Working with what you have

“There [are] no two suns in the sky,” First Lieutenant (1LT) William S. Harrison, Task Force (TF) KIRKLAND’s first commander, reportedly told his Korean counterpart, Major (MAJ) Park Chang Am, before a group of friendly Korean guerrillas in mid-1951. 1LT Harrison wanted to establish without question that the unit was under American control, that he would not share command, and that only motivated Koreans could serve in the unit.1

However, as time would tell, low morale, desertions, shortages of American personnel, and supply problems prevented the unit from mounting an effective guerrilla warfare campaign on the Korean East Coast south of Wonsan. This article describes the personnel, organization, and missions of TF KIRKLAND from April 1951 to July 1953, and the factors that impacted its effectiveness.2 Eighth U.S. Army’s (EUSA) decision to establish organizations to direct operational guerrilla units such as TF KIRKLAND emerged from the conventional situation in Korea.

In June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK), and nearly achieved a complete takeover of the South. Led by the U.S. military, United Nations (UN) forces intervened and held the perimeter at Pusan. In September, X Corps opened a second front at Inch’on, allowing the combined UN forces to push the NKPA from the ROK and advance northward to the Sino-Korean border. But from October to November 1950, sizeable Chinese Communist Forces crossed the Yalu River and attacked. This counteroffensive compelled UN forces to withdraw south from P’yongyang and Seoul, and the X Corps, since reassigned to northeast Korea, to evacuate through the East Coast North Korean port at Hungnam. UN troops prevented a second Communist takeover of the ROK and rolled enemy forces back. By May 1951 the war had basically stalemated along the 38th Parallel.

In January 1951, EUSA intelligence reported that anti-Communist Koreans, many from North Korea’s Hwanghae Province, were engaging the NKPA. A large number of them had fled to off-shore islands along the West Coast. EUSA established a guerrilla command to organize, train, and direct them. In February 1951, Koreans assigned to WILLIAM ABLE BASE (later called LEOPARD BASE) began conducting raids and reconnaissance missions on the mainland. A year later, WOLFPACK BASE split off and augmented the West Coast guerrilla warfare campaign.3 The intent of the EUSA, and later Far East Command (FEC), was to incorporate the operations of the anti-Communist guerrillas into the UN offensive effort.

The EUSA wanted to set up a similar organization to run guerrilla operations on the East Coast. However, the situation there differed greatly from the West Coast. First, there were fewer islands to operate from and fewer anti-Communist guerrillas. In addition, the ROK Army, not the EUSA, was the main conventional force on the East Coast. This resulted in a marked disparity in the resourcing of the West versus the East Coast guerrilla units. Despite these important differences, in April 1951 EUSA activated TF KIRKLAND at Chumunjin to collect intelligence, locate downed U.S. pilots, identify targets for naval gunfire, and attack enemy supply routes.4

The unit organized with two elements, KIRKLAND Rear and KIRKLAND Forward. KIRKLAND Rear operated in Chumunjin, seven miles south of the 38th Parallel, on the coast in the Kangwŏn-do region in northeastern South Korea. This element was a merely a logistics supply point. KIRKLAND Forward was headquartered at Nan-do (also called Nam-do or Al-som), an island slightly south of the 39th Parallel and about ten miles offshore. 1LT Joseph R. Ulatoski regarded the island as “less than awe-inspiring. It looked like a huge forbidding rock thrusting out of the China Sea. With sheer cliffs on almost every side, it looked more like a prison than a base for military operations … [It] was a treeless and grass-covered trapezoidal shaped piece of granite about 400-500 yards long, about 300 yards wide at the center, and about 100 plus yards high at its central point.”5 KIRKLAND interpreter Pak Chang Oun (known also as Bok) called it a rocky, desolate “No-Man’s Island.” The KIRKLAND area of responsibility on the mainland spanned the mountainous region along the coastline south of Wonsan. Bok recalled that from Nan-do, “[W]e could see that rugged long-stretched mountain range very clearly, even some native houses along the coast.”6

