A Team Approach

In fall 2011, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Major (MAJ) Joseph A. Dewey reported to Kelley Barracks, in Stuttgart, Germany, as the PSYOP Planner in the J39 (Information Operations), Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA). There, Dewey learned that U.S. President Barack H. Obama recently authorized the deployment of 100 combat-equipped soldiers to central Africa to support ongoing counter-Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) efforts.1 Named Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS, the mission involved 10th and 19th Special Forces Group (SFG) soldiers training counterparts from Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and other multi-national forces. As the preface to this article explained, those partners sought to remove the brutal LRA from the battlefield.

Led by the mystic Acholi nationalist Joseph Kony, the LRA had perpetrated atrocities against civilians across central Africa since 1987. The President’s authorization finally committed the U.S. to aiding its allies against that threat. Even though encouraging LRA soldiers to defect was a core military objective, in practice the U.S. emphasized foreign internal defense (FID), an SF specialty, with no PSYOP personnel included at first. Thanks to a few enterprising PSYOP soldiers, that soon changed in a way that impacted the trajectory and outcome of OBSERVANT COMPASS. This article describes the deployment activities and accomplishments of the first PSYOP team in Uganda, from January to July 2012. The story begins in the J39, SOCAFRICA, with its newly arrived PSYOP Planner, MAJ Dewey.

Commissioned in 1996, the former Transportation and Chemical Officer had Bosnia and Kosovo deployments before switching to PSYOP in 2004. Deploying to Iraq as a detachment commander (Company C, 9th PSYOP Battalion [POB]), Dewey was then assigned to 6th POB. After leading Military Information Support Team (MIST) – Ethiopia, he became a Plans Officer on the 4th PSYOP Group staff. This led to a nine-month deployment supporting the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan. After serving as 5th POB Executive Officer, which included a tour with the Joint Information Support Task Force (Special Operations) (JISTF [SO]) in Qatar, he joined the J39, SOCAFRICA. From his new position in Germany, Dewey would play a key role in getting a PSYOP team into central Africa.2

OBSERVANT COMPASS rules of engagement dictated that U.S. soldiers could not directly attack the LRA. That restriction shaped the initial approach of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Counter-LRA Control Element (ACCE [pronounced āce]), the lead headquarters for the operation. Located in Entebbe, Uganda, the ACCE treated OBSERVANT COMPASS as a typical FID mission. However, the SOCAFRICA Commander, U.S. Navy SEAL Rear Admiral (RADM) Brian L. Losey, realized that ‘kinetic’ military operations had not yet defeated the LRA. Political interest in the crisis led Losey to adopt a “whole of SOCAFRICA” approach involving more than FID. He directed MAJ Dewey to “get after this problem.”3

Despite his extensive experience, the PSYOP Planner saw this as a unique mission. He and Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Greg Mogavero, the new Information Operations (IO) Officer, discussed how to use Military Information Support Operations (MISO) against Kony.4 Lacking specific guidance or MISO authorities, they had a blank slate. Dewey spoke with 19th SFG leaders at the ACCE, and planned temporary duty (TDY) visits there. The first TDY was a one-week trip in January 2012, involving Dewey and his Non-Commissioned Officer-in-Charge (NCOIC), Master Sergeant (MSG) Geoff Ball, Jr.* Though confirming the ACCE’s FID-heavy approach, they also discovered that it was “receptive” to MISO.5

Given the OBSERVANT COMPASS objective of promoting LRA defections, PSYOP had an opportunity. However, the ‘maxed-out’ 100-person force cap required a workaround. MAJ Dewey contacted LTC Lee H. Evans, commander of the new, USAFRICOM-aligned 7th POB, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.6 They planned to deploy two PSYOP soldiers to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, for assignment with the Regional Information Support Team (RIST), Special Operations Command and Control Element-Horn of Africa (SOCCE-HOA). The team would then go TDY to the ACCE, but could return to Djibouti quickly, if necessary.7 The mission would fall on two unsuspecting members from Company A, 7th POB: Captain (CPT) Adam R. Vance and Staff Sergeant (SSG) Nathan J. ‘Jed’ Todd.8

