Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea

SPECIAL FORCES HISTORY

The Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK)

By Michael E. Krivdo, PhD and Troy J. Sacquety, PhD

From Veritas, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013

“Looking back, we could have developed a much more capable force much earlier, if we had just made up our mind as to what we wanted to achieve with [the guerrillas].”1— BG Glenn Muggelberg, CCRAK Operations Officer, 1953
LTC Muggelberg
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Glenn E. Muggelberg served as the CCRAK Operations Officer and later as the commander of the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea (UNPFK). He retired as a brigadier general, Army National Guard.
ANALYSIS

Strengths and Weaknesses of CCRAK

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Operation GREEN DRAGON, the “largest [guerrilla] airborne operation” of the war, began on the cold night of 25 January 1953.2 Ninety-seven North Korean guerrillas and fifteen hundred pounds of infantry weapons and ammunition were airdropped into the snowy mountains east of P’yongyang. Their mission: to establish a long-term guerrilla base in the interior to harass the North Korean military. More than a month passed without radio contact. Suddenly, the team began issuing sporadic reports. GREEN DRAGON was down to thirty-one men and needed reinforcement. Suspicious, the Far East Command’s (FEC) Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK) was reluctant to reinforce a unit that was most likely compromised.3

Two months later (April 1953) GREEN DRAGON ‘upped the ante’ by reporting that it had recovered “five downed U.S. airmen” and were awaiting pickup arrangements.4 After contacting the team to hear the report firsthand, CCRAK decided to recover the airmen and reinforce GREEN DRAGON. On the night of 18 May 1953 fifty-seven more guerrillas were dropped with equipment and instructions for extracting the Americans. They employed a ‘snatch’ rig that enabled a fixed-wing aircraft to pick the airmen up individually. But when the aircraft lined up for its first recovery, it “got the hell shot out of it.” They aborted the mission.5 Although GREEN DRAGON broadcasted intermittently for months, CCRAK labeled them as compromised. None of the guerrillas or Americans ever returned.6

Far East Command SSI
Far East
Command SSI
Eighth United States Army SSI
Eighth United
States Army SSI

GREEN DRAGON was typical of a CCRAK-directed operation during the Korean War. Besides delivering 150 trained guerrillas and a ton of military equipment to the enemy, it accomplished nothing. Fortunately for the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) guerrilla command, CCRAK directed few operations on its own and had little impact on their day-to-day activities. Because various published accounts present conflicting information on CCRAK, one needs to understand the unit’s organization, limitations, capabilities, and issues. This study traces the origins of CCRAK, keeping it in context. The rationale for the creation of CCRAK and an assessment of mission performance are presented.

The idea of a theater-level headquarters element to oversee and direct the operations of the many organizations employing North Korean guerrillas was discussed at the FEC level beginning in January 1951.7 The EUSA, the Fifth Air Force, the British Royal Marines, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and Marine Corps, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employed North Koreans and Chinese as intelligence agents and guerrilla raiders behind enemy lines. Failure to coordinate these activities at theater-level led to frequent instances of fratricide.8 Meetings were held to coordinate and deconflict guerrilla operations, but these were tactical ‘band aids.’9 To establish lasting control over all guerrilla actions throughout the peninsula, a theater-level approach was required. But first, changes were needed in FEC leadership and organization.

General Douglas A. MacArthur
General Douglas A. MacArthur
Major General Charles A. Willoughby
Major General Charles A. Willoughby
Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway
Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway

The roots of General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur’s FEC organization date to his General Headquarters (GHQ), Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) in WWII. In 1945, MacArthur built FEC around his SWPA structure and the ‘Bataan Gang.’ Although this approach assured a smooth transition and enhanced continuity, it also perpetuated bad habits, flawed practices, and inefficiencies. For example, in the Philippines GEN MacArthur delegated all responsibility for guerrilla operations to his Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G-2), MG Charles A. Willoughby. That situation continued in the FEC despite conflicting with assigned staff functions and existing Army doctrine.10

Normal staff functioning places ‘operations’ under the staff direction of the G-3. FEC ignored that principle when it placed an operational combat unit under the staff cognizance of the G-2. That was not the only piece of doctrine that FEC disregarded. According to the U.S. Army’s contemporary doctrinal publication on guerrilla operations, FM 31-21, a theater command should “organize a theater special forces command on the same level as the theater army, navy, and air” commands. The doctrine also specified that “All units engaged in special forces operations and responsible to the theater commander are assigned to” that command so that unity of effort can be effectively achieved.11 In going against existing doctrine, FEC basically pointed CCRAK down the path to failure.