Colonel (COL) John H. McGee, head of the EUSA’s guerrilla command, needed a reliable commander for TF KIRKLAND and chose 1LT William S. Harrison.7 Harrison’s military career began on 15 September 1943 in the Corps of Engineers. He learned engineering at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia. He served in the 129th Airborne Engineer Battalion, 13th Airborne Division, deployed to Europe briefly, and left active duty on 17 March 1946. Harrison completed an International Relations degree from Harvard and returned to active duty in November 1948.8 He served in the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the ROK before joining the Miscellaneous Division, G-3, EUSA, on 3 February 1951 with assignment to LEOPARD BASE and then as the first commander of KIRKLAND.9

From 21 April to 5 December 1951, 1LT Kingston M. Winget served as KIRKLAND Executive Officer (XO), Headquarters Commandant, and Supply Officer. A former platoon leader in C Company, 1/23rd Infantry Regiment, Winget “supervised the flow of supplies … to the forward base locations of [KIRKLAND]” and “speeded up the arrival of much needed items and expedited transportation and handling.”10 At Chumunjin, Winget had a sergeant working alongside him. Sergeant First Class (SFC) Robert P. Sarama, a former EUSA Ranger, served as the First Sergeant of TF KIRKLAND.

Throughout its existence, KIRKLAND had few U.S. officers and soldiers in the unit to serve as leaders and trainers. The number of Americans increased to only nine by December 1951 (two officers, three noncommissioned officers, two enlisted radio operators, a cook on Nan-do, and a supply sergeant at KIRKLAND Rear, then at Sokch’o-ri north of Chumunjin on the mainland). In 1952, the unit averaged only four U.S. officers and six enlisted soldiers. The total number of Americans in KIRKLAND at any one time peaked at around thirty-five in 1953. Recruiting standards for the unit were not formalized. 1LT Ulatoski remembered that many of “the enlisted men [who served in KIRKLAND] were … Rangers or airborne,” except for those who served in combat service support roles.11

Unlike on the West Coast, no partisans occupied the islands off the East Coast. Luckily, a solution presented itself early on. EUSA had inherited from the ROK Army a group of poorly trained Koreans, sometimes called the Miryang Guerrilla ‘Battalion.’12 According to Bok, most of them were North Koreans who fled Hungnam aboard UN boats the previous winter and had received minimal training from the ROK Army. The ROK Army distrusted the North Koreans and so did not invest much time, resources, and manpower on them. EUSA promptly transferred these strays to KIRKLAND under Harrison, who sent around twenty to KIRKLAND Rear and the rest to Nan-do. Harrison did not have to worry about arming them as they already had small arms and hand grenades, but he had difficulty supplying them with adequate food and potable water.13 Despite these logistical problems, operational planning began.

At 0645 hours on 2 June 1951, the USS Begor (APD-127), commanded by U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Archie C. Kuntze and under the operational control of Commander, TF 95, anchored at Muk-ho, Korea. At 0830 hours, COL McGee and 1LT Harrison met on board with LCDR Kuntze and LCDR J. F. Chace, the officer in charge of an Underwater Demolition Team (UDT). There, McGee proposed a plan to insert 205 guerrillas with seven tons of equipment on the southern beaches of Kojo Bay to gather intelligence and raid enemy garrisons in the area. The plan required naval support.14

McGee, Harrison, Kuntze, and Chace identified four major problems: (1) several ship-to-shore round trips were needed to deliver personnel and supplies; (2) the Begor had to remain 6,000 yards from shore to stay out of mined waters; (3) the NKPA had heavy defenses in (and frequently patrolled) the area; and (4) KIRKLAND would lose the element of surprise after the landing of the first wave. Thus, the plan devolved to occupying the small island of Song-do (also called Sol-som), “using force if necessary, and all personnel and equipment [would be] landed there.” Song-do was a tear-drop shaped, steep sided, tree-covered island approximately nine hundred meters long, three hundred meters wide, and nine hundred meters from the mainland. Its location allowed guerrillas to infiltrate the mainland in teams using smaller craft. In addition, it provided them with a good vantage point to see coastal targets and to allow them to direct naval gunfire.15

At 1500 hours, 2 June 1951, the Begor departed Muk-ho and anchored 4,500 meters from Song-do. Two LCPRs (Landing Craft, Personnel [Ramp]) headed for the island. The first carried LCDR Chace, 1LT Harrison, twenty-one UDT personnel, two enlisted radiomen from KIRKLAND, and twelve Korean guerrillas. The second carried COL McGee and thirty-three Koreans. To LCDR Kuntze, the Koreans “appeared very much undisciplined, with little respect for their officers. In addition, a number were intoxicated and saki [sic] was noted in several canteens in lieu of water.”16

