A True Force Multiplier

“Without a doubt, PSYOP won the hearts and minds of Haiti’s citizens, as well as [set] the stage for the peaceful accomplishment of the [JTF’s] mission. There is no question PSYOP saved lives, on both sides, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. It proved to be the unsung, yet vitally important, factor in this operation—a true force multiplier.”— LTG Henry H. Shelton

On 5 May 1995, Lieutenant General (LTG) Henry H. Shelton, commander of XVIII Airborne Corps and Joint Task Force (JTF)-180, praised the recent accomplishments of Army psychological operations (PSYOP) in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. “Without a doubt, PSYOP won the hearts and minds of Haiti’s citizens, as well as [set] the stage for the peaceful accomplishment of the [JTF] mission. There is no question PSYOP saved lives, on both sides, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. It proved to be the unsung, yet vitally important, factor in this operation—a true force multiplier.”1 This article explains how PSYOP earned such praise.

Between September 1994 and March 1995, active component and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) PSYOP units utilized leaflets, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts to support U.S. and international efforts in Haiti. They also interacted closely with the populace, offering Haitians a positive, non-threatening view of the U.S. intervention. Overseen by the JTF-190/Multinational Force-Haiti (MNF-H) Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) based in the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, the PSYOP effort advanced numerous themes during UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. These included Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s return to power on 15 October 1995, quelling Haitian-on-Haitian violence, weapons turn-in programs, and public health and safety announcements. Supporting both conventional and Special Forces (SF) units, PSYOP soldiers helped prevent a bloody conflict and fostered the peaceful return to democracy in Haiti.

After explaining the basis of the operation, this article will describe the organization and major themes of PSYOP in Haiti. It will also detail the efforts of several Brigade PSYOP Support Elements (BPSEs) and Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) in order to explain tactical PSYOP in Port-au-Prince, the northern coastal city of Cap-Haïtien, and other locations. While there were other tactical PSYOP elements in Haiti, the BPSEs and TPTs chronicled in this article were selected because of the abundance of sources on them and because their efforts adequately represent the overall tactical PSYOP campaign during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

Sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and with primary planning oversight by the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY stemmed from a longstanding political crisis in Haiti.2 In September 1991, three years before the operation, the head of the Forces Armées d’Haiti ([FAd’H] Armed Forces of Haiti), LTG Raoul Cédras, led a successful military coup against President Aristide, who fled to the U.S. Cédras and his allies retained power through bribery, intimidation, imprisonment, and murder. The military takeover exacerbated the already poor living standards of the six million Haitians. The best that the average citizen could expect was a couple hours of electricity and an hour of running, non-potable water a day. The state of sanitation, transportation, and infrastructure was abysmal. Crime and disease ran rampant, especially in cities.3

All of these factors precipitated a refugee crisis. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton repatriated refugees to elsewhere. The situation in Haiti prompted widespread international outcries, leading the UNSC to impose economic sanctions and consider military action to remove Cédras. However, in July 1993, Cédras and Aristide signed the Governor’s Island (New York) Accord to restore the president to power on 30 October. The UN lifted sanctions because political resolution seemed probable, but that optimism proved short lived.4 In late 1993, Cédras’ supporters established the Front pour l’Avancement et le Progrèss Haitien ([FRAPH] Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti) and stepped up attacks on Aristide supporters. Cédras reneged on the Governor’s Accord, causing the UN and U.S. to impose new sanctions. On 31 July 1994, UNSC Resolution 940 authorized the use of military force to remove Cédras (the de facto leader of Haiti) and the puppet provisional president, Émile Jonassaint. In addition, Aristide was to be restored to the presidency. Having already begun planning, USACOM, its rapid deployment force, XVIII Airborne Corps, and other U.S. military forces stepped up their preparations for a forced entry mission.5

