While the rest of 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) was reorganizing to meet the number one Far East Command (FECOM) Psywar prioritiy, broadcasting from Radio Tokyo and creating a Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC), Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields needed an initial assessment of the KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) facility in Pusan. Rebuilding South Korean radio stations was his number two priority. In mid-August 1951, he told Chemical Corps Second Lieutenant (2LT) Jack F. Brembeck, who had worked in an Army Expeditionary Radio Station in Italy and directed the preparation of an enlisted Psywar program of instruction (POI) at Fort Riley, KS, to select someone to help him evaluate and begin supervising KBS operations in the port city. Private First Class (PFC) Leon H. “Lee” Nelson, a 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) programmer, was his choice.1
They were to write and broadcast daily news and commentaries on current events. This was critical because the South Korean [Republic of Korea (ROK)] president, Syngman Rhee, and his government had returned to Pusan after Seoul was captured by the Communist Chinese in early 1951. LT Brembeck and PFC Nelson were to build a transmission capability to deliver Psywar beyond the 38th Parallel.2 Until the 4th MRBC mobile radio systems arrived in theater, UN programs would be broadcast over KBS stations that American military were in the process of rebuilding in the South.3 MRBC teams were capable of doing this at several different sites once Radio Pusan was well-established.
The purpose of this article is to explain how and why Radio Pusan, the first American-supervised KBS station, became the “Voice of South Korea,” the central radio hub for the 1st RB&L in Korea, and the FECOM G-2 Psywar “clearing station” for all UN broadcasts made in the Republic.4 Korean presidential speeches with reunification rhetoric broadcast over the radio posed threats to UN Armistice negotiations. Yet, the responsibility for ‘controlling’ the ROK president fell upon a junior 1st RB&L officer serving as the Program Officer/Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Radio Pusan. In order to understand how this cooperative arrangement evolved, a look at the MRBC structure is in order.
1LT William J. Eilers (left), Signal Corps, and 2LT Eddie Deerfield (center), Infantry were sent to replace 2LT Jack L. Brembeck (right), Chemical Corps at Radio Pusan.
According to its Table of Distribution (T/D) effective 1 September 1951, the 4th MRBC was to conduct strategic propaganda against the enemy and disseminate information to friendly elements in enemy-held territory by radio broadcasting. The company headquarters, in addition to providing administrative and supply support, had a Captain (CPT) commander and lieutenants as the executive officer, radio officer, and monitoring section leader. A WWII Infantryman, CPT Robert A. Leadley, the 4th MRBC commander, had been dual-hatted as 1st RB&L Radio Officer [S-3 (Operations)] to oversee Radio Tokyo and VUNC.5 Since each of the three MRB platoons was authorized four officers and twenty-two enlisted men, LTC Shields had a pool of talented personnel to ‘kick start’ the KBS radio stations.6 They could be task organized as independent detachments to conduct strategic radio Psywar.
LT Jack Brembeck was to restore radio broadcasting for President Rhee.7 But, a family emergency interrupted his efforts. Thus, Signal Corps 1LT William J. Eilers, a Stanford electrical engineering and journalism graduate who had Armed Forces Radio (AFR) experience in Tokyo (1946-1948), Infantry 2LT Eddie Deerfield, a decorated WWII Air Corps veteran, and PFC Joseph E. Dabney were sent to join PFC Nelson and Corporals (CPL) John L. “Stod” Stoddard and Alvin R. “Al” Busse at Radio Pusan in mid-August.8 Since Radio Pusan was the surrogate for Radio Seoul, it became the “Voice of South Korea.” “We ran a ‘seat of the pants, jerry rigged’ operation with American military-repaired/replaced Korean transmitters, antennas, and station facilities,” said LT Eddie Deerfield.9
The 4th MRBC Radio Pusan detachment, initially co-located at the Korean radio station compound, lived in ‘Paradise Pines.’ The officers had a tent covered shelter and the soldiers lived in the Quonset hut behind.1LT Arthur E. Holch, 1st RB&L Radio News Operations, and CPT Frederick P. Laffey, 4th MRBC Radio Manager, relax in ‘Paradise Pines’ during a field visit to Radio Pusan.
The Radio Pusan detachment, 4th MRBC was attached to 2nd Logistics Command (SSI shown here) for administration and logistics support.