Furthermore, FEC under MacArthur (like his WWII SWPA), was not a unified, joint, or combined command structure as we have today. FEC had U.S. Navy and Air Force service component commands, but not a separate Army service component command until later under GEN Ridgway. MacArthur served both as commander of the FEC and as the Army component commander, generally considering them one and the same. Thus FEC, like SWPA, placed “the air and naval component commands under the ground component command.”12 Army personnel dominated FEC from top to bottom.13

Far East Command Organization

The Far East Command (FEC) was not a joint command as we know them today.

Far East Command Organization

GEN MacArthur’s modus operandi continued after his relief in April 1951. The MacArthur team was still in place when GEN Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command. Ridgway established the priority of “fix[ing] responsibility for all behind-the-lines activity in a single headquarters.”14 But Ridgway’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, MG Willoughby, entertained only G-2-centered courses of action.

As often happens, the most obvious and simplest course of action prevailed. FEC already had an element working with the guerrillas, the Far East Command/Liaison Group (FEC/LG). This fifty-man staff group in the FEC G-2 was created on 20 December 1950 at the height of the Chinese Communist intervention. It provided vital tactical intelligence and order of battle on the new enemy threat. FEC/LG trained North Korean ‘agents’ and placed them behind enemy lines via parachute, sea and ground insertions. When the agents returned, FEC/LG personnel debriefed them for current information on enemy dispositions. MG Willoughby proposed that all other guerrilla units be placed under FEC/LG.15

GEN Ridgway went along with MG Willoughby’s recommendation. FEC G-2 quickly reorganized FEC/LG to serve as a theater-level special operations coordinating body. On paper (26 July 1951), the ‘old’ FEC/LG was deactivated and a ‘new,’ expanded FEC/LG 8240th Army Unit (AU) was activated as an FEC Table of Distribution (TD) element. FEC/LG had three major parts: a FEC/LG command element located in Tokyo; a logistics and support staff in Sapporo, Japan; and a new operational liaison detachment in Korea (FEC/LD [K]), co-located with EUSA headquarters in Taegu, Korea.

Far East Command Liaison Group (FEC/LG) Organization, July 1951

Far East Command Liaison Group

The previous FEC/LG commander, COL Calvin A. L. Dickey, continued as the ‘commander’ of the new, expanded FEC/LG. The FEC G-2 detailed another staff officer, COL William I. Russell, as the officer-in-charge of the FEC/LD (K) element in Korea. The two staff officers had no experience with special or unconventional warfare (UW) operations. As a result, by default FEC/LD (K) became “engaged primarily in intelligence activities and had no immediate effect on the [EUSA] partisan effort.” But the only guerrillas subordinate to FEC/LG were those of the EUSA, not the many other elements that also worked with guerrillas.16 FEC/LG and FEC/LD (K) were simply more cosmetic ‘band aids’ applied to the theater-level guerrilla control issue.

FEC/LD (K), at first independent from CCRAK, was later a subordinate unit. Its headquarters in Seoul, pictured here, was near that of CCRAK.
FEC/LD (K), at first independent from CCRAK, was later a subordinate unit. Its headquarters in Seoul, pictured here, was near that of CCRAK.

Conflicting command relationships further confused the situation. Although FEC/LG was to be the overall guerrilla coordination unit, the 8086th AU guerrilla command (LTC Samuel W. Koster) worked for the EUSA G-3 (see chart). LTC Koster continued to plan and conduct UW operations just as he had before the FEC interposition. FEC/LD (K) simply imposed two new administrative requirements on Koster’s command: to coordinate his operations with FEC/LD (K); and to provide FEC/LD (K) with info copies of reports.17

Although the FEC/LG reorganization was intended to improve command relationships, it exacerbated the problem (FEC G-2 oversight versus EUSA G-3 direction) by complicating the UW decision-making process. To compound the issue, the FEC/LG commander (COL Dickey) reported to another staff officer, COL Charles C. Blakeney, the FEC G-2 ‘Joint Special Operations Branch’ (JSOB) Chief. The JSOB was responsible for FEC clandestine intelligence collection. On 1 August 1951, the burdensome guerrilla coordination chain shortened one link when Blakeney became ‘dual-hatted’ as commander of FEC/LG in Tokyo.18

