Bryan email, 28 November 2019. In his email, Bryan noted that "we did not have authority to select elite soldiers… [W]e received regular Army soldiers, sent them to jump school, and trained and trained them until they could perform a 2 or 3-soldier set of tasks. The soldiers rose to the challenge. They were not elite by selection but they became elite because of our training and the culture that we instilled in them from Day 1."

24 SFC (Ret.) Darell A. Brown, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 27 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Brown interview, date; Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

25 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; Brown interview, 27 September 2019; Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. 112th Signal Battalion veterans interviewed were in unanimous agreement that unit *esprit de corps* was high

during the period 1986-1990; most credited this to the leadership of LTC Bryan and LTC Sawdey, the first two battalion commanders.

26 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

27 Bryan email, 28 November 2019. "The strategy was straightforward: take what the Army had to issue and modify it to fit on a C-130; move from the ancient Army standard teletype to light weight commercial computers being built by Apple; and use the Army's PRC-70 high frequency (HF) and PSC-3 tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios until we could get something better, lighter, smaller and more capable." New requirements were prepared from scratch and industry was enlisted to rapidly develop new systems such as multi-band radios like the Harris-built PRC-117 and the LST-5 TACSAT.

28 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

29 Kropp, "Task Force Communications," 30-31; Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

30 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

31 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; William D. Childs, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 18 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Childs interview, date; Mark Buchner, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 18 November 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Buchner interview, date; Kropp interview, 30 October 2019; Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

32 Kropp, "Task Force Communications," 31.

33 Kropp, "Task Force Communications," 31; Jared A. Kline, "Joint Communications in support of Joint Task Force South during Operation Just Cause," (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), 217, https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA241732, hereafter Kline, "Joint Communications," page number. The CUCV modification was accomplished with assistance from both the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and Tobyhanna Army Depot. The TSC-93A it carried was a smaller version of the TSC-85A.

34 Kropp interview, 30 October 2019.

35 COL (Ret.) Steven R. Sawdey, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 3 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Sawdey interview, date.

36 Sawdey interview, 3 October 2019.

37 Sawdey interview, 3 October 2019; Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. "When manning shortfalls in the battalion forced us to accept non-airborne qualified soldiers, LTC Sawdey sought to preserve and protect the character of our unit by highlighting to Personnel Command (PERSCOM) that while the Army will always need solid professionals, they should accept that special requirement units demand a different skill set."

38 Kropp interview, 30 October 2019. Kropp recalls that LTC Sawdey was action-oriented, and wanted to 'sell' the battalion to the ARSOF community by getting in into the fight, whenever possible.

39 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

40 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

41 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

42 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. "Long-tabber" is Army lingo for a Special Forces-qualified soldier (i.e. a Green Beret). The Special Forces tab, worn on the left sleeve, is longer than the Airborne, Ranger, or Sapper tabs.

43 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019; Brown interview, 27 September 2019; Buchner interview, 18 November 2019. One such NCO was the Company B First Sergeant, David M. Dalton, who many early 112th Signal veterans remember fondly as 'Dog' Dalton. He provided no-nonsense leadership and tough, realistic training that prepared his soldiers, both physically and mentally, for their ARSOF support mission. In 1996, Dalton became the 112th Signal Battalion command sergeant major.

44 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019; Bryan interview 17 September 2019.

45 Bryan interview, 15 November 2019; Childs interview, 18 September 2019.

46 COL (Ret.) Charles T. Fry email to Robert D. Seals, "SUBJECT: Re: Hello Again from the History Office," 3 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

47 Buchner interview, 18 November 2019.

48 SFC (Ret.) Thomas Ayers, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 26 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Ayers interview, date.

49 Kropp interview, 30 October 2019. BLUE SPOON evolved from the USSOUTHCOM contingency plan for Panama, original named ELABORATE MAZE. It was renamed JUST CAUSE just prior to the December 1989 invasion.

50 Kropp interview, 30 October 2019.

51 Kline, "Joint Communications," 19-20, 29. "Ancon Hill [near Panama City] was a key microwave radio site, owing to its commanding position and its proximity to USSOUTHCOM Headquarters at Quarry Heights. The Soviet ships were signal intelligence collection stations that were assumed to be intercepting all non-secure telephone traffic that passed through Ancon Hill."

52 Kropp interview, 30 October 2019; Lawrence A. Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning, and Crisis Management, June 1987-December 1989* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2008), 45. 1st SOCOM planning for combat operation in Panama, initially under ELABORATE MAZE, began in March 1988, during a 7th SFG Emergency Readiness Deployment Exercise (EDRE) at Hurlburt Field, Florida, known as CASINO GAMBIT.

53 MAJ Donald Kropp, Memorandum for Public Affairs Officer, "Subject: Information regarding 112th Special Operations Signal Bn (ABN) Participation in Operation Just Cause," 27 December 1989, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter Kropp memorandum; 1st SOCOM, JUST CAUSE SITREPS, 20 December 1989, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter 1st SOCOM, JUST CAUSE SITREPS, date.

54 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. "Watching the invasion force secure Torrijos Airport, Rio Hato, and block the PDF Battalion 2000 at the Pacora River Bridge, leadership in our Battalion felt painfully invisible and could not understand why we weren't in the fight. Soldiers who had expected to be deployed now felt abandoned."

55 Kropp interview, 30 October 2019.

56 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019; Kropp interview, 30 October 2019.

57 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. "Envisioned to be a SOCSOUTH 'coordinating element,' LTC Sawdey and MAJ Kropp saw the thrust of our mission was to use the developing Statement of Requirements (SOR) to advocate for the follow-on deployment of our JSOTF Support Package, while simultaneously managing support and mission requirements for the SOCA Detachments already in country."

58 COL (Ret.) Kevin M. Higgins email to Christopher E. Howard, "SUBJECT: Re: Note from the History Office, Thursday," 10 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. "At 1200 on December 22, we stood around the wall-mounted TV in the Hangar watching the CNN live report of a gunfire exchange up above us at Quarry Heights. As we watched people on the TV ducking for cover on Quarry Heights, stray rounds from that event came ripping through the hangar, wounding a C/3-7 Master Sergeant."

59 COL (Ret.) James S. Kestner email to Christopher E. Howard, "SUBJECT: Re: Follow-Up Question," 16 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

60 1st SOCOM, JUST CAUSE SITREPS, 24 December 1989.

61 Brown interview, 27 September 2019.

62 Sawdey interview, 3 October 2019. LTC Sawdey also had to reassure family members, whose holiday plans had been interrupted by events in Panama. He was assisted in this by one spouse, who encouraged the others not to think of themselves, but of their husbands who were being plucked away on very short notice and sent to war.

63 1st SOCOM, JUST CAUSE SITREPS, 25 December 1989; Brown interview, 27 September 2019.

64 Ayers interview, 26 September 2019; Childs interview, 18 September 2019. In addition to Albrook Air Station and Howard Air Force Base, SOCAs were located at Rio Hato, Fort Davis, and Fort Clayton. Teams later pushed out to David and La Chorrera with supported 7th SFG elements.

65 Ayers interview, 26 September 2019; Brown interview, 27 September 2019. SOCAs in Panama used either the AN/LST-5 or AN/PSC-3, both UHF TACSAT systems, as their primary means of communication, backed up by

HF radio. Frequency modulation (FM) line-of-sight radio was used primarily for ground-to-air communications. Kline, "Joint Communications," 209: "The Motorola LST-5B was a single channel satellite radio capable of either voice or data communications. It could be secured for voice operation using the KY-57 VINSON secure device. Smaller and lighter than either the PRC-3 or the Motorola URC-101, it was very popular with the radio operators who had to carry it in a rucksack." Kline, "Joint Communications," 210: "The Cincinnati Electronics PSC-3 was a single channel satellite radio capable of either voice or data communications. It was the standard Army satellite radio. It was the least popular with the radio operators because it broke more easily than the Motorola radios. It could be secured for voice operation using the KY-57 VINSON secure device."

66 U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Deployment Order, 29 December 1989, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

67 Sawdey interview, 3 October 2019; Higgins email, 8 October 2019. In mid-January 1990, ODAs began to spread out across Panama's 30,000 square miles, from the Costa Rican to the Colombian border. Five-man SF teams patrolled towns and villages, restoring law and order and interfacing daily with the new political leadership. They supervised the organization and training of the new Panamanian Police Force (*Fuerza Publica de la Republica de Panama)*, many of whom were former members of Noriega's recently defeated PDF. MAJ Higgins was surely not alone in wondering how they would react to the SF presence: "In our rear-view mirror we know that all went well," Higgins said, "but at the time, we did not know [if the police would turn on their SF mentors or cooperate with them]."

68 Childs interview, 18 September 2019; Sawdey interview, 3 October 2019. SGT Childs was no stranger to Panama, having deployed there twice within fifteen months. Both of his prior deployments had been in support of SOCSOUTH, and he reported to its headquarters at Albrook Air Station for third time, upon arriving in country on 1 January 1990. A week later, he and two others from the 112th rode with COL Jacobelly to Manuel Noriega's former headquarters, the *Comandancia*, to look for signals-related intelligence. Childs' SOCA Team Four later pushed out to La Chorrera with ODB 770, and then to David, near the Panama-Costa Rica border. Conditions in David were rough, and raw sewage ran through the command post, but LTC Sawdey did not recall a single gripe: "They did their job, no matter how nasty it was."

69 Higgins email, 8 October 2019.

70 Higgins email, 8 October 2019. Higgins assessed the SOCAs to be as aware as anyone in the country of the Panama situation.

71 MAJ Kevin M. Higgins, "Memorandum for CDR SOUCSOUTH," no date, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

72 Higgins email, 8 October 2019.

73 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019; Sawdey interview, 3 October 2019. SOCAs that rotated into Panama after the conclusion of JUST CAUSE are not included in this number.

74 Brown interview, 27 September 2019; Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. CPT David returned home later in the spring 1990 to take company command. He was replaced by 1LT William 'Bill' Bishop.

75 Kropp memorandum. 112th soldiers also assisted the SOCSOUTH staff in the management of SOF tactical communications assets.

76 Kropp memorandum.

77 Sawdey interview, 3 October 2019.

78 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

79 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

CPT Steve Kestner (right) and another unidentified Company A, 112th Signal Battalion soldier (left) conduct rappel training at Fort Bragg, NC (circa 1988 - 1989).
(Photo courtesy of James S. Kestner)

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORTS THE ASSAULT

Company A, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion at the Torrijos International Airport Terminal

by Troy J. Sacquety

Abstract: *Three Company A, 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion soldiers attached to 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment met a greater than anticipated challenge at the Torrijos International Airport Terminal on the initial night of Operation JUST CAUSE. Bilingual language infantrymen were needed. They became a force multiplier when the Rangers were unexpectedly faced with hundreds of civilian airline passengers.*

Since 1974, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB) at Fort Bragg, NC, was the only active duty U.S. Army Civil Affairs unit. Having had a small role in URGENT FURY, the October 1983 invasion of Grenada, the battalion lacked combat experience. That changed when elements of the 96th CAB participated in the initial phase of Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama, on 20 December 1989. As the Latin American-oriented element of the 96th CAB, Company A received the mission to support the 75th Ranger Regiment's night-time parachute assault on the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport Complex. Not until after they boarded their aircraft did the CA personnel comprehend their primary function was to be bilingual infantrymen. Civil Affairs (CA) skills were used by happenchance. This article explains the actions of three CA soldiers from Company A, how they learned their true mission, and how they supported the Rangers during the assault on the Torrijos International Airport Terminal.

Active duty CA officers participated in planning for BLUE SPOON, the code name for military operations against Panama (later JUST CAUSE).[1] In the initial phase of BLUE SPOON, the 75th Ranger Task Force RED-Tango was to conduct a parachute assault to secure the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport Complex. 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, would seize Tocumen, the adjoining military airfield. Facing 350 Panama Defense Forces (PDF) soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Company and the Panamanian Air Force, that was anticipated to be most difficult mission. The simpler mission to secure Torrijos International Airport was assigned to Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th Rangers. Little resistance from security personnel was expected.[2] With a 0100 hours assault, the terminal would be relatively clear.

Company A, 96th CAB, attached nine of its best Spanish speakers to the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. Taken from throughout Company A, five officers and four enlisted men formed two teams. One four-man CA team (two officers and two enlisted) led by Captain (CPT) Terrence A. Lewis, would support 1st Ranger Battalion at Tocumen. The Company A commander, Major (MAJ) Harold A. Williams, led the other CA team, composed of himself, two other officers and two enlisted, that would support Company C, 3rd Ranger Battalion at Torrijos. The CA mission was to minimize civilian casualties, prevent their interference in combat operations, and help the Rangers meet "their legal and moral obligations to civilians," stated CPT Lewis.[3] However, none of the CA soldiers grasped that the Rangers wanted bilingual infantrymen; CA skills were secondary, if needed at all. Despite two airfield seizure rehearsals with the Rangers, the CA attachments had not realized why they were there. The most recent rehearsal had been at Duke Field, Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), FL, just days before the assault.[4]

96th Civil Affairs Battalion distinctive unit insignia.

Looking forward to Christmas at home, the leadership of Company A did not expect the 18 December mission alert. Still, they assembled quickly with weapons and gear. MAJ Williams, told that his CA teams were attached to Task Force RED-Tango, took his men to Pope AFB to catch an airplane to Hunter Army Airfield (HAAF), Savannah, GA.[5] At Pope AFB, the CA element, along with a six-man contingent from 1st Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion, watched their plane depart without them. Because the 82nd Airborne Division was also preparing to jump into Panama, there were no other aircraft available. Just after midnight, MAJ Williams was told that the CA and PSYOP teams would be driven to HAAF to join 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. Two vans were waiting. They drove through a snowstorm to reach HAAF by early morning, 19 December.[6] The two vans were stuffed with soldiers and equipment. CPT Victor M. Feliciano spent five hours traveling atop the piled equipment.[7]

At HAAF, the CA and PSYOP soldiers unloaded in pouring rain. They were soaked to the skin by the time pre-jump training was done. The Rangers, fearing heat casualties in Panama from overdressing, forbid the wear of cold weather clothing. Cold and miserable, the CA soldiers stood in line for first aid dressings, MREs, ammunition, and parachute issue. CPT Dean L. Foster's equipment weighed sixty-five pounds, excluding his M-16 ammunition, two fragmentation

The 96th CA Battalion in JUST CAUSE



Command Structure: 96th CAB (1 December 1989)

In 1989, the 96th CAB was the only Active Duty CA unit in the U.S. Army. Assigned to the 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM), United States Army Special Operations Command, it provided rapidly deployable elements capable of conducting CA missions worldwide. Its 125-130 personnel were organized into a Headquarters and Headquarters Company and four regionally-aligned companies.[1] Company A was oriented toward Latin America, Company B to the Pacific region, Company C to the Middle East, and Company D to Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.[2] In a regional contingency, if necessary, the personnel from one CA company would reinforce another. If additional CA forces were required, the Army Reserve Component, having 96 percent of the total CA force, would assist.[3]

Operation JUST CAUSE was the first time the entire 96th CAB deployed as a battalion, contrary to its structuring. Originally, the command element, 96th CAB, was to recommend the size of post-combat elements needed for stability operations. The 96th CAB was initially tasked for individual attachments. However, on/about 1200 hours on 21 December 1989, the Joint Staff ordered the entire unit to deploy to Panama.[4] The 96th CAB commander, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Michael P. Peters, directed that all personnel not on leave or on another assignment report for overseas deployment.[5] The 96th CAB (-) deployed late on the 21st, and arrived early morning, 22 December 1989. LTC Peters led 93 CA personnel and brought 18 vehicles to Panama.[6] Once in country, LTC Peters dispatched CA teams to all brigade-level combat units, assisted with humanitarian relief, and prepared for a weapons buyback program in accordance with disarming the PDF and Dignity Battalions.

grenades, riot grenades, smoke grenades, and a LAW [M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapon]." When he was issued the LAW, CPT Foster wondered how it would help him do CA tasks.[8] Like the other CA soldiers, he had not realized that they were simply bilingual infantrymen with CA skills.

While waiting to board their C-141 Starlifter aircraft, MAJ Williams rehearsed his men on actions after landing.[9] He made sure all remembered the operational passwords. This was especially critical for the enlisted men, who were native Spanish speakers with thick accents. They did not want to be mistaken for Panamanians on the dark drop zone. While they prepared, the two-man United States Air Force (USAF) Combat Tactical Air Controller Team arrived.

Minutes before boarding the aircraft, the Rangers told MAJ Williams to cut two CA troops. The USAF team, critical to guiding the subsequent parachute assault of the 82d Airborne Division, took their seats. MAJ Williams cut two officers lacking language proficiency. The decision was easy. CPTs Foster and Jerry D. Jackson were the weakest Spanish speakers.[10] CA skills were not deemed critical for the attack. The Rangers were focused on how best to secure their objectives.

The remaining seven CA soldiers tactically cross-loaded by splitting into three groups to board separate aircraft.[11] Like the Rangers, the CA troops wore regular T-10 parachutes. Two hours prior to jumping, they donned the rest of their equipment. They struggled to do this in the packed aircraft. The Rangers also gave periodic updates. One message said that a heavy machine gun might be located near the assembly area. Whoever got there first was to take it out. It finally occurred to the CA troops that they were just infantry assault troops.[12] As the C-141s approached the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport Complex, the soldiers stood and hooked up their static lines. When the doors were opened, hot tropical air blasted inside. The 'green light' came on at 0103 hours, 20 December, and they began shuffling to the door to parachute into the darkness.

