Beyond the Numbers: The 528th Support Battalion in Operations DESERT SHIELD & DESERT STORM

Published May 2021

U.S. Central Command Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI)

U.S. Central Command Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) — U.S. Central Command Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI)

Operation DESERT STORM concluded on 28 February 1991, after six weeks of intense aerial bombardment and a 100-hour ground campaign that ejected Iraqi forces from occupied Kuwait. Commenting on the rapid and overwhelming success of that operation, General (GEN) H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr., Commander-in-Chief (CINC), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), singled out U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) for praise, referring to them as the glue that held the diverse U.S.-led coalition together.1 Schwarzkopf did not specifically mention the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB), but his senior SOF commander in theater, U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel (COL) Jesse L. Johnson, described the 528th as his “saving grace.”2 Johnson’s deputy, U.S. Air Force (USAF) Colonel Douglas Brazil, echoed that sentiment: “we’d have died without them.”3 Viewed in this light, the 528th SOSB was a critical, but largely overlooked, ingredient in Schwarzkopf’s “glue.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. commanded USCENTCOM during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Few published histories of the Persian Gulf War, as Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM are commonly known, address the 528th SOSB’s role.4 However, several unpublished histories, including those produced by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) History Office, devote a few paragraphs to ARSOF combat service support (CSS) in this conflict.5 These accounts typically describe 528th SOSB contributions in terms of quantities: number of miles travelled, requisitions filled, maintenance jobs completed, and meals distributed. They do not provide context for understanding these numbers, nor do they put faces on the ARSOF Support soldiers responsible for sustaining ARSOF.6 In contrast, this article fills that gap by relating how this small, one-of-a-kind support battalion, with limited operational experience and no role in existing USCENTCOM plans, deployed to Saudi Arabia and helped sustain ARSOF during the U.S. military’s largest ground campaign since the Vietnam War.

Background

In 1986, the U.S. Army activated the 13th Support Battalion (Special Operations) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to provide dedicated logistical support to ARSOF units assigned to 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM). Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Louis G. Mason, its 163 soldiers were organized into a headquarters company (HHC) and three functional detachments (Supply, Maintenance, and Transportation). In May 1987, the Army reflagged the 13th as the 528th Support Battalion, better known as the 528th SOSB. Soon thereafter, it began deploying small contingents to Bahrain to support ARSOF in Operations EARNEST WILL and PRIME CHANCE – the so-called “Tanker War” with Iran that lasted from 1987-1989.7 That mission was ongoing in May 1989, when the Army ordered the 528th’s inactivation, effective September 1990.8

528th Special Operations Support Battalion

Rather than passively wait for inactivation, 528th leaders successfully inserted it into U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) contingency plans for Panama. In December 1989, two task-organized elements from the 528th, totaling thirty-seven soldiers, deployed in support of Operation JUST CAUSE.9 The 528th’s performance there convinced the CINC, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), GEN James J. Lindsay, to ask the Army to reconsider its inactivation decision. At a March 1990 meeting with Lindsay, GEN Robert W. Riscassi, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed to postpone the inactivation, pending a comprehensive study of ARSOF CSS.10 This study was underway when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s tanks overran neighboring Kuwait that August.

During Operation JUST CAUSE, a team of eleven 528th soldiers ran a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) from Howard Air Force Base, near Panama City, Panama. Here, a UH-60 Black Hawk is seen departing the FARP. — During Operation JUST CAUSE, a team of eleven 528th soldiers ran a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) from Howard Air Force Base, near Panama City, Panama. Here, a UH-60 *Black Hawk* is seen departing the FARP.

The 528th SOSB gained valuable experience in Panama but, like many USASOC units, had not yet been tested by an extended, large-scale deployment. It would now get that opportunity, due in part to deficiencies in the USCENTCOM plan for supporting ARSOF during contingency operations. Between August 1990 and March 1991, 155 soldiers – 96 percent of the 528th’s total strength – deployed to the USCENTCOM area of operational responsibility (AOR). Their actions there ensured the battalion’s survival.

Planning and Deployment

5th Special Operations Support Command (SOSC) beret flash — U.S. Army, Central (ARCENT) SSI

Inclusion in USSOUTHCOM plans, prior to JUST CAUSE, allowed the 528th SOSB to stage equipment and rehearse with supported ARSOF elements.11 Nothing of this nature existed for USCENTCOM.12 As a result, the 528th’s role in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was largely an exercise in improvisation.

