"Volunteering" for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea

This M4A3 Sherman tank was modified for loudspeaker use.

As a first lieutenant, Jay V. Russell had researched the mounting of loudspeakers on a variety of armored vehicles, after the 1st Marine Division on the Wonju-Hongch’on axis had attached an M4A3E2 “Super” Sherman tank to an L/S team in March 1951. Russell, like 1LT Fred Wilmot from EUSA G-3 Psywar Division, also evaluated the M39, the M29C Weasel Cargo Carrier, and the British Universal (Bren Gun) Carrier.34 One of Russell’s recommendations regarding mounted loudspeakers was that close coordination was needed to keep UN troops from being “shocked” by innovative Psywar techniques.35

Public address system mounted on a M39 AUV — Loudspeaker teams experimented with mounting public address systems on a variety of armored and unarmored vehicles—including the M39 AUV shown here—with mixed results. While mounted loudspeakers could generally approach closer to enemy lines, the proximity to enemy artillery was not always worth the risk to personnel and equipment.

Despite the risks associated with innovative loudspeaker employment, the enthusiasm of the resourceful CPL Jack Dudley was not dampened. Noting the effects achieved by the Chinese in using bugles, drums, and war calls during attacks, and remembering the chills he got watching WWII films of screaming Nazi Stuka divebombers, CPL Dudley went back to Seoul.36 This time he went to the zoo, where he recorded hungry, growling lions and tigers just before feeding time. “Especially proud of himself, Jack kept this recorded broadcast ‘close hold.’ Youn Myong Chong’s broadcast was totally forgotten the night when Dudley turned on the growling lions and tigers. Everybody—the troops in the outpost behind us and the Communist scouts in front of us—started running away. It caused one hell of a commotion. Attacking wild animals were the excuse for abandoning positions. Knowing that the next thing coming our way would be artillery, we got out of there as fast as we could, too,” recalled Rose, laughing. “Fortunately, we were rotating to the 45th Infantry Division [Oklahoma Army National Guard], because Dudley’s dramatic production of ‘Lions on the Loose’ didn’t go over too well with the 25th ID.”37

Broadcast scripts and recorded messages provided by the Propaganda Platoon in Seoul were not much better. When L/S teams supporting the Republic of Korea Army units broadcast nostalgic themes in Korean to the enemy, the intended effects sometimes backfired. South Korean troops began weeping, and their officers were visibly affected. Thereafter, the substance and purpose of the latest campaign was passed down through the chains of command before broadcasting.38 Scripts and tapes were approved by Projects Branch Chief of the G-3 Psywar Division, EUSA before distribution to L/S teams by the Publications Platoon.

Scripts followed an indirect path to the L/S teams. Normally translated into Chinese and Korean, mimeographed copies in English with Chinese and Korean characters alongside, were distributed to the teams. Produced by college-educated writers in the comfort of Seoul, most scripts were too sophisticated for the vast majority of the target audience—illiterate conscripted Chinese and North Korean peasants. Practical solutions to the communication problems were needed.39

After visiting several prisoner of war compounds before assuming command in April 1952, CPT Herbert Avedon instructed that each sentence in the broadcast be spoken slowly and repeated several times in order to improve understanding among illiterate soldiers. To correct printed products, he directed the use of ideographs or pictographs instead of advanced characters, because many Chinese children were taught to read and write (through second grade) using phonetic symbols or ideographs. Avedon managed to convince EUSA G-3 Psywar to use Chinese phonetics on all leaflets aimed at Communist Chinese Forces. This practice was eventually adopted by Far East Command Psywar in Tokyo.40 Still, interpreter Youn thought Psywar products produced in Seoul were “Numba 10.”41

According to Rose, “most of the time we wrote our own broadcasts based on what we found on the bodies and got from regimental S-2s. These were very basic messages identifying enemy KIA [killed in action], using Chinese and Korean vulgarities. After all, we weren’t talking to white collar people.”42 This direct approach met 1st L&L guidance to focus on the lowest possible unit personalities by name, physical characteristics and appearance, and habits. The “contingency” broadcast scripts prepared by “insufficiently trained and untalented” L/S team chiefs were criticized by CPT Avedon, but seemed to be effective nonetheless.43

The written job description of an L/S team chief was nowhere close to the realities of his responsibilities. CPT Avedon’s ideal candidate would fit the following description:

Writes loudspeaker scripts and programs and broadcasts to tactical audiences [in accordance with] the principles of Psywar. Has some knowledge of history, politics, sociology, psychology, customs, traditions or culture of enemy against whom he operates, and knows something of the language and dialects of principal enemy population groups and of the media of mass communications. Has knowledge of enemy leaders, military and civilian.