The CIA paramilitary effort’s “archrival for personnel, funding, air support, and, above all, mission authorization was a hodgepodge intelligence operation … called CCRAK.”29 — MG John K. Singlaub, former CCRAK Deputy Director

Between July and October 1951, the Armistice negotiations further complicated the guerrilla situation and the shortcomings of the FEC/LG structure became glaringly obvious. From the Communists’ perspective, it was imperative for them to reoccupy the islands held by Koster’s guerrillas before a ceasefire froze the opposing combatants in place; they had to remove the threat to their exposed flanks. From FEC’s view, the guerrilla-held islands served vital purposes in providing safe bases for collecting intelligence, launching raids, posting early warning systems, and for prepositioning assets to recover pilots and aircrew shot down over the north (see separate article, page 50). When the Chinese retook several of the northwest islands in September and October, FEC realized the need to better coordinate island defenses and the guerrilla effort at theater level. The latter issue was resolved on 6 January 1952 when FEC tasked the U.S. Navy with overall responsibility for Korean island defense and the guerrillas became a supporting element to that effort.19 But solving the guerrilla problem proved more difficult.

Guerrilla command relationships within the Far East Command, December 1951

When CCRAK was created, it had no command authority over any element of the guerrilla command. It only acted in an advisory role. (Note the oddity of having an operational unit under the staff cognizance of the G-2.)

Guerrilla command relationships within the Far East Command

CCRAK Organization, September 1952

The emergence of CCRAK as the unit in charge of the EUSA guerrillas was the FEC G-2 solution to the problem of organizing for unconventional warfare. It proved ineffective. (Note that it remained under the FEC G-2, vice G-3 chain.)

CCRAK Organization

On 21-22 October 1951, staffs of FEC G-2, CIA, and EUSA G-2 met to discuss the creation of a theater guerrilla command. Conspicuously absent was the EUSA G-3 who ran the guerrilla warfare effort. Those talks proposed another FEC G-2 organization, CCRAK.20 In December 1951, FEC formed the new unit under the FEC/LG ‘8240th AU’ umbrella designation. FEC/LG remained intact, meaning there were now two theater-level special operations elements nominally in charge of the same guerrilla effort. To make matters worse, FEC made CCRAK “responsible for coordinating all behind-the-lines activities of various services and agencies” within Korea, the same mission FEC/LG had!21 In a masterful stroke of obfuscation, FEC/LD (K) was given operational control (OPCON) over the EUSA guerrilla command. FEC/LD (K), instead of reporting to CCRAK, did so to FEC/LG (see chart).22 This official ‘double talk’ confused the assigned personnel of all elements. One CCRAK veteran stated that he “thought it was just a name change” rather than two separate elements.23 Fortunately for the EUSA guerrilla command, neither CCRAK nor FEC/LD (K) exercised any command prerogatives other than assuming a greater role in planning and conducting deep airborne operations (like GREEN DRAGON).24 The actual day-to-day UW operations and support remained with the EUSA under the staff cognizance of the G-3.25

The CCRAK headquarters was somewhat unorthodox. The small staff (of about 100 G-2 personnel) had S-2 (intelligence), S-3 (operations), and a combined S-1/S-4 (administration and logistics) section.26 CCRAK was initially ‘commanded’ by Army COL Washington M. Ives, Jr., former executive officer for MG Willoughby. Although the CIA filled the deputy director billet, the officer assigned to that post (detailed U.S. Army MAJ John K. Singlaub) really functioned more to insulate the CIA from any CCRAK interference.27 And while the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force provided liaison officers, UN contingents (including the South Koreans) were not invited. In any event, the liaison officers were more like observers since their services’ guerrilla activities were beyond CCRAK authority.28 The only guerrillas that CCRAK could influence were those belonging to the EUSA guerrilla command. With Armistice negotiations underway the FEC staff continued their ‘paper war fighting.’