After several hours’ observation, scout swimmers from the UDT concluded that while the island had no enemy defenders, it also had no suitable beach for landing the LCPRs. 1LT Harrison, the two radiomen, and the forty-five Koreans went ashore on rubber boats, and the LCPRs (including COL McGee and the UDT personnel) headed back to the Begor. Radio communication was established with the landing party at 0400 hours on 3 June. After three round trips using LCPRs and a LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel), they completed the delivery of personnel and seven tons of equipment by 0430 hours on 4 June. An LCPR took 1LT Harrison and the remaining UDT personnel off Song-do the next day. With two sampans17 at their disposal, the guerrillas on Song-do could begin infiltrating the mainland.18

Operations had barely begun when command of KIRKLAND transferred from 1LT Harrison to MAJ Alfred R. Coccumelli. Harrison, who left KIRKLAND on 30 June, earned praise for commanding “disorganized guerrilla bands in east Korea, swiftly [unifying] them into a cohesive force … to perform attrition and intelligence missions.”19 With 1LT Winget still at KIRKLAND Rear, Coccumelli welcomed a new officer as XO of KIRKLAND Forward, 1LT Joseph R. Ulatoski.

Still recovering from combat wounds sustained while serving as XO in the 5th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne), Ulatoski joined KIRKLAND in July. In addition to having served with the 5th Rangers, Ulatoski before the war had assisted the G-2, XXIV Corps in infiltrating agents into North Korea. These assignments, coupled with the fact that he “got along real well with the Koreans,” made him a natural fit as a leader in KIRKLAND.20 Ulatoski later stated that “had I not had two years of previous experience working with the Koreans (1946-1948), I would have been almost totally ineffective and virtually useless for several months.”21 Corporal (CPL) Cyril A. Tritz, a post-WWII member of the Army of Occupation (25th ID) in Japan and recent veteran of the 4th Ranger Infantry Company, also joined the unit.22

In July, MAJ Coccumelli sent 1LT Ulatoski and, a short time later, CPL Tritz to Song-do to work with the thirty- to forty-man guerrilla team there. Under MAJ Han, that team had done some small inland raids and had reported information about the enemy to Nan-do for the past month as it endured terrible living conditions on the island. On Song-do, guerrillas had little food or potable water and swarms of mosquitoes and rodents added to their problems. Resupply of the team was rare as the trip from Nan-do to Song-do took several hours by sampan, and then only if winds and currents were favorable. As Ulatoski recounted, sea conditions “frequently dictated the pace of operations.”23

1LT Ulatoski and CPL Tritz met with the group and immediately grasped its supply problems, but could do nothing about it. “Han and his people were obviously disaffected … and in dire need of some sort of supplies and support.”24 MAJ Han and Ulatoski quickly built a good rapport and the pace of operations increased markedly. However, after a while, the relationship deteriorated because the anticipated increased support failed to materialize. Unfortunately, Ulatoski was limited by what the base at Nan-do could procure and send. Morale among the guerrillas steadily worsened.

In addition, the NKPA sent small probing elements by sampan to Song-do. In response, Han and his team emplaced mines, manned lookout points, and fortified positions around the island. According to 1LT Ulatoski, “We got hit a couple of times [while on Song-do], just probes, no major attacks … [During] the raids we Americans took up a position away from the action to avoid getting shot up by either side.”25 Ulatoski and Bok recalled one probe beginning at 0200 hours sometime in early August. The exchange of fire between the Communists and guerrillas over a period of hours left three NKPA soldiers dead on the beach. The KIRKLAND team sustained no casualties.26

After a couple of weeks, 1LT Ulatoski noticed that MAJ Han “seemed to become more distant and demanding about supplies, and wanted money to start paying the members of his group. We were doing all that we could and were unable to provide him [with] any more supplies … [W]e certainly could not provide money for him to pay his personnel.”27 Following the arrival of a large unidentified motorized sampan, MAJ Han informed Ulatoski at gun point that “he’s taking his people and leaving.” They departed on that sampan and the smaller sampans as well, leaving 1LT Ulatoski, CPL Tritz, Bok, and about seven North Korean refugees stranded on the island. Ulatoski remembered calling MAJ Coccumelli on Nan-do and reminding him, “[We’re] hanging out here.” Coccumelli replied, “Well, hang out for a couple of days and I’ll see if I can get some help over to you.” The lieutenant told him that he and the others may have to evacuate because surviving on the island, much less defending it, seemed impossible without reinforcements and supplies.28

