*IAW USSOCOM Sanitization Protocol for Historical Articles on Classified Current Operations, pseudonyms are used for majors and below who are still on active duty, unless names have been publicly released for awards/decorations or DoD news release. Pseudonyms are identified with an asterisk. The eyes of personnel in photos are blocked out when not covered with dark visors or sunglasses, except when the photos were publicly released by a service or DoD. Source references (end notes) utilize the assigned pseudonym.
Validates the doctrinal model for command and control of Joint SOF
Highlights the inherent strengths of building a ‘framework’ around an SF Group
Advantages of utilizing existing command selection processes
Maximizes on ‘reachback’ capability to fill gaps and preserve force
Demonstrates the versatility and flexibility of the CJSOTF-A in extended combat environments
Successfully got Afghan SOF to assume responsibility as the primary engagement force
Southeastern Afghanistan, 2003
Weather-wise, 25 August 2003 began as it had in the past few weeks. As the sun cleared the mountains temperatures were in the 90s and would peak above 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The air was heavy with fine dust that clung to everything as vehicle-mounted soldiers of Operational Detachment - Alpha (ODA) 2056 (20th Special Forces Group [SFG]) scanned the area with binoculars. They were responding to the night ambush of an Afghanistan Militia Force (AMF) near the village of Day Chopan in southeast Afghanistan. The AMF had captured a ‘live’ enemy radio and the intense ‘chatter’ indicated the presence of a large enemy force in the hills north of Day Chopan. ODA 2056, mounted in two Land Rovers, a Toyota HiLux pickup truck, and an unarmored high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) (military utility vehicle known as a ‘Humvee’), was accompanied by two vehicles of AMF soldiers.1
At 0630 hours outside the small settlement of Da’udza’i, ODA 2056 received small arms fire from some hills two hundred meters on their flank. The SF team took immediate action and assaulted the attackers, who pulled back. Surprisingly, the Americans were re-engaged by even greater numbers. The Taliban were determined to keep friendly forces out of the area. While engaging the enemy, the team leader radioed details of the contact to higher headquarters. Recalcitrant enemy intentions raised suspicions at the CJSOTF-A. When the Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC) requested close air support (CAS), the Joint Operations Center (JOC) directed two U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B ‘Harrier II’ attack aircraft to support the ODA. They also forwarded the ODA 2056 contact report to Task Force (TF) 180, the headquarters for all American forces in Afghanistan, to add to their targeting cycle. The ‘Harriers’ made multiple bombing runs, temporarily reducing the enemy’s volume of effective fire.2
Map of the Day Chopan valley in northwest Zabul Province, showing the high relief. ODA 2056 conducted a mounted reconnaissance from Day Chopan to Da’udza’i on 25 August 2003, an action that led to Operation MOUNTAIN VIPER.
At the end of the day when ODA 2056 reported 14 enemy dead and many more wounded, the Taliban were stubbornly maintaining contact by replacing their losses. The CJSOTF-A had been getting more contact reports from other units operating in the Day Chopan District. These reports indicated the presence of a very large enemy stronghold. As the traffic volume grew at JTF 180, conventional U.S. Army forces made plans to exploit the SF findings. Special reconnaissance (SR) ODAs ‘fixed’ a substantial enemy force, prompting JTF 180 to plan, coordinate, and execute a major coalition offensive action that was labeled Operation MOUNTAIN VIPER.3
For the next two weeks SOF elements from CJSOTF-A provided the ‘eyes’ that pinpointed the Taliban forces and kept them ‘fixed’ with CAS to enableconventional ground force attacks against the stronghold in Day Chopan. MOUNTAIN VIPER became one of the most successful operations of 2003 in Afghanistan. SOF elements and coalition forces teamed up to inflict heavy casualties on the Taliban, denying them a base of operations in Zabul Province.4 Iraq reduced U.S. military interest thereafter.
This article covers the creation of the CJSOTF-A in early 2002, general operations for 13 years, and its deactivation in 2014. Organized by Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) phases, the key operational events which caused the CJSOTF-A to assume new missions are highlighted and placed in context with operational and strategic decisions redirecting efforts. While how the command and control functioned in CJSOTF-A is central, what happened at levels above and below makes the rationale for role and mission changes more understandable.
OEF (Afghanistan) Phase I (Liberation)
11 September 2001 - 30 November 2001
In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush directed military action against the perpetrators.6 Having determined that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda (AQ) terrorist network were responsible and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were providing them with support and safe haven, the National Command Authority made plans to defeat AQ and topple the Taliban in Afghanistan. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) had a key role in those plans. The Special Operations Command of U.S. Central Command (SOCCENT) formulated and conducted an unconventional warfare (UW) campaign to advise and assist Afghan elements willing to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan.7
Aerial view of Karshi Khanabad (K2) Airbase, Uzbekistan, early 2002.
COL John F. Mulholland Jr. (L), and GEN Richard B. Myers
The SOF UW campaign had two major components, each designed to fit the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, where indigenous forces (like the Northern Alliance [NA]) had long been fighting the Taliban, SOCCENT initially created JSOTF-North with an Air Force Special Operations unit tasked with Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operations. Air Force Colonel (COL) Frank J. Kisner, Commander, 16th Operations Group, Hurlburt Field, FL, got to Karshi-Khanabad (K2) Airbase in Uzbekistan on 5 October 2001 just as the advance echelon (ADVON) from 5th SFG arrived. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) air campaign was scheduled to begin 7 October.8 And, it did with air and missile attacks throughout Afghanistan.9
However, the intent of the National Command Authority (NCA) had been to put ‘boots on the ground’ in Afghanistan. U.S. Army SOF would spearhead that effort.10 As SF ODAs were infiltrating into Afghanistan to advise and assist the anti-Taliban groups, Army Rangers made parachute assaults to seize key Taliban leaders. Based on wartime alignment with CENTCOM, the 5th SFG, Fort Campbell, KY, would provide the Special Forces. COL John F. Mulholland Jr. would assume command of JSOTF-North when his SF teams began entering Afghanistan (10 October 2001). Understanding the sensitivity of that relationship, COL Kisner blended the two staffs into one seamless organization while suborning himself to Mulholland as Deputy Commander, JSOTF-North.11
Map showing initial SF ODAs operating with Northern Alliance (NA) forces in Northern Afghanistan, October 2001.
As the situation changed, SOCCENT divided Afghanistan roughly in half; JSOTF-N would conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW) in the northern half. Its mission was to kill or capture AQ leaders and to seize control from the Taliban. They would do this by training, equipping, and advising the Afghan forces willing to fight the Taliban. A major SF task was to control and direct U.S. and allied airpower to support the attacks on Taliban positions. ODAs, augmented by U.S. Air Force Combat Control Teams (CCT) and tactical air control parties (TACP), finalized preparations in isolation. In the darkness of 19-20 October 2001, the first two ODAs were flown into northern Afghanistan. MH-47E ‘Chinook’ helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) overcame challenges of inclement weather, high mountains, and low visibility to deliver the teams to their specified landing zones. More ODAs were inserted in the next few days, each establishing contact with anti-Taliban leadership throughout the north. Together with coalition air support, they pushed the Taliban from power, forcing withdrawals into the mountainous border regions.12 On 22 October, General (GEN) Tommy R. Franks, CENTCOM Commander, approved the redesignation of JSOTF-North to Task Force (TF) DAGGER.13
Southern Afghanistan had different problems. Populated predominantly with Taliban-supporting Pashtun tribes, the south had few indigenous forces to advise and assist. Thus, the CJSOTF-South, formed on 17 October 2001, focused on Direct Action (DA) and SR missions rather than UW. U.S. Navy Captain Robert S. Harward, the Naval Special Warfare Group One (NSWG-1) commander, renamed his headquarters TF K-BAR.14 CJSOTF-S/TF K-BAR controlled other Naval Special Warfare units (SEALs), a battalion of Army Special Forces, Air Force SOF assets, U.S. Marines, and Coalition SOF from seven nations. The two Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU [SOC]) had organic aviation, fire support, and combat service support elements. By late October TF K-BAR had dislodged enemy fighters from the Kandahar area and was liberating the adjacent provinces to free the southern and eastern regions from Taliban control. By taking the fight to the leaders, they rapidly reduced the ability of the Taliban and AQ to dominate the populace.15
OEF (A) Phase II (Consolidation I)
December 2001 - 30 September 2006
By December 2001, the collective efforts of JSOTF-North and CJSOTF-South had forced the Taliban from power and most of Afghanistan was controlled by allied indigenous forces. SOF had been the supported force for the capture of Kabul on 13 November and Kandahar on 7 December. That status was reversed to supporting when conventional forces in Afghanistan assumed the long-term missions of stabilization and elimination of the bypassed strongholds of Taliban and AQ.16
As storm clouds continued to grow over Iraq, SOCCENT closed out CJSOTF-North (TF Dagger) on 15 March 2002 and expanded the CJSOTF-South (TF K-Bar) mission to encompass all Afghanistan. The new CJSOTF-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) consolidated the staffs and transferred all SOF elements under one command responsible for conducting UW missions country-wide.17 With the 5th SFG rotating back to the States for new contingencies, COL Mark V. Phelan, 3rd SFG, assumed command of CJSOTF-A at Bagram Airbase on 30 March. Commensurately, SOCCENT authorized CJSOTF-A additional staffing and granted expanded authorities--operational control (OPCON) of all joint SOF and tactical control (TACON) of assigned coalition SOF elements.18
Map showing SF ODAs operating with anti-Taliban Militia (ATM) forces in Southern Afghanistan, October - December 2001.