They jumped at 500 feet above ground level in a single pass. Because many of the heavily-laden soldiers landed on the tarmac runways and taxiways, more than a dozen Rangers suffered leg injuries. Two enlisted CA soldiers

Jump into Night, Torrijos Airport by Al Sprague, 1990. Rangers parachute from their aircraft at 0103 hours, 20 December 1989, onto the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport Complex.



suffered debilitating injuries, reducing their contingent to five.[13] CPT Lewis recalled, "I knew I hit hard because even though I had on…heavy equipment, my legs still went through the complete motion of a PLF [Parachute Landing Fall], but they flew over my head."[14]

After recovering and shedding their parachutes, the CA soldiers headed towards their assembly area. Fortunately, there was no heavy machinegun. The injured were dropped at a casualty collection point as the two CA teams joined their Ranger units. CPT Lewis and Corporal Ricardo F. Barros went with the Rangers attacking Tocumen, while the three-man team of MAJ Williams, CPT Feliciano, and Sergeant (SGT) Miquel Barbosa-Figueroa joined the First Sergeant of Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment to head to Torrijos International Airport.

The three, twenty-four-man Ranger platoons in Company C had their objectives; 3rd and 1st Platoon would secure the perimeter around the Torrijos Airport Terminal to prevent anyone from entering or leaving. Second Platoon would clear the three-story terminal building. As 3rd Platoon moved to cordon the northern approach, they encountered a fire station. A bilingual Ranger told the civilian firemen to surrender. The fifteen firemen walked out with their hands up.[15] They were quickly searched for weapons and had their hands flex-cuffed behind their backs. A few Rangers escorted the 'prisoners' to the rear. Their status would be sorted out later. The number of personnel captured grew as 1st Platoon secured its assigned sector.

As 1st Platoon moved to control the south, they surrounded a restaurant near the terminal entrance. Inside were eighteen civilians completely unaware that the airfield was under attack. Since their identities were unknown (civilians or PDF in civilian clothes), a bilingual Ranger convinced them to surrender. They were also searched and flex-cuffed. That done, 1st Platoon moved to secure the terminal entrance as they established a 'prisoner' collection point in a nearby parking lot. MAJ Williams and his two men questioned the 'prisoners' for information of immediate operational value. The CA team's role became more complicated as the 2nd Platoon began securing the terminal.

Some 2nd Platoon Rangers were dispatched to check the parked aircraft. Then, they went into the *Eastern Airlines* baggage handling area. They found, searched, flex-tied, and then escorted four workers to the collection point. As the rest of 2nd Platoon approached the terminal, they came under mortar fire. They rushed for cover inside the terminal and were surprised by lots of passengers wandering around.

Torrijos suddenly became the most difficult objective. Nothing went as rehearsed. The PDF put up more determined resistance in the Torrijos International Airport Terminal than at Tocumen. And, despite rehearsals that assumed there would not be passengers in the terminal, a late-arriving Brazilian airliner changed everything. Nearly 400 frantic civilians were inside the terminal when the 2nd Platoon stormed inside. The surprised Company C commander, CPT Alfred E. Dochnal, recalled the chaos. "I ran downstairs [at the terminal], and I'm getting more reports. 'Hey sir, we just found another 50 [civilians] in this area,' and all of a sudden it's 150, 200, then it's 300. And I'm going upstairs saying 'Holy shit.' We're taking people out from behind the baggage counter and all over the airport."[16] The Rangers rounded up, searched, and flex-tied the civilians, who were added to the couple dozen already in the collection area. The CA team rose to the challenge.

The Torrijos International Airport Terminal, the morning of 20 December 1989. Soldiers from 2nd Platoon, C/3/75th Ranger Regiment searched the jets in the foreground prior to assaulting the terminal building.

Top: This grainy photo shows the chaotic situation at the collection point just outside the terminal building entrance. In the foreground, lying on the pavement are Panamanian detainees with hands flex-tied behind their backs. Behind them in a much larger group are the airline passengers. **Bottom:** Several PDF put up a fight in a bathroom of the Torrijos International Airport Terminal, but the facility suffered relatively minor damage. Fortunately, no civilians were killed.

Like the Rangers, the CA team had expected to deal with a few dozen civilians. Now, MAJ Williams's main worry was PDF soldiers in civilian clothes mixed into the group. He had to think fast about how to manage the chaos. MAJ Williams quickly briefed his team. First, they had to calm the frightened group. Then, they needed to separate the crowd into three groups: enemy prisoners of war, Panamanian civilian workers, and civilian passengers. The three CA soldiers addressed the group in stern, but clear Spanish, then repeated it in English for Portuguese speakers. Everyone was told to remain calm, obey instructions, and were assured that they would not be harmed. Then, the CA team began identifying the Panamanians.

MAJ Williams and CPT Feliciano spoke in Spanish and began checking identification documents. Once identified, the Panamanians were isolated and questioned by SGT Barbosa-Figueroa to establish their status.[17] At all times, the sergeant was alert for information of immediate tactical value.[18] SGT Barbosa-Figueroa learned the Rangers had missed a group of Panamanian officials.

Several National Investigation Department (DENI) agents had barricaded themselves in an office. SGT Barbosa-Figueroa led several Rangers to the room. Talking through the door, SGT Barbosa-Figueroa elicited their surrender. Eight DENI agents came out. The Rangers also collected twelve weapons. Common sense approaches defused potentially dangerous situations and prevented casualties. The CA team also assisted in the immediate aftermath.

During the airport clearing, some PDF soldiers set a 3rd floor terminal office afire. The CA soldiers asked the detained firemen to help put out the fire. They agreed. The Rangers removed their flex cuffs and escorted them to the burning office.

That accomplished, the CA team focused on the civilian passengers. MAJ Williams prioritized the most pressing needs. First, the Ranger medics provided medical care. Then, the elderly passengers were escorted to bathrooms. The CA team used passports to prepare a passenger list. Those with diplomatic passports were allowed to collect their luggage and leave.[19] Finally, with the group segregated, they focused on families with children.

Several young children were hungry. MAJ Williams asked the owner of the restaurant secured by 1st Platoon if he would feed the hungry kids. MAJ Williams offered him cash (from his Operations Fund [OPFUND]). A few Rangers escorted the group to the restaurant. This simple gesture of kindness was noticed and appreciated. At 0700 on 20 December, MAJ Williams turned the three groups of now 'detainees' over to the 820th Military Police Company, 82d Airborne Division.[20]

Takeaways:

1 Despite two rehearsals with the 75th Ranger Regiment, Company A, 96th CAB soldiers did not realize until they were flying to Panama that they were infantrymen first; CA skills were secondary.

2 Their purpose during the assault was communicating with any Panamanians encountered.

3 The CA assistance with civilians was critical to seizing the Torrijos International Airport Terminal without non-comatant casualties.

The three CA soldiers from Company A had made a combat jump with the Rangers and demonstrated value added to the assault force at Torrijos. Despite serving primarily as infantrymen, they were flexible, displayed initiative, and innovatively solved difficult challenges. Once the CA soldiers understood their role, they excelled. And, the Rangers appreciated their cultural assistance with hundreds of unexpected passengers. The Spanish-speaking CA team collected actionable information, organized the firemen to put out a fire in the terminal, and continuously helped the detained civilians. Their professionalism foreshadowed what the 96th CAB would be expected to accomplish as it was assigned larger roles.

Endnotes

1 Lawrence A. Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning, and Crisis Management June 1987-December 1989* (Washington, DC, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008), 90. CA would assist in combat operations and support public health and safety. In the next phase, CA would help restore essential services to Panama. In the long term, CA would help the Panamanian Government establish a police force. Once the 96th CAB elements finished assisting during combat operations, they would transition to stability operations under PROMOTE LIBERTY, the operational name for the stability and nation building phase. See Ronald H. Cole, *Operation JUST CAUSE: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama February 1988-January 1990*. (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1995), 9.

2 Lawrence A. Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Operation JUST CAUSE December 1989-January 1990* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2014), 222-224.

3 AFRTS video, "Civil Affairs in the Attack," copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

4 Yates, *JUST CAUSE*, 225.

5 Four other CA soldiers from A/96th airlanded with the 2nd and 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Rio Hato.

6 CPT Terrence A. Lewis, CPT Kenneth R. Carter, Jr., CPT Victor Feleciano [sic], CPT Dean L. Foster, SSG Jose A. Pabon, SGT Miguel Barbosa-Figueroa, CPL Ricardo F. Barros, interview by MAJ Robert P. Cook, 326th Military History Detachment, 11 April 1990, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter name and date.

7 Lewis interview, 11 April 1990.

8 Foster interview, 11 April 1990.

9 Lewis interview, 11 April 1990.

10 They later flew to Howard Air Force Base, Panama, and joined A/96th CAB at Torrijos.

11 Four C-130 and seven C-141 aircraft carried paratroopers. Another five C-141s carried supplies and equipment.

12 Lewis interview, 11 April 1990.

13 The two wounded enlisted men were evacuated to Letterman Army Hospital, San Antonio, Texas for recovery. The 96th CAB rear detachment commander, CPT David R. Dreager, arranged for their family members at Fort Bragg to speak with them. Both received the Combat Infantry Badge and Purple Heart from Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono. CPT David R. Draeger and CPT James G. McAffrey, interview by SSG Gerry Albin, 326th Military History Detachment, 11 April 1990, copy in USASOC History Office classified files, Fort Bragg, NC.

14 Lewis interview, Operation JUST CAUSE Oral Interview Tape 48.

15 Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 206.

16 Donnelly, *Operation Just Cause,* 211.

17 Kirk Wyckoff, "Civil Affairs Mission: Jump Start Panama," *Paraglide*, 22 March 1990, 7A, copy in Folder, ARSOF News clips for MAR 1990, Folder 23, 2003.0018, Box 3, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

18 Wyckoff, "Civil Affairs Mission: Jump Start Panama."

19 Wyckoff, "Civil Affairs Mission: Jump Start Panama."

20 Yates, *JUST CAUSE*, 235.

The 96th CA Battalion in JUST CAUSE Endnotes

1 COL (ret) Michael P. Peters, interview with Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 12 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Peters interview.

2 Donna Miles, "A Real Life Mission Helping Real Life People," *Soldiers* (April 1990), 8.

3 Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command History and Archives Division, 1993), 372.

4 Commander, 1st SOCOM to Commander, USASOC, Operation JUST CAUSE sitrep, 21 December 1989, copy in Folder Operation JUST CAUSE SITREPs, 1st SOCOM, 2006.0052, Box 1, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

5 During JUST CAUSE, the 96th CAB had a team from Company A supporting JTF BRAVO in Soto Cano, Honduras, and a team from Company B in Okinawa working with the 1st Special Forces Group. Peters interview.

6 One additional vehicle and a few personnel returning from leave arrived later. The total 96th CAB commitment in JUST CAUSE was 109 personnel, thirteen M1008 CUCVs, four M1009 CUCVs, and an M35A2 truck. See USASOC Briefing-JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY, 11 April 90, copy in Folder 31, 2006.0052, Box 1, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.


ARMOR, VEST, M-1952A
MEDIUM
STEIN BROS. MFG. CO.
24 MARCH, 1954 Q.M. 34420
N. Y. Q. M. P. A.
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ARMOR, VEST, M-1952A
THIS VEST MAY SAVE YOUR LIFE!
WHEN PROPERLY WORN IT WILL PROTECT VITAL AREAS AGAINST SHELL AND GRENADE FRAGMENTS WHICH CAUSE MOST COMBAT CASUALITIES.
FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS:
WEAR VEST OVER SHIRT AND UNDER FIELD JACKET. ADJUST SIDE LACES TO MAKE VEST FIT THE BODY, BUT STILL PROVIDE PROPER VENTILATION.
DO NOT FIT TOO TIGHTLY.
USE PROTECTIVE FLAPS TO COVER OPENING UNDER SIDE LACES AND SLIDE FASTENER. PROTECT SLIDE FASTENER BY FASTENING SNAP CLOSURE.

This Vest May Save Your Life!

U.S. Army Body Armor from World War II to Present

Christopher E. Howard

Abstract: *The adage 'speed is security' applies to vehicles, aircraft, or individual soldiers. But security, increased by armor, can reduce mobility. Since World War II, the U.S. Army has worked to develop body armor that acceptably balances these two competing factors.*

> *"The use of body armor is motivated by one of the most powerful impulses in our psychological makeup, i.e., the desire to survive. In the heat of actual combat, soldiers have reported later, time and again, that they rarely notice the weight and bulkiness of the vests. In these tense periods it seems that the desire for protection outweighs the physiological deficit resulting from the added burden."*[1]

This observation was made in 1952 by the U.S. Army Body Armor Test Team, during the field test of the Army T-52-1 body armor vest with front-line troops in Korea. The team found that the new vest stopped 75.7 percent of all fragments, and 24.4 percent of small arms projectiles.[2] This was remarkable progress, given the state of body armor development when the Korean War started in 1950.

Since then, the U.S. Army has continuously developed body armor to increase the survivability of soldiers. This article summarizes the advancements in U.S. Army body armor from World War II to the present. It also includes a brief description of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) body armor initiatives, specifically through its Special Operations Forces (SOF) Personal Equipment Advanced Requirements (SPEAR) program.

Left: The inside tag of the M-1952A vest bore a clear message: "This Vest May Save Your Life!"

World War II

During World War II, under the direction of its Command Surgeon, Colonel Malcolm C. Grow, the U.S. Army Eighth Air Force pioneered the development of modern body armor.[3] In 1943, bomber pilots and aircrew in the 'Mighty Eighth' began receiving an armored vest manufactured in Great Britain.[4] Incorporating two-inch square manganese steel plates, sewn into a canvas vest, it protected against shrapnel from exploding antiaircraft shells, commonly known as 'flak.'[5] Once testing was complete, the design was standardized and U.S. Army aviation vest manufacturing was moved stateside.[6] Officially dubbed the Flyer's Vest, M1, the vests were more commonly referred to as 'flak vests' and 'flak suits.'[7]

The 17 pound, 6 ounce weight of the M1 vest was not a significant issue for bomber pilots and seated crew

M1
The Flyer's Vest, M1, seen here with the Flyer's Apron, M3, was developed during World War II to protect U.S. Army Air Forces bomber crew from antiaircraft shell fragments. Combined, the armor vest and apron weighed approximately 22 pounds.

"A miss – almost," were the words of this B-17 *Flying Fortress* waist gunner, seen here holding his damaged M1 Flyer's Vest (left) and parachute pad (right).
(Photo Credit: U.S. Army Center of Military History)

M12
Developed late in World War II, the *Armor, Vest - M12* incorporated aluminum plates sewn into nylon and weighed 12 pounds, 3 ounces. The vest pictured here includes the optional Apron, T-65. The M-12 was used in Korea until newer vests could be fielded.
(Photo Credit: National Infantry Museum)

M-1952
The *Armor, Vest, M-1952* was an all nylon vest that weighed 8.5 pounds. M-1952A vests began reaching U.S. Army troops in Korea in late 1952, and remained in service through the Vietnam War.

M-69
The *Armor, Body Fragmentation Protective, with ¾ Collar*, better known as the M-69, was fielded during the Vietnam War. The M-69 was very similar to the M-1952 it replaced, but included a stiff collar that provided neck protection, but sometimes interfered with the wear of the M1 steel helmet.

members, some of whom sat on their vests, because the greatest threat came from below the aircraft. Sitting was not an option for the waist gunners, who manned .50 caliber machine guns on either side of the fuselage.[8] In time, specialized armor was provided to crew members, based on their biggest threats. The Flyer's Apron, M3 was for crewmen in confined spaces, such as ball turret gunners; the Flyer's Apron, M4, for waist gunners; and Groin Armor, M5, for seated personnel (pilots, copilots, bombardiers, and navigators).[9] By war's end, over 300,000 Flyer's Vest, M1s, had been produced, along with nearly 100,000 Flyer's Vest, M2 designs, the latter of which was provided to pilots and copilots, who sat in armored cockpit seats.[10]

A 1944 Eighth Air Force study of battle casualties reported that body armor had led to a reduction in fatalities from thoracic [chest] wounds (36 to 8 percent) and from abdominal wounds (39 to 7 percent).[11] This data, complemented by first-hand bomber crew testimonials, validated the effectiveness of body armor. Still, the Army initially rejected armor for ground troops, due to its weight and restrictive designs.[12] Late in the war, the Army Ordnance Corps developed the 12-pound M-12 vest, consisting of aluminum plates and nylon fabric. The war in the Pacific ended before the field tests could be conducted.[13]

In 1947, the Army Ordnance Corps relinquished body armor development to the Quartermaster Corps. Based on the threat facing U.S. soldiers, it focused on armor for engineer troops doing mine clearance.[14] A 1949 Army study determined that armor for active ground troops was impractical, based on weight.[15] Thus, when war erupted in Korea in June 1950, the WWII-era M-12 vest was pressed into service as a 'stop-gap' measure, until better designs could be fielded.[16]

Korean and Vietnam Wars

Two successful body armor designs emerged during the Korean War. The first, the M-1951 vest, resulted from joint Army-Marine Corps experiments. It incorporated nylon and Doron, a laminated fiberglass material developed during World War II.[17] Weighing just under eight pounds, this 'Marine Vest' was issued to both Army and Marine troops.[18] The second design was the Army's M-1952A Body Armor, Fragmentation Protective, an 8.5 pound vest made up of twelve layers of flexible laminated nylon.[19] It proved effective in field tests, but did not begin reaching front-line troops until late 1952, and then only in relatively small quantities.[20]

During the Vietnam War, the M-1952 was still widely issued, along with the M-1955, which replaced the M-1951 'Marine Vest.' The M-1952 was replaced by the Body Armor, Fragmentation Protective Vest with

3/4-inch Collar, M-69. Weighing 8.4 pounds, the M-69 vest was very similar to the M-1952, consisting of twelve layers of ballistic nylon filler, sealed in a waterproof casing.[21] Its main improvement was the protective collar, which was disliked for interfering with the wear of the M1 helmet.[22] Despite armor availability, soldiers seldom wore body armor while patrolling, as it was bulky and trapped heat and moisture in tropical Vietnam.[23] Instead, it was worn by troops manning static defensive positions, and those in unarmored vehicle convoys.[24]

While ground troops found body armor lacking during Vietnam, Army aviators fared somewhat better. During the Korean War, helicopter pilots and crew had not been provided body armor, as it limited the payload of the underpowered early helicopters. More powerful troop-carrying helicopters in Vietnam attracted more ground fire. At first, World War II and Korean War-era body armor was issued but, in 1963, the Army provided body armor made specifically for aviators. However, it was not well-received by pilots, due to its 18.5-pound weight, restrictions on movement, and tropical temperatures.[25]

In 1964, the Army introduced ceramic plates to aviator armor, to protect aircrew from .30 caliber armor-piercing bullets.[26] An improved version was introduced in 1966 that provided increased protection and comfort, but weighed 28.5 pounds.[27] However, the plates had a tendency to splinter when hit, endangering pilots and aircrew with secondary fragmentation. A field-expedient solution was to wear standard issue M-1952A or M-69 vests over their plates, to contain the fragments.[28] Helicopter door gunners and crew chiefs wore like armor, but with an additional back plate that added eight pounds.[29] In the early 1970s, a new vest was tested that, according to an August 1972 Army report, was "less bulky and present[ed] fewer wearer and production problems than any system to date."[30] It concluded that the new vest "is more satisfactory than wearing the standard flak vest over the small arms protective ceramic plates."[31]

Post-Vietnam to 9/11

Throughout the Vietnam War, body armor for ground troops was Korean War-vintage. The Army relied on laminated nylon primarily for ballistic protection, judging it superior to steel in stopping fragments.[32] Despite the increase in small arms wounds in Vietnam, 'variable-type' armor that combined 'soft' fragmentation protection and 'hard' small arms protection did not reach ground troops until 1969, and then in limited quantities.[33] Post-Vietnam, the Army began redesigning its body armor with a promising new lightweight material: Kevlar.

