The 6th Ranger Company

When the North Korean Peoples’ Army (NKPA) invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950 the United States Army realized that its ability to defend and counterattack was extremely limited based on the massive demobilization of forces after World War II. Specialized units like the Rangers, Merrill’s Marauders, and First Special Service Force, trained to “take the war to the enemy” behind the lines by disrupting rear area operations and interdicting lines of supply and communication were deactivated by 1945. In July and August 1950, the Far East Command (FECOM) reacted to the situation in Korea by creating TDA units like the 8th Army Ranger Company and the General Headquarters (GHQ) Raiders from occupation forces already stationed in Japan. In September 1950, Army Chief of Staff General (GEN) J. Lawton Collins, announced his intent to activate and assign one Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) [RICA] to every active U.S. Army and National Guard infantry division.2 The purpose of this article is to describe how one of these, the 6th RICA, performed a deterrent role in Europe rather than a combat assignment in Korea.

The first step in putting GEN Collins’ concept into action occurred on 15 September 1950. The Commandant of the Ranger Training Center (RTC), Fort Benning, Georgia, Colonel (COL) John G. Van Houten, reported to the Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces and was informed that training of Ranger type units was to be initiated at the earliest possible date.3 Simultaneously, an announcement was made Army-wide calling for Ranger volunteers. The RTC received the first group of volunteers, divided them into four companies, and started training them as company-sized units on 2 October 1950. Finished by 13 November 1950, these men formed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th RICAs, and were already on their way to Korea when the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th RICA volunteers started their training cycle.4 The officers and men who formed the 6th RICA, traced their lineage and honors from World War II’s Company B, 2nd Ranger Battalion, were assigned to the Regular Army on 2 November 1950, and formally activated on 20 November 1950.5

Almost from its first formation at Fort Benning, the 6th started earning a reputation as a ‘one-of-a-kind’ unit even among the other Ranger companies. One of the principal reasons for this was the WWII veterans who filled the company’s three top leadership positions. Chosen to command the company was Captain (CPT) James S. ‘Sugar’ Cain. CPT Cain earned his battlefield commission as a member of the First Special Service Force (FSSF) in 1944. Assisting him was CPT Eldred E. ‘Red’ Weber, the company executive officer. Starting as a member of the 1st Ranger Battalion (‘Darby’s Rangers’), CPT Weber was transferred to the FSSF when the Rangers were disbanded in 1944. Completing the company’s command team was its senior non-commissioned officer (NCO), First Sergeant (1SG) Joseph Dye, Sr. 1SG Dye’s combat record included Ranger assignments from Dieppe, France, in 1942, through North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, and Cisterna, Italy, in 1944.6

With the company headquarters established, the remaining spaces in the platoons were filled by men looking for the challenges, opportunities, and excitement that Ranger units provided. By convention, those assigned to the 6th RICA came through the normal ‘volunteer pipeline’ in no particular order. This process was the same for the officers as it was for the enlisted men. For example, Second Lieutenant (2LT) Clarence E. ‘Bud’ Skoien, 11th Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; First Lieutenant (1LT) Robert B. ‘Buck’ Nelson, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and CPT William S. Culpepper, 7th RICA, Fort Benning, Georgia, were all assigned to the 6th RICA as platoon leaders with little more than peace-time Army garrison experience.7 On the other hand, a greater number of the enlisted men like MSG Eugene H. Madison reported for duty with either combat, post-war Regular Army experience, or both.8 Through the combined efforts of the RTC cadre, CPT Cain, CPT Weber, and 1SG Dye, the knowledge gap between the two groups was soon non-existent.

