The Path to War in Panama

The Path to War in Panama

SOUTHCOM Operational Planning

By Joshua D. Esposito, PhD

From Veritas, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2019

FULL SERIES:
ARSOF role in JUST CAUSE
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Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S. military intervention in Panama in 1989, resulted from a variety of factors decades in the making. In 1903, the U.S. obtained the right to build and defend a canal across the Isthmus of Panama in exchange for helping the territory obtain independence from Colombia. Starting then, U.S. soldiers, sailors, and marines were stationed in Panama. Periodic U.S. interventions over the next seventy-five years safeguarded the canal and protected American interests. In exchange for American backing, Panamanian leaders rarely impeded U.S. use of the Canal Zone as a base from which to counter revolutionary movements and maintain stability in the region.1

A new treaty, signed in 1977, called for an incremental withdrawal of U.S. military forces and hand over of U.S. facilities beginning in 1979, and a turnover of the canal to Panama in 2000.2 Several headquarters, including U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), U.S. Army, South (USARSO), and later Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH), were located in the Canal Zone. In addition, roughly 50,000 American citizens lived in Panama, including canal workers, U.S. military personnel, and their dependents.3

When Panamanian dictator Brigadier General Omar Torrijos died in 1981, a two-year struggle for power ensued. In 1983, General Manuel Noriega became commander-in-chief of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), which oversaw all military and law enforcement.4 The PDF also controlled the dominant political party, though Panama’s political institutions were largely superficial.5

Noriega supported the U.S. assistance to the Contras waging unconventional war against the Cuban-backed Sandinista government in Nicaragua, suppressed leftist movements in Panama, and provided intelligence to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).6 However, he violently oppressed political opponents, trafficked drugs, laundered money, sold weapons to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, and shared U.S. secrets with Cuban and Nicaraguan counterparts.7 Noriega undermined Torrijos’s democratic reforms, dominated Panama’s political system, and controlled the economy.8 Most of the country remained apathetic. The dictator retained a strong base of support after fraudulent elections in 1984, but his opponents were enraged, and loose alliances emerged between dissident groups.9

The following chart shows the escalation of the crisis.

Click on an event to learn more
7 MAY: Bush administration increases pressure on Noriega to step down
31 JAN: JUST CAUSE officially ends
21 DEC: PROMOTE LIBERTY initiated by VOCO
20 DEC-31 JAN: JUST CAUSE
18 DEC: JTFSO ADVON to Panama; troop movement begins
17 DEC: President Bush orders execution of BLUE SPOON
16 DEC: 1Lt Robert Paz, USMC, killed by PDF
15 DEC: Noriega named Maximum Leader
16 NOV: USARSO increases security plan to combat threats against U.S. personnel
3 OCT: Failed coup against Noriega
SEP: U.S. severs diplomatic ties with Panama, increases economic sanctions
22 JUL: NSD17 orders military sections to assert U.S. treaty rights and keep Noriega “off guard”
15 MAY-30 JUN: BLADE JEWEL relocates U.S. dependents to base housing or to the continental U.S.
7 MAY: Noriega nullifies results of the Panamanian Election
APR: Arrest of Kurt Muse
NOV: President-elect Bush makes clear he will recind offer to negotiate drug charges with Noriega
APR-AUG: PDF intrusions onto U.S. installation (Arraijan Tank Farm) and into U.S. housing areas (Ft. Espinar) result in firefights
SPRING: Noriega escalates political repression and clearer ties to Cuba & Nicaragua
FEB: SECSTATE begins negotiations with Noriega to step down in exchange for Reagan Administration dropping drug charges
28 FEB: JCS planning order directs USSOUTHCOM to plan against new situation
2 APR: Reagan announces decision to send additional troops to Panama
FEB: Noriega indicted on drug charges; replaces Panamanian President with ally; U.S. officials call for Noriega to relinquish power
ELABORATE MAZE
28 FEB–APR 1988
PRAYER BOOK
MAY 1988–18 DEC 1989
JCS REVIEW
MAR–APR 1988
NIMROD DANCER
MAY – 19 DEC 1989
POST TIME: consolidation of defensive operations and buildup of forces
Troop Buildup
Training & Ops (CREs, Purple Storms, Sand Fleas)
KLONDIKE KEY: non-permissive evacuation of US civilians
Never Executed
ACID GAMBIT
Kurt Muse Rescue
BLUE SPOON: offensive combat operations. Became JUST CAUSE on 19 DEC
Capture of GEN Manual Noriega included in OPORD
3 NOV: REVISED OPORD APPROVED
JUST CAUSE
BLIND LOGIC: nation building, stability, reconstruction plan for post-invasion    21 DEC: BLIND LOGIC became CONPLAN PROMOTE LIBERTY OPORD
PROMOTE LIBERTY
POTUS: Ronald W. Reagan: 20 JAN 1981–20 JAN 1989
George H.W. Bush: 20 JAN 1989–20 JAN 1993
SECDEF: Frank C. Carlucci: 23 NOV 1987–20 JAN 1989
Richard B. Cheney: 21 MAR 1989–20 JAN 1993
SECSTATE: George P. Shultz: JUL 1982–20 JAN 1989
James Baker: JAN 1989–AUG 1992
CJCS: ADM William J. Crowe: OCT 1986–SEP 1989
GEN Colin Powell: OCT 1989–SEP 1993
CINCSOUTH: GEN Frederick F. Woerner, Jr.: JUN 1987–JUL 1989
GEN Maxwell R. Thurman: SEP 1989–NOV 1990
Panama Timeline background

