Coming out of the devastation of WWII, Japan reluctantly established a security force capable of protecting the island nation from external threats. Since 2004, the Japanese Special Forces Group has embraced that mission set and its skills have been enhanced through regular combined training exercises with U.S. Army Special Operations Forces. Exercises like SILENT EAGLE have proven critically important to improving ties and interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.
TAKEAWAYS
After World War II, Japan evolved into a key U.S. ally in the Pacific region. Joint exercises allow the U.S. to maintain and expand this relationship.
Japan has several international territorial disputes with its neighbors and a need to protect the homeland, requiring it to maintain a capable and ready force to counter regional aggression.
Exercises like SILENT EAGLE 2011 build bonds with partner forces and are a critical component to sharing lessons, experience, and fostering cooperation.
A name followed by a * indicates a pseudonym and Japanese soldiers are only identified by initials.
A balmy September Hawaiian day at sea level turned chilly as a CH-47 Chinook from the 25th Infantry Division’s Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) ascended rapidly to 12,900 feet.1 Land slipped away as the helicopter flew several miles out over the Pacific. Given a two-minute warning, more than a dozen soldiers from the Japanese Special Forces Group (SFGp) stood up in preparation for their exit. Thirty seconds out, the two U.S. Special Forces (SF) jumpmasters conducted a final check and directed the parachutists towards the ramp at the back of the aircraft. Then, accompanied by the two SF instructors, the SFGp members exited. At 4,000 feet they deployed their main parachutes to glide back to the Drop Zone (DZ) on Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH) at Kaneohe Bay on Oahu, Hawaii. This Military Freefall (MFF) jump, the final one conducted in the exercise, represented a rare opportunity for the Japanese and a highlight of Exercise SILENT EAGLE 2011, a bilateral exercise between the U.S. Army 1st Special Forces Group (SFG) and the SFGp from 19 August to 15 September 2011.
This article explains the SFGp, its mission, and its partnership with 1st SFG in SILENT EAGLE, specifically the 2011 iteration. That bilateral exercise highlighted a critical SF mission: training and improving interoperability with foreign military forces.2 The U.S. relationship with the Japanese is particularly important because it is one of its most capable Pacific allies. However, to understand the depth of that relationship and the purpose of the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF), one must go back to Japan’s defeat in World War II.
Following their 1945 victory, the Allies prohibited Japan from maintaining a military force. The post-war occupation ended in 1952, but by then the security environment had drastically changed. With the U.S. engaged in the Korean War, the Japanese felt defenseless against territorial threats posed by the Soviet Union and created the JSDF in 1954, which has existed ever since. As of 2022, its roughly 250,000 personnel handle internal threats, respond to national disasters, and defend sovereign territory.3
From its founding, the JSDF was not a traditional military force. World War II left many Japanese citizens strongly opposed to war. The Japanese government codified that pacifist mentality in Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution, which forbade war as an instrument of foreign policy. It also prevented the nation from maintaining offensive military forces. In fact, only in July 2014 did Japan authorize deploying its military forces overseas to defend allies in the case of a declaration of war. Japan does maintain a robust defensive capability. The Army is the JSDF’s largest element, and the SFGp is its most elite unit and foremost counter-terrorism force.4
SFGp members are required to be airborne qualified, according to Colonel S.H., the SFGp commander.5 Therefore, the majority of SFGp candidates came from the Japanese 1st Airborne Brigade, collocated at Camp Narashino in Chiba Prefecture. The SFGp modeled its difficult selection criteria on the U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). Much of their program of instruction came from SFGp members who were SFQC graduates, explained SFGp Captain (CPT) Y.H., who completed the course in 2004.6
Organization of the Central Readiness Force (CRF)
Commanded by a colonel, the SFGp generally consists of a headquarters, three companies, and several smaller components. Organizationally, the SFGp is a component of the Central Readiness Force (CRF), whose mission is to address “international peace cooperation activities and diverse domestic contingencies,” including disaster relief, evacuation of Japanese nationals, anti-piracy, and combating attacks or guerrilla activities in Japan by foreign powers.7 Even in 2022, the latter mission remains a special concern for Japan, which has long-standing territorial disputes with neighboring countries. Two of these disputes have taken precedence.
The first dispute centers on the Kuril Islands to the north of Japan. In the last days of World War II, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and occupied the Kuril Islands, including the four southernmost islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai islands. Moscow has since governed the islands as sovereign Russian territory despite Japan’s protests that they were illegally annexed. Because of the dispute, Japan and Russia have never signed a peace treaty formally ending WWII, although they have periodically conducted talks regarding the islands.8
The second territorial dispute concerns the Senkaku Islands at the southern terminus of the Ryukyu chain. The surrounding economic zone has rich fishing grounds and potential oil reserves. Japan formally annexed the islands in 1895, but China and South Korea have also claimed ownership. Despite protests from China, Tokyo purchased the islands outright from private Japanese owners on 11 September 2012. The Chinese continue to protest the purchase and regularly send military aircraft and naval forces near the islands to contest Japanese sovereignty.
