From Hangar to Housing

On the morning of 13 January 1990, approximately 2,500 Panamanian displaced civilians (DCs) arrived by bus and disembarked outside the entrance to Albrook Air Force Station. The DCs, whose homes had been destroyed during the early hours of Operation JUST CAUSE, initially found refuge at the Balboa High School, but had to relocate so the school could reopen for classes. Major (MAJ) Richard M. Cheek, Commander, Company C, 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion, oversaw the conversion of a former Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) hangar into a new temporary housing facility in just two weeks. This article briefly explains the situation that led to MAJ Cheek’s mission, and how, as the project manager, he successfully worked through local, interagency and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to accomplish this difficult task.

On 20 December 1989, U.S. forces launched Operation JUST CAUSE to remove Panamanian dictator Manual Noriega from power. Three teams, of four to three men each, from Company A, 96th CA, which was focused on Latin-America, were attached to units of the 75th Ranger Regiment for their assaults at the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport Complex and Rio Hato.1 The rest of the 130-man 96th CA Battalion had not been scheduled to participate in the invasion. Planners had not anticipated how quickly they would have to implement post-combat stabilization efforts, under the civil-military operations plan dubbed BLIND LOGIC. That realization set in early on 20 December when U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Commander, General (GEN) Maxwell R. Thurman, told Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Colin L. Powell, that no CA units were “available in the theater to support my mission requirements.”2 GEN Powell immediately ordered the 96th CA Battalion (-) to deploy to Panama. The bulk of the 130-man unit left Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and arrived at Howard Air Force Base, Panama, on 22 December. Once in Panama, Joint Task Force (JTF)-South tasked the 96th CA with a variety of on-the-spot situational missions and to provide teams to tactical units throughout the country.

Broader map of the Balboa site, with key locations marked. — Broader map of the Balboa site.

One key but unplanned mission the 96th CA received was to run an impromptu DC facility located at the Balboa High School. In the course of the early fighting for the PDF headquarters, La Comandancia, a fire raged through packed shanties in the nearby poverty-stricken neighborhood of El Chorillo. With nowhere else to go, thousands of homeless Panamanians squatted on the Balboa High School grounds, threatening an unanticipated potential humanitarian disaster. To prevent this, ten soldiers from Company D, 96th CA Battalion administered the facility and solved problems concerning sanitation, food distribution, housing, and medical issues. While most of the DCs found housing with family or friends, some 2,500 remained when the facility was scheduled to close so the Balboa High School could reopen for classes on 16 January 1990.3

MAJ Richard M. Cheek had been on Christmas leave in Indiana when JUST CAUSE began. As the commander of Company C, operationally oriented to the Middle East, neither MAJ Cheek nor the 96th CA Battalion leadership anticipated immediate deployment to Panama. On 20 December, as the 96th CA was preparing to deploy, LTC Peters called MAJ Cheek and directed him to get to Panama as soon as possible. Driving through a snowstorm to Fort Bragg, MAJ Cheek caught a military transport and arrived in Panama on Christmas Day .4

Once on the ground, MAJ Cheek found that his soldiers in Company C, who had previously deployed without him, were already assigned to missions throughout Panama. Because the 96th was the only CA unit in Panama, JTF-South tasked it with multiple simultaneous missions. To meet those expectations, LTC Peters had to use every soldier available, and split up his companies and teams as required. With the other 96th company commanders already tasked, MAJ Cheek’s arrival was a godsend to the 96th CA command, which needed a field grade officer to oversee unexpected contingencies. LTC Peters tasked him with pop-up assignments until 27 December. Anticipating that another housing facility would be needed, Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Peters, Commander, 96th CA Battalion, directed his Company C Commander, MAJ Cheek, to establish a new DC housing facility.5

Picture of SSG Edward P. Onan sitting in a chair with a notepad and pen. — SSG Edward P. Onan

Cheek was put in charge of the project, with no greater elaboration or tasking authority other than “get it done.”6 Because soldiers from the 96th CA were detailed to other missions, he could only expect to receive occasional help and guidance from the battalion staff at nearby Fort Clayton, which was just over a mile away. However, Cheek did have the assistance of supply Staff Sergeant (SSG) Edwin P. Onan, who functioned as an informal liaison with the battalion staff. “Onan,” Cheek noted, “would help scrounge [supplies] and run errands. He had a hundred tasks.”7 In addition, MAJ Cheek visited and talked with the personnel who ran the Balboa DC facility.8 From them, he understood the critical needs that had to be met: sanitation, housing, and medical care. Finally, in early January, when reserve CA personnel deployed to Panama, Cheek received translator assistance from SGT Gabrielle Calderon. However, managing the effort was firmly on Cheek’s shoulders. Despite having no experience in refugee assistance, he became the ‘go-to guy’ who had to solve a multitude of tasks and problems of all sizes to be successful.9

Jack Carrol, American Red Cross, and Alejandro James, USAID, provided considerable help during the DC facility construction.

