Voice of the U.S. and Aggressors

From Veritas, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2016

“Dropping leaflets instead of parachutes and using loudspeakers instead of rifles, psychological warfare [psywar] units are ‘fighting’ side by side with airborne troopers of the [82nd Airborne] Division.” –New York Times, 15 November 19531

Supporting that maneuver, Exercise FALCON, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was the 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, a tactical psywar unit. For most of its brief existence (November 1950-February 1955), the 2nd L&L functioned as the stateside psywar training element for Army Field Forces. It thus ‘filled the gap’ left by the 1st L&L Company (formerly called the Tactical Information Detachment) when it deployed to Korea in late 1950. This article introduces the 2nd L&L in the context of renewed U.S. Army efforts to rebuild its psywar capability during the Korean War.

Leading the U.S. Army psywar resurgence was Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, who orchestrated the strategic psywar campaign in Europe during WWII. Heading the Psywar Division, Army G-3 starting in September 1950 and the Office of the Chief of Psywar (OCPW) after January 1951, McClure prioritized activating, manning, training, and deploying psywar units to the Far East and Europe. By spring 1951, the Army’s active duty tactical psywar inventory consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 5th L&L Companies. The mission of these permanent, table of organization and equipment (T/O&E) units was “to conduct the tactical propaganda operations of a field army and to provide quality [psywar] specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate staffs.”2

2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company Unofficial Logo.

In addition to tactical units, by spring 1951 the Army had activated the strategic 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group and had federalized the U.S. Army Reserve 301st RB&L Group. These temporary, mission-driven Table of Distribution and Allowances (T/D&A) units were charged with “conduct[ing] strategic propaganda operations in direct support of military operations; support[ing] and augment[ing] the worldwide propaganda effort of the United States,” and “provid[ing] operational support to tactical propaganda units in a military theater of operations.”3

By late 1951, most of these psywar units had deployed in support of field armies and theater commands in the Far East and Europe. For Korea, the 1st L&L provided loudspeaker and leaflet support to Eighth Army while the 1st RB&L advanced U.S. and United Nations objectives with leaflets and strategic radio broadcasts. In Europe, the 5th L&L and 301st RB&L supported Seventh U.S. Army, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and the European Command (EUCOM). However, the 2nd L&L would remain stateside to train psywarriors while simultaneously orienting other units to its capabilities.

On 8 November 1950, the 2nd L&L was activated at Fort Riley, Kansas, and assigned to the Army General School (AGS). When the company submitted its first Morning Report on 6 December, it had only ten enlisted soldiers and two officers: First Lieutenant (1LT) Howard C. Walters, Jr. in command, and Second Lieutenant (2LT) William C. Shepard as the Executive Officer (XO).4 Arriving in late 1950, Corporal (CPL) Robert F. Denault recalled that soldiers “came in one at a time. We were working on getting things together to make a unit.”5 By mid-January 1951, the 2nd had grown to about forty soldiers, and by mid-June, around sixty.6

Authorized eight officers and ninety-nine enlisted men, the 2nd L&L had an initial personnel shortage, forcing it to temporarily organize as a reduced-strength company. (According to T/O&E 20-77, a reduced-strength company consisted of five officers and sixty-seven men.) However, by September 1951 the 2nd had enough soldiers to fulfill its T/O&E. It was comprised of a 28-man headquarters element to manage administration, mess, supply, training, and transportation; a 15-man Propaganda Platoon with a Propaganda Section and an Operations and Intelligence Section; a 31-man Publication Platoon with Camera, Plate, Press, and Processing Sections; and a 33-man Loudspeaker Platoon containing three Loudspeaker Sections.7 Manning these elements were soldiers with language skills, advanced education, and relevant civilian backgrounds (like printing, journalism, and advertising) who had been identified by The Adjutant General-established Classification and Analysis Center at Fort Myer, Virginia, based on criteria provided by the OCPW.

One new soldier in the unit in mid-1951 was CPL Joel A. Leavitt, an International Relations graduate from Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, who had been drafted in March 1951. After infantry training at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, he was assigned to the 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) with individual orders for Korea. However, new orders to the 2nd L&L diverted him. At Fort Riley, the relative informality of the psywar world (contrasted with the strict discipline of the infantry) surprised Leavitt. Because “most of the guys were college graduates, the officers treated us equally.” As part of the Operations Section, Propaganda Platoon, he helped develop training schedules and made preparations for maneuvers.8

Another arrival was Private First Class (PFC) Raymond P. Laubsted. Originally from Illinois, Laubsted had two years of post-high school engineering education before being drafted in March 1951 and attending basic training at Fort Eustis, Virginia. After graduation and a short time spent loading Liberty ships and changing locomotive wheels, Laubsted received orders to the 2nd L&L where he served as a Multigraph (Printing Press) Operator (0128). “It was just ‘L&L’ on the orders. I didn’t even know what ‘L&L’ stood for.”9 With orders to transfer from Fort Sheridan, Illinois, to the 2nd L&L by 17 August 1951, Private (PVT) Frank R. Haus, a Photo-lithographer (0107) by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), was delayed from reporting by severe flooding across Kansas. This flooding was caused by months of record-setting, cumulative rainfall in the Midwest. “We could not proceed further than Kansas City, Missouri, [due] to the flooding … We were authorized temporary quarters at the YMCA [Young Men’s Christian Association in Kansas City] until roads were again open to traffic.”10

2nd Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company Organization

As new soldiers arrived, the 2nd L&L sent personnel to the few psywar courses offered at the AGS. It also trained with the 1st RB&L, which was driven by deployment to Far East Command (FEC) in August 1951. At Fort Riley, it was common for AGS-assigned psywar units to train together and share or ‘swap’ personnel with each other based on desired skills and MOSs. Accordingly, the 2nd L&L experienced a sizeable personnel shift due to the upcoming deployment of a sister company, the 5th L&L.

