Iraqi soldiers surrender to U.S. Marines during Operation DESERT STORM in early 1991. In the preceding months, U.S. Army PSYOP loudspeaker teams had been attached to the Marines and other U.S. and coalition units for the purpose of encouraging enemy forces to cease resistance. (Image credit: NARA)

PSYOP HISTORY

“Building the Airplane in Flight”

PSYOP in Operation DESERT SHIELD, Part 2

By Jared M. Tracy, PhD

Published July 2022

ABSTRACT

Though challenging, the first phase of U.S. Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) deployments to Saudi Arabia was complete by mid-October 1990. The second phase was complicated by U.S. Army Reserve mobilizations, resulting in the delayed arrival of more PSYOP soldiers until the eve of war in January 1991. Getting a robust PSYOP structure in place was difficult, but in the end, the right soldiers, equipment, and relationships were in place to wage a large-scale PSYOP campaign during Operation DESERT STORM.

SIDEBAR

PSYOP Radio Systems in Operation DESERT SHIELD

TAKEAWAYS
  • More than 400 soldiers from active-duty PSYOP units deployed to the theater of operations between August and October 1990; they were joined by roughly another 200 soldiers, many from USAR PSYOP units, in January 1991
  • PSYOP units were assigned to the 8th POTF and would follow the same themes set forth in the overarching PSYOP plan; however, due to the unique missionsets (including radio, loudspeaker, print, and EPW operations) and the need to support units across the coalition, the PSYOP campaign itself would be executed in a decentralized manner
  • Between frequent pre-war 8th POB TDYs to USCENTCOM; 13th POB field training with the 800th MP Brigade at Fort A.P. Hill in mid-1990; and the recent combat mission in Panama (1989-1990), many PSYOP leaders and soldiers were well-prepared when it came time for Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
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A previous article, “Rising from the Ashes: PSYOP in Operation DESERT SHIELD,” described the state of U.S. Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces after Vietnam, the background to Operation DESERT SHIELD in the Middle East, and the difficulties of getting a theater PSYOP plan approved in late 1990. As that article explained, no PSYOP units were stationed in the area of operations when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, although a handful of 8th PSYOP Battalion (POB) soldiers were on Temporary Duty (TDY) with the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia. During that month, they were joined by a few loudspeaker teams accompanying an 82nd Airborne Division rapid deployment force, as well as the theater-level Joint PSYOP Group (JPOG), led by Colonel (COL) Anthony H. Normand, commander of the Fort Bragg, North Carolina-based 4th PSYOP Group (POG). Behind the scenes, plans were underway for a much larger PSYOP presence in anticipation of a wider conflict.

ABOVE: Iraqi soldiers surrender to U.S. Marines during Operation DESERT STORM in early 1991. In the preceding months, U.S. Army PSYOP loudspeaker teams had been attached to the Marines and other U.S. and coalition units for the purpose of encouraging enemy forces to cease resistance. (Image credit: NARA)

4th PSYOP Group Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI)
4th PSYOP Group Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI)

This article details PSYOP deployments during Operation DESERT SHIELD. Between the invasion of Kuwait and the coalition’s initiation of hostilities on 17 January 1991, some 600 soldiers from across the active and reserve component PSYOP force deployed to Saudi Arabia. They were supported by EC-130 VOLANT SOLO aircraft from the 193rd Special Operations Group (SOG). Finally, one PSYOP team deployed to Bahrain to assist the U.S. Information Service (USIS) with Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts, while another deployed to support Joint Task Force (JTF) Proven Force, headquartered at Incirlik, Turkey. Getting the organizational and technical infrastructure in place to wage a landmark PSYOP campaign in support of a massive multinational coalition was no small feat.

Initial Active-Duty PSYOP Deployments

LTC Jeffrey B. Jones, commander of 8th POB/8th POTF during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
LTC Jeffrey B. Jones, commander of 8th POB/8th POTF during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

A week after the Iraqi invasion, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), General (GEN) Carl W. Stiner, ordered the deployment of a PSYOP battalion no later than 24 August 1990, to coincide with conventionaland special operations forces deployments. The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)-aligned 8th POB, also based at Fort Bragg, was the clear choice, although the initial timeline proved to be ambitious. The 8th POB commander, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jeffrey B. Jones, did deploy with the JPOG in late August, but the balance of his battalion did not begin overseas movement until 6 September (with planned completion by 4 October). Within a week of the start of 8th POB’s deployments, 105 soldiers from across the PSYOP force had arrived in Saudi Arabia.1

8th POB DUI
8th POB DUI

The 8th POB formed the core of the 8th PSYOP Task Force (POTF), an ad hoc, task-organized element consisting of soldiers and units from across the active-duty and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) PSYOP force. Assigned to U.S. Army, Central (USARCENT), the 8th POTF headquarters (HQ) occupied space at both the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) building (along with the JPOG) and at HQ, USARCENT, in Riyadh. On paper, 8th POTF was the higher headquarters for deployed PSYOP units; in reality, PSYOP forces would be arrayed throughout the entire coalition and were responsible to their supported combat arms units. This would result in a PSYOP effort that was centralized in its themes and intent, but decentralized in execution.

LTC Jones (front center) poses with other deployed PSYOP soldiers during the Persian Gulf War. Note that some are wearing the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command (USACAPOC) shoulder sleeve insignia (left) while others wear the 1st Special Operations Command patch (right). With USACAPOC activated in late 1990, this was a period of organizational transition.
LTC Jones (front center) poses with other deployed PSYOP soldiers during the Persian Gulf War. Note that some are wearing the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command (USACAPOC) shoulder sleeve insignia (left) while others wear the 1st Special Operations Command patch (right). With USACAPOC activated in late 1990, this was a period of organizational transition.

As the 8th POTF commander, LTC Jones had general authority for executing the broad theater PSYOP plan; however, as explained in the previous article, that plan (BURNING HAWK) had been mired in the Pentagon bureaucracy for months awaiting approval. In addition, PSYOP-peculiar equipment arrived slowly and piecemeal, forcing reliance on host nation assets early on. While not an ideal or long-term solution, 8th POTF had access to Saudi TV Channel 2, Saudi Ministry of Defense (MoD) production studios, print facilities, and some Arabic linguists, much of this previously arranged by the PSYOP NCOs at USMTM.2

CPT Robert Simmons, commander of the PDB Broadcast Company, pauses for a photo while enroute to Al Qaisumah in December 1990.
CPT Robert Simmons, commander of the PDB Broadcast Company, pauses for a photo while enroute to Al Qaisumah in December 1990.
9th POB DUI
9th POB DUI
DUI for the 3rd POB, successor to the DESERT SHIELD-era PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB)
DUI for the 3rd POB, successor to the DESERT SHIELD-era PDB

There was a spike in PSYOP deployments throughout September 1990. By mid-month, most 8th POB soldiers slated for deployment had arrived. They were joined in theater by soldiers from the Fort Bragg-based 9th POB, commanded by LTC Thomas D. Washburn. While the 9th POB deployed as a battalion, its soldiers would be broken into small tactical loudspeaker teams and attached to combat units across the coalition. Also deploying was the newly activated PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB) (later reflagged as the 3rd POB). The first PDB soldiers came from the Broadcast Company, commanded by Captain (CPT) Robert Simmons. Behind them were the PDB commander, LTC James P. Kelliher, his staff, and soldiers from the Print and Signal Companies (commanded by CPTs David Milani and Susan Forsythe, respectively). Upon arrival, the PDB commander, staff, and print elements occupied facilities at King Fahd International Airport (KFIA), near Dammam on the east coast of Saudi Arabia.3