SSG Todd had reported to his Company A detachment in mid-2011, after studying Arabic at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Monterey, California.9Todd had enlisted in 1994, studied Russian at DLI, served in Military Intelligence (MI), and deployed to Bosnia with the 302nd MI Battalion from Germany. He left active duty in 1999, but later joined the 345th PSYOP Company, U.S. Army Reserve, in Lewisville, Texas. The PSYOP Specialist deployed to Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2004), before returning to active duty in 2006. Assigned to 9th POB, he supported 20th SFG during a second Iraq tour (2006-2007). As a 6th POB soldier, he deployed with MIST-Mali, partnering with the U.S. Embassy in Bamako on counter-terrorist messaging. With tactical and regional experience under his belt, SSG Todd joined 7th POB as a motivated, seasoned PSYOP NCO.10

Led by CPT Matthew J. Shirley, this detachment was tasked to analyze the South Sudan region. Todd clearly recalled that “the LRA kept coming up” during ‘duty day’ research on the area and potential target audiences. Meanwhile, a surprise opportunity arose from the enrollment of a fellow soldier at Fayetteville Technical Community College (FTCC). One evening, FTCC hosted a presentation by Invisible Children, a non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in 2004 to raise awareness about Kony, and to assist Africans in LRA-affected countries. SSG Todd accepted his teammate’s invitation to attend. Impressed by Invisible Children’s efforts, he subsequently contacted the NGO, beginning a relationship that later paid operational dividends.11

In December 2011, CPT Shirley handed command of the detachment over to CPT Adam R. Vance. The 2006 U.S. Military Academy graduate had recently completed an 11-month tactical deployment with Company E, 9th POB, in support of Special Operations Task Force – South, in Afghanistan. Vance was impressed by Todd’s knowledge of the LRA, and his rapport with Invisible Children. The captain had heard rumors that a PSYOP team might deploy to central Africa, but was skeptical when he took leave for Christmas break. Unbeknownst to him, SOCAFRICA and 7th POB had been working hard to get a team into Uganda.12

After the New Year, LTC Evans informed CPT Vance and SSG Todd that they were deploying in mid-January. To Vance, this “seemed completely unrealistic, but it turned out to be true!” Vance and Todd got orders in-hand, and scrambled to get ready (Todd’s tenacity in researching the region and the LRA reduced some of the stress of the short-notice deployment). “We hit a snag with getting our Uganda visas approved, so Jed and I drove a day to the Ugandan Embassy in Washington, D.C. We had just express-mailed our passports the day before, so we hand-picked them up, got them stamped, and drove back,” said Vance. After getting ready in record-time, the two left on 20 January 2012, wearing civilian clothes, and carrying two uniforms and extra civilian clothing in personal bags.13

Upon arrival at Camp Lemonnier, they were met by RIST-HOA members, and provided billeting. The next day, they flew to Entebbe, Uganda, where the ACCE was expecting them. “They had workstations set up for us,” Vance recalled, “which is always a good sign.”14 In Uganda, Vance and Todd briefly met with two NCOs from the J39, SOCAFRICA, who were finishing another TDY to gather information for the broader MISO program.15 Soon, they were on their own.

As MISO Support Element – Uganda (MSE-UG), Vance and Todd quickly reached two conclusions.16 First, the 100-soldier limit seemed low given the size and complexity of the operational area (multiple ethnicities speaking dozens of languages in an area the size of California).17 Obviously, the two could not do anything about the force cap, meaning that effects must be achieved in other ways.