In June 1951, 5th L&L commander Captain (CPT) Robert K. Wensley received unit deployment orders to Germany, but he was short of European linguists. PFC Laubsted recalled that a lot of 2nd L&L soldiers “spoke multiple languages, mostly European, so we figured that they were grooming us to go to Europe.”11 Instead, 34 soldiers (including European linguists) were transferred to the 5th L&L, which in turn switched 32 soldiers to the 2nd L&L. Leadership within the 2nd L&L shuffled as well. CPT Howard R. Clisham replaced 1LT Walters as the company commander, and 1LT Jack L. Thiess, 1LT Tom S. Stein, and 2LT Ivan Gilliam reported to the Propaganda Platoon, Publication Platoon, and Loudspeaker Platoon, respectively. In July, SFC Spencer J. Huggins became First Sergeant.12

Amidst training, the flood, and personnel shifts, the 2nd L&L received orders to take part in Exercise SOUTHERN PINE at Camp Mackall and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in August 1951. Replicating a real-world conventional combat scenario, SOUTHERN PINE aimed “to provide training for Army and Air Force units in large-scale offensive and defensive operations with emphasis on night operations, [close] tactical air support; airborne operations; rail, motor, and air movements; and logistical support, to include aerial supply.” It would also validate joint standard operating procedures (SOPs) in order to better prepare U.S. forces to defend Western Europe against a Soviet attack. Lieutenant General (LTG) John R. Hodge, Commanding General, Third Army, and Major General (MG) W.R. Wolfinbarger, Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, served as maneuver director and deputy maneuver director, respectively.13

According to the hypothetical scenario for SOUTHERN PINE, ‘Soviet’ forces (played by U.S. Aggressor forces), after taking over the Caribbean, invading the American Southeast, and consolidating in South Carolina, were advancing toward Camp Mackall, Hoffman, Hamlet, Laurinburg, and Maxton, North Carolina. They wanted to seize Fort Bragg en route to Raleigh-Durham. Aggressor ground forces drew primarily from the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (AIR) from Fort Bragg, and the 511th AIR, 11th Airborne Division, from Fort Campbell, Kentucky.14 U.S. forces, including the 82nd Airborne Division (-) and the 28th Infantry Division (ID) (based at Camp Atterbury, Indiana) and 43rd ID (based at Camp Pickett, Virginia), both federalized on 5 September 1950 and soon to deploy to Germany, were to defend Fort Bragg and surrounding areas from seizure by Aggressor forces.15 If they failed, “the enemy would have easy sailing in its drive toward the Raleigh-Durham industrial area,” read one news report.16

For SOUTHERN PINE, a 2nd L&L contingent was tasked to provide leaflet and loudspeaker support to the Aggressor forces. On 2 July 1951, CPT Clisham led the eastbound convoy of forty 2nd L&L soldiers and officers. 1LT Edward F. Kaye remained at Riley to serve as acting company commander. 1LTs Jack L. Thiess and Tom S. Stein soon left Kansas to ‘reinforce’ the detachment.17 Bivouacked in tents on Fort Bragg, the 2nd L&L had over a month to become familiar with the area of operations before the exercise began on 13 August.

At the onset of SOUTHERN PINE, the 82nd Airborne Division was to establish contact with Aggressor and cover the concentration of 28th and 43rd IDs north and east of Fort Bragg. On 13-14 August, the 82nd attacked and pushed back Aggressor forces several miles to the Gaddy’s Mountain and Blues Road-Maul Route Road area, and finally to a new front along Raeford-Vass Road. On 16 August, the other two divisions relieved the 82nd, with the 43rd occupying the northern zone of action and the 28th occupying the southern zone. Until 25 August, “sporadic fighting continued in the Raeford-Vass Road area with neither side able to gain a clear advantage.” To break the deadlock, U.S. forces launched coordinated attacks against Aggressor units with the 28th and 43rd IDs making frontal assaults as two battalions of the 504th RCT dropped on the eastern side of Gaither Swamp and one battalion jumped on the western side. The 505th RCT soon jumped in to reinforce them. SOUTHERN PINE ended on 27 August when 82nd elements linked up with the 28th and 43rd IDs.18

During Exercise SOUTHERN PINE, the 2nd L&L designed and printed some 485,800 leaflets that Aggressor forces employed against U.S. units. Loudspeaker appeals complemented printed messages. In addition, the 2nd L&L introduced “Lorelei, the Velvet Voice of Aggressor.” Promoting her nightly local radio broadcasts on Aggressor News Network, a mock enemy news station, one leaflet offered a written sample of Lorelei’s messages: “I hope you’ll like me, fellas… Will you listen to me each night? Please? I promise you, fellas, you won’t regret it.”19 The detachment recruited local girls to pose for leaflets and to speak on air as Lorelei.