In 1983, the Army introduced the Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT), a Kevlar 'soft' armor vest in camouflage print. At nine pounds, the PASGT vest weighed slightly more than the M-69, but provided better fragmentation protection, was more flexible, and fit better. Some U.S. soldiers wore PASGT vests in Grenada (Operation URGENT FURY) in 1983, Panama (Operation JUST CAUSE) in 1989-90, and in the Middle East (DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM) in 1990-91.

PASGT
The *Body Armor, Fragmentation Protective Vest, Ground Troops*, better known as the PASGT, provided better protection with its Kevlar inserts than the ballistic nylon vests used in Korea and Vietnam (M-1952 and M-69), with no significant weight increase.

U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center

Since 1954, the U.S. Army has conducted body armor research and development at the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Systems Center (NSSC) in Natick, Massachusetts. Known by several names over the years, Natick's Combat Capabilities Development Command (CCDC) Soldier Center continues to optimize and modernize soldier performance, to increase combat readiness and lethality. As part of the new Army Futures Command, the CCDC Soldier Center and its Soldier Protection and Survivability Directorate continuously works to **"lighten the soldier's load and keep our warfighters protected, optimized and lethal."**[1]

U.S. Army CCDC Soldier Center logo.

U.S. Army Rangers put their new Ranger Body Armor (RBA) to the test during the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993.

RBA
Ranger Body Armor was the first Army vest to combine a ceramic plate for 'hard' small arms protection with 'soft' Kevlar fragmentation protection. It influenced subsequent designs, including the Interceptor Body Armor, and marked the transition away from 'flak jackets' that provided only fragmentation protection. Initially fielded with just a front plate, the vest shown here was designed to carry front and back plates.
(Photo Credit: U.S. Army CCDC)

ISAPO
The Interim Small Arms Protective Insert (ISAPO) incorporated front and back ceramic plates and weighed 16 pounds. When worn over the PASGT vest, the complete system weighed 25 pounds.
(Photo Credit: U.S. Army photo/David Kamm)

To meet the unique fighting requirements of the Army Rangers, the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center developed the PS-930 Ranger Body Armor (RBA) in the early 1990s.[34] The RBA had the same Kevlar inserts as the PASGT, but also had an eight-pound aluminum oxide ceramic plate to protect the front torso from 7.62mm ball ammunition. During the Battle of Mogadishu, October 1993, it saved lives and reduced the seriousness of bullet wounds.[35] The later addition of a back plate brought its weight up to 25.1 pounds.

The value of 'hard armor' plates was validated in Somalia. In 1996, the Army fielded the Interim Small Arms Protective Overvest (ISAPO), a 'plate carrier' with front and back boron carbide ceramic plates to stop 7.62mm bullets. It was worn over the PASGT, adding 12 to 16 pounds, depending on the size of the plates, for a total weight of 21 to 25 pounds. 'Interim' meant fewer than 4,000 ISAPO were fielded.[36] Yet, the RBA and ISAPO marked a departure from 'flak jackets,' for fragmentation protection, to body armor that protected against fragmentation and small arms fire. The cost was more weight to carry while climbing over obstacles and running.

The Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), introduced in June 1999, solidified this transition. With improved Kevlar inserts in an Outer Tactical Vest (OTV), the wearer could survive fragmentation and 9mm pistol bullets. Two boron carbide ceramic Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) enabled the wearer to withstand

multiple strikes from 7.62mm ball ammunition hits. At 8.4 pounds, the OTV was lighter than the PASGT. The inclusion of two SAPI plates raised the weight to 16.4 pounds, still about nine pounds less than the PASGT with ISAPO.[37] An additional benefit of the new OTV was its compatibility with Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment (MOLLE), which allowed accessories such as pistol holsters, ammunition pouches, and first aid kits to be attached to the outside of the armor vest. Relatively few IBAs had been fielded when terrorists attacked the United States on 11 September 2001.

Post 9/11

Soldiers in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) initially wore a combination of the new IBA and legacy RBA and PASGT vests. The large commitment of ground forces to OIF raised an issue: only one set of SAPI plates was issued for every three OTVs fielded because of SAPI costs ($712/set). The U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) got an exception to Army policy, and received one set of SAPIs for all OTVs. Not all Army units were that fortunate.[38] In October 2003, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) directed that all soldiers and Department of Defense civilians in its theater would be issued "one suit of body armor" (i.e., OTV, with SAPIs).[39] By 2006, the Army had fielded 953,079 OTVs and 896,069 sets of SAPI plates.[40]

Studies of combat wounds during OIF and OEF prompted incremental improvements to the IBA. Deltoid and Axillary Protectors (DAPs), weighing three pounds, were added in 2004, extending fragmentation protection to the upper arms and shoulders.[41] In 2006, two Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts (ESBIs) were attached to the IBA in side pouches to expand 'hard' protection to vulnerable abdominal areas, adding five more pounds.[42] Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert (ESAPI) plates capable of stopping .30 caliber armor piercing ammunition were also fielded (5.5 lbs. ea.), replacing the earlier SAPIs (4 lbs. ea.).[43] Complete, the IBA weighed 33 pounds, without factoring the weight of other gear attached to the vest, such as ammunition magazines, pistol, radio, first aid kit, and canteens or hydration carrier.[44]

IBA
The Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) initially consisted of the Outer Tactical Vest for fragmentation protection (shown here), and front and back Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates. Removable neck, throat, and groin protection was also provided that increased weight and decreased comfort. Deltoid and Axillary Protectors (DAPs) and Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts (ESBIs) were added later, in response to emerging threats, pushing the total weight over thirty pounds.

The assortment of body armor vests initially employed in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is on display in this photo of an Information Operations (IO) 'Tiger Team' operating in Mosul, Iraq, in April 2003. In the front row, the soldiers on either end are wearing Ranger Body Armor (RBA), while the other three soldiers have Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). In back, the soldier on the far right has the Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) vest, and the captain in the center is wearing the Body Armor Load Carrying System (BALCS).

IOTV
The Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV), shown here with Deltoid and Axillary Protectors (DAPs), was first introduced in 2007. It provided a similar level of protection as the IBA that it replaced, but benefitted from a quick release that made it easier to remove in the case of emergency.

To address issues of weight and comfort, the U.S. Army Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier introduced the Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) in 2007. The IOTV provided a similar level of protection as the IBA, and used many of the same 'add-on' components (DAPs, ESBI, and groin protector). Its primary advantage over the IBA was a quick release mechanism that allowed the wearer to remove the vest rapidly in emergency situations, such as a vehicle rollover, fire, or submersion, and provided quick access to wounds. Advertised as lightweight, a complete IOTV weighed approximately 32 pounds.[45]

Motivated by constituent concerns, particularly those from the parents of service members, Congress questioned whether the Department of Defense was too slow to develop lighter-weight body armor.[46] In a 2011 hearing, Army Brigadier General (BG) Peter N. Fuller, Commanding General, PEO Soldier, admitted to a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that body armor had "hit a technical wall" with regard to weight.[47] He also acknowledged the necessity of making tradeoffs in the level of ballistic protection and area of coverage, in order to "provide Soldiers with relief from the weight of body armor."[48]

BG Fuller's conclusions were echoed in an Army-commissioned RAND Corporation study entitled "Lightening Body Armor" (2012). The good news was that the current body armor worked: "There have not been any known penetration of the body armor or fatalities associated with the threat of projectiles that the currently issued body armor is designed to stop."[49] The bad news was that there was no 'silver bullet' solution to the weight problem.[50]

To address these concerns about body armor weight, PEO Soldier introduced the Soldier Plate Carrier System (SPCS) in 2010, a lighter-weight alternative to the IOTV with front, back, and side ballistic plates. At 22 pounds, it weighed 10 pounds less than a fully-loaded IOTV, but lacked 'soft' armor fragmentation protection.[51] It was issued primarily to troops deploying to Afghanistan, where high altitude and difficult terrain made mobility a greater concern.[52] Meanwhile, the balance of the Army continued wearing the IOTV. Both the IOTV and the SPCS are still in service, while the Army tests its newest design: the Modular Scalable Vest (MSV).

Part of the Army's comprehensive Solder Protection System (SPS), the MSV weighs 25 pounds and offers a greater range of motion, better cooling, and an overall better fit than the IOTV.[53] The system includes a ballistic combat shirt, blast pelvic protector, integrated head protective system, and transition combat eye protection. Some components of the system have been fielded and the complete system was scheduled for field testing in fiscal year 2019.[54] How much the final SPS configuration will reduce the soldier's load remains to be seen.

Special Operations Body Armor

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) pursues body armor solutions for ARSOF soldiers through the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)-funded SOF Equipment Personal Advanced Requirements (SPEAR) program.[55] Modular body armor and load bearing equipment development has been part of the SPEAR charter since 1996.[56] It first led to the Body Armor and Load Carrying System (BALCS) in 1999.

Within USASOC, the BALCS was issued primarily to Rangers and Special Forces soldiers.[57] Tactical

BALCS
The Body Armor Load Carrying System (BALCS) vest, an early USSOCOM body armor design, was worn by Special Forces soldiers early in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. *(Photo Credit: US Army CCDC Soldier Center)*



Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA) and ARSOF support soldiers were issued SPEAR armor as it became available; standard issue body armor (IBA, IOTV, and SPCS) were interim substitutes.[58] SPEAR also helped ARSOF aviators through its 'Aircrew' initiative. Subsequent SPEAR designs included the Releasable Body Army Vest (RBAV) and the Modular Body Armor Vest (MBAV).

Through SPEAR, USSOCOM has impacted Army body armor development, as seen in the SPCS and MSV.[59] The SPEAR program also influenced the development of the Army's ESAPI plates.[60] This trend continues with the fielding of the latest generation of SPEAR body armor, the Adaptive Vest System (AVS), in 2014.[61] Part of the Family of Tactical Ballistic Armor (FTBA), the AVS is similar in concept and design to the MSV, but uses lighter ballistic plates and Modular Supplemental Armor Protection (MSAP), instead of the Army ESAPI and ESBI plates.[62]

Conclusion

Since the Korean War, the U.S. Army has issued body armor to enhance solider survivability. The level of protection afforded has increased considerably since the first M-12 vests reached Korea, but the associated weight has exacted a toll on soldier mobility and effectiveness.[63] Until the introduction of the Ranger Body Armor and Interim Small Arms Protective Overvest in the mid-1990s, individual body armor seldom weighed more than ten pounds. Since then, it has seldom weighed less than 25 pounds, as efforts to lighten soldier loads have been offset by the weight of additional armor.

Absent a breakthrough in lighter-weight materials, 'scalable' and 'modular' have become the go-to concepts in the past decade. Through its SPEAR program, USSOCOM led the way for modular body armor; the Army followed suit, with its multi-layered Soldier Protection System, featuring the Modular Scalable Vest. 'Scaling down' body armor protection levels requires an acceptance of risk, but modularity will likely be the offset to the weight issue for the foreseeable future.

BG Peter Fuller said it well in 2011: "Reducing area of coverage presents increased risk of injury to unprotected areas of the soldier, however, it provides the soldier greater mobility, which may result in greater survivability in some terrains or combat situations."[64] He was acknowledging that there are situations on the modern battlefield where speed of movement still provides the best security.

Takeaways:

1 The escalating demand for better protection has created a paradox: lighter, more effective protective materials do not result in lighter body armor; some result in heavier armor, when other levels of protection are added.

2 'Modularity' and 'scalability' refer to soldiers' ability to adjust protective gear to best accomplish the mission; the Army Modular Scalable Vest (MSV) and USSOCOM Adaptive Vest System (AVS) provide that capability.

3 Reducing protection levels assumes risk; however, today's 'scaled-down' armor still provides far better protection from small arms fire than early flak jackets.

Acknowledgements:

The author would like to thank all of those who helped make this article possible, including the 82nd Airborne Division Museum, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia; U.S Army Combat Capabilities Development Command – Soldier Center, Natick, Massachusetts; USASOC G8; and the USASOC History Office History Support Center.

Endnotes

1 Medical Department, U.S. Army, "Wound Ballistics," (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1962), 742-743, hereafter Medical Department, "Wound Ballistics," page number.

2 Medical Department, "Wound Ballistics," 741. The armor's 'total effectiveness' (i.e. percentage of hits, both fragments and small arms projectiles stopped) was placed at 67.9 percent.

3 Medical Department, "Wound Ballistics," xvi. Malcolm C. Grow would later become the first Surgeon General of the U.S. Air Force, retiring as a Major General in 1949.

4 Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Seventeenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations: Reverse Lend-Lease Aide from the British Commonwealth of Nations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 17. The U.S. Government considered the initial run of body armor, enough for "600 United States Eighth Air Force bomber crews," to be "reverse lend-lease," referring to materiel assistance provided to the U.S. by other Allied nations, under the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. Once a design was tested and standardized, production of the Flyer's Vests shifted to the United States.

5 The armor was primarily intended for the crew of the 'heavy bombers,' a term referring to four-engine B-17 *Flying Fortress* and B-24 *Liberator* bombers that conducted 'deep penetration' bombing missions over enemy territory, and therefore encountered the most enemy antiaircraft fire.

6 Simon Dunstan, *Flak Jackets: 20th Century Military Body Armour* (Peterborough, UK: PrintOnDemand-Worldwide, 2009), 10-11, hereafter Dunstan, *Flak Jackets*, page number.

7 The terms 'flak vest' and 'flak jacket' remained in the military lexicon through the 1990s, when the standard issue Personnel Armored System Ground Troops (PASGT) vest was in use. Starting with the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), introduced in 1999, the vests were more commonly known as "body armor," or by the acronym of the vest (i.e. "IBA," or "IOTV").

8 Over 300,000 of the M1 Flyer's Vest were produced by the end of World War II.

9 Dunstan, *Flak Jackets*, 11.

10 Dunstan, *Flak Jackets*, 11. The M2 was a modified version of the M1 issued to pilots and copilots, who sat in armored seats, and therefore did not need a vest with armor in the back.

11 Medical Department, "Wound Ballistics," 666. The study also noted, "After the introduction of body armor there was a reduction of 77.1 percent in the fatality rate of thoracic wounds and a reduction of 82.8 percent in the fatality of abdominal wounds."

12 Medical Department, "Would Ballistics," 673. "Numerous investigators in the Ordnance Department and in the other technical services had contemplated the development of armor for ground troops in the early stages of World War II. However, very preliminary investigations had shown that most models were too heavy, were incompatible with standard items of equipment, and tended to restrict the mobility of the soldier. Therefore, the development of armor for ground troops was initially rejected as an unsound idea, and the development of a flyer's armor received more or less full attention. However, continued investigation in the development of lighter weight metallic ballistic material and in the relatively new field of nonmetallic ballistic material led to a resurge in interest for armor for ground troops"

13 Medical Department, "Wound Ballistics," 676-677.

14 Office of the Quartermaster General, "Armored Vest Fact Sheet," 23 December 1952, on internet at http://www/qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/armored_vest.htm, 1, hereafter "Armored Vest Fact Sheet," page number.

15 "Armored Vest Fact Sheet," 1.

16 Medical Department, "Wound Ballistics," 677. By war's end, most sets of M-12 body armor had been transferred to the South Korean troops.

17 "Armored Vest Fact Sheet," 1. 'Doron' was an eponym, derived from the name of Brigadier General Georges Doriot, World War II chief of the Research and Development Branch, Office of The Quartermaster General of the Army.

18 Medical Department, "Wound Ballistics," 758. As of 31 December 1951, 29,534 M-1951 'Marine Vests' were available to Army units, along with 10,867 of the older M-12s, and 4,584 of the Army's new M-1952A.

19 Shelby Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Korean War* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 192.

20 Dunstan, *Flak Jackets*, 21. Approximately 26,161 M-1952 vests had reached Korea by the end of hostilities in July 1953.

21 Shelby Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1989), 94, hereafter Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War*, page number.

22 Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War,* 94.

23 Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War,* 91. Stanton notes, "[T]he body armor was cumbersome, relatively heavy, and hot to wear. The sweltering tropical heat retained by the vest sapped body strength and caused severe sweating, dehydration, and even heat prostration."

24 Dunstan, *Flak Jackets,* 24; Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War*, 96. Stanton: "Throughout the war, body armor was seldom seen on Army personnel, unless they were in mechanized units like the 11th Armored Calvary or were manning positions that required little movement."

25 Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War,* 97. Curved shields developed in the early 1960s were so heavy and uncomfortable that many pilots preferred to take their chances.