MAJ Cheek’s first stop was gaining further guidance from JTF-South, which was directing operations in Panama and would be his tasking authority. There, LTC A. Dwayne Aaron, the J-5 (Civil Affairs), briefed Cheek and said, based on the number then at Balboa, that a new facility to house 10,000 DCs was needed.10 While at JTF-South, MAJ Cheek also fortuitously met with Alejandro James, a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) representative. James explained that his agency could assist by providing critical funding and supplies.

MAJ Cheek then went to the existing Balboa DC facility, where he saw first-hand the scale, complexity, and urgency of his task. Although they had to learn ‘on the fly,’ the 96th CA personnel running Balboa provided insight on the major areas MAJ Cheek had to address. The CA soldiers were also a sounding board for solutions that might work best to meet the DC’s basic needs at the new facility. With their perspective in mind, Cheek planned and coordinated until 31 December, when the United States Army-South (USARSO) Corps of Engineers offered a former PDF hangar at Albrook Air Force Station, to become the site of the new DC facility.11

A composite view shows the size of the hangar.

With the location established, Cheek went to assess the habitability of the hangar. What he found was less than promising. The hangar was still packed with vehicles, many of which had been stolen by the PDF from U.S. owners, and it held large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and surprisingly, toys and sports equipment. Fortunately, USARSO Engineers had already been tasked by their command to fix the basic problems in the hangar and to install needed amenities.

The engineers removed the cars, weapons, and ammunition; however, Cheek requested to retain the toys and sports equipment for distribution to the DCs when they arrived.12 The engineers then cleaned the hangar, fixed lighting problems and leaks in the roof, installed showers and toilets, and sited dumpsters for trash. Their efforts provided basic sanitation needs for the facility.13 Cheek then determined that he needed to find assistance to create housing facilities and the necessary amenities within the hangar. Fortunately, help arrived the next day from an unexpected source.14

Working in the hangar that afternoon, Cheek was considering how to establish housing for the DCs when a limousine pulled up. A woman inside beckoned him over and asked for a tour. She said her name was Teresa Reyes Calderón, but MAJ Cheek “had no clue who she was.” He thought that she was among the numerous dignitaries whose visits only managed to delay progress. Cheek remembered, “I had plenty of people pop in and offer advice, but they did not stick around” to help implement it.15 MAJ Cheek politely told his visitor that he was busy, but that she could “walk around and then ask questions.” Señora Calderón interrupted MAJ Cheek and said, “I am the vice president’s wife. I am here to help.”16 That got Cheek’s attention and prompted him to give her a tour. Calderón proved to be a godsend. She was a forceful and tireless partner, who visited the facility daily and worked closely with MAJ Cheek to improve the site. Calderón leveraged her substantial connections with Panamanian government officials to obtain the badly needed personnel and funds to make the project a success.17 In order to help establish the post-Noriega government, she was adamant that Panamanians personally did the work to ready the hangar to house families.

CA reservist SGT Gabrielle Calderon provided translator support when needed. Most of the time, the Panamanians spoke enough English that MAJ Cheek, a non-Spanish speaker, could communicate.

As a first step, Calderón obtained the services of a Panamanian government architect. The architect designed housing cubicles, specifying how they would be constructed and laid out within the hangar. He designed each cubicle to house a family of four. Each space was marked on the floors. Señora Calderón then arranged for Panamanian public works employees to put up the cubicles. The public works employees were to frame out the cubicles with lumber and then line them with cloth for privacy. Calderon explained to the workers that although they were employees of the Panamanian government, they still reported directly to MAJ Cheek and were to follow his orders. Panamanian workers had hand tools, but needed construction supplies.18

The shortage of building materials prompted Cheek to reach out to Alejandro James, the USAID representative he met during his initial survey of the situation. James provided USAID funds to contract a nearby sawmill to produce and deliver the lumber needed to construct the cubicles. Through USAID, James also purchased sufficient rolls of tarpaulin-like material to line the cubicle walls. Finally, he arranged for USAID to deliver five thousand cots and blankets to Albrook.19 With the cubicles being built, MAJ Cheek turned his attention to other details.