Although the impact of the psywar products could not be fully quantified, the exercise had still afforded 2nd L&L personnel the chance to practice individual skills and work cohesively. On 3 September, CPT Clisham led the detachment—“flushed with triumph [as] virtually the only trained psywarriors”—back to Fort Riley.20 However, many of these soldiers soon left the Army because they had reached the end of their service terms. Replacements filtered in as the 2nd L&L tried to keep its training momentum going.

One new arrival was PFC Ralph J. Edinger. Drafted in April 1951, the Washington, DC, native attended basic training and Signal Supply Technician training at Camp Gordon, Georgia. He then got orders to the 1st RB&L. Friend and fellow soldier PFC William A. Elias said, “Ralph, this group is going to Korea, but our company commander doesn’t need our MOSs. He is going to take us over and drop us off in Japan and make a swap with another unit.”21 Edinger and Elias requested transfers, resulting in orders to the 2nd L&L. Edinger joined SFC John M. Goodwin and CPL Jintoku Kozuma in the Supply Section.

Another replacement was Milwaukee, Wisconsin, native and skilled pressman PFC Roy D. Adelmann. The 1950 draftee took basic training at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, and served briefly as an engineer before receiving orders for radar training at Fort Bliss, Texas. However, his civilian printing skills resulted in the cancellation of his schooling and reassignment to psywar. In late summer 1951, Adelmann reported to the 2nd L&L as a plate-maker in the Publication Platoon. He was surprised that “all of the people there were so well-versed in their specific jobs, whether they were press, plate, or camera.”22 The influx of qualified personnel like Adelmann was the result of coordination between the OCPW at the Pentagon and The Adjutant General, and it greatly reduced the learning curve of new arrivals.

Although the 2nd L&L had earlier lost most of its European linguists to the 5th L&L, it retained some foreign language speakers (primarily to serve in the Loudspeaker Platoon). These included CPL Dimitri J. Stancioff, a late 1951 arrival to the unit. Born in London, England to an American mother and Bulgarian father, Stancioff had lived in numerous European countries including England, Bulgaria, Italy, and Switzerland, picking up languages along the way. His family moved to the U.S. in August 1946. Drafted in 1950, Stancioff took basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. As a result of his alien status and inability to get a security clearance, the Army shuffled him around. After serving at Fort Myer, Virginia; Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland; Fort McClellan, Alabama; and Washington, DC, he received orders to the 2nd L&L and reported in November 1951.23

As new arrivals trickled in, unit training accelerated. For example, the Psywar Division, Department of Resident Instruction, AGS, had finished writing the Psywar NCO Course. Twenty-one 2nd L&L soldiers attended Psywar NCO Course #1, which began on 24 October and ended on 21 November.24 One of the junior enlisted students, PFC Laubsted, remembered, “Mostly they talked about principles of what we were in there for. They didn’t go into details about psychology or how to run a press or anything like that. They just explained the overall picture of what psywar was trying to achieve.”25 In late 1951, BG Robert A. McClure visited the 2nd L&L and described its training progress as “pretty good.”26

Inaugural Psywar NCO Course — Twenty-one 2nd L&L soldiers attended the inaugural Psywar NCO Course, 24 October-21 November 1951.

Pictured above:

PVT William L. Fallon
PVT Marshall A. Blanchard
CPL Charles Ellison
PVT Donald C. Hillier
PVT Raymond P. Laubsted
PVT John J. Schmitt
SGT Karl J. Hentschel
CPL Dennis J. Guider
CPL Joel A. Leavitt
SGT Robert J. Cyr
PVT Richard E. Smith
PVT Ralph J. Edinger
PVT William A. Elias
PVT Marion H. White
PFC Shigeru Kiyabu
PFC Martin R. Kaiden
PVT Ralph B. Davis
PFC David G. Baker
PVT Everett W. Slagle
PVT PerryS. Samuels

Not pictured: PVT Ronald B. Salisbury

Psywar NCO Course #1 Graduation Certificate for Pressman PVT Raymond P. Laubsted.

Company experiments with printing equipment yielded mediocre results. PFC Laubsted recalled, “One of our LTs decided that he wanted to run the motor-driven, automatic sheet-fed Davidson Model 221 presses (printing 10 x 14 inch sheets) in the vans while we were traveling. They hooked the generator up in the back, fired it up, and off we went down the highway. Lithography depends on water and ink in open fountains. On the first turn we made, all of the water went out.” The men scrambled to keep water from damaging equipment. The LT wanted to run the press “cross-country over furrowed fields and places like that. We had a meeting and I said, ‘Gee, it didn’t work on the highway, how is it going to work somewhere like that? You’d have to have a sealed fountain. You’d have to go into development on something like that.’” That bad idea went nowhere, but another one surfaced. “They wanted to mount two presses in the back of C-119 Flying Boxcar cargo aircraft, have soldiers run these presses, and have the leaflets fly out as we were flying. I told them that you’re going to have to strap me in, and I can’t be strapped in and run a press at the same time.”27 That idea soon died as well.