Existing plans and doctrine gave SOCCENT, the theater special operations command for USCENTCOM, operational control (OPCON) of all ARSOF in theater. However, it was not responsible for their logistical support. That responsibility fell to U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT), the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) for USCENTCOM.13 ARCENT’s plans called for a mobilized U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Army Support Group (ASG) to support ARSOF during contingency operations.14 However, the planned ASG could not arrive in theater for at least seven weeks after the SOF units it was to support, a problem identified by SOCCENT at a March 1990 planning conference.15 Finally, the SOF element intended to coordinate ARSOF logistics in the USCENTOM AOR, 5th Special Operations Support Command (SOSC), would not activate until October 1990, which was too late to have any impact on DESERT SHIELD.16

President George H.W. Bush spoke out forcefully against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, declaring that the aggression “will not stand.” — President George H.W. Bush

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein did not expect U.S. military intervention, when deciding to invade Kuwait in the summer of 1990. — President George H.W. Bush

On 7 August 1990, U.S. President George H.W. Bush ordered the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia, to deter further Iraqi aggression. COL Jesse Johnson and his staff immediately began making preparations for a SOCCENT-Forward headquarters (HQ) on the Arabian Peninsula.17 Knowing the weaknesses in the ARCENT support plan, he asked Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael F. Spigelmire, Commanding General, USASOC, for the 528th SOSB, being familiar with its recent contributions during JUST CAUSE.18 1st SOCOM, the 528th’s higher headquarters, recommended deployment two days later.19

LTC Norman A. Gebhard, 528th SOSB Commander, alerted his battalion, which immediately began preparing to deploy to Saudi Arabia. One junior officer recalled the soldiers being too consumed by the task at hand to worry about what lay ahead. Instead, the prevailing sentiment among the troops was that Iraq, which fielded the fourth largest army in the world at the time, “didn’t know what it was getting into.”20

When LTC Gebhard assumed command of the 528th in July 1990, it was his second consecutive SOF assignment on Fort Bragg. However, he had spent the first fifteen years of his career in the conventional Army, experience that would serve him well during the upcoming deployment. He was aided by battalion Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Otis W. Norfleet, a JUST CAUSE veteran who had been the battalion CSM since mid-1988. Joining him were fellow Panama veterans Major (MAJ) Randy R. Heyward (Executive Officer), Captain (CPT) Robert T. Davis (S-3, Operations Officer), CPT Mark A. Olinger (Support Operations Officer), CPT John M. Gargaro (Commander, HHC), and Sergeant First Class (SFC) James E. Boone (S-4, Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge [NCOIC]).21 Their combined experience made it possible to deploy the entire battalion into a largely unknown environment in less than a month, and then hit the ground running.

Still, a battalion-sized deployment was a new experience for all involved and was not without difficulty. To accomplish the task, the 528th embedded Staff Sergeant (SSG) Ronald Jackson, its Air Movement Officer, at Pope Air Force Base (AFB), North Carolina, to coordinate air load planning.22 It also received invaluable assistance from the USAF, as it jockeyed with XVIII Airborne Corps units for limited space on outbound aircraft heading for Saudi Arabia.23

The battalion began deploying from Pope AFB on 29 August, on a combination of C-5 Galaxy and C-141 Starlifter aircraft. Most arrived at King Fahd International Airport (KFIA), located on the Persian Gulf coast near the city of Dammam, within a few days, although the C-5 lagged behind the C-141s, due to maintenance issues.24 On 8 September, the 528th SOSB became the first ARSOF unit to complete its deployment (“close theater”), despite not having been previously force-listed on USCENTCOM contingency plans.25 It left behind a small rear detachment of eight personnel at Fort Bragg, led by First Lieutenant (1LT) Janette L. Skowron.26

Some 528th SOSB personnel and equipment deployed to Saudi Arabia aboard a U.S. Air Force (USAF) C-5 Galaxy, like the one pictured here. — Some 528th SOSB personnel and equipment deployed to Saudi Arabia aboard a U.S. Air Force (USAF) C-5 *Galaxy*, like the one pictured here.

The C-5, seen here offloading troops in Saudi Arabia, was the largest cargo aircraft in the USAF inventory.

Most 528th soldiers deployed out of Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, on one of several USAF C-141 Starlifter cargo aircraft, like the one seen here. The C-141 has since been replaced by the C-17 Globemaster. — Most 528th soldiers deployed out of Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, on one of several USAF C-141 *Starlifter* cargo aircraft, like the one seen here. The C-141 has since been replaced by the C-17 *Globemaster*.

DESERT SHIELD

The earliest days of Operation DESERT SHIELD were chaotic and tense. Though growing daily, the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia was miniscule, compared to the massive concentration of Iraqi troops in Kuwait.27 The XVIII Airborne Corps and SOF elements that arrived first were sent to deter further Iraqi aggression, but were not equipped to stop a potential Iraqi armored thrust into Saudi Arabia. The resulting “window of vulnerability” necessitated the development of what CPT Davis termed a “run-away plan.”28 The much-anticipated arrival of U.S. Army armored units in October, with their state-of-the-art M841 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, eliminated the need for a quick evacuation plan.29

At KFIA, the 528th linked up with lead elements from 5th Special Forces Group (SFG), and bedded down in the unfinished airport’s extensive underground facilities.30 The 5th Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB), as 5th SFG headquarters was known, formed the core of an Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF), commanded by COL James W. Kraus (Commander, 5th SFG). The ARSOTF in turn fell under SOCCENT and was collocated at KFIA.31

Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT) during DESERT SHIELD/STORM