In January 1994, Admiral (ADM) Paul D. Miller, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM), had appointed LTG Hugh H. Shelton, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, to head JTF-180 to begin operational planning for restoring the legitimate government of Haiti. In accordance with Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370, the invasion would entail the airborne insertion of seven 82nd Airborne Division battalions (five into Port-au-Prince and two farther north), the seizure of twenty-six ‘sensitive’ targets by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) elements (including airfields, police stations, and Camp d’Application, the regime’s largest heavy weapons depot), and the landing of a U.S. Marine Corps contingent in northern Cap-Haïtien. Additionally, OPLAN 2380 directed JTF-190, centered around the 10th Mountain Division (-) under Major General (MG) David C. Meade, to serve as the main conventional occupation force.6 According to Stephen D. Brown, a former intelligence officer in the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG)(Airborne), USACOM “included PSYOP in all Joint Operations Planning Group meetings.”7 Accordingly, the 4th POG, the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion (POB)(A), and the 9th POB(A), all headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, planned for multiple entry scenarios and for support to post-conflict missions.8

In summer 1994, amidst invasion preparations, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Hugh W. Perry assumed command of the 1st POB. The 1976 U.S. Military Academy graduate and Foreign Area Officer had served in multiple capacities within the 4th POG, including deployments to Panama in Operation JUST CAUSE and the Persian Gulf in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. He was the Chief of PSYOP Proponency in the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School prior to assuming command of the 1st POB. He recalled that the battalion had already begun developing products for Haiti, “but they were pretty generic. Only in the couple of months leading up to the operation did the situation get … understood enough or predictable enough to where the products could be refined.”9 With preparations for the invasion ongoing, a Washington, DC-based PSYOP effort for Haiti was underway.

In June 1994, a Military Information Support Team (MIST) led by Captain (CPT) Deborah Hake and consisting of 1st POB soldiers, production specialists, and Creole linguists, launched the PSYOP effort for Haiti from Washington, DC. The MIST developed pro-democracy broadcasts, including statements by Aristide. Then, it forwarded the messages to the U.S. National Security Council and CINCUSACOM for approval. Finally, Commando Solo EC-130 aircraft from the Pennsylvania Air National Guard 193rd Special Operations Group broadcast them to the Haitian people. (An earlier airdrop of 10,000 radios had broadened the listening audience.) To supplement radio messages, pro-Aristide leaflets were also dropped. Specialist (SPC) Sherri Dicarlo, PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB), Fort Bragg, reported, “Before we came down here [to Haiti], we printed up the leaflets they dropped ahead of the invasion and got a start on some of the jobs we knew we were going to have here.”10 By September 1994, months of PSYOP planning and preliminary activity had finally culminated.

The massive U.S. invasion was to start on 19 September 1994. LTG Shelton established his command post off-shore aboard the USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20). The 82nd Airborne Division and U.S. Army Ranger units readied for their airborne assaults. Two aircraft carriers were to be used as the launch platforms for JSOC and 10th Mountain Division elements (the USS America [CV 66] and the USS Enterprise [CVN 65]). At the last minute a final bid was made for a peaceful resolution. Former President James E. ‘Jimmy’ Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired General (GEN) Colin F. Powell, and Senator Samuel A. Nunn, Jr., met with Cédras in Port-au-Prince while the airborne units were en route. He relented and agreed to allow Aristide to return to power.11

The U.S. rapidly switched gears to a permissive entry scenario. JTF-180 invasion elements stood down, but LTG Shelton remained on the scene to facilitate Cédras’ and Jonassaint’s relinquishment of power.12 Other senior American officials visiting or working in Haiti after the successful U.S. entry included Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, U.S. Ambassador William L. Swing, ADM Paul D. Miller, and GEN John M.D. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Maintaining peace and security in Haiti before, during, and after the transfer of power was JTF-190. Commanded by the JTF-190 commander, Multinational Force-Haiti became the designation for the international presence in Haiti. In January 1995, the 25th Infantry Division (ID) (-) under MG George A. Fisher relieved 10th Mountain Division as the MNF-H/JTF-190 lead. And on 31 March, the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) replaced MNF-H, ending Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.13 The U.S. Army PSYOP effort continued through March 1995 during all of these command transitions.