In late 1951, the 2nd L&L received notice of upcoming Exercise SNOW FALL at Camp Drum, New York. SNOW FALL would emphasize: “1) individual survival, over-snow movement, and the use and care of weapons, equipment, and supplies; 2) planning and executing offensive and defensive operations, to include defense on a wide front [and] night operations; 3) airborne operations; 4) tactical air operations; 5) air, motor, and rail movement; and 6) logistical support.” Like SOUTHERN PINE, it sought to test joint operating procedures. LTG Willis D. Crittenberger, Commanding General, First Army, served as maneuver director. MG Leland S. Hobbs, Deputy Commanding General, First Army, served as deputy maneuver director (ground) and MG Robert W. Douglas, Commanding General, Eighteenth Air Force, served as deputy maneuver director (air). U.S. forces included the 11th Airborne Division, the Fort Meade, Maryland-based 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) equipped with M-41 Walker Bulldog tanks, and about forty small units and detachments (including the 2nd L&L). Aggressor ground forces came from the Fort Devens, Massachusetts-headquartered 278th Regimental Combat Team, a Tennessee Army National Guard unit federalized on 1 September 1950 for stateside infantry training.28 The climate of upstate New York in winter 1952 would be a far cry from that of Camp Mackall, North Carolina, six months earlier.

On 3 January 1952, one group of 2nd L&L soldiers began the 1,300-mile drive from Fort Riley to Camp Drum by convoy, followed five days later by another group traveling by rail. The entire detachment consisted of CPT Clisham, 1LTs Stein and James H. Chandler, 2LT Ivan Gilliam, and thirty enlisted soldiers. According to PFC Roy D. Adelmann, “[On] our trip to New York, we were not attached to any other unit; just thirty of us, four [twelve-feet-long] shop vans, four road guard jeeps, a wrecker, and a 2½ ton [M-35].” The Camera, Plate, and Press Sections each had one van while the other carried miscellaneous supplies and equipment. On the trip, “We cut up a little, making the trucks backfire in the Penn State tunnels.”29

Once at Camp Drum, ‘Detachment 2nd L&L’ were barracked with 11th Airborne personnel who were among some 10,000 paratroopers transported from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to Wheeler-Sack Army Airfield (AAF), Camp Drum, by the U.S. Air Force Troop Carrier Air Division (Provisional) between 8 and 13 January.30 According to CPL Robert N. Bauer, “Public Relations between the leaflet droppers and the paratroopers remained high throughout the maneuver.”31 Once again, the company had a month of area familiarization before the exercise kicked off in early February.

Announcer William J. Petry (kneeling, left) reads a script while loudspeaker mechanics Igor Pizuka and Robert Johnson adjust the M-38 jeepmounted public address system.

According to the hypothetical SNOW FALL training scenario, Aggressor forces occupying and consolidated in New Brunswick, Quebec, and Montreal, Canada had recently pushed southward into the U.S., advancing toward Potsdam. The first exercise phase—“build-up”—lasted from 8 to 11 February, with X-day on 9 February. At the outset, the 3rd Armored Cavalry delayed Aggressor advances near Potsdam while 11th Airborne command elements jumped into the area between Camp Drum and Antwerp. The 503rd RCT augmented these paratroopers on X-day; the 511th RCT jumped in on X plus 1; and the 188th RCT air-landed at Wheeler-Sack AAF on X plus 2. Regarding conditions during airborne jumps, CPL Leavitt remembered: “The snow melted before the maneuver started, and the ground froze. They jumped in a little more wind than they were supposed to.”32 The hazardous environmental conditions reportedly caused numerous injuries. Still, the 3rd Armored Cavalry had held Aggressor off long enough to allow 11th Airborne elements to establish a Main Line of Resistance (MLR) north of Camp Drum.

The ‘defensive phase’ of SNOW FALL lasted from 11 to 14 February. The U.S. forces MLR ran from Red Lake to Antwerp to East Antwerp. Determined Aggressor assaults and a simulated tactical atomic attack on 14 February caused heavy ‘casualties’ (especially in the 511th RCT), but failed to breach the MLR. (At that time, the U.S. military perceived that “synergies between [tactical nuclear] weapons and small conventional forces would work to defend Europe against overwhelming Soviet forces.”)33 The final, ‘offensive’ phase of SNOW FALL lasted only one day, 15 February. Comprised of the 503rd RCT and a battalion of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and supported by the 511th RCT, Task Force MOHICAN spearheaded an attack along U.S. Highway 11 against Aggressor main forces. At 0900 hours, U.S. forces dropped a simulated tactical atomic bomb on Aggressor reserves near Gouverneur, and at 1100 hours, 3/188th RCT jumped in just southwest of Canton to thwart the Aggressor withdrawal. Just after noon, that battalion linked up with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, sealing the fate of Aggressor and ending the exercise.34

Throughout the exercise, the 2nd L&L “spread malingering and dereliction among the wily Aggressor foe,” wrote CPL Joel A. Leavitt.35 Thanks to the L&L, U.S. forces dropped nearly 50,000 leaflets and made fifteen loudspeaker broadcasts to Aggressor. Propaganda Platoon personnel wrote and designed leaflets and six issues of Frigid Times, an exercise newsletter. When SNOW FALL ended, the 2nd L&L traveled back to Fort Riley by road and train to fully reassemble at Fort Riley by 24 February.36 Exercise LONG HORN awaited them.

