War in the Land of the Morning Calm

GENERAL ARSOF HISTORY

War in the Land of the Morning Calm

The Korean War

By Robert P. Wettemann

From Veritas, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010

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United Nations

Containment

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In the predawn hours of 25 June 1950, more than 100,000 North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th Parallel to invade South Korea. The move by the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), a force possessing tacit and material support from the Soviet Union and combat experience gained during the 1940s Communist takeover of China, instantly turned the Cold War hot. The immediate cause of the 1950 North Korean invasion can be linked to the closing days of WWII, as two emerging superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, struggled to exert their influence over the Far East. The long-term causes of the Korean War, however, have much deeper roots, and are a product of centuries of interaction between Korea and its neighbors – China, Japan and Russia.

A Land of Contrast

A small but beautiful country, Korea occupies a peninsula separating the Sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea, only twenty-five miles northwest of Japan across the Tsushima Straits. Its northern border with China is the Yalu (Anmok) River, and with the former Soviet Union, the Tuman (Tumen) River. About the size of Utah, Korea shares the same approximate latitude as San Francisco, CA, Wichita, KS, and Philadelphia, PA, but has a much more varied climate. Summers are generally hot and humid, with average July temperatures of 80° F (27° C). Winters are long and bitterly cold, with temperatures in January averaging 17° F (-8° C). Icy winds sweeping down from Manchuria make it feel much colder. The monsoon season, which lasts from late June through mid-August, turns normally dusty lowlands into seas of mobility-hampering mud.1

The Korean War stalled at the Panmunjom Peace Talks. Beginning in June 1951, representatives from North and South Korea haggled over POWS and territorial concessions before signing an armistice in July 1953.
The Korean War stalled at the Panmunjom Peace Talks. Beginning in June 1951, representatives from North and South Korea haggled over POWS and territorial concessions before signing an armistice in July 1953.

Korea is between 90 and 200 miles wide, and between 525 and 600 miles in length, with a 5,400 mile-long coastline. Over seventy-five percent of the country is mountainous. Most of these mountains are in the northern Nangnim and Hamgyong sanmaeks (ranges). The tallest peak, Paektu-San [9,003 feet (2,744 meters)], sits astride the border with China. The Yalu and Tuman Rivers flow north of the northern mountains towards the west and east respectively. In the south, the T’aebaek (“Spine of Korea”) sanmaek dominates the eastern side of the peninsula, and is bisected by the Sobaek sanmaek running northeast to southwest. To the northwest, the watershed slopes towards the coast, and the Han River flows northeast through Seoul. These southern ranges also define the Nakdong River basin, which generally flows through agricultural plains found throughout the south and southeast. The western coast of the Korean peninsula has numerous offshore islands, as well as many natural harbors and waterways. The west coast tides, particularly at Inch’on, vary as much as thirty-two feet and greatly complicate coastal navigation and maritime commerce. In contrast, mountains that reach the very edge of the eastern coast emphasize the importance of ports like Hungnam, Wonsan and Pusan.2

Differences between North and South Korea extend beyond geography. There are stark contrasts in regards to resources, industry and agriculture. For much of their history, North and South Korea complemented each other and trade was active. By the end of WWII, the Japanese had concentrated most industry in the north, where hydroelectric dams and power facilities enabled the exploitation of gold, iron, tungsten, copper and graphite deposits. Mineral wealth was absent in the south. There, the population was chiefly agrarian. Rice, wheat, millet, corn, and soybeans were cultivated using centuries-old methods in the “breadbasket” region.3

Modern transportation was key to developing the Korean peninsula but the terrain posed a serious challenge. One major rail line, built by the Japanese in 1906, ran north from Sinuiju on the Yalu River, southward through P’yongyang, and eventually to Seoul. A second line joined at Seoul, linking the capital with Pusan on the southern coast. Feeder lines connected Seoul and P’yongyang to other regional centers. A branch to the South Manchuria Railway at Sinuiju linked Korea to Asia and the rest of Europe. During WWII, rail traffic supported the external needs of Japan and trade within Korea was nonexistent. After the war, this aging system deteriorated further due to a lack of resources and attention. A sparse road network followed the rail line routes. These narrow, gravel roads with sharp curves and light-duty bridges could not support heavy vehicles, further reducing interregional traffic.4

Korea and its Neighbors: Ancient to Modern

Discord between Korea and its neighbors, dating back thousands of years, is part of the region’s rich history and politics. Korea’s close proximity to Japan, and shared borders with China and Russia (later the Soviet Union) made it vulnerable to all three nations. Each left its imprint upon Korea, and all three, coupled with the post-WWII presence of the United States, were linked to the outbreak of war between a divided Korea.