Fully assembled at the RTC, the 6th RICA started training on Monday, 27 November 1950. Faced with the knowledge that training time was a precious resource not to be wasted, CPT Cain instituted eighteen-hour duty days by augmenting the RTC training schedule with additional off-duty classes that ensured that every man was as fully familiar with every subject being taught as possible.9 Private First Class (PFC) Edmund Kolby remembered that “both officers and non-commissioned officers were up at 0400 hours every morning and spent more time in the field than in the classrooms.”10 Individual physical, weapons, and tactical training were supplemented with other subjects like escape and evasion, village fighting, adjustment of artillery fire, and squad and platoon tactics. As an added task, each man’s swimming ability was tested, and those who were weak or could not swim were given sufficient ‘extra’ time to practice and develop their proficiency.11

After six weeks of exhausting marches, physical exercises, long hours, and little sleep, the 6th RICA prepared for its final evaluation. To measure how well the Rangers were able to perform individual and unit missions, the RTC implemented a five-day field training operational readiness test (ORT).12 Designed to meet specific training objectives, the test started with a night, low-level, tactical parachute drop. This was followed by individual platoons conducting drop zone assembly procedures, night tactical movements, and locating and destroying a series of bridges. With that completed, the platoons moved on their own at night into a designated area, reassembled into a company element, performed a final night tactical march, and attacked a company-sized objective located on a piece of key terrain.13

Unfortunately, the 6th RICA’s final training mission did not begin as anticipated starting with the initial parachute insertion. As the Rangers troop carrying aircraft approached their intended drop zones, it became obvious that the aircrews assigned to the mission had limited airdrop experience. Flying at various altitudes and aircraft speeds, the 6th RICA found itself scattered across the Georgia countryside with few Rangers landing on their intended drop zones. Compounding this problem was the fact that these same miscalculations and aircrew operational inconsistencies contributed to significant losses of key items of equipment, and resulted in numerous Ranger parachute injuries.14 These issues coupled with the fact that each of the four Ranger companies in the second cycle had already received reassignment orders resulted in the RTC terminating this final field training exercise after only three days.

With their last training parachute jumps completed at Fort Benning and their Ranger Infantry Company guidon received from COL Van Houten on 18 January 1951, CPT Cain assembled the company in the unit mess hall to tell them that the 6th RICA was being assigned to Germany instead of going to Korea. Ranger reaction to the news was nothing less than total shock and disbelief. PFC Ed Kolby probably best summed up the feelings of the many of the Rangers when he recalled that the attitude among the men was, “We were pissed. There was talk about going to the 5th or another company, but nothing ever happened.”15 2LT Bud Skoien recalled, “The feeling in the room was like someone had let the air out of a balloon with a pin.”16 Sensing that there might be problems, Skoien remembered that Cain quickly regained control of the situation and removed any options the men may have had to quit the company by telling them: “Don’t think that way; there will be enough war for all of you.”17 With the situation temporarily resolved, the 6th RICA grudgingly accepted its fate and began preparing for Germany.

On 1 February 1951, the five officers and one-hundred eighteen enlisted men of the 6th RICA departed Fort Benning by commercial train for Fort Dix, New Jersey, to complete their final overseas processing requirements before traveling to Germany. After a brief stay at Fort Dix and a much welcomed three-day pass, the 6th RICA boarded the USNS George W. Goethals at the Brooklyn Navy Yard and sailed for Germany on 7 February 1951. Landing at Bremerhaven, Germany, on 17 February 1951, the Rangers were treated to an overnight train trip, arriving at their initial home on Flak Kaserne in Kitzingen, Germany.18 As they began unpacking and settling in, they learned that they were assigned to the 1st Infantry Division (1st ID), commanded by Major General (MG) John E. Dahlquist; under the staff supervision of the Division, G-3 Operations and Training section. Their mission was to conduct Ranger-type operations throughout the Seventh Army area of responsibility.19 Quick to realize that this situation could work to the Rangers’ advantage, CPT Cain developed and implemented a training program that he hoped would deflect attention from at least four of the major issues that plagued the Rangers throughout their time in Europe.