Aerial view of King Fahd International Airport (KFIA), home of the PDB and two EC-130 VOLANT SOLO aircraft from the 193rd SOG during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
Aerial view of King Fahd International Airport (KFIA), home of the PDB and two EC-130 VOLANT SOLO aircraft from the 193rd SOG during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

With the JPOG and 8th POTF in Riyadh and the 9th POB spread out across the coalition, the PDB was the lone Army PSYOP unit at KFIA. While LTC Kelliher trekked back and forth to Riyadh—around 500 miles round-trip—to discuss plans with COL Normand and LTC Jones, his staff coordinated with local units for food, medical, and dental support. Another order of business was contracting to pave the print facility because “dust was everywhere,” said Kelliher.4 In addition, Signal Company soldiers helped establish a secure communications link between Riyadh, KFIA, and broadcasting outstations at Al Qaisumah and Abu Ali Island, Saudi Arabia, using secured telephone lines provided bythe Saudi-owned Aramco oil company. Kelliher described these collective efforts as “building the airplane in flight.”5

This photo was taken inside the PDB compound at KFIA, late 1990. The PDB was the only Army PSYOP unit permanently stationed at KFIA during the Persian Gulf War.
This photo was taken inside the PDB compound at KFIA, late 1990. The PDB was the only Army PSYOP unit permanently stationed at KFIA during the Persian Gulf War.
PDB soldiers fill sandbags for a bunker to protect against Scud missile attacks. As it turned out, within Saudi Arabia, KFIA would be spared from Scud missiles, unlike Riyadh, King Khalid Military City (KKMC), and Dhahran.
PDB soldiers fill sandbags for a bunker to protect against Scud missile attacks. As it turned out, within Saudi Arabia, KFIA would be spared from Scud missiles, unlike Riyadh, King Khalid Military City (KKMC), and Dhahran.

By 6 October, there were 257 soldiers from PSYOP units deployed; another rush brought the number to 414 by 19 October, roughly the status quo for the next three months.6 Helping these units deploy from Fort Bragg was Major (MAJ) James A. Treadwell, the 4th POG S-3, who was aided by Staff Sergeant (SSG) Steven L. Carney, S-3 Air NCO. Since becoming the S-3 in February, Treadwell had been gathering after-action reviews from Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, helping PSYOP soldiers redeploy from Panama, and assisting 4th POG reorganization efforts, including 9th POB’s transition to a tactical battalion and PDB’s activation. The frenzied first weeks of DESERT SHIELD forced him to focus instead on deploying PSYOP soldiers from Pope Air Force Base (AFB), North Carolina. Deployments were “fitful,” Treadwell recalled. “We didn’t get a lot of airflow initially,” with PSYOP units competing for seats with combat units.7 Compounding the challenges of deploying battalions’ worth of PSYOP soldiers, the Group S-3 team had to coordinate the transport of PSYOP-peculiar equipment to Charleston, South Carolina, for maritime shipment to Saudi Arabia. “It was painful for us because we had never deployed our big equipment like that,” said Treadwell,“especially not in a hurry.”8

A C-5A Galaxy aircraft stands ready on the flight line at Pope Air Force Base, NC, during Operation DESERT SHIELD. PSYOP units had to compete with combat units for seats on airframes destined for Saudi Arabia, causing soldiers to arrive piecemeal.
A C-5A Galaxy aircraft stands ready on the flight line at Pope Air Force Base, NC, during Operation DESERT SHIELD. PSYOP units had to compete with combat units for seats on airframes destined for Saudi Arabia, causing soldiers to arrive piecemeal.

Getting PSYOP Equipment and Teams in Place

After the Iraqi invasion, radio was identified as a key medium to reach target audiences. On 16 August 1990, the Commander-in-Chief, USCENTCOM (CINCCENT), GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr., validated the requirement for multiple radio transmitters, although it took months for them to arrivein theater and to be emplaced. The three radio systems deployed during Operation DESERT SHIELD and operational during DESERT STORM were the Transportable AM Transmitter — 10 kw (TAMT-10); the PSYOP Airmobile Dissemination System (PAMDIS); and the 50 kw AN/TRT-22 (see “PSYOP Radio Systems” sidebar for system features and locations).

Leaflets were expected to be another major aspect of the overall PSYOP effort. As previously mentioned, PDB print elements were located at KFIA. These included two Medium Print Systems and a Modular Print System. Each Medium Print System consisted of a Heidelberg press loaded into an early 1970s-era five-ton M820 Expansible Van truck. “Although dated,” according to one PDB report, “this truck provides the most mobile platform for our critical Heidelberg presses.”9 The Modular Print System consisted of three modules:

  • One editorial and one print shelter, each mounted on a 2½-ton truck
  • Two dolly-mounted shelters with Heidelberg presses
  • One dolly-mounted shelter with a paper cutter

The same PDB report noted that while the Modular Print System “demonstrated its efficiency,” its “mobility [as a system] is limited.”10

Modular Printing System

Modular Printing System
Two S-280 shelters mounted on 2½-ton trucks comprising the light print plant.
Two S-280 shelters mounted on 2½-ton trucks comprising the light print plant.
The light print plant in operation.
The light print plant in operation.
The heavier Heidelberg press.
The heavier Heidelberg press.

In addition to these printing systems, leaflet rolling machines (to facilitate loading into leaflet bombs) and hollowed 155mm artillery shells (modified to carry leaflets) began shipment to Saudi Arabia in August 1990. Also delivered were M129A1 leaflet bombs, each able to be filled with up to ten 14-inch-diameter leaflet rolls; capable of delivering up to 60,000 leaflets; and configured for B-52 Stratofortress and F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. The PDB had responsibility for loading and readying the leaflet bombs, and then arranging their transport to various airfields. The delayed approval of the PSYOP plan (BURNING HAWK) did not stop the production of leaflets. Developed by both the 8th POTF and the Combined PSYOP Cell in Riyadh, leaflets stressed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s responsibility for the crisis, world opposition to Iraq’s actions, and the hopelessness of the Iraqi soldiers against overwhelming coalition firepower.11

The B-52 Stratofortress and F-16 Fighting Falcon were the two delivery platforms for the M129A1 leaflet bombs during the Persian Gulf War.
The B-52 Stratofortress and F-16 Fighting Falcon were the two delivery platforms for the M129A1 leaflet bombs during the Persian Gulf War.
A ground crew prepares to load a leaflet bomb onto an F-16 in Dammam, Saudi Arabia.
A ground crew prepares to load a leaflet bomb onto an F-16 in Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

To complement radio broadcasts and leaflets, PSYOP soldiers also made plans for video products. However, the 8th POTF initially only had one system on-hand to produce videotapes, limiting its output to only two videos produced by mid-October. To avoid an overreliance on host-nation equipment and facilities and to give the POTF enhanced capability, on 19 October, USCENTCOM received a request from USARCENT to facilitate expedited shipment of a TSQ-171/Television — Transmitter 5 kw (TV-T5) mobile television and video production system to Saudi Arabia. Less than two weeks from the time of the request, ten soldiers and a civilian technician from 4th POG had deployed with the TSQ-171/TV-T5.12 The system was slated for installation at Khafji in northeast Saudi Arabia just below the Kuwaiti border. However, the TSQ-171 remained at KFIA during combat operations, which later proved fortunate given Iraq’ssurprise, though ultimately unsuccessful, incursion into Khafji during Operation DESERT STORM three months later.13

A soldier mans a TSQ-171/TV-T5 mobile television and video production system, which remained at KFIA during combat operations.
A soldier mans a TSQ-171/TV-T5 mobile television and video production system, which remained at KFIA during combat operations.