To this was later added a requirement for previous combat experience.44 Though L/S team chiefs—usually corporals or PFCs—rarely possessed the above skills and knowledge, they functioned well in the circumstances they actually found themselves in. By the time an L/S team chief completed his combat tour, he knew combustion engines well enough to repair a motor generator, and could fix an amplifier or tape recorder-reproducer in the field. He had also earned a CIB (Combat Infantryman Badge), for the enemy regularly shot back during his broadcasts.45 It was practical knowledge, common sense, and combat savvy that kept L/S teams operational, rather than the academic qualifications Avedon desired.

During Rose’s attachment to the 45th ID, where tank-mounted loudspeakers were used again, the “dirtiest” aspect of Psywar—searching the enemy dead for any items of intelligence value—inspired a lucrative, money-making enterprise for L/S Team 10. Since they routinely worked in no-man’s-land, the newly-arrived Oklahoma National Guard soldiers who watched them at work constantly badgered the team for war souvenirs. This inspired interpreter Youn. “We be rich selling war trophies,” said the enterprising North Korean refugee. After making some arrangements with a nearby orphanage, Youn established a cottage industry creating enemy “battle flags.” Bed sheet remnants were spattered with chicken blood, shot full of holes, and emblazoned in paint with Chinese characters. Because few Americans read Chinese, “Mao Tse-Tung is a Fat F…t” was Youn’s favorite battle flag slogan.46 The enterprise was flourishing when L/S Team 10 moved to the 1st Marine Division, after broadcasting from the notorious Old Baldy (Hill 266), Porkchop (Hill 255), and White Horse hills (Hill 395).47

L/S Team 10’s souvenir business prospered until the sandbagged team bunker received several mortar hits. Fortunately, the 60 mm rounds did not penetrate the mounded earth, sandbags, and timber that covered the dugout, but the concussions collapsed the bunker. No one was killed, but the “battle flag” stocks were buried. PFC Rose crawled from the debris with blood coming out of his ears, nose, and eyes, and was evacuated—earning the first of two Purple Hearts.48 The 14 April 1952 edition of Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk provided this account of the incident:

A bunker enclosing PFC Gerald Rose was partially destroyed by four rounds of enemy 60 mm mortar fire. Rose was broadcasting when the enemy began firing. He ducked into the bunker just before it was hit. The subject of his broadcast was “The Futility of War.” 49

The U.S. Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, offered the Army’s Psychological Warfare course, which produced Psywar Officers and Psywar Staff Officers (MOSs 9305 and 9306).

The broadcaster was actually Youn, and Rose, providing security, was far enough away from the generator and public address system set to hear the telltale “plump” sound made by mortar rounds leaving the tube. After spending Easter 1952 in the hospital, Rose returned to the 1st L&L in Seoul to receive his next assignment, and there encountered a completely new chain of command.

Normal overseas rotations had brought in a whole new group of officers and senior noncommissioned officers. In April 1952, MAJ Osgood was reassigned to the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. CPT Herbert Avedon, Signal Corps, replaced Osgood as the commander of 1st L&L. He had been a WWII Ranger signal officer from Sicily to Anzio, as well as an Office of Strategic Services Psywar veteran of Burma. 1LT Joe Roberts, the former Propaganda Platoon Leader, had succeeded CPT Russell as XO. Only CPT Avedon had attended the officers Psychological Warfare course at Fort Riley, Kansas, where military occupational specialties (MOSs) 9305, Psywar Officer, and 9306, Psywar Staff Officer, were awarded to graduates. The 1st L&L did not receive enlisted Psywar school graduates from the States either.50

To correct Psywar training shortfalls, CPT Avedon intended to start formal training for the L/S teams, and to change the L/S team MOS 0320, Interrogator/Linguist—an intelligence specialty that the Army had difficulty filling—to one more satisfactory based on 1st L&L experience in Korea. Avedon submitted a TO&E change to reduce the L/S team from three to two personnel, and to change the Team Chief MOS to 1636, Intelligence Analyst, and the Assistant Team Chief MOS to 3174, Public Address System Mechanic. The changes were finally effected in 1954.51

In an effort to overcome the dearth of school-trained L/S personnel, Avedon instituted a seven-day course on Psywar principles and training on loudspeaker equipment. However, increased field requirements for L/S teams across Korea, personnel rotations, combat casualties, and inexperienced enlisted instructors minimized the effectiveness of this solution.52

*Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk* provided 1st L&L personnel in the field with training materials and news from the rest of the company. *Team Talk* also quickly became the primary means of distributing tactical information to the loudspeaker teams, including broadcast scripts and leaflet drop schedules

Operational training detractors prompted the Propaganda Platoon to print (mimeograph) a ten to twelve page handout entitled Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk. According to CPT Avedon, “a lack of adequate specialized training by L/S personnel” made a continuing instruction program mandatory for the teams in combat. Team Talk contained “instructional material, tactical information (such as lists of enemy vulnerabilities), leaflet drop schedules (coded K for North Korean and C for Chinese units) and programming lessons, as well as a sprinkling of entertainment features.”53 Intramural sports stories and a “Horning-In” section explained what L/S teams were doing in the field and who they were supporting—with names and team numbers provided.54