SOCCENT assigned the 528th SOSB responsibility for providing direct support to ARSOF units at both KFIA and the other main ARSOF staging base, King Khalid Military City (KKMC), approximately 350 miles to the northwest.32 528th soldiers supported the HQ, ARSOTF (5th SFOB); 1st Battalion, 5th SFG (Forward Operational Base [FOB] 51); SOCCENT–Forward; Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) 1, consisting of two SEAL teams and a special boat unit; and elements from two Psychological Operations (PSYOP) battalions.33 The 528th supplied Class I (meals-ready-to-eat [MREs], meals operationally ready-to-eat [MOREs], T-rations, supplements, and bottled water), and Class VI (male and female sundry packs).34 It utilized the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS) to requisition Classes II, III, V, VII, and IX for supported units.35 It drew and issued ammunition, replenishing the 5th SFG basic load several times, and obtained approximately 50,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition for coalition partners.36 Lastly, it maintained an air line of communication (ALOC) with ARSOF at KKMC.37

Heavy equipment was initially scarce at KFIA. Fortunately, the 528th brought “everything but the kitchen sink” with them, according to CPT Olinger.38 Most mission essential equipment had accompanied the troops by air, while less essential or oversized equipment travelled by sea.39 This allowed the battalion to make an immediate impact, and CPT Davis recalled their M816 5-ton wrecker and 10,000-pound capacity (10k) forklift being especially valuable.40 “They [the 528th] came in ready to go,” said Col. Brazil, the SOCCENT Deputy.41

528th SOSB soldiers arrived at King Fahd International Airport in early September 1990 with much needed heavy equipment, including a 10,000 pound-capacity (10k) forklift. A smaller, 4,000-pound capacity forklift is seen here, unloading supplies in Saudi Arabia.

Just five days after it closed theater, a SOCCENT Logistics Assessment, dated 13 September 1990, noted, “the 528th Support Battalion continues to provide outstanding support to ARSOF units,” mentioning that it had just received its first pallet of supplies, via air, from the continental U.S. (CONUS).42 A week later, the 528th received and signed for fifty-four Global Positioning System (GPS) units, which it transported to forward-located SF units.43 However, when it came to supplies, the first few weeks of DESERT SHIELD consisted of a lot of scavenging. CPT Davis recalled SSG Jackson spending considerable time in the lost pallet yard, searching for anything useful. Meanwhile, the 528th’s cooks went directly to the docks to retrieve Class I (food and water), lest it not find its way to KFIA, through normal supply channels.44

The M923 5-ton cargo truck, seen here in garrison, was the workhorse of the 528th SOSB Transportation Company during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and performed superbly in the harsh desert conditions.

Transportation Company soldiers perch on the hood of a M923 5-ton truck during a rare moment of downtime. The 528th’s truck drivers logged over a quarter million miles in support of ARSOF missions during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

These supplies were ferried between the King Abdul Aziz Seaport, near Dammam, and ARSOF bases at KFIA and KKMC by the 528th’s Transportation Company, which deployed with twenty-three M92862 5-ton cargo trucks and five M35A2C 2½-ton trucks.45 These seldom sat idle, due to limited organic transportation assets in the supported ARSOF units, including 5th SFG, which was responsible for manning dozens of border outposts. Delivering food, water, and ammunition to these remote outposts required the company’s truck drivers to traverse hundreds of miles of desert each trip.46 The company deployed with roughly thirty truck drivers (military occupational specialty 88M), but the high operational tempo led the 528th to request augmentation from non-deploying units on Fort Bragg, resulting in the addition of approximately forty personnel.47

528th SOSB truck drivers ferried supplies to remote border outposts, manned by U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers.

All of those miles, combined with the intense heat and desert sand, kept the 528th’s Maintenance Company busy. Tire blowouts and overheating engines were constant threats, sometimes necessitating recovery using the lone 5-ton wrecker.48 As if performing unit-level maintenance for the 528th, and direct support maintenance to the ARSOTF, were not enough, SOCCENT also tasked it to support NSWTG 1, which lacked an organic maintenance capability.49 The maintenance section had to overcome several obstacles, in order to complete these missions, including a shortage of repair parts, grueling temperatures that forced it to shut down operations for several hours in the afternoon, and frequent “Scud alerts,” that brought work to a grinding halt.50

The 528th brought a M816 5-ton wrecker, pictured here at Fort Bragg, NC. Over the course of the deployment, it ran dozens of recovery missions for ARSOF vehicles that had been disabled by the harsh desert conditions.

The steady influx of ARSOF units into Saudi Arabia led LTC Gebhard to send a task-organized Forward Area Support Team (FAST), consisting of 35-40 soldiers, to the sprawling KKMC complex in mid-September. This new Saudi military facility housed 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 5th SFG (FOB 52 and FOB 53, respectively), and 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (3/160th SOAR), among others.51 It offered outstanding facilities: dormitory-style living quarters, an excellent dining facility, showers, maintenance shops, and a well-lit, paved motor pool.52 However, these luxuries came at the price of more oversight from the Saudi Ministry of Defense.53

528th SOSB Locations during DESERT SHIELD.