Noriega’s actions concerned the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who viewed the Canal as strategically important, and a potential threat in the hands of insurgents, or a government sympathetic to the Soviet Union.10 After the PDF killed Noriega critic Hugo Spadafora in 1985, the relationship between the U.S. and Noriega began a downward spiral, with growing calls in the U.S. government for the dictator to step down.11 Public acknowledgement of covert U.S. aid to the Contras ended that support in late 1986 and eliminated Noriega’s value as a conduit to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas.12 Sanctions levied in June 1987 damaged the Panamanian economy and emboldened Noriega’s opponents.13 The dictator increased ties to the Soviet Union, and his supporters attacked the U.S. embassy and American policies.14

Noriega strengthened his position despite U.S. attempts to force his resignation through political and economic pressure.15 Opposition to Noriega was disorganized in early 1988, and the dictator consolidated his support. In February, the PDF increased harassment of U.S. citizens in response to news of Noriega’s indictment, along with his top aide, Colonel Luis del Cid, on drug trafficking charges in the U.S.16 Noriega became more aggressive in challenging the U.S. after sanctions stemmed the flow of U.S. dollars into Panama, impeding his ability to pay the PDF.17 As a result, senior U.S. officials revised their options for military involvement in Panama. On February 28, the JCS ordered General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., USSOUTHCOM commander-in-chief, to develop contingency plans for military operations short of war (ELABORATE MAZE).18 These addressed noncombatant evacuations, combat using forces already in Panama, and stability operations. Eventually broken into four distinct Operations Orders, PRAYER BOOK planning intensified as tensions increased. Occasionally acts of violence occurred.19

By early 1989, U.S. President George H.W. Bush’s administration concluded that Noriega could not be pressured into stepping down.20 The situation escalated after the April arrest of Kurt Muse, an American citizen who ran an anti-Noriega radio station.21 Noriega annulled the results of the May elections, in which U.S.-supported candidates received the majority of the vote, and selected a president. Beginning in May, additional U.S. reinforcements were sent to the Canal Zone (NIMROD DANCER), to increase pressure on the Noriega regime. Over the next several months, plans were revised, and Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) units rehearsed missions anticipated as part of Operation BLUE SPOON.22

Beginning in July, a series of exercises and operations called “Purple Storms” asserted U.S. treaty rights of free movement, and rehearsed missions. “Sand Flea” exercises kept Noriega and the PDF off balance.23 In September, the U.S. severed diplomatic ties with Panama, and increased economic sanctions.24 In late-September, GEN Maxwell R. Thurman replaced GEN Woerner, and offensive operational planning against Noriega intensified. GEN Thurman made the XVIII Airborne Corps the ground force commander to unify conventional and special operations planning. Operational plans evolved toward a surprise assault to capture Noriega and dismantle the PDF.25

Following the PDF killing of Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz on 15 December 1989, President Bush gave the execute order for BLUE SPOON (renamed JUST CAUSE) to remove Noriega, subdue the PDF, protect American lives and property, and safeguard the canal.26 The stability mission (PROMOTE LIBERTY) afterward lasted into 1991. Noriega was captured and extradicted, and the PDF was disbanded. The three candidates who received the most votes in the May 1989 election were charged with standing up a new government. More than 27,000 U.S. military personnel (including 3,600+ Army Special Operations Forces) participated in JUST CAUSE.

The subsequent four articles discuss ARSOF preparation for, and participation in military operations in Panama in 1989–1990. Forthcoming articles will examine the ARSOF role in JUST CAUSE and stability operations during Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY.

‘Stop the Radio Nacional Broadcasts’

“Proving the Concept” The 528th Support Battalion in Panama

Absolute Confidence: The 617th SOAD and 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG in Panama, 1989–1990

A Tale of Two Teams: Tactical Loudspeaker Support in Operation JUST CAUSE

“No Ordinary Signal Unit” The 112th Signal Battalion in Panama

Civil Affairs in the Assault: Company A, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion at the Torrijos-Airport Terminal

ENDNOTES