The Team Talks, though labeled “Restricted Security Information,” were not classified. Operational security, as it is known today, for Psywar activities was not taken seriously. Because the Propaganda Platoon prepared the EUSA Psywar leaflets, as well as air and ground loudspeaker broadcasts in order to exploit enemy psychological vulnerabilities, Team Talk quickly became the primary means to get broadcast scripts to L/S teams in the field.55 With hardly any security measures protecting 1st L&L products, the Communists knew exactly where the major UN tactical Psywar was emanating from, and did not hesitate to demonstrate their intelligence. When a six-by-six truckload of leaflets was captured by the enemy, a “Bed Check Charlie” pilot returned them a few nights later—showering them over the 1st L&L compound in Seoul.56

In spite of Avedon’s detailed standard operating procedures, among the men of the 1st L&L, the unspoken rules were: log as many missions as possible (front line time accrued the most points for overseas rotation), don’t report contacts with the enemy—especially with the Psywar Hunter Squads, don’t get captured, and don’t report friendly fires.57

Friendly fire was a constant threat because the L/S broadcasts routinely drew enemy fire. The nervous infantrymen behind them also wanted “combat points” to shorten their overseas tours, but did not want to get killed in the process. Sandbagged log bunkers and deep trenches provided protection against small arms and machinegun fire, but enemy artillery and mortar attacks were risky.58 The last thing the infantry wanted was to have the enemy direct fire against the L/S teams, because that would obligate the infantry to respond and lead to an escalating fire fight. “Friendly” fire from the rear, loudspeakers stuffed with snow, and cut wires were strong warnings from the American troops on line that the L/S teams were being too effective.59 When caught in crossfire Rose’s team played its “Ace in the Hole”—Doris Day:

For some reason, the Americans and Chinese loved listening to Doris Day. So, when our efforts had really stirred them up, resulting in artillery and mortar barrages and machinegun fire being directed at us, and in turn from the American lines, we quickly switched to Doris to quiet things down. We once tried the chaplain’s church music, but “Onward Christian Soldiers” didn’t have much impact on the Chinese nor the American GIs. Only Doris Day worked.60

The situation was different for L/S teams supporting artillery forward observers trying to pinpoint enemy firing positions. The forward observers wanted the L/S teams to draw fire to direct counterbattery fire against the enemy artillery and mortars. Since 1st L&L officers rarely accompanied the L/S teams on night combat missions, the enlisted Psywar soldiers developed practical mission parameters of their own: get as close as possible; talk as long as possible; when you receive fire, get yourselves and the equipment out as quickly as possible.61 Getting as close as possible was important because the range of the AN/UIQ-1 public address (PA) set was “a mile, if the wind was blowing right.” Psywar doctrine said, “Statements read over a PA set sound more ‘authoritative’ than those coming from a radio or printed in a newspaper or leaflet. The announcer’s voice has a super-human volume; it commands attention as no radio broadcast can ever do.” 62 Ignored was the reality that broadcasts from the front line “drew fire like a magnet” and served as homing beacons for enemy Psywar Hunter Squads and searchlights, as shown by this Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk story: 63

Team 12, consisting of Team Chief Preslesnik and interpreters, visited the Company this past week. Preslesnik played the part of “Bring ‘em Back (but not Alive) Buck” when he toted in a badly damaged generator that the Chinese used as a target for their guns. He also brought back three small pieces of what originally was a speaker that once belonged to PVT Joseph (Combat Story) McSheffrey. If the Chinese keep hitting our equipment the way they have been, we’ll have to start indoctrinating them about supply economy.64

Korea’s steep ridgelines presented the loudspeaker teams with some logistical challenges. Rose’s winching system, as illustrated by his own hand, was simple, but got the job done—repeatedly.

Once under enemy fire, recovering equipment was not that easy—especially the communications wire connecting the generator in the Jeep trailer to the forward location of the loudspeaker site in the steep mountainous terrain of Korea. Rose had to devise a simple “deadman” winching system to get the Jeep and trailer in place on a steep ridgeline. To further add to the difficulty, infantry units commonly laid minefields beyond the outpost line. As a result of geography and war, abandoning equipment was not uncommon for the L/S teams. SGT Nick Soter from Team 9 lost his Jeep after driving up Hill 854 for a night broadcast. Before the L/S team could start broadcasting, Hill 854 was attacked from three sides. The team barely got away, and had to leave its Jeep, trailer, generator, and public address system set behind.66 A common sense refusal to retrieve their WD-1 wire at night led to the rapid transfer of CPL Dudley, PFC Rose, and Youn from the 40th ID (California Army National Guard) to the British 1st Commonwealth Division.67