Commanded by CPT Rodney O. Griffin, the Supply Company Commander, the FAST provided ARSOF units at KKMC with food, water, ammunition, and fuel. The Supply Company set up and operated a fuel point from a Saudi motor pool, and a fuel system supply point for both SOF (3/160th) and conventional aviation assets. The 528th drew and issued the ammunition, and the receiving units had responsibility for storing it. It also requisitioned supplies, provided direct support transportation and maintenance, maintained ALOC between KKMC and KFIA, and established an Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (A/DACG) for SOF.54 Twelve 528th fuelers participated in a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) training exercise with 3/160th SOAR, from 31 October to 7 November 1990.55 This training would pay off later, during DESERT STORM, when the refuel capacity of the 528th was stretched to the limit.

Fuel System Supply Point (FSSP) equipment, seen here on display at Fort Bragg, NC, had a considerably larger capacity than the more compact and transportable Forward Area Refueling Equipment (FARE). Both systems were used in Saudi Arabia.

The UH-60 Black Hawk, seen here, and the SOF variant, the MH-60, saw extensive action in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. — The UH-60 *Black Hawk*, seen here, and the SOF variant, the MH-60, saw extensive action in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Despite being overextended in its core mission areas of supply, maintenance, and transportation, the 528th was assigned other missions, for which it was less prepared. For example, USASOC tasked the battalion with performing a water purification mission, and issued it four 600 gallon-per-hour Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs) shortly before deployment.56 Once in theater, LTC Gebhard entrusted this mission to 1LT John M. Sheckler, who assembled an ad hoc team of Headquarters and Supply Company soldiers.57 Sergeant Stephen R. Anderson, normally the HHC supply sergeant, served as his NCOIC.58 After setting up their ROWPUs at a desert oasis between KFIA and Dammam, they produced an estimated 3,000 gallons of potable water per day, before shutting down operations in December 1990.59 This water was then transported to remote ARSOF elements in 500-gallon blivets, sling-loaded under CH-47 Chinook helicopters. Despite the improvised nature of the mission, the 528th demonstrated an ability, as CPT Olinger saw it, “to fill a capability gap, without burdening the rest of ARSOF.”60

A small team from the 528th was assigned a water purification mission, using four 600 gallon-per-hour Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs). They set up their ROWPUs at an oasis in the vicinity of Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

SGT Stephen R. Anderson is pictured here at the ROWPU site, was the Headquarters Company Supply Sergeant. Early in DESERT SHIELD, he was tabbed to be the NCOIC for the water purification mission.

Purified water produced by the 528th ROWPU team was transported to remote SOF locations via 500-gallon blivets, slung under CH-47 helicopters.

Transition to DESERT STORM

On 29 November 1990, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678, giving Saddam Hussein until 15 January 1991 to withdraw his forces from Kuwait, and authorizing the use of force, if he did not comply.61 Within a month, the 528th SOSB relocated its main body of about 150 soldiers forward to KKMC, to better support offensive operations to liberate Kuwait. In turn, the FAST, which had been at KKMC since late September, replaced the main body at KFIA.62

From KKMC, the 528th supported the same units the FAST had supported, plus the 112th Signal Battalion, and VII and XVIII Corps aviation units.63 It provided food, water, fuel, and ammunition, and requisitioned Classes II, III, IV,VII, and IX. It also provided ALOC from KFIA, direct support maintenance and transportation, and water production and distribution.64

The 528th’s fuelers went from relative novices to experts in the course of a few days in mid-January 1991, when they set up and operated a FARP to support aviation units from both XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps, which were repositioning to support the DESERT STORM ground offensive.65 Over four hundred AH-64 Apaches, AH-1 Cobras, UH-60 Black Hawks, CH-47 Chinooks, and OH-58 Kiowas transitioned through KKMC. For several days, the fuel section pumped as much as forty thousand gallons of aviation fuel.66

CPT Griffin’s FAST, now at KFIA, picked up the mission of supporting 5th SFOB (HQ, ARSOTF), FOB 51, and HQ, SOCCENT, along with providing limited support to 3rd SFG and attached units.67 It supplied food, water, and ammunition, and requisitioned Classes II, III, IV, VII, and IX. It provided ALOC to KKMC, along with direct support maintenance and transportation.68 This arrangement, with the main body at KKMC, and the FAST at KFIA, continued after Operation DESERT STORM commenced on 16 January 1991.69

In January 1991, Coalition Forces began repositioning westward, in preparation for the ground offensive against Iraq. GEN Schwarzkopf’s strategy called for a “left hook” that would catch the Iraqis off guard, allowing for a swifter victory.

SOCCENT map depicting disposition of SOF during DESERT STORM. Note that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units are not listed, because these did not fall under SOCCENT.