Korea and its neighbors share a legacy of warfare and cultural exchange that, coupled with the arrival of the United States after WWII, shaped the history of modern North and South Korea.
Korea and its neighbors share a legacy of warfare and cultural exchange that, coupled with the arrival of the United States after WWII, shaped the history of modern North and South Korea.

Ancient Korea was originally comprised of numerous walled town-states. By the third century AD, three kingdoms dominated Korea: Paekche surrounding present-day Seoul, Koguryŏ in the north, and Silla in the central part of the peninsula. An alliance with China’s Tang Dynasty allowed Silla to unify the peninsula by 668 and introduce Confucianism and Buddhism to Korea. Under Chinese patrimony, the Silla Dynasty exercised autonomous control for three centuries until its replacement by the Koryŏ Dynasty in 918. Under consistent leadership of the Koryŏ (918-1392) and Chosŏn (1392-1910) dynasties, the consolidated Koreas flourished culturally, repelling attacks from the Khitans (920s), Mongols (1230-1270), Japanese (1592-1598) and Manchus (1620-1630).5

Theodore Roosevelt, with peace envoys from Russia and Japan at the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905.
Theodore Roosevelt, (center) with peace envoys from Russia and Japan at the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905.

China allowed Korea to manage its domestic concerns, but controlled all foreign affairs. With China’s gradual decline in the mid-19th century, other nations sought access to trade with Korea. The United States, Great Britain, and Russia secured trade treaties in the 1880’s, but Japan remained the greatest threat to Korean autonomy, because it hoped to dominate the entire Yellow Sea region.6 The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), effectively demonstrating Japanese martial improvements made since the Meiji Restoration, ended China’s dominion over Korea. The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) granted Korea total independence from China, but opened the way for Japan to gain control.7

Czarist Russia challenged Japanese hegemony in Asia. When Chinese nationalists failed to end western influence during the Boxer Rebellion (1900), Russia moved troops into Manchuria and occupied northern portions of the Korean peninsula. Japan and Russia later agreed to jointly occupy Korea, dividing it along the 38th Parallel. The two unsuccessful invasions of Japan launched from Korea by Kublai Khan in 1274 and 1281, caused the Japanese to regard the peninsula as a “dagger pointed at the heart” of their country. Japan and Russia subsequently came to blows over the joint occupation of Korea in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).8 Unable to achieve a decisive land victory at Mukden, the Imperial Japanese Navy delivered a deathblow to the Russian fleet at Tsushima. The Treaty of Portsmouth, brokered by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, forced Russia to abandon Korea and recognize that the entire peninsula lay within a growing Japanese “sphere of influence.”9

In 1919, Korean protestors in the “March First Movement” opposed the Japanese occupation, marching peacefully after reading their own Declaration of Independence. The Japanese violently suppressed this display of Korean nationalism.
In 1919, Korean protestors in the “March First Movement” opposed the Japanese occupation, marching peacefully after reading their own Declaration of Independence. The Japanese violently suppressed this display of Korean nationalism.
Born Kim Sŏng-ju, Kim Il Sung led the Communist movement in Korea from 1946 until his death in 1994.
Kim Il Sung

Korea became Tokyo’s colony for the next forty years. On 1 March 1919, American-educated Syngman Rhee and other Korean leaders led thousands of their fellow countrymen in peaceful demonstrations against the Japanese. The marchers read a proposed declaration of independence and carried a prohibited Korean flag. Outraged by the overt display of Korean nationalism, Japanese authorities cracked down unmercifully. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans fled the country or joined underground revolutionary movements. Between 1921 and 1937, Korean expatriates tried to secure foreign support for national independence. In the United States, the future South Korean President Rhee advocated democracy. Others like Kim Song-Ju (later Kim Il Sung) briefly led guerrilla groups against the Japanese in northern Korea before joining with Communists in China, who were supported by the Soviets during WWII.10

World War II and its Aftermath

Japan incorporated Korea into its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” during WWII. Although the Korean population grew from twenty million to twenty-five million between 1930 and 1944, they suffered terribly during the war. Koreans faced Allied bombings, conscription into the Imperial Japanese Army, or work as forced laborers, as well as economic hardship and psychological strain at the hands of the Japanese. Korea’s natural resources, particularly its timber, supplied the Japanese war machine for almost twenty years.11

Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta, February 1945.
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta, February 1945.
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, President Harry S. Truman, and Premier Joseph Stalin at Potsdam, July 1945.
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, President Harry S. Truman, and Premier Joseph Stalin at Potsdam, July 1945.