Co-locating in the KBS compound on a hilltop overlooking Pusan harbor offered the best operational solution. The 4th MRBC enlisted soldiers lived in a Quonset hut while two wooden-floored tents served the lieutenants and any visitors. The Radio Pusan ‘office’ was in a separate wooden building. A ten-minute drive to the 2nd Logistics Command mess by the railroad station was convenient. An armed Korean guard provided security by controlling the compound gate. The only threat was an occasional North Korean Air Force ‘Bed Check Charlie.’ The pilots of these WWII-vintage propeller aircraft hand-dropped mortar shells into the perimeter at night. Within three weeks 2LT Deerfield was elevated from newsroom OIC to detachment Radio Officer responsible for assigning script writing tasks, editing products, and coordinating broadcast times with the KBS station director.10
Officially, the Radio Pusan team had four major tasks:
Supervise and counsel KBS personnel on the installation and operation of radio broadcast equipment;
Take the initiative in program development for all programs aired over the Pusan network, not just Psywar;
Co-operatively promulgate FECOM and UN Command policy with ROK government officials
Successfully sell Psywar at ‘ground’ level by developing a close working relationship with the Korean people.11
U.S. assistance was categorized as technical and programming support.
Technical assistance came first. This included arranging the transportation, engineering, and installation of new broadcast equipment and coordinating use of interim Army Signal Corps broadcast equipment until KBS network facilities were restored. Specifically, the following was done for Radio Pusan:
An Army Signal Corps master sergeant was temporarily attached as the engineering advisor to supervise the installation of a U.S. Army 5 KW broadcast transmitter. This supplement to the one KW expanded local transmission coverage and reduced station down time. He also managed the network and worked to improve the quality of transmissions
They arranged for the installation of a radio teletype news service to provide 24-hour daily world news for the network
They coordinated the transfer of repair parts and components for transmitters and studio equipment
They programmed one of the AN/MRT-5 Mobile Studios for Pusan to tape record and serve as backup for live broadcasts
They furnished fuel, Korean vehicle tires and parts, water, and transportation when deemed critical to broadcast operations.12
While these technical aspects were being accomplished, LTs Eilers and Deerfield focused on programming.
“My maxim was to always tell the truth,” said LT Deerfield. “You never wanted to get caught in a lie. That always worked well for me.”13 The programs were consistent with overall theater policy based on the best available intelligence. Truthful, accurate news was the backbone of American programming. The Free World proclaimed that its Psywar was based on truth while that from the Communist world was built on lies.14 Specific program times were allocated for daily news broadcasts from the United States Information Service (USIS) and UNCACK (UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea).15
Beginning with four daily fifteen-minute sessions, the script writers (CPLs Stoddard and Busse and PFCs Nelson and Dabney) explained why UN forces were fighting in Korea, UN goals versus those of the Communists, and tried to undermine enemy leaders. The RB&L soldiers were labeled the “Root Beer & Lemonade” guys by the combat soldiers in Korea.16 CPLs Anthony E. Severino, Kenneth V. Benson (farm programs), and William F. Morton were replaced after several months.17 Korean service rotations for 1st RB&L script writers and programmers varied from three to four months, but some stayed longer.18 By late 1951, Radio Pusan programming had stabilized.
The 4th MRBC Radio Pusan staff in the fall of 1951 (L to R): CPLs William F. Morton, Anthony E. Severino, Joseph E. Dabney and Kenneth V. (Ken) Benson; Korean Secretary, Miss Suh (Suzie); PFC Bradley Duckworth; 2LT Eddie Deerfield; and Mr. Min, the chief Korean translator, a Department of Army Civilian (DAC).
The 4th MRBC writers shared the building and work tables with Korean translators.
Programs included live and taped broadcasts that were regularly used by KBS and VUNC. Network world reports, commentaries, a daily children’s show, a special for teens emphasized responsibilities in a postwar Korea, a weekly farmers program, special events in Korea, and UN spot announcement campaigns filled the air time. This broadcast schedule was accomplished by one officer, four enlisted writers, and a Korean staff working twelve to sixteen hours daily. Four Korean local news reporters covered assigned ‘beats’ in Pusan. A Korean DAC (Department of Army Civilian) supervised seven bilingual translators who spanned the day and night requirements by working overlapping eight hour shifts. Asian news transmissions via Morse Code were recorded by five Korean monitors doing four hour shifts.19 Regular anchor programs provided consistency to the daily and weekly broadcast schedule.