The company had four days before the advance party left for Exercise LONG HORN at Fort Hood, Texas that was scheduled for 25 March-9 April 1952. To further complicate matters, the 2nd L&L was to relocate to Fort Bragg shortly after the exercise. According to the 2nd L&L yearbook, “Everything had to be cleaned up, packed up, and shipped off; we were turning in our barracks and all of our buildings.” Recently appointed Personnel Administrative Specialist CPL Frank R. Haus, recalled, “I had to pack up the company personnel records for the trip by convoy. I even wound up handling the physical crating of the records, going so far as to design and build a crate that when opened up and placed on legs became my temporary desk at Fort Hood.” 1LT Jack L. Thiess and CPLs Martin A. Kaiden and Joel A. Leavitt formed the Advanced Echelon (ADVON) to Fort Hood, arranging mess, barracks, and supply before the company arrived.37

Along with the 23rd Signal Company and D Company, 43rd Army Engineer Camouflage Battalion, the 2nd L&L left Fort Riley on 28 February, and arrived at Fort Hood on 1 March after stops at Tinker Air Force Base, Okalahoma, and Fort Worth, Texas. Haus remembered, “Upon our arrival at Fort Hood, most of the men that had traveled in open jeeps had to report [to] sick-call for extreme sun and wind burn.”38 Clisham praised his men “on the conduct of the convoy coming down. One thing’s for sure, the 2nd L&L is reaching its aim to be so mobile that most of us are a little ground sick when the wheels stop rolling and we have to get out and walk.”39 The company would ‘live’ and work on Fort Hood during the exercise.

LONG HORN had the same basic objectives as previous exercises—test and validate joint SOPs in order to better prepare U.S. forces to defend Europe from a Soviet attack. LTG William M. Hoge, Commanding General, Fourth Army, was maneuver director. MG E.J. Timberlake, Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, served as deputy maneuver director (air) and MG Hobart R. Gay, Deputy Commanding General, Fourth Army, served as maneuver director (ground). U.S. ground forces consisted of the 31st ID from Fort Jackson, South Carolina, the 47th ID from Camp Rucker, Alabama, the 1st Armored Division from Fort Hood, and the 508th RCT from Fort Bragg. Aggressor included the 82nd Airborne Division and the 17th Armored Cavalry Group from Camp Polk, Louisiana. The Camp Polk-based 301st Army Logistical Command supported both sides.40

The hypothetical training scenario for LONG HORN was as follows. The aggressor invaded Texas in September 1951, pushed inland, captured San Antonio by December, and was advancing northward up the Colorado River toward Brownwood. Meanwhile, to the northeast of Fort Hood, Aggressor mechanized attacks broke U.S. positions along Little and Brazos Rivers with the goal of capturing Waco. The rectangular ground maneuver area covered Goldthwaite to the northwest, Gatesville to the northeast, Killeen to the southeast, and San Saba to the southwest. LONG HORN played out in three phases: 25-30 March, 2-5 April, and 7-9 April. On the defensive for the first two phases, U.S. forces had the initiative by Phase III. Following 1st Armored advances and airborne drops by the 508th RCT astride the Colorado River, Phase III ended on 9 April when the 1st Armored Division linked up with the 508th RCT and U.S. forces seized the objective, San Saba.41

The 2nd L&L psywar efforts during LONG HORN surpassed those of SOUTHERN PINE and SNOW FALL. Throughout the exercise, the 2nd designed sixteen leaflets (eleven for the U.S. and five for the Aggressor) and printed over 500,000.42 “The presses never stopped running,” said PFC Adelmann.43 For the first time, the company developed leaflets for civilian target audiences: one ‘resistance’ leaflet for citizens of Lampasas (some twenty-five miles from Fort Hood) under Aggressor ‘rule’ and a leaflet after U.S. forces liberated the town. Air liaison sergeant PFC Deboorne Piggot personally dropped 40,000 leaflets from C-47s over Lampasas. Adelmann recalled another product, a warning leaflet with a black widow on the front, and a rattlesnake and Rocky Mountain wood tick on the reverse. “This leaflet was dropped on American troops taking a hill top. It worked. It took the troops twice the time it should have, which could have made the difference in a tactical situation. When interviewed, the American troops thought the leaflet was a warning to be careful … One man in our outfit got a wood tick on him [and] he thought he would die.” Ironically, “he was in on producing the leaflet. It shows what your mind can concoct. That was the best leaflet we produced.”44

In addition to leaflets, during LONG HORN, Publication Platoon printed the company newsletter, The Brieflet, under the directorship of 1LT Thiess. The LT wrote that a “considerable number of the copies of [The Brieflet] are being distributed externally, and … they may arouse some curiosity and interest among recipients unfamiliar with the organization for, and the purpose of, [psywar].” He informed readers: “our primary mission on these maneuvers is to add realism, and within the scope of obvious limitations and restrictions, actually to wage a propaganda campaign employing loudspeakers and leaflets just as we would in combat.”45

Finally, for LONG HORN the 2nd L&L created “Laura, the Voice of the U.S.,” the equivalent to Lorelei during SOUTHERN PINE ten months earlier. They selected PFC Shirley Attebury, Women’s Army Corps, to play Laura. CPL Ralph B. Davis from Propaganda Platoon and PFC Presley D. Holmes from Loudspeaker Platoon (who had a Master’s Degree in Speech from the University of Michigan) coached ‘Laura’ during five recordings and edited them. The messages were then given to “Laura teams” (loudspeaker teams tasked to only play her messages). More than once, Aggressor forces (thinking that Laura was broadcasting live) attacked Laura teams to try to capture her. Loudspeaker personnel got ‘killed’ multiple times during LONG HORN.46