The senior PSYOP organization under JTF-190/MNF-H was the JPOTF, situated at Camp Democracy near the Port-au-Prince International Airport and commanded first by the 4th POG commander, COL Jeffrey B. Jones. When Jones rotated stateside soon into the operation, LTC Perry, 1st POB commander (‘dual-hatted’ as the Deputy JPOTF commander), took over. Many personnel comprising the JPOTF came from the 1st POB. The JPOTF also had a platoon-sized PDB detachment for printing and broadcasting support. Heading the printing section of the PDB detachment were CPT Gregory Jaksec (also the JPOTF officer-in-charge [OIC] of dissemination) and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Carlos Grimes, noncommissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC). According to Grimes, “These people here have printed every poster, leaflet, handbook, and book that’s come out in this operation. Most people don’t know that. They think this stuff magically comes from the States.”14 Finally, the JPOTF supported tactical elements belonging to the 9th POB under LTC William H. Harris (mostly from B Company under MAJ Kevin L. Thompkins) and the reserve 2nd POG from Cleveland, Ohio, by providing them with approved printed products.15

JPOTF facility — This facility housed the JPOTF. Note the cots draped with mosquito netting in the foreground, the light printing station to the left of the bay door, and stacked boxes containing pre-approved leaflets at the rear of the photo. Administrative offices were located on the second floor above the main entrance.

Tactical units looked to the JPOTF for product support and as a sounding board, but operationally they belonged to the ground combat commanders. According to the 1994 U.S. Army Field Manual 33-1-1: Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, a tactical PSYOP company could deploy one division PSYOP support element (DPSE) and three BPSEs with three to five battalion-level Tactical PSYOP Teams each.16 The BPSEs in Haiti had a coordinating relationship with the JPOTF, but they were ultimately brigade assets. Similarly, while BPSEs provided guidance and support to their subordinate TPTs, the teams also answered to the commanders of their supported battalion. Ideally, a TPT would support the same battalion throughout an operation, but in Haiti, TPTs were ‘mixed and matched’ to whatever units needed support. For example, “During the deployment, I coughed up two of my TPTs for an ad hoc detachment put together to support Special Forces,” according to USAR Military Intelligence Officer CPT Louis M. Sand, OIC of the Port-au-Prince-based BPSE 21 (246th PSYOP Company, Columbus, Ohio).17

The PSYOP effort had begun as an active duty venture, but USAR units became a big part of it. On 15 September 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order (EO) 12927 “to augment the active armed forces of the [U.S.] for the effective conduct of operational missions to restore the civilian government in Haiti.” This EO allowed the Secretary of Defense “to order to active duty any unit, and any individual members … of the Selected Reserve.”18 On 20 September, Pentagon spokesman LTC Douglas Hart announced that 2nd POG elements would deploy to Haiti.19 USAR PSYOP units began arriving within the first month. In some areas they augmented their active duty counterparts, and in others they replaced them. In the case of BPSE 22, reserve detachment OIC, CPT Martin C. Schulz, said, “It was an OJT hand-off … We had to adapt to the procedures established by the unit that was leaving, but it’s worked out well, and our people are doing fine. Everyday we’re proving that reservists can fill the shoes of active duty guys.”20 By early 1995, USAR units comprised over 80% of the tactical PSYOP force in country.21

“No to violence, no to vengeance, yes to reconciliation … These simple words of wisdom are a key to a successful democracy.” — Jean-Bertrand Aristide

Prior to detailing tactical efforts, a discussion of broad PSYOP themes for Haiti is in order. Naturally, themes reflected short- and long-term mission priorities. Media used to reach audiences included loudspeakers, printed products, informal personal discussions with the people, and radio broadcasts. (On-the-ground coordination by tactical PSYOP soldiers led to some Haitian-owned and operated stations allocating time for PSYOP messages.) Early on, loudspeaker broadcasts encouraged pro-Cédras militants to lay down their arms and not interfere with U.S. operations.22 More persistent themes included neighborhood crime watch, preventing Haitian-on-Haitian violence, and urging political reconciliation. An early leaflet directed audiences, “Help us to help you. Support law and order. Report criminal elements. Do not loot.”23 From 27 December 1994 to 1 January 1995, radio message 4N-07-20R told listeners, “Violence is not an answer to the road to peace and reconciliation. The new year is a chance to reconcile, start anew, and give peace a chance … A new year. A new start. A new Haiti.”24 Broadcasted on the locally-owned Radio Cap-Haïtien from 8-11 January 1995, one message implored listeners: “Make your community a safer place to live; support and join your community watch program.”25 One pre-recorded loudspeaker message quoted Aristide: “No to violence, no to vengeance, yes to reconciliation … These simple words of wisdom are a key to a successful democracy.”26