In particular, Cheek wanted to improve the amenities. Although U.S. Army engineers had already installed toilets, they stood out in the open. Cheek directed some of the Panamanian workers who were working on the cubicles to also create privacy partitions for use between the commodes. Then, he designated half of them for male use, and the rest for females. Similarly, USARSO engineers had constructed rudimentary showers, but had not made enough to designate some for male or female use. To solve that problem, Cheek set different times when each sex could use the bathing facilities. For clothes washing, MAJ Cheek asked the engineers to construct a row of sinks outside the hangar. After the clothes were washed, the DCs would dry them on clothes lines, using cord provided by MAJ Cheek.20

After U.S. Army Engineers constructed toilets, MAJ Cheek had partitions and privacy screens installed.

The toilet, showering, and washing facilities were basic, but functional. With U.S. standards in mind, MAJ Cheek did not think that they were enough. He expressed his concern over the lack of hot running water and seats on the toilets to Señora Calderón. She replied that the facility was a dramatic improvement over the DCs’ pre-conflict living standards.21 El Chorillo had been a densely-packed, poverty-stricken neighborhood of tin shanties and wood buildings with neither running water nor flushing toilets.22 Relieved that his efforts more than met the need, MAJ Cheek concentrated on providing cooking facilities.

MAJ Cheek discusses the sanitation facilities with Señora Calderón. She told him that the facilities, while basic to him, were nicer than what the DCs had prior to the war.

Again, Alejandro James and USAID were able to help. James introduced Cheek to Jack Carrol of the American Red Cross, who was temporarily working for USAID. Carrol offered his assistance in coordinating the efforts of local Catholic charities that had volunteered to provide food and cooks. While Carrol worked out the details, Cheek obtained excess U.S. Army mobile kitchens from USARSO. With the mobile kitchens, the Catholic volunteers could prepare basic fare of rice, beans, and pork.23 As a finishing touch, Cheek directed the Panamanian laborers to construct picnic-style tables to provide seating for the DCs to eat. Cheek then turned his attention to putting systems in place to help the DCs’ better manage their family responsibilities.

Believing it critical to their daily life, MAJ Cheek designated space in the hangar for child care. MAJ Cheek reasoned that because the DCs had lost much of the community support that the El Chorillo barrio had provided, those who were employed outside the facility needed someone to watch their children while they were away. Plus, having the children under supervision would also make managing the facility easier. Again, the local Catholic churches stepped in and agreed to provide volunteers to supervise the children while their parents worked. Because MAJ Cheek had the foresight to keep the toys and sports equipment that had originally been in the hangar, he was able to turn those items over to the child care center staff. Then, MAJ Cheek asked Calderón to direct the local bus system to establish a stop near the entrance to the facility to provide much needed transportation for the DCs to get back and forth to work.24 MAJ Cheek also arranged for the DCs’ mail to be delivered to Albrook and also had four payphones installed outside the facility.25

This photo shows the location of the dispensary relative to the hangar that housed many of the DCs. CPT Margaret V. Cain, 361st CA Brigade, was responsible for getting the dispensary operational.

The last major essential item was health care. Fortunately, the Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF), an organization composed of CA reservists that fell under the J-5 directorate of JTF-South, dispatched Captain (CPT) Margaret V. Cain of the 361st CA Brigade to Albrook in early January.26 She told Cheek, who did not know beforehand that she was coming, that she was a nurse when not on active duty. MAJ Cheek directed her to create an infirmary out of a vacant building near the hangar. CPT Cain obtained sufficient medical equipment and supplies from nearby U.S. Army Gorgas Hospital and got the infirmary operational so rapidly that the elderly residents from Balboa arrived at Albrook days earlier than the other DCs. Cheek recalled that CPT Cain was “super” and that her work took a lot “off my plate.”27 The only issue remaining was completing the housing.