When the U.S.-led coalition advanced into Kuwait and Iraq, starting on 24 February, the 528th sent a second FAST, under the command of MAJ Harold ‘Hal’ Walker, to Kuwait City International Airport (KCIA).70 From there, it supported ARSOF elements that had advanced with the ground offensive.71 It established a FARP, using a combination of East German and HEMTT tankers. It also provided food, water, ammunition, limited direct support transportation support, and ALOC from KMMC to KCIA.72

Retreating Iraqi troops set fire to Kuwaiti oil wells, severely limiting visibility and causing it to literally rain oil.

A 528th SOSB soldier snapped this photo on his way to Kuwait City.

With no prospect of holding onto occupied Kuwait, Iraq agreed to a ceasefire on 28 February 1991. The 528th SOSB began redeploying to Fort Bragg the next month. In the six months since it arrived in Saudi Arabia, the 528th provided 500,000 MREs, 175,000 T-Rations, and 600,000 gallons of bottled water. It dispensed 589,000 gallons of Jet A-1 fuel, 57,997 gallons of diesel, and 125,551 gallons of MOGAS. It drew and issued 303.39 short tons of ammunition. It filled 20,601 of the 23,765 requisitions it received (86.69 percent). It transshipped 7,584 short tons via ground, and 2,070 short tons via air. Its drivers transported 14,416 personnel, driving a total of 275,340 miles. At KKMC, its Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group directed 198 total cargo aircraft, most of which were C-130s (145) travelling intra-theater.73 Its mechanics received 272 jobs, completing 263 (97 percent).74

His ROWPU mission complete, SGT Anderson joined MAJ Hal Walker’s FAST for the push into Kuwait. He is seen here near the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City.

Conclusion

The numbers were certainly impressive, but the impact the 528th SOSB went beyond the numbers. It was in the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment, skill sets, and adaptability to fill the CSS gap for ARSOF. COL Donald W. Betts, Chief of Logistics (J-4), SOCCENT, during the war, wrote in a U.S. Army War College paper, “Without [the 528th’s] expertise and responsive support, ARSOF would not have been able to accomplish their missions.”75 COL Jesse Johnson was even more succinct: “We would have been in dire straits without them.”76

This sentiment was shared by members of the 528th. CPT Mark Olinger, Support Operations Officer, referred to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM as a “high-water mark for the battalion,” adding, “had we not been there, it would have been an entirely different picture for the ARSOTF and other SOF we supported.”77 SGT Stephen Anderson, who served as NCOIC for ROWPU operations before advancing into Kuwait City with MAJ Walker’s FAST, expressed great pride in the unit’s accomplishments. “[We] did a fantastic job.”78

Following the war, the Army awarded the 528th SOSB the Valorous Unit Award, with streamer embroidered IRAQ-KUWAIT 1991. The 528th also earned campaign credit for both the Defense of Saudi Arabia and Liberation and Defense of Kuwait.79 More importantly, its contributions to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM reinforced the value of a dedicated, rapidly deployable ARSOF CSS unit, settling the inactivation question.80

While the 528th was deployed to Saudi Arabia, USASOC completed the review of ARSOF CSS review, commissioned by GEN Lindsay in March 1990. Four months into DESERT SHIELD, it was clear that the 528th SOSB support was invaluable to ARSOF, but the battalion was stretched beyond its capacity.81 USASOC proposed quadrupling the battalion’s size to 724 soldiers, judged sufficient to support major contingencies in two different theaters.82 Although later pared back to 400, it still represented 150 percent growth.83

In the years immediately following DESERT STORM, the expanded 528th SOSB reorganized into a headquarters company and two robust multifunctional forward support companies (FSCs). It supported ARSOF “to the utmost” in the Balkans, Haiti, Africa, and elsewhere. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the 528th deployed in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. It was inactivated in 2005, as part of broad realignment of ARSOF CSS capabilities. Since 2008, its lineage lives on in the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations).

Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank all the 528th SOSB veterans who helped make this article possible. A special thanks goes out to COL (Ret.) Mark A. Olinger, LTC (Ret.) Robert T. Davis, and Stephen R. Anderson.