Second, Vance and Todd noted that U.S. military expertise on central Africa and the LRA was lacking. However, NGOs fluent in local languages and customs were already on the ground, helping civilian communities throughout the region. MSE-UG decided early on that it would make sense to work directly with them, particularly Invisible Children. The only condition was that they had to keep the U.S. State Department’s in-theater counter-LRA representative, Jason Lewis-Berry, informed.18

On paper, the MSE-UG mission was simple: influence fighters to leave the LRA. “For every member of the LRA removed from the operational area,” MAJ Dewey said, “we … achieved a portion of the desired effect.”19 Once LRA soldiers defected, they would need to report to designated Safe Reporting Sites (SRSs), managed by local security forces or by the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Defectors could also report to civilian-run Community Defection Centers (CDCs).20 U.S. Navy SEAL Captain (CAPT) Kenneth Wright, ACCE commander, granted MSE-UG latitude in developing its approach to this problem.

With enthusiastic U.S. Embassy support, the ACCE sent Vance and Todd to Djema and Obo, Central African Republic; Dungu, Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Nzara, South Sudan, in order “to get a solid plan together.”21 At those locations, MSE-UG planned to meet with SF teams, local religious and political figures, NGO representatives, and civilian-run radio stations. The two were comfortable working with SF due to their previous combat tours. In addition, Todd had interagency experience from his earlier MIST-Mali deployment. Together, they knew how to coordinate cross-organizational efforts at the ground-level.

In February, during their site surveys, MSE-UG realized that FM radio was key to reaching the LRA and nearby communities. MONUSCO and host nations, with NGO support, were running local radio stations. However, coverage was spotty, and Acholi-language broadcasts were rare (Azande-language programs were more prevalent). MSE-UG had current FM radio coverage mapped to suggest expansions. They found that Radio Zereda in Obo needed better equipment and must relocate to higher elevation for better range. Further, Djema was a good candidate for an FM transmitter for several reasons: nearby LRA activity; the presence of an SF Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) from Company A, 4-10th SFG, for security; and no other stations nearby.22Djema became a priority.

A change in MSE-UG NCOICs did not halt ongoing site surveys, plans, and improvements. SSG Todd, who had gotten MSE-UG on a good footing for deployment and had made critical inroads with groups on the ground, departed on 30 March so that he could return for a full tour in July. His replacement, SGT Pete H. Blackman*, kept radio expansion efforts going. By mid-April, with U.S. Embassy approval in-hand, MSE-UG finished coordinating with USAFRICOM and SOCAFRICA for shipping two tactical FM transmitters. They arrived on 3 May; three days later, the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group trained SGT Blackman* on their use and repair.23 One FM transmitter was then transferred to Djema, where Blackman* trained locals for the remainder of May.

The Djema station provided local leaders, the SF ODA, and African military forces the ability to broadcast popular music, public safety notices, and counter-LRA messaging, to listeners within a 30-kilometer radius. In addition, as CPT Vance noted, MSE-UG sat with defectors to document their stories and gratitude for being free of the LRA.24 Recordings were then edited on a Panasonic Toughbook CF-31 laptop by MSE-UG, in partnership with the NGO The Voice Project. Djema broadcasters voluntarily played sixteen recorded “come home” messages from LRA defectors, which complemented printed products.25

As MSE-UG expanded radio coverage, it also assisted Invisible Children with defection leaflets.26 First, MSE-UG, ‘armed’ with information from site visits, planned leaflets directly with the NGO.27 Next, Invisible Children printed, packaged, and delivered the leaflets to the ACCE with their own vehicles.28 Finally, Vance and Todd arranged the dissemination of these products (usually by contracted air) based on target audience location.

One leaflet campaign featured one of Kony’s former wives, Guinikpara Germaine (abducted in 2008), who claimed that seeing another former wife on a leaflet inspired her to flee as well. On 17 February 2012, 20,000 of these leaflets were dropped around Gilima, Democratic Republic of the Congo. A month later, 30,000 leaflets fell on Dungu, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Finally, on 23 March, 50,000 were dropped around Djema and Obo, and 20,000 around Duru, Democratic Republic of the Congo.29 Aerial leaflet drops like these remained commonplace during OBSERVANT COMPASS.