Though there were two breaks (0830-1130 hours and 1430-1730 hours) in the broadcast day that went from 0630-2300 hours, the ‘Gander’ (nickname for 1st RB&L personnel) script writers never stopped writing. They rewrote news broadcasts from AP (Associated Press), UP (United Press), INS (International News Service), Reuters, Pan Asia wire services & Central News Morse Code transmissions, wrote commentaries and children stories, and edited the local news and field interviews (by KBS reporters) for content and policy violations, and did the ‘first cut’ English reviews of translated materials.21 Recording local interest stories was challenging.
Considerable innovation was necessary. Battery-powered Japanese tape recorders did not work well in the winters and hot, humid summers of Korea. Cigarette lighter fluid hand warmers, popular with North American deer hunters, increased functionality in the cold. “Tube technology recording equipment was ponderous, unreliable, and weather-sensitive. Capturing live current events like the Koje-do prison riots, speeches by Generals [Matthew B.] Ridgway and [James A.] Van Fleet, the inauguration of the ROK Military Academy, counter-guerrilla operations around Chiri-san in December 1951, and interviewing wounded aboard the USHS Hope was frustrating. They were ‘crap shoots,’” said Deerfield. “There was nothing worse than getting back to HLKA (Radio Pusan) and discovering that the recording tape was either distorted by static or contained nothing.”22 Pre-recording “Voice of South Korea” speeches by President Rhee was a necessity.
Formal addresses by the ROK president were recorded to edit sensitive UN issues like a South Korean victory and Korean unification. “The South Korean president took the monitoring well. It was his Austrian wife, Francesca, who always gave me a hard time despite having arranged every session through the Minister of Public Information, Dr. Clarence Ryee. I was the only U.S. Army Psywar officer who worked directly with President Rhee. LTC Shields told me to ‘cut the power’ if the ROKs tried any shenanigans. Thank heavens, they did not,” stated LT Deerfield.23 But, that guidance was easily given from Tokyo when you did not live in the HLKA compound and work with the KBS staff daily.
Official guidance came to LT Deerfield from Tokyo via teletype, not radio or telephone. As controversial as some of the things done by President Rhee and the National Assembly were, “the teletype provided solid records.” Since he was at “the tip of the Psywar radio broadcasting spear” in Korea, the WWII veteran took care to submit Memoranda for Record (MFR) on tough issues: Accusations of domestic interference (after some out-of-favor ROK assemblymen sought asylum in American Army facilities); Armistice negotiation caveats; and constant reunification rhetoric by President Rhee. Deerfield had no choice because CPT Robert Leadley, his company commander and the Psywar Group Radio Officer, simply reiterated guidance from COL Greene, Chief, G-2 Psywar Division, FECOM and his deputy COL James E. Goodwin:
Primary mission in KBS: retain control of the stations where we have detachments.
Secondary mission: See that material supporting UN interests in turbulent political situations is aired over the KBS facilities.24
The secondary “umbrella” mission was to be accomplished by airing only official ROK PIO (Public Information Office) releases not blasphemous to the U.S. or UN cause, all official statements from USIS, UNCURK (UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea), UNCACK (UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea), UN, other UN or State Department agencies, and authenticated news releases not speculative nor editorial in nature if they come from reliable sources and these sources are carefully labeled.25
An Army second lieutenant was held accountable for daily judgment calls on blasphemy, speculation, and non-objectivity from every conceivable information or intelligence source. The teletype message concluded with this reminder: “Despite our mission of supporting the UN cause and carrying out all of the above, we must remember that KBS broadcasts go above the 38th Parallel. We must not furnish the enemy with food for propaganda against us (the U.S.).”26 The ‘we’ was ‘the royal we’ because whenever there were radio broadcast problems in Korea, “the buck stopped at LT Deerfield and Radio Pusan,” the 1st RB&L in-country radio hub.27
LT Deerfield had to explain that Army personnel at Radio Pusan suggested that a Korean announcer read a denial of ROK Government charges that eight National Assemblymen arrested had been involved in an international plot against President Rhee and received money from Communist sources. After discovering that it was the result of a misinterpreted comment, LT Deerfield officially apologized to Dr. Clarence Ryee, the ROK PIO, but reiterated his authority over all KBS broadcasts: “We will continue to exercise censorship on news and commentary affecting United Nations policy, but we will refrain from interfering in the internal affairs (of South Korea).”28 Typical for the time (on 20 May 1952, several weeks after the Occupation ended), his apology was printed on the last page, first section of The Nippon Times (Tokyo) while President Rhee’s hollow ban on VUNC broadcasts headlined the front page.29
Deerfield’s frustration was evident when he reminded LTC Shields and MAJ Leadley that he was “caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place”: “A constant state of alert is required to catch all utterances [by President Rhee] and to edit them for policy” before they can be aired as KBS broadcasts because they could sabotage the VUNC campaign if presented in the original form. A junior Psywar officer ‘at the tip of the spear’ was the ‘lone arbitrator of high policy on the spur of the moment.’30
South Korean President Syngman Rhee and his Austrian wife Francesca commemorate the reopening of the Han River railroad bridges in 1951.