PSYOP continually employed pro-democracy, pro-Aristide themes. For example, leaflet 4A-01-02L informed Haitians, “U.S. forces have arrived to restore democracy to your country.”27 In October 1994, radio broadcast 4F-06-10R announced that “in a democracy … individuals have an avenue for meaningful participation both in government and in their own communities’ successes.”28 Democratic messages would ring hollow if Haitians did not believe that Aristide’s government could keep them safe. Due to the security vacuum in many parts of Haiti, the MNF-H and other international agencies had to provide security while building up pro-Aristide security forces.29 PSYOP helped legitimize these organizations. One broadcast scheduled to air from 18-31 October urged Haitians to support the UN International Police Monitor (IPM), headed by Director Raymond W. Kelly. It said, “Police from CARICOM [Caribbean Community], Jordan, Argentina, and many other countries make up the world team of [IPM] … They are here to re-establish a peaceful society in Haiti … Please support their efforts, and together, we will make a difference!”30 Support for the MNF-H, IPM, and the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) continued to appear in PSYOP messages.

The MNF/JTF PSYOP interface with the Haitian population was primarily the three-man Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs). These operated in major cities and in outlying areas throughout the country. They disseminated their messages via loudspeakers and in the course of face-to-face conversations with the Haitian people. They also distributed printed products sent by the JPOTF and even developed some of their own. One TPT leader described the equipment typically used by the teams: “An M1025 HMMWV, a vehicle-mounted AEM 450 Loudspeaker [estimated 1,000 meter range], and an LSS-40 Loudspeaker [estimated 350-500 meter range]. For protection, we carried M-16s, an M-203, and 9 mms.”31 What follows is an in-depth account of tactical PSYOP in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, and elsewhere.

The heavily populated capital city, Port-au-Prince, represented a key area for such units as BPSE 960 (from B Company, 9th POB), BPSE 910 (from A Company, 9th POB), BPSE 21 (from 2nd POG), and subordinate TPTs. These elements urged public safety and a peaceful return to democracy. On 26 September, the TPTs under BPSE 960 (961-964) made loudspeaker broadcasts promoting Aristide and the MNF and advertising a weapons-for-cash program. On 27 September, one TPT conducted pro-Aristide messaging, two TPTs broadcasted civil order messages around police stations, and one TPT manned a weapons-for-cash site, part of the UN-sponsored weapons buyback program.32 In early October, BPSEs 960 and 21 both supported TF MOUNTAIN (a 10th Mountain Division ad hoc subordinate task force of JTF-190) by advertising weapons turn-in sites. They also provided ‘on call’ support to the 16th Military Police (MP) Brigade.33 Peaceful dispersals of crowds, turning in of weapons, and relatively low levels of violence provided indications of PSYOP effectiveness.

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returns to Port-au-Prince, 15 October 1994.

Within the first month, PSYOP units operating around the capital worked to ascertain Haitian reactions to their messages and their general attitudes, which would help them with appropriate themes. On 7 October, BPSE 960 reported that many Haitians “still fear the FRAPH and Haitian military and police.” A survey of residents of Pétionville just outside of Port-au-Prince revealed that most people were apathetic toward national leaders. One respondent said that Haiti suffered from a chronic “lack of leadership” at the top and “lack of talent” at the bottom, adding that “Aristide will not solve this endemic problem.”34 (This type of feedback only reinforced the need for PSYOP units to promote Aristide.) And on 12 October, three days before Aristide’s return, BPSE 960 reported many cars around the capital displaying their bumper stickers, interpreting that as an indication of PSYOP effectiveness.35