During the transition period, CJSOTF-A inherited a commitment to Operation ANACONDA, the largest military operation in the war to date. Several SF ODAS and Navy SEAL platoons had been sent to perform strategic reconnaissance and to ‘fix’ the reported AQ and Taliban forces concentrating in the steep mountainous caverns in the Shahi-Kot region of eastern Afghanistan. Other SOF units had been brought in to block and contain the enemy forces with anti-Taliban forces (ATF) as they were located.19 The ATF had been promised considerable air support. To exploit SOF successes, infantry battalions from the U.S. 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions were helicoptered into assault positions while the SOF and ATF blocked the exits from the Shahi-Kot valley. Instead of breaking contact and escaping into Pakistan, the Taliban and AQ forces fought from strong defenses under well-directed protective fire of mortars and artillery.
Consequently, U.S. conventional forces, decisively engaged, relied heavily on airpower. The stalemated fighting lasted until 8 March 2002 when CENTCOM proclaimed ANACONDA a success. U.S. casualties were light: eight killed in action (KIA) and 46 wounded. The Taliban and AQ casualty figures, difficult to confirm, were much higher.20
Official estimates said “Up to several hundred enemy fighters were killed. The rest fled the Shahi-Kot Valley, leaving it in the control of U.S. and allied forces.”21 Impact on the new CJSOTF-A headquarters was minimal because much of the coordination to support the SOF in the fight had already been arranged before ANACONDA. Still ‘lightly-manned,’ the CJSOTF-A had its hands full with communications and sustainment requirements.
The old Russian control tower as it appeared when the first U.S. forces arrived at Bagram Airbase in late 2001. The tower, a familiar landmark to deployed service members and civilians who worked there, was built on Bagram Airbase in 1976 during the Soviet Union’s period of economic collaboration with Afghanistan.
The second task involved constructing a secure base in-country. The old Soviet airbase outside of Bagram was much closer to the fight than K2 Airbase in Uzbekistan. Bagram was quickly assessed as being safe enough to house its JSOTF headquarters and personnel without excessive risk. On 30 November 2001, GEN Franks decided that Bagram Airbase would be the Forward Operating Base (FOB) for all combat and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan. It posed its own challenges. Just fifty-five kilometers north of Kabul, the Taliban and Northern Alliance had fought over Bagram for more than a decade. As one would expect of a constant battleground, the infrastructure was in shambles and few amenities remained. Nonetheless, American and coalition units began offloading tons of supplies and materials. An operational command and control facility was key to transferring control from K2 to Bagram. The top engineer priority was to rehabilitate the runway for cargo jet aircraft operations. Facilities were a close second. The CJSOTF-A headquarters staff competed with advance parties of the several units assigned to establish ‘homes’ on Bagram Airbase (see article on Camp Abel).22
COL Joseph D. ‘Joe’ Celeski
A third challenge for the combined/joint headquarters staff was to effect a change of command less than two months after formation and in the midst of combat operations. When COL Phelan assumed command of CJSOTF-A on 30 March 2002, he was already slated for reassignment after two years of command. COL Joseph D. ‘Joe’ Celeski, his successor, arrived in Bagram in mid-May and became familiar with the situation. On 28 May, COL Celeski took command of the 3rd SFG and CJSOTF-A during a simple ceremony outside the motor pool. A combat veteran of DESERT STORM with considerable experience in Somalia, COL Celeski focused on his immediate critical key tasks.23 Combat operations continued as planned, but the expansion of GWOT to include Iraq had distinct impacts.
“When we were here before, we began the process of building the ANA. Coming back this time, three brigades had been completed and it allowed us to start maneuvering and utilizing the ANA battalions on the battlefield. And that has had a dramatic positive impact.”30 COL Joseph D. Celeski, two-time Commander of CJSOTF-A, 2003
With the eviction of the Taliban from power and all major cities and towns now under coalition control, America’s attention shifted to future combat in Iraq. The Afghanistan war slipped into shadow because Iraq’s large conventional military forces mandated a major strategic shift to accommodate that fight--manpower, funding, and support priorities were significantly reduced. GEN Tommy L. Franks shifted responsibility for all combat operations in Afghanistan to a corps-level Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-180 headquarters formed on 1 June 2002 using the XVIII Airborne Corps staff.24 The CJSOTF-A became a supporting command under the Tactical Control (TACON) of Lieutenant General (LTG) Dan K. McNeill and CJTF-180. This arrangement was in effect until December 2005. The SOF elements of CJTF-180 produced a prodigious amount of intelligence in support of conventional force operations.25 As that relationship matured during the formation of an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) in June 2002, SOF assumed a larger Foreign Internal Defense (FID) role.
“I would get reports from my subordinate headquarters, which was CJTF-180, then CJTF-76, and they got reports from CJSOTF [Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force], and they got reports from all their various component piece parts out there.”26 LTG David W. Barno, Commander, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan, 2003-2005
In addition to finding (Special Reconnaissance), fixing, and engaging the enemy, SOF was advising and assisting the Afghan militias in combat operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda. But, more significantly, the CJSOTF-A was tasked to train a new Afghan National Army (ANA). This would be done at a new training camp near Kabul (Kabul Military Training Center). Defense Secretary Rumsfeld authorized another SF battalion for that mission, raising the SF battalions to three. CJSOTF-A began supervising the formation, training, and equipping of new ANA units.27
Trainees from the 1st Battalion, Afghanistan National Army (ANA), graduate at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) in Kabul, Afghanistan.
The 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG created a specially-tailored Program of Instruction (POI) approved by the CJSOTF-A headquarters. SF instructors were to produce a fully-equipped, trained to standard, Afghan National Army (ANA) battalion every ten weeks. During recruit training, the SF cadre also selected natural Afghan leaders to serve as instructors in successive classes. This was done purposefully to commit the Afghan military to train-to-standard. These progressive transfers of responsibility went smoothly. At the first ANA battalion graduation ceremony, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Kevin M. McDonnell (1/3 SFG battalion commander and ANA Training Program Manager [PM]) said, “We’re here to help the Afghans ensure that the people that attacked us … do not come back and terrorize the civilians of Afghanistan.”28 After watching the first three battalions in action, COL ‘Joe’ Celeski, CJSOTF-A commander, said that their combat proficiency made them valuable assets. It “allowed us to start maneuvering and utilizing ANA units on the battlefield. And that has had a dramatic positive impact” in the Afghan conflict.29
SIDEBARCoalition Special Operations Forces
Until October 2003, CJSOTF-A had three SF battalions in-country; one in the north operating from K2, a second in Kandahar to cover the large swath of border region in the south and east; and a third dedicated to training the Afghan National Army (ANA) in Kabul. Coalition SOF elements (see sidebar above) and a Navy SEAL platoon rotated the SR and DA missions throughout Afghanistan. In later years the SEAL platoons grew to SEAL team-size (roughly SF battalion equivalent) and U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) battalions and companies were added to rotations. The SEAL Team and Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOBs) also replaced SF battalion Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) for a number of cycles. Initially, the assigned Civil Affairs (CA) battalion and tactical Psychological Operations (PSYOP) company ‘pushed’ detachments to CJSOTF-A subordinate SOTFs, Advanced Operating Bases (AOBs), and individual ODAs when needed. In succeeding rotations, the CA commitment to CJSOTF-A shrank to company size because of Iraq.31
The Afghanistan war is “by design and necessity, an economy-of-force operation. There is no getting around that. Our main focus, militarily, in the region and in the world right now is rightly and firmly in Iraq.”34 Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The early SF rotations in Afghanistan were predominantly borne by the 3rd and 7th SFG headquarters, augmented by individuals and elements from other active component SF Groups and the two Army National Guard (ANG) SF Groups (19th and 20th SFGs). The 20th SFG also covered the CJSOTF-A command element commitment for one six-month period. Eventually, every active SF battalion and most ANG SF battalions served at least one deployment with many returning several times. The 3rd and 7th SFG staffs habitually rotated as the nucleus of the CJSOTF-A headquarters. Force planners at USSOCOM and USASOC soon developed a long-term rotation plan centered on 3rd SFG as the executive agent for CJSOTF-A with 7th SFG providing some relief from that commitment. Tour lengths became standardized to better manage troop rotations. USSOCOM coordinated the assignment of other service SOF components into the deployment plan. The pattern of replacing elements after six-month intervals became the modus operandi which allowed the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) and USSOCOM to draw from a larger population base.32
SF soldiers from SOTF-South and ANA soldiers prepare at Kandahar in 2009 for a combined night combat mission.
