Absolute Confidence

On 20 December 1989, thirty-three Special Forces (SF) soldiers from Company C, 3-7th SFG fast roped onto the roof of the Contraloria General building to stop radio broadcasts encouraging violence against U.S. forces during the early hours of Operation JUST CAUSE.1 The mission required precision flying in dangerous conditions. Several weeks later, Operational Detachments-Alpha (ODAs) from 3-7th SFG established a forward operating base south of the Cordillera de Talamanca mountain range, from where they conducted stability operations in the area around David. Getting to David required a high risk flight across the mountains, descending through heavy cloud cover over the Pacific Ocean.2 Success in those missions was largely dependent on established interoperability with the 617th Special Operations Aviation Detachment (SOAD).

The 617th was a company of five MH-60A Black Hawk helicopters operationally controlled by, and stationed in Panama with Special Operations Command-South (SOCSOUTH).3 Activated in October 1987, it provided the majority of Army Special Operations Aviation support to the theater special operations command’s special operations forces (SOF), which included 3-7th SFG.4 In September 1989, the 617th was reorganized and administratively placed under the newly established 3rd Battalion, 160th Aviation.5

Despite being stationed on opposite sides of the isthmus, and nearly continuous deployment schedules, the 617th and 3-7th SFG built strong rapport over a period of nearly three years.6 The units had a habitual, nearly daily working relationship, and the 617th often left two Black Hawks and crew with 3-7th SFG at Fort Espinar, where they trained on urban operations, fast roping, precision fires, and vehicle interdiction.7 Underscoring the consistency of the relationship, then-Captain (CPT) Mark B. Petree, a detachment commander in Company C, 3-7th SFG, remembers being “in a 617th helicopter at least once a week.” Then-CW2 Daniel Jollota, a fully mission qualified 617th pilot, recalls training with 3-7th SFG from 1987 to 1989, “three or four times a week, mostly at night.”8 In addition to training, the units upgraded fast rope equipment; revised tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and conducted missions throughout the hemisphere.9

As tensions increased between U.S. forces stationed in Panama, and the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) under the control of dictator Manuel Noriega, those missions came closer to home. In the spring of 1988, 3-7th SFG established observation posts in the jungles “around the Arraijan Tank Farm, adjacent to Howard AFB,” the 617th’s home station.10 From there, they observed the infiltration routes of armed Panamanians into the area.11 On one occasion, the 617th and the C/3-7th SFG quick reaction force launched to support ground forces in contact with armed intruders, suspected to be Cuban special forces and pro-Noriega Panamanians. Similar missions were conducted near Fort Espinar, where 3-7th captured intruders near dependent housing areas.12 Co-located in helicopter hangars and shoot houses during those missions, the 617th and 3-7th SFG safeguarded U.S. installations and gained experience operating together, especially at night.13

The 617th and 3-7th SFG had been preparing for combat operations in Panama since late-1987. Early rehearsals for missions that became part of Operation Plan (OPLAN) BLUE SPOON, later renamed JUST CAUSE, laid the groundwork for success when the invasion was launched.14 Specifically, the 617th used Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and gun reconnaissance video to collect intelligence for the OPLAN.15 In the summer of 1989, the units began training together more frequently.16 After a failed coup to remove Noriega on 3 October 1989, Task Force (TF) BLACK was established “to plan, coordinate and execute assigned tasks under OPORD 2-90 BLUE SPOON.”17

Mission-specific training between the 617th and 3-7th SFG increased to several times per week in November 1989 as planning was refined. Then- C/3-7th SFG commander, Major (MAJ) David E. McCracken noted, for example, that the rescue of American Kurt Muse from Modelo Prison was considered a critical mission prior to a full-scale invasion. McCracken noted that “the 617th was the only capability to support insertion for the rescue.”18 Rehearsals for combat operations included flying routes later used to subdue the PDF, “inserting 3-7th SFG detachments on critical targets,” including “water tanks, a school, and an old hospital,” and “dispersed insertions of C/3-7th SFG to secure the three individuals elected by the Panamanian people to govern the country.”19

The rehearsals also provided critical lessons learned. Training insertions, for example, helped the 617th and 3-7th SFG establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) for internal communications on the Black Hawks. Anticipating planned missions, 617th and 3-7th SFG rehearsals helped determine how quickly the ground force could disembark the helicopters on small, high platforms.20 In addition, rehearsals led to the development of physical infrastructure used on D-Day, such as map boards, communications gear, and wiring for antennas.21

One challenge that the units faced in late December was a demand for special operations aviation that exceeded the 617th’s capacity. Despite being manned at roughly half of what was allocated in the Table of Organization and Equipment, the 617th was tasked with supporting special operations missions for other task forces, in addition to its formal placement in TF BLACK.22 Because of the need for crew rest, coupled with the 617th’s small number of helicopters and limited manpower—the unit had only ten pilots in Panama—7th SFG used conventional assets and U.S. Air Force (USAF) helicopters to supplement their dedicated special operations aviation support.23

3-7th SFG used MH-53s Pave Lows from the USAF 1st Special Operations Wing for larger troop movements, and two UH-60 helicopters provided by 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment, when 617th assets were unavailable.24 Conventional and USAF units performed well during JUST CAUSE, but the 617th’s close relationship with 3-7th SFG, and its special operations capabilities, gave the ground force the confidence to conduct missions they would not have attempted with other units.25 Thus, the use of conventional and USAF units in TF BLACK allowed the 617th to focus on missions where its SOF-specific capabilities were essential.