As radio, leaflet, and video equipment trickled into theater, one to two-man loudspeaker teams from 9th POB began dispersing throughout the coalition (primarily XVIII Airborne Corps units). The 8th POTF allotted some Arabic speakers to the loudspeaker mission, but not enough for every team. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) at Fort Bragg also tried to identify Arabic speakers within its formations for this mission. However, there were never enough to go around, which forced PSYOP units to rely on pre-taped messages and Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti interpreters.14 Another problem was a shortage of serviceable vehicle-mounted and man-pack loudspeaker systems. On 10 September 1990, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) directed USASOC and the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to procure enough loudspeaker systems for units in Saudi Arabia. Amidst efforts to increase the stockpile of loudspeaker systems through normal Army procurement channels, stateside USAR PSYOP units scrambled to locate unused loudspeakers, vehicles, and other equipment to lend to 4th POG for DESERT SHIELD.15

On paper, a Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) would consist of three NCOs for tactical loudspeaker operations. In reality, loudspeaker teams consisted of, at most, two NCOs. Those lacking an Arabic-speaking capability or an attached interpreter relied on pre-recorded tapes.
On paper, a Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) would consist of three NCOs for tactical loudspeaker operations. In reality, loudspeaker teams consisted of, at most, two NCOs. Those lacking an Arabic-speaking capability or an attached interpreter relied on pre-recorded tapes.

Into early 1991, the 8th POTF (with around fifty loudspeaker systems in its possession) shuffled loudspeaker teams around the coalition. By that point, loudspeaker teams had been attached to the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions, 1st Cavalry Division, 24th Infantry Division (ID), 5th Special Forces Group (SFG), the 16th Military Police (MP) Brigade, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions (MARDIVs), and other units from U.S. Marine Corps Central (MARCENT) (which alone would ultimately have around 25 teams). A 9th POB team was also attached to the 18th Aviation Brigade to man a 2,700-watt loudspeaker (with a two to three-mile range), mounted on a UH-1H Iroquois (‘Huey’) helicopter.16

A 9th POB team mounts a 2,700-watt loudspeaker onto a helicopter belonging to the18th Aviation Brigade.
A 9th POB team mounts a 2,700-watt loudspeaker onto a helicopter belonging to the18th Aviation Brigade.

To help integrate PSYOP into operational planning, including loudspeaker team assignments and activities, the 8th POTF seeded Liaison Officer (LNO) teams throughout the coalition. Like the loudspeaker teams, the LNO team requirement fell heavily on 9th POB. In early 1991, there were LNO teams at USARCENT, XVIII Airborne Corps, the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) from Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT), MARCENT, the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th ID, the 3rd ACR, and the 16th MP Brigade.17 Despite the in-theater presence of more than 400 soldiers from PSYOP units, there were still not enough to support the entire coalition.

Requirement and Request for Additional PSYOP Forces

When U.S. President George H.W. Bush ordered the deployment of VII Corps and an additional 200,000 troops to DESERT SHIELD in early November, it quickly became apparent that the existing PSYOP presence in Saudi Arabia would not suffice. At least another active-duty battalion was needed. In addition, before relinquishing command of 4th POG in December 1990, COL Normand asked for 100 reserve component augmentees, citing the need for additional loudspeaker teams at the tactical level.18 This new force package would theoretically bring the total number of loudspeaker teams to 70, each with one or two PSYOP NCOs and, ideally, an Arabic speaker.19

On 1 December, USCENTCOM received the formal request for additional forces, which would consist of some 200 soldiers and equipment from the Fort Bragg-based 6th POB and select USAR units. Ten days later, GEN Schwarzkopf forwarded to theJoint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) his request for these forces to deploy no later than 16 January 1991. In addition, 4th POG tasked the Europe-oriented 6th POB to deploy a cell to support the soon-to-be-activated JTF Proven Force in Turkey, which was slated to launch an air campaign against northern Iraq once hostilities started.20

6th POB DUI
6th POB DUI

Approval for additional PSYOP forces happened quickly, though deployment less so. On 20 December, GEN Schwarzkopf learned that Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney had authorized this movement, which had prompted the Chairman of the JCS, GEN Colin L. Powell, to issue the deployment order. Commanded by LTC Jay R. Savage, the 6th POB would deploy approximately 95 soldiers, 12 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 26 Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles (CUCVs), five M35 2½-ton trucks, a mobile print plant, trailers, and other equipment. Augmenting 6th POB would be soldiers and equipment from the following USAR PSYOP Companies (POCs): 18th, 19th, 244th, 245th, and 362nd. Each company would deploy a 15-man detachment (four 3-man loudspeaker teams, an officer-in-charge, a noncommissioned officer-in-charge, and a maintenance technician), except for the 245th, with an 18-man detachment and five loudspeaker teams. Finally, for enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) operations, the Army would mobilize 32 soldiers from the USAR 13th POB (EPW) from Fort Snelling, Minnesota, commanded by LTC James P. Noll. This second wave of PSYOP deployments, including challenges associated with USAR mobilizations, is described below.21

An EC-130 VOLANT SOLO aircraft of the 193rd SOG, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, taxis on the runway. The 193rd supported Army PSYOP forces in Panama in 1989-1990, and again in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991.
An EC-130 VOLANT SOLO aircraft of the 193rd SOG, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, taxis on the runway. The 193rd supported Army PSYOP forces in Panama in 1989-1990, and again in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991.

Deployment of National Guard and Reserve PSYOP Forces

The first non-active-duty PSYOP element deployed was not from the USAR, but from the Pennsylvania Air National Guard. Headquartered in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the 193rd SOG utilized EC-130 VOLANT SOLO aircraft to provide radio jamming and broadcasting capabilities to PSYOP forces. With a lineage dating to the Vietnam War, the 193rd had recently supported PSYOP forces in Panama. Just after the Iraqi invasion, its VOLANT SOLO aircraft were again requested. In late August, two of these planes, one of them carrying COL Normand and the JPOG, arrived at KFIA, where they would ultimately be collocated with the PDB headquarters.22 The 193rd SOG contingent was assigned to USCENTCOM Air Forces (CENTAF), not the 8th POTF, but it had a close coordinating relationship with the task force.

Like the 8th POTF, the 193rd SOG crews had to wait for approval of the theater PSYOP plan (and for the 15 January deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait) before they could broadcast PSYOP messages. VOLANT SOLO crewmembers shared their Army PSYOP colleagues’frustration that this was time wasted (as explained in the previous article). Accordingto one crewman, “In five months we could have been shaping the attitudes of the enemy and [the U.S.] … elected not to use the capability.”23 In the meantime, the 193rd SOG was authorized to retransmit VOA broadcasts into Kuwait and Iraq, and monitor and record Iraqi broadcasts, which it did until combat operations began on 17 January. After that, VOLANT SOLO became a key component of the Voice of the Gulf network.

13th POB DUI
13th POB DUI

The second aspect of reserve deployments involved PSYOP units for both EPW operations (the 13th POB) and tactical loudspeaker missions (18th, 19th, 244th, 245th, and 362nd POCs). The 13th POB had a running start prior to mobilization. In July 1990, just before Iraq invaded Kuwait, the 13th POB held its two-week annual training (AT) at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. Fortuitously, during AT, it supported the USAR 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade, from Hempstead, New York, which it later supported in Saudi Arabia. LTC Noll, the 13th POB commander, stated that the exercise “showed that [we were] in a superior state of readiness, and with the exception of some missing or outdated equipment, could be mobilized immediately.”24 He was understating the problem with equipment. The battalion’s vehicles and loudspeaker systems were obsolete or unserviceable, and its AN/MSQ-85 Audiovisual Unit was incomplete. Over the next few weeks, the battalion procured a new series of loudspeaker (AN/LSS-40), as well as AN/MSQ-85 parts and other equipment, thereby improving its overall deployment posture.25

The USAR 13th POB was the only PSYOP unit with the Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) mission. Here, 13th POB soldiers conduct annual training at a mock EPW camp, which it did routinely prior to 1990. Training exercises like this helped it prepare for real-world operations during the Persian Gulf War.
The USAR 13th POB was the only PSYOP unit with the Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) mission. Here, 13th POB soldiers conduct annual training at a mock EPW camp, which it did routinely prior to 1990. Training exercises like this helped it prepare for real-world operations during the Persian Gulf War.