BPSE 960 and its TPTs continued supporting multiple units and missions in the days leading up to Aristide’s return. On 11 October, TPTs 961 and 962 assisted 2/22nd Infantry and 3/14th Infantry (TF MOUNTAIN) with security missions while BPSE 960 and TPT 944 handed out 100 radios around the mayoral office building.36 The next day, BPSE 960 oversaw the distribution of 1,300 radios around Port-au-Prince while its TPTs interacted with the local population. TPTs 961 and 944 provided support to the 16th MPs, using loudspeakers to help control crowds around Carrefour where a FAd’H station had been burned and looted.37 On 14 October, the day before Aristide’s return, TPTs 961, 962, and 944 played mixed tapes containing music and pro-Aristide messages while driving up and down Avenue John Brown (a key thoroughfare), near the Presidential Palace, in Carrefour, and around Port-au-Prince. These were the final missions for BPSE 960, which began preparations for redeployment on 15 October.38

Primarily supporting 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division under COL Andrew R. Berdy, BPSE 910 and its TPTs (911-914) also operated in Port-au-Prince.39 On 4 October, BPSE 910 assisted 1/22nd Infantry with loudspeaker support as part of a crowd control mission during a speech by Emmanuel Constant II, the anti-Aristide founder of FRAPH, in Port-au-Prince. (LTG Shelton had strong-armed Constant into publicly supporting Aristide on CNN.) After the speech, BPSE 910 supported MPs by helping them disperse the crowd peacefully. Later that day near Carrefour Stadium, BPSE 910 and TPT 932 distributed some 1,500 leaflets promoting weapons buyback, 700 copies of a leaflet explaining Haitian rights and responsibilities, and 700 miscellaneous leaflets. TPTs 913 and 931 supported C Company, 1/87th Infantry’s seizure of a weapons cache formerly held by Cédras supporters, “to convince audience[s] not to resist and cooperate with [the] seizure of weapons.”40

“The Haitians were a beautiful people. They were just absolutely ecstatic that the Americans were there … They wanted anything they could get from us. They were so thrilled when they got their electricity back on, thrilled to get a soccer ball, thrilled to get a radio from us.”— CPT Anthony P. Arcuri

Led by CPT Louis M. Sand, the reserve BPSE 21 augmented active duty elements around Port-au-Prince. BPSE 21 and its TPTs (211-214) were encouraged because “most of the Haitian people are [very] interested in what we give them,” said Sand.41 On 10 October, TPT 211 supported MPs with crowd control following Cédras’ resignation. TPT 212 broadcasted news and information at a local school while TPTs 213 and 214 supported 2/22nd Infantry with the seizure of a weapons cache.42 On 12 October, TPT 211 disseminated handbills supporting the new police, TPT 213 performed a crowd control mission with MPs, and TPTs 212 and 214 helped distribute AM radios to citizens in Port-au-Prince anticipating Aristide’s return.43 Over the next 48 hours, the four TPTs distributed 2,100 radios, as well as 2,000 pro-Aristide leaflets and campaign buttons, in anticipation of the president’s 15 October return.44 Active duty and USAR PSYOP elements in Port-au-Prince thus played a key role in the relatively peaceful political transition in Haiti.

Outside of the capital, OIC CPT Brian Stackhouse ‘split-teamed’ BPSE 950 (from B Company, 9th POB) with detachment NCOIC SSG Perry M. Bartram. Stackhouse set up at Forward Operating Base (FOB) 31 in Pétionville, and oversaw three TPTs operating in the southern locations of Jacmel, Petit Goâve, and Les Cayes. SSG Bartram, a former Infantryman who, after deploying to Panama and the Persian Gulf, re-classed to PSYOP in 1991, set up at FOB 33 in Gonaïves to oversee two TPTs. One supported a 3rd SFG (A) Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) in Hinche in Haiti’s Centre Department. The other TPT supported ODAs operating in multiple locations. Bartram’s elements collected PSYOP-relevant information; disseminated JPOTF-approved products; helped control crowds with loudspeakers; and researched Haitians’ attitudes towards allowing former Cédras supporters to serve as security forces. Having made arrangements with local Haitian radio stations, “We also set up radio call-in shows where Haitians could speak to an ODA or company commander about utilities or what things would be like with Aristide back in power.”45