Leaflets were also distributed face-to-face by SF teams, NGOs, MONUSCO, partner nation forces, and community leaders. In one case, MSE-UG delivered dozens of boxes of leaflets in the back of a Toyota Hilux pickup truck to the SF team in Dungu to hand out. Vance recalled that the load “was so heavy that the front wheels came off the ground. I don’t know how we steered!”30 These missions demonstrated how NGOs, MSE-UG, and other agencies cooperated to encourage defections from the LRA.

These efforts were working, and the LRA was shrinking one soldier (or a handful) at a time. Still, in the West, OBSERVANT COMPASS was overshadowed such events as the drawdown in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. That changed on 5 March 2012, when Invisible Children released its 30-minute film, Kony 2012, on YouTube. It was produced on the following premise: “Can an online video make an obscure war criminal famous? And if he is famous, will the world work together to stop him?”31 Directed by Invisible Children co-founder Jason Russell, Kony 2012 exposed LRA crimes and atrocities, especially child abduction and slavery. It also urged viewers worldwide to publicize Kony in their own communities.

Reactions to Kony 2012 exceeded expectations. According to SSG Todd, “We knew in advance that Invisible Children was making a movie, [the Embassy] knew about it, and the ACCE knew about it. But no one thought it would be a big deal.”32 To their surprise, it exploded on social media, gaining millions of views. According to Invisible Children, Kony 2012 was “the fastest growing viral video of all time and resulted in unprecedented international action to end Africa’s longest running conflict.”33 Virtually overnight, Kony and the LRA became front-page news. Kony 2012 offered an interesting dynamic: a short film released on YouTube generated instant global visibility of, and interest in, a low-key, U.S.-supported mission.

As a result of Kony 2012, Congressional visits to Uganda increased. Further, on 23 April 2012, at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, Obama said, “part of our regional strategy [is] to end the scourge [of] the LRA and help realize a future where no African child is stolen from their family, no girl is raped, and no boy is turned into a child soldier.” The U.S. was stepping up “efforts to facilitate defections and support their reintegration, in parallel with increased military pressure, [to] help reduce the LRA’s capacity.”34 Continued political support of the mission seemed assured.

Additionally, Colonel (COL) Kurt S. Crytzer, who became ACCE commander in June, saw enormous potential in the PSYOP-supported defection campaign against the LRA. The former 2-19th SFG and Joint Special Operations Task Force – Trans-Sahara commander “really got relationships going with NGOs, [and] transformed the mission from training folks in tactics to developing partnerships with the community.”35 With great political support, strong command backing, and enduring partnerships, PSYOP soldiers went on to play a critical role throughout OBSERVANT COMPASS.

In mid-2012, the first MSE-UG rotation was nearing the end of its tour. Replacing CPT Vance and SGT Blackman* in July were Sergeant First Class (SFC) Nathan J. Todd and SGT Trevor B. Rangel*. Before completing the turnover, on 6 July, Vance, Blackman*, Todd, and Rangel* cooperated on an aerial leaflet drop mission. Invisible Children had delivered eight cardboard boxes, each filled with 2,500 defection leaflets, to the airfield. The PSYOP soldiers then loaded them into the contracted Cessna 208 Caravan, operated by Air Serv.