Fresh off its AT exercise and soon after the invasionof Kuwait, the 13th POB knew that it would likely deploy. On 6 August 1990, at Fort Bragg, LTC Daniel D. Devlin relinquished command of 6th POB to LTC Savage to assume PSYOP advisory and liaison duties in Cairo, Egypt. Among the attendees at the change of command ceremony was LTC Noll, who received a verbal warning order (WARNO) from local USASOC and PSYOP leadersin attendance that his battalion, the only one with an EPW mission, should expect to be deployed.26 Within two weeks, USASOC officially informed USSOCOM that the 4th POG would need USAR augmentation, a message that quickly made it down to select PSYOP units, among them the 13th POB.27 For the next few weeks, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) worked on validation criteria, USAR time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), and issuing mobilization orders.28 In effect, these notifications marked the beginning of a months-long mobilization process.

The 13th POB began to get organized for deployment, to include drafting its annex to the theater DESERT STORM Operation Order (OPORD). This annex specified the following. First, the 13th POB would attach camp teams to MP units to assist the “evacuation, administration, and internment of [EPWs and Civilian Internees (CIs)].” Second, its PSYOP priorities would include “pre-testing and post-testing of PSYOP products, identification of cooperative EPWs for PSYOP exploitation, and collection of PSYOP specific information for use by PSYOP units employed within the AO.” Finally, the 13th POB would be assigned to the 8th POTF. It would deploy with loudspeakers and the AN/MSQ-85B system.29 Housed in an S-280 shelter mounted on a HMMWV, the AN/MSQ-85 could produce and conduct A/V presentations, develop 35mm slides, make broadcasts from a 350-watt AN/LSS-40 loudspeaker system, and print a limited number of leaflets.30

The 350-watt AN/LSS-40s were utilized by dismounted loudspeaker teams. They had an effective range of 700 to 1000 meters and could sustain operations for up to three hours on a fully charged battery.
The 350-watt AN/LSS-40s were utilized by dismounted loudspeaker teams. They had an effective range of 700 to 1000 meters and could sustain operations for up to three hours on a fully charged battery.
Diagram depicting a typical AN/MSQ-85A setup.
The 13th POB deployed with an AN/MSQ-85B Audiovisual Unit. The diagram depicts a typical AN/MSQ-85A setup.

Meanwhile, USAR PSYOP soldiers were also needed for tactical loudspeaker operations. On 16 November 1990, USASOC tasked the soon-to-be-defunct U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC) to quantify the number of Arabic-speaking loudspeaker teams that it could deploy. After researching this question, USARSOC responded that it could field 49 loudspeaker teams, 36 man-pack loudspeaker systems, and 33 loudspeaker-mounted HMMWVs and jeeps, but provide only six Arabic speakers. (The 13th POB had two USCENTCOM linguists, Chief Warrant Officer 3 David L. Juba [Arabic] and Sergeant [SGT] Mark A. Felton [Farsi].)31 This input underscored the shortage of Arabic speakers, but also revealed that ample loudspeaker teams and valuable equipment resided in the reserve component.

USACAPOC SSI
USACAPOC SSI

On 27 November 1990, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) was activated under USASOC, replacing USARSOC and assuming command of all active and USAR CA and PSYOP units. An early priority for the USACAPOC Commanding General (CG), Brigadier General (BG) Joseph Hurteau, was a briefing from LTC Noll in Columbia, South Carolina, at the headquarters of the 306th Civil Affairs Command, about how the 13th POB would support four MP-run EPW camps in Saudi Arabia. Noll’s initial plan, based on a whole-battalion deployment, fell into disarray when he learned that only 32 members of his unit (approximately 25 percent) would deploy. “This was shocking news … as our organization and training focused around PSYOP camp teams… of 12-15 soldiers.”32 In addition to these camp teams, the standard 13th POB model was to deploy the command group, the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), a research and development section, print and audiovisual sections, and illustrators. The 32-man cap would drastically reduce the 13th POB footprint and capabilities.

“My thoughts at this time were that the [U.S.] had reached the [USAR] cap, and that was the reason we were being severely limited in deployable soldiers,” saidLTC Noll. The briefing to Hurteau, then, explained that each camp would instead have only five PSYOP-qualified soldiers, all supported by a skeletal staff of seven (commander, command sergeant major [CSM], the S-2, the S-3, an operations NCO, and two liaison officers [LNOs]), each with dual-hatted functions. Noll would have to be very selective about who would deploy. For instance, as Noll recounts:

“Because the 13th POB would be deployed … in a Moslem culture and be dealing directly with captured Moslem male prisoners, the unit was instructed not to include female PSYOP soldiers on the camp teams. Therefore, the battalion transferred a number of well-trained and capable female soldiers out of the camp teams and replaced them with males. This delicate situation was not popular with, but was accepted without incident by, the female soldiers involved.”

Led by the battalion Executive Officer (XO), the rest of the 13th POB would remain at Fort Snelling, ready in case the force cap was lifted. Satisfied with Noll’s modified plan, Hurteau directed him to prepare for this mission, although the battalion had nothing in writing yet. Meanwhile, the 13th POB identified 60 people for a two-week, pre-deployment training exercise at its home station starting on 17 December.33

With cooperation from engineers, Military Police construct EPW camps in support of combat operations. During the war, the 13th POB would support the 800th MP Brigade, which ran two Eastern camps (called ‘Bronx’), south of the Saudi Arabian town of An Nu-Arriyah, near Sarrar, and two Western camps (called ‘Brooklyn’), south of Hafer Al Batin and north of KKMC.
With cooperation from engineers, Military Police construct EPW camps in support of combat operations. During the war, the 13th POB would support the 800th MP Brigade, which ran two Eastern camps (called ‘Bronx’), south of the Saudi Arabian town of An Nu-Arriyah, near Sarrar, and two Western camps (called ‘Brooklyn’), south of Hafer Al Batin and north of KKMC.