Unfortunately, due to a lack of power tools, construction of the cubicles lagged behind, threatening to prevent the on-schedule transfer. Señora Calderón wanted construction of the cubicle to be done with only Panamanian labor; however, by 7 January 1990, only 30 had been completed. As a result, they could only house 120 of the then-planned for 2,500 DCs.28 Once again, Señora Calderón proved invaluable. On 8 January, she mentioned to MAJ Cheek that she was going to dinner that evening with the Commanding General, USARSO, Major General (MG) Marc A. Cisneros, and she asked if Cheek needed anything.29 Cheek told her that he needed an engineer unit to speed the cubicle construction. The next day, MG Cisneros visited Albrook and asked Cheek directly, “What do you need to be done in four days?” MAJ Cheek replied “an engineer unit.” MG Cisneros agreed to the request if the major would personally guarantee that the facility would be ready in that time frame.30 When MAJ Cheek replied in the affirmative, MG Cisneros arranged for the U.S. Air Force 24th Civil Engineering Squadron to provide the needed labor.31 The airmen brought power tools and “got cubicles up one after another.”32 By 11 January, all of the planned 506 cubicles were completed.33 However, that still was not enough to house all the DCs, so Cheek had concurrently asked Señora Calderón for additional Panamanian labor. He directed them to erect General Purpose (GP) Medium tents outside the hangar to house single males. Everything was then set for the DCs to move from Balboa on 13 January 1990.

Once MG Cisneros obtained the assistance of the U.S. Air Force 24th Civil Engineering Squadron to help with cubicle construction, the pace picked up dramatically.

On that day, the DCs at Balboa boarded buses according to a schedule created by members of Company D, 96th CA Battalion. The 1st Psychological Operations Battalion also provided soldiers who used loudspeakers to provide information to calm the crowds.34 Because of space limitations on the busses, each DC was only allowed to hand carry a single bag of personnel items. The rest of their belongings were consolidated and then transported by truck for the mile drive to Albrook, where U.S. soldiers stood ready to help unload. A detachment from 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, provided security to prevent any outside interference from lingering Noriega supporters.35 Meanwhile, while 96th CA personnel helped unload passengers from the buses, MAJ Cheek saw to any last-minute tasks. However, the job of actually processing the DCs into Albrook was an all Panama affair.

Señora Calderón led that effort. In order to show the approximately 2,500 DCs that the post-Noriega government of Panama truly cared about them, she insisted on personally registering each person. The Panamanian Red Cross then showed each family to its assigned cubicle and escorted the single males to their tents. Although the process took hours, moving day proceeded without incident. That allowed the 96th CA Battalion to then turn the DC mission over to Colonel (COL) William W. Graham, 361st CA Brigade, who took command of the Albrook facility.36

Despite having no experience in project management or DC operations, MAJ Cheek worked by, with, and through partners to construct a DC facility in only two weeks. As he described it, “I fought my war with a steno book and a pen.”37 He added, “I was an Infantry Officer assigned to CA. I had never built anything in my life. It was a tough job and the learning curve was huge.”38 Nonetheless, his efforts produced the required provided food, clothing, and shelter to sustain 2,500 Panamanians, significantly lessening the suffering of those displaced during Operation JUST CAUSE. For Cheek, the experience helped him begin a career in disaster management after retiring from the Army in 1991.

Displaced civilians are shown to their housing cubicles on 13 January 1990. Through the open hangar door are some of the GP Medium tents used to house single males.