26 Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War,* 97-98. The early plates used tiled ceramic plates that were effective against 7.62mm/.30 caliber bullets, but vulnerable at the seams. This weakness was corrected with the introduction of 'monolithic' (i.e. one-piece) ceramic plates in 1966. These were often referred to as 'chicken plates' and were made of a various ceramic composites, of varying cost and weight.

27 Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War,* 98-99; Dustan, Flak Jackets, 26-27. The aluminum oxide ceramic plates favored by the Army were the heaviest (28.5 pounds) but cost the least ($195 each); the boron carbide ceramic plates used by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy weighed only 20.75 pounds, but cost $1,018 each.

28 Thomas H. Judge and Paul J. Buttkus, *Ballistic and Spall Tests for Aircrew Body Armor*, (Natick, MA: U.S. Army Natick Laboratories, 1972), 1, hereafter Judge and Buttkus, *Ballistic and Spall Tests*, page number.

29 Judge and Buttkus, *Ballistic and Spall Tests*, 1; Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War,* 97-98. The total weight of the *body armor, fragmentation, small arms protective, aircrewmen, gunner/crew chief, front and back plate* version was 34 pounds, 3 ounces.

30 Judge and Buttkus, *Ballistic and Spall Tests*, ii.

31 Judge and Buttkus, *Ballistic and Spall Tests*, ii: The new vest weighed 16 pounds, 4 ounces; the vest it replaced weighed 14 pounds, but required the standard 9-pound M-69 'flak jacket' be worn over it, to reduce the threat from secondary fragments.

32 "Armored Vest Fact Sheet," 1.

33 Stanton, *U.S. Army Uniforms of the Vietnam War*, 96. In 1968, the Army developed a 'variable-type' vest that combined a ballistic-nylon felt vest and two (front and back) ceramic fiberglass plates. The total weight of the armor was approximately twenty pounds, which was over twice that of the M-69. Additionally, each vest cost $800, compared with $35 for the M-69. The relatively small number of these vests that made it to Vietnam in 1969-1970 were worn by soldiers conducting motorized, boat unit, or stationary operations. The program was cancelled in early 1970 and the idea of 'hard' armor plates for ground troops did not gain widespread support until the mid-1990s.

34 Jane Benson, "NSRDEC-Developed Body Armor Saved Lives in the Battle of Mogadishu," 5 October 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/212068/nsrdec_developed_body_armor_saved_lives_in_the_battle_of_mogadishu.

35 Robert L. Mabry, MD, John B. Holcomb, MD, Andrew M. Baker, MD, Clifford C. Cloonan, MD, John M. Uhorchak, MD, Denver E. Perkins, MD, Anthony J. Canfield, MD, and John H. Hagmann, MD, "United States Army Rangers in Somalia: An Analysis of Combat Causalities on an Urban Battlefield," *The Journal of Trauma Injury, Infection, and Critical Care* 49:3 (September 2000): 523, on internet at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA628420?q=body+armor+%2B+vietnam: A study of combat wounds incurred by Task Force RANGER (TFR) during the Battle of Mogadishu found: "Body armor seems to have reduced mortality from injuries to the chest. This statement is additionally supported by the comments of TFR soldiers. There are at least a dozen anecdotal accounts of soldiers whose armor was hit by bullets and fragments." The study also noted that the RBA prevented "small fragment wounds to the abdomen," [thus] "eliminating the need to perform additional diagnostic studies, serial examinations, and surgical exploration required by such casualties, thus significantly reducing the surgical workload."

36 "Interim Small Arms Protective Overvest," 21 October 2001, https://web.archive.org/web/20011221181143/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/isapo.htm

37 Leif Hasselquist, Carolyn K. Bensel, Brian Corner, and Karen N. Gregorczyk, *An Investigation of Three Extremity Armor Systems: Determination of Physiological, Biomechanical, and Physical Performance Effects and Quantification of Body Area Coverage* (Natick, Massachusetts: U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center, 2012), 3; "Interceptor Body Armor," no date, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/interceptor.htm.

38 U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), Assistant Chief of Staff G7 – Force Integration, "Materiel Modernization Master Plan, FY 03-09," March 2003, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

39 Inspector General, United States Department of Defense, "DoD Procurement Policy for Body Armor," 31 March 2008, 26, hereafter IG Report, "DoD Procurement Policy for Body Armor," page number.

40 IG Report, "DoD Procurement Policy for Body Armor," 26.

41 IG Report, "DoD Procurement Policy for Body Armor, 5. Deltoid and Axillary Protectors (DAPs) were also known as the Deltoid and Axillary Protector System (DAPS).

42 IG Report, "DoD Procurement Policy for Body Armor, 7-8; Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, "Update on the Use of Combat Helmets, Vehicle Armor and Body Armor by Ground Forces in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM," 15 June 2006, 109, hereafter HASC Hearing, "Use of Combat Helmets, Vehicle Armor, and Body Armor," 15 June 2006, page number.

43 HASC Hearing, "Use of Combat Helmets, Vehicle Armor and Body Armor," 15 June 2006, 106. ESAPI plates provide 'Level IV' (National Institute of Justice [NIJ], Type IV) protection, indicating the ability to stop .30 caliber (7.62mm) armor piercing ammunition. Previous SAPI plates had been rated 'Level III' (NIJ Type III), meaning that they protected against 7.62mm ball ammunition, but not armor piercing bullets. An interim 'Improved SAPI' could stop 7.62 x 39mm armor piercing ammunition, but not 7.62 x 54mm rounds used by snipers in Afghanistan and Iraq, at the time.

44 Hydration carriers (often referred to by the brand-name 'Camelback') were often integrated into the vest, for convenience. Other accessories included 'dump pouches,' for empty magazines, the Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK), and plastic zip ties (i.e. 'flex cuffs').

45 Kenneth Horn, Kimberlie Biever, Kenneth Burkman, Paul DeLuca, Lewis Jamison, Michael Kolb, Aatif Sheikh, *Lightening Body Armor: Arroyo Support to the Army Response to Section 125 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2011*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 21, hereafter Horn, et.al, *Lightening Body Armor*, page number.

46 Horn, et.al, *Lightening Body Armor*, iii.

47 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, "Soldier and Marine Equipment for Dismounted Operations," 17 March 2011, 93, hereafter HASC hearing, "Soldier and Marine Equipment for Dismounted Operations," page number..

48 HASC hearing, "Soldier and Marine Equipment for Dismounted Operations," 93.

49 Horn, et.al, *Lightening Body Armor*, 10.

50 Horn, et.al, *Lightening Body Armor*, 10: The study echoed BG Fuller's testimony from the year prior, recognizing that the most expedient method of reducing the weight of body armor was to adjust 'body armor protection levels,' or BAPL, but acknowledging the inherent risk of this practice (36).

51 U.S. Army, Program Executive Office Soldier, "Equipment Portfolio: FY17" https://www.peosoldier.army.mil/portfolio/.

52 KDH Defense Systems, "Magnum TAC-1 Soldier Plate Carrier System," no date, www.KDHdefensesystems.com; HASC hearing, "Soldier and Marine Equipment for Dismounted Operations," 7, 22, 91. As of 2011, the Army requirement was for 85,000 Soldier Plate Carrier Systems (SPCS).

53 Todd South, "New in 2018: Army to issue new body armor to soldiers," *Army Times*, 1 January 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/01/01/new-in-2018-army-to-issue-new-body-armor-to-soldiers/.

54 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade deployed in early 2019 with the "Integrated Head Protection System," which is part of the overall SPS.

55 Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, *Department of Defense Body Armor Programs*, 6 June 2007, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 113. In 2007, Army Colonel (COL) Kevin S. Noonan, U.S. Army PEO for SOF Warrior Programs, U.S. Special Operations Command, explained SOF body armor requirements to the House Armed Services Committee as follows: "USSOCOM requires the ability for the individual operator to tailor his protection and load to meet various mission profiles while maintaining the necessary agility, mobility, and range of motion to meet SOF mission standards." COL Noonan also assured the committee that SPEAR body armor had "saved the lives of SOF operators in combat."

56 "Operational Requirements Document for SOF Personal Equipment Advanced Requirements (SPEAR)," 15 April 1996, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

57 U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), Assistant Chief of Staff G7 – Force Integration, "Materiel Modernization Master Plan, FY 03-09," March 2003, Slides 1-3 and 1-6. Combat support and combat service support troops were issued standard Army body armor (the IBA, and later the IOTV).

58 This method was known as 'cascading;' through it, the highest priority SOF soldiers received the most modern body armor, and previous versions 'cascaded' to those in support roles.

59 Email from Program Manager Special Operations Forces – Survival, Support, and Equipment Systems (PM-SOF SSES) to Christopher E. Howard, "SUBJECT: RE: Body Armor Questions," 26 August 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter PM-SOF-SSES email, date. According to the PM-SOF-SSES program office, Natick Soldier Support Center scientists and engineers provide technical expertise "in the development, testing, and evaluation of all SPEAR generations of ballistic plates and helmets."

60 Email from Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center to Christopher E. Howard, "SUBJECT: FW: Body Armor Questions," 26 August 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

61 United States Army Special Operations Command, "USASOC Annual Command History, Calendar Year 2014," 167, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Through SPEAR, USASOC also fields Clandestine Body Armor, the SOF alternative to the Army's Ultra-Low Visibility Concealable Body Armor.

62 PM-SOF-SSES email, 26 August 2019; U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), *ARSOF Next: A Return to First Principles* (Fort Bragg, NC: USAJFKSWCS, 2015), 71. The Family of Tactical Body Armor (FTBA) was approved by U.S. Special Operations Command in August 2014. The system is described, in *ARSOF Next*, as being "modular and scalable to enable operators to prepare for various mission requirements and to minimize the operator's load while maximizing the operator's survivability."

63 Lauren Fish and Paul Scharre, "The Soldier's Heavy Load," Center for a New American Security, 26 September 2018, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-soldiers-heavy-load-1. The report addressed the impact of heavy fighting loads on soldiers. It referenced eight separate studies, reports, or doctrinal publications that placed the recommended fighting load for a soldier between 35 and 51 pounds. Body armor worn in recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq often weighed 30 or more pounds, leaving no more than 20 pounds for all other combat necessities, such as ballistic helmet, primary weapon, ammunition, water, night vision devices, radio, and first aid kit. Thus, it found that fighting load guidelines were routinely violated, out of necessity

64 HASC hearing, "Soldier and Marine Equipment for Dismounted Operations," 93.

U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center Endnotes

1 Email from Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center to Christopher E. Howard, "SUBJECT: RE: Body Armor Questions," 28 August 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

AVERTING DISASTER

Company D, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion at the Balboa High School Displaced Civilians Facility

by Troy J. Sacquety

Abstract: *The U.S. military was slow in exercising Civil Affairs during and after Operation JUST CAUSE. This became evident when 11,000 refugees turned the Balboa High School grounds into an impromptu Displaced Civilians facility. A pragmatic and common-sense approach by the untested 96th Civil Affairs Battalion snatched success from the mouth of disaster.*

Prior to the U.S. invasion of Panama, little time was invested in post-conflict stability planning. Operation BLIND LOGIC (later changed to PROMOTE LIBERTY) contained only vague guidance for Panama's recovery after the removal of its dictator, Manuel Noriega. Even the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Commander, General (GEN) Maxwell R. Thurman, admitted that he "did not even spend five minutes on BLIND LOGIC."[1] No thought was given to displaced civilians (DCs). That oversight became apparent early on 20 December 1990 when combat operations made thousands homeless. Noriega-supported paramilitary Dignity Battalion (DIGBAT) thugs set fires to divert the U.S. assault on the *Comandancia*, the headquarters of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF).[2] Uncontrolled fires burned the surrounding 'wood-shanty' *barrio* of El Chorrillo, where 25,000 poverty-stricken dwellers lived in a few city blocks.[3] With their homes in flames, the residents fled to the American-run Balboa High School a mile away. First Lieutenant (1LT) David W. Roberts, 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, had already set up a battalion aid station there to support the attack.[4]

Since planners had not designated an alternate location, the Balboa High School campus became a temporary, *de facto* DC facility.[5] Likewise, poor planning, chaos, and the growing population left the facility on the cusp of a humanitarian crisis from 20 December to 22 December 1989. That situation changed when the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB) was given the mission. Relatively untested CA soldiers pulled the Joint Task Force (JTF)-South effort 'out of the fire.' This case study examines Company D, 96th CAB management of the Balboa High School DC facility from

Left: The *Comandancia* was the headquarters of the PDF. During the assault to secure the building, Dignity Battalion (DIGBAT) personnel set fire to the surrounding neighborhood of El Chorrillo. **Bottom**: El Chorrillo was a poor, densely packed neighborhood. Thousands lost everything when fires swept through their tin, wood, cardboard, and plastic sheet homes.



Map of Balboa and the surrounding area.

22 December 1989 to 12 January 1990. It explains the level of Civil Affairs readiness for combat in Panama and the rationale for the refugee facility, as well as what the CA soldiers encountered and how they solved the immediate problems. The major events flow in sequence, but many problems were dealt with simultaneously. Before discussing this impromptu mission, it is necessary to explain the state of CA then.

In 1989, CA was not a Regular Army Branch; it was a functional area. Ninety-six percent of Army CA was in the Reserves. The 96th CAB was the only active-duty CA battalion.[6] While the battalion was assigned to the U.S. Army 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM), CA was an 'outsider' until designated a Special Operations function by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1993. Prior to JUST CAUSE, 96th CA teams assessed civilian institutions and infrastructure for Special Forces Groups. The 96th CAB aligned its four companies regionally. Each company had five, four-man teams.[7] Its strength of 125 soldiers limited missions to short term tactical missions.[8]

Army leadership was focused on combat units. Few knew how to employ CA or grasped its capabilities. The CA reputation in and employment by Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) likewise suffered from a lack of understanding.[9] This negative perception of CA meant that assignment to the 96th CAB was not career-enhancing. The only active CA battalion had no 'champion.' It did not help that the vast majority of soldiers assigned were not graduates of the six-week CA course. This included the battalion commander.[10] With the exception of Company A, which had some native Spanish speakers, few soldiers spoke a second language fluently.[11] However, the 96th soldiers came from different backgrounds. They had been to Basic Combat Training, Advanced Individual Training, and Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) schools, and the officers were basic-branch qualified. This background saved them in Panama.

JUST CAUSE operational planning (code-named BLUE SPOON) force-listed Company A, 96th CAB to assist the 75th Ranger Regiment with the capture of the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport Complex and the Rio Hato airfield. After the JUST CAUSE assaults, a small CA command element was to deploy to determine future requirements.[12] That 'floating' plan became obsolete early on 20 December when GEN Thurman complained to GEN Colin L. Powell that he had no CA units.[13] The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the 96th CAB (-) to deploy to Panama. It arrived on the 22nd.

The 96th CAB commander, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Michael P. Peters, went to the J-5 (Civil Affairs) of JTF-South for guidance. LTC A. Dwayne Aaron directed Peters to provide CA teams to tactical units throughout Panama, conduct Humanitarian Assistance, help American citizens return to the U.S. if they wished, and assist at the Balboa High School DC facility.[14] The latter proved to be the most complicated mission.[15]

Thousands of DCs had squatted on the high school grounds before U.S. forces could respond. The refugees broke into the gym, seeking cover and access to bathrooms. Others erected makeshift shelters on the baseball field. Surprisingly, they did not break into the school. The chaos accompanying a mass of poor, hungry people facing an absence of sanitation, shelter, and security, was a huge humanitarian crisis that required immediate attention. A poorly-run operation would increase the wartime hardships for Panamanians. This threatened to negate U.S. efforts to limit its war with Noriega, not the people. The presence of major news

correspondents at the high school meant that failure would be publicized and politically embarrassing.

LTC Peters gave the Balboa High School mission to Company D, whose commander, Major (MAJ) Michael A. Lewis, was a Military Police (MP) officer. MAJ Lewis was to establish order. LTC Peters stated that that MAJ Lewis was "the most obvious choice. He had the right demeanor, was even tempered, and not easily flappable."[16] Together they went to the DC facility to meet the officer in charge, COL William J. Connolly, the United States Army South (USARSO) Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM). On 19 December 1989, the acting USARSO Chief of Staff had sent COL Connolly to USSOUTHCOM to "help fix" the neglected BLIND LOGIC operation order.[17] With just a day to do this, COL Connolly focused "on the refugee issue, assuming that it would be one of the first problems with which the military would have to cope as the result of combat operations."[18] He was right. When the DCs squatted at the Balboa High School, COL Connolly was the most experienced available officer. COL Connolly and his four subordinates faced a tremendously difficult mission. The reality was evident during a quick walk around with LTC Peters and MAJ Lewis.

COL Connolly explained his dilemma. Combat units working in Balboa provided security. He could request engineer support from USARSO, but the priority of combat operations limited availability. As LTC Peters surmised, COL Connolly had to "count on the help of other units [over] which he had no control."[19] There was one exception. COL Connolly had gotten a Preventative Medical Section from the Gorgas Hospital to support an infantry battalion medical aid station that had been set up next to the school.[20]

Because it was closed for Christmas break, the high school principal had been willing to open the building as needed. COL Connolly put the military administration in a classroom. LTC Peters and MAJ Lewis saw that hallways and a few other classrooms had been transformed into infirmaries, urgent care facilities, and medical supply rooms. The elderly and pregnant women were in separate classrooms. To prevent the spread of illness, COL Connolly had isolated sick children with their mothers.[21] That was the upside. The rest of the DC facility was in chaos.

Thousands of DCs were squatting on the high school grounds and hundreds more were arriving daily. Refugees were coming and going at will, making it

Map of the Balboa Displaced Civilians Facility.



