Wolfpacks and Donkeys: Special Forces Soldiers in the Korean War

A noteworthy aspect of the Korean War was the first combat employment of U.S. Army Special Forces. North Korean partisan units, known as WOLFPACKS and DONKEYS, were advised by Americans as they raided the enemy from islands off both coasts of the Korean Peninsula. Special Forces soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group advised the partisans and conducted unconventional warfare operations on the mainland.

The Korean War (1950-1953) ended in an armistice with the armies of North Korea and Communist China facing the forces of South Korea, the United States and the other countries of the United Nations coalition across the 38th Parallel. The first year of fast-paced, fluid, conventional combat up and down the Korean peninsula was followed by a gradual stalemate as the armies of both sides hardened their defensive positions and jockeyed for the most advantageous terrain. The armistice agreement of 27 July 1953 brought an end to active combat, but did not end the war. Today the 38th Parallel remains the most heavily defended border in the world.

By 1951 the Korean War had reached a stalemate with both sides improving defensive positions in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. The partisan forces occupied the off-shore islands on both coasts.

Unconventional warfare was a feature of combat operations throughout the war, which began when the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) invaded the Republic of Korea in June 1950. The NKPA rapidly overran the south during this first year resulting in a large number of anti-communist North Koreans fleeing their homes in the north and moving into South Korea. A significant percentage of these anti-Communist refugees formed guerrilla bands and fled to the islands off the east and west coasts of Korea near the 38th Parallel. The training and employment of these partisan units became a major part of the U.S. Army unconventional warfare (UW) effort.

The headquarters building for the 8240th Army Unit in Seoul. The 8240th was the Eighth Army unit responsible for the employment of the partisans.

The organization and conduct of unconventional warfare in Korea was complex and involved not only the U.S. Army, but the Navy, Air Force, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Republic of Korea as well as the United Nations, and began to take shape before the war started. Formed after World War II, the United States Far East Command (FEC) was responsible for combat operations in Korea. FEC was a joint headquarters operating from the Dai’ichi Building in Tokyo, Japan.1 General Douglas MacArthur commanded FEC and was “triple-hatted” to serve as the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) and as the commander of the U.S. Army Forces, Far East, (USAFFE). His G-2 (Intelligence), Major General Charles A. Willoughby, formed the Korean Liaison Office (KLO) during the interwar period to collect information about North Korea by inserting agents across the border. In June 1950, the KLO was virtually the only U.S. organization collecting intelligence on Kim Il Sung’s Communist government.2

FEC began to develop an unconventional warfare capability in 1950 to take advantage of the large number of North Korean partisans who had settled on the off-shore islands. This led to the formation of the 8240th Army Unit by the Miscellaneous Group of the Guerrilla Section, G-3, Eighth U.S. Army in late 1950.3 The unit went through a series of name changes; starting as the Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit (AU) on 5 May 1951, and becoming the Far East Command Liaison Detachment Korea (FEC/LD/K), 8240th Army Unit on 10 December 1951.4 After the signing of the armistice, the unit was carried as the 8007th Army Unit and in September, 1953 it became the 8112th Army Unit.5 These changes were made for security reasons. There was no significant alteration in the unit’s mission. The 8240th was the Eighth U.S. Army’s unit responsible for employing the partisans in an unconventional warfare role.

Partisan Units: TASK FORCE KIRKLAND controlled the partisan activities on the east coast. On the west coast, the DONKEY elements of LEOPARD BASE worked generally north of the 38th Parallel and those of WOLFPACK, south of the 38th. LEOPARD BASE was organized first. Both units concentrated their activities in Hwanghae Province on the mainland.

The build-up of the 8240th AU occurred concurrently with a steady increase in unconventional warfare activities conducted by the CIA, the UN Command, the ROK Army, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force. Within HQ FEC was a special staff section called the Documents Research Division headed by a representative of the CIA. The Joint Advisory Commission Korea (JACK) managed the CIA operations in Korea and the deputy commander, Major (MAJ) John K. Singlaub, was a military officer attached to the CIA.6 In an attempt to get a handle on theater unconventional warfare operations and eliminate duplication, HQ FEC had created the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK) under the staff supervision of the G-2.7

Major Jack Singlaub and JACK advisors observe training. From right to left, Major Dutch Kramer, Lieutenant Tom Curtis, Major John Singlaub and Lieutenant George Atcheson.