By late 2003, Afghanistan had clearly become an economy of force effort. The primary focus of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was Iraq. Troop levels in 2007 reinforced that status; 166,000 troops in Iraq versus 25,000 in Afghanistan, almost seven times larger. Conventional and SOF manning in Afghanistan dropped to minimal levels by mid-2003.33 A shift in SOF operational focus caused other changes in CJSOTF-A missions.
The ANA training mission disappeared in mid-2003 for American SOF when the CJTF-180 commander, LTG Lloyd J. Austin, transferred that responsibility to 10th Mountain Division.35 This would be done by a newly-formed TF PHOENIX (June 2003). That prompted a mission analysis by CJSOTF-A resulting in SOF forces continuing to train Afghan militia and targeting key AQ and Taliban leaders for capture or elimination. SF teams were reduced.36 And, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assumed responsibility for northern Afghanistan, the CJSOTF-A repositioned its SOF teams to cover the Pakistan border. Hence, by September 2003, there were only two SF battalions (minus) at Bagram and Kandahar. These two American SF FOBs, augmented by Naval Special Warfare elements and coalition SOF, focused on DA and SR missions.37
“Special Operations Forces had killed or captured hundreds of terrorists and insurgents using precisely targeted offensive operations.”40 GEN Bryan D. "Doug" Brown, Commander, USSOCOM, 2005
A rise in politically motivated violence and criminal activities led to more conventional forces being committed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. In April 2004, the newly-organized Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) led by Major General (MG) David W. Barno, divided the area of operations (AO) into Regional Command (RC) South and RC East for Operation TICONDEROGA. CJSOTF-A was to concentrate forces on the Pakistan border while conventional forces conducted stability and support operations (SASO) in the interior. Civil Affairs (CA) teams were allocated to help non-SOF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) country-wide.38
Spreading its reduced assets to cover more than 750 miles of rugged mountains that dominated the Pakistan-Afghanistan border presented major challenges: First, there were insufficient Afghan forces partnered with SOF to properly do the border security mission; Second, by concentrating SOF along the border, its presence was removed from large portions of the interior and their well-cultivated sources of intelligence on enemy activities and movement went untended; Third, SOF support in Iraq had reduced sustainment in Afghanistan to a trickle. Twenty-five SF ODAs distantly arrayed along the long border region were extremely difficult for CJSOTF-A to resupply, let alone interdict Taliban and AQ fighters and supplies coming into Afghanistan nightly through remote mountain passes and trails.39 Nonetheless, some progress was made.
Soldiers from the 3rd Company, 6th Afghan Commando Kandak conduct a room clearing exercise in the ‘tire house’ at Camp Morehead, Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2011. The training is supervised by SF soldiers assigned to CJSOTF-A.
In December 2004, just before Afghan national elections, a few CJSOTF-A elements were partnered with ANA kandaks (battalions) to bolster their fighting spirit in combat. This proved beneficial to both in April 2005 when a kandak in RC South successfully attacked a long-established AQ sanctuary (Operation NAM DONG).41 The ANA accomplishments got the attention of American and Afghan military leaders. The significant part played by SF led to major changes in the CJSOTF-A mission set.
Throughout Phase II of OEF-A (May 2002 – September 2006), CJSOTF-A forces focused on DA and SR to provide intelligence to support a conventional force offense. But their efforts were clearly minor compared to the major initiatives going on in Iraq. By mid-2006, coalition partners were voicing concerns that the security situation in Afghanistan was getting worse. With Iraq as the top American priority, political and military leaders faced a dilemma—how to improve conditions in Afghanistan sufficiently to allow a reduction of military forces. The conundrum prompted SOCCENT to come up with resourceful solutions for the next phase of the long campaign. These initiatives modified SOF missions in Afghanistan.
“…when several of the [enemy] leaders tried to return to the villages after Operation NAM DONG, they were run out of town by the people they had suppressed for years.”42
OEF (A) Phase III (Consolidation II)
1 October 2006 - 30 November 2009
In the winter of 2006, Major General (MG) Francis H. ‘Frank’ Kearney, the SOCCENT commander, directed COL Edward M. Reeder Jr., the 7th SFG/CJSOTF-A commander, to investigate the possibility of creating Special Forces-type units within the ANA. After a thorough analysis COL Reeder concluded that the Afghan military “did not have the core capability to develop, task-organize, equip, train and sustain” SF units. However, Reeder felt that light-infantry commando forces like the U.S. Army Rangers could be organized and trained.43 The commando battalions could spearhead ANA offensive operations. MG Kearney approved a ‘pilot’ program to prove the concept.
Based on his assessment, COL Reeder set out to “build a well-organized, well-trained, and well-led infantry fighting force.”44 One hundred ANA soldiers were selected and sent to Jordan to be trained in small unit leadership skills by 5th SFG soldiers. When they returned home the graduates became the instructors for a new Commando Training Course set up at the Camp Morehead near Kabul. The ANA instructors, working closely with COL Reeder’s SF advisor teams, then selected, organized and trained volunteers from the 201st Corps to become the first ANA Commando Kandak (battalion). Over three months the SF teams provided the trainees with combat marksmanship, small-unit tactics, reconnaissance skills, and land navigation. Organized as squads and platoons for collective training, the future commandos practiced small raids and direct action missions.45
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, left foreground, receives a tour of the Camp Morehead Afghan Commando Training Camp by Afghan National Army (ANA) LTC M. Farid Ahmadi in Kabul, Afghanistan, June 4, 2007.
The 1st Commando Kandak graduated on 24 July 2007. Its ‘baptism of fire’ operation came in September in Nangarhar Province near the Pakistan border. They captured a high value target (HVT), the Taliban bomb-maker Haji Shir Khan, 80 kilograms (176.5 pounds) of opium, and uncovered two large weapon caches. This success established the reputation of the Commandos and demonstrated their ‘value added’ to the ANA. Subsequent Commando kandaks increased their elan. Today, nine Commando kandaks are stationed throughout Afghanistan to ‘spearhead’ ANA combat operations. CJSOTF-A teams provided a true ‘force multiplier’ to the Afghan military and became partnered with the Commandos.46
ANA Commando SSI
2007 was also the year that the CJSOTF-A started using the proper doctrinal term Special Operations Task Forces (SOTF) to denote its subordinate battalion-size headquarters elements. SOTF replaced the previously used Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), a term that conventional forces adopted for specific locations and bases. SF battalion-sized SOTFs were more than support organizations; they directed and supported subordinate special operations elements in the field (AOBs and ODAs), making SOTF the proper term. In time, the SOTFs became aligned with the conventional Regional Commands (RCs) that controlled sections of Afghanistan.48
U.S. Army SOF brigadier generals were integrated into the special operations command structure in 2009 as the situation stabilized in Iraq. After six years of benign neglect, the Taliban and AQ had come out of hiding to pose a major threat to American, coalition, and ANA forces. With the creation of the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) on 31 January 2009, an Army SOF general officer became part of ISAF planning and insulated CJSOTF-A from the ‘staff overmatch’ caused by the number of senior commands that had sprung up in Afghanistan as the war progressed.