The administrative process to deploy USAR PSYOP forces accelerated in December. On 7 December, USSOCOM issued a WARNOto USASOC that the 13th POB soldiers would deploy to support the 800th MP Brigade, a message in turn relayed to USACAPOC. Collaboration between USACAPOC, USASOC, and FORSCOM resulted in the establishment of derivative unit identification codes (DUICs) for a five-man advanced echelon (ADVON) and the 27-man main body from the 13th POB, and for five USAR PSYOP detachments for loudspeaker operations. By 14 December, USAR PSYOP personnel numbers were locked in:

  • 13th POB five-man ADVON, Fort Snelling, Minnesota
  • 13th POB 27-man main body, Fort Snelling, Minnesota
  • 18th POC, 15-man detachment, St. Louis, Missouri
  • 19th POC, 15-man detachment, Fort Snelling, Minnesota
  • 244th POC, 15-man detachment, Abilene, Texas
  • 245th POC, 18-man detachment, Dallas, Texas
  • 362nd POC, 15-man detachment, Fayetteville, Arkansas34

Fort Bragg would be the mobilization station for all deploying USAR PSYOP soldiers.35

Within days, USACAPOC issued Operation Plan (OPLAN) 03-91. According to this document, USACAPOC units would provide PSYOP teams “to deploy to Saudi Arabia in support of … assigned units. Teams will augment the PSYOP capability of [other] units and prepare to act as advance parties and liaison elements for follow-on forces.” The broad intent was to “provide fully qualified and validated PSYOP teams and units to [USCENTCOM] in support of DESERT SHIELD.”36 OPLAN 03-91 was soon followed by the 20 December JCS deployment order (DEPORD) for USAR PSYOP units. It was official; soldiers from the 13th POB and five USAR POCs were going to war.37

On 23 December, 13th POB received notification of its forthcoming 180-day mobilization, startingon Christmas Day. LTC Noll appealed this order and the date moved to 27 December. Meanwhile, on Christmas Eve, the 90th Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) issued procedural guidance for impending USAR deployments. First, units needed to deploy ADVONs to their designated mobilization station at least two days before the main body. Second, units needed to bring enough licensed operators for their equipment. And third, units needed to deploy with required modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and individual equipment (in serviceable condition), including Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) gear to protect from chemical agents. The same day, USACAPOC relayed this information to its units, reminding them that they can have their vehicles painted a single desert color (Tan 686) at either their home or mobilization station.38

Concerns about Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological (NBC) attacks by Iraqi forces prompted the U.S. military to prioritize NBC countermeasures. Here a U.S. servicemember demonstrates Mission-Oriented Protective Posture level 4 (MOPP-4) to visiting Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney in December 1990, during Operation DESERT SHIELD. MOPP equipment and proficiency were required of deployed forces, including reservists.
Concerns about Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological (NBC) attacks by Iraqi forces prompted the U.S. military to prioritize NBC countermeasures. Here a U.S. servicemember demonstrates Mission-Oriented Protective Posture level 4 (MOPP-4) to visiting Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney in December 1990, during Operation DESERT SHIELD. MOPP equipment and proficiency were required of deployed forces, including reservists.

Completing the administrative steps to deploy 110 USAR PSYOP soldiers was one thing. Ensuring the readiness of reservists who drilled one weekend a month and trained full-time for only two weeks a year was another. On 17 December, the 13th POB began an internal readiness enhancement program, focusing on physical training (PT), common task training, and military occupational specialty (MOS) skills.39 Three days later, USACAPOC informed its units of the official standards for deployment, since “there is less than a comprehensive understanding of mobilization procedures in some units.”40 The most alarming part of this memorandum was the requirement for all deploying USACAPOC soldiers to meet Special Operations Forces (SOF) validation standards.

SOF validation standards were daunting for reservists, who had to earn at least 70 percent on each PT test event (push-ups, sit-ups, and two-mile run). They needed to finish a 10-kilometer march with a weapon, load-bearing equipment, and a 55-pound rucksack, in two hours, and a 10-kilometer land navigation course with combat gear and rucksack in four hours. They had to pass a swim test wearing the battle dress uniform and boots. And they needed to score at least 90 percent on a written MOS test and, for applicable soldiers, at least 90 percent on the CA/PSYOP Leader’s Test. Among those concerned was Noll, who had heard rumors of SOF validation but downplayed it until the official order came in. Wanting to lead from the front, Noll set about improving his own physical conditioning while USAR PSYOP units hurried to get deploying soldiers prepared for validation.41

On 29 December, the 13th POB ADVON and vehicles departed for Fort Bragg. They were followed two days later by the main body, which flew by commercial air from the Minneapolis International Airport. Upon arrival at Fort Bragg, the reservists were assigned billeting, which was teeming with transient personnel.It was then that LTC Noll learned that the recently arrived 78 soldiers from the five POCs would report to him until arrival in Saudi Arabia, when they would be attached to other coalition units. “With the assignment of all activated Reserve PSYOP units under my command, I decided to call a meeting that same evening, for the officers and senior NCOs.” After brief introductions, “My expectations for training standards and personnel conduct were made emphatically clear … No longer would the companies look to their peacetime chain [of command], but to my battalion and staff for guidance and direction … to avoid unnecessary confusion or problems in control issues.”42 Attention shifted to validation.

The first event was the SOF PT test, conducted first thing on New Year’s Day, 1991, with a temperature in the mid-30s. LTC Noll “was sympathetic to the soldiers from our two Texas PSYOP companies [244th and 245th] … I wondered ifthe Texas reservists would be as sympathetic for us when we arrived to face the heat in the Saudi Arabian desert.” Out of 110 soldiers, only two did not complete the SOF PT test for medical reasons: the S-3 and the CSM. “Neither soldier would recover in time to deploy,” recalled Noll.43 CPT Sanderson Prescott, an LNO, assumed duties as the S-3. He was replaced as LNO by Second Lieutenant (2LT) David Cole, who flew in from Minnesota. The unit filled the S-3 and LNO positions using its own personnel; replacing the CSM position happened differently.

Fortuitously, Special Forces (SF) Sergeant Major (SGM) Robert S. McCarter knocked on the 13th POB orderly room door and requested the CSM job. He was already SOF validated and had a release from his present temporary duty in-hand. “My prayers had been answered,” remembered LTC Noll. “SGM McCarter was readily accepted by the soldiers of the battalion.” The reservists completed the SOF validation (minus the swim test due to a lack of time) and other administrative procedures without further loss. HMMWVs were “wired to accommodate the LSS-40 speaker systems that were being mounted … All vehicles were washed, dried, and painted the deserttan camouflage color scheme and new bumper markings added.” Unfortunately, XVIII Airborne Corps had exhausted the local supply of desert-camouflaged uniforms, meaning, “We were destined … to go to war in the wrong type of uniform.”44

The rapid deployment of U.S. forces after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait meant that not all personnel and equipment were fitted in time with desert-camouflage, as evidenced by these two photos. With XVIII Airborne Corps units having used the local supply of ‘chocolate chip’ uniforms, PSYOP reservists who mobilized through Fort Bragg had to deploy with the standard woodland-pattern Battle-Dress Uniforms (BDUs).
The rapid deployment of U.S. forces after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait meant that not all personnel and equipment were fitted in time with desert-camouflage, as evidenced by these two photos. With XVIII Airborne Corps units having used the local supply of ‘chocolate chip’ uniforms, PSYOP reservists who mobilized through Fort Bragg had to deploy with the standard woodland-pattern Battle-Dress Uniforms (BDUs).