The Radio Pusan officer also reminded the Psywar Group and FECOM staff officers in Tokyo that his Korean reporters and translator/interpreters and the HLKA managers and staff should be praised for being “disciples of radio Psywar,” instead of being called to task. The interpreters, in particular, bridging the language gap for the Americans were “very wary about new program ideas, special events, and the speeches by public officials” being approved for broadcast by KBS. Though they were on “tricky ground,” the loyal KBS personnel regularly alerted Radio Pusan personnel about potentially controversial issues. LT Deerfield summarized it well: “They were numb to just how tricky this unwritten responsibility is. There might well have been ‘loss of face,’ relations ruptured between the ROK government and KBS, and policy violations.”31
Because there was a continuous exchange of ideas, daily coordination, and mutual respect between KBS program directors and the Psywar detachment officers, Deerfield felt that they had a good working relationship. The Psywar detachment and KBS were in the same family working generally toward the same purpose. “The KBS staff is almost one hundred percent in agreement with the aims of Psywar and with what it is trying to help the network do in Korea.”32 Every day involved some polite ‘give and take’ negotiations and mutual ‘back scratching.’ Hiring Korean commentators with solid prewar reputations was politically sound.
The introduction of Korean radio announcers with name and voice recognition proved popular. Yun Chul Sung, a well-known sports commentator, regained his ‘star’ status shortly after HLKA began broadcasting again. “While his English was poor, Sung spoke Korean with a deep, melodious voice. He got the most fan mail. And, it was all good because we translated it into English,” said Deerfield. “He praised the scripts effusively.”33 CPL Burton C. “Bud” Perfit wrote many of Sung’s commentaries.34 Sung, the “Voice of Philosophy,” “built up an impressive following among South Korean listeners.” Radio Pusan started mimeographing his commentaries and mailed them on request.36
2LT William F. Brown II a former Look magazine writer, conveyed the frustration of the Korean refugees and provided an astute assessment that was published in The Proper Gander: “If you look at Pusan with ‘Psywar Eyes,’ you notice poverty which is almost unimaginable, the necessary selfishness of almost everyone, and the vaguely accusing eyes of a people who have been cheated out of something. They can be our friends, or our enemies. Everywhere you go, you feel that ‘something has got to be done.’ The people need our help.”37 At Radio Pusan, the American Psywarriors helped the KBS staff and their extended families as best they could.
Bugs Bunny cartoons had universal appeal
“Koreans probably get a bigger kick out of seeing a photo than any people in the world. Whenever someone pulls out a snapshot, he always has a balcony of Koreans leaning over his shoulder. You can imagine what happens when they get a chance to see a movie,” explained CPL “Stod” Stoddard. “The crowd starts gathering about 6:00 P.M. At first it is just kids. About 6:45 P.M. our Korean station workers start bringing chairs and benches into the Quonset hut. You’d be amazed at how many people can squeeze onto a board laid across a couple of water cans. At 7:00 P.M. the house is really filling up. Personnel from HLKA along with their friends and the neighborhood families pour in. The kids sprawl out in front. At 7:25 P.M. when we go over, the crowd is so thick that it’s like fighting through a bargain basement sale to find our seats.The lights go out, and Bugs Bunny springs onto the screen bringing a chorus of ‘Oh’s and ‘Ah’s’ just like Saturday afternoons [matinees] back home,” wrote Stoddard.38 This entertainment was icing on a cake decorated with supplemental food and clothing provided by the American troops. But, health care for the Koreans in the Pusan Perimeter was limited.
LT Eddie Deerfield was instrumental in saving the life of seven-year-old Cho Jong Hee in December 1951. After Korean doctors had diagnosed her sickness as fatal and denied hospital care, Deerfield got her admitted to the UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK) hospital in Pusan where she survived.