Another center of PSYOP activity was the northern coastal city of Cap-Haïtien which, for practical purposes, was divided into ten operational zones. On 2 October, BPSE 940 (from B Company, 9th POB) under Field Artillery Officer CPT Anthony P. Arcuri, as well its subordinate TPTs (941-944), arrived in Cap-Haïtien to begin the PSYOP effort there.46 BPSE 940 was soon augmented by the reserve BPSE 22 under CPT Martin C. Schulz. From October 1994 to January 1995, PSYOP elements in Cap-Haïtien supported units from 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, led by COL James M. Dubik. After January, they supported units from 3rd BCT (TF BRONCO), 25th ID, under COL Gary D. Speer. The mission in Cap-Haïtien also involved support to 3rd SFG ODAs in outlying areas, as required.47

Operating around Cap-Haïtien, TPT 941 (from B Co., 9th POB) consisted of (L to R) Team Leader SSG Brent A. Mendenhall, Assistant Team Leader SGT Darren R. Roberts, and SPC Jesse Bolka.

Attached to 2/14th Infantry, TPT 941 consisted of Team Leader (TL) SSG Brent A. Mendenhall, Assistant Team Leader (ATL) SGT Darren R. Roberts, and SPC Jesse Bolka. SSG Mendenhall, a Light Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic turned PSYOP Specialist in 1993, recalled that 10th Mountain Division was “eager to incorporate TPTs into operational planning.”48 SGT Roberts, a former Combat Signaler who re-classed to PSYOP in 1993, described how TPT 941 integrated into 2/14th Infantry operations: “Brent or I would go up there to the S-3, 2/14th Infantry to find out what the missions of the day were. There was always a Quick Reaction Force mission, and that duty rotated between the battalion’s companies. But since we were the only PSYOP element, we were on every QRF mission that rolled. So, we did both QRF and planned one- and two-day missions.”49

BPSE 940 and its TPTs advanced such themes as Aristide and democracy, non-violence, and support to the MNF-H and security forces. While presenting a ‘friendly face’ of the U.S. Army to the Haitian people, they also accompanied units conducting ‘show of force’ missions around the city. “The Haitians were a beautiful people. They were just absolutely ecstatic that the Americans were there,” according to Arcuri. “They wanted anything they could get from us. They were so thrilled when they got their electricity back on, thrilled to get a soccer ball, thrilled to get a radio from us.”50

On 10 October, TPT 941 supported a 10th Mountain Division raid on a weapons cache and played a recently recorded Aristide speech via loudspeakers “to a very receptive audience.” Meanwhile, TPTs 942 and 943 patrolled the city playing pre-recorded messages.51 The next day, TPTs 942 and 943 distributed leaflets promoting the IPM while TPT 914 used loudspeakers for crowd control during a trash removal operation. At 0900 hours on 12 October, TPT 941 conducted loudspeaker operations at Port Margot while TPT 942 supported 2/87th Infantry at a weapons turn-in site. TPT 914 soon began accompanying trash vehicles to dump sites to keep Haitians from interfering with 37th Engineer Battalion clean-up operations.52 As Arcuri explained, “We did a lot of route clearance stuff, telling them, ‘Keep clear of military vehicles, keep clear of bulldozers, etc.”53

On 14 October, BPSE 940 and several TPTs prepared audiences for Aristide’s return the following day. TPTs 914 and 941 broadcasted up and down the main thoroughfare (Route Nationale #1) while TPTs 942 and 943 zigzagged throughout Cap-Haïtien. Units also distributed radios so that Haitians could listen in to Aristide’s speech the next day. Occasionally, handing out radios led to problems. As BPSE 940 reported, “Radios caused scuffles all day long. Everybody and their mother had a good idea on how we should have distro’d them, but no matter how hard we tried to control the lines with [a] linguist and speakers it was still mayhem.” On the day of Aristide’s return, TPTs gave City Hall pro-Aristide items to hand out, including buttons, T-shirts, and 200 radios. However, Cap-Haïtien city workers “chickened out of the radio distro game, so our … guys did it.”54

Crowds gather in the main square in Cap-Haïtien in anticipation of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s return speech there. 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division soldiers provide security, while BPSE 22 use their loudspeakers for crowd control and to amplify Aristide’s speech.

