Spreading the Word Fast

On CBS Evening News on 1 January 1990, anchorman Dan Rather displayed aerial imagery of the Papal Nunciature in Panama City, Panama, the hideout of dictator Manuel Noriega. After showing U.S. military roadblocks, Rather pointed to another spot, saying, “Over here … is a speaker system through which statements by President [George H.W.] Bush and rock music are being pumped out on a 24-hour-a-day basis as part of a psychological pressure that the U.S. wants to keep drumming into Noriega inside that compound.”1 This “pressure” being applied by soldiers from the 1st Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was part of a broader PSYOP effort during Operation JUST CAUSE.

This article details PSYOP in Panama from 20 December 1989 through mid-January 1990. First, it explains pre-conflict PSYOP preparations, including the development of print, audio, and visual products, and plans for a PSYOP Task Force (POTF). Second, it summarizes the role of tactical loudspeaker teams in combat operations on and after D-Day. Third, it describes the arrival of 4th PSYOP Group (POG) (-) and the POTF on D+4, and the ensuing multifaceted PSYOP effort through January 1990. Finally, it summarizes PSYOP output, impact, and lessons learned, and concludes that it made key contributions to the U.S. mission in Panama.

PSYOP planning began long before JUST CAUSE, the mission to remove Noriega, the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), and Dignity Battalion (DIGBAT) paramilitary squads, and help restore a democratic government. The commander of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)-aligned 1st PSYOP Battalion (POB), Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Dennis P. Walko, knew key players on the USSOUTHCOM and U.S. Army South (USARSO) staffs. He had also previously worked for Lieutenant General (LTG) Carl W. Stiner, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and, later, Joint Task Force (JTF) – South, during JUST CAUSE. The 4th POG commander, Colonel (COL) Anthony H. Normand, also had a positive relationship with XVIII Airborne Corps. Walko stated in hindsight that “liaison between us and USSOUTHCOM [and] XVIII Airborne Corps was extremely easy.”2 PSYOP was thus ‘plugged into’ Panama contingency planning early on, correcting a noted failure from Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada in 1983.3

According to Walko, “Various prepackaged PSYOP materials—pre-recorded TV, radio, and loudspeaker tapes; radio and loudspeaker scripts; music; and designs for printed leaflets and posters—were developed from 1987 to 1989.”4 The possibility of American intervention increased and 4th POG preparations accelerated once Noriega nullified the May 1989 elections, a PDF coup in October failed, and U.S. civilians and service-members in Panama faced heightened hostility. The priority in contingency planning was fielding enough loudspeaker teams to support a corps-sized operation. Unfortunately, 1st POB did not have enough soldiers to meet this requirement.5

As a solution, 4th POG tasked 6th, 8th, and 9th POBs to provide additional soldiers so that each combat battalion would have at least one attached two-man team armed with a 250-watt AN/UIH-6 man-pack loudspeaker system.6 According to Major (MAJ) Robert W. Caspers, 8th POB Executive Officer, the battalion’s “loudspeaker assets [were] the most likely portion of the unit to be utilized during this operation.” 8th POB had “both the people and the equipment [man-packed and vehicular loudspeaker systems] ready to move on a relatively short notice to anywhere.”7 The lack of Spanish language capability in the other PSYOP battalions would be offset by the use of surrender appeals pre-recorded on cassette tapes.

As 1st POB commander, LTC Walko was slated to head a POTF in Panama, although the POTF main body would not arrive until D+4. Eventually located at Corozal near Albrook Air Base (but with Walko just north at Fort Clayton), the POTF would be comprised of soldiers from across the 4th POG serving in loudspeaker teams, as staff, and as Liaison Officers (LNOs); the 1st POB Propaganda Development Center (PDC); two print sections; and soldiers from the 90th Strategic Dissemination Company (SDC), to run the Transportable AM Transmitter – 10 kw (TAMT-10) station near Corozal. Upon arrival, the POTF was to provide command and control of PSYOP elements, develop and disseminate PSYOP products, and advise the JTF-South commander. 8

These plans notwithstanding, the actual PSYOP footprint in Panama on D-Day was meager. It initially consisted only of LTC Walko and a small staff; a 1st POB loudspeaker detachment of five teams (which had been in Panama since May); and the 90th SDC broadcast team.9 Based on LTG Stiner’s directive that PSYOP soldiers would accompany U.S.-based assault forces for the invasion, tentative plans called for the following disposition of loudspeaker teams:

• Three for TF RED-Tango (1/75th Ranger Regiment [+])
• Three for TF RED-Romeo (2/75th Ranger Regiment [+])
• Nine for TF PACIFIC (HQ, 82nd Airborne Division [ABD]; 1st Brigade, 82nd ABD [+])
• One for TF WHITE (SEAL Team 4)
• One for TF GATOR (4th Battalion, 6th Mechanized Infantry Regiment [+])
• One for TF BLACK (3-7th Special Forces Group [+])
• One for a Special Operations team

U.S.-based loudspeaker teams could be and were shuffled around until the last minute, depending upon mission requirements. 1st POB teams already present in Panama were allotted to in-country forces.10

When JUST CAUSE began at 0100 hours on 20 December 1989, approximately forty 4th POG soldiers joined invasion forces as planned, providing loudspeaker and linguistic support to their supported units.11 By the end of D-Day, there were 66 personnel from 4th POG in Panama.12 For several days, loudspeaker teams continued to support combat and clearing operations. According to one loudspeaker operator, “We would … roll up with a rifle company. I’d get with the company commander, and we would decide that we were going to broadcast into the house to try and clear out innocents before we would hit it. In three or four cases, we [got] 50 or 60 people out of a house before the troops went in and cleared it.”13

Loudspeaker teams were complemented by pre-taped messages broadcasted on Panamanian TV Channel 2 from EC-130E VOLANT SOLO aircraft of the 193rd Special Operations Group (SOG), Pennsylvania Air National Guard. Days into JUST CAUSE, broadcasting resumed from the station itself at Cerro Azul, near Panama City, after members of 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group had secured it and the situation had stabilized.14 There were also radio broadcasts emanating from the TAMT-10 in Corozal, which became known as Radio Liberty. According to one 90th SDC soldier, “We had to operate 24 hours a day for the first four days before had gotten reinforcements. During that period, we [got] little if any sleep at all.”15 Loudspeaker broadcasts, VOLANT SOLO, and Radio Liberty comprised the bulk of the round-the-clock PSYOP effort until the POTF main body arrived on 24-25 December 1989.16

Also deploying was 4th POG commander, COL Normand, and key staff, who formed the theater-level PSYOP Task Group (POTG). Collocated with USSOUTHCOM at Quarry Heights, a couple miles south of Corozal, the POTG ensured PSYOP policy compliance, reviewed POTF products, provided ‘as-needed’ support to the POTF, and advised the USSOUTHCOM Commander, General (GEN) Maxwell R. Thurman.17 This was the first attempt at a new deployment model in which the POG commander became the theater PSYOP officer, while a regional battalion formed the core of a JTF-level POTF.

Into January 1990, PSYOP forces used various printed, audio, and visual media to support ongoing military objectives. First, they delivered news and health and welfare information to Panamanians, to include locations of food distribution and medical treatment centers. Second, they continued to urge the surrender of Noriega and his supporters, including former DIGBAT members. “[I]f somebody was holed up in a house … [we] would use [the loudspeaker] to talk them out,” according to First Lieutenant (1LT) Robert E. Gagnon, an 8th POB loudspeaker detachment commander. Third, they provided reasons for the U.S. intervention, assuring Panamanians that the U.S. “would leave as soon as possible.” Fourth, they promoted the weapons turn-in program. “[W]e would broadcast information on … where they could turn in the weapons and receive their money for payment,” said Gagnon.18 Finally, they worked to enhance the credibility of the new President Guillermo Endara government.

With pre-fabricated products in-hand, PSYOP soldiers quickly transitioned to ‘on the spot’ broadcasts and original products. For example, LTC Walko recalled that the POTF “was heavily involved in preparing scripts and acquiring news items and music adequate to keep the Panama City area receiving VOLANT SOLO’s broadcasts and the nationwide audience receiving the AM radio station’s broadcasts 24 hours per day.” Print products were originally produced at the U.S. military print plant at Corozal, and later at Fort Amador. These highly sought-after items were disseminated via pick-up trucks, helicopters, and by hand.19