On 27 September 1952, CCRAK was separated from the FEC/LG 8240th AU and became the 8242nd AU under a newly-created Army Forces Far East (AFFE), the Army service component command of FEC. FEC/LD (K) was made OPCON to CCRAK in Japan. Finally, almost two years after its creation, the EUSA guerrilla command was subsumed by CCRAK. FEC/LG in Tokyo reverted to a purely administrative role supporting CCRAK, FEC/LD (K), and the EUSA guerrillas.30

Still more cosmetics had to be applied to the guerrilla ‘face.’ Two months later, another paper change made the guerrilla units appear more conventional. CCRAK redesignated the guerrillas as the United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea (UNPFK) and codified its units as ‘battalions’ and ‘regiments.’ The major guerrilla elements were labeled as Partisan Infantry Regiments, each comprised of several guerrilla-led Partisan Infantry Battalions (see chart). Guerrillas with previous airborne training were merged into a separate Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment (PAIR). It looked good on paper, but the various guerrilla unit commanders continued to refer to themselves by the original Donkey, Wolfpack, or other names that they had used for years. The PIR/PAIR designations were only inserted in reports that went up the chain of command outside the guerrilla units.31 CCRAK had little influence on the day-to-day operations of the guerrilla units, whose activities were curtailed by the approaching cease-fire.

CCRAK accomplished more after the Armistice than it ever did while the war was underway. It’s most significant achievement was when it resolved the legal status of the guerrillas and paved the way for their transition into South Korean society. Comprised largely of displaced North Koreans, the guerrillas had no legal standing in South Korea. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) distrusted them and was content to leave the guerrillas under the care of the U.S. Army. The Armistice changed everything by negating the requirement for the guerrillas. Something had to be done to settle their status. On 16 August 1953, the CCRAK commander, BG Archibald W. Stuart, and the South Korean Minister of National Defense, Sohn Won-il, reached an accord for the disposition of the guerrillas.32 The Stuart-Sohn Agreement activated a U.S.-funded 8250th AU in the ROK Army and all guerrillas transferred into it. The ROKA gradually integrated the guerrilla officers and men, assuming control, discipline, and administration. During the transition, American advisors assisted with the transition by providing direction and support.33 By 8 January 1954, the ROKA had discharged or reassigned all 8250th AU personnel, and the EUSA guerrillas passed into history.34

CCRAFE Organization, September 1953

After the Armistice, the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Far East (CCRAFE) replaced CCRAK. With no special warfare mission, CCRAFE’s primary concern was intelligence collection and dissemination.

CCRAK Organization

In September 1953, CCRAK renamed UNPFK as the UN Partisan Infantry Korea (UNPIK), but the former guerrillas were technically ROKA soldiers with only a minor defensive role. CCRAK no longer had an operational function and was deactivated in the fall of 1953. Its personnel were transferred to a new theater intelligence collection unit called the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Far East (CCRAFE), 8177th AU, in Japan. The Army Forces Far East Coordinating Detachment (AFFECD), 8078th AU, represented CCRAFE in Korea.35

CCRAK was formed too late in the war, with inexperienced personnel, and with too little authority. In the end, CCRAK got control of the EUSA guerrilla command, but the ‘paper tiger’ came too late to exercise command. Fortunately, outside of its total failure with deep airborne missions, CCRAK had no impact on tactical-level UW operations. The American military advisors with the guerrilla units had great latitude and directed missions using their best judgment. CCRAK staff officers concentrated primarily on the collection and dissemination of intelligence – administrative tasks that they were well-suited to perform. CCRAK’s Operations Officer perhaps best summed it up when he declared that he “got the feeling [that the guerrilla leaders] did just as they wanted to do.”36

Another officer stated flatly that “CCRAK had no real control, no command function.”37 That opinion was mirrored by the guerrilla task force commanders and advisors, one of whom dryly noted that CCRAK “was just another layer down south,” and had no influence on how he ran his guerrillas.38 Its biggest contribution was made during demobilization of the guerrillas. Current doctrine specifies that the transition phase remains “the final, most difficult, and most sensitive phase of UW operations.”39 The Stuart-Sohn Agreement provided legal status for these combatants and opened the door to citizenship and ROKA service. In the end, the best that can be said about CCRAK is that it successfully transitioned its guerrillas to civilian life after their war service.

Strengths and Weaknesses of CCRAK

Some of CCRAK’s successes were:

  • That it excelled in staff functions.
  • That its intelligence collection, sanitization, and dissemination allowed effective use of guerrilla and agent gathered information.
  • That it made administrative agreements that provided for the legal status of the North Korean guerrillas.
  • That its logistics efforts effectively supported the guerrilla command.
  • That it demonstrated a recognition that some kind of senior command and control of guerrilla forces needed to be achieved, even if it was poorly thought out and executed.