The company convoyed back to Fort Riley and arrived on 16 April 1952, the last time it would return to that post since all psywar activities were relocating to Fort Bragg. Personnel lived in temporary billeting while the company finished last-minute requirements for the move. SGT Haus had the unenviable task of processing all enlisted records for the 2nd L&L and the Psywar Detachment, 5021st ASU, a carrier unit soon to become the 6th RB&L Group (activated 26 April 1952), before moving to the Army’s new Psywar Center.47 On 1 June, an ADVON consisting of 1LT Kaye, 2LT Thomas G. Pazell, and five enlisted personnel left for Fort Bragg. The main body continued to prepare to move. A month before the transfer, on 10 May, CPT Clisham became I Corps Psywar Officer in Korea. Two acting commanders, CPT Robert B. Bleecker and 1LT James H. Chandler, Jr., filled the void until the unit arrived at Fort Bragg.48

The 2nd L&L was fully on station by 17 June. At Fort Bragg, it met its new commander, CPT George B. Blackstock, a 9th Infantry, 2nd ID Silver Star recipient from Korea.49 The 2nd L&L belonged to the Psywar Center, the higher headquarters for the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG), the 6th RB&L, the Psywar Board, and the Psywar School.50 The 2nd L&L was attached to the 6th RB&L for administrative purposes before formally being assigned.51 The 6th RB&L consisted of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, the 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, the 7th Reproduction Company, the 9th L&L (activated 26 April 1952), and the 2nd L&L.52 A year later, the 6th RB&L also assumed control of the 12th Consolidation Company (activated 27 May 1953). The purpose of the latter unit was to support Civil Affairs/Military Government units by “providing information to, and assisting in the direction and/or control of, civilian populations.” It might operate “in friendly, liberated, or enemy areas,” where it would supervise or control local or national media to achieve “maximum cooperation of the civilian population.”53

SGT Frank R. Haus, Personnel Administrative Specialist in the 2nd L&L, poses by the sign of the company’s higher headquarters, the 6th RB&L Group, on Smoke Bomb Hill. The 2nd L&L and 6th RB&L were located at the corner of what is today 9th Infantry Street and Son Tay Road.

The new 2nd L&L and 6th RB&L home was Smoke Bomb Hill, at the corner of what is today 9th Infantry Street and Son Tay Road. According to SGT Haus, “The entire company was restricted … for three days while we got everything in shape. After [that] we were allowed to look over the post … Then, Class A passes were issued and we were allowed to leave the post for the first time in a week … Several things we learned very quickly; first, don’t go off post with ‘bloused’ boots as that was the prerogative of the airborne, and two, don’t get in between the boys from the 82nd Airborne and the Air Force boys from Pope Base since a fight could break out at the drop of a hat.”54 PFC Edinger recalled, “The airborne couldn’t stand us. I stayed away from them.”55 PFC Laubsted said similarly, “We were all surrounded by airborne soldiers. They were really gung-ho, and you were very careful what you said.”56

Soon after the 2nd L&L arrived at Fort Bragg, 2LT Edgar L. Feingold reported to the Loudspeaker Platoon. A former enlisted military policeman in Osaka, Japan, after WWII, Feingold left the service in 1947 to attend Georgetown University in Washington, DC. While a student majoring in Foreign Service, he was a reporter for the Baltimore Sun. The newly minted 2LT (Reserve Officers’ Training Corps [ROTC]) was surprised when, “Out of the blue, I got orders for psywar. I think the Army looked at my background at the Sun.” Feingold similarly noted the contrast between 2nd L&L and other Fort Bragg units. “At that time, the Center was a combination of psywar and Special Forces. All the psywar officers and enlisted men were engaged in these creative activities. On the other side were these combat arms soldiers who used to come by and give us a lot of hassle.”57

At Fort Bragg, company personnel worked diligently to get unit administration straight. ‘Dual-hatted’ as the personnel clerk for the 2nd L&L and the 6th RB&L, SGT Haus worked for the Group Adjutant 1LT Don M. Anderson. “First order of business for me was going over all the personnel records,” said Haus. “All personnel had to have [a] security clearance and this was our first priority … Because we needed foreign language experts, we had quite a few men from Russian-dominated [and] far eastern countries. It was extremely hard to get credible information on those born behind the Iron Curtain.”58 For a while, administration filled the days.

Psychological Warfare Organization. Fort Bragg, NC, 1953.

In contrast to the operational tempo at Fort Riley, 2nd L&L field training at Fort Bragg was slow-going. CPT Blackstock, 1LT Chandler, and 2LT Pazell did additional individual psywar training, but this was not the norm. “Mainly we were just locked into our area,” PFC Edinger remembered.59 According to PFC Laubsted, “I had so little to do that I volunteered to be company driver. I was just plain bored.”60 A several months-long training lull hurt unit morale and readiness.

The company did receive some new equipment, including mobile printing equipment installed in two twenty-seven-feet long, temperature- and humidity-controlled vans. One van with an electric typewriter and varitypes, “pre-digital age” word processors used to produce “neat, camera-ready copy for offset printing,” went to the Propaganda Platoon. The other van had a new stream-fed, offset multi-lithographic Harris LTV 35 x 45 inch press, as well as a camera and plate section to prepare photographic plates for publication.61 PFC Adelmann recalled, “The only problem was that we were so congested in the van that every time we ran out of paper, we had to use a hoist to bring another roll inside.”62

Pressmen Roy R. Elkins, Everett W. Slagle, William J. Bellio, and Michael Garbacz (L to R) operate the new offset multi-lithographic Harris LTV 35 x 45 inch press. The Camera and Plate Sections were located behind the press in the Publication Platoon van.