ENDNOTES

Facsimile sent to John W. Partin on 13 May 1998, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) History and Research Office, MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), FL. ^[return]
Colonel (COL) Jesse L. Johnson, interview with John W. Partin, 30 April 1991, USSOCOM History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL. ^[return]
Colonel Douglas Brazil, interview with John W. Partin, 7 March 1991, USSOCOM History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, hereafter Brazil interview, 7 March 1991. ^[return]
Works consulted for this article include Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993); Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008); H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr., It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Linda Grey Bantam Books, 1992); U.S. Army Center of Military History, War in the Persian Gulf: Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, August 1990 – March 1991 (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 2010);Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al., Certain Victory (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993); Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1995). ^[return]
Unpublished histories consulted include USASOC History Office, “Army Special Operations in Operations in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (DRAFT),” undated, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, 104-105; USASOC Directorate of History and Museums, “A Short History of Special Operations Support,” undated, USSOCOM History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, 46-50; Richard W. Stewart, “Appendix J: Special Operations Forces,” in U.S. Department of Defense, “Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,” April 1992, USSOCOM History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, J-18 – J-19; Richard W. Stewart, Stanley L. Sandler, and Joseph R. Fischer, Command History of the United States Army Special Operations Command: 1987-1992: Standing Up the MACOM, (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC Directorate of History and Museums, 1996), 77-83. ^[return]
The notable exception is the account provided in Chapter Three of an undated and uncredited manuscript entitled “SOSCOM History Book,” dating to 2003-2004. It provides a brief, but descriptive, narrative account of the 528th in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, incorporating interviews with junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and other enlisted soldiers. It is quoted herein, but only after the excerpts cited were independently verified. ^[return]
John W. Partin, “Special Operations Forces in Operations EARNEST WILL and PRIME CHANCE,” April 1988, USSOCOM History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL; COL (Ret.) Mark A. Olinger, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 13 May 2020, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, “Permanent Orders 79-6,” 11 May 1989, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. The reasons for the inactivation decision are not clear, but competing proposals for how to best sustain ARSOF, under consideration at the time, depended on harvesting the 528th’s 163 billets. ^[return]
For more on the 528th SOSB in Operation JUST CAUSE, see Christopher E. Howard, “Proving the Concept: the 528th Support Battalion in Panama,” Veritas: Journal of U.S. Army Special Operations History 15:1 (2019): 52-58. ^[return]
General Robert W. Riscassi, Memorandum for Commander-in-Chief, Special Operations Command, “SUBJECT: Recent Decisions Concerning Special Operations Force Structure,” 12 March 1990, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Howard, “Proving the Concept,” 53-54. This role was expanded after JUST CAUSE started, due to identified shortfalls in ARSOF CSS. ^[return]
USCENTCOM was in the process of revising its primary contingency plan in the summer of 1990. ^[return]
COL Donald W. Betts, “U.S. Army War College Paper: Logistical Support of Special Operations Forces During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM,” Carlisle Barracks, PA (1992), 3, on internet at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA251754, hereafter Betts, page number. ^[return]
Betts, 8. This was consistent with FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Operations, 20 April 1990. ARSOF was considered an Echelon Above Corps force, for sustainment purposes. ^[return]
Betts, 8. Compounding the problem was that USSOCCENT headquarters relied on U.S. Air Force Central Command (USCENTAF) to meet its logistical requirements, but that organization’s logistics capacity was stretched thin by the rapid USAF build-up in Saudi Arabia, during the initial stage of DESERT SHIELD. ^[return]
COL Jesse L. Johnson, interview with John W. Partin, 3 May 1991, USSOCOM History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, hereafter Johnson interview, 3 May 1991. ^[return]
Brazil interview, 7 March 1991. SOCCENT-Forward initially went to Riyadh, the Saudi capital, but relocated to King Fahd International Airport (KFIA) a few days later, due to overcrowding. ^[return]
Betts, 28-29; Johnson interview, 3 May 1991. ^[return]
“528th SOSB, 1991 Annual History Report,” copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter 528th SOSB AHR, 1991. 1st SOCOM was then in the process of standing down, as the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) prepared for a November 1990 activation. ^[return]
LTC (Ret.) Robert T. Davis, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 3 March 2021, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Davis interview, 3 March 2021. ^[return]
COL (Ret.) Mark A. Olinger email to Christopher E. Howard, “SUBJECT: Re: 528th in DS/DS,” 20 October 2020, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. Other key leaders were Company A (Supply) Commander: CPT Rodney O. Griffin; Company B (Maintenance) Commander: CPT Desmond Keyes; Company C (Transportation) Commander: 1LT Kyle Fugate. ^[return]
COL (Ret.) Mark A. Olinger, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 17 June 2020, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. ^[return]
Davis interview, 3 March 2021. ^[return]
Davis interview, 3 March 2021; Mark A. Olinger email to Christopher E. Howard, “SUBJECT: Re: 528th in DS/DS Draft,” 15 April 2021, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. Olinger: “Although under construction, KFIA offered many advantages over an undeveloped desert location. Water, although non potable, was available, as was access to international telephone lines for C2 and SARSS use; runways could be used by both military and commercial aircraft; and the terminal uncompleted infrastructure could be used for C2, supply points, and billeting.” ^[return]