CCRAK’s problems were:

  • That it did not follow doctrine that called for an independent theater-level special operations command.
  • That it was not given effective command and control of the Army’s guerrilla units until it was too late to make a difference.
  • That confusion surrounding CCRAK and its mission, combined with constant reorganizations, created a cloud of uncertainty.
  • That bureaucratic infighting between the U.S. Army and the CIA, and within staff sections of FEC headquarters, reduced unit effectiveness.
  • That it made no attempt to become a truly joint or combined command.

ENDNOTES

  1. BG (Ret) Glenn Muggelberg, COL (Ret) Paul W. Steinbeck, and LTC (Ret) Michael A. Matzko, Interview by COL Rod Paschall and Dr. Edward J. Drea, 15 November 1985, Project 85-S, Korean Partisan Operations, United States Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC), Carlisle, PA, 14-15, Muggelberg quote from 11. [return]
  2. Frederick W. Cleaver, George Fitzpatrick, John Ponturo, et al., “UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954,” AFFE Group Technical Memorandum ORO-T-64, Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, June 1956 (hereafter ORO Study), 91-93, quote from 91. [return]
  3. ORO Study, 91-93; Ed[ward C.] Evanhoe, Darkmoon: Eighth Army SpecialOperations in the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 158-59. [return]
  4. ORO Study, 91. [return]
  5. BG (Ret) Glenn Muggelberg, COL (Ret) Paul W. Steinbeck, and LTC (Ret) Michael A. Matzko, Interview by COL Rod Paschall and Dr. Edward J. Drea, 15 November 1985, Project 85-S, Korean Partisan Operations, USAHEC, 14-15, Muggelberg quote from 15. [return]
  6. ORO Study, 91. More information on the incident has surfaced in recent years through declassified reports. According to Fifth Air Force, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, Air Intelligence Information Report #IR 3478-55, “USAF Personnel Possibly Alive in Communist Captivity,” 19 October 1955, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. Records list the missing aircrew present at the GREEN DRAGON site as: 1LT Harold P. Turner, 1LT Arthur R. Olsen, 2LT John P. Shaddick, 1LT Gilbert L. Ashley, Jr., AM2 Hidemaro S. Ishida The five suspected missing Americans were from the crew of a B-29A bomber that was downed by MiG fighters the night of 29 January 1953 about 10-12 miles south of P’yongyang, North Korea. According to the reports, the recovery aircraft was in voice communication with a person identifying himself as 1LT Ashley during the recovery mission. Ashley (?) provided them with a run-in heading and talked to them throughout. For more details, see: Defense Prisoner of War-Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), “Korean War Aircraft Loss Database” (KORWALD), on the Internet at: http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/korea/reports/air/, last accessed on 12 March 2013. [return]
  7. “UN Partisan Forces,” 7-8. The same source has dozens of other examples where friendly guerrillas were inadvertently engaged by Allied vessels or aircraft. [return]
  8. ORO Study, 36-39; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “CIA in Korea, 1946-1965,” Vol. 1, DDO HP 283, July 1973, Extract, 122-23; Message, HQ, Korean Navy, Pusan, 17 January 1951, GF/Rush/127 Hah, included in 8086th Army Unit (AU), Armed Forces Far East (AFFE) Military History Detachment-3, “UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 1951-1952,” Project MHD-3, Center of Military History (CMH), Fort McNair, DC, (hereafter “UN Partisan Forces”), 29. [return]
  9. Boyd Hubbard, Jr., “Special Activities Unit Number One (Operating Instructions),” 5 March 1951; C.A.L. Dickey, “Guerrilla Activity-Sabotage-North Korea,” 9 March 1951, “UN Partisan Forces”; Memorandum, “Guerrilla Activity – Sabotage – North Korea,” 9 March 1951, in “UN Partisan Forces,” 46-48; Memorandum to Chief of Staff, “Conference aboard the HMS Belfast, 14 March on Friendly Partisan Activity on West Coast of Korea,” 17 March 1951, in “UN Partisan Forces,” 59-60. [return]
  10. Justin M. Haynes, “Intelligence Failure in Korea: Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s Role in the United Nations Command’s Defeat in November, 1950”(master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College, 1995), 8; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 142; Roger F. Kropf, “The US Air Force in Korea: Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Power,” Airpower Journal (Spring 1990), republished on the Internet at: http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj90/spr90/3spr90.htm, last accessed on 6 December 2012, 1-2; Peter T. Sinclair, II, “Men of Destiny: The American and Filipino Guerillas During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines,” School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2012, 38-41; Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, “History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1977,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Study, 1977, 1-4, 11. Normal staff functioning places operations under the staff direction of the G-3. According to the U.S. Army’s own doctrinal publication in place at that time (FM 31-21), the theater command should “organize a theater special forces command on the same level as the theater army, navy, and air” commands, and that “All units engaged in special forces operations and responsible to the theater commander are assigned to” that command (Department of the Army, FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare [Washington, DC: GPO, October 1951], 21-31, quote from 25). By disregarding that doctrine, FEC created a dysfunctional organization with no authority to accomplish the operational tasks it was assigned. [return]