By May 1952, the Chinese were conducting effective counterpropaganda against UN forces. It was quite easy to accomplish, since operational security was nonexistent; Koreans were everywhere doing everything. Few Americans questioned where the locals went or what they did. The majority of classified destruction was done by Koreans using fifty-five-gallon burn barrels. Even loudspeaker teams had Korean houseboys who arranged laundry, cooked meals, scrounged rare commodities on the black market, and worked on the Jeeps. In Seoul, it was not uncommon for members of the 1st L&L and the Psywar Division of EUSA to keep female consorts, many of whom were North Korean intelligence agents. The majority of the secretaries at EUSA headquarters were also Korean, and security checks were cursory at best. “These people were our allies, after all,” was the common response.68 There was little wonder that the Communists were well informed.

Nevertheless, enemy knowledge about the 1st L&L and L/S team identities and assignments was disconcerting. Chinese counter-Psywar broadcasts “welcomed” L/S teams by number and the members by name when they arrived at their frontline divisions. “The Chinese portable loudspeakers were as good as ours,” said Rose. “We had those used by the U.S. Navy beach masters in WWII.”69 Chinese patrols left personally addressed “skull and crossbones” notes tied to bushes in no-man’s-land for the L/S teams. The leaflets threatened to hang L/S team members if captured, and advertised the $10,000 gold bounty to Psywar Hunter Squads for capturing any of them.70 “For this reason, we had contact with Hunter Squads about every three missions by mid-summer,” remembered Rose.71

In a line stretching across the peninsula, UN troops battled fiercely for a series of hills and ridges whose nicknames still resonate with the tragedies that played out in their midst.65

During his second assignment with the 1st Marine Division, the division’s Psywar staff officer concocted a scheme much riskier than being captured in no-man’s-land. As a result of this misguided plan, PFC Rose’s second tour with the 1st Marine Division in June 1952 proved to be short-lived. Having done tank reconnaissance probes into the Chinese lines around the Punch Bowl, the Marines were anxious to repeat the practice at Panmunjom. To enhance these probes, the 1st Marine Division Psywar officer “promised to make the broadcast team famous.” He proposed the construction of a simple raft that would hold the 10th L/S team Jeep and trailer. PFC Rose, the team chief, and Youn would simply broadcast to the Chinese Soldiers as they floated down the Injim River. This was notwithstanding enemy fire being concentrated on them.72

Some very accurate artillery fire eliminated that ‘harebrained Huckleberry Finn’ scheme. My team consisted of Youn and me. I didn’t have another American. We were in a foxhole setting up to broadcast when a Marine full colonel in starched utilities brought a Red Cross volunteer up to the COPL for a battlefield ‘tour.’ The two ‘tourists’ silhouetted themselves on the ridgeline, taking turns with the colonel’s binoculars. You could see the sun glinting off his silver eagles. When we tried to warn them away because they would attract artillery fire, they waved back, ignoring our shouts to go away. Less than a minute after they drove off in their Jeep, we were hit by artillery. The impact was so close that Youn and I were blown out of the foxhole by concussive impact. The first thing that I saw was my mangled bloody hand. A large piece of shrapnel had ripped it apart. Our Jeep sitting behind the COPL was our only means of escape. Just as I drove away, a second round hit the COPL. It was just like a war movie—a series of artillery rounds exploding in orchestrated sequence behind us as we raced down the road. Luck was with us. I made it to the MASH at X-Ray Bridge. A helicopter carried me to the USHS Hope,” said Rose. “That second Purple Heart was a real doozy. I never saw Youn again.”73

It was several surgeries and considerable physical therapy later before lately-promoted CPL Jerry Rose was shipped to the United States and discharged in the summer of 1953. Thus, in less than a year, Rose completed 253 tactical loudspeaker missions, the majority at night, while supporting 24th ID, 25th ID, 45th ID, 40th ID, 1st Marine Division, the Commonwealth Division, Turkish Brigade, and the Republic of Korea 9th Division (White Horse). In the course of his tour, he was awarded the Bronze Star, two Purple Hearts, and the Combat Infantryman Badge.74 “No other sergeant in the Eighth Army shoulders greater responsibility than the chief of a loudspeaker team,” was the fitting tribute accorded the tactical field arm of the 1st L&L by Lieutenant Dale Story in a 1952 Combat Forces Journal article on Psywar in Korea.75

Loudspeaker teams were responsible for carrying and positioning their equipment in the most strategic location possible—often on top of a steep, craggy hill that could only be accessed by foot. *(Painting by 1st L&L artist PFC Richard “Dick” Zayac.)*

During CPL Rose’s tour with the company, no 1st L&L personnel were killed in action, but numerous L/S soldiers were wounded.76 In May 1952, CPT Avedon accepted the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for the 1st L&L at a ceremony in Taegu. The unit was also awarded two U.S. Army Meritorious Unit Citations for Korean service. The citation awarded by EUSA General Order #245 dated 28 February 1953 read:

… The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, the only unit of its kind in the combat zone, performed their duties with determination and aggressiveness. Equipped with bulky public address systems best adapted to vehicular use, the loudspeaker teams hand carried their equipment to isolated peaks on the front in order to render close psychological warfare support to infantry line units.77

Psychological warfare was still a fairly untested tool when Rose joined the 1st L&L in Korea. Though frontline combat is not in the Psywar soldier’s job description, life on a loudspeaker team was everything Rose the infantryman could have hoped for in terms of excitement. In spite of the trials and dangers of L/S duty, Rose reflected that:

Life in Korea wasn’t all bad. We hunted golden pheasant in the Chorwon Valley. And I acquired a nice collection of Chinese and North Korean weapons. I got to see a Bob Hope USO show with Jerry Colona, some pretty girls, and listened to the Marine Band. Tins of Fosters ale were the highlight of supporting the Aussies in the Commonwealth Division. We got to see the latest movies—albeit in pretty cold and austere theaters. I managed to get copies of the Oakland Tribune occasionally. Selling enemy “battle flags” was a real hoot. And then … there was R&R in Tokyo.78

Special notes of appreciation are due to retired LTCs Jay Russell, former 1st L&L Loudspeaker Platoon Leader and Executive Officer, and Fred W. Wilmot, G-3 Psywar EUSA, and to former CPL Gerald Rose, Loudspeaker Team Leader, 1st L&L Company, Korea, for sharing memories, old photographs and memorabilia, documents, and providing the words to explain tactical Psywar loudspeaker operations during the Korean War.