ENDNOTES

For more on 96th CA operations at the Torrijos-Tocumen Airport Complex, see Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, “Civil Affairs Supports the Assault:Company A, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion at the Torrijos International Airport Terminal” in Veritas:Journal of Army Special Operations History 16, no. 1 (2020), on internet at https://arsof-history.org/articles/20jan_ca_in_the_assault_page_1.html ^[return]
Ronald H. Cole, Operation JUST CAUSE Panama, (Washington DC: Joint History Office, 1995), 46. ^[return]
For more on 96th CA operations at the Balboa DC Facility, see Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, “Averting Disaster: Company D, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion at the Displaced Civilians Facility” in Veritas:Journal of Army Special Operations History 16, no. 1 (2020), on internet at https://arsof-history.org/articles/20apr_averting_disaster_page_1.html ^[return]
Richard M. Cheek, interviewed by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 2 December 2019, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC.Hereafter Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
Richard M. Cheek, email to Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, SUBJECT:Albrook, 31 November 2020, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. Hereafter Richard M. Cheek email. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
Richard M. Cheek email. ^[return]
Richard M. Cheek, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 23 June 2020, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Hereafter Cheek interview, 23 June 2020. Cheek did have CA training and had planned for refugee assistance for an exercise in Kenya in 1989. ^[return]
COL William W. Graham, “Situation Report=DC Team=1700, 6 Jan-1700, 7 Jan,” 7 January 1990, located in Folder “After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) includes Daily Situation Reports (1-30 Jan 1990),” p. 67, Civil Affairs-Latin America, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019; Civil Affairs Task Force, “Chronological Events Displaced Civilian Community,” [1990], located in Folder, “Civil Affairs Chronology-Ancon, Panama Chronological Events Jan 1990,” USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Only one vehicle remained, which was a van said to be owned by Noriega himself. That van was secured by the XVIII Corps G-2. Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
A platoon from the 193rd Infantry Brigade provided security. ^[return]
Richard M. Cheek, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 19 January 2018, USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Hereafter, Cheek interview, 19 January 2018. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
Calderón had a brush with danger, when, several days later, she walked into a nearby building and found some PDF soldiers hiding. She called for MAJ Cheek to come over and take them into custody, then “chewed out” the PDF members for supporting Noriega. Hungry, unarmed, and tired from days in hiding, the PDF members offered no resistance. Cheek turned them over to the 193rd Infantry Brigade soldiers who were providing security. Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 23 June 2020. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 23 June 2020. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 23 June 2020. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 23 June 2020. Calderón was in fact worried that the facility would be too nice, and the DCs would not want to return to their homes. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 23 June 2020. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
COL William W. Graham, “Situation Report=DC Team=1700, 6 Jan-1700, 7 Jan,” 7 January 1990, located in Folder “After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) includes Daily Situation Reports (1-30 Jan 1990),” p. 68, Civil Affairs-Latin America, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
COL William W. Graham, “Situation Report=DC Team=1700, 9 Jan-1700, 10 Jan,” 10 January 1990, located in Folder “After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) includes Daily Situation Reports (1-30 Jan 1990),” p. 115, Civil Affairs-Latin America, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Reserve CA elements began to deploy to Panama in early January 1990.Calling them up and processing them through USASOC, while rapid, meant that they could not deploy as fast as active-duty units. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
COL William W. Graham, “Situation Report=DC Team=1700, 6 Jan-1700, 7 Jan,” 7 January 1990, p. 68. ^[return]
COL William W. Graham, “Situation Report=DC Team=1700, 7 Jan-1700, 8 Jan,” 8 January 1990, located in Folder “After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) includes Daily Situation Reports (1-30 Jan 1990),” p. 77, Civil Affairs-Latin America, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019; Cheek interview, 19 January 2018. ^[return]
COL William W. Graham, “Situation Report=DC Team=1700, 9 Jan-1700, 10 Jan,” 10 January 1990, p. 116. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019; Cheek interview, 19 January 2018. ^[return]
COL William W. Graham, “Situation Report=DC Team=1700, 10 Jan-1700, 11 Jan,” 11 January 1990, located in Folder “After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) includes Daily Situation Reports (1-30 Jan 1990),” p. 140, Civil Affairs-Latin America, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
“Civil Affairs Sitrep 14,” 12 January 1990, located in Folder “After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) includes Daily Situation Reports (1-30 Jan 1990),” p. 174, Civil Affairs-Latin America, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
COL William W. Graham, “Situation Report=DC Team=1700, 10 Jan-1700, 11 Jan,” 11 January 1990, p. 140. ^[return]
COL William W. Graham, “Situation Report=DC Team=1700, 12 Jan-1700, 13 Jan,” 13 January 1990, located in Folder “After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) includes Daily Situation Reports (1-30 Jan 1990),” p. 207, Civil Affairs-Latin America, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. COL Graham and elements of the 361st controlled the facility until 19 January, when the facility became the responsibility of USAID and the Panamanian Red Cross. COL Kenneth D. Strong, “Civil Affairs After Action Report-Operation JUST CAUSE,” [1990], located in Folder “Civil Affairs After Action Report-Operation Just Cause-Panama, 361st CA Brigade-1 Jan-28 Feb 1990;” Civil Affairs-Latin America, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]
Cheek interview, 2 December 2019. ^[return]

From Hangar to Housing

Providing Shelter for Displaced Civilians in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE

ENDNOTES