Operating in concert with BPSE 940 in Cap-Haïtien was the USAR BPSE 22 and its four TPTs (221-224). Consisting of SSG Jon Cartier, SGT Daniel Stilson, and SGTs Jon McGinnis and Duane Tumas from the 245th PSYOP Company in Dallas, Texas, TPT 221 supported 2/14th Infantry until 14 November 1994; 2/87th Infantry until 20 January 1995; and 4/87th Infantry (part of TF BRONCO) until the TPT redeployed on 25 February. Consisting of SSG Marco A. Lopez, SGT Gonzalo F. Villarreal, and SGT Richard I. Keith (also from the 245th), TPT 223 supported 2/14th Infantry until 14 November 1994. Thereafter, TPT 223 served at the brigade level until it redeployed on 25 February 1995. Only in Haiti briefly, TPTs 222 and 224 both supported 2/87th Infantry until redeploying on 5 December.55

Just like their active duty counterparts, USAR PSYOP elements promoted Aristide in Cap-Haïtien before and after the transition. One reservist, SGT David G. Brown, remembered, “The people kept saying that they wanted to see Aristide. They didn’t believe that he had come back. We asked the JPOTF to have him come up, and he did.” While the 2nd BCT provided security during the November 1994 speech, BPSE 22 also directly supported the event. According to Brown, “I was on the stage with him. We actually ran the loudspeakers for part of the presentation and used them to broadcast his speech. The Haitians loved him.”56

Throughout the remainder of 1994, BPSE 22 and its TPTs promoted security forces, urged reconciliation, advertised neighborhood crime watch and weapons buyback programs, and offered Haitians public safety tips.57 Among the original products produced by BPSE 22 was the Cap-Haïtien Newsletter, which contained news and information. By February 1995, BPSE 22 had printed ten issues of the Newsletter, and its TPTs had distributed 60,000 copies throughout Cap-Haïtien.58 Daily loudspeaker broadcasts continued unabated. TPT messages on 17 January 1995 included “Graffiti is Inappropriate” and “U.S. Forces are Going Through a Transition; Security Remains #1 Priority.”59 Those on 12 February included “Remember: No Toy Guns or Fireworks During the Mardi Gras Season” and “The [UN] Will Help Democracy Grow.”60 On 18 February, they included “The City of Cap-Haïtien is Cleaning Up” and “Don’t Wear [MNF-H] Uniforms.”61 And 21 February messages included “Keep Watching Your Neighborhood.”62

Although not required by the combat commanders or the JPOTF, BPSE 22 conducted post-testing to assess product effectiveness and general attitudes. Based on interviews with 372 Haitians, the first report concluded that Haitians had positive opinions of the U.S. and the IPSF but did not fully understand MNF-H’s purpose. They also stated that political reconciliation hinged on economic progress. The report recommended expanding TPT coverage off the main roads; conducting PSYOP missions separately from combat forces; promoting MNF-H; encouraging Haitians to support FAd’H members providing security; and more face-to-face meetings with community leaders.63

On 28 December 1994, BPSE 22 published Post-Test III covering 14 November to 14 December. Two hundred seventy Cap-Haïtiens answered sixteen questions about CARICOM, the IPSF, reconciliation, weapons buyback, the FAd’H, and media coverage and preference. The results again validated PSYOP efforts. Most respondents had heard loudspeaker messages daily and had read leaflets and/or the Cap-Haïtien Newsletter. However, they preferred getting their information from the radio, especially Radio Cap-Haïtien. Most respondents approved of CARICOM and the IPSF. While 92.22% favored political reconciliation, significantly fewer thought that the FAd’H should remain intact.65