All that remained was deployment. On 8 January, Noll learned that his group would arrive in Saudi Arabia by 14 January, the day before Iraq’s deadline to withdraw from Kuwait. The next day, the ADVON left Fayetteville via commercial air, arriving in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 11 January. From there, it arranged for the battalion to occupy a building in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia, near Dhahran. At 0400 hours on 12 January, the 13th POB left Pope AFB via a C-141 Starlifter, for Saudi Arabia, with stops at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, and Ramstein, Germany. Noll remembered, “The combination of [PT], maximum stress, minimum sleep, and … inoculations was beginning to take its toll … The question foremostin my mind at this time was what condition … the soldiers [would] be in once we landed in Saudi Arabia.” The main body arrived at Dhahran at 2200 hours on 13 January and rode to Al-Khobar. “Accommodations were beyond my expectations … A lot of credit was due our advance party for a job well done.”45 The 19th, 244th, and 245th POC soldiers departed from Pope AFB on 12 January; those from the 18th and 362nd POC left on 13 January.46 Nearly five months after Noll received the verbal WARNO, USAR PSYOP soldiers were finally joining Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The day after arriving, the jet-lagged 13th POB commander and staff linked up with the leadership of the recently arrived 800th MP Brigade, commanded by BG Joseph F. Conlon, III. Following an intelligence and operations briefing, the 13th POB was ordered to continue unit-level training until four EPW camps were established. In addition to routine daily contact, LTC Noll or First Lieutenant (1LT) Donald E. Sinnwell, an LNO, were to attend evening intelligence briefings held by the brigade. Finally, at the meeting, Noll informed Conlon that “the PSYOP camp teams [must] have 24-hour access to the EPW,” to which the general agreed. Things had gotten off on the right foot. “In retrospect, I feel the cooperation and sense of trust were the primary reasons for the superior results achieved by both units during the campaign.”47

Questioning Iraqi EPWs at the camps would be central to the 13th POB’s mission. Information gleaned from Iraqi soldiers in pre- and post-testing of products proved invaluable to the overall PSYOP effort once combat operations were underway.
Questioning Iraqi EPWs at the camps would be central to the 13th POB’s mission. Information gleaned from Iraqi soldiers in pre- and post-testing of products proved invaluable to the overall PSYOP effort once combat operations were underway.

After their meeting with BG Conlon, LTC Noll, CPT Prescott, and 2LT Cole made the 250-mile drive to Riyadh to meet with the new 4th POG/JPOG commander, COL Layton G. ‘Gerry’ Dunbar. By chance, they came across two 4th POG officers en route, who escorted them to the GCC building. They met the 8th POTF commander, LTC Jones, before speaking with Dunbar. Topics discussed included pre- and post-testing products on EPWs, passing intelligence from EPWs to 4th POG and the 8th POTF, and attaching soldiers from the USAR detachments to the 6th and 9th POBs. The meeting broke, but LTCs Noll, Jones, and Devlin (visiting from Cairo) reconvened for dinner that night, where Noll learned that Saudi Arabia had ‘green lit’ the U.S. PSYOP plan (though further host nation approval would not be needed once combat began).48 Having met with the 800th MP Brigade, 8th POTF, and 4th POG/JPOG leadership, the 13th POB was ready to get to work.

The final aspect of USAR PSYOP deployments was the assignment of a standalone, six-man USAR PSYOP team from the 306th POC from Los Alamitos, California, to assist the U.S. Information Service (USIS) with operating a VOA transmitter in Bahrain.49 On 18 December, the U.S. and Bahrain had agreed to emplace a radio station for VOA broadcasts. Ten days later, the JCS issued orders for this team to deploy for 45 days to get the VOA station operational no later than 14 January 1991.50 The plan was for the Government of Bahrain to furnish the site and USIS to furnish the Transportable AM Transmitter — 50 kw (TAMT-50). Meanwhile, the DoD would furnish the remaining equipment (including the antenna, shelters, two 200 kw generator sets, repair parts, and manuals), and handle transport, installation, and training. Soldiers from the 1199th Signal Battalion, who had helped construct radio antennas elsewhere, would do the same in Bahrain.

Around the New Year, the requirement changed from USACAPOC completing USIS’s TAMT-50 to the 306th POC deploying its own AN/TRT-22 system. The 306th POC would transport this heavy equipment about 400 miles away to Travis AFB, California. On 5 January 1991, the AR/TRT-22 and 200 kw generator left on board a C-141, later arriving at McGuire AFB. From there, it moved to Torrejhon, Spain, then to KFIA, and finally to Bahrain.51 Before leaving the States, the PSYOP team got separated from its equipment. According to the 7th POG, the 306th’s senior command, “During load procedures … it was discovered that there was not sufficient space for the [equipment] and the [soldiers]. The Air Force solution was to send [them] on another plane tomorrow, but this plane lands 60 miles away across the border.” The 7th POG argued, “It is imperative that the [soldiers] land with the [equipment].”52 However, this was not possible due to airflow schedules. As a workaround solution, USACAPOC and USASOC arranged to fly the team into KFIA, and have them moved to Bahrain by ground.53 Arriving by 8 January, the team proceeded to Bahrain to get the VOA station operational.

Conclusion

The process of deploying active-duty and USAR PSYOP units, personnel, and equipment in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was complicated but ultimately successful. The initial wave of soldiers from the active-duty 4th POG, 8th POB, 9th POB, and PDB resulted in more than 400 personnel arriving in-country between late August and mid-October 1990. The mobilization and deployment of some 200 additional soldiers from the active-duty 6th POB and USAR 13th POB and 18th, 19th, 244th, 245th, and 362nd POCs took another three months. On the eve of war in mid-January 1991, the disposition of PSYOP forces in theater was as follows:

  • The JPOG, 8th POTF, and Combined PSYOP Cell in Riyadh
  • PDB headquarters and print elements at KFIA
  • PDB teams manning TAMT-10 and PAMDIS transmitters in Al Qaisumah and an AN/TRT-22 on Abu Ali Island
  • Two EC-130 VOLANT SOLO from the 193rd SOG based at KFIA
  • Approximately seventy loudspeaker teams from the 6th and 9th POBs and 18th, 19th, 244th, 245th, and 362nd POCs, plus LNO teams, spread across the coalition
  • 13th POB (-) headquarters at Al-Khobar, ready to deploy camp teams
  • A six-man team from the 306th POC in Bahrain supporting USIS/VOA
  • A 17-man detachment from 6th POB attached to JTF Proven Force at Incirlik AFB, Turkey

It was this force that made such enormous and visible contributions to the U.S.-coalition victory in Operation DESERT STORM.

Locations of PSYOP Forces

Several lessons emerged from these PSYOP deployments between August 1990 and January 1991. First, it was clear that the initial PSYOP presence would not sufficefor a three corps-sized coalition in DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Rapidly deploying additional forces and equipment required significant effort and improvisation. Second, and related, USAR PSYOP mobilizations took time and might have fallen flat had the right people not been selected for deployment. Third, the dearth of Arabic speakers, and unavailability or unserviceability of equipment, forced an overreliance on host-nation assets early on. Finally, nearly one-third of the PSYOP force arrived in Saudi Arabia just before Operation DESERT STORM began. Obviously, scattering more than 200 jet-lagged soldiers, half of them reservists, across the coalition immediately prior to combat operations, and attaching most of them to units that they had likely never met before, was not ideal.

Still, there were number of positives. First, PSYOP had a running start when the U.S. initially responded to the Iraqi invasion. For example, the 4th POG, 8th, 9th, and 6th POBs, and the 193rd SOG had just recently supported Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. Further, 8th POB soldiers had traveled on temporary duty (TDY) to USCENTCOM prior to the invasion, giving them first-hand familiarity with the region.54 Second, although USAR PSYOP mobilizations were rocky, those units had adequate advance notice, giving them ample time to plan, prepare, procure or repair equipment, and select the best soldiers for the mission.

Third, while many units arrived in theater at the last minute, PSYOP was nonetheless able to get its LNOs and loudspeaker teams integrated across the coalition in a quick and efficient manner. Finally, according to Dunbar, “The command and control relationships were exactly the way they should have been,” due to the fact that “PSYOP operates across the entire breadth and depth of the battlefield.”55 In addition, the relationships within the POTF were cordial and effective. LTC Kelliher called it a “coalition of equals,” with no commanders vying for supremacy and all of them supporting each other.56 These positive relationships would prove essential when U.S. Army PSYOP setout to wage what became one of its most well-known and effective campaigns: Operation DESERT STORM.

Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank COL (ret.) James A. Treadwell, LTC (ret.) James P. Kelliher, and Mr. Douglas P. Elwell for their assistance to this article.