With little else happening, several junior enlisted soldiers left the 2nd in October-November 1952 to join psywar units and staffs in Europe and the Far East.63 SGT Haus recalled that “most of the men that could not be [security] cleared ultimately wound up in the Far East Command.”64 Other soldiers simply transferred to other Fort Bragg units or were discharged. Although the size of the 2nd L&L fluctuated between 1952 and its 21 February 1955 inactivation, the company remained a tactically ready psywar training asset for Army Field Forces and the Psywar Center.65

The 1952 company yearbook, Psyd-Lites, was the first item produced on Publication Platoon’s new roll-fed, high-speed Harris press.

The 2nd L&L was the first T/O&E Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company activated stateside as part of the U.S. Army effort to rebuild a psywar capability during the Korean War. Unlike its counterparts, the 1st and 5th L&Ls, it did not go overseas. Instead, it stayed in the U.S. to support Army Field Forces. It did three large training maneuvers in 1951-1952 (SOUTHERN PINE at Camp Mackall and Fort Bragg, NC; SNOW FALL at Camp Drum, New York; and LONG HORN at Fort Hood, Texas), exposing conventional Army units to psywar. After leaving Fort Riley in June 1952 and being assigned to the 6th RB&L, the 2nd L&L remained an adept training asset for the Psywar Center until 1955. With an active duty tenure of less than five years, it did valuable, realistic training during a formative period in U.S. Army psywar history.

The author would like to thank the veterans of the 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Mr. Walter Elkins, and Mr. Doug Elwell, for their assistance with this article.