Organization:
Balboa Community



impossible to get an accurate headcount. Some were merely transients who lived with family members outside the facility. They returned for food, or to use the facilities. Others had nowhere to go and stayed. In the gym, women and children slept in cramped quarters on the floor. LTC Peters and MAJ Lewis saw that the toilets were backed up. The stench was awful. Makeshift 'tents' filled the baseball field. People were sleeping on the bleachers. The torrential afternoon rains of the tropics and the masses of people had turned the grass into "a sea of mud," said LTC Peters.[22]

The 'walk-through' showed LTC Peters the magnitude of the problem. With multiple commitments, LTC Peters could only give MAJ Lewis nine personnel. However, the 96th Tactical Operations Center (TOC) on nearby Fort Clayton would help. COL Connolly was redirected on 27 December to fund the 'money for weapons' program. This left MAJ Lewis and his second-in-command, CPT Gregory J. Rhine, to turn the DC mess into a sanitary humanitarian refuge.[23] MAJ Lewis divided his team to cover operations, sanitation, and logistics.

The 96th CAB soldiers got to work. With the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook for Emergencies* as a guide, MAJ Lewis used "a blackboard and wrote down the missions that were necessary and decided which [to] accomplish" each day. "Once we started that," MAJ Lewis noted, "it started looking a

Thousands of DCs lived in makeshift shelters on the baseball field. Others slept in the bleachers. Wet clothing was drying everywhere.

lot better."[24] The priority tasks were discipline, sanitation, food, shelter, and security. Because solving these interrelated tasks was done concurrently, they are presented thematically.

The first priority was to impose some discipline to get organized. The Panamanians had to help and assume ownership for the facility. It was serendipitous that Serio Galvez, the elected but never seated mayor of El Chorrillo, was at the high school.[25] Galvez was encouraged to take charge because the DCs were his people and his responsibility. The mayor 'deputized' some as 'assistant mayors' to assign residents critical tasks, and to hold them accountable for their jobs, including the unpleasant tasks.

A Psychological Operations loudspeaker team helped to create order. Soldiers from the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion (commanded by LTC Dennis P. Walko) erected their speakers to relay information and make announcements.[26] The system helped the mayor explain why certain tasks had to be done. The residents were told what needed to be done, as well as why and when. The broadcasts provided a sense of community. When not broadcasting informational broadcasts, the PSYOP soldiers played Panamanian music.

The next task was to improve sanitation. 1LT Bruce A. Baker, attached Company C Supply Officer, 96th CAB, remembered, "When we got there and walked around . . . [we] saw what terrible shape it was in. The latrines were overflowing . . . there were chickens and dogs and cats and naked kids [relieving themselves] all over the place." And, "they couldn't take a shower. There was an extreme amount of garbage everywhere."[27] MAJ Lewis arranged for the 96th CAB TOC to hire Panamanian contractors to unclog the 'backed-up' facilities and to provide portable toilets. The Preventative Medicine Team from Gorgas Army Hospital showed the DCs how to use toilets, and clean them afterwards, since many of the El Chorrillo residents did not have running water or flush toilets. Then, it became their responsibility. The 96th personnel also divided the gym showers for males and females. Water troughs and rope were purchased for communal clothes washing and clotheslines.

The TOC contracted for dumpsters for trash disposal. The CA soldiers explained how to use the marked receptacles while Mayor Galvez organized cleanup crews. CPT Rhine located a nearby dog kennel for pets before announcing that other animals were no longer permitted.[28] The removal of flea-ridden dogs, chickens, and pigs improved sanitation efforts when all the animal excrement was removed.

While sanitation improved rapidly, the CA team feared an outbreak of measles and flu among the largely unvaccinated children. CPT Rhine learned

Reserve CA
and the Balboa High School Displaced Civilian Facility


361st BDE SSI

Despite the BLIND LOGIC premise that Army reserve CA units would be activated for PROMOTE LIBERTY, individual reserve CA soldiers were asked to volunteer (from 31 and 139 days).[1] Because it took time for processing, the 96th CA was already at work in the Balboa High School DC facility when the reserve soldiers began trickling into Panama. The first group of twenty-five reserve CA soldiers (361st CA Brigade) arrived on 26 December 1989.

Led by COL William H. Stone (Deputy Commander), they formed the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) under JTF-South. COL Stone assigned Captain Margaret V. Cain and Sergeant First Class John W. Wawroski to the Humanitarian Assistance Team and sent them to the Balboa High School DC facility. They worked for MAJ Lewis, acted as liaison to the CMOTF, and helped plan for the move to Albrook Air Force Station on 13 January 1990.[2] A civilian nurse, CPT Cain helped care for the geriatric DCs.

Another 126 reservists arrived on 1 January 1990. They formed the Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF), the "operational element for the CMOTF."[3] COL Stone sent a 14-soldier CATF contingent (led by COL William W. Graham, 361st CA Brigade), to the Balboa High School DC facility. When they arrived on 2 January 1990, COL Graham saw how well MAJ Lewis was doing and subordinated his team to support the effort at the Balboa High School DC facility until it closed on 13 January 1990. COL Graham then took command of the Albrook DC facility.[4]

Command Structure:
Civil Affairs Panama, January 1990



that there were U.S. Air Force medical teams at Howard Air Force Station that could provide immunizations. He arranged for the five teams (4-5 personnel each) to come and inoculate all of the kids against those childhood diseases.[29] Solving the food issue was another hurdle.

At first, each DC received two 'Meal, Ready-to-Eat' (MRE) packs per day. The DCs "would stand in line all morning" and "all afternoon" for the meals, recalled MAJ Lewis. The waiting routine "was not necessarily bad because it gave them something to do and kept them out of trouble" while the CA team got things organized.[30] While MREs sufficed for the immediate need, they were expensive, and their wrappers produced a lot of trash. And, most DCs were used to a 1500 calorie/day diet of beans and rice. The calorie-rich MREs caused severe gastric upset, putting further strains on the toilets.[31] To solve both problems, the JTF-South J-5 got mobile kitchens from the USARSO 41st Area Support Group (ASG). The Panamanian civilians were trained on the equipment. For local foods, 1LT Baker raided a former PDF warehouse to collect bags of dry beans, rice, sugar, flour, and cooking oil. Meanwhile, the DCs built tables and benches to eat their meals. The Panamanian-cooked meals raised morale "overnight," said Rhine.[32]

To help bring some semblance of order to the school grounds, the CA team arranged for the delivery of tents to the baseball field for those men sleeping 'under the stars.' The 41st ASG provided twenty-five general purpose (GP) medium tents and fifteen GP small tents.[33]



Top: The CA team scrounged unserviceable parachutes for sun shelters. **Bottom:** The 96th CA soldiers got tents from the 41st Area Support Group, JTF-South. Once shown how to erect them, the Panamanians built their tent city.

Top: Two entrances to the Balboa DC camp allowed 96th CA personnel to control access and check bags for contraband, weapons, and drugs. (Photo credit: Gregory J. Rhine) **Bottom:** Demographic Age Break Down of Balboa Displaced Civilians Camp Populations.

AGE	FEMALE	MALE
0-1	120	159
2-4	140	165
5-9	255	306
10-14	333	323
15-19	433	566
20-24	521	674
25-34	905	1,245
35-44	502	820
45-54	271	434
55-64	149	248
65-74	115	179
75+	48	61
	3,792	5,180

Despite an absence of Spanish speakers, two CA NCOs demonstrated how to erect the tents, a step at a time. The attentive DCs then set them up "one after another," where the NCOs had marked their placement.[34] Meanwhile, 1LT Baker contacted USARSO to get thirty-five non-serviceable parachutes for sun shelters.[35]

The last major concern was security. Because the facility evolved from an *ad hoc* assembly area, the DCs became transients. Looters, drug users, sex offenders, and PDF in civilian clothes lived among the DCs. The CA soldiers relied on the mayor and the semi-permanent residents to identify troublemakers. Most DCs disliked Noriega and were happy to identify former PDF infiltrators. Families had little tolerance for drug and sex offenders, but looters were acceptable; the stolen goods trade was popular. CPT Rhine, however, felt that loudspeaker warnings deterred those engaged in the practice when threatened with expulsion.[36]

Perimeter security was a U.S. military responsibility. To improve safety, USSOUTHCOM had engineers place concertina wire rolls around the school facility. USARSO arranged for rotating infantry to control access at two entrances. Army CPT Steven Sanchez, the senior Junior Reserve Officers Training Course (JROTC) advisor at the Balboa High School detachment, mustered cadets to perform perimeter security.[37] They often served as the sole roving patrol during the evening hours.

DCs could come and go at will. Since there was no 'headcount' of residents, or a way to identify who belonged, the CA soldiers instituted access control measures. Each incoming civilian had his/her bags searched for contraband or weapons. Then, the 96th CA personnel began 'registering' personnel by name and occupation. Each Panamanian that filled out the form was given a MAJ Lewis-signed paper pass. Panamanian social worker volunteers used six computers to input data from 11,000 forms to create a searchable database.[38]

Once the facility was running smoothly, attention was given to preparing for its closure to eliminate 'dependency.' In late December 1989, the Department of State mandated that Balboa High School resume classes on 16 January 1990. By 31 December 1989, JTF-South had selected another location for the DCs on Albrook Air Force Station.[39] The Company C, 96th CAB Commander, MAJ Richard M. Cheek, was given that mission. That 'fixed' facility was ready on 13 January 1990, and 2,500 refugees were bussed to Albrook as the Balboa High School DC facility was shut down. Since many USARSO staff personnel had dependent high school children, Panamanian workers were contracted to clean up the high school facility so it would be ready for the return of students on 16 January.[40]

Despite the absence of refugee planning before the U.S. military intervention on 20 December 1989, the 96th CAB effort at the Balboa High School was highly successful. CA soldiers prevented a humanitarian crisis. Although they had little experience in DC operations, the CA soldiers quickly identified the problems and organized them by priority into manageable tasks. Then, common sense, hard work, and Panamanian 'ownership' led to success. They identified Panamanian leaders and partnered with them to stabilize a chaotic situation. In their efforts at the Balboa High School DC facility, Company D, 96th CAB, aided by other members of the battalion, truly brought 'order from chaos.'

Takeaways:

1 The U.S. military did not plan for refugees during Operation JUST CAUSE.

2 Despite having no experience in DC operations, the 96th CA contingent provided order, sanitation, food, and shelter for thousands of displaced Panamanians.

3 The CA soldiers worked by, with, and through Panamanian partners who accepted ownership. Together, they established stability and improved the lives of thousands facing chaos.

4 The Balboa High School DC facility was politically highly visible. A poor effort would have invited international criticism. Problem-solving and hard work by 96th CAB soldiers resulted in a well-run Panamanian 'owned' facility.

The 96th CAB soldiers were proud of their efforts in Panama. Despite limited Spanish skills, they used basic soldier discipline and problem solving skills to provide stability after JUST CAUSE.
(Photo credit: Gregory J. Rhine)

Acknowledgements:

The author would like to thank 96th CAB veterans Michael P. Peters, Richard M. Cheek, and Gregory J. Rhine for their assistance with this article.

Endnotes

1 Lawrence A. Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Operation JUST CAUSE December 1989-January 1990* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2014), 449.

2 For an account of the attack on the *Comandancia*, see Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama*, 121-138.

3 Families averaged 3.5 persons and lived in wood hovels of 200 square feet or less. MAJ Lasher, Team Chief, Chorrillo Project, "Subject: Req. Info. Gen Thurman's 1600 10 Jan. Briefing," 10 January 1990, located in Folder, After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama), includes daily situation reports (1-30 Jan 1990), 134, Civil Affairs Latin America, USASOC History Classified files, Fort Bragg, NC.

4 Richard Van Ness Ginn, *The History of the U.S. Army Medical Service Corps* (Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1997), 426, on Internet at https://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/HistoryofUSArmyMSC/chapter13.html, accessed 6 December 2019.

5 This article uses the term 'facility' to describe the refugee area at the Balboa High School. During the operation, the term 'camp' was widely used. However, that term does not properly describe an area where DCs were free to come and go at will. Camp implies that they were corralled into an area with restricted access and limited freedom to leave.

6 Civil Affairs was a branch in the U.S. Army Reserves. The political challenges of activation meant they were rarely deployed as units.

7 Company A was oriented to Latin America, Company B to the Pacific, Company C to the Middle East, and Company D to Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa.

8 Michael P. Peters interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 12 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, hereafter name and date.

9 Peters interview, 12 September 2019.

10 Peters interview, 20 September 2019.

11 Peters interview, 29 October 2019; Gregory J. Rhine, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 30 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

12 LTC Michael P. Peters, MAJ Kassem R. Saleh, CPT Michael D. Clay, CPT Joe N. Hadden, and 1LT Vernon G. Schoonover, interview by MAJ Robert P. Cook, 326th Military History Detachment, 11 April 1990, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter individual name and date.

13 Ronald H. Cole, *Operation JUST CAUSE Panama* (Washington DC: Joint History Office, 1995), 46.

14 Peters interview, 11 April 1990. LTC Aaron was one of the XVIII Airborne Corps officers deployed to Panama as part of JTF-South, the warfighting command for JUST CAUSE.

15 Peters interview, 29 October 2019.

16 Peters interview, 29 October 2019.

17 Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama*, 131. At lower levels, the 96th CA had been involved in planning for DCs. Gregory J. Rhine, then a Captain in the 96th, was involved in pre-JUST CAUSE planning regarding DCs and protecting cultural sites and artifacts. Gregory J. Rhine, "Running a Dislocated Civilians Camp During Operation Just Cause December 1989, Reflections by former Major Gregory J. Rhine, D Co., 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne)," copy provided to author.

18 Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama*, 131.

19 Peters interview, 29 October 2019.

20 Larry P. Vervack, "SUBJECT: Operation JUST CAUSE Observations," 1 May 1990, 47. Copy provided in email from Lewis L. Barger, AMEDD Center of History & Heritage, to Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, "SUBJECT: 1748-Operation JUST CAUSE," 6 December 2019. The clinic later had the added support of more than a dozen medical residents from the University of Panama.

21 The policy of isolating sick children was continued by the 96th CA soldiers.

22 Peters interview, 29 October 2019.

23 Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama*, 424. COL Connolly had to find funds for a weapons turn-in program.

24 Lewis interview, 11 April 1990.

25 Yates, *The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama*, 442. Noriega had not allowed Galvez to serve.

26 Gregory J. Rhine, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 30 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Dennis P. Walko, "Psychological Operations in Panama During Operations *Just Cause* and *Promote Liberty*," in Frank L. Goldstein, ed. *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 261.

27 MAJ Michael A. Lewis, CPT Ronald Hagen, CPT Gregory J. Rhine, and 1LT Bruce Baker, interview by MAJ Robert P. Cook, 326th Military History Detachment, 11 April 1990, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter name and date.

28 Rhine interview, 30 October 2019. Rhine said that after the announcement to remove the animals, the DCs "had a lot of barbeques."

29 Email from Gregory J. Rhine to Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, "SUBJECT: Balboa: JUST CAUSE," 9 December 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files; Rhine interview, 30 October 2019. Rhine was an MP who had provided security at a DC camp at Fort Indiantown Gap, PA, for Cuban refugees that were part of the Mariel Boat Lift in 1980-81. He was familiar with some of the critical needs of DC operations.

30 Lewis interview, 11 April 1990.

31 Rhine interview, 30 October 2019.

32 Rhine interview, 30 October 2019.

33 Lewis interview, 11 April 1990.

34 Clay interview, 11 April 1990.

35 Lewis interview, 11 April 1990.

36 Rhine interview, 30 October 2019.

37 Rhine interview, 30 October 2019.

38 Clay interview, 11 April 1990. The number of residents in the facility on a daily basis was less than 5,000.

39 Civil Affairs Task Force, "Chronological Events Displaced Civilian Community Balboa/Curundu DC Facility," February 1990, Folder, Civil Affairs Task Force, Ancon, Panama, Civil Affairs Latin America, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

40 Soldiers from the 96th CAB helped oversee the cleanup efforts.

Reserve CA and the Balboa High School DC Facility Endnotes

1 United States Army Special Operations Command, "JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY Civil Affairs," May 1990, located in Folder, USASOC Briefing-JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY, Civil Affairs Latin America, USASOC History Office Classified files, Fort Bragg, NC.

2 Margaret V. Cain, "History of Displaced Civilian Facility," February 1990, located in Folder, Humanitarian Assistance Team (HAT), Civil Affairs Latin America, USASOC History Office Classified files, Fort Bragg, NC.

3 Kenneth D. Strong, "Civil Affairs After Action Report, JUST CAUSE [361st CA Brigade], March 1990, located in Folder, Civil Affairs After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE-Panama-361st CA BDE-1 Jan-28 Feb 1990, Civil Affairs Latin America, USASOC History Office Classified files, Fort Bragg, NC.

4 LTC Greenhut, "Civil Affairs in Panama," April 1990, located in Folder, Civil Affairs in Panama, LTC Greenhut, USARSOC Historian, Civil Affairs Latin America, USASOC History Office Classified files, Fort Bragg, NC. COL Graham was a civil engineer and industrial hygienist. He had helped to run a DC camp at Fort Indiantown Gap, PA, during the Mariel Boatlift of Cuban refugees in 1980.

COMMANDO & RANGER TRAINING, PART III

Forging Junior Leaders to Toughen Men to Win in Combat

by Charles H. Briscoe



The 8th Infantry Regiment led by COL James A. Van Fleet spearheaded the 4th Infantry Division and VII Corps assault on Utah Beach, Normandy, France on 6 June 1944.

Abstract: *This article, centered around a 'Commando' instructor at the Amphibious Training Center who created the 4th Division Ranger program, explains why individual troop-building skills were critical to preparing a draft Army for war. Both programs developed Army junior leaders 'on the cheap' by providing practical methods to 'steel' recruits for combat overseas. Intertwining the professional growth of Captain Oscar L. Joyner, Jr., 8th Infantry Regiment, with the environment of 1940s America reveals the state of U.S. military preparedness while war was raging throughout the world.*

This article emphasizes how important 'Commando,' Ranger, and amphibious training were in preparing America's soldiers to fight on multiple fronts in World War II. Infantry Captain (CPT) Oscar L. Joyner, Jr., 4th Division, was prepared to organize a 'shoestring' Ranger program after six weeks of Commando training at Camp William, Achnacarry, Scotland, in 1942.[1] This was proven when he was diverted for 'Commando' instructor duty at the new Amphibious Training Center (ATC) at Camp Clarence R. Edwards, Massachusetts. When CPT Joyner rejoined the 4th Division in November 1942, he brought a wealth of field expedient individual and collective 'Commando' training and amphibious operations experience.[2] By chronicling CPT Joyner's professional development during the feeble Army modernization during America's mobilization for World War II will show his 'value-added' to 4th Division.