Due to weight limits, only Vance and Blackman* boarded the plane. While in flight, they dropped 20,000 leaflets over suspected LRA locations around the Chinko Natural Reserve in eastern Central African Republic. Some leaflets showed defectors who later joined the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF). Others showed former LRA Major General (MG) Caesar Achellam, who was reunited with his family.36 A milestone in the counter-LRA fight, the UPDF had captured Achellam, an LRA member since the late-1980s, on 12 May 2012, near the Central African Republic-Democratic Republic of the Congo border. From then on, Achellam cooperated with the U.S. and its partners by encouraging other LRA soldiers to defect.37

By the end of the first MSE-UG deployment in July 2012, twenty-five out of perhaps 500 LRA members had defected.38 Among them was Michael Oryem, who was abducted by the LRA at around eight years old in 1995, rose to battalion commander, and defected on 22 June 2012.39 Subsequent PSYOP teams highlighted the defection of higher-ranking LRA members like Oryem to encourage highly indoctrinated, lower-ranking soldiers to defect, through products demonstrating that their former leaders and comrades were safe and happy.

U.S.-supported defection efforts seemed to be paying off, despite several obstacles. First, defecting was inherently difficult due to tight small-unit cohesion within the LRA, and Kony’s strong psychological hold over his forces (rooted in superstition). Second, the region’s size and topography made it difficult to pinpoint where LRA units were located, and for LRA fighters themselves to leave. A third obstacle was limited literacy and technology use within the LRA, forcing PSYOP to rely expressly on leaflets and radio broadcasts. These factors affected, but did not derail, the counter-LRA defection campaign, which was showing results.

LRA defections alone were not the only credit to PSYOP in early OBSERVANT COMPASS. In a short period of time, a few highly motivated and experienced soldiers had established a team presence on the ground; made the right interagency connections; plugged-in with and expanded existing NGO efforts; and got the MISO effort up and running. The second MSE-UG rotation, and every subsequent team, built on the strong foundation laid by PSYOP soldiers in SOCAFRICA and MSE-UG in 2011-2012.40

There were eleven PSYOP rotations to central Africa between the start of Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS in October 2011 and its successful conclusion on 21 April 2017. Each one supported the ACCE, which became Special Operations Command Forward – Central Africa (SOCFWD-CA) in 2013. They bore similarities to the first one discussed in this article, but there were also differences. For example, starting with the third rotation in May 2013, the PSYOP team consisted of at least three or four personnel per deployment (as opposed to two). Also, the team designation changed over time. Starting off as the MSE-UG in 2012, it became Regional MISO Team – Uganda (RMT-UG) by 2014, and finally, Regional MISO Detachment – Uganda (RMD-UG) by 2015.

Interagency cooperation continued, but on 17 July 2013, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the “USAFRICOM Counter-LRA MISO Program.” This led to unilateral PSYOP messaging and improved MISO tactics. For example, by 2013, low-altitude aerial loudspeaker (ALS) missions via contracted Bell UH-1 Iroquois (‘Huey’) helicopters, which caused LRA soldiers to scatter and defect, had become standard practice.41 In addition, by 2015, products began targeting specific LRA soldiers. These included pre-recorded loudspeaker messages featuring their own family members. Customized products remained a mainstay of MISO during OBSERVANT COMPASS.

Although Kony remained at-large, the PSYOP-supported defection campaign had diminished the LRA down to less than 100 fighters by early 2017. Defectors and escapees included LTC Opio Sam on 25 June 2014; Brigadier General Dominic Ongwen in late 2014; seven members of Kony’s inner circle (known as the Kony 7) in June 2015; COL Okot George Odek, one of Kony’s bodyguards, on 6 February 2016; and LRA Chief of Communications, Michael Omona, in January 2017.42On 29 March 2017, General Thomas D. Waldhauser (U.S. Marine Corps), Commander, USAFRICOM, declared that African forces could handle what remained of the LRA, and shut the mission down the next month.43OBSERVANT COMPASS offered a model of how to apply creative, ‘non-kinetic’ solutions to complex military situations.

The author would like to thank LTC Joseph A. Dewey, MAJ Jonathan Easter, MSG (ret.) Nathan J. Todd, Adam R. Vance, and the soldiers, NCOs, and officers of 7th POB, for their support to this article.