The “nine Commando kandaks … remain the most effective fighting force in the Afghan Army.”47 LTG David W. Barno, Commander, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan, 2003-2005
Assigning BG Edward M. Reeder Jr. to command CFSOCC-A put an experienced ‘Afghan hand’ in charge of all UW. Reeder, an El Salvador and JUST CAUSE (Panama) SF veteran, had commanded 2/3 SFG in Kandahar (2002-2003) and had been the CJSOTF-A commander at Bagram twice while 7th SFG commander (2005-2007).49 His experience with Afghans and their problems paid dividends. (See BG Edward M. Reeder Jr. career assignments) With CJSOTF-A operationally controlled by CFSOCC-A, BG Reeder sought ways to improve local security by “applying unconventional warfare (UW) principles to the fight against Anti-Afghan Forces.” Knowing that Special Forces in Vietnam had relied heavily on Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) forces to protect rural villages and hamlets, BG Reeder challenged his staff to develop a similar program to be implemented at province level.50
Shortly after assuming his post as ISAF commander (15 June 2009), GEN Stanley A. McChrystal introduced his vision of a new population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy for Afghanistan.51 BG Reeder’s UW-centric concept embedded SF ODAs at the village level to increase security, provide stability, and lend legitimacy to the central government of Afghanistan. These soon became referred to as Village Stability Operations (VSO). The first VSO site established in the village of Nili in Daykundi Province in July 2009 would become the model (see article on VSO – “The Nili Experiment”).52
Soldiers from ODA 7224 conduct Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Nili, Daykundi Province, 2009.
As more military leaders began treating the mission in Afghanistan as counterinsurgency, BG Reeder directed CJSOTF-A to expand VSO to more locations. Continued success firmly established the program as the way for the future in Afghanistan. By the end of 2009, almost all SF ODAs had moved into VSO sites across the country. CFSOCC-A began soliciting more SOF to cover requests from more VSO coverage. COL Donald C. Bolduc, the CJSOTF-A commander at the time, considered VSO expansion in late 2009 to be “the strategic shaping phase” of the overall ISAF COIN campaign plan.53
On 21 August 2009, USSOCOM emphasized personnel stability and continuity of leadership as critical to the COIN-based strategy for Afghanistan. The 3rd SFG, designated as the ‘framework group’ for forming CJSOTF-A, would provide about 40 percent of the headquarters personnel; the remainder would be sourced from “across the joint special operations community.” CJSOTF-A staff tours were extended from seven months to a year, and SF battalion deployments went from seven months to nine months. These initiatives were designed to increase organizational stability, provide more predictability to plan individual and collective training, lengthen time at home between rotations, and build area familiarity and cultural knowledge in Afghanistan.54
The map shows various locations of SOF units performing VSO/ALP missions on 28 March 2012, probably the ‘high-water mark’ of the two programs.The chart graphically illustrates the rapid growth of VSO Program in Afghanistan. 103+ VSO Sites Established in 28 Months
“You can execute VSO without ALP, but you can’t execute ALP without VSO.”60 BG Austin ‘Scott’ Miller, Commander CFSOCC-A, 2010
OEF (A) Phase IV (Consolidation III)
1 December 2009 - 30 June 2011
“If you’ve seen one VSO site … you’ve seen one VSO site.”57 Often-repeated statement by VSO veterans emphasizing the vast differences between sites.
A Special Operations Task Force-East (SOTF-E) Cultural Support Team (CST) member conducts a women’s shura for Konduz province. The CST members are providing health awareness, education, and a sewing project, 5 April 2011.
The next eighteen months were marked by large-scale expansion of VSO country-wide. Success in the field overcame initial reluctance from Afghan officials. It proved to be the most viable stability program introduced by the American military. On 14 July 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai spoke in behalf of the “village stability initiative,” stating that the program meshed with the coalition’s overall counterinsurgency strategy. Karzai’s endorsement of VSO led to the creation of Afghan Local Police (ALP) units to improve security from the bottom up. ALP units were formed and trained in the villages. Local volunteers were key. This capability was expanded upwards first into the districts and then the provinces.55 President Karzai’s decree reinforced GEN McChrystal’s COIN vision with SOF spearheading the ISAF effort.
CFSOCC-A became the executive agent for VSO in Afghanistan. As “a bottom-up COIN initiative … to promote local governance and development,” it involved “establishing …Village Stability Platforms (VSPs)” around embedded ODA-sized units in key villages countrywide. Enablers (Civil Affairs, PSYOP, medical, and logistics support personnel and dog handlers were attached to ODAs committed to VSO as needed. Conventional infantry squads ‘beefed up’ security in the more remote sites. VSO teams, living in the small towns and villages, worked closely with local leaders to improve health, education, and economic conditions. The Afghan central government was legitimized by supporting community projects. In 2011, select female soldiers, trained as Cultural Support Teams (CSTs), were attached to some ODAs to work with the females and children. SOF conducting VSO also recruited local volunteers for training as ALP. Once formed the SF soldiers advised and assisted in the performance of guard duty and accompanied local security patrols.56
CFSOCC-A made VSO and its ancillary ALP requirement the primary focus of CJSOTF-A. While training, equipping, and advising ALP was more Foreign Internal Defense (FID), it was an integral part of the VSO mission. The two complemented each other. The ‘bottom-up’ execution worked well with the ‘top-down’ planning and management to support the ISAF COIN strategy. CJSOTF-A Operational Order (OPORD) MUSTAQUILANA (‘Afghans standing up for themselves’) provided the guidance necessary to duplicate the successes achieved by ODA 7224 and earlier UW experiences.58
Afghan Local Police (ALP) fill sand bags during the construction of a traffic checkpoint in Jegdalay district, Kabul Province, Afghanistan, 5 March 2014. ALP assisted by U.S. Special Forces soldiers assigned to CJSOTF-A. The checkpoint disrupted insurgent freedom of movement. A U.S. Special Forces soldier analyzes targets with ANA soldiers during training in Staging Area Tinsley in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, 9 May 2011. Soldiers from CJSOTF-A train Afghan national security forces on soldiering skills and security measures to protect the local populace.
Expanding VSO to ‘blanket’ Afghanistan required a significant increase in SOF personnel and ‘enablers.’ All services ‘surged’ SOF assets into the country to accommodate the demand. VSO grew from one ‘pilot’ site in July 2009 to five by April 2010. Forty-six sites existed by March 2011. By the end of the year there were 103 VSO or ALP training sites spread throughout Afghanistan. By then, the CJSOTF-A had grown from 2,900 to more than 6,000 personnel.59
In addition to performing VSO and training ALP in 2010, CJSOTF-A relooked another capability that was first raised back in 2006—creation of ANA Special Forces. In 2006, COL Reeder felt that the condition of the ANA would not support that capability at that time. As the CFSOCC-A commander in 2010, BG Reeder reevaluated his earlier assessment and concluded that the ANA had now reached the level of maturity where it could raise and sustain a SF component. He envisioned ANA SF units specifically trained to operate within their own complex multi-ethnic and multi-cultural environment. Trained professionals could “leverage the local ethnicity and tribal affiliations” to their advantage in combat operations.62 After getting his concept approved by the ISAF commander and Afghan Minister of Defense, BG Reeder directed the CJSOTF-A to create ANA Special Forces.63
The first class of ANA SF graduated at Camp Morehead, Kabul, on 13 May 2010.
By the end of February 2010, the SOTFs were recruiting and screening volunteers from existing Commando Kandaks to attend the first ANA SF Qualification Course (SFQC). Medical screening was followed by physical fitness tests and mental aptitude evaluations at the two SOTF bases. The potential candidates did pushups, situps, and pullups before a two kilometer run. Then, they were given literacy and math tests. After the results were analyzed, packets of those qualified were sent to the CJSOTF-A to select the best-qualified twenty-five soldiers to attend the first ANA SFQC, scheduled to begin in March 2010 at Camp Morehead.64
As SF personnel screened candidates at the SOTFs, the CJSOTF-A staff prepared a program of instruction (POI) for ANA SFQC. While loosely based on the SFQC conducted by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) at Fort Bragg, NC, it was uniquely tailored for Afghanistan and conducted over a ten-week period. FID and COIN were reduced to internal Afghanistan defense and counterinsurgency tasks. During weapons training students mastered only Soviet weapons common in the region. Instead of foreign language and culture training, the program stressed improving literacy. Basic knowledge of the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan was included. ANA SF ODAs, while mirroring U.S. specialties, consisted of fifteen personnel. The other three men were an intelligence sergeant; an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) sergeant; and a religious officer. The first ANA SF class graduated at Camp Morehead on 13 May 2010.65
Some Afghan National Army Commando and Special Forces personnel were trained in Afghan Information Dissemination Operations (AIDO) by U.S. PSYOP soldiers at Camp Morehead, Afghanistan.