Post-Test IV by BPSE 22 covered 15 December 1994 to 15 January 1995. Two hundred and forty Cap-Haïtiens responded to fifteen questions about such topics as crime watch programs, the IPSF, the upcoming transition from MNF-H to UNMIH, and the security situation in Cap-Haïtien. Most respondents supported local crime watch initiatives and the IPSF. More than half knew about the upcoming transition to UNMIH. Although 65% of respondents felt that they enjoyed a secure environment, residents expressed ongoing concern about employment, inflation, and crime.66 Published on 19 February 1995, Post-Test V covered 15 January to 8 February. Of the 240 people surveyed, 70% approved of the IPSF. Awareness of the transition to UNMIH increased to 70% (half of the citizens wanted the UN to stay indefinitely). About 60% approved of their local governments, and 90% believed that they were better off than six months prior.67 Post-Test V was the final survey conducted by BPSE 22.

BPSE 22 had contributed greatly to the PSYOP effort in Cap-Haïtien and elsewhere. Between October 1994 and February 1995, it made over 3,500 loudspeaker broadcasts, disseminated 400,000 leaflets, and produced the well-received Cap-Haïtien Newsletter. They developed and distributed over 20,000 original calendars (“our most popular and sought-after product”) and handed out such items as soccer balls, radios, T-shirts, pens, pencils, notebooks, and bumper stickers. As evidence of PSYOP effectiveness in northern Haiti, BPSE 22 reported that Cap-Haïtiens had turned in 3,700 weapons and 50,000 rounds of ammunition by 25 February 1995 thanks to PSYOP promotion of the UN-sponsored buyback program.68

By all accounts, PSYOP during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY succeeded. It helped shape Haitian attitudes toward such organizations as JTF-190/MNF-H, CARICOM, International Police Monitor, IPSF, and the UNMIH. It eased tensions surrounding the transfer of power from LTG Raoul Cédras and President Émile Jonassaint to the rightful leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. It had promoted various public health and safety programs, and performed crowd control and ‘show of force’ missions. Most importantly, it helped prevent the country from descending into a bloody civil war by urging political reconciliation and deterring Haitian-on-Haitian violence. SGT Brown thought that PSYOP successes owed in large part to the personal, face-to-face time that PSYOP soldiers spent with the Haitian people. “Our job in PSYOP is to show a more human side to the people instead of walking around with weapons locked and loaded and ignoring them … We play tapes, have fun, and get out there and make friends with the people.”69

Commanders at all levels praised PSYOP. MG George A. Fisher, commander of MNF-H, JTF-190, and the 25th ID, said, “PSYOP was one of our top three combat multipliers … We used [it] very aggressively. Our teams focused on everything from the [UN] mission, to law and order, the justice system, the governmental programs that needed publicity, the programs to stop looting and counter vigilante justice, security for the carnival, to how the elector[al] process would work and how candidates would be registered. All of these require massive PSYOP campaigns. The PSYOP personnel … did a great job, in some cases turning the themes and products around in 24 hours. This allowed us to quickly impact on the local situation.”70

Acknowledgments: Thanks to COL (Ret.) Anthony P. Arcuri, 1SG (Ret.) Perry M. Bartram, MSG David G. Brown, CSM (Ret.) Brent A. Mendenhall, COL (Ret.) Hugh W. Perry, MAJ Darren R. Roberts, LTC (Ret.) Louis M. Sand, Mr. Douglas Elwell, Mr. Kent A. Bolke at the 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum Museum, Ms. Kathleen H. Ramsden at the Topic Lightning Museum, Deputy PSYOP Commandant Mr. Timothy Fitzpatrick, and XVIII Airborne Corps Historian Ms. Donna L. Tabor for their assistance with this article. Special thanks go to COL Martin C. Schulz for allowing access to his extensive collection of photos and documents.

A True Force Multiplier

Psychological Operations in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1994-1995

ENDNOTES