ENDNOTES

  1. USASOC, “Significant Activities/Events to Date,” n.d., Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, “SOF Deployment Status — 181330ZSEP90,” n.d., Folder 101, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter “SOF Deployment Status — 181330ZSEP90”; USASOC, “General Situation,” 12 September 1990, Folder 101, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  2. CDR, 4th POG, “SUBJECT: Informal PSYOP Update 10 Aug — 14 Sep 1990,” 14 September 1990, Folder 101, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter “Informal PSYOP Update 10 Aug — 14 Sep 1990.” [return]
  3. LTC (ret.) James P. Kelliher, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 30 March 2021, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Kelliher interview, 30 March 2021. [return]
  4. Kelliher interview, 30 March 2021. [return]
  5. Kelliher interview, 30 March 2021. [return]
  6. “Informal PSYOP Update 10 Aug — 14 Sep 1990”; USSOCOM, Psychological Operations During Desert Shield/Storm: A Post-Operational Analysis (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM, 1993), 3-6; USASOC, “General Situation,” 3 October 1990, Folder 102,Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis 070600R — 080600R OCT 90,” n.d., Folder 102, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. See also, USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis 220600R — 230600R OCT 90,” n.d., Folder 102, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; CG, USARCENT to USCINCCENT, “SUBJECT: PSYOP Report No. 44 as of 210900Z OCT 90,” 21 October 1990, Folder 102, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. There were 10 soldiers at USCENTCOM; 254 assigned to U.S. Army, Central (USARCENT) (98 in Riyadh, 156at KFIA); 130 at XVIII Abn Corps (116 from 9th POB, 14 from 6th POB); and 20 supporting Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT). [return]
  7. COL (ret.) James A. Treadwell, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 25 February 2021, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Treadwell interview, 25 February 2021. [return]
  8. Treadwell interview, 25 February 2021. [return]
  9. PDB, “Printing Operations,” n.d., copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  10. PDB, “Printing Operations.” [return]
  11. Psychological Operations During Desert Shield/Storm: A Post-Operational Analysis, 1-C-3; “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 260001 to 262400C DEC 90,” 27 December 1990, Folder 958, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; 4th POG, Leaflets of the Persian Gulf War(Fort Bragg, NC: 4th POG, 1991), 13; “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 030001 to 032400C JAN 91,” n.d., Folder 958, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 290001 to 292400C DEC 90,” n.d., Folder 958, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 030001 to 032400C JAN 91,” n.d., Folder 958, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  12. CG, USARCENT to USCINCCENT, “SUBJECT: Request for Immediate Deployment of the TV-T5 Mobile TV System,” 19 October 1990, Folder 102, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, “General Situation,” 28 October 1990, Folder 102, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis 010600R — 020600R NOV 90,” n.d., Folder 103, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. The TV-T5 had been in the original Time-Phase Force Deployment Document (TPFDD), but shipment was delayed due to modifications. [return]
  13. Douglas P. Elwell, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 12 January 2022, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  14. USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis, 050600R — 060600R DEC 90,” n.d., Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  15. USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis, 120600R — 130600R SEP 90,” n.d., Folder 101, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis, 100600R — 110600R DEC 90,” n.d., Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; CG, USACAPOC to CDRs, 5th POG, 7th POG, and 321st CA Group, “Equipment Requirement,” 22 December 1990, Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  16. Jeffrey B. Jones and Jack N. Summe, “Psychological Operations in DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and URBAN FREEDOM,” Institute of Land Warfare: Landpower Essay Series, No. 97-3 (August 1997): 5; Leafletsof the Persian Gulf War, 13; and “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 220001 to 222400C DEC 90,” 23 December 1990, “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 240001 to 242400C DEC 90,” n.d., “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 260001 to 262400C DEC 90,” 27 December 1990, “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 290001 to 292400C DEC 90,” n.d., “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 030001 to 032400C JAN 91,” n.d., “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 080001C to 082400C JAN 91,” n.d., and “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 260001 to 262400C DEC 90,” 27 December 1990, all in Folder 958, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  17. See daily reports in Folder 958, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  18. COL (ret.) Anthony H. Normand, interview with Richard D. Stewart, 10 October 1991, Folder 957, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Normand interview, 10 October 1991. [return]
  19. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, PSYOP at War: The Management of Strategic Information in Panama andthe Persian Gulf(Washington, DC: NDU, 1993), 15. [return]
  20. ARCENT to CINCCENT, “SUBJECT: Deployment of Additional PSYOP Support,” 30 November 1990, and “SUBJECT: Deployment of Additional PSYOP Support,” 1 December 1990, both in Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis, 060600R — 070600R,” n.d., Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USCINCCENT to Joint Staff, “SUBJECT: Request for Additional Forces Operation DESERT SHIELD,” 8 December 1990, Folder 244, Box 3-3B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; CDR, 4th POG to CG, USASOC, “SUBJECT: Request for Equipment in Excess of LTOE,” 6 December 1990, Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis, 190600R — 200600R DEC 90,” n.d., Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. The 4th POG submitted its request for USASOC approval to deploy additional soldiers and equipment, including 26 vehicles, on 6 December 1990. [return]
  21. CJCS to USCINCCENT, “SUBJECT: Deployment Order for Additional PSYOP Units for Operation DESERT SHIELD,” 20 December 1990, Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter “Deployment Order for Additional PSYOP Units,” 20 December 1990; 90th ARCOM to 97th and 120th ARCOM, “SUBJECT: Admin/Log Order 4,” 24 December 1990, Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; memorandum for CG, USASOC, “SUBJECT: PSYOP Unit PAX and Equipment Information,” 20 December 1990, Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. Breakdown of USAR personnel in each unit in OPLAN 03-91 and in various USAR PSYOP deployment rosters in Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. There is conflicting data whether 6th POB deployed with 96 or 92 personnel; regardless, it was nearly 100. [return]
  22. Psychological Operations During Desert Shield/Storm: A Post-Operational Analysis, 1-C-3; “SOF Deployment Status — 181330ZSEP90.” [return]
  23. Richard W. Stewart, Information Paper, “VOLANT SOLO and DESERT STORM,” n.d., 1-2, Folder 960, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter “VOLANT SOLO and DESERT STORM.” [return]
  24. COL James P. Noll, “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW) during Mobilization, DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and Demobilization” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 2-3. [return]
  25. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 2-3. [return]
  26. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 1-2. [return]
  27. USASOC to USSOCOM, “SUBJECT: Psychological Operations Support to DESERT SHIELD,” 18 August 1990, Folder 963, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. See also, CG, USASOC to USCINCSOC, “SUBJECT: Sustainment of ARSOF in Protracted DESERT SHIELD Operations,” 8 October 1990, 5, Folder 955, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  28. USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis, 160600 — 170600R SEP 90,” n.d., Folder 101, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter “SOF Deployment Status — 181330ZSEP90.” [return]
  29. HQ, 13th PSYOP Battalion, “ANNEX_____ (Psychological Operations) to Operation Order No _____,” 15 October 1990, Folder 244, Box 3-3B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  30. HQ, 13th PSYOP Battalion, “ANNEX_____ (Psychological Operations) to Operation Order No _____,” 15; 13th PSYOP Battalion, “Briefing Paper,” n.d., Folder 244, Box 3-3B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; 4th POG, Capabilities Handbook (Fort Bragg, NC: 1993), 16-17, 46-47; “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 4. The 13th POB also owned a modular printing system, but it did not deploy with it. [return]