ENDNOTES

Gerald A. Rose, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 13 October 2003, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Rose interview, 13 October 2003. ^[return]
“PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most,” The Stars and Stripes, 20 May 1953; Herbert A. Friedman, “The American PSYOP Organizations During the Korean War,” http://www.Psywarrior.com/KoreaPSYOPHist.html, accessed 15 April 2010. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003. ^[return]
Gerald A. Rose, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 29 October 2004, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Rose interview, 29 October 2004. Getting school-trained Psywar soldiers to the 1st L&L in Korea was not an Army priority judging by the Psywar NCO Class No. 1 (24 October 1951–21 November 1951) graduation roster. All forty-five graduates were assigned to either the 2nd L&L Company or Psy War Det 5021 ASU stationed at Fort Riley, KS, site of the Army General School. The Psywar Division was in the department of Resident Instruction. Psywar NCO Class No. 1 Graduation Roster, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
In 1950, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the Republican senator from Massachusetts, authored Public Law 597 as a means of incorporating select members of Europe’s displaced persons population into the U.S. Army. Popularly called the “Lodge Act,” PL 597 offered the opportunity to apply for U.S. citizenship in return for five years of enlisted service in the U.S. Army. Passed by the 81st Congress in June 1950, the “alien enlistment program” received its first recruits at the 7720th Replacement Depot, Sonthofen, Germany, in 1951. Kenneth Finlayson, “The Lodge Act and the Early Days of Special Forces,” Special Forces: The First Fifty Years (Tampa, FL: Faircount LLC, 2002), 92–93. ^[return]
1st L&L Company Thanksgiving Dinner Menu, Korea, 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Jay V. Russell, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 November 2004, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Russell interview, 16 November 2004. ^[return]
Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, Psywar in Korea (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960), 26. Major Homer Caskey took the Technical Information Detachment overseas. After the TID was expanded to become the 1st L&L Company, it was subsequently commanded by Majors John T. Dabinett and Donald W. Osgood, and Captains Herbert Avedon and Oliver W. Rodman. ^[return]
Department of the Army, Operational Research Office, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3 (FEC); George S. Pettee, US Psywar Operations in the Korean War (n.p.: 23 January 1951), 29; “PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most,” The Stars and Stripes, 20 May 1953; 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, EUSA, APO 301, Seoul, Korea, Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) dated 10 August 1952, hereafter cited as 1st L&L SOP. ^[return]
Pettee, US Psywar Operations in the Korean War, 29; Russell interview, 16 November 2004. When war broke out in Korea, Major (MAJ) Alfred L. DiBella from the G-2 Psywar Branch (“Special Projects Division”) of the Supreme Command Allied Powers (General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters) in Tokyo was dispatched to Seoul. In January 1951, General Mathew Ridgway transferred responsibility for Psywar from G-2 to G-3 in EUSA, where it became a division of the G-3 Operations section rather than a special staff section. He increased the manning to eight officers and nine enlisted men, and named MAJ DiBella acting chief. MAJ DiBella, MAJ Edwin Rios, First Lieutenant Fred W. Wilmot, and a master sergeant conducted the tactical Psywar campaign for EUSA until the 1st L&L Company was combat effective in April 1951. Airborne and ground loudspeaker efforts were experimental. Only two trailer-mounted loudspeakers and two airborne loudspeakers had been in service. The 1st Cavalry Division occasionally lent its loudspeaker trailer to the 25th Infantry Division in the summer and fall of 1950. The Marines used loudspeakers throughout the fall. Attempts to use them at the Chosin Reservoir in winter were unsuccessful. With the temperatures from -10º to –20º F, the generator would not start. Fred W. Wilmot, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 10 November 2004, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Wilmot interview, 10 November 2004; Fred W. Wilmot, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 29 November 2004, digital recordings, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Wilmot interview, 29 November 2004; Pettee, US Psywar Operations in the Korean War, 2, 7, 23–24; Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 26, 194, 196. ^[return]
TO&E 20-77, Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army, 1 September 1950, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter TO&E 20-77. ^[return]
TO&E 20-77. ^[return]
Russell interview, 16 November 2004; 1st L&L SOP. First Lieutenant Russell escorted five Chinese interpreters from Pusan to Seoul. They were former professors from the Pusan University. HQ, 2D Logistical Command, APO 59, AG 300.4, “SUBJECT: Letter Order No. 2-40,” dated 7 February 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The L/S Platoon was definitely combat effective by 1 May 1951. When a L/S team with the 27th Infantry Regiment, northeast of Seoul, encountered three Chinese prisoners of war being escorted to the rear, the team sergeant and interpreter obtained their names, units, and names of officers and friends. The interpreter then made surrender appeals with this current information. Twenty-four Chinese soldiers surrendered that day. The next day another fifteen surrendered. “Some Psywar Operations Highlights,” RG 319, Section 338, Box 4, 1951–52, National Archives, Washington, DC. ^[return]
Stephen E. Pease, Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950–1953 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 131–32; Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 313–14, 316. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003. Private First Class John Squicciarini’s Loudspeaker team supported a Republic of Korea Army division in Operation RATKILLER from December 1951 through January 1952. Large bands of guerrillas and bandits had taken refuge in the mountains northwest of Chinju after the Communist retreat from the south. General James A. Van Fleet assigned Lieutenant General Paik Sun Yup two Republic of Korea Army divisions to eliminate this potentially dangerous threat. 1st L&L loudspeaker teams broadcast surrender appeals to surrounded groups. By the end of January 1952, nearly twenty thousand bandits and guerrillas had been killed or captured. John A. Squicciarini, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 30 November 2004, digital recording, USASOC History Office ClassifiedFiles, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004; Matthew D. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 191. ^[return]
“PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most,” The Stars and Stripes, 20 May 1953. ^[return]