Japan considers these two territorial disputes among its greatest security threats. Accordingly, the Japanese Army staff chose Oahu for SILENT EAGLE 2011 because it replicated an environment similar to what the SFGp would experience if it had to repel an invading enemy force from a disputed island.9 Therefore, approximately 40 SFGp members arrived on Oahu to learn skills that they could in turn impart to the rest of the unit.10 An Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) from Company A of the then-provisional 4th Battalion, 1st SFG, hosted the exercise.
The MFF-qualified team was well-suited to conduct SILENT EAGLE 2011.11 The Operations Sergeant, Master Sergeant (MSG) Roger H. McSweep*, said that many of the detachment’s soldiers entered SF through the 18X (X-Ray) program and were younger than the SFGp soldiers that they were going to train with. However, “they have been in a while … all [but one] has a CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] deployment under their belt.”12 SFGp members later commented that hearing the SF soldiers tell stories about their combat experiences was one of the best aspects of their training.13
The ODA’s planning for SILENT EAGLE 2011 began in May 2011. “At first we thought that it would be canceled because of the [11 March 2011] tsunami, but the training just got pushed back,” explained MSG McSweep*.14 The magnitude 9.0 Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami had killed more than 20,000 Japanese and caused extensive damage. Despite the disaster, the SFGp pushed to continue with the training. They especially sought additional training in MFF operations and long-distance shooting techniques. The ODA had to prepare training events for both skill sets.
Prior to SILENT EAGLE 2011, the detachment spent three days refreshing their long-range shooting skills.15 Then, the entire team underwent intensive MFF training at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. To cap it off, the ODA conducted a MFF jump from a C-17 upon their arrival in Hawaii. “It was the best jump I have ever had … When the ramp opened up, all I [saw were] the beautiful Hawaiian Islands,” exclaimed Sergeant First Class (SFC) Bill J. Macks*, the Team Intelligence Sergeant (18F).16
The ODA then conducted final preparations for the exercise by dividing into groups. Two experienced MFF jumpmasters would conduct that portion of the training. Another group would be the primary instructors for sniper and firearms training. Finally, the ODA ensured that it had enough personnel to facilitate all training phases. The ODA was already fully staffed with two Medical Sergeants (18D) to provide medical coverage, but also brought an additional 18D to cover all the training events.17 The detachment also brought two riggers (one for MFF and one for the reserve parachutes) to inspect parachutes for the team and for the SFGp.18
The ODA organized the training into three segments: advanced marksmanship, MFF operations; and a culminating exercise to evaluate how well the participants employed the skills that they learned. These training segments dictated how the SFGp personnel organized. The SFGp divided themselves into two main operations sections, a MFF team and a ground team, each with about ten men. The rest performed supporting command and control and administrative functions. With those preparations done, the SFGp members arrived. As a prelude to the training, the ODA and the SFGp broke the ice by hosting a barbeque. SILENT EAGLE 2011 kicked off early the next morning with firearms training.
Advanced firearms training was particularly important to the SFGp, because it does not have rifle ranges greater than 300 meters and noise restrictions limit the amount of shooting practice. To maximize training, the ODA soldiers coordinated range safety with U.S. Marine Corps Range Control. The impact area of the rifle range was in restricted open water, and range control personnel monitored water traffic to make sure that all boats stayed out of the impact area. The SF team also provided spotters that were posted at both sides of the range. “If a boat drifted in [the impact area] we had to radio that in.” Such an occurrence stopped the firing until the boat left the area, explained rigger Sergeant (SGT) James K. Guinness*.19
The instruction included advanced sniper training.20 The group climbed high ridges bordering the range, where the SF instructors utilized Mk 17 Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR) and M110 rifles to show their Japanese counterparts how to engage long-distance targets from a steep angle. Using their 7.62mm M24 sniper rifles, the SFGp practiced high-angle precision shots in excess of 400 meters (more than 1,300 feet). The Japanese shooters fondly recalled this as a training highlight.