The winter of 1951 was especially hard on the refugees who had sought sanctuary in the Pusan area. “About midnight one evening in early December, an HLKA staff member knocked on my tent door to introduce a friend whose daughter was extremely ill. There was no room for the seven-year-old child in any Korean hospital and her father was very distraught. In the dead of night I loaded them in my jeep and drove to the UNCACK hospital. Since we were approaching the Christmas season, I implored their sympathy to help the young child. They agreed to make an exception and the AP Wire Services and Stars and Stripes jumped on the story. It appeared twice on 10 and 14 December 1951. “The look of gratitude on the face of Cho Jong Hee’s mother made it a perfect Christmas,” recalled Deerfield.39
When UN forces stabilized the front near the 38th Parallel after the second recapture of Seoul, the success of Radio Pusan prompted LTC Shields to expand KBS rehabilitation efforts. Antennas were critical to transmitting and receiving radio broadcast transmissions. Repair of salvageable ones and the erection of new antennas was what the 4th MRBC riggers did. As the initial steps were put in motion for Radio Taegu and Radio Seoul, the antenna men were sent to Korea. Two occupations by the Communists had left Seoul in shambles.
The “Proper Gander” was featured on 1st RB&L Christmas cards designed by the Graphics Section. They sold for a “piddling 3½ cents” when beer cost “a nickel and a high ball sold for a quarter” in Japan. A Christmas card was an easy way to claim credit for writing home.
Well ensconced in the best Pusan facilities, President Rhee and his government elected to remain there despite the reestablishment of Radio Seoul and the relocation of 4th MRB company headquarters to the capital. Thus, Radio Pusan remained as the 1st RB&L mother station and UN Psywar radio relay hub. It became the KBS model for radio stations in Taegu, Seoul, and Taejon. An Infantry lieutenant and his script writing teams were responsible and deserve the lion’s share of the credit for the American success—WWII veteran LT Eddie Deerfield—was the ‘tip of the Psywar spear’ in Korea, 1951-1952. Because the United States was funding the restoration and sustainment of radio broadcasting to South Korea, it was in the best interests of the government, military, and KBS staff to capitalize on the 4th MRBC talent and maintain good relationships with American Psywar detachment personnel. And, just as FECOM paid Japan Broadcasting System (JPS) for ‘air time’ in Radio Tokyo when the Occupation ended on 28 April 1952, they did the same after the Armistice was signed in Korea. This was basically a ‘win-win’ situation for all parties that most benefitted South Korea long term.41
Guard shack at the Motor Pool entrance to 4th MRBC Detachment at Radio Pusan. The two Autocar 4-5 ton G510 tractors behind it were the prime movers for the mobile transmitter and radio studio mounted on the V-51-G trailers.
EPILOGUE
By April 1952, Radio Pusan had a staff of forty-four personnel. The 4th MRBC detachment consisted of an OIC (Technical & Program Officer), an assistant Program/Radio Officer/News Chief, two communications chiefs, two radio transmitter operators, a radio repairman, antenna rigger, two wheeled vehicle mechanics, a sound recording repairman, teletype operator, electrical powerman, a news writer, a production assistant-writer, and two radio broadcast script writers. A Korean DAC, the chief interpreter-translator, supervised eight local translators, five Morse Code monitors, and three bilingual stenographers. The OIC also had a bilingual secretary. Five Korean laborers were the responsibility of the senior detachment NCO (non-commissioned officer), who was one of the communications chiefs.42 It was “the high water mark” in Radio Pusan manning.
By late spring 1953, the original 1st RB&L Group had undergone a 90+ percent turnover in personnel and its organic companies (minus the 4th MRBC in Korea) had become assimilated into the FECOM Psywar staff and Publications Command. The drawn out Armistice negotiations, tactical stalemate along the 38th Parallel, and the anticipated end of combat impacted heavily on the strategic Psywar mission. WWII Army Air Corps veteran 1LT Nevin F. Price, the former 8th MRBC commander, 6th RB&L at Fort Riley, KS, and Fort Bragg, NC, was the link to what happened at Radio Pusan in 1953-1954.43
The Radio Pusan site (lower right) after the great 1953 fire.
The Fate of Radio Pusan 1953-1954
Having trained two Army Reserve RB&Ls on the new radio broadcasting equipment for their MRBCs and built the Radio Section, 5021st ASU into the 8th MRBC (three officers and thirty-four enlisted), the WWII B-26 Radio/Gunner brought a wealth of experience to the 4th MRBC in October 1953. Most notably, Signal Corps 1LT Nevin F. Price, when alerted for Korea, had written a letter to the Army Chief of Psywar requesting assignment to the 1st RB&L. He did not want his MRBC expertise to be wasted.44