Directed by Brigadier General Archibald Stuart, whose deputy was from the CIA, CCRAK’s mission was to deconflict the various unconventional warfare operations run by the different commands and organizations in Korea.8 CCRAK was a coordinating headquarters and had no command authority over JACK or the other elements engaged in UW activities. MAJ Singlaub, the Army officer detailed to be the deputy of JACK noted that “JACK had neither the responsibility nor the inclination to coordinate its independent covert activities with CCRAK.”9 Consequently CCRAK only exerted minimal influence by controlling FEC aviation and maritime assets essential to the units conducting UW operations. The number of organizations engaged in unconventional warfare activities required constant coordination by the 8240th. MAJ Richard M. Ripley, commander of the 8240th’s WOLFPACK guerrilla group remembers; “There was a period when people were working on top of each other. I counted 15 or more different U.S. and Allied organizations working in our area.”10 In most cases, the different organizations had missions similar to those of the 8240th.

The mission of the 8240th, as defined in the unit Table of Distribution (TD), was twofold. First; “to develop and direct partisan warfare by training in sabotage indigenous groups and individuals both within Allied lines and behind enemy lines,” and second; “to supply partisan groups and agents operating behind enemy lines by means of water and air transportation.”11 To accomplish these missions, the 8240th established four sections between 1951 and 1952. Three sections controlled guerrilla operations, WOLFPACK, LEOPARD, and TASK FORCE (TF) KIRKLAND. Geography determined the location of these sections. The fourth, BAKER SECTION, provided aerial resupply, airborne training, and inserted agents using C-46s and C-47s. Aviation support for the 8240th was the responsibility of the AVIARY team of BAKER SECTION, located at the ROK Ranger Training School at Kijang near Pusan. BAKER SECTION later moved to the K-16 Airfield outside Seoul.12

Troops of WOLFPACK 8 moving on the beach at Chumen-do to board junks for Kanghwa-do, 1953.

On the west coast, LEOPARD, originally called WILLIAM ABLE BASE, was located on Paengnyŏng-do. Formed in February 1951, it supported roughly 12,000 men organized into 15 units called DONKEYS. The origin of the term “DONKEY” is uncertain. It is sometimes said to be a derivation of the Korean term dong-il (leader). It was adopted soon after Colonel John McGee took command of the 8240th in early 1951 and may have come from a speech McGee gave to the guerrillas telling them to follow the example of the “wise mule” in avoiding confrontations. Wise mule became donkey in translation.13 The LEOPARD area of operations was generally north of the 38th Parallel to the west of the Ongjin Peninsula, reaching as far north as Taehwa-do at the mouth of the Yalu River on the Chinese border.14 Eight DONKEYS were located on Cho-do and the remaining seven on other islands. LEOPARD was organized a year before WOLFPACK.

TASK FORCE KIRKLAND operated on the east coast of Korea, primarily against the North Korean port city of Wonsan. TF KIRKLAND inserted agents that collected intelligence and target information in the area.

Established in January 1952, WOLFPACK was composed of eight units initially totaling 3,800 partisans.15 The units were called WOLFPACK 1 thru 8. They occupied various islands south of the 38th Parallel on the west coast. WOLFPACK headquarters was on the large island of Kangwha-do due west of Seoul, with the units on adjacent islands. WOLFPACK conducted operations behind enemy lines in the southern portion of the Ongjin Peninsula northwest of Seoul.16 Major Richard M. Ripley commanded WOLFPACK in the spring of 1952. “Our mission was to harass and interdict the rear areas. We conducted raids and ambushes and laid mines along the MSRs [Main Supply Routes].”17 By late 1952, the LEOPARD unit reported a strength of 5,500 partisans and WOLFPACK, 6,800.18 A compilation of the two unit operational reports for the week of 15-21 November 1952 recorded 63 raids and 25 patrols against the North Korean coast resulting in an estimated 1,382 enemy casualties.19 By official policy, Americans were prohibited from accompanying the partisans on their missions. Thus the numbers associated with enemy casualties were inaccurate. The robust partisan forces on the west coast were difficult to control and supply. This later resulted in the 8240th initiating an organizational change. Partisan operations on the east coast were the responsibility of TF KIRKLAND.