Sidebars will connect Joyner's military progression with the state of Army junior officers in 1940; the credentials of his mentor, one of the Army's strongest leaders, commanders, and trainers at the battalion and regimental level; and the spread of war worldwide. The U.S. Army ranking among nations, second and third order effects of British, Chinese, and Russian combat losses, pacifist impacts on conscription, and defense priorities before Pearl Harbor serve as the atmospheric context. They help one better appreciate the importance of 'shoestring' training for a draftee Army. All of these factors increased the pressure on junior officers and sergeants charged with daily transforming new recruits into combat-capable soldiers. Severely resource-constrained British Commando improvised training methodology and combat skills became the templates for Ranger programs. Combat marksmanship and urban fighting were emphasized as well. Consider these factors along with life in small town America in the early 1940s.

CPT Joyner's Early Years

Born 8 January 1919 into the upper middle class family of Dr. Oscar L. and Mrs. Eleanor 'Lucille' Stafford Joyner in Kernersville, North Carolina (population 1,219 [1920]), Oscar Junior grew up in the Depression as the oldest of five children.[3] His father, the Kernersville dentist, graduated from Atlanta Dental College (now Emory University School of Dentistry) and his mother attended nearby Salem College in Winston-Salem. It was a foregone conclusion that the Kernersville High School senior class president and salutatorian was off to college in 1936.[4] This was not typical.

According to the 1940 census, just half of America's population (132 million plus) had finished eighth grade. Six and four percent of men and women were college graduates. There were significantly more white Americans better educated than minorities.[5] These demographics were reflected in America's draftee Army and represented what a commissioned Oscar Joyner would face in the 1940s.

While at Davidson College, north of Charlotte, North Carolina, Oscar Jr. pledged Beta Theta Pi fraternity, lettered three years in soccer, and was a cadet captain in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) battalion. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) in chemistry in June 1940 and was commissioned as an Infantry Second Lieutenant (2LT) in the Organized Reserve

2LT Oscar Joyner, Jr., 8th Infantry Regiment—WWII officer rank was worn on uniform epaulettes. **DUI:** The 8th Infantry Regiment, Regular Army, was constituted on 5 July 1838.

Corps (ORC).[6] 2LT Joyner elected to attend his branch basic course at Fort Benning, Georgia, that summer.

4th Infantry Division

After completing the Infantry Officer Basic Course at Fort Benning, 2LT Joyner was offered a Regular Army (RA) commission and an assignment to the 8th Infantry Regiment of 4th Division.[7] It had been reactivated as the seventh RA division on 1 June 1940, raising the active Army strength to 227,000 men; still 33,000 soldiers short of that authorized by the 1920 National Defense Act.[8] Though designated a new 'triangular' division, the 4th consisted of two 'skeletal' infantry regiments (the 8th and 22nd Infantry) instead of three, at 31 percent authorized strength.[9] Only two Army divisions (RA and NG) were rated 'mission capable' for Rio Grande border patrol: the 1st Cavalry and 2nd Infantry at 63 percent and 71 percent strength, respectively.[10] By keeping units undermanned the War Department could divert soldier pay to other priorities, like modern airplanes, tanks, and mechanized and motorized vehicles.

Lieutenant (LT) Joyner was quickly swept up in a flurry of activity as newly conscripted recruits arrived for indoctrination into Army life and soldiering. The lieutenants and sergeants were to provide thirteen weeks of mobilization (basic) training. Then, the soldiers were organized into platoons and companies in battalions for sixteen weeks of combined training.[11]

To complicate matters, in August 1940, the Army provisionally 'motorized' the 4th with enough motorized vehicles to move the entire division. Twenty to forty year-old draftees (half of whom had an eighth grade education) had to be taught how to drive, service, and repair a fleet of motorcycles, scout cars, half-tracks, and various trucks (to 2½ ton). Because his family had one of 400 automobiles registered in Forsyth County, North Carolina, LT Joyner was logically 'tapped' to help with driver training and basic maintenance.[12] Regardless of its state of training, the 4th Motorized was force-listed for maneuvers.

The 4th Division was motorized provisionally in August 1940. It became the 4th Infantry Division (ID) on 12 April 1943

Carolina Maneuvers

The 4th Division got its third regiment, the 12th Infantry, on 24 October 1941, just days before the First U.S. Army (FUSA) Carolina Maneuvers.[13] Road movement tactics, techniques, and procedures were developed 'on the fly' as they convoyed east on predominantly dirt roads using local 'road maps.'[14] Gasoline resupply was an afterthought in planning. Broken down and 'out of gas' vehicles littered roadsides from Georgia into the Carolinas. The 'triangular' division doctrine was still in draft when General Headquarters (GHQ) umpires graded the division and regimental commanders on tactical proficiency.[15] LT Joyner was fortunate. The 8th Infantry was led by the 4th Division's best regimental commander, Colonel (COL) James A. Van Fleet.[16] But, sometimes a good leader was not enough.

The troops' view of the Carolina Maneuvers:

"a general confusion of enemy alerts, the reds and the blues, foxholes by the numbers, great clouds of dust, smoke pots and tear gas, the Pee Dee River battles, and warm beer."[1]

The 8th Infantry was spearheading the 4th Motorized Division attack to relieve pressure on the 1st Armored Division when it ran straight into a major II Corps assault. After being quickly surrounded by the four regiments of the 44th Division (NG), the 8th Infantry was abandoned as the 4th began 'back pedaling' to break contact. The highly-touted tank divisions of I Armored Corps 'outran' their fuel resupply. Tank regiments were surrounded at rural gas stations while commandeering fuel. COL Van Fleet and the 8th Infantry officers learned how vulnerable road-bound trucks with soldiers aboard were to 'ground pounding' infantry.[17] Mobility and maneuver speed were negated. It was embarrassing being sacrificed, but the gross tactical errors made by the generals had severe consequences.

The biggest casualties in the maneuvers (Louisiana and Carolinas) were generals. Poor performance led to considerable turnover. 4th Motorized Division commanders, on average, lasted three months, with seven commanders in two years (June 1940 to July 1942); turbulence created uncertainty in the ranks.[18] After Thanksgiving 1941, the 4th Motorized left the

Infantry Lieutenants 1940

In the years preceding World War II, the Regular Army (RA), National Guard (NG), and Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) were critically short of lieutenants. By late 1940, ROTC and CMTC (Citizens's Military Training Camp) graduates constituted 90 percent of the Army lieutenants and 60 percent of officers in tactical units.[1] The 1940 Army maneuvers in Tennessee revealed weak leaders at all levels and a general unfitness of soldiers. This caused a diversion of RA officers to 'shore up' the federalized NG four infantry regiment 'square' divisions.[2] The lack of lieutenants and young sergeants made NG weekend drills 'paper soldiering.'[3] By 1940, the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) was in name only.[4]

Colonel James A. Van Fleet

James A. Van Fleet, a native of Florida, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1915 after leading the football team to victory over Navy (20-0).[1] Van Fleet was a respected, experienced leader, trainer, and coach. He commanded the 17th Machine-Gun Battalion, 6th Infantry Division (ID) in WWI, infantry battalions in Panama, Maine, and Georgia in the inter-war years, and coached the Kansas State University, University of Florida, and West Point football teams. He led the 8th Infantry from July 1941 through July 1944, spearheading the 4th ID and VII Corps D-Day assault on Utah Beach, Normandy. Personal valor led to two Silver Stars and a Distinguished Service Cross before promotion to Brigadier General (BG) on 24 July 1944, far behind his West Point classmates. At the end of the war in Europe, Major General (MG) Van Fleet commanded IX Corps of Third U.S. Army. In Korea, Lieutenant General (LTG) Van Fleet was X Corps commander before taking command of the Eighth U.S. Army. General (GEN) Van Fleet retired in 1954.[2]

Just How BAD Was It?

Conflicts throughout the 1930s grew to encompass the world by 1939. Japan began the onslaught of China by invading Manchuria in 1931. Nazi Germany annexed the Sudetenland before conquering Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and Poland seven months later. This latter invasion prompted declarations of war by Great Britain and France and the sending of a ten-division, predominantly British, Allied Expeditionary Force to Europe to shore up defenses. Fascist Italy had invaded Ethiopia in 1935 before conquering Eritrea and Somalia, annexing Albania, and then intervening in the Spanish Civil War. By then, the Japanese had expanded their aggression into regional British, French, and Dutch possessions like Burma, Indochina, Singapore, the East Indies, and Malaya. In America, isolationism and pacifism predominated politics and national policy.

The Selective Training and Service Act of October 1940 established conscription for 21 to 45 year-old able-bodied males for twelve months service. Congress debated for months while France collapsed. The Allied Expeditionary Force suffered 100,000 killed or captured before it abandoned ten divisions-worth of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, mortars, trucks, scout cars, and tons upon tons of munitions and supplies to allow 350,000 soldiers to escape from Dunkirk. By then, England was subjected to massive cross-Channel bomber raids while Nazi submarines devastated shipping in the Atlantic and Caribbean.[1] In 1940, the U.S. provided more than fifty WWI-era destroyers to England for use of its Caribbean islands to protect the Panama Canal, U.S. shipping, and the Western Hemisphere. Under Lend-Lease agreements in 1941, America provided aid "for the defense of any country the President deemed vital to defense of the United States."[2] Of the more than thirty, Great Britain and the Soviet Union dominated the list.

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress to extend draftee service to thirty months for national security reasons, the bill was approved by one vote in pacifist-heavy House of Representatives.[3] By July 1941, 606,915 draftees had been processed, inducted, and assigned to nine woefully understrength 'triangular' RA divisions and eighteen 'square' NG divisions.[4] In his Biennial Report to the Secretary of War (1 September 1940), GEN George C. Marshall said that "the active Army…of approximately 174,000 enlisted men…was virtually a third-rate power."[5] A third of American soldiers were at coastal artillery posts defending seaports.[6] The U.S. Army, strengthwise, was ranked 19th in the world-below Portugal and above Bulgaria.[7] America was the least prepared of the world powers to fight a global war.

"The Alcatraz of the Army"[1]

Adopting the quip of Walter Winchell, the scandal-mongering, sensationalist gossip columnist of the era, the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion (CMB) characterized "the combat swimming, speed marches, un-orthodox exercises, street fighting, Judo, hand-to-hand fighting, use of knife and bayonet, cargo net practice on mockups, loading and unloading small craft, demolitions, and use of explosives… as vigorous, hazardous, and exciting" (6 May to 10 June 1943).[2] They underwent training, unlike the 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion (December 1942). Those soldiers "fired (4.2 inch mortar smoke) from landing craft (to screen) simulated assault landings. For the first time ammunition was available…to permit adequate gunnery practice. Firing technique was developed."[3] The 2nd CMB accompanied the 45th Infantry Division (ID) overseas and the 81st CMB joined 1st ID for D-Day assault landings on Omaha Beach.[4] These heavy mortar men benefitted from the efforts of CPT Oscar Joyner. And, Major MG James A. Van Fleet, 90th ID, praised 81st CMD for its smoke and high explosive (HE) support from August 1944 to January 1945.[5]

Top: A chemical 4.2 inch mortar mounted in an Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM 3) to smoke screen an assault landing at Camp Gordon Johnston.
Bottom: The 4.2 inch mortar being 'man transported' on its carriage to a hilltop.

A Little Context:

BRITISH COMMANDO TRAINING, 1942

The abandonment of ten divisions-worth of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, mortars, trucks, scout cars, and tons upon tons of munitions and supplies around Dunkirk 'rocked' the British army. Demands for retaliatory action by Prime Minister Winston Churchill prompted numerous enthusiastic Commando raids along the coasts of Europe. The majority of these were debacles, low-keyed to the public. After Commando training was centralized in 1942, U.S. Army and Marine officers attended the course to learn how individual soldiers and small groups were physically and mentally strengthened by a tough regimen of challenging tasks under combat conditions. All were done on various terrain, in all weather, day and night, 'on the cheap.' CPT Joyner and his comrades began the indoctrination by carrying their baggage eight miles from Scotland's Spean railway station to the Commando Depot.[1]

Daily physical training (PT) focused on agility and strength exercises to build stamina and endurance. Skills and techniques needed to overcome wall, barbed wire, water, ravine, and cliff obstacles were taught and practiced on multiple confidence courses spread throughout the rugged Scottish terrain. Log drills built teamwork and cooperation. Combat-experienced cadre designed and built quick-reaction, live fire assault lanes everywhere. The overarching premise was to develop self-confidence while promoting initiative and ingenuity in individuals and the small groups.[2]

Problem solving was inherent. Reconnaissance and combat patrols and raids were done day and night. Live fire with small arms, machineguns, antitank weapons, and mortars applied combat, instinctive marksmanship techniques. Repetitive practice continued until competency was achieved in all conditions. Hand grenades, explosives, and pyrotechnics increased the element of shock to enhance violent attacks. Hand-to-hand unarmed combat, 'dirty' knife fighting, navigation with map and compass was practiced on land and water. Small boat operations were rehearsed during the day and executed at night in the midst of exploding artillery, mine simulators, and overhead machine gun fire using tracer ammunition.[3] Since the European population lived in villages, towns, and cities linked by railroads and a variety of roads, street fighting from house-to-house with booby traps everywhere was done day and night.[4] The easily 'exported' fighting skills, techniques, tactical training methods, and field expedient venues became the 'bread and butter' of division Ranger training in the States.[5]

Carolinas to return to Fort Benning before relocating to Camp Gordon, Georgia. The troops were settling into their Camp Gordon barracks on 7 December 1941 when they heard that Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese. The infantry battalions were quickly dispatched to reinforce coastal defenses from North Carolina to Florida.[19] A maneuver respite allowed GHQ to reassess Army training and readiness levels as it regularly 'riddled' divisions for troops to fill those going overseas. Basic infantry training was a constant in the battalions because levies of a hundred plus key personnel three times in two years turned readiness upside down. The internal turmoil was bad, but war news was worse.

Commando Training

By the time the fear of imminent Axis attack had subsided in July 1942, Army Ground Forces (AGF) command had written sufficient doctrine to have the Armies conduct maneuvers corps-on-corps to evaluate divisions and regiments. By then, CPT Joyner, the 4th Division selectee for Commando training, was at Camp William, Achnacarry, Scotland. He was there because GEN Marshall headed an Army plagued with weak junior leaders and unfit American soldiers. He saw Commando training as a way to strengthen and instill confidence among those charged with getting the Army 'fit for combat.'[20] The Commando sidebar specifies the individual and collective skills developed as well as the innovative, 'cheap' training methods adopted by the resource-constrained British after Dunkirk.

CPT Joyner wrote to COL Van Fleet explaining how Commando training could be used to develop more capable junior officer and sergeant leaders in the 4th Division. The 8th Infantry Regiment commander replied after the Second Carolina Maneuvers that they were "preparing for bigger events to come," mistakenly believing that the 4th was troop-listed in the plan to invade North Africa.[21] The 4th Division leaders were stressing tactics and techniques for attacking fortified positions and concrete 'pill boxes' like those in the Maginot Line along the border of France.[22]

Joyner had no inkling that he would not be rejoining his division. Like his Commando mate, CPT Jack T. Shannon (later 10th Special Forces Group [SFG] executive officer and first commander, 77th SFG), he was diverted to the Amphibious Training Center at Camp Edwards. Assigned to its Commando Division, the two were to train the federalized NG 36th ID from 24 August to 4 October 1942 as directed by Major (MAJ) William B. Kunzig.[23]

Based on the lessons learned from the 45th ID in the previous cycle, more night training was added to the Commando task force program: map reading and compass land navigation; explosive charge preparation to eliminate beach obstacles; mine and booby trap detection and neutralization; sandy beach speed marches; sea wall scaling; and obstacle and combat assault courses at night. Since 36th ID Commando Task Force elements would do beach reconnaissance as well as spearheading the division assault, it was isolated on Washburn Island in Waquoit Bay for intense, specified training since they were the key to success.[24]



The Second Army Ranger tab was only worn on the dress uniform of cadre; since it was unofficial, the graduates were only awarded a certificate.

CPT Oscar Joyner, Jr. is wearing the 4th ID Ranger insignia—a black 'R'—above the cuff of the right shirt sleeve of his khaki uniform.