“These [ANA SF] teams provide immediate rapport with the local populace and at times have ties with the locals. The ANA SF teams take the lead in the villages, and they add legitimacy to the mission.” –BG Edward M. Reeder Jr.
To further enhance ANA SOF capabilities during VSO, CJSOTF-A implemented the Afghan Information Dissemination Operations (AIDO) Planners course, the first of which began on 19 September 2010. AIDO training involved U.S. PSYOP personnel instructing Afghan Commandos on Military Information Support Operations (MISO) (formerly PSYOP) principles. The AIDO course was essentially a translated, modified version of the U.S. Psychological Operations Qualification Course (POQC). While AIDOs’ primary Military Occupational Specialties remained combat arms, they also functioned as the MISO Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) within their units, with the end-goal of ‘improved public perception of Commandos, ANA, ANP, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) as a whole.’ By early 2011, 250 Commandos were already AIDO-qualified.66
After graduation, ANA SF ODAs were sent to select VSO sites to join the Commando Kandaks, countering insurgency in Afghanistan. The CJSOTF-A provided the “tactical framework for supporting CFSOCC-A operational priorities” to conduct the ISAF campaign. Authorities were broadened to allow VSO sites to “move at the speed of the populace and the insurgent,” said COL Bolduc. Tactical commands (SOTFs and below) had to be agile and flexible to accommodate rapid situational changes encountered daily at the lowest levels.67 From 2010 until 2012, VSO and ALP training grew hand-in-hand with the ANA SF ODAs as they often jointly occupied areas. In these cases coalition SOF leaders could mentor ANA COIN partners during hundreds of combat operations to dramatically increase the experience base of Afghan SOF.68
ANA soldiers from the 8th Commando Kandak conduct deliberate clearing operations, 2011. U.S. SF soldiers accompanied the Commandos, providing advice and support.
“Our contribution to the strategy revolves around U.S. SOF living among the people in rural villages … , building relationships and assisting the local populace to stand up against insurgents.”61 –COL Donald C. Bolduc, Commander CJSOTF-A, 2011
OEF (A) Phase V (Transition I)
1 July 2011 – 31 December 2014
This phase of the war was seriously affected by major GWOT strategy shifts. On 2 May 2011, U.S. forces killed AQ leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan.69 This caused President Barack Obama to announce that all U.S. forces would be out of Iraq by 31 December 2011.70 Plans to transfer some of those assets to Afghanistan were forestalled when Congressional pressure for an ‘exit strategy’ prompted President Obama to announce his plans on 22 June 2011. He stated that by 31 December 2014 the Afghan government would assume responsibility for its security.71 With the end dates firmly set, coalition forces accelerated efforts to prepare Afghan forces to assume responsibilities.
NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A SSI
The SOF commands had to adjust quickly. On 1 July 2012 the CFSOCC-A morphed into a two-star Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) and the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) under ISAF. MG Raymond A. ‘Tony’ Thomas III, a former CFSOCC-A commander and more recently the deputy commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg, NC, became its first commander. The larger SOJTF headquarters commanded all U.S. SOF and tactically controlled NATO and Afghan SOF forces. “Our mission set spans the entire spectrum of special operations” stated MG Thomas. “13,000 special operators and support people from 25 partner nations (perform missions) ranging from direct action to capacity-building.”72 Reducing SOF headquarters minimized redundancy, concentrated power in high level decisions, and integrated all special operations capabilities. And, it downsized the American presence in Afghanistan.73
Afghan National Army (ANA) LTC Saifullah Najribi (center), 4th Special Operations Kandak commander, talks to Afghan and U.S. Special Operations soldiers through an interpreter (right), during a transfer of authority (TOA) ceremony at the Village Stability Operations (VSO) site at Parmakan, Shindand District, Herat Province, 26 September 2013.
SOJTF-A strategy anticipated a drawdown of coalition SOF and a calculated transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghans in 2014. VSO would enter a Transition Phase. Afghan officials at district and province levels and local and national police and ANA forces would assume primary responsibility for the country’s security. Coalition SOF would transition to secondary roles as advisors. How the roles would be shifted was the major challenge and central focus of MG Austin S. ‘Scott’ Miller when he assumed command of the SOJTF-A in June 2013. MG Miller, like MG Thomas before him, brought considerable Afghanistan experience to the position.74
COL Patrick B. Roberson, commander of 3rd Special Forces Group and CJSOTF-A, addresses U.S. service members assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan on Nov. 28, 2013, at Bagram Airbase, Parwan Province, Afghanistan.
As COL Patrick B. Roberson (3rd SFG commander at the time) viewed it, the central question was “How do you put the Afghans in the lead?” With an “outsider’s eye for detail” Roberson analyzed the challenge leveraging his three years of Iraq experience. He visited COL Antonio M. Fletcher, the 7th SFG commander in charge of the CJSOTF-A at that time, and discussed the question while becoming familiar with the different nuances of SOF operations in Afghanistan.75 Roberson would soon have to answer that question.
The soon-to-be CJSOTF-A commander focused on two lines of effort: first, build the capacity of the Commando Kandaks and Afghan SF to assume missions being done by coalition SOF; second, raise VSO and ALP initiatives to the next level. His SOF had to relinquish dominant roles with the local Afghan leaders and become mentors who focused ‘up’ on district and provincial officials.76 The efforts had the same goal – to ‘cut the Afghan reliance on coalition capabilities cord’ while instilling confidence in their ability to protect and govern themselves.77
“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.” COL Thomas Edward Lawrence, ‘Lawrence of Arabia’79
COL Roberson and other SOF leaders knew that the hardest part would be curbing the American tendency to lead. “I always thought that if you are going to put partner forces in the lead, you’ve got to have ‘forcing functions’ or compliance mechanisms to get guys to do what you want done.”78 Measures had to be put in place to reduce the SF urge to get out in front and convince them to move aside and let the Afghans take charge.
To change SF behavior, Roberson ‘capped’ the number of Americans accompanying the Afghan SOF and local police on field operations. “When you place that force ratio out there [10 Afghans per American], it definitely makes our guys put Afghans out front, keeps them away from the leading edge, and forces them into a command and control role. If American SOF outnumber Afghans [in an assault], they are much more predisposed to take charge and take buildings by themselves.” What was needed at that phase in the war was to get the Afghans to lead by example, not vice versa. SF, as advisors, had to be content to hold back and mentor the Afghan SOF leaders. “You’re not accompanying them to teach troop leading procedures, but to encourage them to take charge and do it on their own.”80
An American Special Forces captain observes how his Afghan trainees do on their own as they meet villagers near Taliban territory in Parwan Province, 2014. Photo: Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times
Along the second line of effort (VSO and ALP programs), CJSOTF-A began turning over select VSO sites to partner forces and other sites were eliminated. ALP training with only Afghan instructors was consolidated at provincial training centers. ODAs originally responsible for VSO sites maintained contact with district leaders and conducted ‘tactical overwatch’ presence patrols as reassurance during the transitions.81 Basically, a mounted ODA would irregularly circulate through old VSO areas. As time passed and Afghan confidence and experience grew, the number of ODAs in-country could be reduced as SF ‘stepped back’ and put mentoring/advising in the forefront.82
By late 2013, the environment and U.S. role had changed dramatically in Afghanistan. “I had 72 SOF teams when I went to Afghanistan [in March 2013]. I had 45 in October,” COL Roberson recalled. He had succeeded in changing the American SOF mindset and enabled the Afghan SOF to lead their country’s fight.83
Subsequent CJSOTF-A commanders followed suit while the conventional force ‘footprint’ shrank. As Operation ENDURING FREEDOM came to a close in late 2014, the CJSOTF-A had transitioned to advising and assisting. The commensurate reduction of coalition forces had forced CJSOTF-A to operate from a handful of strongpoints. The impact of medevac, fire support, and sustainment limited SOF operating ranges. Commanders assessed calculated risks carefully. SOF elements were positioned where they could optimally influence ANA SOF.
“If you want to put Afghans in the lead, you’re going to have to accept the fact that they are, in some ways, going to be less capable.” COL Patrick B. Roberson, 3rd SFG/CJSOTF-A Commander, commenting on ‘expectation management.’84
The last CJSOTF-A command group commemorates the unit deactivation on 31 October 2014 with a photo in front of the CJSOTF-A Memorial Wall, Camp Vance, Bagram Airbase. From left to right are: CW5 Edward K. Hall, COL Robert L. Wilson, and CSM Brian C. Rarey.