ENDNOTES

“War by Leaflets Stirs Fort Bragg: Psychological Units Also Use Loudspeakers to Woo ‘Foe’ in Test at Maneuvers,” New York Times, 15 November 1953, 47. ^[return]
Department of the Army, “Table of Organization and Equipment 20-77: Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army,” 1 September 1950, Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC. ^[return]
Psychological Warfare School, Special Text 33-25-1: Psychological Warfare Field Operational Units (Fort Bragg, NC: 1953), 3, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC), Carlisle, PA. ^[return]
2nd L&L Company, “Psyd-Lites” (company yearbook), 1952, USAHEC. ^[return]
Robert F. Denault, 2nd L&L, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 5 August 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Morning Reports, 1-18 January 1952 and 1-14 June 1952, 2nd L&L, National Personnel Records Center/National Archives and Records Administration (NPRC/NARA), St. Louis, MO. ^[return]
“T/O&E 20-77.” ^[return]
Joel A. Leavitt, 2nd L&L, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 11 April 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Raymond P. Laubsted interview, 2nd L&L, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 22 March 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Jared M. Tracy, “The Flood at Fort Riley, May-July 1951,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History 10/1 (2015): 41-42; Frank R. Haus, “Recollections of the 2nd L&L Company,” 1, http://members.fortunecity.com/2dlandl/recollections.html(accessed 13 March 2012). ^[return]
Laubsted interview, 22 March 2012. ^[return]
5th L&L, “5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 1951-1952” (company yearbook), no date, Box 365, Record Group 338, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD; “Psyd-Lites”; Headquarters, Fort Riley, “Special Orders #165,” 14 June 1951, NPRC/NARA; 5th L&L, “Walters Named to Korea Psywar,” The Leaflet, 30 November 1951, 4. 1LT Walters was briefly ‘dual-hatted’ as 2nd L&L commander and acting 5th L&L commander.He soon went to the Far East Company for another psywar assignment. ^[return]
Ralph D. Bald, Jr., Air Force Participation in Joint Army-Air Force Training Exercises, 1951-1954 (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, 1957), 1, 3-4. ^[return]
A typical 3,700-man Infantry Regiment at this time had an HHC, three infantry battalions (each with an HHC, three rifle companies, and a heavy weapons company), a heavy mortar company (with a HQ and two heavy mortar platoons), a tank company (with a HQ and four tank platoons), a service company, and a medical company.An Airborne Infantry Regiment generally ‘looked like’ an infantry regiment, but was slightly lighter (roughly 3,400 men).The AIR did not have a heavy mortar or tank company, but rather a single airborne support company with a HQ, two heavy mortar platoons, and an antitank platoon.Finally, a typical Regimental Combat Team had its usual infantry battalions, a 105 mm field artillery battalion, an engineer combat company, sometimes a tank company or anti-aircraft artillery automatic weapons battery, a signal detachment, and other organic elements.Gordon Rottman, Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950-1953 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 18-20. ^[return]
The 28th ID, for one, moved from Camp Atterbury to Fort Bragg between 28 July and 14 August by motor, rail, and air.“Men and vehicles of the 28th became a familiar sight to the residents of Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, South and North Carolina as the long convoys rolled through many cities and towns of those states.Troop trains loaded with men and supplies departed from the rail head at Camp Atterbury almost continually during that period.Movement of the entire Division was completed with no extraordinary incidents or problems occurring.”Moving a division was a massive undertaking.Among the elements of a typical 19,000-man infantry division at the time were a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), three infantry regiments, division artillery, division troops, division special troops, and miscellaneous attachments.28th Infantry Division, Twenty-Eighth Infantry Division, United States Army: Pictorial Review, Europe, 1951-1952 (Atlanta: Albert Love Enterprises, 1952);Rottman, Korean War Order of Battle, 16-18; United States Army, “Directory and Station List of the United States Army,” 2 July 1951, http://cdm16635.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16635coll14/id/50372(accessed 16 July 2015). ^[return]
Associated Press quotation from 14 August 1951 cited in Robert F. Dorr, “Exercise Southern Pine Illustrated Cold War Era Priorities,” http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/exercise-southern-pine-illustrated-cold-war-era-priorities/(accessed 14 July 2015). ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites.” ^[return]
Bald, Air Force Participation in Joint Army-Air Force Training Exercises, 5, 7. ^[return]
2nd L&L, “Listen to Lorelei,” leaflet, no date (ca. July 1951), copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites.” ^[return]
Ralph J. Edinger, 2nd L&L, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 16 March 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Roy D. Adelmann, 2nd L&L, interview by Jared M. Tracy, 16 August 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Dimitri J. Stancioff, 2nd L&L, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 12 June 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Headquarters, Fort Riley, “Special Orders #290,” 17 October 1951, NPRC/NARA; “Psyd-Lites; Army General School, Fort Riley, “Graduation Exercises for Psychological Warfare Noncommissioned Officers’ Class No. 1,” 21 November 1951, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Laubsted interview, 22 March 2012. ^[return]
5th L&L, “McClure Inspects 2nd L&L at Riley,” The Leaflet, 30 November 1951, 4. ^[return]
Laubsted interview, 22 March 2012. ^[return]
Bald, Air Force Participation in Joint Army-Air Force Training Exercises, 26-27, 29. ^[return]
Letter from Roy D. Adelmann to Jared M. Tracy, no date, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Adelmann letter; Adelmann interview, 16 August 2011. ^[return]
Bald, Air Force Participation in Joint Army-Air Force Training Exercises, 29. ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites”; Robert N. Bauer, “Exercise SNOW FALL,” The Brieflet, 19 March 1952, 3. ^[return]
Leavitt interview, 11 April 2012. ^[return]
Paul Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination,” in Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland, eds., Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 17. ^[return]
Bald, Air Force Participation in Joint Army-Air Force Training Exercises, 31. ^[return]
Joel A. Leavitt, “More SNOW…,” The Brieflet, 19 March 1952, 4. ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites.” ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites”; letter from Frank R. Haus, Jr. to Jared M. Tracy, 12 March 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
“Recollections of the 2nd L&L Company,” 1. ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites”; James R. Bunting, “Company Motors to Texas,” The Brieflet, 19 March 1952, 1, 6; Howard R. Clisham, “CO’s Time,” The Brieflet, 19 March 1952, 1. ^[return]
United States Army, “Directory and Station List of the United States Army,” 2 January 1952, http://cdm16635.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16635coll14/id/52977(accessed 16 July 2015). ^[return]
Bald, Air Force Participation in Joint Army-Air Force Training Exercises, 49, 51, and 54. ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites.” ^[return]
Adelmann interview, 16 August 2011. ^[return]
Adelmann letter. ^[return]
Jack L. Thiess, “Psywar Mission for LONG HORN,” The Brieflet, 19 March 1952, 2. ^[return]
Preston D. Holmes, 2nd L&L, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 20 March 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Headquarters, Fifth Army, “General Orders #50: Organization of 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, Fort Riley, Kansas,” 25 April 1952, NPRC/NARA; “Recollections of the 2nd L&L Company,” 2. ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites.” ^[return]
Silver Star award citation for George B. Blackstock, 27 February 1951, http://militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=54139, accessed 10 October 2012. CPT George B. Blackstock commanded from 11 June to 19 November; 1LT Dwayne A. Panzer assumed command on 20 November 1952. ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites.” ^[return]
“Recollections of the 2nd L&L Company,” 3; Office of the Commanding General, Headquarters, Fort Bragg, “SUBJECT: Welcome to Fort Bragg to the Officers and Men of the Psychological Warfare Center,” 10 July 1952, cited in 6th RB&L, The Psyn-Post, 12 September 1952; Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, “A Clearer View of Psywar at Fort Riley & Fort Bragg, 1951-1952,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History 5/4 (2009): 68. ^[return]
Headquarters, Fifth Army, “General Orders #50: Activation of 9th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army, Fort Riley, Kansas,” 25 April 1952, NPRC/NARA. ^[return]
Special Warfare School, Combat Developments Study: Consolidation Psychological Warfare in Support of CA/MG and MP Activities (Fort Bragg, NC: 1958), 1-2. ^[return]
“Recollections of the 2nd L&L Company,” 2. ^[return]
Edinger interview, 16 March 2012. ^[return]
Laubsted interview, 22 March 2012. ^[return]
Edgar L. Feingold, 2nd L&L, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 8 August 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
“Recollections of the 2nd L&L Company,” 2-3. ^[return]
Edinger interview, 16 March 2012. ^[return]
Laubsted interview, 22 March 2012. ^[return]
“Recollections of the 2nd L&L Company,” 3; “The Classical Typewriter Page,” http://staff.xu.edu/polt/typewriters/varityper.html(accessed 7 April 2015). ^[return]
Adelmann interview, 16 August 2011. ^[return]
“Psyd-Lites.” ^[return]
“Recollections of the 2nd L&L Company,” 3. ^[return]
Email from William M. Yarborough to Jared M. Tracy, “SUBJECT: 1st RB&L T/O&E,” 3 February 2015, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]

Voice of the U.S. and Aggressors

The 2nd Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company

ENDNOTES