During WWII, the “Big Three” – U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston L. Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin – met repeatedly. Korean independence was a regular topic, as was an international organization that possessed the power to maintain peace in the postwar world. Although plans were underway for a United Nations by early 1944, Allied leadership reached no decisions regarding Korea prior to President Roosevelt’s death in April 1945. At Yalta in February 1945, Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan three months after the Allies defeated Nazi Germany. Two new western leaders (President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Clement Atlee) joined Stalin at Potsdam in July 1945, but international cooperation was already unraveling.12

On 8 August 1945, two days after the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Soviet troops attacked Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea to gain increased political leverage in Asia. Despite the Soviets’ delayed entry into the Pacific War, President Truman offered to share the occupation of Korea, dividing the country along the 38th Parallel. When Allied foreign ministers met in Moscow six months after implementing this plan, they agreed that Korea would be reunited after a five-year UN trusteeship.13 Although both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the idea of a unified and independent Korea, numerous obstacles became apparent in the wake of the complicated post-war economic reconstruction and attempted social and political reconciliation.14

After the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1944, General Douglas A. MacArthur became Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), overseeing the creation of a democratic Japan for the next six years.15 In the southern half of Korea, Lieutenant General (LTG) John R. Hodge, XXIV Corps commander, directed the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), following orders from Washington to carry out a Korean reconstruction program.16

From the outset, the U.S. Department of State desired a democratic South Korea while the Soviets organized a Communist government in North Korea. Meanwhile, the recently organized nine-member United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) announced countrywide elections of a National Assembly in Korea, a preliminary step towards unification. Soviet officials countered by announcing that UNTCOK would not be permitted to visit North Korea in early January 1948.17

Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas A. MacArthur greets South Korean President Syngman Rhee upon his first visit to Korea in August, 1944.
Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas A. MacArthur greets South Korean President Syngman Rhee upon his first visit to Korea in August, 1944.

Highlighting the ideological clash between the superpowers, democratically-minded Koreans competed with the Communists for control of the country. The result was two Korean governments, one north and one south, both seeking dominion over the entire peninsula. In May 1948 elections observed by UNTCOK, South Koreans voted in a two-hundred-member National Assembly chaired by Syngman Rhee. This Assembly adopted a constitution to institute a Republic of South Korea, and elected Rhee president. At this point, LTG Hodge announced the end of the U.S. occupation and initiated troop withdrawals. President Rhee soon stated his desire to reunify the peninsula under one flag.18 In July 1948, Communist supporters of Kim Il Sung formed the North Korean People’s Council and drafted a resolution calling for the formation of the Supreme People’s Assembly of Korea. Convened in August, this Communist-supported body adopted its own constitution and selected Kim Il Sung to be the Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.19 Neither Korean leader was satisfied. Local violence erupted, but the U.S. continued its unilateral military withdrawal from the peninsula as Washington’s focus shifted to Europe.

An anti-Communist demonstration in South Korea, July 1948.
An anti-Communist demonstration in South Korea, July 1948.

A Simmering Cauldron

The United States repeatedly demonstrated its resolve to limit Communist influence in Europe with the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and response to the Soviet blockade of Berlin. American commitment to the Far East seemed to be diminishing except for the occupation of Japan. During WWII, the United States supported Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese, despite General Joseph W. “Vinegar Joe” Stillwell’s belief that the Nationalists were more interested in fighting Mao Zedong and his Communists than they were the Japanese. Concurrent with the U.S. occupation of Korea, Washington provided more than three billion dollars in aid to Chiang Kai-shek, now totally focused on his Communist rivals. North Korean army units supported the Chinese Communist forces, in the process gaining valuable combat experience against the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT). By 1949, Chiang and his Nationalists were fighting a losing battle.20

In December 1949 the defeated KMT fled to Formosa (Taiwan), and Mao established the People’s Republic of China. Two months later, Mao and Stalin signed a Sino-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance, establishing what appeared to be a monolithic Communist bloc that, in American eyes, would promulgate Communism worldwide. The Cold War now divided Asia into two camps, one aligned with the Soviet Union, the other with the United States, a political reality best demonstrated on the Korean peninsula.21 When China fell to the Communists, it appeared that democracy was losing the Cold War in the Far East.