By Presidential decree, OEF ended on 31 December 2014 and was replaced by Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL (OFS), which continues today.85 The NATO mission, labeled Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT, is to “train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces.”86 American SOF remains key to fulfilling the NATO mission in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The proud legacy of CJSOTF-A continues forward with the Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (SOTF-A), albeit on a much smaller scale.87
At the deactivation of the CJSOTF-A on 31 October 2014, the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG commander, LTC Michael P. Sullivan, became the first commander of SOTF-A, the smaller, SF battalion-sized organization that commanded the remaining UW-focused U.S. SOF in Afghanistan. His headquarters and subordinate elements were to train, advise, and assist the newly-created ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) and select Afghan National Police (ANP) units.88 LTC Sullivan had ‘shadowed’ his 3rd SFG commander (and final CJSOTF-A commander), COL Robert L. Wilson, and forged a good relationship with BG Mark C. Schwartz (a previous CJSOTF-A commander and the Deputy Commanding General, SOJTF-A, to MG Edward M. Reeder Jr). Together authorities were allocated, redistributed, and adjusted. LTC Sullivan viewed his task to “work the SOTF-A out of job.”89 The new ‘way ahead’ for Afghanistan was clear.
EPILOGUE
What are the ‘takeaways’ and legacy of CJSOTF-A? First, the organization validated joint doctrine that a Special Forces Group had the capacity to act as a CJSOTF in wartime. It did this for an extended period of time in combat – more than twelve years. While initially two SOF task forces were used (TF DAGGER and K-BAR) to prosecute the CENTCOM war in Afghanistan, SOCCENT and its elements were the ‘supported’ command. When American conventional forces grew to dominate the battlefield, CENTCOM changed SOF to a ‘supporting’ role. Consolidating all coalition SOF under one command, the CJSOTF-A, proved to be a logical progression. Its flexibility to accommodate mission changes was proven over time.
Second, SFGs had commanders and functioning staffs to facilitate accommodating additional missions and SOF elements. And USSOCOM could capitalize on Army’s command selection process instead of having to convene boards for CJSOTF leaders. It could also provide personnel augmentees from the other services as well as the Reserves and National Guard. SFG commanders dual-hatted as CJSOTF-A commanders could ‘tap’ their rear echelons and access higher Army SOF commands in CONUS to get assistance. These capacities were skillfully ‘tapped’ throughout the life of CJSOTF-A.
Lastly, VSO supported by ALP were a major success story in Afghanistan. The CJSOTF-A demonstrated its nimbleness when ISAF expanded the program country-wide. VSO paved the way towards making Afghan officials responsible for the security, economic recovery, and future of their country. Coalition SOF commanders had to restrain the inherently American cultural tendency to take charge and enforced advise and assist roles. They did, and Afghan SOF leaders ‘stepped up’ to fill the void. Today, Afghan SOF elements lead the fight against insurgents. That is the ultimate measure of SOF success in Afghanistan.
The twenty-three commanders of CJSOTF-A (five of whom served twice) and their staff contributed in turn to the progressive achievements of SOF in Afghanistan. The combined joint special operations command was a central player in the fight for Afghanistan for twelve critical years. CJSOTF-A played a key role in every major development in that war. Everyone that served in CJSOTF-A throughout its long history should be justifiably proud of their contributions and sacrifices.
ENDNOTES
Gentext Message, CDR3DSFGA FWD to COMCJTF-180 and COMJFSOCC EF, 242100ZAUG03, “CJSOTF-AFG SITREP 24 AUG 03,” copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, 5-6; Gentext Message, CDR3DSFGA FWD to COMCJTF-180 and COMJFSOCC EF, 242100ZAUG03, “COMCJTF180 SITREP 24 AUG 03,” copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, 1-2. ODA 2056 is in the 20th Special Forces Group (SFG) (Airborne), a National Guard unit headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama.Day Chopan village has also been spelled as Deh Chopan, Daichopan, and several other variations.Located in Southeastern Afghanistan near the border with Pakistan, the surrounding mountains have long provided a safe haven for Taliban fighters, and before that for the Afghans who fought against soldiers from the Soviet Union.The unarmored or lightly armored High-Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), or ‘Humvee” was the standard military tactical utility vehicle at the time.[return]
Gentext Message, CDR3DSFGA FWD to COMCJTF-180 and COMJFSOCC EF, 252100ZAUG03, “CJSOTF-AFG SITREP 25 AUG 03,” copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, 4-5; Gentext Message, CDR3DSFGA FWD to COMCJTF-180 and COMJFSOCC EF, 252100ZAUG03, “COMCJTF180 SITREP 25 AUG 03,” copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, 1-2; Lon Nordeen, AV-8B Harrier II Units of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (Oxford: Osprey Press, 2014), 30-31; WO1 Michael J. McInerney, “The Battle for Deh Chopan, Part I,” Military.Com, on Internet at: http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SOF_0804_Afghanistan1,00.html, accessed 25 June 2015.[return]
COL (Ret.) Joseph D. Celeski, interview by Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, 13 March 2015, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Noor Khan, “U.S., Afghan Forces Kill at Least 14 Guerrillas,” Stars and Stripes, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 26 August 2003, 7; Sayed Salahuddin, “Aircraft Bomb Big Taliban Force,” Ariana, Kabul, Afghanistan, 25 August 2003, on e-Ariana News Service at: http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allPrintDocs/5FC915F307AAB11687256D8D00564792?OpenDocument, accessed on 24 March 2015; Noor Khan, “At Least 14 Die in Afghan Bombing,” Associated Press, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 26 August 2003, on Internet at: http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/nation_world/article_09d18fd7-d0e0-52a0-b371-298716277701.html, accessed on 24 March 2015;“U.S. General:Taliban Streaming from Pakistan to Afghanistan,” USA Today, Gardez, Afghanistan, 8 September 2003, on Internet at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-09-08-afghanistan-us_x.htm#, accessed on 25 March 2015.[return]
COL Celeski interview, 13 March 2015; Noor Khan, “U.S., Afghan Forces Kill at Least 14 Guerrillas,” Stars and Stripes, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 26 August 2003, 7; Sayed Salahuddin, “Aircraft Bomb Big Taliban Force,” Ariana, Kabul, Afghanistan, 25 August 2003; Noor Khan, “At Least 14 Die in Afghan Bombing,” Associated Press, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 26 August 2003;“U.S. General:Taliban Streaming from Pakistan to Afghanistan,” USA Today, Gardez, Afghanistan, 8 September 2003; n.a., “Up to 100 Afghan Militants Killed in Operation ‘Mountain Viper,’” Voice of America, 29 October 2009. Although enemy casualty figures were hard to ascertain, reports from all sources indicate a large number of Taliban or ACM fighters were killed during Operation MOUNTAIN VIPER.The official U.S. Army history of the action noted that “the Taliban stood and fought for the first time since March 2002,” and that “U.S. forces routed the enemy, killing one hundred forty to two hundred insurgents.” Center of Military History, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, March 2002-April 2005, The United States Army in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011), quote from 43. U.S. losses were limited to one ARSOF soldier killed (Sergeant First Class Mitchell A. Lane, assigned to 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group [Airborne]).SFC Lane died of injuries sustained during a night fast rope accident while inserting for a combat assault.From USASOC History Office, The Last Full Measure of Devotion: ARSOF Fallen from the War on Terrorism, 2001-2014 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015), 27.[return]
From “Presidential Address to the Nation,” 7 October 2001, as quoted in New York Times, 8 October 2001.[return]
107th Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 23, “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists,” 14 September 2001, Enacted 18 September 2001.[return]
Charles H. Briscoe, et al., Weapon of Choice:U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Reprinted [2003]; Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 41-42; RADM Bert Calland, Commander, Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command, interview by Kalev I. Sepp, 3 May 2002, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
COL John F. Mulholland Jr., interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe and MAJ Tom Searle, 12 July 2002, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Gentext Message, USCINCCENT to multiple addressees, “Subj: USCINCCENT Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Karshi-Khanabad Mod,” 010901Z Oct 01, copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL; Briscoe, et al., Weapon of Choice, 68. COL Kisner’s mission was to conduct Combat Search and Rescue operations throughout Afghanistan when the American forces began their attack on the Taliban.[return]
According to Gentext Message, JSOTF Khanabad UZ to COMSOCCENT, “SITREP02/ENDURING FREEDOM/07OCT01,” 080700Z Oct 01, copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, on 7 October 2001, USCENTCOM commenced engaging hostile targets within Afghanistan.[return]
Joseph J. Collins, “Initial Planning and Execution in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in Richard D. Hooker Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, Eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2015), 23-24.[return]