TF KIRKLAND was the smallest of the three partisan commands, comprising five units and 6,000 troops. Based on the mainland 40 miles south of the 38th Parallel in the eastern coastal village of Chumunjin was the TF KIRKLAND headquarters and the sub-unit called AVANLEE. Twenty miles up the coast to the north in the village of Sokcho-ri were two other elements, STORM and TORCHLIGHT. Further north on the island of Nan-do was the TF Forward Command Post with partisan forces on some of the surrounding islands.20 TF KIRKLAND conducted amphibious insertions of agents and raids along the east coast between the 38th Parallel and the North Korean port city of Wonsan.21

Initially, Eighth Army manned the 8240th with U.S. Army volunteers from within the theater. Colonel John McGee, the original head of the Miscellaneous Group was the first commander of the 8240th in Taegu. He industriously recruited veterans to serve as advisors to the partisans on the islands. When the five numbered Ranger companies and the Eighth U.S. Army Rangers were disbanded on 1 August 1951, the men were distributed among the American infantry divisions and the 8240th.22 First Lieutenant (1LT) Joseph Ulatoski, the former Executive Officer of the 5th Ranger Company, joined the 8240th and was assigned to TF KIRKLAND.

“I’d just been released from the Swedish Red Cross hospital and my friend Phil Lewis from the 7th Ranger Company signed me up for the 8086th [later the 8240th]. After a month as assistant G-2, I was sent up to Sokcho-ri and then out to one of the islands.”23 The island, Song-do, near the TF KIRKLAND forward base on Nan-do, lay 700 yards off the mainland. Arriving on a motorized sampan, Ulatoski found a tent city and three different groups of partisans on the island.

“We had no real briefing or training to prepare for this. It was one hundred per cent ‘fly by the seat of your pants.’ There were three groups on the island including the East Coast Patriotic Volunteers, under a Major Han. I had a corporal, Cyril Tritz from the 4th Ranger Company, with me and we began to collect intelligence as well as gather food, weapons and communications gear.”24 Located so close to the mainland, the island was not immune to North Korean attacks.

“We got hit a couple of times, just probes, no major attacks. The partisans were not the most observant group of people and during the raids we Americans took up a position away from the action to avoid getting shot up by either side.”25 1LT Ulatoski served on the islands for ten months, during which time he noted “there was no command and control capability with the partisans. These North Koreans were strangers to the area and there was no vetting of them. Still, we managed to keep up the insertions of the five or six-man teams. We were able to supply the Navy with [gunfire] targets, probably our best contribution.”26 The experience of 1LT Ulatoski with TASK FORCE KIRKLAND mirrored that of other officers serving with WOLFPACK and LEOPARD on the west coast.

In 1953, the 8240th reformed the various partisan elements into the United Nations Partisan Forces in Korea (UNPFK), using cadre from WOLFPACK and LEOPARD.27 Five infantry regiments and one airborne infantry regiment were organized on the west coast. TF KIRKLAND remained unchanged. The regiments retained the original Korean leadership, but with American officers advising at the regimental level and below and serving as the UNPFK staff. It was during this period that the action to bring Special Forces soldiers to Korea was initiated.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the Chief of Psychological Warfare, was responsible for the conduct of Psychological Operations in the Army. He had been closely monitoring the unconventional warfare operations in Korea since the beginning of the war. He was dissatisfied with the conduct of the partisan operations, calling them “minor in consequence and sporadic in nature.”28 Within his office McClure created the Special Operations Division staffed with veterans of World War II unconventional operations like COL Aaron Bank of the OSS, COL Melvin R. Blair of Merrill’s Marauders, and COL Wendell Fertig and LTC Russell W. Volckmann, both of whom led guerrilla forces behind the lines in the Philippines. After nearly a year of staff work, the Army approved the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that included the Special Forces Department, to instruct the new Special Forces soldiers. Shortly after this move the 10th Special Forces Group was stood up under COL Bank in June 1952. McClure encouraged the Far East Command to request Special Forces troops in November 1952 and again in January 1953.29 FEC finally requested fifty-five officers and nine enlisted men from the 10th Special Forces Group be levied for Korea in early 1953. Ultimately, 99 Special Forces volunteers, 77 officers and 22 enlisted men, were sent from Fort Bragg between February and September, 1953.30