There, 36th ID 'Commandos' lived like Spartans, practicing overwater scouting, stealthy night rubber boat insertions, artillery and naval gunfire targeting; obstacle creation to impede motorized counterattacks; and clearing and securing multiple landing sites. For ten days sleep-deprived 'Commandos' trained hard living on combat rations and water. Since amphibious operations, vice ship landing exercises, were new to the expanding Army, field expediency, live fire, and creativity, was practiced following the British Commando example.[25]

Just as the ATC cadre got into a smooth training rhythm with the 36th ID, AGF ordered the center moved to the Florida 'Panhandle.' Training of the 38th ID was scheduled to begin 23 November 1942. The cadre, reconstituted for BG Frank A. Keating, the ATC commander, had new training priorities established personally by LTG Lesley J. McNair, the AGF commander.[26]

Second Army Ranger School

The formation and training of a Commando task force in each division was eliminated. Never a strong supporter of the Commando concept, General McNair retained only those tough training features that would condition all troops for combat. He was not interested in making 'super killers' out of a select few. All soldiers would get live-fire battle 'inoculations' and practice urban street fighting as part of their physical and mental hardening for combat.[27]

However, LTG Ben Lear, the Second Army commander, still upset about the drubbing given his divisions by LTG Walter Krueger's Third Army in the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers, relieved the most inept generals and colonels. The 1912 Olympics bronze medalist (equestrian) was disgusted with the physical fitness of his infantrymen and weak junior leaders. To deal with those problems, LTG Lear organized a Second Army Ranger School late in 1942. All of his division commanders were told to send their best lieutenants and sergeants to the two-week course. "We are here to toughen men for dirty work," commented General Lear.[28] The course graduates were to promulgate 'Rangerism' in their units.[29]

After helping to move the ATC to Camp Gordon Johnston near Carrabelle, Florida, Captains Joyner and Shannon returned to their units: 4th Motorized at Camp Gordon; and 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) at Fort Benning, respectively. Instead of rejoining COL Van Fleet in November 1942, Joyner was assigned to Division G-3 to organize a Ranger program.[30]

Ranger training was still the 'hottest thing' in the Army despite the misgivings of LTG McNair. It was a simple and inexpensive way to develop tough, highly motivated junior leaders. Select Second Army Ranger course graduates became 4th Division instructors. Ranger-trained junior leaders were in demand because attrition (all ranks) to fill units going overseas required constant basic training. Even new Officer Candidate School graduates had to attend.[31]

CPT Joyner lengthened and reduced Ranger training curriculum based on conditions at Fort Dix, New Jersey (April to August 1943) and Camp Johnston (September through November 1943) while engaged in the III Corps Carrabelle Maneuvers. While the redesignated 4th Infantry Division (April 1943) was at Camp Johnston, its infantry regiments did amphibious operations when not committed. CPT Joyner, a former ATC instructor, could recommend the best training for the time available.[32]

December at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, marked the last 4th ID Ranger course. The graduates were given embroidered black 'R' patches sewn above the right cuff of the long-sleeve khaki uniform shirt.[33] After the Christmas-New Year holidays the division boarded trains for Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. They shipped out of New York on 18 January 1944 and reached England eight days later.[34] The next five months were spent training for the amphibious invasion and assault of Europe.

As a division G-3 operations officer, CPT Joyner arranged live-fire amphibious training for the 4th

Second Army Rangers cross a stream on a toggle-rope bridge under simulated battle conditions. This demostration occured at Camp Forrest, Tennessee, on 23 January 1943.

ID regiments at the U.S. Assault Training Center at Slapton Sands and Woolacombe Beach, near Devon, England. Its commander was Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) William B. Kunzig, Joyner's former Commando Division boss at Camp Edwards. CPT Joyner was well-versed in landing and beach breakout plans.[35] The best trained infantry regiment would lead the way.

Assault on Normandy

COL Van Fleet's 8th Infantry Regiment (reinforced by 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry) led the 4th ID and VII Corps assault on Utah Beach, Normandy, France, 6 June 1944. CPT Joyner helped Brigadier General (BG) Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the Assistant Division Commander, direct units inland. In the first two hours the 8th Infantry Regiment had captured five fortresses while clearing a two-mile swath in the Cherbourg peninsula.[36] But, this was not done without significant losses.

As 4th ID officer casualties mounted, CPT Joyner was sent down to the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry on 13 June as the executive officer. He was replacing MAJ John Dowdy, an original 4th ID officer, who had taken command on 8 June.[37] This 'troop assignment' was reward for 'staff officering' in the G-3 since November 1942. The two battalions of the 22nd Infantry had captured Azeville, the major bastion overlooking the beachhead, and driven the Germans from Chateau de Fontenay, a major headquarters. Infantry advances inland were made dangerous and laborious by hedgerows.[38]

For centuries Normandy farmers had planted hedgerows around their property as fences. The German had months to take advantage of these natural obstacles that channeled movement to roads and paths and allowed the siting of well-concealed fighting positions with interlocking fire. U.S. soldiers discovered quickly how dangerous the hedgerows were and ground movement was slowed considerably.[39]

On 21 June, as the 22nd Infantry was approaching Le Thiel in the 4th ID-led VII Corps drive to Cherbourg, accurate enemy artillery fire forced CPT Joyner to relocate the 1st Battalion jeep-mounted command post (CP). They barely escaped a well-directed barrage. 'Bugging out' under fire, the CP vehicles chose to follow a narrow wagon trail. This route channelized them into a

Top: 4th ID's plan for the assualt on Utah Beach on 6 June 1944. **Center**: Just inland from Omaha Beach on D-Day, 4th ID MG Raymond O. 'Tubby' Barton (center), BG Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (left) and the G-3 discuss division progress. Those personnel behind them were G-3 staff personnel. **Bottom**: WWI veteran BG Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.

These 4th ID soldiers, moving along a road between dense hedgerows, are in the Normandy breakout. They were excellent concealment for German infantry who burrowed into them from the back side.

well-camouflaged hedgerow ambush. The jeep-mounted CP was annihilated by heavy machinegun and rifle fire. CPT Joyner and his driver were killed instantly.[40]

CPT Oscar L. Joyner, Jr. was posthumously awarded Silver and Bronze Stars, a Purple Heart, and the Combat Infantryman's Badge. He is buried in Normandy American Cemetery at Colleville-sur-Mer, France, overlooking Omaha Beach of D-Day.[41] Lest one in remorse forget, the 'Commando,' Ranger, and amphibious training organized, taught, overseen, and promulgated by CPT Joyner for two years undoubtedly saved countless numbers of soldiers in the 36th and 4th Infantry Divisions. And, this training turned several hundred corporals, sergeants, and lieutenants into leaders in the 4th ID, 36th ID, and other divisions. CPT Oscar Joyner merits a gracious salute by these veterans from the Greatest Generation.

Takeaways:

1 WWII Ranger programs, built on British Commando training methodology and combat-proven skills, challenged, motivated, and produced junior officer and NCOs capable of molding draftees into fit, confident soldiers, capable of winning in combat.

2 The two years of 'Commando,' Ranger, and amphibious training organized and run by CPT Oscar L. Joyner, Jr. saved countless lives in the 36th and 4th ID and other divisions while making leaders of several hundred corporals, sergeants, and junior officers.

3 Physical training can be done anywhere, anytime; demonstrate how to overcome tough obstacles and then make 'enabled' soldiers face those challenges every day and at night.

Endnotes

1 "Oscar L. Joyner," at http://1-22infantry.org/kia/joyner, accessed 4 February 2020.

2 Charles H. Briscoe, "Commando & Ranger Training: Preparing America's Soldiers for War," *Veritas*, 10:1 (2014): 64-79, and "Commando & Ranger Training, Part II: Preparing America's Soldiers for War: The Second U.S, Army Ranger School & Division Programs," *Veritas*, 12:1 (2016): 1-15.

3 Monica Young, "Second Chances," at https://www.journalnow.com/news/local/second-chance/article_082caf7d-514c-5175-95, accessed 24 October 2019. Oscar L. Joyner, Jr. was a teenager when his dentist father purchased their family home at 408 West Mountain Street, Kernersville. Oscar, Sr. was one of the first dentists to practice in the town. That house was renovated in 2011 by another dentist, Dr. Amy-Jo Fischer.

4 George Gunn, *Milestones Backward Run….: Beta Theta Pi at Davidson*, Vol. II 1941-1971, 30 in Matthew R. Joyner family papers; Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), 428. The Organized Reserve Corps (100,000+) consisted primarily of college graduates from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Citizen Military Training Camps (CMTC). There were about 14,000 professional Regular Army (RA) officers in the summer of 1940. It was customary to offer the Honor Graduates of the combat arms basic officer courses an RA commission. Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops: The Army Ground Forces: United States Army in World War II* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, United States Army, 1947), 2.

5 "National Assessment of Adult Literacy," at https://nces.ed.gov/NAAL/lit_history.asp, accessed 15 May 2020.

6 Gunn, *Milestones Backward Run*, 30; Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 428.

7 Gunn, *Milestones Backward Run,* 30; Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 428; Greenfield, Palmer and Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops: The Army Ground Forces,* 2.

8 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 3; Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1948), 489; Weigley, *History of the United States Army,* 424.

9 Shelby I. Stanton, *World War II Order of Battle* (New York: Galahad Books, 1984), 81; Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Army Ground Forces; Organization of Ground Combat Troops,* 9; Martin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955), 550.

10 Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 550.

11 Gabel, *The U.S. Army Maneuvers of 1941,* 18-19. The Mobilization Training Program (MTP) lasted about thirteen weeks: six weeks were devoted to basic soldier skills from physical fitness to discipline (School of the Soldier) and seven weeks for specialty training. Riflemen practiced weapons maintenance and marksmanship and their role in squad tactics.

12 Paul F. Braim, *The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 62. The Army's original experimental unit, the 2nd Division, was divested of its mobility field testing.

13 Stanton, *World War II Order of Battle*, 81; Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Army Ground Forces; Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 9. Contrary to Gabel in *The U.S. Army Maneuvers of 1941*, 29, the 12th Infantry Regiment was simply motorized, never mechanized. The armored divisions (supposedly fully motorized) and the Cavalry's experimental 'mechanized' force had gotten virtually all 'mechanized' assets. Their infantry carriers and artillery haulers were the M2 and M3 half-tracks. Reliance on Army-level documents and journal articles without cross-referencing with veterans distorted reality. John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, *Infantry: Part I: Regular Army: Army Lineage Series* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972), 311-323; "The Units: 12th Infantry Regiment," at http://www.25thida.com/12thinf.html, accessed 26 March 2020.

14 Briam, *The Will to Win*, 62-64; Gabel, *The U.S. Army Maneuvers of 1941,* 45-47, 87.

15 Management of the training of the field forces had been decentralized in July 1940 by transferring this function from the War Department General Staff (WDGS) to the staff of the wartime General Headquarters (GHQ) to assist the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, in his capacity as Commanding General of the Field Forces. GHQ ran the maneuvers of 1940 and 1941. Shortly after America's declaration of war, Army Ground Forces command was created and assumed this training responsibility. Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 6, 12, 16, 31, 43, 44, 60; Stanton, *World War II Order of Battle*, 81; Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, 424.

16 Wiley, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions Study No. 12*, 13. There was a dearth of competent regimental and battalion commanders and other field grade officers. But the junior and noncommissioned situation was even more disturbing.

17 Gabel, *The U.S. Army Maneuvers of 1941*, 146.

18 The Army Ground Forces, CPT Marshall O. Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center: Study No. 22* (Washington, DC: Army Ground Forces Historical Center), 5-7, 10; Wiley, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions Study No. 12*, 12; Stanton, *World War II Order of Battle*, 81; Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Army Ground Forces; Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 9.

19 Braim, *The Will to Win*, 63.

20 The Army Ground Forces, MAJ Bell I. Wiley and CPT William P. Govan, *History of the Second Army Study No. 16* (Washington, DC: Army Ground Forces Historical Section, 1946), 33.

21 Letter, COL James A. Van Fleet to CPT Oscar L. Joyner, 8 August 1942. Matthew R. Joyner family papers. The unwieldiness of the 4th Motorized Division became obvious to planners by the number of ship transports necessary to accommodate its vehicles. Braim, *The Will to Win*, 65, 380 endnote 40.

22 Braim, *The Will to Win*, 65.

23 Briscoe, "Commando & Ranger Training," 69, 71, 72, 74.

24 Briscoe, "Commando & Ranger Training," 69, 72, 74.

25 Briscoe, "Commando & Ranger Training," 72, 74.

26 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center: Study No. 22*, 12, 48, 57-58; Briscoe, "Commando & Ranger Training," 69, 71, 74.

27 Baker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, 48, 58, 59-60.

28 Tennessee, Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Archaeology, Report of Investigations No. 13 (2007); Benjamin C. Nance, "Archeological Survey of World War II Military Sites in Tennessee," 17.

28 David W. Hogan, Jr., *Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 23.

30 Briscoe, "Commando & Ranger Training," 71; Photograph, Matthew R. Joyner family papers.

31 Braim, *The Will to Win*, 65-66.

32 Stanton, *World War II Order of Battle*, 81.

33 Photograph, Joyner family papers.

34 Braim, *The Will to Win*, 64.

35 Briscoe, "Commando and Ranger Training," 77.

36 "Famous Fourth: The Story of the 4th Infantry Division," at http://www.lonesentry.com/gi_stories_booklets/4thinfantry, accessed 11 October 2019; Joyner family papers.

37 Stanton, *World War II Order of Battle*, 82; Joyner family papers; Braim, *The Will to Win,* 68; "LTC John Dowdy, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, 1944," at http://1-22infantry.org/commanders/dowdypers.htm, accessed 4 February 2020.

38 "Famous Fourth: The Story of the 4th Infantry Division," at http://www.lonesentry.com/gi_stories_booklets/4thinfantry, accessed 11 October 2019; Joyner family papers.

39 "Famous Fourth: The Story of the 4th Infantry Division," at http://www.lonesentry.com/gi_stories_booklets/4thinfantry, accessed 11 October 2019; Joyner family papers.

40 "Famous Fourth: The Story of the 4th Infantry Division," at http://www.lonesentry.com/gi_stories_booklets/4thinfantry, accessed 11 October 2019; Joyner family papers.

41 Joyner family papers.

Quote

1 *History of the Second Chemical Mortar Battalion* (undated WWII account), 6, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Infantry Lieutenants 1940

1 Ronald Spector, "Military Effectiveness of US Armed Forces, 1919-1929," in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), *Military Effectiveness: The Interwar Period* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 70, cited in COL Lonnie B. Adams III, "The Interwar Period: Lessons from the Past" manuscript (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), 5; Major Generals (MG) Robert T. Frederick (Canadian-American First Special Service Force, 1st Allied Airborne Task Force, and 45th ID commander, WWII) and John K. Singlaub (Office of Strategic Services [OSS], WWII) attended CMTC. MG Singlaub was operations officer of the U.S. Army Ranger Training Command, Ft. Benning, GA and CIA Joint Advisory Commission, Korea (JACK) during the Korean War and was the first Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Operations Group (MACV-SOG) during the Vietnam War. MG Robert T. Frederick, Official Military File, National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, MO; Retired MG John K. Singlaub, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 25 January 2008, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC

2 Army Ground Forces. MAJ Bell I. Wiley, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions Study No. 12* (Washington, DC: Army Ground Forces Historical Section, 1946), 12. The WWI-era 'square' infantry divisions had four infantry regiments were considered to be too unwieldy for modern 1940s warfare. The U.S. Army reduced the divisions to three smaller infantry regiments to improve their mobility. Thus evolved the 'triangular' division.

3 Christopher R. Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1992), 16, 17.

4 Spector, "Military Effectiveness of US Armed Forces, 1919-1929," 70.

COL James A. Van Fleet

1 *The Howitzer 1915* (NY: The Blanchard Press, 1915), 191.

2 Braim, *The Will to Win*, 43, 45, 48-52, 52-53, 57, 59-61, 92. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, had James A. confused with another Van Fleet, a drunkard at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Consequently, many of his classmates were four-star generals by the end of the war.

Just How BAD Was It?

1 William Addleman Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942), 517

2 "H.R. 1776, the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, 10 January 1941," at http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cf?smtlD=3&psid=4075, accessed 27 May 2020.

3 Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army,* 519; *The Officers' Guide*, 9th ed. (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1940), 19; Weigley, *History of the United States Army,* 569.

4 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, 10.

5 *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1996), 3.

6 Richard W. Stewart, ed. Army Historical Series. *American Military History Vol. II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2009), 67.

7 John W. Mountcastle, "Foreword" to Biennial Reports, v; David B. Woolner, email to Politifact, 13 June 2014, "SUBJECT: The 'Special Relationship' between Great Britain and the United States Began with FDR," 13 June 2014, at https: rooseveltinstitute.org/special-relationship-between-great-britain-and-united-states, accessed 3 February 2020.

Alcatraz of the Army Sidebar

1 This quip about the Army Amphibious Training Center at Camp Gordon Johnston near Carrabelle, Florida, was coined by Walter Winchell, the scandal-mongering, sensationalist gossip columnist and radio news commentator of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. He was notorious for exploiting famous people, first in the entertainment world, Prohibition era gangsters, then to J. Edgar Hoover in law enforcement against appeasers of Nazism before WWII and by aiding and abetting Senator Joseph McCarthy's allegations and labeling of government and Hollywood celebrities as Communists. This Second Red Scare was triggered by the Communist takeover of China and the Korean War. That association with McCarthy finally led to his demise as television eclipsed radio and newspapers. The major political gossips/pundits were Edward R. Murrow and Walter Lippmann. Herman Klurfeld, *Winchell: His Life and Times* (NY: Praeger, 1976). It was cited in *History of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion, Training History at CGJ (May 6th through June 10th 1943)*, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

2 *History of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion, Training History at CGJ (May 6th through June 10th 1943).*

3 *History of the Second Chemical Mortar Battalion* (undated WWII account), 6, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

4 *History of the Second Chemical Mortar Battalion,* 6; "World War II History of the 2nd Chemical Mortar Bn," at http://www.4point2.org/hist-2w.htm accessed 16 June 2020; *History of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion*; "WWII Commands: 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion," at https://www.historynet.com/wwii-commnds-81st-chemical-mortar-battalion.htm accessed 16 June 2020. The 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion served 1,000 days in the Korean War. Walter J. Eldredge, *Red Dragons: The 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion in Korea* (Indianapolis: DogEar Publishing, 2009); "Unit History in Korean War," at http://red-dragons.org/Unit%20History%20in%20Korean%20War.html, accessed 16 June 2020.

5 *History of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion*.

British Commando Training 1942

1 Timothy R. Moreman, *British Commandos 1940-46* (London: Osprey Publishing, 2006), 16-17.

2 Moreman, 38; Nick van der Bijl, *No. 10 Inter-Allied Commando 1942-45* (London: Osprey Publishing, 2006), 12.

3 Moreman, 38; Bijl, *No. 10 Inter-Allied Commando 1942-45*, 12.

4 Moreman, 38; Bijl, *No. 10 Inter-Allied Commando 1942-45*, 12.

5 Briscoe, "Commando & Ranger Training," 72-76, 78; Briscoe, "Commando & Ranger Training, Part II," 5-9; Donald J. Cann and John J. Galluzzo, *Images of America: Camp Edwards and Air Force Base* (Charleston SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2010), 67-73; Elizabeth Taylor, *Images of America: Camp Forrest* (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2016), 60-61, 66-70, 72-78.