First among these was the fact that despite Cain’s ‘Fort Benning pep-talk,’ 6th Ranger morale remained at an all-time low with both officers and men repeatedly requesting a transfer to combat duty with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) in Korea. Second, the lack of adequate training facilities, areas, and ranges did not support, develop, and maintain the advanced skills required to complete basic Ranger missions. Third was the lack of additional assigned and qualified unit administrative personnel to fill the positions of clerk-typist, records clerk, and armorer. Finally, with no vehicles assigned to the company, the Rangers had to borrow them as needed from one of the division motor pools. Of these, this situation was the easiest to fix and was partially resolved when the company was issued two, one-quarter ton trucks (jeep) and one, two-and-one-half-ton truck (deuce-and-a-half).

In the meantime, Cain refined his individual training concept so the Rangers would be ready for the company’s spring field training exercises scheduled for Grafenwohr, Germany. Starting with physical training (PT) the Rangers soon were conducting daily runs around Kitzingen’s military airfield and ‘occasional’ forty-mile forced marches in eight hours carrying full field equipment and weapons for the first ten miles.20 Cain’s program swung into high gear with the assistance of 1st ID combat engineers who provided demolitions training tailored to a European battlefield. It consisted of preparation of charges, minefield breaching operations, timber cutting, bridge destruction, and construction and emplacement of booby traps. Once these tasks were mastered to Cain’s satisfaction, he shifted his emphasis back to refreshing those basic skills that the Rangers had learned at the RTC at Fort Benning. These included advanced map and compass work, infiltration and guerrilla tactics, camouflage and concealment, communications, combat intelligence, and aggressor organization and tactics.21

Arriving at Grafenwohr in mid-May 1951, the Rangers went straight into training. Beginning with 60mm mortar and 57mm recoilless rifle range firing, Ranger squads and platoons soon became highly proficient at integrating these fires into maneuver training that focused on executing retrograde movements, raids, ambushes, and information collection and reporting. After a second week of individual tactical training and more range firing, the Rangers returned to Kitzingen where they finished the cycle by emphasizing squad and platoon employment and control techniques and field expedient stream crossings of the Main River. If the Rangers had any questions about the reasons behind CPT Cain’s training program, they were soon answered the more the company was integrated into the 1st ID’s annual field training exercise schedule.

Realizing that Rangers provided an additional capability to the 1st ID that it did not normally have, MG Dahlquist quickly put them to work as aggressors for every unit in the division.22 Starting at the squad level, the Rangers quickly demonstrated that their operational tactics, techniques and procedures could be used to assist in evaluating the preparedness of selected 1st ID units. For example, unchallenged squad penetrations into unit areas demonstrated that, except for the Air Control Warning Station at Hertz Base which was patrolled by Polish guards and dogs, other units and installation security procedures were not as efficient as they should have been. One case in particular involved the 5th Artillery Battalion where, after breaching one battery’s internal security, ‘painted wooden block’ demolitions simulated destruction of key facilities and equipment and tactical wire communications were actually disabled. The infiltration of the Giebelstadt Army Airfield produced a roster of the base commander and his staff, a list of the types of aircraft and armaments located there, and a detailed area map.23

In July 1951, the 6th Rangers sharply increased their involvement with 1st ID maneuver units. Beginning with tank-infantry platoon-level training with the 63rd Tank Battalion, the Rangers also provided company support to the 16th and 26th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) exercises at Grafenwohr. When the RCT’s concluded their training at the end of July, the Rangers stood-down for two weeks to prepare for their next major training exercise with the 18th Infantry Regiment at Wildflecken, Germany. This time though, the Rangers were teamed-up with the 63rd Tank Battalion and 1st Engineer Combat Battalion to form the task force that would aggress against the 18th Infantry. At the conclusion of the exercise in mid-August, the Rangers remained in Wildflecken to “perfect various techniques in map and compass, river and stream crossing expedients, and infiltration and guerrilla tactics.”24

Returning to Kitzingen, little did the Rangers realize that their participation in next trilogy of major training events would be their last ones as a unit. Starting with the 1st ID’s Exercise DRAWBRIDGE (11 September 1951), they moved to V Corps’ Operation JUPITER (27 September 1951), and ended with the annual European Joint Command (EJCOM) maneuver FTX-51 (Exercise COMBINE) (3 October 1951). Building upon the original operational concept of employing the Rangers as a theater asset, these exercises additionally showcased the unique skills and capabilities for which all the Ranger companies had been created. Despite the 1st ID change of command from MG Dahlquist to MG Thomas S. Timberman, and the lack of any division-sized exercises since October 1950, recently promoted Major (MAJ) Cain was more ready than ever to prove his Rangers’ effectiveness.