Products originated at the Propaganda Development Center (PDC) in the POTF. Its mission was to “develop, produce, and disseminate multi-media [PSYOP] in the Republic of Panama.” Commanded by a major, the PDC had around 45 officers and soldiers organized into seven sections: Command Group, Print, Radio, TV, Face-to-Face, Information Collection/LNOs, and an ad hoc planning section called Cell A. Its overarching objectives were enhancing “popular support and legitimacy of the Government of Panama,” and discrediting “Noriega loyalists, [DIGBATs], and criminal elements.” Among its products around the New Year were the Nueva Republica newspaper; weapons turn-in leaflets for the 82nd Airborne Division, 7th Infantry Division, and 75th Ranger Regiment; special bulletins; and 30-minute radio programs broadcasted three times weekly.20

The most well-known PSYOP episode during JUST CAUSE occurred at the Papal Nunciature, where Noriega hid from 24 December 1989 until 3 January 1990. First, the PDC organized a prayer vigil about the event. Then, LTG Stiner (with Thurman’s approval) ordered a PSYOP-led “sound barrier” around the Nunciature after Christmas to prevent media eavesdropping on negotiations between MG Marc A. Cisneros, Commander, USARSO, and José Sebastían Laboa, the Papal Nuncio (Vatican diplomatic representative). Deafening, round-the-clock music from cassette tapes and local radio stations blared through 450-watt loudspeakers mounted on HMMWVs. Harassing Noriega was of ancillary benefit. While effective, that practice sparked criticism from diplomats, the media, U.S. citizens, and even Laboa himself. With the issue becoming increasingly uncomfortable for U.S. President George H.W. Bush, GEN Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed Thurman to stop the music on 29 December. Though highly publicized in the international media, this was but a fraction of the overall PSYOP effort.21

The scope of the PSYOP effort in Panama belied the relatively low number of 4th POG soldiers in JUST CAUSE, which peaked at around 250 in late 1989. PSYOP units also utilized fluent Spanish speakers, some from the 4th POG and others from supported units.22 After the New Year, PSYOP soldiers spread throughout Panama began consolidating at Corozal for re-deployment. On 10 January 1990, there were 207 personnel from PSYOP units in-country; that number decreased greatly throughout the month.23 Equipment used by these soldiers while in Panama included the TAMT-10 station; twenty-three 250-watt loudspeaker systems, thirteen 450-watt loudspeaker systems, and two 900-watt loudspeaker systems; and two light print plants, each mounted on a M35A2 truck inside an ES-38 or ES-82A shelter and powered by a PU-406 trailer-mounted generator. PSYOP-owned vehicles included fourteen HMMWVs, and ten M1008 and M1009 Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles (CUCVs).24

PSYOP output between 20 December 1989 and 8 January 1990 was significant. The POTF produced and distributed a million leaflets and handbills, 50,000 posters, over half a million newspapers (Perspectivas and Nueva Republica), and 125,000 units of various other print products (including posters, receipts for weapons, and ID cards).25 The free PSYOP-printed newspapers were so popular that they were being sold by Panamanians on the streets.26 Additional PSYOP efforts included ongoing tactical loudspeaker support, TV messaging, and 24-hour AM radio broadcasts.27 An estimated 70 percent of the Panamanian population had tuned into Radio Liberty programming, which was, according to COL Normand, “quite remarkable. It proved the credibility we had with the Panamanian people, and [the] efficacy of our broadcasting efforts. They were relying on us for their information [that] they knew they could trust.”28

Perhaps most important were face-to-face interactions, which helped personalize the U.S. presence to Panamanians. One PSYOP soldier recalled fondly that the Panamanians were genuinely “happy that we were there. They would come out, shake our hands, give us free Coca-Colas, food, [etc.]. These were poor people who did not have a lot themselves, but they would give us whatever they had because they were happy to see us [and] that we had liberated them from Manuel Noriega.”29 Perhaps more than PSYOP products themselves, these personal interactions had helped shape Panamanian attitudes toward the overall U.S. operation.