  11. Department of the Army, FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1951), 21-31, quote from 25). FEC habitually went against accepted doctrinal and procedural practices where guerrillas were concerned. Rather than simply applying the principles that had been developed in the crucible of past conflicts, FEC instead invented different ways of organizing for unconventional warfare operations. In general, their departures from accepted practices failed. A theater-level command for all special operations units would have solved most of the problems FEC identified. [return]
  12. Kropf, “The US Air Force in Korea,” 1-2, quote from 2. [return]
  13. There are a number of critical studies on both the lack of ‘jointness’ in MacArthur’s FEC and his propensity for controlling every aspect within his theater. For example, during WWII MacArthur refused to allow the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to operate within his theater because he believed it would report to external entities rather than solely through him. Along the same lines, MacArthur strongly resisted having the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operate in his theater, although pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the political side forced him to grudgingly accept a CIA presence. See Joint History Office, “The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995, 11-16, 20-21; Haynes, “Intelligence Failure in Korea,” 8. [return]
  14. ORO Study, 36. [return]
  15. ORO Study, 34-36; FEC Liaison Group, APO 301, “Subject: Guerrilla Activity – Sabotage – North Korea,” 9 March 1951, in “UN Partisan Forces,” 46-48; John P. Finnegan, “The Evolution of US Army HUMINT: Intelligence Operations in the Korean War,” Studies in Intelligence 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011), 60-61. FEC/LG had been originally formed under the cover name of the 442nd Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment (Finnegan, “Evolution of US Army HUMINT,” 60-61). [return]
  16. Morning Report, “FEC Ln Gp 8240th AU, Hq & Sv Cmd GHQ FEC,” 26 July 1951, NPRC; ORO Study, 36-41, quote from 37; U.S. Army, Official Army Register, 1951 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), 174, 585; FEC Liaison Group, APO 301, “Subject: Guerrilla Activity – Sabotage – North Korea,” 9 March 1951, in “UN Partisan Forces,” 46-48; Finnegan, “Evolution of US Army HUMINT,” 60-63. [return]
  17. Morning Report, “FEC Ln Gp 8240th AU, Hq & Sv Cmd GHQ FEC,” 26 July 1951, NPRC; ORO Study, 36-41, quote from 37; U.S. Army, Official Army Register, 1951 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), 174, 585; FEC Liaison Group, APO 301, “Subject: Guerrilla Activity – Sabotage – North Korea,” 9 March 1951, in “UN Partisan Forces,” 46-48; Finnegan, “Evolution of US Army HUMINT,” 60-63. For more information regarding LTC Samuel V. Koster and the Army’s guerrilla command, see the article in this issue and: Michael E. Krivdo, “Creating an Army Guerrilla Command, Part One: The First Six Months,” Veritas 8, no. 2 (2012), 12-26. [return]
  18. U.S. Army, Official Army Register, 1951, 60; Morning Report, “FEC Ln Gp 8240th AU, Hq & Sv Cmd GHQ FEC,” 1 August 1951, NPRC; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1962: Origins of a ‘Special Warfare’ Capability for the United States Army,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1979, 9-11; U.S. Department of State, “Verbatim Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee,” Washington, DC, 3 December 1948, reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1945-1950, Retrospective Volume, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 881-92; FRUS, 892-902; Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley, Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley, eds., The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda, and Special Operations (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 37, quote from text; Stanley P. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002), 495; Neil D. Lankford, ed., OSS Against the Reich: The WWII Diaries of Colonel David K. E. Bruce (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991), 143, see note 11 (231). COL Blakeney was a Regular Army Field Artillery officer with a WWII background in psychological warfare operations. On 26 July 1942, Blakeney became Chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch of the Army G-2, holding that position until it was dissolved on 31 December 1942. In July 1944, he served as the Press Relations Officer for GEN George S. Patton’s Third Army and was relieved of those duties for a security violation. Sent to work in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) Psychological Warfare Department, Blakeney recovered from that setback and worked in the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), a forerunner of the CIA, in the interwar years. In early 1950 he transferred to FEC to serve as an intelligence staff officer in the FEC’s G-2 section before moving up to head the JSOB. [return]