Mulholland interview, 12 July 2002; Briscoe, et al., Weapon of Choice, 52-54, 57-58, 74-75; [return]
Mulholland interview, 12 July 2002; Briscoe, et al., Weapon of Choice, 52-54, 72-80, 96-99. JSOTF-North, led by COL John Mulholland (also Commander, 5thSFG [A]), controlled Joint SOF forces operating in the northern portion of Afghanistan from the time of first infiltrations on 19 October 2001, until the creation of the CJSOTF-A organization on 15 March 2002.On that date CJSOTF-A gained operational control (OPCON) of all U.S. SOF elements operating within Afghanistan (except JSOC) and Tactical Control (TACON) of all coalition SOF assets.[return]
Gentext Message, USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL to COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, “Fragmentary Order 029, Redesignating JSOTF-N as TF DAGGER,” 230158Z Oct 01, copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL.[return]
Dwight Jon Zimmerman, “Task Force K-Bar – Special Operations Forces and Operation Enduring Freedom,” Defense Media Network, 19 September 2011, on Internet at: http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/operation-enduring-freedom-the-first-49-days-6/, accessed on 19 February 2015. CJSOTF-South, also known as TF K-BAR, had been formed around Naval Special Warfare Group-One (NSWG-1) (Commanded by Navy Captain Robert Harward). On 7 December 2004, President George W. Bush presented the unit with a Presidential Unit Citation.[return]
Briefing, USCENTCOM/Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), “Command Chronology Inputs (U), 5 February 2002, USCENTCOM, copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, FL, entries for 15 and 20 November 2001. On 15 November 2001, USCENTCOM directed COMCFLCC to exercise operational command over all Army Forces, Special Operations Forces, and Tactical Control of all coalition forces.On 20 November 2001, CFLCC reported it had assumed control of all forces in the Afghanistan Area or Responsibility (AOR).[return]
Gentext Message, COMJSOTF N EF to COMJFSOCC EF, “Subject: TF DAGGER Stand-Down Message,” 151441Z Mar 02, copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, F;.[return]
“USCENTCOM OEF Command Chronology,” 80; Briefing slides, USCENTCOM Joint Operations Center (JOC), “JOC Floor Update,” 30 March 2002, copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL. According to GENTEXT Message, 3RDSFGAFWD to COMJFSOCC and COMJTF Afghanistan, “SITREP/CJSOTF-A/30301530ZMAR02,” copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, “CJSOTF-Afghanistan assumed C2 of all SOF in Afghanistan at 301300ZMAR02.”[return]
Richard W. Stewart, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-March 2002 (The United States Army in Afghanistan) (Washington, DC: GPO, Center of Military History, 2004), 32.[return]
Richard Krugler, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle (Case Studies in Defense Transformation Number 5) (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2007), on Internet at:http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463075%2526Location%3DU2%2526doc%3DGetTRDoc.pdf&ei=mNojVbTCH8iQsAWKwILQDg&usg=AFQjCNEtP_WXQNVY7_qVAO_-mUqvxvhuSQ&bvm=bv.89947451,d.eXY, accessed on 1 April 2015, quote from 1.[return]
Message USCINCCENT 302200Z Nov 2001, “FRAG 02-020, Establishment TF Bagram (U),” copy at “USCENTCOM OEF Command Chronology,” 36; SGM (Ret.) Richard C. Kimmich, interview by Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, 4 August 2015, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
COL Celeski interview, 13 March 2015; COL Joseph D. Celeski, interview by MAJ Jeff Davis, 11 September 2003, Bagram, Afghanistan, original at SOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL; Email correspondence, COL (Ret.) Joseph D. Celeski to Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, 13 April 2015, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Document, “Change of Command,” 28 May 2002, CJSOTF-A, Bagram, Afghanistan, USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL.[return]
“USCENTCOM OEF Command Chronology,” 129; Center of Military History, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, March 2002-April 2005, The United States Army in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011), 13.[return]
Christopher N. Koontz, General Editor, Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003-2005 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2008), 13; Commander, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180, CJTF-180 Operations Order (OPORD) 02-01 [CJTF Assumption of Authority for Operations in Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA) Afghanistan], 23 May 2002, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, passim; Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), “CJSOTF-A Campaign Plan Jun-Oct [20]03,” 11 June 2003, Headquarters, CJSOTF-Afghanistan, Camp Vance, Bagram, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, 9. LTG Dan K. McNeill also concurrently commanded the XVIII Airborne Corps.For a good description of the issues raised by subordinating the CJSOTF to the lead conventional force, see MAJ Grant M. Martin, “Special Operations and Conventional Forces: How to Improve Unity of Effort Using Afghanistan as a Case Study,” School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009, 19-22.[return]
SFC Kathleen T. Rhem, “American Soldiers Training Afghan National Army,” American Forces Press Service, Washington, DC, 21 May 2002, on Internet at:http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44032, accessed on 2 April 2015.[return]
N.a., “First Battalion of Afghanistan Army to be Deployed,” Voice of America, July 22 2002, on Internet at: http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-a-2002-07-22-29-first-66500992/552955.html, accessed 2 April 2015.[return]
COL Celeski interview, 11 September 2003. COL Celeski commanded the CJSOTF-A for two separate rotations (May-September 2002, and March-September 2003).[return]
CJSOTF-A Campaign Plan Jun-Oct 03, ANNEX A (Task Organization), ANNEX C (Operations), Headquarters, CJSOTF-Afghanistan, Camp Vance, Bagram, 111000Z June 2003, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The size and composition of the CJSOTF organization changed constantly throughout its existence.Each rotation was different in some way to previous ones, although there were a few features that were fairly predictable.The same applied to the coalition SOF elements that also changed from time to time.[return]
Findings from the analysis of the historical patterns from CJSOTF-A command assignments, unit deployments and mission taskings.[return]
Donald P. Wright, et al., A Different Kind of War:The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), October 2001 - September 2005 (Combined Studies Institute, Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 238-39; Robert Burns, “Mullen: Afghanistan Isn’t Top Priority,” USA Today, 1 December 2007, on Internet at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-12-11-3963072919_x.htm, accessed 13 October 2015.[return]
Burns, “Mullen: Afghanistan Isn’t Top Priority,” USA Today, 11 December 2007, quote from text.[return]
Koontz, Ed., Enduring Voices, 17, 20-21; CMH, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, March 2002-April 2005, 21, 56-57; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook (Fort Leavenworth, KS:Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2011), 3, 47.[return]
CMH, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, March 2002-April 2005, 56-57.[return]
U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Bryan D. Brown, U.S. Army, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 April 2005, 7.[return]
CJSOTF-A Public Affairs, “Operation Nam Dong: ANA Soldiers Take the Fight to the Insurgents in the Heart of Afghanistan,” U.S. Central Command Press Release, 12 May 2005; Donald P. Wright, et al., A Different Kind of War:The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), October 2001 - September 2005 (Combined Studies Institute, Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 288; Major D. Scott Mann, “Combat-Advising the ANA,” Special Warfare 18: 3 (November-December 2005), 17-19.[return]
Mann, “Combat-Advising the ANA,” Special Warfare 18: 3, quote from 18-19.[return]
“Q&A with Brigadier General Edward M. Reeder Jr.,” Special Warfare 24, Issue 4 (Oct-Dec 2011) (hereafter “Q&A with BG Reeder”), quote from 20.[return]
“Q&A with BG Reeder,” 20-21; Linda Robinson, One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), 11-12.[return]
“Q&A with BG Reeder,” 20-21; Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “New Afghan Commandos Take to the Frontlines,” National Public Radio, 23 July 2007, on Internet at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12127848, accessed 13 February 2015; Donna Miles, “Gates Visits New Afghan Commando Training Site,” American Forces Press Service, Kabul, Afghanistan, 4 June 2007, on Internet at: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46277, accessed on 13 February 2015; “Afghan Commandos Nab Taliban Leader in First Raid,” American Forces Press Service, Washington, DC, 14 September 2007, on Internet at:http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47446, accessed on 14 February 2015.[return]
For the doctrinal framework regarding the establishment of Special Operations Task Forces, see Joint Staff, Special Operations (Joint Pub [JP] 3-05, 18 April 2011 (Washington, DC: GPO), III-7; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (FM 3-18/FM 3-05.20), March 2012 (Washington, DC: GPO), 3-13 to 3-17.[return]
John D. Gresham and Shawna Gorman, “Interview with Brigadier General Edward M. Reeder, Jr,” Defense Media Network, 2 July 2012, on Internet at: http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/interview-with-brig-gen-edward-m-reeder-jr-usa/, accessed 27 April 2016.[return]
Dan Madden, “The Evolution of Precision Counterinsurgency: A History of Village Stability Operations & the Afghan Local Police,” Rand Corporation, CFSOCC-A Commander’s Initiative Group, 30 April 2011, 2-3, quote from 2.[return]