10th SFG soldiers in Japan with their United Nations counterparts, 1LT Brian Passey, 1LT Murl Tullis, 1LT Reuben Mooradian, CPT Bliss Croft, 1LT Charlie Norton, Captain John Sullivan Australian Army, Lieutenant Johnston Australian Army 1LT Mike Layton, Lieutenant George, British Army. Photo taken at Camp Ebisu, Japan, Spring 1954. — 10th SFG soldiers in Japan with their United Nations counterparts, (L to R) 1LT Brian Passey, 1LT Murl Tullis, 1LT Reuben Mooradian, CPT Bliss Croft, 1LT Charlie Norton (in Australian hat), Captain John Sullivan Australian Army, Lieutenant Johnston Australian Army (in U.S. Overseas cap) 1LT Mike Layton, Lieutenant George, British Army. Photo taken at Camp Ebisu, Japan, Spring 1954.

Recruitment and training were the top priorities in the early days of the 10th SFG. In the first year the number of new recruits exceeded the capacity of the Special Forces Department of the Psychological Warfare Center to teach them. With the classes full, many of the new Special Forces soldiers got their training in the 10th Special Forces Group.31 Five separate groups of SF-qualified personnel were levied for assignment to Korea while the 10th SFG deployed to Bad Tolz, Germany in September 1953. Those SF officers and NCOs (slightly less than half the SF contingent) left behind at Fort Bragg became the cadre of the new 77th SFG.

After graduating from Class #2 of the Special Forces Qualification Course, newly promoted 1LT Charles W. Norton took leave before reporting to Camp Stoneman, California for his assignment to Korea. Along with the other members of the fourth shipment of Special Forces soldiers from Fort Bragg, Norton flew by Air Force C-54 aircraft to Camp Drake, Japan, where they received additional schooling before deploying to Korea.

“We were put in the Far East Intelligence School. The three-week course covered maritime operations, raids, ambushes, demo and put a lot of emphasis on the Korean tides and their effect on operations.”32 Not everyone in the class was Special Forces. Norton recalled, “There were Military Intelligence guys in the class who were going to run agents into North Korea. We had maybe thirty guys in the class.”33 1LT Rueben Mooradian’s impression of the preparatory class was of “two ridiculous weeks of intelligence training and a mission planning exercise to capture a North Korean general.”34 After the class, the Special Forces soldiers were sent to the 8240th headquarters in Seoul where they received their assignments.

The supply building of the 2nd Partisan Infantry Regiment on Kangwha-do. The rugged terrain of the island and the snow of the Korean winter are evident in this photo from late 1953.

Some of the partisans were accompanied by their families when they occupied the islands. Young children are present in this photo of a detail loading rice bags on Kangwha-do.

1LT Norton was assigned to the 2nd Partisan Infantry Regiment (2nd PIR) on Kanghwa-do (on the west coast) to serve under LTC Paul Sapieha. “My first job was as the S-3 [operations officer], which I held for about six weeks. [2LT] Joe Johnson came out with me. He was the S-4 [supply officer]. His job was to keep track of rice.”35 Rice and salt were the two principal commodities for supplying the partisans. Stored under guard, rice replaced money as payment to the guerrillas. The 2nd PIR had three battalions; the 3rd battalion functioned as a training unit for new recruits. They received marksmanship and demolitions training. After his brief stint as Regimental S-3, Norton was assigned to WOLFPACK 1, across the island.