The SFGp also trained in close quarters battle (CQB) tactics; because they were already proficient, the Japanese operators excelled. American Special Forces Weapons Sergeant Staff Sergeant (SSG) Thomas Sofa* said that the SFGp “knew their stuff. Their [Standard Operating Procedures] are similar to ours … but they would ask for opinions like what would we do different?”21 SSG Wilson S. Segar*, the Junior Engineer Sergeant, commented that the SFGp “shot group was so tight we had to constantly move targets around” lest they punch holes in the wall.22 ODA leader CPT Anderson H. Dow* summed up this aspect of the training with a compliment, saying: “these guys are phenomenal shooters.”23
Providing the SFGp with the desired MFF training proved to be harder than the ODA originally thought. CPT Dow* explained that the Japanese desired the training because “their version of [Federal Aviation Administration restrictions] is even stricter than our own.”24 The height of a MFF jump required air traffic within a large area to be suspended to prevent accidental collisions. Because of Japan’s dense population and high-volume flight corridors, halting air traffic for training jumps was nearly impossible, leaving few training opportunities. Ironically, the ODA also found MFF training in Hawaii difficult for similar reasons.
First, the ODA coordinated with the FAA for airspace usage. In planning, the SFGp had requested MFF jumps from 25,000 feet. The ODA agreed because jumping from that height is routinely done on various U.S. military bases, which also happened to be far from commercial air traffic. However, like Japan, Oahu had heavy commercial air traffic. Each jump meant that the FAA had to halt all air traffic within the airspace for up to twenty minutes to eliminate the possibility of a mid-air collision. Fortunately, MSG McSweep* was a pilot-in-training and “could speak the FAA’s language,” said CPT Dow*.25 “I was told that I was a godsend because I knew the issues and hurdles,” recalled MSG McSweep*.26 The FAA finally approved the mission schedule, but from then on, the ODA could only cancel jumps, not add new ones.27 At that point, the ODA looked to secure aircraft.
The main obstacle was finding military aircraft that could support a jump from 25,000 feet. Flying at that altitude required that all jumpers, aircrew, and passengers utilize oxygen bottles and masks. The Coast Guard had previously agreed to provide a C-130, but at the last minute, the ODA discovered that it lacked onboard oxygen and was not rated to drop jumpers above 10,000 feet.28 The ODA scrambled to line up suitable U.S. Air Force aircraft and crews. “We called every fixed wing group in the U.S. to get platforms, but it was always an issue of money and crew time,” MSG McSweep* explained.29 The ODA feared that they might have to cut the MFF portion entirely.
Fortuitously, the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, based at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, was preparing for a deployment. One of their pre-mission training requirements was proficiency working with Special Operations Forces. Therefore, the 25th CAB agreed to support SILENT EAGLE 2011 with their CH-47 Chinook helicopters, even though the airframes could only accommodate jumps up to 13,000 feet above sea-level (ASL). Although disappointed, the Japanese also realized that the ODA had done everything it could do and agreed to the solution. Thirty jumps were planned, but ten had to be scrubbed. Still, the jumps dramatically added to the SFGp level of experience, said its MFF team leader CPT I.S.30 The SFGp soon put both their MFF and ground teams to the test in a culminating exercise simulating an attack on a Japanese island by an unnamed aggressor force.
In the scenario, the enemy infiltrated by fishing boats and occupied a facility on the island. The SFGp countered the enemy force by having the MFF team make a night parachute insertion on the island. That team would then guide the SO team’s infiltration by CH-47. Together, they would conduct a reconnaissance of the island that would help them plan for a course of action.31
Due to the strict FAA schedule, the MFF Team made an evening jump on 12 September over Kaneohe Bay, then drove to Bellows Field to prepare for the helicopter insertion. Night vision goggles assisted the two teams in linking up. Together, they moved a couple of hundred yards into the brush to set up a patrol base from where they could conduct an area reconnaissance. The SFGp discovered that the enemy was located in an abandoned U.S. Air Force Nike missile facility.33
To avoid confusion, the Japanese provided colorful uniforms to the American and Japanese role players acting as aggressors. We all “looked like Mario” from the Mario Brothers video game, said SGT Brady K. O’Malley*.34 From a concealed location several hundred yards away, the SFGp personnel and ODA members surveilled the target, noted the number of enemy personnel, and observed activities. Additionally, the enemy force conducted vehicle patrols every three hours. From under cover, the SFGp took photos to ascertain the number of enemy personnel.35 The SFGp gathered enough information to plan an attack to capture the facility.
At 0300 hours, wearing night vision goggles, the combined force crept up to the front gate of the enemy-held facility. Snipers eliminated the gate guards while others cut the lock. An assault team then swept the compound’s buildings and surprised the defenders. “We were notified by the cadre that we would be [attacked] … in order to give the most training effect for the guys coming through the door.” But the warning did not suffice. “I could not tell there was anyone in the room until they were halfway across… I laid down fire in the open bay and moved into a side room. Then, they shot me,” said ‘enemy soldier’ SGT Guinness*.36
The after-action review of the final exercise provided additional benefits. After observing the ODA in the field, SFC Macks* noted that the Japanese were interested in learning how the ODA functioned, its tactics, and equipment.37 After years of combat experience, “we are compact and have lessons learned concerning improvements in our gear.” The Japanese contingent had brought with them several medical doctors and they were very interested in the ODA’s field medical kits. As team medic SSG Sam D. Parks* explained it, “in ten years of war, we have boiled down [our equipment] to handle trauma.”38
With the training and culminating exercise complete, everyone could relax. To express appreciation, the Japanese contingent purchased a small pig and cooked it in the ground, kalua-style. During the luau, each group exchanged gifts and their nation’s airborne wings. The ODA presented the Japanese a wooden plaque commemorating SILENT EAGLE 2011. The Japanese gave each ODA member a SFGp ballcap and also presented a miniature metal samurai helmet.