A more serious assault on Song-do seemed imminent. “We put people at various points along the coast so that [we] would be alerted if anything [threatening] was noted.” Concerned about their vulnerability, Ulatoski radioed Nan-do and demanded, “Get us a boat over here, get us some way that we can get the hell off of here if we are attacked.” MAJ Coccumelli arranged for the delivery of a 40-foot motor launch that the Navy had provided to KIRKLAND. When it arrived, it was moored in a makeshift harbor on the seaward side of Song-do.29

Shortly after midnight one morning in early August 1951, the sounds of a loud explosion, small arms fire, and screaming erupted on the north side of the island. “Almost immediately,” Ulatoski recalled, “the same thing happened on the south side of the island.”30 Enemy soldiers had “apparently got[ten] on the island without anyone observing them … How they got there I have no idea. Who didn’t see them? Who didn’t fire? Who didn’t yell?” It was clear to the KIRKLAND personnel that the “volume of fire coming in was more than just a little routine probe.”31 The NKPA threatened to overrun the defenders. Covering their movement with a heavy volume of small arms fire, 1LT Ulatoski, CPL Tritz, and Bok made it to the motor launch. They and the remaining refugees evacuated the island and, with CPL Tritz having lit a timed fuse, blew a pre-wired weapons and ammunition cache behind them. Ensuing naval barrages destroyed the remaining Communists on the island. This enabled naval intelligence and friendly Korean soldiers to reoccupy Song-do some time later.32

In the fall of 1951, MAJ Coccumelli suffered a heart attack, was evacuated, and never returned to KIRKLAND.33 Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Samuel W. Koster from the U.S. Army guerrilla command visited Nan-do to inspect the unit and to inform Ulatoski of his plan to replace Coccumelli with another major. The 1LT replied, “Why not leave me in command? Hell, I’ve got enough points to go home, but if you’ll leave me in command, I’ll stay.” LTC Koster acceded, and he also sent a second lieutenant (2LT) whom Ulatoski soon relieved because some guerrillas refused to go on any more missions with him. On 22 December 1951, the commander welcomed a new lieutenant as his XO, 1LT Albert W. C. Naylor-Foote.34

Born in Manchester, England, Naylor-Foote had seen service in China, Burma, India, and French Indo-China during World War II. He served in the British and Indian Armies from April 1941 through April 1945. He received a commission as a 2LT in the U.S. Army in April 1945, after which he served in such units as the Military Intelligence Service X (MIS-X), the Air Ground Aid Service [AGAS], and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He completed parachute training at the OSS Parachute School in Kunming, China, in July 1945. Promoted to 1LT in September, he retained a reserve commission in the Military Intelligence (MI) Branch after the war. In August 1950, he completed the MI Course at the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas. In addition to his colorful military record, he was, according to official Army records, fluent in several foreign languages.35

Throughout late 1951, the unit forwarded information that it had uncovered through island observation and mainland operations to Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK), the FEC coordinating agency for guerrilla warfare. One CCRAK report dated 28 December 1951 listed some of TF KIRKLAND’s findings: a 120mm gun position, twenty North Korean troops stockpiling ammunition, a battalion-sized element traveling southward along a trail, fifty enemy soldiers digging entrenchments, and an anti-aircraft artillery piece.36 Occasionally, intelligence collection included very vague and non-specific information about American prisoners of war (POWs) on the mainland.

In early 1952, TF KIRKLAND attempted to rescue downed U.S. Navy pilot Lieutenant junior grade (LTJG) Harry E. Ettinger. During a close air support mission on 13 December 1951, Ettinger’s AD-4 Skyraider was struck by 37mm anti-aircraft fire and he was forced to abandon the aircraft. On the ground, Ettinger was captured by villagers, turned over to NKPA soldiers, and transported as a POW to the main North Korean interrogation center at P’yongyang. In late January 1952, Ettinger’s captors escorted him to the vicinity of Wonsan, possibly as bait for rescue aircraft. KIRKLAND Forward would soon attempt to rescue Ettinger using one of its guerrilla teams already operating on the mainland.37