“PSYWAR Hits Korean Enemy Right Where It Hurts the Most,” The Stars and Stripes, 20 May 1953. ^[return]
TO&E 20-77; Rose interview, 13 October 2003. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003. ^[return]
“War Without Weapons,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, 17 March 1951, 3. ^[return]
Major Donald W. Osgood, Commander, 1st L&L Company, Korea, letter to Captain Jay V. Russell, Fort Benning, GA, dated 14 March 1952, Russell Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
TO&E 20-77; 1st L&L SOP; Captain Herbert L. Avedon, “Command Report No. 18,” June 1952, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Hansen,Psywar in Korea,300; Rose interview, 13 October 2003; EUSA, Office of the Commanding General (CG), APO 301, AG 300.4 KAGM, Letter Order No. 11-221 dated 30 November 1951 had Captain Jay V. Russell; First Lieutenant Hillard J. Trubitt, 062034, Armor; Second Lieutenant Quillian D. Clements, 02263454, Artillery; and twenty-four enlisted men (including Corporal William E. Johnson, RA16249927; Corporal John H. Dudley, US56050526; and Private-2 Gerald A. Rose, US56141578) temporary duty from 1 Dec 51 to 31 Dec 51 in connection with Psywar activities. They were authorized travel by train, but no per diem. Loudspeaker platoon officers and team members had thirty-day temporary duty orders issued monthly. EUSA, Office of the CG, APO 301, AG 300.4 KAGM, Letter Order No. 12-197 dated 28 December 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; EUSA, AG 300.4 KAGM, Letter Order No. 11-221 dated 30 November 1951, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Captain Jay V. Russell, “Psychological Warfare Operations During the Attack,” U.S. Army Advanced Infantry Officers Course, Class #2, 1952–53, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Russell interview, 16 November 2004. ^[return]
“Corporal Jack Dudley was a ‘legendary character’ among the loudspeaker men in the 1st L&L. But, he got things done. Dudley was an eccentric who wore an Australian Army bush hat, a heavy Chinese padded cotton overcoat with his British battle jacket, and Korean overboots. His team Jeep sported a UN flag and UN markings, so no one hassled him,” related a bemused John Squicciarini, another original loudspeaker team leader in the 1st L&L. Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Gerald A. Rose, letter to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 25 May 1994, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Gerald A. Rose, undated letter to parents, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The 1st L&L Company Propaganda Platoon had little access to the enemy Order of Battle in Seoul. This severely handicapped the scope and focus of the loudspeaker broadcast scripts and leaflets. Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to Sandler, 25 May 1994; Rose letter to parents, undated. ^[return]
First Lieutenant Jay V. Russell, 1st L&L Company Report, “SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Report Resulting from Personal Visit to I Corps,” dated 16 January 1951, Russell Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Gerald A. Rose, letter to parents, May 1952, Korea, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
“War Without Weapons;” Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 59. ^[return]
“Far East Command AFF Observer Team 5 Report,” July 1951, Entry 1, Box 91, RG 337, National Archives. ^[return]
Gerald A. Rose, letter to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 12 July 1994, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose interview, 13 October 2003. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003. ^[return]
Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 194–95. ^[return]
Wilmot interview, 10 November 2004; Far East Command AFF Observer Team 5 Report; Russell, “Psychological Warfare Operations During the Attack,” 10–11, 13; First Lieutenant Jay V. Russell, “SUBJECT: Operation of Loudspeaker Teams with Attached Tank,” n.d., USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 194. On 15 February 1951, Task Force BURGESS flanked the 150th North Korean Division on Hill 191 and raked its positions with the combined firepower of numerous twin 40 mm antiaircraft guns, quad .50 caliber antiaircraft machineguns, and 76 mm tank guns. Then, the Loudspeaker (L/S) team broadcast a surrender appeal three times with positive results. However, the best use of the L/S team was against a village south of the Han River. The L/S team sergeant convinced the task force commander that the L/S could reduce the risk of assaulting the village and minimize collateral damage to the civilians. When the villagers began running toward the L/S, they were halted until the headman came forward. The villagers were told to come out of their homes to help move wounded North Koreans out to the road. The task force commander held his fire to give the enemy an opportunity to respond to the surrender appeals. “As a result of the broadcasts, thirty North Korean soldiers surrendered and no villagers were injured. Thus, a North Korean division was effectively destroyed by combining all direct action weapons available to the 15th Infantry.” ^[return]
Russell, “SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Report Resulting from Personal Visit to I Corps.” ^[return]
“War Without Weapons,” 3. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003. ^[return]
Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 205. In June 1952, seven of the eleven loudspeaker teams were supporting Republic of Korea Divisions. Avedon, “Command Report No. 18.” ^[return]
1st L&L SOP. ^[return]
Herbert Avedon, interview by Dr. Stanley Sandler, 14 September 1994, Rockville, Maryland, transcript in Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Avedon interview, 14 September 1994. ^[return]
Rose letter to Sandler, 25 May 1994. ^[return]
Rose letter to Sandler, 25 May 1994. ^[return]
1st L&L Co. SOP; Captain Herbert Avedon, O&T Branch, Propaganda Division, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, “Memorandum For Record, SUBJECT: Psywar Operational Deficiencies Noted in Korea—A Study,” 28 August 1953, 23, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 187–88. This was a considerably summarized job description based on the one prepared by Captain Avedon during his four-month period of 1st L&L Company command. Though his was only a single sheet of paper, it was single-spaced. His inflated description of duties and idealistic requirements far exceeded the qualifications of a corporal or sergeant. It is doubtful that any serving Psywar officer, including Avedon, possessed the requisite leadership, tactical skills, and capabilities. He wanted Assistant Loudspeaker Team Chiefs (corporals and privates first class by TO&E) to be highly intelligent, have platoon sergeant experience, academic education in psychology, sociology, anthropology and/or oriental history or culture, and possess the ability to write. Ironically, the majority of enlisted personnel in 1st L&L were drafted college graduates, though not with the specializations Avedon sought. Avedon, “Command Report No. 18;” Rose interview, 29 October 2004. ^[return]
Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 187–88. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Gerald A. Rose letter to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 8 October 1994, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Avedon interview, 14 September 1994. The 40th and 45th were National Guard divisions that were sent to relieve the 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division in the winter of 1951–1952. The two active divisions returned to their prewar occupation duties in Japan. D.M. Giangreco, War in Korea 1950–1953 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), 205. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to Sandler, 8 October 1994. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to Sandler, 8 October 1994; Avedon interview, 14 September 1994. ^[return]
Eighth U.S. Army, G-3, Psywar Division, Seoul, Korea, Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk, 14 April 1952, Major Alan J. Dover Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
1st L&L SOP; 226th Signal Service Company photo, Seoul, Korea, 1-3126-3/FEC-52-11116, dated 18 April 1952; Avedon interview, 14 September 1994; U.S. Army General School, Psywar NCO Class No. 1 (24 October 1951–21 November 1951) Roster, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. All forty-five graduates were assigned to either the 2nd L&L Company or Psy War Det 5021 ASU stationed at Fort Riley, KS. ^[return]
TO&E No. 33-77, Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army, dated 13 September 1954. This TO&E superseded TO&E 20-77A, 30 October 1952, including Change 1, 30 December 1952, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
1st L&L SOP; Captain Avedon’s seven-day Psywar and loudspeaker operation course in reality was “four days crammed into seven days.” Ten personnel completed the course in June 1952. The number assigned to operational loudspeaker teams was not specified. Avedon, “Command Report No. 18.” ^[return]
1st L&L SOP. ^[return]
Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk, 14 April 1952; Eighth U.S. Army, G-3, Psywar Division, Seoul, Korea, Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk, 24 November 1952, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
At least 143 copies of the Loudspeaker Team Talk were distributed weekly: two per loudspeaker (L/S) Team for twenty; two per L/S Section Leader for six; four to L/S Platoon headquarters; four to 1st L&L Company headquarters; two to the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) L&L Company; three to the 1st Radio Broadcast & Leaflet Company; two to Psywar Projects, G-3 EUSA; one copy to Psywar Operations, G-3 EUSA; one copy to Psywar School; eight copies to the eight Division Psywar officers (one each); four copies to the Corps Psywar officers (one each); seven copies to the ROKA Division Psywar officers (one each); one copy to the airfield; fifteen file copies; and sixty-five copies minus the news items and translations to 1st L&L Company personnel. 1st L&L SOP dated 10 August 1952. ^[return]
Paul A. Wolfgeher, “Psychological Warfare: The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in the Korean War,” http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/support_units/psyc_war/index.htm, accessed 15 April 2010. ^[return]
Gerald A. Rose letters to Dr. Stanley Sandler, 10 April 1994 and 7 June 1994, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 205; Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004; Lieutenant Beverly Scott, “One Man’s War,” in Rudy Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 188; 1st L&L loudspeaker team personnel were granted Class “A” time for rotation, four points per month, which meant nine months on the line or a total of thirty-six points made them eligible for rotation to Japan or the U.S. ^[return]
Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to Sandler, 8 October 1994. ^[return]
Rose letters to Sandler, 10 April 1994, 25 May 1994, and 7 June 1994; Rose interview, 13 October 2003. ^[return]
Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk, 14 April 1952. ^[return]
“War Without Weapons”; Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 206. ^[return]
Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk, 24 November 1952. ^[return]
Robert J. Dvorchak, Battle for Korea:A History of the Korean Conflict (New York, NY:Da Capo, 2000), 237. ^[return]
Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk, 24 November 1952; Squicciarini interview, 30 November 2004; Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 205. Full equipment of three U.S. and three Republic of Korea Army teams had been overrun by the enemy, and in November 1952, another team reported the loss of all its equipment to an Allied unit that felt its need was greater. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Rose letter to parents, 11 April 1952, Chorwon, Korea, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Colonel John Sadler (attached to the Central Intelligence Agency during the Korean War), interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 15 October 2003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose letter to parents, 30 May 1952, Panmunjom, Korea, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994. Captain Avedon took command of the 1st L&L in April 1952. Avedon interview, 14 September 1994. ^[return]
Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994; Avedon, “Command Report No. 18.” ^[return]
Rose letter to parents, 30 May 1952; Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994; Hansen, Psywar in Korea, 313–14, 316. ^[return]
Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003. Bearing out Rose’s criticism of the 1st Marine Division Psywar officer’s ideas, the next loudspeaker team assigned to the 1st Marine Division suffered one man killed in action, and one wounded. Captain Herbert L. Avedon, “Command Report No. 19,” July 1952, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Rose interview, 13 October 2003; Avedon, “Command Report No. 18.” ^[return]
Rose interview, 29 October 2004. ^[return]
Lieutenant Dale Story, “Psychological Warfare in Korea,” Combat Forces Journal, July 1952, 15. ^[return]
Rose interview, 29 October 2004. ^[return]
226th Signal Service Company, photo of Captain Herbert Avedon accepting Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for the 1st L&L Company on 18 May 1952 in Taegu, Korea, U.S. Army Photo 11/869-4/FEC-52, Avedon Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Wolfgeher, “PsychologicalWarfare,” http://www.koreanwareducator.org/topics/support_units/psyc_war/index.htm; Friedman, “The American PSYOP Organizations During the Korean War,” http://www.Psywarrior.com/KoreaPSYOPHist.html. ^[return]
Rose letter to parents, 30 May 1952; Rose letter to Sandler, 12 July 1994; Rose interview, 29 October 2004. ^[return]
Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, Psywar in Korea (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960), 194–95. ^[return]
http://www.acepilots.com/korea_bordelon.html LT Guy Bordelon Interview in Donald Knox and Alfred Koppel, The Korean War: The Concluding Volume of an Oral History: Uncertain Victory (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 246–50. ^[return]

“Volunteering” for Combat

Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea

ENDNOTES