Working with the SFGp highlighted the capabilities of a partner-SOF unit and impressed the ODA members. SSG Sofa* said that often training “was crawl, walk, run. With [the Japanese] it was run.”39 Finally, SFC Macks* provided the best compliment, “I would totally feel comfortable going on real world operations with these guys.”40
Although training missions like SILENT EAGLE 2011 appear routine, they remain vital. Building personal relationships, enhancing the capabilities of, and improving interoperability with, allied SOF improves the overall security situation within the Pacific region and pays dividends. Such exercises allow partner forces to share experiences and earn mutual respect. In the event of real-world conflict, when time is of the essence, the learning curve of interoperability will be less and understanding each other’s capabilities will occur quicker, both of which will help streamline operations.
ENDNOTES
CW2 Andrew Hawk*, interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 14 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
SILENT EAGLE 2011 was funded by the Department of State’s Military Sales Program, which introduces U.S. military equipment to potential foreign buyers. It was not a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). The SF role in Foreign Internal Defense is in FM 3-18, Special Forces Operations, dated May 2014.[return]
Overview of Japan’s Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense, Japan, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/index.html.[return]
When formed in 2004 it was originally named the Special Operations Group. It is now called the Japanese Special Forces Group or SFGp.[return]
Colonel S.H., interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 13 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. He is a U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course graduate. Because of sensitivities, SFGp members will only be identified by initials.[return]
Captain Y.H., interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 13 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Y.H. interview. [return]
Japanese Ground Self Defense Force/Central Readiness Force Mission page, http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/crf/pa/Englishv/framepage2.html.[return]
Anna Malpas, “Russia, Japan Vow New Push to end Islands Dispute,” AFP news, 29 April 2013 http://ph.news.yahoo.com/japan-pm-set-putin-talks-062842025.html.[return]
Colonel K.Y., interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 14 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC., hereafter K.Y. interview. [return]
MSG Roger H. McSweep*, interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 15 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC., hereafter McSweep* interview. The 18X program allowed recruits to enlist into SF and attend SF selection after basic combat training and advanced individual training. It is commonly called the ‘X-Ray’ program.[return]
K.Y. interview; SSG Wilson S. Segar*, interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 14 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC., hereafter Segar* interview. [return]
McSweep* interview. On 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred off the east coast of Honshu, Japan. According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) the earthquake and resulting tsunami resulted in “at least 15,703 people killed, 4,647 missing, 5,314 injured, 130,927 displaced and at least 332,395 buildings, 2,126 roads, 56 bridges and 26 railways destroyed or damaged by the earthquake and tsunami along the entire east coast of Honshu from Chiba to Aomori.” See “Magnitude 9.0-NEAR THE EAST COAST OF HONSHU. JAPAN,” http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2011/usc0001xgp/#summary.[return]
SSG Thomas Sofa*, interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 13 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC., hereafter Sofa interview; SFC Bill J. Macks*, interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 14 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC., hereafter Macks interview. [return]
SFC Samuel Tinker*, interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 13 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
SGT Brady K. O’Malley*, interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 16 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter O’Malley interview. The MFF qualified rigger had more high altitude jumps than even the most-experienced jumpers in the SFGp contingent.[return]
SGT James K. Guinness*, interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 16 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Guinness interview.[return]
Japan has severe controls on firearms ownership, meaning that unlike many U.S. soldiers, the Japanese do not grow up with a familiarity with firearms.[return]
That is when the ODA then found out that then-Vice President Joseph R. Biden was coming to Oahu, which led to Temporary Flight Restrictions, further hampering MFF training. McSweep* interview. [return]
Captain I.S., interview by Troy J. Sacquety, 14 September 2011, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
Additionally, the SFGp established a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to oversee the entire operation SFGp Mission brief, 13 September 2011, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Richard Goldstein, “Kazuo Sakamaki, 81, Pacific P.O.W. No.1,” The New York Times, 21 December 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/21/world/kazuo-sakamaki-81-pacific-pow-no-1.html. [return]
Nike missiles were an air defense system employed from the 1950s to the 1970s.[return]