“528th Support Battalion Lessons Learned – OPERATION DESERT SHIELD,” undated, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter 528th SOSB Lessons Learned, DESERT SHIELD. ^[return]
Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. ^[return]
Davis interview, 3 March 2021. Davis recalls a massive explosion at KFIA that sent everyone scrambling for cover. At first, it was assumed to be an enemy missile attack, but was later determined to be the result of an accident. ^[return]
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992, 81-82; Davis interview, 3 March 2021. ^[return]
Davis interview, 3 March 2021. LTC Gebhard had Davis, his S-3, track the arrival of conventional forces in theater. ^[return]
528th SOSB Lessons Learned, DESERT SHIELD. The lack of a Pre-deployment Site Survey (PDSS), noted in a post-war lesson learned, was a minor inconvenience, given that the 528th arrived in theater ahead of many of the ARSOF units it was to support, which continued to arrive throughout September. ^[return]
Olinger email, 15 April 2021. LTC Gebhard held battalion formations each Friday morning to update the soldiers on the status of the deployment, recognize soldier accomplishments, and share significant events. ^[return]
COMSOCCENT Message 160910ZSEP90, “SUBJECT: SOCCENT Logistics Architecture,” copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991; Mark A. Olinger email to Christopher E. Howard, “SUBJECT: Strength of elements,” 9 February 2021, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. 528th SOSB troop strength at various locations broken down, by phase of operation: Phase I (SEP to late DEC 90): 128-138 soldiers at KFIA (main body); 25-40 at KKMC (FAST)
Phase II: (Late DEC 90 to late FEB 91): 50-60 at KFIA (FAST); 140 to 150 at KKMC (main body)
Phase III (Late FEB to MAR 91): 50-60 at KFIA (FAST); 100 to 120 at KKMC (main body); 30-40 at KCIA (FAST)
528th SOSB AHR, 1991; Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. Sundry packs consisted of personal items, such as toiletries, tobacco, and chewing gum. ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991; Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. The 101st Airborne Division had already established a fuel point at KFIA, meaning that the 528th was not asked to provide Class III support. ^[return]
Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991. ^[return]
Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. ^[return]
Davis interview, 3 March 2021. ^[return]
Davis interview, 3 March 2021. ^[return]
Brazil interview, 7 March 1991. Brazil added that the 528th enabled them to get needed supplies through Army channels (ARCENT), which could then be billed to the Air Force, which bore ultimate responsibility for sustaining HQ, USSOCCENT. ^[return]
“SOCCENT Commander’s Logistics Assessment,” 13 September 1990, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
LTC (P) Jimmie F. Holt, USASOC Summary Sheet, “SUBJECT: Operation DESERT SHIELD,” 21 September 1990, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Davis interview, 3 March 2021; Olinger email, 15 April 2021. The food initially arrived via prepositioned shipborne stocks, and the water came from a potable water fill point. 1st COSCOM ran the supply points until Theater Army assets were in place (circa November 1990). ^[return]
SOSB Lessons Learned, DESERT SHIELD. The battalion also took five 2 ½-ton M35A2C cargo trucks, but judged the 5-ton M92862 superior, in most respects. Members of the 528th’s Transportation Company agreed with this assessment. ^[return]
SSG Keller, interview with CPT Robert T. Young, 25 June 1991, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Keller interview, 25 June 1991. Drivers (MOS 88M) were escorted at first, until they knew the routes, after which they were on their own. ^[return]
Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. This augmentation pushed the peak deployed strength of the 528th SOSB to 214. ^[return]
1SG Rene Kelly, interview with CPT Robert T. Young, 25 June 1991, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Kelly interview, 25 June 1991. The combination of weather and sand broke down lubricants, increased tire wear, and led to frequent blowouts. ^[return]
Davis interview, 3 March 2021. Davis, who had commanded the Maintenance Company prior to becoming S-3, remembers the Naval Special Warfare element being particularly hard of vehicles. ^[return]
Keller interview, 25 June 1991; Stewart, “Appendix J: Special Operations Forces,” J-18. The shortage of repair parts during the first two months of DESERT SHIELD, was partially due to the resulting from the lack of Authorized Stockage Lists (ASLs) for supported units. Fortunately, the 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM) and the 101st Airborne Division Support Command (DISCOM) were able to provide assistance. ^[return]
3/160th SOAR, commanded by LTC Dell L. Dailey, formed the core of Task Force (TF) 3/160. Elements of 2/160th SOAR rounded out the TF. ^[return]
Kelly interview, 25 June 1991. Other 528th soldiers agreed that the facilities at KKMC were superb, and considerably better than those at KFIA. ^[return]
Mark A. Olinger email to Christopher E. Howard, “SUBJECT: RE: Need Input,” 7 April 2021, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Olinger email, 7 April 2021; “SOSCOM History Book,” undated, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, 33, hereafter “SOSCOM History Book,” page number. “When it was necessary to push up a berm around an aviation refueling location, the construction had to be requested on a work order and the work had to be done by Saudi workers. It took at least three weeks to get the berms constructed.” ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991. ^[return]
“After Action Report: Unilateral FARP Training,” undated, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
528th SOSB Lessons Learned, DESERT SHIELD. The 528th SOSB Table of Organization & Equipment did not include water purification specialists (MOS 77W), and those assigned the mission received only minimal on-the-job training from 77Ws, prior to deployment. ^[return]
Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. 1LT Sheckler was the Executive Officer, Headquarters Company. ^[return]
Stephen R. Anderson, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 14 January 2020, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Stephen R. Anderson, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 5 May 2020, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Anderson interview, 5 May 2020. ^[return]
Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. ^[return]
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, 29 November 1990, on internet at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/678. ^[return]
Olinger interview, 17 June 2020; 528th SOSB AHR, 1991. ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991. The 112th Signal Battalion main body arrived in early February 1991. Additionally, the 528th supported USSOCOM Deployment Cell, ARCENT Jump TOC, 5th SFOB Jump TOC from KKMC. ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991. ^[return]
“SOSCOM History Book,” 34. XVIII Airborne Corps was positioning itself for the planned left hook around the Iraqi defenses, which required relocating from Dhahran, on the Persian Gulf, to Rahfa, in western Saudi Arabia. ^[return]
“SOSCOM History Book,” 34; Olinger email, 7 April 2021. According to Olinger, “We sustained this for about 3 to 4 days…until the late afternoon of 16 January, when the FARP was essentially down to a few thousand gallons [with] no resupply from theater army. LTC Gebhard and I talked with LTC [Dell] Daily [Commander, 3rd BN, 160th SOAR] and his S-3 Andrew Milani, about the potential impact [and] set an immediate safety level.” ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991. This included 4th Battalion, 17th Cavalry Squadron, 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG, and 3rd SFOB. ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991. ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991; Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. 528th operations were not significantly impacted by the initiation of the air war phase of Operation DESERT STORM, which lasted from 16 January through 23 February 1991. ^[return]
Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. MAJ Walker, an Army Aviator with a logistics background, had replaced MAJ Heyward as battalion XO in November 1990. ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991. These units included: 5th SFOB, 1-5th SFG (FOB 51), 2-5th SFG (FOB 52), 3-5th SFG (FOB 53), 3rd SFOB, and 1-3rd SFG (FOB 31). The FAST also supported 4/17th Cavalry Squadron, U.S. Embassy, SOCCENT Jump Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT). ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991; Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. The ammunition, which included over 100,000 rounds of 5.56mm ball, link, and tracer ammo, came from a prepositioned stock of 70 short tons, located in a MARCENT service support area. ^[return]
“SOCOM History Book,” 34; Olinger email, 7 April 2021. The 528th transferred A/DACG mission to a theater army unit in late November/early December, upon the arrival of VII Corps and supporting elements. ^[return]
528th SOSB AHR, 1991. ^[return]
Betts, 30-31. Betts noted elsewhere, “Army problems were minimized due to the presence and outstanding support provided by the 528th Support Battalion.” (JULLS Number 51536-21957, submitted by SOCJ4, LTC Betts, Title: “SOF Logistics Training,” 5 June 1991.) ^[return]
COL Jesse L. Johnson, interview with John W. Partin, 29 April 1991, USSOCOM History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, hereafter Johnson interview, 29 April 1991. In a subsequent interview, dated 3 May 1991 (cited above), Johnson explained, “There was no Army element to support [the ARSOTF]…[the 5th SOSC] did not come into existence until October, and then it was very small. The Navy had no such element. What saved me, obviously, was the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion.” ^[return]
Olinger interview, 17 June 2020. ^[return]
Anderson interview, 14 January 2020. ^[return]
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), General Order 7, 2 April 1993, on internet at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/go9307.pdf; HQDA, General Order 14, 25 June 1993, on internet at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/go9314.pdf. ^[return]
“Army Special Operations Forces Combat Service Support Review,” 17 December 1990, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter ARSOF CSS Review. The study validated the need for larger SOSB, based in part on the 528ths contributions to Operation JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD, which was still underway when the study concluded. ^[return]
Betts, 30; 528th Lessons Learned, DESERT SHIELD; “5th Special Operations Support Command (SOSC) After Action Report,” 23 May 1991, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter 5th SOSC AAR. The 528th had required individual augmentation to perform its transportation mission, and was only able to support 3rd SFG, which was not part of the ARSOTF, to a limited degree. ^[return]
ARSOF CSS Review; Johnson interview, 29 April 1991; Johnson interview, 3 May 1991. COL Johnson proposed expanding the 528th to brigade size, with a battalion supporting each theater. ^[return]
Additional lessons learned noted other deficiencies across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. Support doctrine for ARSOF was not clearly defined or understood. Battalion S-4s and support company commanders throughout USASOC lacked sufficient logistics training. The 528th did not have the qualified personnel and resources for some of the missions assigned to it (water purification and graves registration, in particular). State-of-the-art refueling equipment was needed, in order to better support Special Operations Aviation. The lack of an ARSOF-specific Materiel Management Center was also noted, as was the lack of demand history for USASOC units not stationed at Fort Bragg. There was clearly room for improvement, and these hard-learned lessons were not neglected. See: 528th SOSB Lessons Learned, DESERT SHIELD; 5th SOSC AAR; LTC Dell L. Dailey, Memorandum For Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, “SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Desert Storm,” 8 May 1991, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Iraq targeted Israeli civilians with dozens of Scuds, in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to provoke an Israeli response that, in turn, would cause Arab members of the U.S.-led coalition to withdraw their support. ^[return]
U.S. Department of Defense, “Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,” April 1992, USSOCOM History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, 53-54. ^[return]
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 219. ^[return]
COL (Ret.) Mark A. Olinger, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 17 June 2020, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Defense Acquisition University https://www.dau.edu/cop/ammo/DAU%20Sponsored%20Documents/Military%20Classes%20of%20Supply.pdf ^[return]