  31. USARSOC to USASOC, “SUBJECT: PSYOP Loudspeaker Teams,” 1 December 1990, Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. USACAPOC observed in Lessons learned that “The CENTCOM-oriented USAR Civil Affairs and PSYOP units have very few personnel knowledgeable in KTO area languages and cultures.” See USACAPOC, “DESERT STORM Observations [Languages],” n.d., Folder 235, Box 3-3B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. For the 13th POB, see “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 5-6. For the need to activate USAR units to backfill active-duty PSYOP units for other contingency operations, see USSOCOM, no subject, 21 February 1991, Folder 240, Box 3-3B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USACAPOC, “DESERT STORM Observations [Mobilizations of USAR SOF Forces],” n.d., Folder 235, Box 3-3B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  32. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 9. [return]
  33. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 9-11. [return]
  34. The DUICs were as follows: 13th POB 5-man ADVON (WTLWA1); 13th POB 27-man main body (WTLWA2); 18th POC (WTMAA1); 19th POC (WTMDA1); 244th POC (WTMBA1); 245th POC (WTMCA1); and 362nd POC (WSQWA1). The purpose of a DUIC is to ‘carve out’ a subordinate (or derivative) unit from a parent unit in cases when the entire parent unit is not needed, particularly for deployment. See Cain E. Roberts, “Force Registration and Role of the Unit Identification Code Information Officer (UICIO),” 7 November 2017, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/254393. [return]
  35. USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis, 070600R — 080600R DEC 90,” n.d., Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC to FORSCOM, “SUBJECT: Derivative Unit Identification Codes (UIC) for DESERT SHIELD,” 8 December 1990, Folder 244,Box 3-3B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis, 120600R — 130600R DEC 90,” n.d., Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; CG, USACAPOC, to CG, USASOC, “USACAPOC Derivative UIC TDA Mobilization,” 10 December 1990, Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC, “DESERT SHIELD Synopsis, 110600R — 120600R DEC 90,” n.d., Folder 104, Box 3-2B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; FORSCOM to USASOC, “SUBJECT: Derivative Unit Identification Codes (UIC) for DESERT SHIELD,” 14 December 1990, Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USACAPOC to HQDA, “SUBJECT: Employment of USAR SOF Units in Support of DESERT STORM,” 18 December 1990, Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USASOC to FORSCOM, “SUBJECT: Establishment of MOB Stations for PSYOP Unit Derivative UICs,” 14 December 1990, Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  36. USACAPOC to2nd POG et al., “SUBJECT: USACAPOC OPLAN 03-91,” 17 December 1990, Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter OPLAN 03-91. [return]
  37. USASOC to USACAPOC, “SUBJECT: Alert Order—Select PSYOP Units,” 21 December 1990, Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  38. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 11-12, 64-65; USACAPOC to 2nd POG et al., “SUBJECT: Admin/LogOrder 4,” 24 December 1990, Folder 267, Box 3-3B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  39. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 11. [return]
  40. USACAPOC, “DESERT STORM Observations [USAR Mobilization],” n.d., Folder 235, Box 3-35, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  41. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 6-9. [return]
  42. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 12, 14-16. [return]
  43. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 16-17. [return]
  44. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 16-20, 22. [return]
  45. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 21-25. [return]
  46. Deployment Reports for 19th POC, 12 January 1991, 244th POC, 12 January 1991, and 245th POC, 12 January 1991, all in Folder 959,Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; deployment Reports for 18th POC, 13 January 1991, and 362nd POC, 13 January 1991, both in Folder 959, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USACAPOC, “DESERT STORM Observations [Insufficient Communication],” n.d., Folder 235, Box 3-3B, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USACAPOC, “DESERT SHIELD Observation Sheet [USACAPOC Contact with Deployed Units],” n.d., USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  47. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 25-26. [return]
  48. “The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (EPW),” 27-29. [return]
  49. “DoD/VOA Requirements List for Bahrain Medium-Wave Radio Relay Station in Support of Desert Shield,” n.d., Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USACAPOC to CG, PERSCOM, “SUBJECT: Conversion of Voice of America Desert Shield ADSW to TTAD,” 9 January 1991, Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. The team consisted of MAJJames A. Stronach, CW2 Donald L. Urista, SGT Harold A. Ford, and Specialists (SPCs) Everett B. Cooley, Matthew M. Martin, and Theodore A. Vagenas. [return]
  50. Psychological Operations During Desert Shield/Storm: A Post-Operational Analysis, 1-C-5; CJCS to HQDA et al., “SUBJECT: Deployment Orderin Support of Voice of America,” 28 December 1990, Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USCINCSOC to CG, USASOC, “SUBJECT: Deployment Order in Support of Voice of America,” 30 December 1990, Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, and  HQDA to CG, USASOC, “SUBJECT: Assembly and Training Support to VOA-Bahrain,” 28 December 1990, Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  51. CG, USASOC,to CG, USACAPOC, “SUBJECT: Equipment in Support of VOA,” 31 December 1990, Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; Conversation Record, “SUBJECT: Tasking of Mobile Radio Transmitter to Support VOA,” 31 December 1990, Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; Conversation Record, “SUBJECT: Status of Movement,” 6 January 1991, and Deployment Report for 306th POC (SDC), 5 January 1991, both in Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  52. Conversation Record, “SUBJECT: Load Problems—VOA Equipment at Travis AFB,” 5 January 1991, Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  53. Conversation Record, “SUBJECT: Update on VOA Equipment/PAX,” 5 January 1991, Folder 283,Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; Conversation Record, “SUBJECT:VOA Equip & PAX,” 5 January 1991, Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  54. “PSYOP in DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and URBAN FREEDOM,” 9. [return]
  55. COL (ret.) Layton G. Dunbar, interview with Stanley Sandler, 1991, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Dunbar interview, 1991. [return]
  56. Kelliher interview, 30 March 2021. [return]
  57. 4th POG, Capabilities Handbook (Fort Bragg, NC: 4th POG, 1993), 36-37. [return]
  58. Douglas P. Elwell, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 12 January 2022, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Elwell interview, 12 January 2022. [return]
  59. Robert Simmons, “Broadcast Operations,” n.d., 1, copy in USASOC History Office Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
  60. “Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 240001 to 242400C DEC 90,” n.d., Folder 958, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC“Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 270001 to 272400C DEC 90,” 28 December 1990, Folder 958, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Daily PSYOP Activities Report, 27 December 1990Jeffrey B. Jones and Jack N. Summe, “Psychological Operations in DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and URBAN FREEDOM,” Institute of Land Warfare: Landpower Essay Series, No. 97-3 (August 1997): 54th POG, Capabilities Handbook, 32-33. [return]
  61. Simmons, “Broadcast Operations,” 1-2. [return]
  62. Simmons, “Broadcast Operations,” 1-2. [return]
  63. Simmons, “Broadcast Operations,” 1. [return]
  64. The audio control shelter remained in Riyadh and the studio shelter was used for storage. However, another shelter was present to house the AN/TRR-18 receiver, which was used with but not technically part of the AN/TRT-22. See attached graphic for details. [return]
  65. USASOC to HQDA, “SUBJECT: 1199th Sig Bn Antenna Team,” 18 August 1990, 1-2, Folder 954, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NCCommander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) to USASOC, “Message #RUCJAAA2511,” 17 August 1990, Folder 954, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NCCG, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, to HQDA, “SUBJECT: Antenna Team Support for 4th POG,” 25 September 1990, Folder 954, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NCElwell interview, 12 January 2022. [return]
  66. “Radio Dissemination Equipment: AN/TRT-22 Transportable Radio Transmitter and AN/TRR-18 Transportable Radio Receiver,” n.d., Folder 283, Box 3-4A, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC“Daily PSYOP Activities Report: Period Covered: 260001 to 262400C DEC 90,” 27 December 1990, Folder 958, Box ADA-1, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]