To add to a growing sense of power loss, the United States’ atomic energy monopoly gained during WWII soon ended. In late 1949, atmospheric readings revealed that the Soviets had detonated a nuclear weapon. The fall of China, coupled with Russia’s acquisition of the bomb caused the United States’ government to rethink its global strategic commitments, and strengthen its atrophied conventional forces.22

KMAG SSI
KMAG SSI

In a January 1950 speech before the National Press Club in Washington, DC, Secretary of State Dean Acheson implied that South Korea lay outside the American “defensive perimeter,” a sweeping Pacific ring that included Alaska, the Ryukyu Islands, Japan, and the Philippines.23 Given the rise of Communist China on the Asian mainland, the necessity for a significant United States military presence in the Pacific appeared reasonable. At the time of Acheson’s speech, however, only the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG), a 241-man element attached to the U.S. Embassy and tasked with training, logistical support and advising the young Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), remained on the peninsula. Aside from this small force, the principal U.S. contingent in Asia, the Eighth Army (EUSA) remained in Japan in an understrength post-war organization (See Troy J. Sacquety, 25 July 1950: Three Combat Forces).24

Anticipating a U.S. strategic realignment, the National Security Council (NSC) took steps to overcome the post-WWII deterioration of American military power. NSC Memorandum 68 (NSC-68) called for a massive increase in conventional military assets. While NSC-68 did not specifically address South Korea, the document made it clear that the containment of Communism dominated American foreign policy.25

Korea Boils Over

Communist forces prepared to test the American policy of containment before NSC-68 affected the status quo in the Far East. While critics cited Secretary Acheson’s January 1950 speech as encouragement for Kim Il Sung to launch an attack, the North had invasion plans in place well before June 1950. Kim Il Sung met repeatedly with Stalin, who had furnished Soviet military aid to the NKPA as early as November 1949. On Sunday, 25 June 1950, thirty minutes of preparatory artillery fire broke the pre-dawn stillness, paving the way for the North Korean invasion south.26 The NKPA targeted ROKA troop concentrations that protected road or secondary rail junctions at Ongjin, Yonan, Kaesong, Tongduch’on-ni, and P’ach’on (north of Seoul), Ch’uch’on (in central Korea), and Kangnung (along the eastern coast). NKPA infantry and armor shocked ROKA troops and their KMAG advisors, who had discounted reports dating as early as 12 June that the NKPA was massing troops along the border.27

The attack caught the United States and most of the world totally unaware. As the Communist forces drove southward, the United Nations (at the urging of the U.S. government) responded. In the absence of the Soviet Ambassador, the Security Council passed a resolution authorizing member states to “repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the region.” To halt the North Korean advance General MacArthur, now Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), ordered elements of the 24th Infantry Division into South Korea. Task Force SMITH, named for Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Charles B. Smith and comprised of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment and augmented by a section of 75 mm Recoilless Rifles (two guns), two heavy mortar platoons from the regiment, and a battery of artillery (52nd Field Artillery Battalion), was ferried across the Tsushima Strait to delay the Communists at Osan.28

Lacking an effective command and control network and logistical support, unable to communicate with ROKA forces, and with no way to coordinate air support, Task Force SMITH was little more than a “speed bump” for the North Korean juggernaut. When additional Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) units failed to stop the Communist offensive and MacArthur made plans to establish a defensive “toe hold” around the port at Pusan, there was no doubt that the Korean situation was far more critical than previously believed. Within five weeks, the Communists drove shattered ROKA elements and LTG Walton H. Walker’s remaining EUSA forces across the Naktong River and into the Pusan Perimeter.29 Realizing that units in theater lacked the cohesion and capability to counter the NKPA advance, General MacArthur hoped to save the withdrawing forces by reducing pressure on what remained by interdicting the enemy’s supply line. The CINC, familiar with the Alamo Scouts and 6th Ranger Battalion from his South West Pacific command during WWII, supported the creation of the GHQ Raider Company and the Eighth Army Ranger Company from other GHQ assets.30 Largely out of a sense of desperation, MacArthur’s decisions renewed the Army’s interest in Special Operations. From June 1950 until April 1951, the U.S. Army mobilized a wide variety of Army SOF to fight in Korea against Communism. These units formed a legacy for today’s ARSOF elements.