  19. Senior CIA Representative Far East Command to Chief, FE, “Review of Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK),” 6 March 1952, found online at http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp, accessed 21 April 2010. Operationally, the U.S. Navy commander in charge of island defense split his responsibilities into West Coast and East Coast Defense Commands. For most of the war the British Navy or Commonwealth Naval Forces handled the West Coast defenses, while the U.S. Navy exercised command over the East Coast islands (see: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 423; U.S. Navy Historical Division, “Korean War: Chronology of U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations,” January–April 1952, available on the Internet at: http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron52a.htm, last accessed 10 December 2012). [return]
  20. Senior CIA Representative Far East Command to Chief, FE, “Review of Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK),” 6 March 1952, found online at http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp, accessed 21 April 2010; CIA, Clandestine Services History, “The Secret War in Korea, June 1950 to June 1952,” CS Historical Paper No. 52, 17 July 1968, Extract, 74. [return]
  21. General Order 90, GHQ, FEC, 7 December 1951; General Order 975, HQ, EUSA, 10 December 1951; ORO Study, 36-37, 57, 64, quote from 64. [return]
  22. ORO Study, 36-37, 57, 64-66. [return]
  23. Thomas Reeka, interviewed by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 25 August 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  24. CCRAK abrogated what minimal authority it had in advising FEC/LG by issuing “no detailed operational directive … during the first year of operations.” It did that by design because “it was felt that this experimental organization required time before its organization, functions and appropriate command relationships, both lateral and vertical, could be established without impeding natural growth and development” (see: “Covert & Clandestine Activities in Korea (JLS 53),” 11 February 1953, Digital National Security Archive, quotes from text). [return]
  25. ORO Study, 64-66; Richard M. Ripley, Interview with Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, and Mr. Eugene Piasecki, 28 July 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  26. LTC (Ret) Michael A. Matzko, interview by Dr. Edward J. Drea, 15 November 1985, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA; FE Division, CIA, “The Secret War in Korea: June 1950 to June 1952,” 11; “Covert & Clandestine Activities in Korea (JLS 53).” [return]
  27. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “The 8240th Army Unit: Unconventional Warfare in the Korean Conflict” Special Forces: The First Fifty Years, (Tampa, FL: Faircount, LLC, 2002), 110. [return]
  28. “Covert & Clandestine Activities in Korea (JLS 53),” 11 February 1953, Digital National Security Archive. [return]
  29. John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century (New York: Summit Books, 1991), 181-82. [return]
  30. ORO Study, 64-66. [return]
  31. ORO Study, 66-69. [return]
  32. In WWII, Archibald W. Stuart was primarily involved with the Nisei and served as the Assistant Commandant of the Military Intelligence Service Language School (1942-44), and commander of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, G-2, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA).After the war, he joined the Counter Intelligence Corps. In the Korean War, he commanded the 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division. By this time, the head of CCRAK was a brigadier general. [return]
  33. ORO Study, 143-44. [return]
  34. ORO Study, 144. [return]
  35. ORO Study, 112. [return]
  36. Colonel Paul W. Steinbeck, interviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Martin W. Andresen, 15 November 1985, United States Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA, quote from text. [return]
  37. LTC Francis R. Purcell, Interviewed by LTC A[rthur].S. Daley and MAJ B[illy].C. Mossman, 13 May 1953, included in “UN Partisans in the Korean Conflict,” 252. [return]
  38. Former TF WOLFPACK Commander, Richard M. Ripley, interviewed by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, Mr. Eugene Piasecki, 28 July 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, quote from text. [return]
  39. U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-18, Special Forces Operations, 5 March 2012, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2-7. [return]