Abstract: *USASOC customized the Blue Star Service banner to instill parental and family pride in loved ones who volunteered to serve in Army Special Operations Forces during wartime. It reinforces the spirit of a united ARSOF family. The reunification of Gold Star with Blue Star Service emphasizes that it was an ARSOF soldier who made the supreme sacrifice to preserve liberty in America.*

ARSOF Blue Star Service Banner

by Charles H. Briscoe

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has decided to rekindle a hundred-year-old tradition honoring wartime military service. The new Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)-unique Blue Star Service Banner unites our families in pride of national service during conflict. It will remind all that ARSOF is 'the tip of America's spear.'

The Blue Star Service (BSS) banner tradition dates to World War I. Captain Robert L. Queisser, 5th Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry (State Militia), wanted to honor his two sons' overseas military service in 1917. He created a red, white, and blue banner featuring a blue star for each son to hang in the front window to show his pride in their patriotism.[1]

The Blue Star Service banner tradition originated during WWI.

The mother of a WWI serviceman hangs her Blue Star Service banner in her front window.

The Governor of Ohio, James M. Cox, had the following read into the *Congressional Record* on 24 September 1917: "The mayor of Cleveland, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Governor of Ohio have adopted this service flag. The world should know of those who give so much for liberty. The dearest thing in all the world to a father and mother–their children."[2] The banner quickly became a symbol for families with children serving in the war. The practice was stimulated by articles in *National Geographic* and *Popular Mechanics* magazines.[3]

The original BSS banner (approximately 8.5 by 14 inches) was red with a white field to accommodate as many as five blue stars vertically (representing five in service). Expanding on the BSS banner philosophy, President Thomas Woodrow Wilson in 1918 endorsed a request from the Women's Committee of the Council of National Defense whereby mothers who lost a child in military service during wartime could affix a gold star to their mourning armband.[4] This led to a smaller gold star being placed on the highest blue star of the BSS banner. BSS Mothers and Gold Star Mothers (GS) formed veterans' service organizations.[5]

1–3: WWI Blue Star Service window banners were handmade.

Gold Star Mothers rally to support their organization after WWI.

This banner with the Gold Star above the other two Blue Stars reflects the loss of a serving family member during WWI.

During World War II, the practice of displaying Blue Star banners started anew. The War Department issued banner dimensions (most were handmade) and display guidelines.[6] The most famous banner commemorated the five Sullivan brothers who died when their light cruiser USS *Juneau* (CL-52) was sunk in the naval Battle of Guadalcanal at night on 13 November 1942. The Sullivan family BSS with five stars and a photo of the five sailors became a 'Support the War Effort' poster. [7]

Although the tradition of BSS banners was not embraced during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Department of Defense (DoD) authorized a service flag and a lapel pin in 1969 (DoD Directive 1348.1) as specified in U.S. Code 179-182. The American Legion tried to rekindle pride in those serving military men and women after 11 September 2001 by freely distributing BSS banners to families nationwide (the Queisser patent [6 November 1917] had long expired).[8] Numerous cities across America demonstrated pride in those serving by installing personalized Blue Star Banners along main thoroughfares.[9] In 2010, the 111th Congress declared that home owner associations could not restrict GS or BSS banner display by members (Blue Star/Gold Star Act of 2010 [S.3477]).[10]

The Army resumed the GS banner tradition during the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Now by presenting the ARSOF BSS banner stickers to parents and families of soldiers graduating from the Special Forces, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs courses, and ARSOF assessment programs, USASOC will instill parental pride. And, this practice allows parents and families to demonstrate support for sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, and loved ones who volunteered to serve in ARSOF units.

These banner stickers wordlessly convey sacrifice, pride, service to country, and signify that a loved one is away at war.[11] ARSOF BSS banner decal/stickers containing a blue-bordered Gold Star connect the Gold and Blue Star families. It reminds all that a Blue Star 'begat' the Gold Star. Both programs will be bolstered. The two banners remind all that the current conflicts continue to touch every neighborhood in America.[12]

Additional
Blue Star Products

The Office of War Information (OWI) combined the Blue Star Banner tradition with the photo of the 'Five Sullivans' to make Poster No. 42 in 1943. The five Sullivan brothers from Waterloo, Iowa, who died when the light cruiser USS *Juneau* was sunk on 13 November 1942 were: (L to R) George Thomas, Francis Henry 'Frank,' Joseph Eugene 'Joe,' Madison Abel 'Matt,'and Albert Leo 'Al' Sullivan.



Another OWI poster linked poor security to the death of a U.S. Navy sailor that led to a Gold Star Service banner.

The Gold Star Mothers postage stamp was issued 21 September 1948.

Gold Star Mothers were recognized after WWI and WWII by the U.S. Postal Service.



The current Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)-unique Blue Star Service banner reminds all that Army SOF is "the tip of America's spear."

Endnotes

1 "The Tradition Continues," online at https://www.legion.org/troops/bluestar, accessed 3 December 2019.

2 "The Tradition Continues," online at https://www.legion.org/troops/bluestar, accessed 3 December 2019.

3 "The United Service Flag Company," *National Geographic* (October 1917): 186; "For Those Who Carry On: The Service Flag Still Waves and Makers of Novelties Find Many Ways to Display It," *Popular Mechanics* (February 1919): 29.

4 "About the Service Flag," online at https://www.bluestarmothers.org/service-flag, accessed 10 December 2019. President Woodrow Wilson used the term 'Gold Star Mother' in that letter to the Women's Committee of the Council of National Defense. Mrs. Grace C. Siebold was recognized as the first 'Gold Star' mother. Her son, 1LT George V. Siebold, a Sopwith Camel pilot in the 148th Aero Squadron, U.S. Army Air Service, was shot down over France in August 1918 while the unit was attached to the British Royal Air Force. Mrs. Siebold organized the American Gold Star Mothers, Incorporated, on 5 January 1929. "Gold Star Service Banner History," online at http://floridalegionpost13.org/p13goldstarhistory.html, accessed 18 February 2020.

5 "Gold Star Service Banner History," online at http://floridalegionpost13.org/p13goldstarhistory.html, accessed 18 February 2020; "About the Service Flag," online at https://www.bluestarmothers.org/service-flag, accessed 10 December 2019.

6 "The Tradition Continues," online at https://www.legion.org/troops/bluestar, accessed 3 December 2019.

7 "The Five Sullivan Brothers, 'Missing in Action' off the Solomons: They Did Their Part," Office of War Information poster No. 42, 1943, online at https://digital.library.unt.edu/rk:/67531/metadc532/, accessed 18 February 2020; "About the Service Flag," online at https://www.bluestarmothers.org/service-flag, accessed 10 December 2019; Hugh Conrad, "War Mother," America in WWII, December 2007, online at https://www.americainwwii.com/articles/war-mother, accessed 24 February 2020.

8 "The Tradition Continues," online at https://www.legion.org/troops/bluestar, accessed 3 December 2019.

9 "Blue Star Banner Program," online at https://www.bluestarbanner.org/about.php, accessed 6 January 2020.

10 "S-3477 – Blue Star/Gold Star Flag Act of 2010," online at https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/3477, accessed 10 December 2019.

11 Meg Jones, "Blue Star Flags Convey Sacrifice for Service Members," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, 5 March 2017, online at https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/2017/03/05/100-years-old-blue-star-flags-convey-sacrifice-service, accessed 18 February 2020.

12 "History of the Blue Star Service Banner," online at http://www.bluestarsforasafereturn.com/history.htm, accessed 18 February 2020.

ARSOF-History.org Microsites

In late 2018, the USASOC History Office launched command-internal ARSOF History websites, just before the 'external', publicly accessible website. The '25-meter target' was to migrate existing History Office print products onto the online platforms. These included published *Veritas* articles, and content from *The Last Full Measure of Devotion* and *Indomitable Valor* (Medal of Honor) books. Since then, the website has grown to include ARSOF icon biographies, 'born-digital' articles, and thematic microsites. In the pages that follow, descriptions and links are provided for four of these ARSOF History microsites: the First Special Service Force (WWII), the M29 'Weasel' Cargo Carrier, ARSOF in Panama (Operations JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY), and 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group leaflets (Korean War). New sites will be added as the content becomes available.

By USASOC Historians

First Special Service Force

Special Forces lineage dating to World War II began with the combined U.S.-Canadian First Special Service Force (FSSF). Activated on 9 July 1942, the FSSF was an elite commando unit designed to attack hydroelectric plants in Nazi-occupied Norway. Commanded by U.S. Army Colonel (COL) Robert T. Frederick, the FSSF was nicknamed the 'Devil's Brigade' by the Germans in Italy. The FSSF earned six campaign streamers during its two-and-a-half year existence. The USASOC History Office established a publicly accessible, 'content rich' micro-site on 5 December 2019 to honor the 75th anniversary of the FSSF deactivation ceremony near Menton, France. The website follows the FSSF from activation through its postwar legacy. Introduction, Beginnings, At War, and Legacy sub-sections cover 1942 to 1945, stateside training, and operations in Kiska, Italy, and Southern France. Photographs, rare videos, documents, and audio clips accompany the narratives. Visit: https://arsof-history.org/first_special_service_force/index.html



M29 WEASEL

The M29 Weasel, built by Studebaker, was a WWII tracked vehicle designed for operations in snow. Designed by British inventor Geoffrey Pyke as a fast and light mechanized device to transport small groups of commando troops of the First Special Service Force (FSSF) across snow. In active service in Europe, Weasels were used to supply frontline troops over difficult ground inaccessible to wheeled vehicles.

After the war, many surplus M29s were sold to allied countries. They served in Arctic and cold weather operations until retired in 1958.

WEASEL VIDEOS

WEASEL NEWS CLIPPINGS

M29 Weasel

The M29 'Weasel' Cargo Carrier was a purpose-built WWII-era tracked vehicle used by the U.S. military in both Europe and the Pacific. It was originally designed for the U.S.-Canadian First Special Service Force (FSSF) for use in Nazi-occupied Norway. Built by U.S. auto-maker Studebaker, it was fielded six months after design. Although the Norway operation was cancelled, utility of the Weasel was apparent. Its wide tracks and light weight (3,800 pounds), allowed the M29 to traverse difficult terrain impass-able for wheeled vehicles. Thousands of Weasels were built to transport and supply front-line troops. The vehicle remained in the U.S. mili-tary inventory until 1958, for arctic, mountain, and rough terrain operations. Allied surplus M29s were used for decades in Europe and ski areas of the U.S. Based on its origin, the USASOC History Office created a M29 Weasel site with period photographs, articles, and videos. Visit: https://arsof-history.org/weasel/index.html

ARSOF in Panama, 1989-91

On 20 December 1989, the U.S. military launched Operation JUST CAUSE to remove Panamanian dictator Manuel A. Noriega, subdue the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), protect American lives and property, and safeguard the Panama Canal. More than 27,000 U.S. military personnel (including 3,600 Army Special Operations Forces [ARSOF] soldiers), participated in the operation. The ensuing stability mission (PROMOTE LIBERTY) lasted until 1991. This USASOC History Office microsite includes original articles, oral history interviews with JUST CAUSE veterans, photographs, and primary sources. The materials available through this microsite provide a snapshot of ARSOF preparation for, and participation in, military operations in Panama, 1989–1991. Visit: https://arsof-history.org/arsof_in_panama/index.html.

1st RB&L Psywar Leaflets from the Korean War

During the Korean War, Psychological Warfare (psywar) elements produced and disseminated some 2.2 billion leaflets. These prompted thousands of North Korean and Chinese Communist troops to surrender. The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was a strategic psywar asset for the UN Command (UNC) and the Far East Command (FECOM) from 1951 to 1953. The J.B. Haynes Leaflet Collection is another microsite featuring one hundred leaflets. Each leaflet has a brief description explaining its design and intended purpose. Visit: https://www.arsof-history.org/articles/19dec_1st_rbl_leaflet_collection_page_1.html.

Leaflet #40: 'The Sky Thunders — The Earth Rocks — Human Flesh Cannot Stand Against Tanks and Planes

#arsofhistory on Social Media

V-E Day Blitz

Below are USASOC History Office social media posts that celebrated the 75th Anniversary of Victory in Europe Day.

May 8, 2020 marked the 75th anniversary of Victory in Europe (V-E) Day, Nazi Germany's unconditional surrender to the Allied powers in World War II, after almost six years of conflict. After the suicide of Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler on April 30, 1945, in Berlin, representatives of the German government began negotiating with the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), commanded by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Reims, France. Two signing ceremonies were held; the first was on May 7, 1945, in Reims, and a second, more formal event took place the following day in Berlin, and was attended by Eisenhower and other Allied representatives. In Europe, hostilities were to cease by midnight May 8, 1945. Victory in Europe ushered in celebrations, but fighting continued against Imperial Japanese forces in the Pacific.


VE-DAY

THE STARS AND STRIPES

VE-DAY

GERMANY QUITS

U.S. Really Let Go With Yells At (Unofficial) Peace News

London Shouts 'It's All Over'

Passes, Furlough Extended 48 Hours

Rangers

Several Ranger units supported Allied combat operations in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, France, and Germany, as they fought across Europe. These included the First through Fifth Ranger Battalions, Task Force X-ray, the 6615th Ranger Force, the Ranger Force, 29th Provisional Ranger Battalion, and Rangers who served with the First Special Service Force.

Ranger units earned eleven Campaign Streamers, five of them with the distinctive Arrowhead Device signifying assault landing credit. The Rangers were among the first American forces to fight in Europe as part of Operation JUBILEE, the attempted raid at Dieppe, France. They climbed the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc, France, to destroy key German defenses and secure Utah and Omaha beaches during Operation OVERLORD, and helped spearhead the attacks across the Rhine River as Allies advanced on Germany. In living up to their motto, Rangers found themselves 'leading the way' in many of the major combat actions of the war. Direct lineal predecessors of today's U.S. Army 75th Ranger Regiment, these legendary special operations units contributed to the defeat of Nazi forces in the field, and ultimate victory in Europe.

PSYOP

Supporting Allied combat operations in Sicily, Italy, and Western Europe were psychological warfare (psywar) units, task forces, and staff agencies. These included the Psywar Branch, Allied Force Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ); the Psywar Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF); the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies (MRBCs); and task-organized, Field Army-level Psywar Combat Teams (PWCTs) and Combat Propaganda Teams (CPTs). Together, these elements used a wide variety of media, including leaflets, pamphlets, posters, tactical loudspeakers, radio, and film, to convince opposing forces of the inevitability of Allied victory; urge combatants to desert or surrender; gain support from civilians in recently liberated areas; and persuade the enemy home front to cease supporting the war effort. Predecessors of today's U.S. Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units, these legacy psywar elements contributed to the demoralization and weakening of Nazi forces, and to ultimate victory in Europe.

Civil Affairs

As the war came to a close, U.S. Army Civil Affairs/Military Government (CA/MG) units came to the forefront. Guided by policies formulated by the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) under Major General John H. Hilldring, these specialized units helped rebuild the American Zone of Occupation into a modern democratic society. The Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), headed by General Lucius D. Clay, handled military government duties in Germany from January 1, 1946, until it was disbanded on December 5, 1949. One of its elements was the Information Control Division (ICD), headed by former Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF) director, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure. The ICD ensured that media supported denazification and other U.S. and allied priorities. McClure later rebuilt the U.S. Army psywar capability during the Korean War, which included forming the Psywar Center at Fort Bragg, NC, today's U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The occupation of West Germany ended on May 5, 1955. By then, the economic aid provided by the U.S. through the Marshall Plan, in conjunction with CA/MG efforts, had turned West Germany into a staunch ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which stood in opposition to the Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc during the Cold War.

Air Power

U.S. Army Air Forces played a critical role in the Allied victory over Nazi Germany and its allies. Strategic bombing campaigns degraded the Luftwaffe, Germany's industry and transportation networks, and command and control elements. Tactically, Army air power provided critical support to ground forces.

In addition, between D-Day and V-E-Day, B-17s and B-29s of the Eighth U.S. Air Force, namely from the Special Leaflet Squadron, disseminated nearly three billion psychological warfare (psywar) leaflets produced by the Psywar Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). The primary mode of delivery were T-1 leaflet bombs, each carrying some 80,000 leaflets, activated by barometric fuse at 2,000 feet above ground, and covering an area of around one mile.

After the war, U.S. Army elements in the T-Force and Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency sought out Nazi avionic technology to further U.S. rocket and aviation programs. Some of these technologies aided the development of U.S. rotary-winged platforms.

ARSOF Icon:

SGM Tyrone J. Adderly (1943–)

Special Forces | Vietnam | Son Tay Raider | SF 'Q' Course Instructor

Tyrone J. Adderly enlisted as a U.S. Army Infantryman in 1961. After basic training and Airborne School, he joined the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 1965, Sergeant Adderly deployed to the Dominican Republic as a Fire Team Leader with the 504th Infantry during Operation POWER PACK. In 1966, he served as a Squad Leader with the 502nd Infantry, 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam, was wounded, and awarded the Army Commendation Medal, with V device, and Silver Star. After graduating from the Special Forces (SF) Weapons Course in 1968, Staff Sergeant Adderly deployed back to Vietnam to serve with the 5th SFG. He returned to Fort Bragg in 1969, and volunteered in 1970 for IVORY COAST, the Son Tay Raid to free American Prisoners of War (POWs) held in North Vietnam. Although unsuccessful, the raid led to improved conditions for American POWs. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for heroism during the mission. After serving in the 6th and 5th SF Groups, he was promoted to Master Sergeant, and Sergeant Major (SGM). He retired from active duty in 1988. SGM Adderly returned to the SF Qualification Course ten years later to support exercise Robin Sage as a guerrilla chief, mentor, and advisor. His ongoing support to training builds on a legacy of excellence and devotion to duty that characterized his career.

For more information on SGM Adderly, please visit: https://arsof-history.org/icons/adderly.html



Commander, USASOC
ATTN: AOHS (Veritas)
E-2929 Desert Storm Drive
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

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