Michael A. Cohen, “Tossing the Afghan COIN:The U.S. Military’s Reinvented Counterinsurgency Turns Out to be the Same Old Game,” The Nation, 16 December 2010, on Internet at: http://www.thenation.com/article/tossing-afghan-coin/, accessed on 22 October 2015. Counterinsurgency is defined in Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 November 2010 [As amended through 15 February 2016]), 53, as the “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Also called COIN.”[return]
Madden, “Evolution of Precision Counterinsurgency,” 2-5. In Afghanistan, the original concept was known as the Community Defense Initiative (CDI).CDI was also later referred to as the Local Defense Initiative (LDI), but by the time the concept matured was widely expressed in the term Village Stability Operations (VSO).Therefore, for the sake of clarity VSO is used throughout this article.[return]
Madden, “Evolution of Precision Counterinsurgency,” 2-5; Donald C. Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” Special Warfare 24, Issue 4 (Oct-Dec 2011), 24. For more information, see the article in this issue that details ODA 7224’s experiment with the concept that came to be popularly known as Village Stability Operations (VSO).[return]
Sean D. Naylor, “SOCOM Directive Announces Major Changes,” Army Times, 28 August 2009, quote from text.[return]
Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, on Internet at: http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1230_1231Report.pdf, accessed on 22 October 2015, 67-68; Hamid Karzai, “Joint Proposal of Security Organizations for Establishing Afghan Local Police,” Decree number 3196, 14 July 2010, Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Interior Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, copy in USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, FL.[return]
DoD, Report on Progress, October 2011, 67-68, quote from 67; Madden, “Evolution of Precision Counterinsurgency,” 2-5. For information on the selection, training, and employing of female Cultural Support Teams (CSTs), see the associated article in this issue.[return]
Oft-repeated conventional wisdom quote reflecting the many differences between the various Village Stability Operations sites.It highlights the fact that there were so many differences between VSO locations and situations that each site was unique.[return]
“Q&A with BG Reeder,” 20; Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” Special Warfare 24:4, 24-27; DoD, Report on Progress, October 2011, 67.[return]
Madden, “Evolution of Precision Counterinsurgency,” 3; Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” Special Warfare 24:4, 27; DoD, Report on Progress, October 2011, 67.[return]
Briefing slides, LTC Scott Mann, USSOCOM, “Village Stability Operations – Afghan Local Police,” 10 December 2010, USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, FL, quote from slide 8.[return]
Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” 25.[return]
CJSOTF-A, “Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 14, CJSOTF-A Headquarters, Bagram AB, Afghanistan, 23 February 2010, USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, FL.[return]
“Q&A with BG Reeder,” 20; Sean Naylor, “No Easy Task:Making the Afghan Special Forces,” Military Times, 29 March 2013.[return]
TMD 9C10, “Tactical Military Information Support Operations in support of CJSOTF-A’s Village Stability Operations,” no date (ca. January 2011), copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” 24-26, quotes from 25.[return]
DoD, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2011, 28-29, 67-70.[return]
Philip Sherwell, “Osama bin Laden Killed: Behind the Scenes of the Deadly Raid,” The Telegraph, 7 May 2011, New York, on Internet at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/8500431/Osama-bin-Laden-killed-Behind-the-scenes-of-the-deadly-raid.html, accessed on 17 March 2015.[return]
Document, “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq,” 17 November 2008, text on Internet at:http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf, accessed on 17 March 2015.[return]
CNN Wire Staff, “Obama Announces Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal Plan,” CNN Politics, 23 June 2011, on Internet at: http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/22/afghanistan.troops.drawdown/, accessed on 17 March 2015.[return]
Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Plans Shift to Elite Units as it Winds Down in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 4 February 2012, on Internet at:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/asia/us-plans-a-shift-to-elite-forces-in-afghanistan.html, accessed on 17 March 2015; Spencer Ackerman, “U.S. Commandos New Landlord in Afghanistan,” Wired, 5 December 2012, on Internet at: http://www.wired.com/2012/12/academi-special-operations/, accessed on 17 March 2015; Carmen Gentile, “U.S., Afghan Elite Forces Merge,” USA Today, 19 August 2012, on Internet at:http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/story/2012-08-19/afghanistan-joint-command/57147250/1, accessed on 22 October 2015; Karen Parrish, “Special Ops Task Force Helps Shift Afghanistan Trend Line,” American Forces Press Service, 15 May 2013, on Internet at: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120051, last accessed on 10 March 2015, quotes from text.[return]
Shanker and Schmitt, “U.S. Plans Shift to Elite Units”; Spencer Ackerman, “U.S. Commandos New Landlord in Afghanistan,” Wired, 5 December 2012, on Internet at: http://www.wired.com/2012/12/academi-special-operations/, accessed on 17 March 2015; Carmen Gentile, “U.S., Afghan Elite Forces Merge,” USA Today, 19 August 2012, on Internet at:http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/story/2012-08-19/afghanistan-joint-command/57147250/1, accessed on 22 October 2015; Karen Parrish, “Special Ops Task Force Helps Shift Afghanistan Trend Line,” American Forces Press Service, 15 May 2013, on Internet at:http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120051, last accessed on 10 March 2015, quotes from text.[return]
DoD, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO), on Internet at:http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf, accessed 17 March 2015, 19-22; COL Patrick B. Roberson, interview by Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, 23 June 2014, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; COL Patrick B. Roberson, interview by Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, 11 December 2014, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
COL Roberson interview, 23 June 2014, quotes from interview.[return]
Thomas E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917. From Article 15 of a guide written by T.E. Lawrence and meant to provide advice to British soldiers assigned to fight alongside Arab tribesmen during World War I. [return]
President Barack H. Obama, “Statement by the President on the End of the Combat Mission in Afghanistan,” 28 December 2014, White House, Washington, DC, on Internet at:https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/28/statement-president-end-combat-mission-afghanistan, accessed on 29 September, 2015.[return]
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2189 (2014), 12 December 2014 (S/Res/2189 [2014]), on Internet at:http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2189.pdf, accessed on 29 September 2015, 2.[return]
LTC Michael P. Sullivan, interview by Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, 29 September 2015, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Memorandum, “Afghanistan Campaign Medal – Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL and Transition II Campaign Phase,” Pentagon, Washington, DC, 13 February 2015, on Internet at:http://www.defense.gov/documents/AfghanistanCampaignMedalOperationFreedomsSentinel.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2015. [return]
LTC Sullivan interview, 29 September 2015; Database, Richard Green, “Copy of CJSOTF-A Cdrs2-13 Nov2014,” USSOCOM History Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL.[return]
LTC Sullivan interview, 29 September 2015, quote from interview.[return]
Dwight Jon Zimmerman, “Task Force K-Bar – Special Operations Forces and Operation Enduring Freedom,” Defense Media Network, 19 September 2011, on Internet at: http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/operation-enduring-freedom-the-first-49-days-6/, accessed on 19 February 2015.On 7 December 2004, President George W. Bush presented the Presidential Unit Citation to CJSOTF-South/TF K-BAR at Camp Pendleton, CA.TF K-BAR Coalition SOF were included in that award.[return]
CJSOTF-A Campaign Plan Jun-Oct 03; COL Celeski interview, by Dr. Michael E. Krivdo, 13 March 2015; Correspondence, Celeski to Krivdo, 9 May 2016.[return]
Document, Robert W. Jones Jr., “PRT Timeline,” 30 March 2003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, quote from 5.[return]
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, CALL Playbook no. 07-34, September 2001 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2007), 3.[return]
CALL, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, 23-27.[return]
USAID, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” 20 June 2016, on Internet at:https://www.usaid.gov/provincial-reconstruction-teams, accessed on 22 June 2016.[return]
CALL, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, 3.[return]
William Maley, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – How They Arrived and Where They are Going,” NATO Review, Autumn 2007, on Internet at:http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/Military_civilian_divide/Provincial_Reconstruction_Teams_Afghanistan/EN/index.htm, accessed on 27 June 2016.[return]
Maley, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.” [return]
CALL, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, 8-10.[return]
Drew Brooks, “Maj. Gen. Edward M. Reeder Jr. retiring to Fayetteville,” Fayetteville Observer, 1 June 2015.[return]