By the time Operation JUST CAUSE began, Howard Air Force Base had become overcrowded with units from several task forces. For that reason, and because he determined that co-location with 3-7th SFG would enhance operational planning, then- Major (MAJ) Richard D. Compton, the 617th SOAD commander, moved his unit to Albrook Air Base soon after H-Hour. While advantageous operationally, Albrook’s proximity to unsecured areas occasionally led to tense situations. In one instance, Colonel (COL) Robert C. Jacobelly, the SOCSOUTH commander, was nearly hit by a round fired into the operations center.26 Risks aside, the 617th did not incur casualties at Albrook, and co-location with the ground force enhanced mission planning.

The 617th flew multiple insertions of Special Forces ODAs prior to H-Hour, and numerous combat missions for TF BLACK over the course of two weeks.27 It provided airlift; infiltrated and recovered ODAs during direct action raids; and flew casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, surveillance, and interdiction missions. At times, the 617th’s unique capabilities and experience working with Special Forces were key to mission success.28 One such mission was the assault on Radio Nacional, which took pro-Noriega broadcasts off the air.

MAJ McCracken noted that his “absolute confidence” in the aviators was critical to the assault on Radio Nacional, both in the decision to conduct the mission, and in its success.29 Only the 617th was fast rope capable, and the years of operating with 3-7th SFG enabled speed and precision during infiltration and recovery of ground forces during the operation. McCracken noted that the two units’ preparedness was a result of having trained on platform infiltrations during the lead-up to JUST CAUSE.30

617th SOAD pilots delivered the ground force to their target and held steady as the SF team fast-roped to the small roof on top of the seventeen-story Contraloria General building, amidst swirling winds and low-level light.31 From there, the assault team shut down propaganda broadcasts transmitted on AM radio that encouraged Panamanians to take up arms against U.S. forces. The 617th was also far more experienced with night vision goggles (NVGs) than other units, which was critical, since the mission unfolded in late-evening of the shortest day of the year. After a quick return to Albrook under NVGs, they re-launched, again under NVGs, to neutralize the FM antenna at Hippodrome, east of Panama City.32 Ultimately, MAJ McCracken attributed much of his team’s success in securing the Radio Nacional building to the 617th’s proficiency operating in the most difficult conditions—at dusk and in shifting winds; and during the exfiltration, under NVGs.

At the outset of hostilities, the 617th was primarily assigned to support C/3-7th SFG, with three of the detachment’s Black Hawks committed to the company during initial combat operations.33 While C/3-7th SFG was the 617th’s priority ‘customer’, the unit began operating as five separate helicopters after the first 48-hours, based on ad hoc tasking from TF BLACK.34 It supported Company A, 3-7th SFG in blocking PDF reinforcements at Pacora River Bridge, and helped safeguard Noriega’s imprisoned opponents who had been identified as key leaders in the new government.35 By early January, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Group sent several pilots and crew, and a Black Hawk, to augment the 617th.36

During Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, the stability operations that began just after H-Hour and continued throughout 1990, the 617th transported and resupplied ODAs and Military Intelligence-Civil Affairs (MICA) teams around the country.37 The 617th’s experience with internal fuel tanks was critical in those missions, which included collecting weapons and narcotics from rogue elements.38 7th SFG missions to Penonomé and David, for example, were possible because internal fuel blivets, unique to MH-model Black Hawks, allowed the 617th to transport the ground force to the target without refueling.39

The month-long mission to David, in particular, demonstrated the contributions of the 617th to special operations in Panama. Located in the northwestern part of the country, David was a stronghold of pro-Noriega PDF. In the first few days of the invasion, the 617th helped the Rangers from 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment manage the surrender of the PDF in David and capture a weapons cache north of the city, and 3-7th SFG secure Lieutenant Colonel Luis del Cid, a key aide to Noriega.40 Then, in late-December, ODAs from A/3-7th SFG, and one 617th Black Hawk, with two pilots and two crew members, set up on a local airfield just over the mountains from David, from where they conducted “clearing” operations to subdue the remaining PDF soldiers.41

Almost every day for a month, the 617th transported ODAs north over the Cordillera de Talamanca mountain range to David. The flight required 617th pilots to descend through heavy cloud cover over the Pacific Ocean, with no instrumentation, before turning east toward the city. The small Panamanian airport provided the only fuel, and the pilots had no direct communication with their chain of command at Albrook. Years of training together made the units interoperable, and the 617th crew was able to work efficiently under A/3-7th SFG, speaking only rarely with MAJ Compton through their Special Forces partners. Despite the austere conditions, the units completed their mission, and the remaining PDF forces were subdued.42

Tactical familiarity between special operations aviation units and ground forces, and habitual relationships that streamlined the process for conducting missions, contributed to Army special operations forces’ success during operations in Panama.43 While the 617th had a small footprint, it played a critical role in several key missions during the conflict. 617th pilots received Army Air Medals for their efforts, though their contributions to Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY are best reflected in the views of the ground force units that they supported. In summarizing the invasion, now-retired COL McCracken stressed the extent of 617th support to his company. They “earned DFCs [Distinguished Flying Crosses],” he emphasized, “whether they received them or not.”44