ENDNOTES

  1. Federal Research Division, Country Profile: North Korea (Library of Congress, 2007), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf, accessed 16 October 2009; Federal Research Division, Country Profile: South Korea (Library of Congress, 2005), http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/South_Korea.pdf, accessed 16 October 2009; Office of the Chief of Military History, Korea -- 1950 (Washington: G.P.O., 1952), 1-3 [return]
  2. Office of the Chief of Military History, Korea – 1950,1-3; http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/29.htm, accessed 16 November 2009; http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/19.htm, accessed 16 November 2009. [return]
  3. Federal Research Division, Country Profile: North Korea (Library of Congress, 2007). http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf, accessed 16 October 2009; Federal Research Division, Country Profile: South Korea (Library of Congress, 2005), http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/South_Korea.pdf, accessed 16 October 2009; Office of the Chief of Military History, Korea -- 1950, 1-3. [return]
  4. Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951 (Washington: G.P.O., 1990), 7. [return]
  5. Office of the Chief of Military History, Korea -- 1950, 1-3. [return]
  6. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1997), 3-4; James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War (New York: William Morrow, 1988), 21-23. [return]
  7. http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/5.htm, accessed 1 December 2009. [return]
  8. Denis Ashton Warner and Peggy Warner, The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 (New York: Charterhouse Publishers, 1974; reprint, New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 81-98. [return]
  9. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 5. [return]
  10. Max Hastings, The Korean War (London: Pan Books, 1987), 17-23; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967; reprint, New York: De Capo Press, 1986), 5-7; E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1951), 35-39. Allan A. Millett, The War for Korea: A House Burning (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 16-42. [return]
  11. http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/7.htm, accessed 29 October 2009. [return]
  12. James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 107-12; Millett, War in Korea, 52-55. [return]
  13. http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/8.htm, accessed 27 October 2009; Callum A. McDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 6-8). [return]
  14. Roy E. Appleman, The United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 4-5. [return]
  15. “Occupation and Reconstruction of Japan, 1945-1952,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/91194.htm, accessed 9 February 2010. [return]
  16. Millett, The War for Korea, 60-61. [return]
  17. Millett, The War for Korea, 125-26. [return]
  18. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 4-5: Millett, The War for Korea, 135-48. [return]
  19. Millett, The War for Korea, 175-78. [return]
  20. Patterson, Grand Expectations, 170-73. [return]
  21. Ralph B. Levering, The Cold War: A Post Cold-War History (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1994), 46; Patterson, Grand Expectations, 172. [return]
  22. Patterson, Grand Expectations, 169-78. [return]
  23. Levering, The Cold War, 40. [return]
  24. Millett, The War for Korea, 189-90. Between 1945 and 1950 Eighth Army was comprised of four infantry divisions: 7th, 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry. Aside from the 25th, which fielded 13,000 men, all were below their authorized peacetime strength of 12,500, though this authorized strength was well below the wartime standard of 18,900 men. [return]
  25. Levering, The Cold War, 41-42; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/82209.htm, accessed 16 November 2009; http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm, accessed 16 November 2009. [return]
  26. Millett, The War in Korea, 193-98, 241-46; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, 9. [return]
  27. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, 19-22. [return]
  28. Roy K. Flint, “Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-9 July 1950,” in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America’s First Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 266-75, (hereafter Flint, “Task Force Smith”). [return]
  29. Flint, “Task Force Smith,” 275-99. [return]
  30. Kenneth Finlayson, “Alamo Scouts Diary,” Veritas 4 (3 2008), 3-17. [return]
  31. Ralph B. Levering, The Cold War: A Post Cold-War History (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1994), 20. [return]
  32. “Truman Doctrine,” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp, accessed 16 November 2009; James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 126-33; Levering, The Cold War, 33-34. [return]
  33. X, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947), 566-82; “Kennan and Containment,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17601.htm, accessed 22 February 2010. The content of Mr. X’s article did not come as a surprise to the Truman Administration. A year earlier, Kennan had sent his “Long Telegram” to Secretary of State James Byrnes, examined the roots of Russian policy and outlined a recommended American response. The content of Kennan’s earlier “Long Telegram” provided much of the justification for the Truman Doctrine. [return]
  34. 1950 UN Yearbook, available at http://unyearbook.un.org/unyearbook.html?name=1950index.html, accessed 8 December 2009. “The Teheran Conference, 1943” at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/104429.htm, accessed 16 March 2010. [return]