1LT Murl Tullis and 1LT Mike Layton, were members of 10th Special Forces Group advising the 2nd Partisan Infantry.

By then, the late spring and summer of 1953, the armistice talks were nearly completed. The ranks of the original North Korean partisans, some of whom had been on the islands since 1950, had been greatly thinned by losses. Many of the replacements were South Korean. “The leadership was still people who came out of the north,” noted Norton, “but the replacements were made up of guys from Seoul and Inchon who were dodging the ROK Army [draft]. The partisans were a lot better deal.”36 MAJ Richard Ripley of WOLFPACK recalled that, “things were locked in as far as the war went. The guerrillas knew the country was going to be divided in the end, so it was tough to ask them to sacrifice too much.”37 Still, raids on the mainland continued right up to the signing of the Armistice on 27 July 1953.

“When we got there in the Spring of 1953, there wasn’t much of the war left,” noted 1LT Norton. “The Koreans could sense it was winding down. Still, we continued to run operations against the mainland. Usually about 90 partisans would go. This number was dictated by the number that could fit on a fishing [sailing] junk. Usually 30 per junk and 1 motor junk could pull three fishing junks. We gave the fisherman rice to use their junks.”38 The raids were against the North Korean Army, the Border Constabulary units, and the Chinese Communist Forces guarding the coast. The experiences of 1LT Norton were typical of those who served with the PIRs.

Motorized fishing trawler, “LB-24.” The motorized vessels were used to tow sailing junks on missions to the mainland.

Two sailing junks at Chumen-do. A motorized junk could tow three of the sailing junks, each carrying up to 30 partisans. The junks were “volunteered” by the local fisherman who were paid in rice.

In the five levies of Special Forces personnel, those who came in the final two shipments experienced the war’s drawdown. Those in the first three groups dealt with a faster operational tempo and a greater threat from the Communist forces. However, two Special Forces soldiers were killed during operations in 1953. Second Lieutenant (2LT) Joseph M. Castro was killed in a daylight operation with WOLFPACK 8 when he was shot in the head crossing a rice paddy dike on the mainland. 1LT Douglas W. Payne was killed at night when his island was attacked by North Korean forces. They were the first two Special Forces troops to die in combat. Not all the Special Forces soldiers that went to Korea were assigned to the 8240th. The insertion of agents into enemy territory was another unconventional warfare mission for the Special Forces.

2LT Earl L. Thieme was part of the third group of 10th SFG soldiers levied for Korea in March 1953. Trained in the 10th SFG, Thieme recalls that “there was very little done to prepare to go. No special training, no advance briefings. Once we were on orders, we got some leave and reported to Camp Stoneman.”39 When he arrived at Camp Drake, Japan, Thieme found that he was being assigned to the 8007th Army Unit Recovery Command. Their mission was to gather information on POW camps where Americans might be held in North Korea. Four other Special Forces soldiers, CPT Francis W. Dawson, 1LT Warren E. Parker, 1LT Sam C. Sarkesian and 1LT Leo Siefert also served along with Thieme in the 8007th. “The FECOM G-2 gave us the mission, told us it was Top Secret and to get over there ASAP.”40 Arriving in Seoul at the 8007th headquarters, the men got their assignments. The 8007th conducted agent insertions on both coasts, separately from the missions conducted by the 8240th.

10th Special forces Group Officers assigned to the 8007th Army Unit at Camp Drake, Japan. From left to right, 1LT Sam C. Sarkesian, 1LT Warren E. Parker, CPT Francis W. Dawson, 2LT Earl L. Thieme and 1LT Leo F. Siefert.

Cho-do was the island used by 1LT Sam Sarkesian for inserting agents onto the North Korean mainland. Other 8007th personnel operated on the east coast from Yo-do and out of Sokcho-ri.