When the focus fully shifted from combat to stability operations (PROMOTE LIBERTY) in mid-January, the POTF was replaced by a 48-person PSYOP Support Element (PSE). Commanded by 8th POB commander, LTC Jeffrey B. Jones, and mostly comprised of 8th POB soldiers supported by 1st POB linguists and 90th SDC augmentees, PSE efforts included legitimizing the new Panamanian Police Force and Public Force; promoting the Endara government; and countering propaganda from Endara’s opponents. As the world’s attention shifted to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in mid-1990, Panama became a sideshow. Drawing down throughout 1990, the PSE was officially dissolved in March 1991.30

There were many indicators of PSYOP impact during JUST CAUSE.31 First, it was credited with reduced casualties on both sides. For example, early in the operation, U.S. Marines encountered heavy PDF/DIGBAT resistance around La Chorrera. During an overnight ceasefire, the attached loudspeaker team broadcasted surrender appeals and aircraft dropped 20,000 leaflets. “Resistance ceased early the next morning without an additional shot being fired,” recalled Walko.32

Similar events happened elsewhere. “I don’t want to blow my own horn,” said SGT Javier R. Ramirez, who supported TF RED-Tango, “but I think we saved more lives by being there.”33 According to MAJ Caspers, “[O]nce the loudspeakers were on the ground and had shown themselves to be effective at reducing the level of resistance met, nobody wanted to … turn loose of them … [They] played very significant roles in … diminishing casualties on both sides.”34 It had not just reduced military casualties, but civilian casualties as well. COL Normand was “personally convinced that the civilian casualty toll would have been significantly higher had we not had [PSYOP soldiers] spread out … to keep civilians out of the line of fire.”35

A second impact indicator was high Panamanian support for the U.S. intervention and the new government. For example, by 29 December 1989, 76 percent of Panamanians polled saw U.S. forces as liberators; 88 percent wanted U.S. forces to remain; 90 percent felt that Panama would improve; 95 percent viewed Endara as the legitimate president; and 88 percent approved of Noreiga being tried in the U.S.36 “To see what was happening in that country,” Normand recalled, “and to be a part of changing that and to feel the electricity in the air when you talk[ed] with the Panamanian people, it was something that words don’t express.”37 A third measure of effectiveness was 8,848 weapons turned in through the PSYOP-advertised ‘weapons for cash’ program. According to SGT Joel L. Villa, another loudspeaker operator, the Panamanians “seemed to respond to it pretty well. Especially when they see $125 being waved in front of them … just for bringing a rifle in. Word spread fast.”38

Finally, thanks to PSYOP support, there were reduced anxieties among Displaced Civilians (DCs) temporarily sheltered at Balboa High School. One 1st POB loudspeaker team worked full-time in the compound, broadcasting messages, handing out newspapers, pre-testing products, talking with people, and reporting problems to camp administrators from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. According to Walko, “By building rapport and establishing information programs with the [DCs] over time, PSYOP soldiers established their credibility and were able to neutralize rumors before they expanded to crisis proportion.” Once an improved DC facility was constructed at Albrook Air Base, “PSYOP soldiers helped prepare the population of the Balboa camp to minimize apprehension about the move to the new site and to enhance control during the move itself.”39

Several PSYOP lessons arose from JUST CAUSE. First, soldiers were well-prepared because PSYOP had been fully integrated into the theater campaign plan, and enjoyed senior-level support from the chain of command.40 Second, because the POTF main body took longer than expected to arrive in Panama due to delayed deployment orders, the “full capabilities of PSYOP could not be brought to bear until D+4 of Operation JUST CAUSE.” A lessons learned report recommended that, in the future, all necessary PSYOP elements must “arrive in the AO early in the deployment.”41

And third, pre-fabricated products received praise in post-conflict lessons learned reports. For example, “Loudspeaker teams equipped with pre-recorded tapes and bilingual script booklets contributed significantly to the success of the combat assault and [consolidation] phase of JUST CAUSE.”42 However, input from the field about pre-made products was less glowing. According to 1LT Gagnon, “Of the … [pre-recorded] tapes, we didn’t use any of them.”43 SGT Ramirez said, “We were given some tapes to be used in surrender appeals, tapes to control the civilians. We never used them.”44 SGT Villa stated pointedly, “They were just extra weight.”45

These critiques notwithstanding, PSYOP contributed to U.S. victory in JUST CAUSE. 4th POG and its battalions were integrated into contingency planning long before the invasion, allowing for the development of multi-media products in advance. In-country and U.S.-based PSYOP forces supported combat operations until the D+4 arrival of the POTF main body, which was in turn bolstered by the theater-level POTG. Through January, PSYOP provided the U.S. and its Panamanian allies with a ‘voice’ to speak to the people via print, audio, and visual products. According to Walko, PSYOP in Panama was widely viewed “as both cost effective and critical to success.”46 At the ground level, SGT Todd said, “We did a good job. We fulfilled our mission or [even] far [past] the mission we were initially told to do.”47