During Exercise DRAWBRIDGE, the 6th Ranger Company’s second platoon, led by 1LT Buck Nelson, successfully swam a rope across the Main River and established a crossing point at 0430 hours on 16 September 1951. Under MAJ Cain’s direct command, the 1st and 3rd platoons in assault boats, crossed the Main River undetected, secured vital road junctions, sealed off the battlefield, blocked retreat routes, and prevented supplies and reinforcements from reaching ‘enemy forces’.25 This same level of success was also achieved during Operation JUPITER when the Rangers crossed the Rhine River. This time, though, the first and third platoons led by 2LT Bud Skoien, secured the area near the Frankenthal Bridge while 1LT Nelson’s second platoon guarded an engineer tactical bridge site near the town of Worms. Having the Rangers conduct their crossing thirty minutes prior to the planned 26th Infantry Regiment assault enabled the 26th Regiment to shift its timetable forward, begin moving fifteen minutes after H-hour, and being completely across in one hour.26

Exercise COMBINE, the last European operation for the 6th RICA was unique in that it was also the first tactical parachute drop of American paratroopers in Europe since the end of World War II in 1945.27 Supplied with parachutes and air delivery items from the 557th Quartermaster Parachute Aerial Supply Company, the Rangers jumped from a twelve-plane formation of C-82 Packet aircraft of the 60th Troop Carrier Group on 3 October 1951.28 Leading the Ranger ‘aggressors’ against the Seventh Army’s ‘friendly forces’ was MAJ Cain whose mission was to seize and hold a key autobahn bridge across the Rhine River to cut ‘friendly’ supply lines. Following this, the company reorganized into platoon-sized elements and operated behind the 7th Army’s front lines to harass and raid at random.29 Completing all assigned missions, the Rangers returned to Kitzingen at the end of COMBINE on 10 October 1951.

Arriving back at Harvey Barracks the Rangers received the second-worst piece of news in their brief history. After considerable study, the Department of the Army decided to disband all the RICAs and had issued a message on 29 September 1951 that the 6th RICA was to be completely inactivated by 1 December 1951.30 This time though, each man was given a choice of one of three options: (1) remain in Europe, (2) return to the U. S., or (3) volunteer for Korea. As the men made their choices they were reassigned as quickly as possible. MAJ Cain and Bud Skoien returned to the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY, but would not remain there for long. Cain volunteered to go to Korea and Skoien became one of the original members of the newly forming 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, NC. Eugene A. Kuta, future editor of the RICA newsletter, volunteered for Korea and was assigned to Company A, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) from 1951 through 1952. Ed Kolby, Red Weber, and Joe Dye were among the approximately forty Rangers who remained in Europe in a classified assignment.

The inactivation of all the Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) did not mark the end of U.S. Army Rangers or Ranger training. The Ranger spirit, developed during World War II and passed on to the Korean War-era Ranger Infantry Companies, remained alive in the Ranger Training Command, transferred to the Infantry School’s Ranger Department in 1951, and is now an integral part of the current Ranger Training Brigade at Fort Benning, GA. Although the men of the 6th RICA did not experience combat as a unit, they can always be proud of the fact that in Europe they were the ‘Tip of the Spear’ and were prepared to sacrifice everything to preserve freedom. Perhaps the greatest tribute to this small group of volunteers was provided by Mrs. James S. Cain, MAJ Cain’s widow, when she confided to ‘Ranger’ Eugene A. Kuta some years later, “his (MAJ Cain) proudest accomplishment was being the commanding officer of the 6th Airborne Ranger Company.31