1LT Sam Sarkesian was to command the 8007 AU Recovery Command Team #1. He was sent to Cho-do on the west coast with a sergeant and two other enlisted men.41 His mission was two-fold: to establish escape and evasion nets for downed U.S. and UN pilots, and to gather intelligence. This was accomplished by inserting Korean agents on the mainland. They were to return to a pre-arranged pick-up point after a set number of days. There the collected intelligence would be exchanged. Most of the agents Sarkesian inserted failed to show up at the rendezvous point for extraction.42

With the signing of the Armistice, Sarkesian moved his operation from Cho-do south to Paengnyŏng-do and continued to insert agents until he left Korea in March, 1954. “We learned a lot of lessons, but we did not accomplish very much. Unfortunately, the lessons learned were not put into any official documents. We expended a lot of energy for little result. I wish we had better briefings and training before we went. There was a total lack of coordination.”43 Similar missions were run on the east coast by other detachments of the 8007th.

1LT Warren Parker commanded a detachment on the east coast at Sokcho-ri. He coordinated for the Navy to escort his motorized junks during insertion and extraction operations.44 The detachments on the islands did not do agent training. The agents only appeared on the islands prior to their insertion. The 8007th did provide some of the support to the agents before they left on their mission. 1LT Earl Thieme recalls going back to Tokyo on occasion to collect watches and gold for use by the agents as items of barter.45 Thieme remained with the 8007th through two unit name changes, from the 8007th to the 8112th on 24 September 1953 and finally to 8157th on 5 January 1955.46 The airborne insertion of agents ceased with the Armistice though the ground and sea insertion of agents continued until 1955.

Range firing, Chumen-do in the Fall of 1953.

The signing of the Armistice did not end the mission for advisors to the Partisan Infantry Regiments. With the cessation of hostilities, the South Korean government was faced with the dilemma of dealing with the well-armed and trained partisan units that were not part of the ROK Army. The South Korean solution was to incorporate the units into their military, but it took time to accomplish. 1LT Charles Norton recalls, “The transition was a very messy thing. The ROKs needed to get control, but it took from July 1953 to April 1954 to process the partisans for the transition. They did not replace the U.S. forces [advisors] so we stayed with the partisans, keeping them supplied and trained until the spring of 1954.”47 Some of the partisan leadership were commissioned as officers in the ROK Army, a move which helped maintain command and control over the units.

1LT Reuben Mooradian, 10th Special Forces Group. In 1953 the men of the 10th Special forces Group were the first Special Forces soldiers deployed to combat. — 1LT Reuben Mooradian

1LT Rueben Mooradian had to move off Yo-do with his partisan element at the signing of the Armistice, as that was one of the islands returned to North Korea. He relocated south to Yuk-do where he assisted with the training of the 1st PIR until he returned to the 77th SFG at Fort Bragg in July 1954.48 Ultimately, the partisan units were removed from the coastal islands and replaced with ROK Marine and Army units. 1LT Charles Norton’s WOLFPACK 1, numbering some 500 partisans, and the 700-man WOLFPACK 2 were shipped to Cheju-do, the primary receiving and processing point for transitioning the partisans into the ROK Army.49

The Korean War provided the setting for the first employment of Special Forces soldiers as unconventional warfare specialists. All the SF soldiers were employed as individuals. No Operational Detachments were sent to Korea during the war. “There was never any plan to run 12-man teams,” recalls 1LT Norton. “We could have effectively employed one ODA per regiment, but the teams were all back at Fort Bragg or enroute to Germany.”50 The arrival of the Special Forces advisors in the last months of the war makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the Special Forces training programs. What the war demonstrated was that the mission of advisor and trainer of the partisan forces was a necessary unconventional warfare skill and validated the concept of Special Forces. Those same skills are the cornerstone of the Special Forces’ Foreign Internal Defense and Counter-Insurgency missions today.

ENDNOTES

James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992), 46-48. ^[return]
Steven F. Kuni and Kenneth Finlayson, “Catch as Catch Can: Special Forces and Line Crossers in the Korean War,” Veritas Vol. 2, No. 2, 26-32. ^[return]
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “The 8240th Army Unit: Unconventional Warfare in the Korean Conflict” Special Forces: The First Fifty Years, (Tampa, FL: Faircount, LLC, 2002) 84-91. ^[return]
Paddock, “The 8240th Army Unit”, 90. (For the purpose of clarity, the various permutations of the unit name will be referred to collectively as the 8240th AU unless otherwise noted). ^[return]
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 104-112. ^[return]
Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, “Soldier-Sailors in Korea: JACK Maritime Operations,” Veritas, Vol 2, No. 2, 12-25: Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, 106. ^[return]
This was sometimes referred to as Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities, Korea. ^[return]
Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, 110. ^[return]
John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century, (New York: Summit Books, 1991), 181. ^[return]
Colonel (retired) Richard M. Ripley, 8240th AU, interview by Dr. Kenneth Finlayson, 14 August 2007, Raleigh, NC, written notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army Korea, Table of Distribution No 80-8086, Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit, undated, Record Group 319, National Archives, in Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, 104. ^[return]
Colonel (retired) Douglas C. Dillard, Operation AVIARY: Airborne Special Operations –Korea, 1950-1953, (Victoria, BC, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2003), 12. ^[return]
Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington, D.C., Batsford Brassey, Inc, 1999), 56. ^[return]
Dillard, Operation AVIARY: Airborne Special Operations –Korea, 1950-1953, ii. Figures are based on the disposition of partisan units in June of 1952. “Do” is the Korean word for island, hence Cho-do means Cho Island. ^[return]
Ripley interview. ^[return]
HQ, United States Army Forces, Far East, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-64, UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954, dated 19 September 1956, Army War College, copy in the USASOC History Office Classified Files, 31. ^[return]
Ripley interview. ^[return]
HQ, United States Army Forces, Far East, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-64, UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954, 69. ^[return]
HQ, United States Army Forces, Far East, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-64, UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954, 69. ^[return]
Dillard, Aviary, ii. TF KIRKLAND also underwent a name change to TF SCANNON later in the war. ^[return]
Dillard, Aviary, ii. ^[return]
Gordon L. Rottman, Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950-1953 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 16. ^[return]
Brigadier General (retired) Joseph Ulatoski, 8086th Army Unit, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 14 October 2003, Seattle, WA, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Ulatoski interview. ^[return]
Ulatoski interview. ^[return]
Ulatoski interview. ^[return]
Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, 106. United Nations Partisan Forces Korea was another organization prone to name changes. It is often referred to as the United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea (UNPIK). ^[return]
Paddock, The 8240th Army Unit, 85. ^[return]
Paddock, The 8240th Army Unit, 85. ^[return]
A comprehensive list of the 10th Special Forces Group personnel who deployed to Germany and Korea in 1953 compiled from the original orders is contained in Special Forces: The First Fifty Years, (Tampa FL: Faircount LLC, 2002), 94-101. ^[return]
Major (retired) Earl L. Thieme, 8007th Army Unit, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 6 February 2006, Fayetteville, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Colonel (retired) Charles W. Norton, 8240th Army Unit, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 9 April 2004, MacLean, VA, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Norton interview. ^[return]
Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Rueben L. Mooradian, 8240th Army Unit, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 21 November 2005, Fayetteville, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Norton interview. ^[return]
Norton interview. ^[return]
Ripley interview. ^[return]
Norton interview. ^[return]
Thieme interview, 6 February 2006. ^[return]
Thieme interview, 6 February 2006. ^[return]
Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Sam C. Sarkesian, 8007/8112th AU, interview by Dr. Richard Kiper, 8 October 2003, Lake Zurich, IL, transcribed notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. In Sarkesian’s recollection there was no Team #2. ^[return]
Sarkesian interview. ^[return]
Sarkesian interview. ^[return]
Major (retired) Earl L. Thieme, 8007th Army Unit, interview by Dr. Richard Kiper, 11 August 2003, Fayetteville, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Thieme interview, 11 August 2003. ^[return]
Thieme interview, 11 August 2003. ^[return]
Norton interview. ^[return]
Mooradian interview. ^[return]
Norton interview. ^[return]
Norton interview. ^[return]